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Burak Erkut

Abstract

The Turkish Cypriot elections in December 2003 ended with no single political party attaining an absolute majority of seats, whereupon both supporters and opponents of the Annan Plan were each represented with 25 Members of Parliament (MPs), leading to a hung parliament. The aim of this study is to understand the outside options of parties in this hung parliament setup, and identify who were the winners and losers of the formed coalition and the alternative possible coalitions. The methods chosen to evaluate the possibilities are the Shapley–Shubik Power Index and the Casajus Value, which enable a quantification of negotiation power of parties by means of outside options. The results show that the Democratic Party (DP) is the real winner of the coalition. Outside options explains why the National Unity Party (UBP) preferred not to join a coalition with the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and how the Peace and Democracy Movement’s (BDH’s) unwillingness to join a coalition with the DP and the CTP seemed to be a wrong decision. Moreover, outside options illuminates on how the CTP’s power would be reduced in a grand coalition suggested by President Denktash. This study forms a new and original contribution to the literature on the Annan Plan and the Cyprus dispute, providing a better understanding of the political conditions prior to the referendum by using cooperative game theory.

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Keywords

outside options, hung parliament, Cyprus dispute, Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriot politics, cooperative game theory, coalitions analysis

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