Faculty Expert Panel
Posted on 2026-03-27
Faculty Expert Panel is an initiative taken by faculty members in MA in International Relations and Eastern Mediterranean Studies (Department of Politics and Governance/School of Law, University of Nicosia) and the Cyprus Review, aiming to provide concise, accessible expert framing for the public. Each faculty member/associate were asked to provide short replies to maximum three (3) out of totally seven (7) questions on the war in the Middle East, depending on their expertise.
The views expressed below are those of the individual contributors and do not represent an official position of the University of Nicosia or the Cyprus Review. Responses are dated and reflect information available at the time of writing; assessments may change as facts develop.
Our contributors:
Dr Thomas-Nektarios Papanastasiou
Dr Themistoklis Tzimas
1) Nature of the conflict:
How should we characterise the war at this stage (type of conflict, drivers, and what makes it distinct from earlier Iran-related crises)?
Dr Michalis Kontos (14 March 2026):
“Beginning in late February 2026, the conflict has become an extensive air and missile campaign undertaken by the US and Israel against the Islamic Republic of Iran, with horizontal escalation into Gulf bases and critical infrastructure as Iran retaliates. Drivers stack across time: a long-run identity and legitimacy struggle rooted in Israel’s establishment and the unresolved Palestinian question, sustaining a civilizational framing in regional politics; a mid-run balance-of-threat dynamic as Iran’s ‘axis of resistance,’ ballistic missile reach, and nuclear ambitions, plus declared hostile intent, intensify Israel’s perceived threat; and a short-run trigger chain from October 7, 2023 through Gaza and Lebanon and the June 2025 strikes that reportedly weakened Iranian air defenses. What is distinct is the move from episodic proxy and covert contests (the so-called ‘campaign between wars’) to sustained, overt US participation and region-wide blowback, including attacks on Gulf states and disruption of the Strait of Hormuz, dragging Washington back to deep military engagement in the MIddle East (contrary to NSS 2025 declarations). This is a conflict provoked by (and further feeding) a classic security-dilemma escalation spiral”.
Dr Nikolaos Stelgias (20 March 2026):
“This is an act of aggression against a sovereign state. Whatever Tehran's nuclear ambitions or human-rights record, the US and Iran were actively negotiating — with Omani mediation — hours before the strikes began. Washington, with Israeli backing, abruptly terminated diplomacy and launched a decapitation campaign against the Islamic Republic. To legitimise an operation lacking UN Security Council authorisation, the administration invoked the claim that Iran was on the verge of acquiring a nuclear weapon — an assertion unsupported by IAEA findings and eerily reminiscent of the fabricated pretexts for the 2003 invasion of Iraq. The drivers of escalation are addressed below, but the conflict's distinctiveness lies in its scope: this is not a contained proxy confrontation or a limited strike exchange. It has already generated deep security, economic and diplomatic repercussions across a remarkably wide arc of states, from the Gulf to the Eastern Mediterranean”.
2) Belligerents’ goals:
What are the key political and military objectives of the main belligerents, and what would “success” look like for each?
Dr Thomas-Nektarios Papanastasiou (13 March 2026):
“The political and military objectives of the United States and Israel are not always fully aligned or clearly defined. This partly reflects shifting political messaging in Washington and partly the different strategic pressures facing the two allies. From a U.S. perspective, success would likely mean significantly degrading Iran’s nuclear program and weakening the regime’s capacity to pursue nuclear weapons or sustain destabilizing regional activities. Achieving these goals without becoming deeply involved in a prolonged regional war would allow Washington to present the operation as strategically successful.
For Israel, however, the stakes are more existential. Israeli security doctrine has long viewed Iran as a major long-term threat. As a result, success would probably require more than damaging Iran’s nuclear infrastructure. It would involve weakening Iran’s broader military capabilities and its ability to project power through regional proxies.
For Iran, which faces a clear military disadvantage towards the United States and Israel, success would likely mean regime survival and the ability to impose strategic costs on its adversaries. One possible lever would be disrupting energy flows through the Strait of Hormuz, driving up global energy prices and raising the economic and political costs of a prolonged military campaign”.
