British Policy Towards Cyprus, 1960 - 1974: A Tale of Failure or Impotence?

Abstract

Upon Cypriot independence, in 1960, the British were relieved about having a  troublesome  policy issue out of the way. Their reaction was to relax and -  in the eyes of U.S. officials -  not to be overly concerned about either the Communist danger or the intercommunal problems on the island. The Americans were thus injected into the limelight of Cyprus diplomacy as a consequence of British withdrawal from their role as Western security interest guard in early 1964, leaving the U.K. on the sidelines. At least the U.S. diplomats could usually count on British moral support in their attempts to solve the Cyprus issue, including support for some of their conspiratorial schemes in 1964. Only after the Greek coup d_'etat on Cyprus, in July 1974, were the British pushed back into Frontline diplomacy by their status as a Guarantor Power. The different policy parameters produced sharp disagreements between the U.S. and the British. At the end, the two blamed each other for having failed to prevent the Turkish invasion.