

# THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

**Craig Webster and Alexandros Lordos**

Who Supported the Annan Plan?

An Exploratory Statistical Analysis of the Demographic, Political, and Attitudinal Correlates

**Nicos Trimikliniotis**

A Communist's Post-Modern Power Dilemma: One Step Back,  
Two Steps Forward, "Soft No" and Hard Choices ...

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Towards a 'European Solution' of the Cyprus Problem: False Promise or Real Opportunity?

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Practical Agency through Uncertain Identities

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Cyprus Books: *The Greek Gift: politics in a changing Cypriot village* (Oxford: Blackwell, 1975); *The Heart Grown Bitter: a chronicle of Cypriot war refugees* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1981). His collected essays on Cyprus were published under the title *Unofficial Views: Cyprus politics and society*, by Intercollege Press, Nicosia in 2000, and *Grace in Exile: the people from Argaki* [a collection of documentary photographs] was published by Moufflon, Nicosia in 2003. His other books include: *Choosing Research Methods* (with Brian Pratt) (Oxfam); *Innovation in Ethnographic Film* (Chicago/Manchester); *Conceiving Persons: ethnographies of procreation, fertility and growth* (LSE) (with Patrick Heady); *Contested Identities: gender and kinship in Modern Greece* (Princeton) (with Evthymios Papataxiarchis).

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# Articles

**VOLUME 18**  

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# **WHO SUPPORTED THE ANNAN PLAN? AN EXPLORATORY STATISTICAL ANALYSIS OF THE DEMOGRAPHIC, POLITICAL, AND ATTITUDINAL CORRELATES**

**Craig Webster and Alexandros Lordos**

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## **Abstract**

In April 2004, the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities voted on the Annan Plan in simultaneously held referenda. The Annan Plan was a UN-sponsored plan to reunite the divided island of Cyprus under one federal government. The majority of the Greek-Cypriot electorate did not vote in support of the Plan while the majority of the Turkish-Cypriot electorate did. While the Annan Plan was not put into action, many of the factors which influenced voting patterns on both sides of the Green Line will most likely remain relevant in defining public attitudes towards future plans to re-unite Cyprus. In this work, the authors delve into the demographic, political, and attitudinal factors linked with support for the Annan Plan, using public opinion surveys of large numbers of residents in Cyprus.

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In April 2004, the two communities of Cyprus voted on a referendum to decide whether they would accept or reject the UN-sponsored Annan Plan. The aim of the Plan was to unite the island's two major communities under one federal umbrella. The majority of the Turkish Cypriots (65 per cent) voted to accept the Plan while the majority of the Greek Cypriots (76 per cent) voted to reject it. Despite being rejected, the Annan Plan and its protocols continue to fuel debate regarding the search for a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Whatever form or shape the future solution plan takes, whether it utilises the Annan Plan as the basis of negotiations or simply as one reference point among others, the public's views on the Plan should not escape our attention. Such insight will surely be relevant in our search to define a settlement that will be acceptable to both communities on the island. Thus, it is necessary to explore the attitudes and demographics that are linked with support for it.

The following analysis is an investigation into what is linked with the support for the Annan Plan among the two major communities on the island. Others (Attalides, 2004; Bahcheli, 2004; Coufoudakis, 2004; Heraclides, 2004; Jakobsson-Hatay,

2004a, 2004b; Lordos, 2004, 2005a, 2005b) have conducted post-mortems of the Plan and proffered reasons as to why there were significant differences in how the electorates on the island voted on the issue. Few analyses have, however, delved into the statistical correlates to test whether assertions of the hypotheses linked with the support for the Plan are true or not. In this work, we shall not explore the normative aspects of the Annan Plan, the international dimensions of the Cyprus Problem, or the specific weaknesses and strengths of the plan. Instead, this paper will focus on the public opinion aspect of the Plan in order to determine which demographic, political, and attitudinal factors seem to be playing a role in shaping the voters' impressions of it. The hope is that the findings of this work will shed some light onto the political sociology of the politics of reunification amongst the electorate.

This paper, to a large extent, is a response to Coufoudakis (2004, p. 77) who argues that analysts of the Cyprus Problem should recognise that there are variations of opinion within each of the major ethnic groups. This investigation is thus a move away from the positioned approach of previous research, which generally views political viewpoints to be merely determined by nationality. Indeed, the vote on the Annan Plan shows that neither of the ethnic groups voting on the island did so in monolithic blocks.

### **Previous Works**

There is a voluminous amount of literature written about the politics of Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem (see for example, Attalides, 1979; Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999; Joseph, 1997, 1999; Kyriakou, 2000; O'Malley and Craig, 1999; Peristianis, 1998; Richmond, 1999, 2001, 2002; Stravrinides, 1975; Theophanous, 1996, 2000). What is notable about the vast majority of the literature is that it largely reflects what has been referred to as a "positioned approach" to the Cyprus Problem (Demetriou, 2004). The positioned approach starts with the notion that the major ethnicities on the island have a particular position in the Cyprus Problem. Most of these approaches thus view strategic political decisions as being largely a reflection of the particular ethnicity's position in the Cyprus Problem. Each ethnicity, therefore, tends more or less to be viewed as a monolith with political figures and institutions merely reflecting the desires of the constituent ethnicity. There are a number of recent works that have broken with this tradition although the vast majority of the works written on the topic of the Cyprus Problem tend to view the conflict through the narrative of "ethnicities as rational actors", thus simplifying the social and political diversity of the societies on each side of the Green Line.

It is also notable from the preponderance of literature written on the Cyprus Problem that there is a lack of quantitative evidence unveiled to support the research. The literature generally concentrates on the Cyprus Problem and the



ethnic conflict on the island tends to be theoretical and prescriptive. Thus, there is little insight gained from new findings and new data that would contradict the researchers' expectations. There are some exceptions to this (Webster, 2005a, 2005b; Lordos, 2004, 2005a, 2005b) but in the main the works tend to be theoretical and do not burrow into testing the empirical truths behind the Cyprus conflict.

Since the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, there have been a number of works that have provided post-mortems on the vote and some speculation has been made as to what might happen in the future. One of the first articles to emerge, by Attalides (2004), addresses, among other things, some of the reasons for the negative vote from the Greek-Cypriot community. In this work, Attalides records the campaigns in Cyprus prior to the Annan Plan referendum and the dynamics that led to a 'no' vote by the Greek-Cypriot population. In many ways the work of Attalides is similar to that of Jakobsson Hatay (2004a and 2004b) in that both view the outcome of the vote as the product of too short a period of time in which the electorates were asked to decide how to cast their vote on the Plan, only weeks after it was finalised. During this period the political parties in Greek Cyprus experienced difficulties in terms of forming an opinion of the plan while the media tended to emphasise those aspects of it that Greek Cypriots would find problematic. Both authors analyse the campaign in a similar way, although Jakobsson Hatay delves a little further into the political situation among the Turkish-Cypriot community while Attalides deals almost exclusively with the Greek-Cypriot community, as does Heraclides (2004).

One of the most intriguing aspects arising from Jakobsson Hatay's (2004b) analysis is her argument that age is one of the key drivers of positions on the Annan Plan within the two communities. She argues that in Greek Cyprus the young are more likely to reject the Plan because they are more nationalistic and less likely to want to share political power and influence with non-members of their ethnic group. She also argues that for the Turkish-Cypriot community, the opposite is true – that the young Turkish-Cypriot population have not experienced the negative aspects of being an ethnic minority in a country dominated by a Greek-speaking and Greek Orthodox majority while the older generation have such experience and this has influenced support for the Annan Plan.

Coufoudakis (2004) added his weight to the debate regarding the Annan Plan and its aftermath by analysing both the Plan and the foreign involvement in the development of it and analysing the Greek-Cypriot public's reaction to it. He gives a full list (Coufoudakis, 2004, pp. 74-75) regarding the reasons why the Greek-Cypriot community rejected the Plan. Among the political reasons cited he says that the Annan Plan would infringe upon certain Cypriot human rights and result in the dissolution of the current republic which has been in existence since 1960. The fact

that the financial cost of unification would largely rest on the shoulders of the Greek-Cypriot population is also one notable economic reason for reticence. There is at any rate a substantial list of reasons why the Greek-Cypriot community rejected the Annan Plan, apart from the major political and economic reasons outlined.

A radically different view of the Annan Plan – in terms of methodology – is an econometric analysis of the views of the Greek-Cypriot population on their preferences for types of solution in Cyprus (Webster, 2005b). Webster (2005b) investigates Jakobsson Hatay's (2004b) assertion that there is a generational difference in views upon the desirability of reunification or continued division on the island. The major finding shows that the two variables tested that seem to play a role in shaping views regarding the desirability of unification, or continued division, are the ages of respondents and their views toward the ability of the two communities to coexist. Those Greek-Cypriot individuals who are younger tend to prefer division and those who do not feel that the two ethnicities on the island can coexist successfully are more likely to prefer a continued division.

In a similar fashion, Lordos (2004, 2005a, 2005b) has led an extensive effort to gain an understanding of the views of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities on the desirability of the Annan Plan and those aspects of a solution that would be necessary and agreeable to both populations. He has made available on his website ([www.cypruspolls.org](http://www.cypruspolls.org)), the findings of four major survey efforts on the island since the Annan Plan vote. This data-gathering effort has amassed a wealth of public opinion data assembled on topics linked with the Cyprus Problem and the Annan Plan. The story-telling that results from the data collected by Lordos gives insights into the changes that should be made to future versions of the UN Plan, in order for both communities to find a settlement which is acceptable.

While there is a great deal of theory about the Cyprus Problem and the Annan Plan, there has been little rigorous testing of data to assimilate what plays a role in terms of shaping opinions on the Plan. In this paper, we shall attempt to fill the void by investigating, via rigorous statistical testing, which things are linked with support for it. The hope is that by testing various propositions, we can determine those characteristics of the voters which influenced voting either for or against the Plan.

### **Data and Indicators**

In an independent research project, two surveys were completed just a few months following the Annan Plan plebiscite. The data were collected in order to study the opinions of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities following the Annan Plan referendum, with special emphasis on exploring possible amendments to the Plan that might render it mutually acceptable. It should be emphasised at this point

that the surveys were not originally designed with a view to developing a model to explain voters' behaviour at the referendum; thus, not all the variables that we might have wished to include in the current model were available in the database. This research is, therefore, based upon data containing large numbers of observations on both sides of the Green Line in Cyprus but there are some differences in the questions asked to both the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot sample since an econometric analysis and comparison of the communities was not originally intended. The timeframe in which the questionnaires went to field is an advantage, since awareness of the Annan Plan was probably at its height soon after the referendum, and there is some indication that elections create awareness of issues and lower the cost of information for citizens (Zaller, 1992), meaning that surveys taken near the time of the actual election or referendum may actually be more accurate than similar polls taken at other times.

Two leading market research firms in Cyprus were contracted to conduct the surveys in order to discover more about the views of the public on the Annan Plan and related issues. For the Greek-Cypriot community, Cymar Market Research Limited pledged to gather field research whilst KADEM was given the task of gathering the data for the Turkish-Cypriot community. Both of these organisations enjoy a good reputation in Cyprus and as a result, they have been assigned to carry out the Eurobarometer in Cyprus – the EU's polling tool.

Within each community on the island, research was handled in a slightly different way. Among the Greek-Cypriot community, Greek language interviews took place by telephone between the dates 1-15 September, 2004. Interviewing via the telephone is fairly common in the Republic of Cyprus-controlled areas on the island, since telephone access is almost universal. Interviewing via the telephone is an extremely cost-effective method of reaching a reasonably representative sample of the population quickly and efficiently. In order to study the Greek-Cypriot population and their views on the Annan Plan and related issues, 1,000 interviews were gathered using this inexpensive method which yielded a large sample.

To test whether the resulting Greek-Cypriot sample is representative, we can compare two key demographic measures against what is known from census figures detailing the island's population. Table one (p. 18) illustrates that this sample is very close to parameters used to describe the population. Thus, while the sample may contain a few more males than one would expect from the population, the differences are very minor indeed and suggest that the telephone interviews are generally representative of the population's gender mix and geographical spread.