Dr Themistoklis Tzimas (13 March 2026):
“The major issue in the present war is that the objectives of the belligerents are not clear and achievable, except at enormous cost, especially to those who started the conflict. They are thus dragged into an all-out, total war for which they remain unprepared. In fact, there may be different goals between the US and Israel, at least in terms of this, specific, military operation and at the time of its launch. For Israel, the goal is regime change in Iran, the fragmentation of the country and therefore the control of West Asia. For the US, it seems that this is also the strategic goal, but it is doubtful whether it was in terms of this particular military campaign. Although the US has the same strategic pursuit, this military operation began with the pursuit of a spectacular Venezuelan-style success with a rapid change in the balance of power within the Iranian regime. Now it seems that the US is being dragged into trying to achieve its strategic goal through the military operation, which may require ‘boots on the ground’ or even the use of a nuclear weapon. For Iran, the goal is its survival and the cancellation of the role of the US as the protector power of the Arab states in the region, in order to limit or even cancel the power of the US and Israel in the region through chain effects, pushing the two countries into a phase of historical retreat”.
Dr Stavros Drakoularakos (15 March 2026):
“For the US, success seems intricately connected with the appointment of an approved Iranian leadership, willing to bow to all conditions related to the nuclear program and future relations. Whether future Iran will be a continuation of the regime or another altogether is not a priority. Success remains paramount to justify the operation’s cost in blood and treasure. For Israel, neutralising Iranian military infrastructure and administration for the foreseeable future seems the order of the day. In other words, any future version of Iran will need to be neutered or unable to get its house in order for retaliation, threats, or support of non-state actors against Israel. For Iran, success means both ensuring state survival as well as demonstrating that its counterstrategy of decentralisation and second-strike capability against US intervention – akin to the one in Iraq – works. If successful, then Iran would stand at the very least as a symbolic bulwark against US laissez-faire”.
Prof. Hubert Faustmann (15 March 2026):
“Despite the confusion surrounding the reasons why the United States joined Israel in its attack on Iran, the stated war objective remains regime change—an outcome unlikely to be achieved without the deployment of ground troops. For Netanyahu, who has a domestic agenda in which the war enhances his chances of re-election and avoiding trial, any weakening of Iran and Hezbollah in Lebanon is welcome. Netanyahu can live with a destabilized Iran and chaos in Lebanon following the path of Libya, Syria, or Iraq after military interventions, as such instability would prevent Iran from posing a threat to Israel and would allow repeated interventions to fight the remnants of Hezbollah or use proxies for the same purpose.
Increasingly, the destabilization of neighbouring states that could threaten Israel appears to be its broader regional strategy. For Israel, therefore, almost any outcome can be framed as a success: even a severe weakening of Iran’s military infrastructure and capabilities, short of regime change, could be presented as a victory.
For the Trump administration, however, the potential failure to achieve regime change and the possible destabilisation of the Gulf region would still need to be portrayed as a success—something Trump is comfortable doing, though it would require a degree of fact twisting that even he might find challenging. Alternatively, being drawn into a potential ‘forever war’ in the run-up to the midterm elections risks becoming a heavy millstone around the neck of the Republicans and Trump in particular. The danger is that the United States may be compelled to deploy ground troops either to end the war or to secure the Strait of Hormuz, a move that could fundamentally alter the nature of the conflict.
For the Iranian regime, mere survival constitutes victory”.
Dr Nikolaos Stelgias (20 March 2026):
“For the Islamic Republic, survival is the overriding imperative. Tehran's strategy is to decentralise its already weakened state apparatus, absorb the blow, and inflict maximum cost — dragging Gulf stability, Israeli security, the US military posture, and the global economy into prolonged turbulence. For Israel, two outcomes would satisfy the ruling right-wing coalition: outright regime collapse, ideally replaced by a transitional authority steered by the exiled Crown Prince, or a drastically weakened and forcibly decentralised Iran stripped of strategic reach. For Washington, the picture remains opaque. Presidential messaging has been inconsistent, and it is unclear whether the destruction of Iran's nuclear and missile programmes alone would suffice for the Trump administration to return to negotiations — or whether the unstated objective is regime change by attrition. This ambiguity is itself a destabilising factor, as it forecloses diplomatic off-ramps”.
3) Escalation and de-escalation:
What are the most plausible escalation pathways, and what realistic de-escalation mechanism could emerge?
