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Andreas Constandinos

Abstract

Government documents from the British and American National Archives, currently within the public domain, have provided a revealing insight into Whitehall’s and Washington’s objectives in relation to the geopolitically strategic island of Cyprus. Whilst many continue to argue in favour of a Western conspiracy to overthrow President Makarios and divide the island in the summerof 1974, British and American governments’ documents suggest that whilst the American intelligence community’s role in the coup against Archbishop Makarios remains nebulous, any possible suggestion of collusion, whether British and/or American, with Turkey in its subsequent invasion, can now be largely dismissed.


This article looks at the history of US and British policy on Cyprus from 1964-1974, by  examining the crucial way in which Whitehall allowed its foreign policy vis-à-vis Cyprus to become influenced by decision-makers in Washington, and the role played by the two countries in the infamous and ultimately tragic summer of 1974.

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Keywords

Britain, America, Cyprus, Makarios, Callaghan, Kissinger, Turkish Invation, 1974

References
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