**Table 1: The Structure of the Greek-Cypriot Sample and Population in per cent**

Males/Females – Sample	Male	Female			
	50%	50%			
Males/Females – Population	Male	Female			
	49%	51%			
District – Sample	Nicosia	Limassol	Larnaca	Famagusta	Paphos
	40%	28%	17%	5%	10%
District – Population	Nicosia	Limassol	Larnaca	Famagusta	Paphos
	40%	29%	17%	5%	10%

Based upon data from Cymar Market Research Limited and Cyprus 2001 Census. Census figures adjusted in 2004. Figures do not add to 100 due to rounding.

In terms of the data from the Turkish-Cypriot community, 700 face-to-face interviews were used to gather data during January 2005. Face-to-face interviews were adopted among the Turkish-speaking population of the island since telephone penetration in the Turkish-speaking parts of the island is not as comprehensive in comparison to accessibility in the Greek-speaking areas. Similar questions were asked of the Turkish-speaking population by KADEM and additional questions were raised, since the political situation among this community evokes dimensions that complicate the political situation and face-to-face exchange offered the opportunity for longer discussion than the telephone method.

It is difficult to determine whether the data from the Turkish-speaking interviews on the island is representative of the Turkish-speaking population since demographic data gathered from the political authorities is dubious and will frequently be contested. One figure that seems to stand out is the fact that about 69 per cent of the respondents to the survey are male, suggesting that males are over-represented in the sample. The favouring of males in the Turkish-Cypriot data could be a result of a real gender imbalance, a cultural factor which leads males to respond to enquiries on their doorstep, or just pure chance. According to feedback from interviewers in the field, males tended to insist on responding themselves in households because “political issues” are generally considered to be a male domain, while in a similar way females tended to demure to their husbands. This tendency was particularly strong in rural regions. Males are thus over-represented in this sample, although the females in such households probably vote following discussions with the male, so the political positions and attitudes recorded in the survey may actually reflect the consensus of a household on political issues.

Bivariate regressions using the gender of the respondent and voting on the Annan Plan indicate that there is no convincing evidence that gender had any impact upon voting for the Plan, thus the gender imbalance may not be a major

concern. At any rate, gender is taken into account in the analysis to ensure that this gender imbalance does not contort the results despite the fact that a bivariate test indicates no reason to believe that gender played any significant role in influencing the vote. Since a gender imbalance resulted from this highly political issue, future research should take into account the problem faced by this investigation. The outcome of the gender imbalance seems to be the effect of a cultural factor, as well as the lack of foresight by the researchers to put into place a quota to ensure that females were adequately represented in the sample.

The regions, from which interviews were taken, seem to suggest however, that the regional spread of interviews was reasonable, with about 35 per cent of interviews taking place in the Nicosia district (Lefkosa), 26 per cent in Famagusta (Magusa), and 17 per cent in Kyrenia (Girne). The other districts, Morfou (Guzelyurt) and Trikomo (Iskele) were represented in the sample with slightly over 10 per cent of the responses from each district. The regional spread of the canvass suggests that an increased number of interviews took place where the population was denser, given that Nicosia and Famagusta are the major cities in the region covered by KADEM. Indeed, KADEM used a similar frame when carrying out all its major research efforts among the Turkish-Cypriot sample, which resulted in the collection of data from districts being no different to Eurobarometers conducted within the same community.

There are some differences in the surveys in terms of the wording of questions and the types of questions asked, since the questionnaires were not intended to be compared directly. However, there is also a considerable overlap in the questions, the major difference being that the Turkish-Cypriot sample was asked additional questions pertaining to Islam, links with Turkey, and the length of time each family had lived in Cyprus. These are questions that would not be relevant to the Greek-Cypriot population. Furthermore, additional, questions were asked of the Turkish-Cypriot population because it was possible to raise more questions with respondents in face-to-face exchanges than during interviews taken over the telephone.

### **Support for the Annan Plan**

The dependent variable for this work is derived from questions that directly asked respondents how they had voted on the Annan Plan referendum. In the Turkish-Cypriot survey the respondents were asked, "How did you vote in last April's referendum?" In the Greek-Cypriot survey, the respondents were asked, "How did you vote in the referendum, 'yes' or 'no'?" There were some responses that did not fit into the yes/no categories, and these responses were either refusals to answer the question, "don't know" responses, or blank votes.

The responses to the question closely correlated with the responses to the referendum, as shown in Table two. For the Turkish-Cypriot population, the data indicate a nearly perfect reflection of the support in the voting at the April 2004 referendum, while the Greek-Cypriot figures depicting support are also very close to the actual figures in the voting. The responses to the support for the Annan Plan suggest that the sample is reasonably reflective of the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot populations in terms of their voting behaviour in the referendum.

**Table 2: Frequencies of Responses to Vote on Annan Plan**

	Yes	No	Others	Number of Interviews
Turkish-Cypriot sample	65%	32%	3%	702
Greek-Cypriot sample	27%	65%	7%	1000

Note: Figures do not add to 100 due to rounding.

For the purposes of this research, the data have been recoded to denote those who voted for the Annan Plan. All those who voted in favour of the Plan are denoted with a dummy variable. Those who did not vote for the Annan Plan are denoted with a zero, while other responses have been removed from the analysis. We now turn to explanatory variables that might help to explain the variations in the dependent variables in this research. It should once again be emphasised at this point that, in designing this model, we did not have absolute freedom to construct and define the independent variables in precisely the way we might have wished, based on theoretical considerations. Instead, we had no choice but to adapt our model to the data that was already available, a weakness that made itself particularly felt in the selection of the attitudinal variables. Normally in sociometric studies, an attitude (such as nationalism, social tolerance, political trust etc.) is quantified by first asking the respondent a battery of associated questions, and then constructing a suitable scale by summing up the various responses. Such a methodology was not available to us, though we did agglomerate similar attitudinal questions into encompassing scales, wherever it was theoretically sound to do so.

### **Independent Variables**

#### **Age**

One of the critical aspects to investigate in this work is the role that time has played in the development of perceptions of the Cyprus Problem and a solution. Jakobsson Hatay (2004b) argues that young Turkish Cypriots have grown up in isolation and that merging with the rest of the country is viewed as a positive development, bringing them out of a political wilderness to be part of a wealthier

economy. The older Turkish-Cypriot generation feel, however, that according to this logic, entering into a union with the Greek-Cypriot community raises the spectre of interethnic violence. Thus, the argument continues that: a) support for the Annan Plan among the Turkish-Cypriot community is likely to be influenced by different views of working and living with the Greek-Cypriot community, b) members of the older generation – remembering ethnic clashes and violence – are more likely to desire to continue the separation, and c) the younger Turkish-Cypriot population are more likely to view unification as an opportunity for their community to join a wealthier economy.

On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriot expectations could quite likely be different. Jakobsson Hatay (2004b) argued that the Greek-Cypriot youth are more likely to be against the Annan Plan while the older Greek-Cypriot generation support it. The reasoning is that the younger Greek-Cypriot population are more nationalistic which thus repels them from power sharing with the Turkish-Cypriot community. On the other hand, members of the older Greek-Cypriot generation might be more sympathetic towards a reunified island and support the Annan Plan, since this generation remembers a time when there was unification. According to Webster (2005b), these sentiments have been shown to have some empirical basis. Webster (2005b) found that in terms of preferences for unification or continued division, the age of the Greek-Cypriot respondent was one of the best predictors as to whether a person favoured continued division or political unification. The Greek-Cypriot young are more likely to favour division (whether a continuation of the status quo or a permanent division) and the older generation are more likely to favour unification (whether merely generic “unification” or federation).

Age is measured at the ordinal level in this work. In both questionnaires, the age of the respondent was an integral part of the generic demographic data gathered on each respondent. All respondents were aged eighteen years or older. In the Turkish-Cypriot data, age was placed upon a five-point scale with the highest category indicating those aged fifty-five years or over. In the Greek-Cypriot data, age was placed upon a six-point scale with the highest category indicating those aged sixty-five years or over. The expectation is that older Turkish-Cypriot respondents will be less likely to support the Annan Plan and that older Greek-Cypriot respondents will be more likely to support it.

#### Refugee Status

Refugee status should play a role in the support for the Annan Plan, since it was a concrete plan that would have enabled many to return to their homes according to a schedule. This should have been a major factor in the decision-making process, as support for the Plan was designed to solve the refugee problem and would have enabled many refugees to regain their land. In Cyprus, the question of land is

especially sensitive, since land is one of the major ways of investing and saving (Zetter, 1994). Thus, if refugees were acting as rational economic actors and they valued their land, refugees ought to show a statistical predilection for supporting the Annan Plan. In this analysis refugees are denoted with a dummy variable and are identified by self-description.

### Education

In the analysis the highest education level achieved is also a consideration as there may be some influence on attitudes. The socialisation that goes hand-in-hand with education may play a role in conditioning how people perceive political choices. In this research, the Greek-Cypriot sample were coded into a trichotomy into which the most educated (those with a tertiary education) were denoted with a “3” while those with only a primary school education or less were coded with a “1.” In a similar manner, the Turkish-Cypriot sample were coded into a four-point scale with “1” denoting the least educated and “4” denoting the most educated.

### Gender

Gender may also play a role in the formation of opinions regarding unification and the Annan Plan. In this work, males are denoted with a “1” as a dummy variable. Males and females may conceptualise the issue of the Plan differently because the demilitarisation of the island that the Plan would bring about, would engender contrasting implications for males and females including the end of compulsory military service.

### Party Preference

Since political parties play a major role in the formation of political opinion and because they are reflective of support for a particular worldview, there ought to be a link between party support and support for the Annan Plan. For this research the major political parties were, therefore, denoted with dummy variables. Among the Greek-Cypriot population, support for political parties was measured by how people claimed they had voted in the last parliamentary elections. The parties that are denoted as major parties are AKEL, DISY, DIKO, and EDEK. Among the Turkish-Cypriot population, party support was derived from how respondents claimed they had voted in the parliamentary elections of 2003. The resulting Turkish-Cypriot parties that were to be identified in the research are the UBP, CTP, DP, and BDH.

### Preferences for a Federation

Attitudes toward the Annan Plan may be merely a function of the support for the generic form of solution (federation) that was also presented to the public on both sides of the Green Line. Support for federation may thus be a leading explanatory variable to explain why some people supported the Plan while others did not. Support for a federative solution is measured on a ten-point Likert scale. On both sides of the Green Line, respondents were asked how much they supported a



bizonal-bicommunal federation. The highest score on this independent variable indicates that this is the ideal solution while zero marks this solution as entirely unacceptable. The data were recoded as a dummy variable to indicate those responses that were most in favour of federations (responses eight, nine, and ten). The recoding into a dummy variable was carried out in order to prevent a loss of observations, since about 5.4 per cent of the Turkish-Cypriot sample and 8.4 per cent of the Greek-Cypriot sample did not respond to the question.

#### Greek-Cypriot-specific Indicators

A battery of questions was raised to ascertain Greek-Cypriot attitudes toward Turkish Cypriots and the Cyprus Problem. Four social attitudes that are Greek-Cypriot-specific have been added to the analysis to determine the role of attitudes in shaping views on the Annan Plan. Responses ranged on a five-point Likert scale from “completely disagree” to “completely agree”. Higher scores indicate higher levels of agreement with the questions asked. One important concept to explore was the distrust of Turks. In order to examine this, responses to the statement “I could never trust a Turk” and “Turkish Cypriots are primarily after personal gain” were added together, creating an index ranging from two to ten. In a similar fashion, political radicalness was measured by summing the values of the responses to the question that the Cyprus Problem can only be solved with a war of liberation and, if it is not possible for all refugees to have the right of return, a solution is not wanted. Thus, two indexes were developed, one to measure the mistrust of Turks and Turkish Cypriots and another to measure the radical nature of the respondent’s beliefs.