Dr Themistoklis Tzimas (13 March 2026):
“The escalation results from the failure of the US and Israel to achieve a quick change in the correlation of forces within the Iranian regime or even the regime itself. The inability of the US and Israel to subdue Iran, i.e. non-victory, turns into a defeat as a product of time. A defeat of the two states could mean the collapse of their regional security system, as well as their possible inability to control any thought by Iran of acquiring nuclear weapons. The path to escalation has to do with bombing of oil facilities on both sides, a land invasion or even the use of a nuclear weapon by the US and Israel, which will probably be followed by a strike on Dimona or even the acquisition in some way, of a corresponding nuclear weapon on the part of Iran. De-escalation can come from mutual exhaustion as well as from an internal political defeat of Trump or fear of it”.
Dr Michalis Kontos (14 March 2026):
“Escalation and de-escalation hinge on two central variables: the Iranian regime’s endurance (political cohesion, societal resilience, residual strike capacity) and how far Washington and Jerusalem define ‘success’. Further horizontal, geographic expansion in the region is less likely because Iran has already demonstrated reach across the Gulf and beyond; Vertical escalation remains plausible: an Israeli advance deeper into Lebanon; a sharp rise in civilian casualties from misidentification or deliberate pressure in dense areas; a US ground operation; and a low-probability, high-impact WMD contingency. Although President Trump demands Iran’s unconditional surrender, a realistic off-ramp could be a mediated freeze-for-freeze, especially in case the conflict reaches a zero-sum-game deadlock (which would be “sold” by the belligerents according to each one’s interests). However, the eruption of a new round of violence in the near future cannot be rulled out, especially if the Iranian regime retains its curren anti-Zionist posture and resumes activity perceived by Israel as existential threat. As exemplified by the 12-day war and its outcomes’ interpretation by Israel and the United States, a militarily weakened but still radically anti-Israeli Iranian regime serves as an invitation to further Israeli and US aggression”.
4) Regional security and broader societal implications:
How is the war reshaping Gulf security architecture and broader Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean Alignments? How could it affect routine societal functions in the broader region?
Dr Petros Petrikkos (13 March 2026):
“The war is greatly disruptive on society, particularly due to the sense of insecurity and anxiety emerging from the limitations of governments to effectively communicate their response to its citizens, thereby causing direct damage to civilian infrastructure, crippling economic activity, and creating a profound sense of fear and insecurity. Limited capabilities (such as ineffective or poor use of critical infrastructure, an absence of effective warning systems) and conflicting information present in the media shape societal insecurity, particularly in countries where allied military bases (US, UK, and so on) are located, due to the fear of retaliatory strikes targeting civilian infrastructure instead of military infrastructure. Certain media narratives also appear to be distorted and/or exaggerated, for instance, in terms of the direct effect of the war on regional countries. Flight cancellations and additional restrictions also have a negative impact on the tourism sector of countries in the Eastern Mediterranean, as well as countries in the Gulf, generating financial insecurity to countries depending on seasonal tourism. Finally, the conflict poses a risk of creating major population displacement, with millions of refugees or migrants potentially requiring aid and creating strain on neighboring countries and international efforts. All the above contribute to disruptions in routine societal functions.”
Dr Stavros Drakoularakos (16 March 2026):
“The US-Israel-Iran war might put the final nail on the coffin of the ‘axis of resistance’ which had – to an extent – come undone since the fall of Assad’s Syria. At the same time, the war might call for further entrenchment of Russian and Chinese interests in the region, effectively retriggering great power competition in the Middle East. Besides the Shanghai Cooperation Organisation and BRICS+, China hosts a number of fora and promotes initiatives which include Arab and Middle Eastern countries. Energy security remains paramount for China’s standing in the international order. In this regard, besides Iran, China had invested in partnerships with Gulf countries in order to guarantee continuous access for its energy needs. At the same time, Gulf countries may view their security jeopardised due to the volatility of US foreign policy. Hence, this situation may provide the necessary momentum for balancing with the further development of ties with China or Russia”.
5) Cyprus:
What are the most direct implications for Cyprus (security, diplomacy, economy), and what should be the top policy priorities?
Dr Petros Petrikkos:
“In terms of the appropriate level of response, the Republic of Cyprus has exhibited substantial inefficiencies, limited infrastructural support, poor communication tactics, and ultimately, ineffective allocation of resources to tackle insecurity and material strains on Cypriot society and the state, both directly and indirectly. In terms of critical infrastructure, the government had failed to fully implement an effective warning system via the European Electronic Communications Code (Directive (EU) 2018/1972). While it did test SMS warnings, the method is archaic and is under criticism due to the system overloading and failing to distribute messages in a timely manner to all citizens. In terms of diplomacy, the Republic has taken advantage of its status as Presidency of the Council of the EU, to effectively draw attention to the war and how this may negatively transform key EU policies and priorities. In terms of the economy, Cypriot society will likely suffer due to increased oil prices, but also more indirectly, with general inflation on basic goods and services.”