In addition, a sense of commonality with the Turkish-Cypriot community was taken into account by studying the responses to the notion that Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities have much in common, as expressed on a five-point Likert Scale. Finally, a dummy variable was taken into consideration to measure the sense of urgency in solving the Cyprus Problem. Those respondents who believed the appropriate time to pursue a settlement was before December 2004 were denoted with a dummy variable. The expectations are that those who have a mistrust of Turks and Turkish Cypriots and those who are more radical in their political beliefs will be more likely to reject the Annan Plan. The expectation is, however, that those with a sense of commonality with the Turkish-Cypriot community and who feel that there is an urgency in solving the Cyprus Problem would be more likely to support the Plan.

#### Turkish-Cypriot-specific Indicators

There are several indicators that should be added to the analysis of the Turkish-Cypriot sample due to the availability of the data as well as the very different dimension of the ethnic clash on the island between the Turkish- and the Greek-Cypriot communities. The Turkish-Cypriot sample was asked a battery of questions

on a five-point Likert scale. One dimension to explore is the apprehension of the Greek-Cypriot community. This notion is revealed by summing the responses to levels of agreement to statements regarding whether “Greek Cypriots are murderers” and whether “Greek Cypriots will attempt to dominate us”. In addition, there is a measure of commonality with the Greek-Cypriot community, accessed by summing the extent of agreement to statements regarding whether “Greek Cypriots are brothers” and “Greek Cypriots are co-citizens”. Finally, there was a measure of the pro-Turkish orientation of the respondents, gathered by seeking responses as to whether “Turkey is in Cyprus to protect Turkish Cypriots” and whether the respondent “is happy to allow Turkey to guide Turkish-Cypriot policies”. The lower end of the scale (“1”) indicates total disagreement while the upper end of the scale (“5”) represents total agreement – summing these values created three indicators ranging from two to ten.

Finally, there is a need to separate the island’s natives from the more recent arrivals on the island. The Turkish-speaking respondents were, therefore, asked whether their parents were from Cyprus or elsewhere. The majority (68.9 per cent) claimed that their parents were both born in Cyprus while about 25 per cent reported that both of their parents were born in Turkey. Those who reported that their parents were both born in Turkey were denoted with a dummy variable to indicate that their families are of Turkish origin. We expect that those of mainland Turkish extraction will be less likely to support the Annan Plan.

### **Statistical Tests and Findings**

A Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach has been used for this investigation because the dependent variable is dichotomous. Binary logistic regression is used in this analysis to determine the probability of attaining a “1” – those supporting the Annan Plan. To simplify interpretation of the results, all the independent variables have been standardised so that the extent of their impact on the dependent variable can be compared. All independent variables are scaled from zero to one to allow for comparisons.

The ‘Enter’ method was used to determine the impact of the independent variables, although the independent variables were added into the equation in blocks. The first block entered into the equation is used to judge the extent to which demographic variables influenced voting. The second block includes the independent variable to measure generic support for a federal solution. The third block incorporates underlying attitudes toward the other community and the fourth block included political party supporters. By adding the variables in blocks, the impact of categories of variables (demographics, attitude toward federation, attitudes towards the “other” and political party support) can be measured.

Before running the regressions, however, bivariate correlations were run to determine the impact of collinearity in the regressions. In the Turkish-Cypriot data, these correlations produce no statistically significant value, that is, above the absolute value of  $r=.4$ , apart from the expected correlations between party supporters. In the Greek-Cypriot data, there are only two noteworthy statistically significant correlations, i.e. that between the political radicals and the mistrust of Turks ( $r=.454$ ), and that between age and educational levels ( $r=-.445$ ). Although there are a few other correlations below the  $r=.4$  range, there is little reason to believe that there is a major problem with collinearity in the dataset.

Table three (p. 26) shows the outcomes of the first three stages of the regressions for the Greek-Cypriot population. In each of the stages, the Chi-square statistic shows significant evidence that the model is superior to the null model. We see, however, that the first two models do not have much explanatory power when considering the pseudo-R-Square statistic (Naglekerke R Square). By this measure of the success of the model, it does not appear that the models with the demographic variables and support for federation have much explanatory value, apart from explaining the .045 per cent of the variation. The model does properly classify about 70 per cent of the variation in the first two stages, though it should be acknowledged that this is approximately what one would expect from the null model as well. The third stage of the model adds significantly to the analysis, making the pseudo R-Square statistic rocket from .045 to about .26 while it properly classifies about 77 per cent of the dependent variable. This highlights that the addition of attitudes towards the Turkish-Cypriot community and the urgency toward solving the Cyprus Problem adds a great deal to the explanatory value of the model.

**Table 3: Greek-Cypriot Sample – Outcome of Logistic Regressions (Stages 1-3)**

Stage	Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients	Chi-square	df	Sig.	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Stage 1	Step	26.209	4	.000						
	Block	26.209	4	.000						
	Model	26.209	4	.000						
	<b>Age</b>				<b>.571</b>	<b>.268</b>	<b>4.518</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.034</b>	<b>1.769</b>
	<b>Education</b>				<b>.778</b>	<b>.227</b>	<b>11.702</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>2.177</b>
	Males				.117	.151	.605	1	.437	1.124
	<b>Refugee</b>				<b>.539</b>	<b>.147</b>	<b>13.424</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.715</b>
	Constant				-1.974	.267	54.829	1	.000	.139
	Nagelkerke R Square				.04					
	% Properly classified				69.8					
	Stage 2	Step	3.404	1	.065					
Block		3.404	1	.065						
Model		29.614	5	.000						
<b>Age</b>					<b>.587</b>	<b>.269</b>	<b>4.748</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.029</b>	<b>1.798</b>
<b>Education</b>					<b>.751</b>	<b>.228</b>	<b>10.833</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>2.119</b>
Males					.081	.152	.283	1	.595	1.084
<b>Refugee</b>					<b>.542</b>	<b>.147</b>	<b>13.523</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>1.720</b>
<b>Federation Supporter</b>					<b>.306</b>	<b>.165</b>	<b>3.449</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.063</b>	<b>1.358</b>
Constant					-2.031	.269	56.846	1	.000	.131
Nagelkerke R Square					.045					
% Properly classified					70.8					
Stage 3	Step	155.893	4	.000						
	Block	155.893	4	.000						
	Model	185.507	9	.000						
	<b>Age</b>				<b>.126</b>	<b>.310</b>	<b>.167</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.683</b>	<b>1.135</b>
	<b>Education</b>				<b>.305</b>	<b>.253</b>	<b>1.457</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.227</b>	<b>1.356</b>
	Males				-.198	.170	1.362	1	.243	.820
	<b>Refugee</b>				<b>.488</b>	<b>.163</b>	<b>9.001</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>1.629</b>
	Federation Supporter				-.084	.183	.214	1	.644	.919
	<b>Mistrust of Turks</b>				<b>-1.228</b>	<b>.273</b>	<b>20.291</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.293</b>
	<b>Radical</b>				<b>-2.278</b>	<b>.363</b>	<b>39.327</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.102</b>
	Commonality with Turkish Cypriots				.243	.290	.702	1	.402	1.276
	Urgency				.977	.190	26.421	1	.000	2.656
	Constant				-.762	.433	3.096	1	.078	.467
Nagelkerke R Square				.259						
% Properly classified				76.9						

Finally, the full model shown in Table four illustrates that this model has greater explanatory value than the previous stages of the regressions. The Naglekerke R-Square value indicates that the model explains approximately .37 per cent of the variation while the model also classifies about 80 per cent of the dependent variables properly. What is interesting about this final model is that the independent variables that have explanatory value are attitudinal and political, with the exception of refugee status. The final model shows that refugees are more likely to support the Annan Plan, while those who mistrust Turks, or are “radical”, or are DIKO supporters, tend not to support it. Those, however, who view an urgency in solving the Cyprus Problem; who see a commonality with the Turkish-Cypriot community, and those who are DISY supporters, are more likely to support the Plan.

**Table 4: Greek-Cypriot Sample – Outcome of Logistic Regressions (Stage 4: Final Stage)**

Stage 4	Omnibus Tests of Model							
	Coefficients							
			<b>Chi-square</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>			
	Step	89.902		4	.000			
	Block	89.902		4	.000			
	Model	275.409		13	.000			
		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	
	Age	.140	.333	.178	1	.673	1.151	
	Education	.129	.270	.227	1	.634	1.137	
	Males	-.271	.181	2.234	1	.135	.762	
	<b>Refugee</b>	<b>.408</b>	<b>.175</b>	<b>5.469</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.019</b>	<b>1.504</b>	
	Federation Supporter	-.083	.193	.186	1	.666	.920	
	<b>Mistrust of Turks</b>	<b>-1.466</b>	<b>.296</b>	<b>24.551</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.231</b>	
	<b>Radical</b>	<b>-2.047</b>	<b>.385</b>	<b>28.310</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.129</b>	
	<b>Commonality with Turkish Cypriots</b>	<b>.562</b>	<b>.315</b>	<b>3.179</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.075</b>	<b>1.754</b>	
	<b>Urgency</b>	<b>.964</b>	<b>.202</b>	<b>22.910</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>2.623</b>	
	AKEL Supporter	.236	.266	.793	1	.373	1.267	
	EDEK Supporter	-.454	.460	.975	1	.323	.635	
	<b>DIKO Supporter</b>	<b>-.665</b>	<b>.333</b>	<b>3.995</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.046</b>	<b>.514</b>	
	<b>DISY Supporter</b>	<b>1.461</b>	<b>.247</b>	<b>34.911</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>4.310</b>	
	Constant	-1.236	.499	6.148	1	.013	.290	
	Nagelkerke R Square	.367						
	% Properly classified	79.9						
	N	925						

The coefficients show that the strongest opposition to the Annan Plan is from those who could be classified as “political radicals.” The political attitudes toward the Plan seem, therefore, to meet with strongest opposition from those who support armed struggle to solve the Cyprus Problem and who feel that any solution should entail the right of return for all refugees. The weakest statistically significant independent variable is the dummy variable denoting refugees, which shows

evidence suggesting that they were statistically more likely to support it, despite the addition of other independent variables in the equation.

In general, the regressions on the Greek-Cypriot sample illustrate that the model using demographic variables alone has little explanatory value, despite the fact that all of the demographic variables, with the exception of gender, are statistically significant. With the addition of attitudinal and political variables, the model attains increased explanatory value. In the final regression, we see that voting for the Annan Plan is best explained by attitudes and political party support and not by demographic variables, with the exception of refugee status.

It is now that we turn to the regression on the Turkish-Cypriot data. The outcome of the first three stages of the regression is shown in Table five (p. 29). The findings of this regression show that there is significant evidence to indicate that all of the models run are statistically different from the null hypotheses, as the Chi-squared statistics show. The first two stages, however, seem to be very similar in terms of explaining the variations in the dependent variable, meaning that the insertion of attitudes toward federation adds little or no explanatory value to the model. By adding other attitudes into the equation in the third model, we see a leap in the explanatory value of the model, from a Naglekerke R-Squared value of .046 to .355, meaning that the addition of attitudes amplifies the explanation of the patterns of voting for the Annan Plan to unravel about 35 per cent of the variation, while the model itself can properly classify about 73 per cent of the votes for and against the Plan.

**Table 5: Turkish-Cypriot Sample – Outcome of Logistic Regressions (Stages 1-3)**

Stage	Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients							
		Chi-square	df	Sig.				
Stage 1	Step	2.268	1	.132				
	Block	2.268	1	.132				
	Model	20.821	6	.002				
		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	
	Age	-.158	.305	.270	1	.603	.854	
	Education	.574	.378	2.310	1	.129	1.775	
	Males	-.182	.192	.899	1	.343	.834	
	Refugee	.285	.220	1.683	1	.195	1.330	
	<b>Turkish Parents</b>	<b>-.585</b>	<b>.208</b>	<b>7.912</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.005</b>	<b>.557</b>	
	Constant	.613	.368	2.777	1	.096	1.846	
	Nagelkerke R Square	.041						
	% Properly classified	65.6						
Stage 2	Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients							
		Chi-square	df	Sig.				
	Step	2.268	1	.132				
	Block	2.268	1	.132				
	Model	20.821	6	.002				
		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	
	Age	-.114	.307	.138	1	.710	.892	
	<b>Education</b>	<b>.633</b>	<b>.380</b>	<b>2.775</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.096</b>	<b>1.884</b>	
	Males	-.198	.192	1.060	1	.303	.820	
	Refugee	.315	.221	2.027	1	.154	1.370	
<b>Turkish Parents</b>	<b>-.574</b>	<b>.208</b>	<b>7.593</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.006</b>	<b>.563</b>		
Federation Supporter	-.265	.176	2.261	1	.133	.768		
Constant	.687	.373	3.397	1	.065	1.987		
	Nagelkerke R Square	.046						
	% Properly classified	65.6						
Stage 3	Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients							
		Chi-square	df	Sig.				
	Step	159.978	3	.000				
	Block	159.978	3	.000				
	Model	180.799	9	.000				
		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	
	Age	-.358	.350	1.044	1	.307	.699	
	Education	.350	.439	.636	1	.425	1.420	
	<b>Males</b>	<b>-.446</b>	<b>.225</b>	<b>3.912</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.048</b>	<b>.640</b>	
	Refugee	.012	.256	.002	1	.962	1.012	
	Turkish Parents	-.333	.240	1.926	1	.165	.717	
	Federation Supporter	-.138	.208	.437	1	.508	.871	
	<b>Apprehension of Greeks</b>	<b>-1.813</b>	<b>.335</b>	<b>29.381</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.163</b>	
<b>Pro-Turkish</b>	<b>-1.756</b>	<b>.526</b>	<b>11.161</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.001</b>	<b>.173</b>		
<b>Commonality with Greek Cypriots</b>	<b>3.288</b>	<b>.414</b>	<b>63.069</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>26.784</b>		
Constant	2.470	.629	15.437	1	.000	11.817		
	Nagelkerke R Square	.355						
	% Properly classified	72.5						

Table six below illustrates the outcome of the final stage of the regressions, showing the full model. This model, like the others before it, has strong evidence to show that it is statistically different from the null hypothesis. This means that the model itself has explanatory power versus a constant. In addition, the full model shows strong explanatory power, properly classifying over 82 per cent of the votes for and against the Annan Plan.

**Table 6: Turkish-Cypriot Sample – Outcome of Logistic Regressions (Stage 4: Final Stage)**

Stage 4		Omnibus Tests of Model Coefficients		Chi-square	df	Sig.		
	Step	156.205	4	.000				
	Block	156.205	4	.000				
	Model	337.004	13	.000				
		<b>B</b>	<b>S.E.</b>	<b>Wald</b>	<b>df</b>	<b>Sig.</b>	<b>Exp(B)</b>	
	Age	.264	.421	.392	1	.531	1.302	
	Education	.439	.526	.696	1	.404	1.550	
	<b>Males</b>	<b>-.487</b>	<b>.264</b>	<b>3.400</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.065</b>	<b>.615</b>	
	Refugee	.241	.318	.570	1	.450	1.272	
	Turkish Parents	.031	.287	.012	1	.914	1.032	
	Federation Supporter	-.059	.250	.055	1	.815	.943	
	<b>Apprehension of Greeks</b>	<b>-1.193</b>	<b>.396</b>	<b>9.093</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.003</b>	<b>.303</b>	
	Pro-Turkish	-.638	.653	.956	1	.328	.528	
	<b>Commonality with Greek Cypriots</b>	<b>1.882</b>	<b>.502</b>	<b>14.055</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>6.563</b>	
	<b>UBP Supporter</b>	<b>-1.871</b>	<b>.320</b>	<b>34.143</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>.154</b>	
	<b>CTP Supporter</b>	<b>1.924</b>	<b>.400</b>	<b>23.197</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.000</b>	<b>6.850</b>	
	<b>DP Supporter</b>	<b>-.808</b>	<b>.350</b>	<b>5.341</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.021</b>	<b>.446</b>	
	<b>BDH Supporter</b>	<b>1.887</b>	<b>.779</b>	<b>5.859</b>	<b>1</b>	<b>.015</b>	<b>6.597</b>	
	Constant	1.239	.774	2.558	1	.110	3.451	
	Nagelkerke R Square	.587						
	% Properly classified	82.1						
	N	610						

In terms of the value of the independent variables, we see that the hypothesised demographic variables generally fail to predict Annan Plan voting, with the exception of males. Attitudes, however, towards the Greek-Cypriot community seem to have played a major role in conditions supporting the Plan. On the other hand, support for political parties indicate that CTP and BDH supporters were more likely to have been supporters of the Plan while UBP and DP party supporters were statistically less likely to have voted in support of it. Political parties and their positions thus seem to have played an important role in the formation of opinions of the Plan among the Turkish-Cypriot population, rather than demographic factors.

What is notable is that with the addition of attitudes and political party support, the demographic variables used to predict the Annan Plan voting become increasingly less powerful in their explanatory value. The only exception to this is



the independent variable denoting males, which for some reason becomes more statistically significant with the addition of independent variables in the model, suggesting that it is a statistical fluke. The addition of the political variables provides the greatest leap in explaining the Annan Plan voting among the Turkish-Cypriot population.

### **Conclusions**

One of the interesting discoveries from the work is that most of the demographic independent variables hypothesised to predict voting on the Annan Plan fail to be predictive in the fuller model. The full models which run the multiple regressions capture information and illustrate which intervening variables have stronger explanatory power. For example, in the case of the Turkish-Cypriot constituency, it seems that many of the attitudinal and demographic factors generally fail to be predictive in the multiple regressions, indicating perhaps that the political parties have constituencies consisting of people who have attitudinal and demographic similarities. It could also be argued, however, that the relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot parties and voting for the Annan Plan should be expected, since the parliamentary elections among the Turkish-Cypriot electorate served in many ways as a realigning election among the Turkish-Cypriot population, where parties were beneficiaries of votes based on their position on the Plan.

A further intriguing observation is that the age of voters does not seem to play a role in terms of support for the Annan Plan. As Jacobsson Hatay (2004b) had first suggested, the Greek-Cypriot youth appear to be more against the Annan Plan. It is, however, the intervening variable of attitudes that really drives the positions on the Plan. Thus, while it is true that the younger Greek-Cypriot population were more likely to reject the Plan, it is probably more meaningful and useful to assert that those who do not experience a sense of commonality with the Turkish-Cypriot community were more likely to reject it, and that such alienation from the other community is somewhat more common among the young than among their elders. Future research should investigate why the youth have such different attitudes and whether these attitudes change over time, or whether they are retained. If such attitudes are retained, it is suggestive that reunification under an agreement such as the Annan Plan will increasingly meet a harder sell among the Greek-Cypriot community. Certainly, the findings are not inconsistent with the notion that the Greek nationalist state of mind of many of the Greek-Cypriot population played an important role in their rejection of the Plan as suggested by Heraclides (2004), though it should be emphasised that in this model the variables that were tested are indicators of “mistrust” and “alienation”, not “nationalism” per se.

There is evidence to support the notion that Greek-Cypriot refugees acted as economic rational actors, grasping that the Annan Plan was a scheme that would

have allowed many to regain their properties or at least to contest their properties; this can be inferred from the fact that there is a statistically meaningful difference between refugees and non-refugees in their votes for the Plan – 35 per cent of refugees voted for it while approximately only 25 per cent of the non-refugees voted for it in the data gathered – and also by the fact that refugee status “made it” into the final model among the Greek-Cypriot population. The sentiments of refugees more than likely played a role in bringing some support to the Plan among the Greek-Cypriot population, although this does not seem to have been the case among the Turkish-Cypriot population. Future research should examine the Turkish-Cypriot refugees to determine their perception of the Annan Plan and ownership issues. Future research should also enquire further into the segments of the refugee populations, by modelling those refugees who would most clearly benefit from unification, instead of viewing them as a monolith. In addition, future research should explore the question of the return of refugees and security issues, since some votes against the Plan by refugees may have been the result of concerns about security upon returning to their property.

In terms of the Turkish-Cypriot population, the strong correlation between political party support and referendum vote is open to various alternative interpretations. One possibility is to argue that Turkish-Cypriot political parties are “constructed” ideologically around the issue of re-unification, much more so than Greek-Cypriot parties. Another possibility is to argue that Turkish-Cypriot parties took an early stance either in favour or against the Annan Plan, and therefore they had the time to align their voters with the official party position, much more so than the Greek-Cypriot parties who only made their decision two weeks before the referendum. A third possibility is to argue that the arrow of causality is an inverse correlation, in the sense that the 2003 parliamentary election in the north was in many ways a pre-referendum referendum. The truth is probably a combination of all three factors.

Another very interesting discovery regards the settlers from Turkey. While in the first iteration of the model – in which only demographics were tested – settler status emerged as a significant predictor. The variable dropped out of the model as soon as underlying attitudes were included; more particularly, “pro-Turkish orientation”, but also “sense of commonality with Greek Cypriots”. The “pro-Turkish orientation” variable itself dropped out of the model when political party support was included, seemingly suggesting that Turkish-Cypriot parties are themselves constructed around the issue of how dependent on Turkey the Turkish-Cypriot population should be. Therefore, in a similar vein to the argument used concerning the Greek-Cypriot youth, it is more meaningful and useful to say that those with a pro-Turkish orientation are more opposed to re-unification, and that more of the settlers than the Turkish-Cypriot population have a pro-Turkish orientation, than to state that settlers are more opposed to re-unification than the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Future works should delve into those specific aspects of the Annan Plan that played a role in the rejection of it by the Greek-Cypriot population. This is especially necessary since the Greek-Cypriot community has demonstrated that it is the least likely to accept the Plan. Future statistical analysis may probe more deeply into the first forays on this topic presented by Lordos (2005b) in an attempt to clarify what modifications might have to be made on the Plan in order for the two communities on the island to accept it.

Future research should also attempt to tie in the voting patterns on the Annan Plan with what is known about referendum voting in other countries. Future research should not thus view the Plan merely as a Cyprus-specific phenomenon but should link it with referenda in other parts of the world. There is probably a great deal to learn by incorporating what is known about referenda from the substantial literature on the topic (see for example; Banducci, 1998: Bowler and Donovan, 1998: Bowler et al., 1992: Cronin, 1989).

There is much to discover about the Cypriot community and public opinion on solutions to the Cyprus Problem. Public opinion does matter in Cyprus since future plans for reuniting the Cypriot communities will most likely be presented in plebiscites of the two communities on the island, so that learning about the predilections of the public on both sides of the Green Line is necessary in order to understand the elements that are likely to lead to success or failure. In the less likely scenario that a future plan might be presented to parliamentary votes, the political leaders will ultimately have to answer to their constituencies. Consequently, the political views of the public on the issue of continued separation and unification on the island are vital.

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# **A COMMUNIST’S POST-MODERN POWER DILEMMA: ONE STEP BACK, TWO STEPS FORWARD, “SOFT NO” AND HARD CHOICES ...**

**Nicos Trimikliniotis\***

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## **Abstract**

This paper considers the challenges ahead after having assessed what determined the outcome of the referendum in April 2004 and the balance of forces as they emerge in the Parliamentary elections of 2006. In spite of the generally sound claims that globalisation shifts decision-making away from nation-states, particularly weak and small states to networks beyond the nation-state, in the case of Cyprus what we have for the first time paradoxically is the “fate” of Cyprus primarily in the hands of Cypriots themselves. Although semi-occupied the two communities can make their decision as to the future of their country and state, providing they agree to share power in a federal state. This would mean addressing the obstacles they are facing, including the current polarisation of Greek-Cypriot opinion, which is divided amongst those who want to live together with the Turkish Cypriots and those who want to live apart. The Parliamentary elections of 2006 have not resolved matters. The key to the future of Cyprus is the contestation between the “hard no” and the “soft no”, which at the same time is the contestation between the “Right” and the “Left”: the paradox is that they are coalition partners in Government.