Prof. Hubert Faustmann (15 March 2026):
“For Cyprus, the attacks on the British Sovereign Base Areas came as a shock, temporarily undermining the island’s sense of security as the ‘eye of the storm’ in regional developments. Although the Republic of Cyprus itself was not attacked, the public shock, the blow to the tourism sector, and the global perception that life on the island had suddenly become dangerous—suggesting Cyprus could be targeted—caused considerable short‑term harm to its reputation as a safe place to live, work, study and spend your holidays.
The expressions of solidarity from key EU member states provided important reassurance. Still, the counter‑narrative—that only the British bases were targeted and not the rest of the island—will take time to prevail, assuming no further attacks occur. Much will depend on the frequency and severity of any future strikes directed toward the island. The absence of further attacks would gradually restore both the perception and narrative of security. Conversely, any hit outside the bases would significantly alter both the threat perception and the lived reality of the conflict for Cypriots.
Currently, in an ironic twist of history, the air force and defence capabilities of the three Guarantor Powers—Greece, Turkey, and the United Kingdom—are contributing to the island’s protection, as originally envisaged in the Treaty of Alliance, albeit in a very different context. For the first time, an increase in the Turkish military presence has actually enhanced the security of Greek Cypriots, even if many do not perceive it as such. Equally ironic is the fact that the EU is effectively helping to safeguard the military installations of a former member state”.
Dr Nikolaos Stelgias (20 March 2026):
“The implications are immediate and structural. Security-wise, the role of the British Sovereign Base Areas is already under scrutiny — a development that touches directly on the foundation treaties of the Republic. Simultaneously, the island is undergoing de facto militarisation on both sides: the deployment of Turkish F-16s to the north is neither routine nor temporary. Ankara is pursuing a new strategic logic, coupling the aircraft with planned radar installations and expanded base infrastructure to construct an altered security paradigm on the island — one that inevitably re-securitises the Cyprus issue itself. The island’s internationally recognised government is attempting to balance these pressures while maintaining close alignment with the EU and Western allies, a task complicated by the war's broader destabilisation of Eastern Mediterranean security architectures. Economically, tourism — the most exposed sector — is already absorbing the shock, with mounting cancellations signalling a difficult season ahead”.
6) EU strategic autonomy:
What does the war reveal about EU strategic autonomy (defence readiness, energy resilience, crisis response, sanctions capacity), and what should change?
Dr Thomas-Nektarios Papanastasiou (13 March 2026):
“For several years, especially since the outbreak of the war in Ukraine, the EU has increasingly recognized the need to address external security threats and strengthen its strategic autonomy. Yet it still lacks a coherent political and legal framework for a truly integrated common defence and security policy. The recent crisis involving Cyprus, an EU member state exposed to external security risks, illustrates this structural gap.
At the same time, the swift reaction of several European partners—initially Greece and subsequently France, Spain, and Italy through the deployment of naval and air assets—demonstrates both the willingness and the operational capacity of certain member states to act collectively.
Whether this cooperation eventually develops into a formal EU institutional mechanism or remains a regional arrangement operating within the broader framework of EU cooperation, it could become a valuable strategic asset. In either case, strengthening such coordinated responses would enhance both Cyprus’ security and the EU’s broader capacity to manage crises in its neighbourhood”.
Dr Petros Petrikkos (13 March 2026):
“The EU itself has called for effective action against these developments. Certain member-states have expressed great dissatisfaction with allies like the United States and Israel, with the example of Spain being more reactive against both countries, both in terms of cooperation, as well as in terms of diplomatic ties. Other EU member-states like the Netherlands have also notably, through their intelligence community, warned against Israeli influence operations within the EU, to push pro-Israeli and pro-war narratives on a societal scale. While the EU has committed to stronger strategic autonomy, the EU as a case presents a fractured response, which prevents it from effective readiness and in implementing crisis response mechanisms it theoretically committed itself in via its Strategic Compass and the CSDP, while it remains preoccupied in countering Russian influence and disinformation operations in Europe in relation to the full-scale war in Ukraine. Ultimately, this shows limited preparedness and capacity against multiple geopolitical tensions”.