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## **Introduction**

An outburst of publications has appeared relating to the Annan plan, the referendum and the post-referendum conjunctures in Cyprus<sup>1</sup> which make it a separate task to review such material.<sup>2</sup> However, little work has been done in terms of a detailed analysis on the balance of political and social forces within Greek-Cypriot society.<sup>3</sup> Very few works have managed to move beyond the eschatological, aphoristic and sweeping accusations of the “yes” and “no” camps, blaming each other for risking to make the partition permanent and for trying to bring a catastrophe to Cyprus. Irrespective of one’s stance during the period of referenda, it is now essential to move beyond that. A sober analysis is warranted, if we are to

provide a reasoned sociological explanation of the tendencies in Cypriot society, not to mention the political necessity for such an analysis so that Greek-Cypriot politics can finally open the public space for a dialogue as to how to proceed from the current impasse. This is not simply a matter to be decided by the political elite, but a matter to be debated and decided by citizens at a societal level. This paper attempts to examine the balance of forces within Greek-Cypriot society via an analysis of the discourses, ideologies and political practices in their evolution since the appearance of “Annan I” or thereabouts, as they are embedded within their distinct social base and their connection to questions of power, wealth and security.

During the period around the beginning of the millennium, in what we define as “the Euro-Cyprus conjuncture”, a number of disparate international forces finally converged due to changes in priorities, strategies and long-term and short-term goals in the post-cold war era.<sup>4</sup> The paper links the debates over the Annan plan and the way forward amongst various political parties and schools of thought to the resulting post-referenda political scene. This is defined by new kinds of polarisations, which may have certain elements of continuity with the past, but mark a qualitatively new era in Greek-Cypriot politics which corresponds to an equivalent rupture in society and defines new social cleavages.

That there is a polarisation of society between the “yes” and “no” supporters since April 2004 is to state the obvious to any informed observer.<sup>5</sup> What is not often recognised is the extent to which there is an ongoing implicit but rather intense contest between the Greek-Cypriot “maximalists” on the one hand, who aim to “bury the Annan plan” (referred to as “hard no”), and on the other hand those who want to see “minimum changes to the plan to make it acceptable to the Greek-Cypriots” (referred to as the “soft no”). This paper, therefore, considers how President Papadopoulos managed to elevate himself into an unstable but nonetheless hegemonic position as long as he is in power. Papadopoulos has the full “state ammunition” of the powers vested in him as “President”, inheriting the powers of the Colonial Governor, enjoying privileges and powers of an elected post-colonial monarch and legitimated by the enormous popularity and charisma of Archbishop Makarios: A colonial designed the regime’s “checks and balances” on the basis of a communal consociation essentially via the Turkish-Cypriot Vice President. However, the constitution, as regards participation of the Turkish Cypriots, has been in abeyance since 1963. Through political manoeuvring, Tassos Papadopoulos has managed to retain the upper hand until 2008, but faces critical challenges: The stalemate is a major problem and the slick Erdogan-Talat duo has promised to remain “one step ahead”. It is no easy task when the President is also facing criticism from the even “harder no” camp that he once nurtured himself in addition to the dilemmas of trying to “retain AKEL on board”, the pressures from the USA, the EU and the UN, as well as the opposition of Anastasiades’ “modernised” DISY.



A “strong” President in a divided micro-state whose legitimacy is increasingly being questioned cannot hope to stay in that position too long. The “doctrine of necessity” seems to be running out of steam: The property question for both Turkish-Cypriots under the control of the Republic and the Greek-Cypriots in the occupied territories is like a ticking bomb, as the current state of limbo cannot continue indefinitely without cost to the Government. The elections of 2008 will be the test. This will also be the test for AKEL.

AKEL, on the other hand is the largest political party in Cyprus and within the Government coalition, but it is in an extremely difficult situation, currently performing an impossible “balancing act” between two opposing tendencies, its traditionally pro-solution, pro-rapprochement support and being locked in a coalition with the “hard no”. Moreover, AKEL is forced to compromise between the popular social demands of the mass movement it represents and the disciplines of power in what it perceives as a neoliberal EU context. It will soon be forced to decide whether it will continue to be the major party but subordinated by President Papadopoulos, or whether it will decide to take the lead and put forward its own candidate, which will then open the way for a compromise solution to Cyprus.

This article considers the shifts of position as regards the notion of “solution” and the gradual erosion of the so-called “soft no” by the “hard no”, at least at the level of political discourse. AKEL is the soul of the “soft no”. However, the Left in Cyprus, dominated by AKEL, is faced with a broader set of dilemmas: How does it deal with the conflicting legacies of a rhetoric of anti-imperialism and a class-based rapprochement in the context of resolving a “national question”? How does it compromise a legacy of fostering “national unity” within the Greek-Cypriot community when there are such fundamental differences on the “national question” whilst trying to reach an understanding with the Turkish-Cypriot Left, which is in power in the north? Can AKEL’s typically “centrist” position move beyond a defensive strategy so that the “soft no” can at last become meaningful as a policy towards solution, or is it condemned to be eroded and eaten up by the “hard no”? AKEL could thus be forced to confront the question of power head on: Should there be a Left-wing candidate in the next election? The next few months can be telling as Ankara is facing two elections whilst being tested on its hard road to accession to the EU. The Cyprus Republic faces the tests of membership in the EU and the costs for the Greek-Cypriot “no” are gradually being felt as partition is being normalised, without a solution.

The basic position of this paper maintains that the contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no” holds the key to unlocking the Cyprus problem because it defines whether we will have a consolidation of the de facto partition via the prolonged continuation of the status quo, or whether there will be a meaningful but limited renegotiation of the Annan plan that will lead to an agreement.

At this point, the term “Left” is deliberately vague, although a three dimensional axis is provided to locate it more specifically in an increasingly complex and confusing world.

### **The Euro-Cypriot Paradox: The Making of the Conjuncture<sup>6</sup>**

It is accurately claimed that globalisation in general tends to shift decision-making away from nation-states, particularly weak and small states, to transnational networks and supranational powers beyond the nation-state.<sup>7</sup> However, in the case of Cyprus, a small divided country, the specificities of the international and regional balance of forces and their current priorities in a chaotic post-cold war era dictates that the insecurity in the broader Middle Eastern region and the Balkans calls for more stability in Cyprus, where the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus triangle joins (see Anagnostopoulou, 2004; Trimikliniotis, 2004b). Thus in a world, hegemonised by the US, but facing constant challenges – due in part to the US policy that destabilises the Middle East<sup>8</sup> and partially as a result of the “decline of American power”<sup>9</sup> with its supremacy riddled with contradictions,<sup>10</sup> – a solution to the Cyprus problem would serve as an important stabilising factor in the region and benefit all major forces in a number of ways. A re-united Cyprus within the EU could facilitate the smoothing of Turkey’s own accession orbit, given that Turkey faces a backlash by an increasingly insecure – many would say racist – European public opinion. Moreover, Turkey’s own internal and contradictory transformations resulting mostly from the accession process faces difficulties which make it increasingly difficult to meet the EU anchoring targets. There is internal opposition to economic reform liberalisation which creates turbulence amongst the poorer sections of the population, and there is opposition to political and human-rights reforms that may undermine the privileged position of the authoritarian Kemalist Army. The Kurdish question has been rekindled enhancing the political role of the military, whilst the NATO alliance with the West against “fellow Muslims” prompts unrest amongst those populations that form the social basis of AKP and the popular Erdogan leadership. The USA and the EU require Turkey’s accession route to remain on course in order to retain Ankara as a regional secular force of stability in this turbulent region: Even after the rejection of the UN plan it might in some ways be easier to deliver a solution on the Cyprus problem than to deliver internal political reform in connection with the Kurdish question or economic improvements.

In other words, with the advent of the new millennium a conjuncture emerged which gave Cypriots an opportunity to take their fate into their own hands: This conjuncture, the Euro-Cypriot paradox, has its limitations of course because the scope of this “free choice” is itself determined by powerful national, international and regional factors. Nonetheless it allows the two communities of a semi-occupied micro-state to take decisions on the future and the shape of a re-united state,

providing they do agree to share power in a federal state. Perhaps, for the first time, it is not the “external factors” alone that determine the future; at the moment the key for the solution to the Cyprus problem may well lie with the Cypriots themselves.<sup>11</sup>

In this context, it is essential to discuss the internal factors, without wanting to undervalue the international factors and obstacles to resolution. After all, the so-called “Cyprus problem” consists at least of the internal and the international component – the dominant Greek-Cypriot discourses overplay the international over the internal, (i.e. it is fundamentally a problem of invasion and occupation by Turkey) and the dominant Turkish-Cypriot discourses overplay the internal over the international, (i.e. it is fundamentally a problem of ethnic conflict between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots). As analysed elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2005a, forthcoming), the Cyprus problem cannot be detached from the wider international issues surrounding it; these issues form an integral part of the problem itself. It is precisely due to this that many sound analysts see the role of the international factor as crucial to the resolution of the problem (Attalides, 1979; Hitchens, 1997).<sup>12</sup> Often the role of the “international political actors” is invoked in Greek-Cypriot political discourse in different forms such as “foreign powers”, “the powerful of this world”, or “imperialism”. It has been correctly pointed out that the conflict in Cyprus cannot merely be seen as externally imposed nor is it simply a “generic ethnic antagonism” (Anthias, 1987, pp. 187-188). The conflict is one of multiple levels.<sup>13</sup> Understanding the Cyprus problem means examining some “internal” dynamics and processes like class, ethnicity, power, and nationalism together with factors “external” (or adjacent) to the Cypriot State, for example, international treaties and laws; other countries interventions, particularly Greece, Turkey, Britain and NATO, which is under US hegemony and regional and world politics.<sup>14</sup> Moreover, there is a social and ideological dimension deriving from the “use and abuse” of the Cyprus problem within Greek-Cypriot society and as such we are obliged to examine the central role of the internal actors (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2005a).

### **The Post-referendum Greek-Cypriot Political Scenery**

#### **The Annan Plan and Greek-Cypriot Politics in 2006: The “Yes”, the “Soft No” and the “Hard No”**

More than two years after the historic moment when Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots were asked to vote in an unprecedented referendum to reunite the country, Cyprus is still caught in its aftermath. President Tassos Papadopoulos’ own dramatic address to the Greek-Cypriots on 7 April 2004, calling for a “resounding no” was based on the premise that the referendum was a crucial historic event. All the political leaders concurred about the importance of the referendum, even those who strongly objected to the terms, style and tone of Papadopoulos’ address.

In his opening remarks to the specially convened Pancyprian Conference of AKEL on 14 April 2004, the General Secretary of the party, Demetris Chrisofias was in no doubt that “the characterisation ‘historical moments’ is one of [the] few times that is fully justifiable.” In a book that aptly captures the spirit of the times and provides an analysis of the post-referendum climate, Takis Hadjidemetriou (2006) refers to 24 April as a “landmark date” when Cypriots had to face “the historic dilemmas”. The same viewpoint is taken by most known opponents of the plan.<sup>15</sup> By any standard the referendum represents a decisive point in the recent history of Cyprus and it is still an active force in the divided Cypriot society, on both sides of the barbed wire.

The climate both during and following the referendum has been characterised by a hysteria on both sides of the camp, the “yes” and the “no” supporters, that has made informed dialogue extremely difficult. In fact ever since the introduction of Annan I it has not been possible to engage in a meaningful dialogue, in spite of efforts made at the time.<sup>16</sup> Hadjidemetriou (2006) refers to the tense, polarised and intimidating mood during the referendum, in which the popular perceptions were more or less “conditioned” by a number of factors such as misinformation and use of the state machinery to influence people. Businessmen<sup>17</sup> involved in construction and land development, particularly in the regions of Paphos and Limassol, were fearful that land prices would depreciate and affect their investments (p. 114); civil servants campaigned against the UN plan after being informed that posts and pensions may not be secure (p. 114); ambassadors and employees of the Foreign Ministry were on alert to demonise the plan (p. 115); police officers campaigned against it after being told by the Minister in charge and other high ranking Ministry officials that their employee rights were not safe under the plan; central bank officers were informed that their jobs were insecure because Turkish Cypriots would have to be employed, and the vast majority of the church leaders also campaigned against the plan (p. 116). For Hadjidemetriou, however, the most crucial role was played by the media’s biased presentation and the terms by which President Papadopoulos rejected the plan. In such a climate, as the very terms of the Presidential rejection left no room for reasoned argument, we thus witnessed “the death of political dialogue” – it was a demonisation of the worst kind. Hence, new racisms were unleashed “derived from the nationalism, fanaticism and intolerance” against Turkish Cypriots for whom “we would have to pay”, as populist discourses expounded, or against Kofi Annan, Colin Powell and Condolisa Rice, due to the colour of their skin (Hadjidemetriou, 2006, pp. 18-19). A number of grievances were lodged with the Cyprus anti-discrimination and anti-racist body over this racist issue. As a result some families were driven apart, friendships ceased, and political parties were sharply divided (some even split).

Post-referendum Greek-Cypriot politics may have “calmed down” a little since,

but the essential elements of that climate are still in place. Different indicators of attitudes such as electoral results, opinion polls and research conducted from 2004 to 2006 show that there is polarisation, confusion and uncertainty amongst the Greek-Cypriot population.<sup>18</sup> The core issue is the inherent inability of the Greek-Cypriot political system and the party structure to engage in a meaningful dialogue over the content of the solution as proposed in the Annan plan. This can be interpreted as a “pathology” of the political system that tends to treat differences of opinion regarding a solution to the Cyprus issue as “national treachery”, as it symbolises “a wound in the national body”. Avoiding the danger of too much “pathologising” of a social formation, we may interpret this as a crisis of the political system when it approaches some notional “limits”: The Annan plan was for sure the end of an era of a mono-communal political system as we have known so far. The system closure can thus be understood as both a self-defence of the system to perpetuate its existence, as well as a malfunction of the democratic process itself derived from the inability of the Cyprus Republic to cope with a radical transformation of its historical “nation-state dialectic” inherent in all national states (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a; forthcoming) .

Philippou (2005) attempts to penetrate and remedy this probably incurable tendency by conceptualising this state in Foucaultian terms as an “austere Cypriot enclosure”. He draws on Kitromilides who refers to the “sickliness of Greek-Cypriot political thought” that ideologically entraps politics in a conventional and cyclical perception of the political problem (Kitromilides, 1998-1999). If combined with Kitromilides’ celebrated “dialectic of intolerance” (Kitromilides, 1979), we have a powerful critique of the hegemonic system of political thought in Cyprus. Philippou illustrates that the Annan plan, posed “as a problem and as a question”, calls for an implicit challenge to the legitimacy of the claims made by the power mechanisms in Greek-Cypriot society. The system survives by suppressing questioning, concealing any potential for reflexivity, and by recycling clichés without reappraisal, dogmatic thinking and meaningless sound bites (Philippou, 2005, p. 70). The Annan plan, instead of being presented as the product of a long-lasting process of negotiation and compromise between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (and others), was presented as an “alien aborted product” or “an unworkable freak monster”<sup>19</sup> for which no one was prepared to take responsibility (see Hadjidemetriou, 2006).

A number of intellectuals have lambasted the absence of critical thought before the appearance of the Annan plan: Kitromilides (1981, pp. 451-453) noted that the legacy of colonialism was the ideological framework of political life, which was characterised by an absence of serious dissent that would challenge the dominant social and political life of Cyprus which resulted in a weakening of social critique. Ierodiakonou (2003) wrote about the undemocratic elements and the deficiencies in observing the constitution, whilst Mavratsas (2003, pp. 119-157) attributes “the

atrophy of civil society” and “clientelist corporatism” to be the key characteristics of Greek-Cypriot society. Similarly, Attalides (2006) in a recent review article makes similar observations.

Although this paper to a large extent shares the above critiques, it considers that they do not properly capture and fully assess the complexity of Cypriot society, as though it were a large homogeneous space which is somehow “weak” or “unable to produce critical thinking”. Gramsci’s contribution to the study of civil society provides a different approach to the dominant western approaches (Gramsci, 1972). Andreas Panayiotou (1999) presents perhaps the most comprehensive study on the role of the Left within civil society, and sketches out an alternative view of understanding civil society, modernisation and development of Cypriot/Greek-Cypriot political culture. The Left played a crucial role in Cyprus’ own route to modernity in the twentieth century. Moreover, the sophisticated work of Constantinou (2002, 2003a) provides for a more complex and nuanced understanding of the state and civil society in the Cypriot context. To properly appreciate Cypriot civil society one has to grasp the process of the transformation of Cyprus from a colony to what Constantinou (2002, p. 20) refers to as a “post-colonial quasi-state”, given that “Cyprus was founded by Grossraum experiences which dictated its limited sovereignty”.<sup>20</sup> It is this contest for hegemony between the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot elite that resulted in a distorted public sphere and shaped civil society accordingly. As aptly pointed out by Constantinou (2003a, p. 36), “civil society is not so much a sphere outside political power” and,

“it is not separate but influent on centres of power. This is particularly true in the case of Cyprus whereby the concept of government does not enjoy any significant margin of sectoral autonomy while the cohesiveness of civil society and party blocs largely compensates for the absence of a classical form of impersonal sovereign stateness capable of effect as well as affect.”

After the introduction of the Annan plan there was some debate over the complex nature of civil society and the social movements as inspired by the Swiss example and what we can learn for Cyprus (see Constantinou, 2003c and Trimikliniotis, 2003b).

To interpret the current lack of an open and democratic dialogue over the Annan plan is primarily the expression of the dilemmas of AKEL itself, which had been seen as a beacon for large sections of the population and functioned as the only alternative, even if it took a mild form, to the mainstream elites. It is the failure to properly appreciate the historic contribution of AKEL, with all its successes, failures and inadequacies that may lead to misunderstanding over the nature of civil society in Cyprus. The party, in spite of its historic democratic deficits, had been a major

force in democratising society, channelling and expressing the views of the subaltern and “as a labour pillar substituted for the deficient legitimacy of the state” given that it pre-existed the Republic (Constantinou, 2003a, p. 36). AKEL and its allied organisation of the “popular movement” («λαϊκό κίνημα») organised as a “counter-hegemony” since in practice it operated as a Gramscian party without a Gramsci-like theorist,<sup>21</sup> to use Panayiotou’s insightful perspective (Panayiotou, 1999). AKEL’s vacillation over “Enosis” and its early reluctant support of irredentism resulted in failing to keep together a fragmented society and to consolidate and “freeze the ethnic cleavage and split political identification along communal lines” (Constantinou, 2003b, p. 37). Moreover, AKEL’s support of archbishop Makarios as President, and the subsequent leaders of the Greek Cypriots (with the exception of Clerides) was rightly criticised for being too closely identified with his policies. This was done at the expense of class unity and the building of a common front with the Turkish-Cypriot Leftists (see Anthias and Ayres, 1978, 1983). However, AKEL remained a popular movement outside the realms of power, and for decades was branded as “traitor” for daring to question EOKA’s military campaign in the 1950s. Moreover, the party remained a voice of calm and compromise, as it supported both rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots, as well as being a loyal supporter of the Cyprus Republic and its institutions. It was therefore a central pillar of civil society and a natural, but mild “functional opposition” of an almost “internal exile”: The party, its allied organisations and trade unions commanded massive support, controlled large portions of the cooperative movement, and had its own counter-hegemonic culture such as football teams, local meeting places in all neighbourhoods (“sylogoi”), entertainment events, and festivals within civil society (see Panayiotou, 1999). With the collapse of the so-called “actually existing socialism” and the internal split of 1989-1991, without abandoning its adherence to the communist ideology, AKEL made moves towards democratising its own centralist institutions and began to transform itself into a more open party allowing for more internal discussion, more questioning of the legacy of Stalinism and its confrontation with nationalism, the party’s relations with the Turkish Cypriots as well as voicing different opinions in public about social issues etc.

This, however, was brought to an abrupt halt due to two factors: Firstly, AKEL’s transition into a governmental force, the party is now in a different trajectory, and thus, after decades of “internal exile” AKEL has been “symbolically rehabilitated” and has accepted to uphold its role in the high echelons of state power. Secondly, AKEL’s adaptation coincided with the historic opportunity to reunite Cyprus thus bringing into direct collision the two potentially antagonistic traditions and strategies for the resolution of the Cyprus problem – “anti-imperialism” versus “rapprochement”. AKEL’s inability to cope with this ideological collision by setting out the rules of engagement/debate resulted in an historic failure to allow a free and open dialogue within and outside the party at all levels, which in turn spilled over

and curbed freedom of speech throughout society. But then again the party has retained the prospect of a “solution” and its discourse of “reunification” and “rapprochement” are still central. Moreover, AKEL politicians who are known to have supported “yes” in the referendum are still prominent in the party – perhaps more prominent than before, as the forthcoming municipal elections show.

There is no doubt that in post-referendum Greek-Cypriot politics there is a new taboo. References to the dreaded “Annan plan” itself are not acceptable; it has become the banned “A-word” of Greek-Cypriot politics and as a result, at least in the short term, this has squeezed out any possibility for debate over “softer” political alternatives to the current stalemate between the Greek-Cypriot’s “no” and the Turkish-Cypriot’s “yes”. The political contest has continued and was tested in two national elections, i.e. the EU Parliament election shortly after the referendum in 2004 and the national Parliament election in May 2006. The election outcomes have not shown any massive overturning or reversal of old party structures, but the terms of the debate amongst the parties have shown a notable longer term shift away from a substantive politics to that of a politics of style and marketing.<sup>22</sup>

We can thus appreciate the hysterical exchanges at the time of the referendum and afterwards over the Annan plan as part of this pathology. The climax was rather bizarre when a tragic message was voiced by a high ranking DIKO MP calling to all those who were “bribed to vote Yes” to “commit suicide in public squares”.<sup>23</sup> Beyond the bizarre and the tragic, there is an internalisation of the “referendum trauma”, which has meant that emerging ruptures and cleavages have been perpetuated and have even mutated into other forms of disagreements. The political differences, however, have merely turned into pathologies between the “yes” versus “no”, and those who adopted a “soft no” during the referendum appear to have been caught “in between” political forces and have been attacked by all sides. There are some mild signs of recovery or “healing” but this is a rather slow and contradictory process.

### **The Contest between the “Hard No” and “Soft No”**

The terms “hard no” and “soft no” are not used by the political actors themselves but are derived from the apparent disagreements between the two major partners of the current coalition Government, President Papadopoulos and AKEL. EDEK is less important; it serves a small buffer but often its discourse is much harder than any of the parties of “hard no”. Papadopoulos, in his address to the Greek-Cypriot people on 7 April 2004 called on them to say a “resounding no”<sup>24</sup> to the Annan plan, because it not only fails to “abolish the de facto partition but on the contrary it legalises and deepens it”. AKEL’s decision on 14 April, which was subsequently repeated in the political decision of the 20<sup>th</sup> Pancyprian Congress of the party,<sup>25</sup> explicitly noted that



“AKEL did not share the evaluations made by the President of the Republic, as these had been expressed in his declaration, concerning the provisions of the Annan plan and especially concerning his evaluation. [...]

If such an evaluation was supported then the plan should also not have been accepted not even as a basis for negotiation.”

The so-called “middle ground” that is somewhere “in between” the outright “yes” to the Annan plan and the “hard no” has been approved by the 20<sup>th</sup> Pancyprian Congress:

“AKEL quite rightly is working to continuously repel the two extreme trends which have been expressed on the domestic fro[nt.] One trend, by exaggerating potential threats concerning the possible repercussions arising from the rejection of the plan, in essence comes out in favour of the reintroduction of the Annan plan in the form it was presented during the referenda, irrespective of the verdict of the people. The other trend, using the 76% “no” vote of the referendum result as a pretext and in the name of some vague so-called European solution, calls for the rejection of the plan but also of the bi-zonal bi-communal federal solution itself. The Congress assesses that both of these trends are catastrophic and calls on the new C[entral] C[ommittee] to continue to repel and expose the dangers which these trends harbour.”