Dr Themistoklis Tzimas (13 March 2026):
“The war in Iran is another test for the EU, which seems unable to keep up with the needs of the times. Given its policy towards Russia, it will be one of the big losers, in terms of its economies, from the rise in oil prices and the difficulty of its trade, let alone from the secondary effects of these events. At the level of international diplomacy and international law, it cannot gain any credibility due to its identification with the USA and Israel. As far as its military competence is concerned, the accumulation of forces around Cyprus proves that it has neither the readiness nor the political will for a more active and lasting international political role. It can hardly (perhaps) protect a member state for a certain, limited period of time. Having been cut off from Iran due to its satellite relationship with the US, it is not a reliable mediator to de-escalate the situation, while it is quite likely that the internal political stability of major member states will be affected, if the war continues for a long time”.
Prof. Hubert Faustmann (15 March 2026):
“The war reveals both the potential and the limits of EU strategic autonomy across defence readiness, energy resilience, crisis response, and sanctions capacity. Symbolically, the EU gained an inexpensive opportunity to demonstrate its ability to act—even with elements of hard power—while facing relatively low risk of being drawn directly into the conflict, largely because the attacks focused on the British bases in Cyprus rather than the Republic itself.
By contrast, the current effort by the Trump administration to involve the EU in securing the Strait of Hormuz is far more dangerous from a European perspective, and the EU is likely to avoid taking on such a role. Many EU member states, including Germany, remain unprepared for any large-scale conflict, but the present crisis is unlikely to drag the EU into direct confrontation.
Nonetheless, the war serves as yet another catalyst accelerating the transformation of US–European relations and reinforcing Europe’s perceived need to develop the capacity to stand militarily on its own feet. Macron welcomes this shift, Germany is gradually warming to the idea, and other member states—either already convinced or increasingly persuaded—are moving in the same direction”.
7) International system:
What are the most consequential implications for the international system (norms, institutions, non-proliferation, great-power competition)?
Dr Thomas-Nektarios Papanastasiou (13 March 2026):
“Οne of the most significant implications of the current conflict for the international system concerns the gradual erosion of the legal framework governing the use of force. The UN Charter established a relatively clear order: Article 2(4) prohibits the use of force, while the only recognized exceptions are either a) authorization by the UN Security Council or b) the exercise of the inherent right of individual or collective self-defence under Article 51 following an armed attack.
In recent years, however, states have increasingly relied on broader and more contested interpretations of self-defence, including concepts such as preventive self-defence. This trend risks blurring the line between lawful defence and unlawful use of force. If such interpretations become normalized, the authority of the UN Charter may gradually weaken, potentially opening a ‘Pandora’s box’ for revisionist states around the world to justify military action under similarly expansive readings of self-defence”.
Dr Michalis Kontos (14 March 2026):
“Since the early 2010s the international system has been transitional: the ‘unipolar moment’ has faded, yet no new polarity has consolidated. Instead of a readable structure we see ongoing systemic reshuffling that heightens instability, rewards risk-taking, and widens power deficits and spirals in contested regions. Two accelerators are China’s rapid advance, now widely seen in Washington as the principal competitor, and the erosion of the rules-based order. The current Middle East war fits this setting. After 2011, rivals tested the margins of US commitments while building influence through military pressure (Russia in its near abroad), infrastructure and finance (China across regions), and proxy networks (Iran in the Middle East). Washington’s renewed engagement in the Middle East recalls Ronald Reagan’s early 1980s call to overcome the ‘Vietnam syndrome’ in response to the Soviet invasion in Afghanistan and developments in Nicaragua, but the power trend is reversed: then the US rose as the USSR declined; today China gains while US primacy is contested, shaping different scenarios”.
Dr Stavros Drakoularakos (15 March 2026):
“The most prevalent implication for the international order is certainly the complete disregard of both its Westphalian and Western liberal aspects by its main architect. Although the international order has witnessed its fair share of interventions in recent decades, they were cloaked or argued under the auspices of humanitarian intervention, the fight against terrorism or the threat of imminent offensive war. In this particular instance, any pretence was overshadowed by the openly publicised desire to further state regional security interests. As a result, the utter lack of following jus ante bellum and jus in bello paves the way for other states to take a page from the Trump playbook. In other words, the international order seems on the brink of reverting to the state of the interwar era, with states openly defying international law and institutions, while moving forward with their perceived rights or obligations”.