Furthermore, on many occasions during and after the referendum, the General Secretary of AKEL, Demetris Christofias was at pains to explain that “AKEL’s no” was different from the others, and “AKEL did not support a resounding no”.<sup>26</sup> The often quoted extract from his statements by his critics, that “AKEL said no in order to cement a yes” [was presumably in the latter stages implying that there would be another referendum soon]. Christofias’ endeavour to steer AKEL into the “middle road” in an attempt to adopt a “centrist” position has made him a target of both the “yes” supporters for being “a stooge” or “tail of Papadopoulos” and “tailing nationalism” in order to “deceive AKEL supporters whilst benefiting from the privileges of being in power”,<sup>27</sup> and coming under attack from the “hard no” supporters for being “the fifth column in the no camp” and for trying to retrieve the Annan plan with minor changes via “the back door”.<sup>28</sup>

In order to follow the contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no”, one has to bear in mind the development of the policy regarding “managing the no vote” and the prospects for a solution in conjunction with the electoral results that followed.

In general, there has been little progress in terms of the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Since the Greek-Cypriot rejection the UN Secretary General has asked the Greek Cypriots to state what changes to the UN plan are required to

make it acceptable, but Papadopoulos was originally reluctant to state his concerns fearing that there would be another UN arbitration, “strict deadline for negotiations” and he would lose his “negotiating advantages”. The National Council convened several times and all parties stated their “concerns” and Papadopoulos, after adding his own issues, “codified” the areas of concern. Finally, Papadopoulos sent a special envoy to state orally what he wanted as regards “areas of concern”. In the meantime, although he has repeatedly threatened to veto Ankara’s accession,<sup>29</sup> this has proved impossible in practice since the initial go-ahead was given in December 2004 and again in October 2005. In terms of rhetoric there has been little debate and to date the Greek-Cypriot people have not officially been informed as to what these areas of concern are or what changes have been requested to the plan in order to make it acceptable, claiming that this information would “give away any negotiating advantages”.

The Report by the Under-Secretary-General for Political Affairs, Kieran Prendergast, suggests that “the substantive points that the Greek-Cypriot side would like to pursue touched on most of the main issues dealt with in the plan, including governance, security, citizenship, residency, property, territory, economic and financial issues, transition periods and guarantees of implementation”.<sup>30</sup> In other words the chapters that make up the entire UN plan; more importantly, what Papadopoulos proposes, via his all-out rejection of the plan is essentially an attack on the very political philosophy of the UN, in spite of his nominal reiteration of supporting “a bizonal bicomunal federation”. One would expect this criticism from Sir David Hannay (2005), however it is fully confirmed with Claire Palley’s critique of the plan, which is heralded as the most well-articulated argument of the official Greek-Cypriot side, voices precisely an attack on the very foundations of the UN plan (Palley, 2005),<sup>31</sup> something that was never expressed by Tassos Papadopoulos during the negotiations.<sup>32</sup>

The strategy of Papadopoulos has been to allow Ankara to proceed with its accession in December 2004 and thus avoid reintroducing the Annan plan to the negotiating table. His endeavour is to attempt small gains in the longer term and to gradually “eat away” concessions given to Turkey via the Annan plan each time that Turkey attempts to open a new harmonisation chapter. In practice this has meant a stalemate at local level, plus non-negotiation and marginalisation of the Turkish Cypriots and an EU stand-off before each chapter is opened. Moreover, it has resulted in a retraction from the substantive issues as regards the content of the solution to procedural side-issues and legalistic issues such as “direct trade”, “recognition” and other such matters.

There may be some glimmer of “progress” in the recent agreement brokered by the UN Under-Secretary General, Mr. Campari, which provides for “Technical

Committees". The secretive "technical talks" have stumbled even before they started because they are simply trying to put the carriage before the horse: it is highly improbable that they will yield results if one examines the positions of the two sides.<sup>33</sup> Technocrats cannot provide answers when there is a fundamental disagreement of political philosophy; they need a clear political mandate. The procedure may be ineffective but it gives the impression that something is being done. By the end of 2006 will be the time to evaluate results.

### **Chronicle of the President's Hegemony: A Tale of a Referendum**

The referendum results of 24 April 2004 came as a shock to many international observers. The resounding "no" by the Greek Cypriots – a massive 76 per cent, in contrast to the affirmative 64 per cent of the Turkish-Cypriot population – ought to have been expected given the internal balance of forces in Greek-Cypriot society. The taken-for-granted Greek-Cypriot "yes" proved to be a gross miscalculation: The possibility of failure in that great initiative was thought possible, as it had happened on numerous occasions in the past, but only as a result of Ankara's misgivings or the intransigence of the hawkish Turkish-Cypriot veteran leader, Mr Denktash. The only alternative scenario of anticipated failure was the rather remote chance that such serious deviations from the original Annan Plan (mark 1) were to occur, and thus be considered of such magnitude that the Greek-Cypriot political leadership would not be able or willing to support it. The UN failed to realise that the Annan plan, the so-called "last chance" to resolve this intractable problem would be voted out by the Greek-Cypriot body politic, as this might endanger foregoing the occupied territories.

Mr. Papadopoulos, a lawyer by profession and close to Makarios for years, was well aware of the enormous power of the Presidential post: Once elected, the parties who elected him (or her in that unlikely possibility) would have little leverage, until the run up to re-election five years later. The pact with AKEL was made; Demetris Christofias became the President of the House of Representative, the "number 2" post as he would replace the President whenever he was absent from office. In the case of AKEL, this was of great "symbolic" value as it signalled a time when AKEL, a Communist party, would be "rehabilitated" and accepted as "normal" and "equal" to all other political forces after years of exclusion, discrimination and isolation. Beyond that, however, it is the President who calls the shots.

The institution of the Presidency in Cyprus is extremely powerful. It is referred to in Article 1 of the Cyprus Constitution (together with the Vice-President) which states that "the State of Cyprus shall be an independent and sovereign Republic with a presidential regime". It is a prestigious post given the symbolic role of "head of the state"; it is connected to the very notion of "independence and sovereignty"; it has all the executive powers and powers of patronage; it is the head of the army

and the state and, it is the post which for seventeen years was headed by archbishop Makarios between 1960 and 1977. Makarios bestowed legitimacy on the institution as he personified the sovereignty/independence of Cyprus against a hostile international environment in the 1960s and 1970s.<sup>34</sup> Moreover, since 1963, with the Turkish Cypriots “abandoning” or “pushed from” their Governmental posts and in particular the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President, who also held reciprocal powers for the Turkish-Cypriot community including power to veto any of the President’s decisions, the institution of the Presidency has had no effective “checks and balances”. Parliament has no effective means of controlling the President – even if the budget is rejected; the previous year’s budget is re-activated. The strict separation of powers prevent Parliament from performing any “checks and balances” on the executive.

Prior to the referendum, when Papadopoulos was newly elected President in February 2003, he was very cautious. After all, the mandate he received hinged on the premise that he would work to resolve the Cyprus problem on the basis of the Annan plan. Following the referendum he changed his style of leadership, taking the 76 per cent vote as endorsement of full backing that gave him strength irrespective of AKEL. His supporters claimed that it was the only time a Cyprus President had been given a mandate mid-term. Whilst retaining his Presidency, once accession to the EU had been secured, the “compromise” with AKEL became less important. Given the prestige that the Presidential institution carries, Papadopoulos ensured that he made use of this to further his political goals: Critics argue that he would make compromises to internal policies and appointments in various quangos and communities (i.e. share out some of the powers and privileges of patronage), but he made no real compromises to his Cyprus policy except to reiterate his support for a “bizonal, bicomunal federation” that would serve as a “fig leaf” for AKEL and shield him from international and Turkish-Cypriot criticisms. Moreover, the terms upon which he rejected the plan were so extreme that he may have damaged the institution of the Presidency itself by relegating the State function of the President, which he holds, into that of a mere “communal leader”, which he simultaneously holds. The constitution declares that the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-president represent the unity of the country. Given the “deviations” from the constitution since 1964, the fact the Turkish-Cypriots are living in the occupied north and the Turkish-Cypriot leadership is questioning whether they can be represented by a Greek-Cypriot- run Republic internationally, one would expect some caution by the President – but there was none. Hadjidemetriou’s critique of the speech illustrates that it was not only the content of the speech that was damaging but it was his expression, terminology and extremity that created what he calls “a dynamic of rejection” that has mobilised and unleashed forces of regress in Greek-Cypriot society (see Hadjidemetriou, 2006). However, as the Presidential elections of 2008 are approaching, Mr Papadopoulos

is perhaps becoming more willing to compromise with AKEL. For the forthcoming municipal elections he has backed the former Interior Minister Andreas Christou and Eleni Mavrou MP in Cyprus' most important cities, Limassol and Nicosia, in spite of disagreement by many DIKO cadres that both these politicians were reputed to be amongst the most prominent "yes" supporters of AKEL. It remains to be seen whether such "domestic" concessions will find a wider application when dealing with the Cyprus problem; at this point it seems unlikely.

The "political autonomy" of the Greek-Cypriot-controlled Cyprus Republic is derived from authoritarian statist tradition,<sup>35</sup> as articulated within legal fiction branded as "the doctrine of necessity" since 1964 (see Papaphilippou, 1995; Trimikliniotis, 2005d). The "no" campaign effectively appealed to capture the hearts and minds and become the chief representative of a regime poised to protect its privileges and exclude the Turkish Cypriots who, according to the 1960 constitution, ought to enjoy equal footing power-sharing in the consociational Cyprus Republic, in the same way that the hegemony of the Denktash regime had done years before. Class factions, as Poulantzas (1975) pointed out, appear as "natural" and are interconnected to such interests, but they become powerful enemies of a compromise in practice.

#### **The President's "Propaganda Machine": Brief Encounter with Media Power**

The literature on the Annan plan formed an important part of the contest with regard to the interpretation of the UN plan. Of course this section cannot review the "popular debate" that took place in the media (the press, radio and TV), even though it would be an interesting exercise to undertake to assess the kind of issues that dominated the political agenda prior to the referenda and afterwards. Nevertheless, the issues that circulate in a small society such as Cyprus are not dissimilar, whereby "experts", academics and politicians "interact" and regularly present their views in the media. In fact many of the publications that appeared in haste were directly or indirectly aimed at influencing public opinion or articulating specific views in order to make a political statement rather than enriching the debate and enhancing the chances of reaching a settlement in Cyprus. The following types of literature were published on the subject of the solution, post Annan; legal, economic and other expert opinions, polemical texts (books and articles in journals and newspapers, reviews in journals and "popular guides" to the Annan Plan, i.e. the PRIO, 2003 guide and the anti-Annan leaflets of the newspaper Simerini).

#### **Presidential "Propaganda Machines" II: A Tale of "Turkey Taking it All"**

Contrary to Greek-Cypriot media claims, the plan was far from a Turkish triumph – even if the pro-European and pro-Erdogan Turkish press took such a celebratory stance – partly due to the fact that powerful social forces in Turkey wanted to "close", once and for all, the Cyprus problem, so that Ankara could "move on". In

order to do so, they secured strong media support for Prime-Minister Erdogan against the hardliners of the powerful military establishment. Nevertheless, this jubilation combined with the triumphant spirit showed by Mr. Erdogan himself, in sharp contrast to a lukewarm Karamanlis – not to mention the solemn-faced Papadopoulos – set the scene. Straight after the Swiss talks the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot press celebrated a “solution a-la-Turka”, whilst a stunned Greek and Greek-Cypriot press shouted “foul”. This of course is far from true.

The Greek-Cypriot media, which had already been negatively predisposed, if not all out hostile to the UN deal, drafted in its final form only a few days before accession to the EU. The hysterical “no” campaign had already been underway, whilst the “yes” campaign had not even begun. Overall, the plan itself was made out to be “evil”, “unjust”, “unworkable”: The process, the context, the climate, the timing and the “balance of forces” within the Greek-Cypriot community (and Greece) has not allowed for any transparent and sober debate to take place for over a year now.

The climate has not moderated to allow for open democratic dialogue throughout the post referenda period. The island has been subjected to the mass production of magazines, journals, books demonising the Annan plan as an “Anglo-American and Turkish conspiracy”; a classic is the best-seller of Ignatiou, Venizelos and Meletis,<sup>36</sup> with the telling title *The Secret Bazaar*. The book repeats all the myths, exaggerations, even fabrications about “the Turks taking all they asked for in the final stages of peace talks”.<sup>37</sup> Moreover, the demonisation as “US-funded agents” of those people who campaigned for a “yes” vote reached a pinnacle straight after the referendum. Despite the fact that there was no evidence of this, Mr. Papadopoulos informed us that the very absence of it is evidence which requires that one examines “the surrounding atmosphere” from which one can deduce that money was offered and accepted. The investigation by Makarios Drousiotis (2005), illustrated the way in which Tassos Papadopoulos used the state machinery and the media to obliterate his critics and political opponents by defamation. He accused them, without any evidence, of being financed by the USA.<sup>38</sup> These methods have not yet ceased.<sup>39</sup>

### **A Presidential Address that Stirred Up the Fears**

On his return from Switzerland, President Papadopoulos set the mood with a tearful address to the nation, presenting a tone and content that no-one had anticipated.<sup>40</sup> Following a memorandum by the Education Minister to all primary and secondary schools, pupils and most of their teachers poured out into the streets with Greek and Cypriot flags shouting “no”.<sup>41</sup> The polarisation of society climaxed and the “No campaign” continued at fever pitch to maintain the upper hand. That there would be partition and no way out this time was the reaction of the “yes” supporters who

pointed to the warnings of the USA, the UN and EU officials. An electrified atmosphere prevailed and the hysterical mood did not permit any sober dialogue.<sup>42</sup>

The President's address to the nation consolidated what had been carefully and masterfully planted by the "no" campaign. The intonation and context of the Presidential address was solemn and hammered home the most "basic" instincts and key ideas: The Greek-Cypriot people, he said, would be devoid of the most important vehicle of their political existence. Their sovereignty and democracy – the Republic of Cyprus – would be "destroyed only a few days before accession", in return for "empty promises from an occupying force", which had been violating international law and human rights for the past thirty years. The key word here was "security", a security that would be based on the alleged, but clearly untrustworthy "goodwill" of Ankara.

The second key word to be hammered in was "dignity": The Greek Cypriots would be robbed of their "dignity," because they would be "forced to sign away their rights to justice" and "give away their independence", which was part and parcel of the new constitution – the Protocol relating to the Treaty of Guarantee. What Mr. Papadopoulos failed to mention was the fact that the Treaty of Guarantee has been in place since 1960 and the comparison is not between the said Treaty with alleged intervention rights or no treaty at all, but between the 1960 Treaty, which is part of the constitution and the amended treaty, which is introduced as a protocol.

The third key word was "fairness": For the previous eighteen months Mr. Papadopoulos had made a big issue out of the fact that he has dropped references from his speeches to a "fair solution" in favour of a "functional" and "viable solution", to illustrate his willingness to negotiate. He argued that since the UN did not even entertain his basic concerns, he was no longer bound: This solution is neither fair, nor even-handed.

The fourth element was "prosperity". Amid fears over the alleged economic viability of the Annan solution, Mr. Papadopoulos claimed that the Greek Cypriots would be forced to subsidise an ineffective system, and the economic security and prosperity that the Greek Cypriots had worked so hard for, would be jeopardised. The scent of "welfare-chauvinism", a kind of common sense economic racism, which seemed to have pervaded Greek-Cypriot society and penetrated the media was taken advantage of.

Underneath these references lay a basic point: A strong body of Greek-Cypriot opinion are neither willing to share equally, with the Turkish Cypriots, the State that they have exclusively monopolised since 1964 nor the prosperity they have accrued – majoritarian nationalism may have become the hegemonic force (see

Trimikliniotis, forthcoming). The logic of the “no camp” has re-emerged like a phoenix from the ashes to declare “the Cyprus Republic as a second Greek-controlled state”<sup>43</sup> and is thus unwilling to transform itself into a “federal bizonal bi-communal state to put the Turkish Cypriots on an equal footing”. Of course, this has never been explicitly said directly, nevertheless, throughout society such discourses were circulating widely amongst different sections of the population from the nationalist camp. Moreover, it exaggerated fears and suspicions that via the Turkish-Cypriot population and the 60,000 settlers that would stay under the plan, Turkey would become “a partner” in Cyprus and might interfere by manipulating the Turkish settlers.

Papadopoulos also had an ingenious second line of defence – assuming that the supporters of the plan are correct and he is wrong. He said that Cyprus would have nothing to lose if Greek-Cypriots said “no” as Cyprus would have acceded to the EU and Turkey would still be knocking on Brussels’ door to accede. If, however, he was correct about the plan and the Greek-Cypriots had voted “yes” it would be catastrophic for Cyprus, whereas a “no” vote would achieve the second best of the “national goals”, i.e. accession to the EU and an opportunity to achieve a solution with the security of accession, improved odds and additional bargaining power.

The Greek Cypriots returned a resounding “no”.

### **The National Hegemony and the Political Forces of the Greek-Cypriot Community**

The analysis of the political forces on the Greek-Cypriot community requires close scrutiny if we are to understand what actually happened. To this effect we ought to examine the Greek-Cypriot party system. The fact that AKEL did not carry the burden of the campaign by unequivocally adopting the Annan plan certainly left the “yes” campaign soul-less. Shortly after the referendum there was a contest to determine the exact meaning of the massive 76 per cent. It was a contest between the “hard no” of Papadopoulos and his allies and the “soft no” of AKEL. The result remains blurred, as the two sides are still locked in a Governmental alliance and the issue is simply not being pushed, leaving the situation with little public dialogue as to the future of Cyprus. The so-called “codification” regarding the positions of the political parties on the Annan plan is merely a fig leaf in the absence of any real “common position” as to the future, and leaves Cyprus in the ambiguous position of “wait and see”.

### **The Break-up of the No Vote: Class and Nationalism**

The question of class is rarely discussed in research on Cyprus. Moreover, it is rarely touched upon when discussing the national question and nationalism.



However, class and national elements intersect in ways whereby the social cleavages emerging do not correspond to a “pure” class conflict (see Anthias and Ayres, 1978, 1983). We can deduce that class and socio-economic interests are articulated within the policies and strategies from the vantage point of the “yes” and “no” (“hard” and “soft” camps). In fact their “fractional interests” are strong determinants of the position articulated by political and economic actors in Greek-Cypriot society. Political power appears to reflect two crucial dimensions of Greek-Cypriot politics; the role of class in the broad sense (economic, socio-political and power relation) and the autonomy of nationalism matters that is closely connected to international politics of the post-cold war order (Trimikliniotis, 2004b). The central locus of power is the Cyprus state, via which the various interests are articulated by competing groups (see Kattos, 1999; Trimikliniotis, 2000a).

Initially the Greek-Cypriot powerful economic forces, or the bourgeoisie in Marxian terms, appeared to be divided over the Annan plan; however, the “divide” may not be as deep a rift. It appears rational to expect that the “maximalist” strategy may not have long to run, but the major financial forces in the construction and tourism industry prefer to retain the divided status quo rather than risk sharing the position they currently enjoy. Annan 4/5 had provisions which were not beneficial for Greek-Cypriot firms and large land owners who, since 1974, have become economically active in the south. The property provisions of Annan 5 were designed to win over the poorer and middle-income earners, leaving the large ones out. In view of this it appears reasonable to assume that major hoteliers, land-owners and developers would prefer the status quo and in the meantime continue to enjoy their power and privileges via the state, the media, the economic might, the relations with the powerful financial factors, as well as personal and business networks. Of course, there are other powerful factions orientated towards a solution, and thus positively predisposed to the Annan plan (and a revised Annan plan). A re-unified Cyprus would provide major opportunities for economic expansion, investment and establish new markets and “raw materials” for the tourist industry, which is currently nearing saturation point. It could also provide stability in the region; essential elements for growth and long-term prosperity (see Trimikliniotis and Ioakimoglou, 2005). In addition, the tourist sector is deeply divided over a solution.<sup>44</sup> The “no campaign” convinced those connected with the tourist sector that they stand to lose from an Annan-based solution as it might result in stiff competition and job-losses for workers<sup>45</sup> – this posture, however, evades the issue. In fact, partition would be a much more “negative” development for the Greek Cypriots in the longer-term than an Annan-based solution.

### **Social Transformations, Party and Power**

It would be misguided to present the formation of opinion as somehow unmediated via political and other institutions of society. We have already spoken of the role of

the State, as expressed via the powerful institution of the President. The other institutions that are important are political parties, which will be referred to briefly before we look at their fortunes as interpreted in the post-referendum elections. Cypriot society has been undergoing significant transformation that affects the social base of political parties (see Christoforou, 2001, 2003, 2005; also Sarris, 2006; Trimikliniotis, 2006).

The “modernist” section of DISY represented by the party leader, Mr. Anastasiades, decided to support the Annan plan fully, making a strategic choice to forego short-term political costs in favour of long-term gains. The party, which has traditionally consisted of two antagonistic poles, the “modernising” section (swinging betwixt neo-liberal tendencies and more socially-orientated policies) and the nationalistic-chauvinistic section (with corporatist but right-wing tendencies) had always been riddled with contradictions making co-existence under the same political formation tense. Anastasiades, however, having decided to let go of the national-chauvinist section, came into conflict with the majority of ordinary DISY voters, who did not follow the leadership (merely 38 per cent did).

The leading figures of the most vociferous “no” within DISY, eventually split the party and set up a new block to contest the Euro-elections, as EVRODI. They then merged with “Neoi Orizontes” and subsequently contested the Parliamentary elections of 2006, as EVROKO, although a small group around Prodromos Prodromou, who refused to merge and retained the party as EVRODI. Another initiative was an attempt to combine all the smaller parties together to consolidate the “no” vote, but such efforts were in vein. The parties DIKO and EDEK, who in the past had formed an old “national-patriotic front” in the early 1990s, agreed to unite as a single party. The smaller parties from the “hard no” camps tried to combine forces (e.g. Neoi Orizontes, EVROKO and ADYK), but some “one man” bands disappeared (e.g. EVRODI). Others, however, such as the Cypriot Greens<sup>46</sup> only just survived as Parliamentary parties. The “hard no” followers remain dependent on Tassos Papadopoulos, even though some of these parties appear further to the right than he does.

### **Messages From a Bottle: What Can We Learn From the Election Results?**

The results of the Euro-elections that followed soon after the referendum (13 June 2004), did not strengthen the DIKO party’s stance for Mr. Papadopoulos, and AKEL lost approximately 6 per cent of its votes. DISY lost 5 per cent but finished first with its splinter groups of right-wing extremists winning 11 per cent of the vote and EDEK receiving almost 11 per cent. The results did not “resolve” matters in any way. The 2004 European Parliament elections were the first that Cyprus had ever participated in. However, the Lilliputian parties of the “hard no” trailed behind Tassos Papadopoulos, failing in their attempt to capitalise on it in the European

Parliament and subsequent national Parliamentary elections. Following their failure to gain a single advantage in the polls they competed over claims as to which party was the most consistently anti-Annan, whilst attempting to appear as “European” as possible. Hence, the adjective “European” featured in every electoral campaign. Nevertheless, DIKO and its “hard no” allies also failed to capitalise on its “success” in the referendum. The party joined forces with the ex-DIKO groupings such as ADYK, but only managed to gain 17 per cent and secure one MEP despite up to the last minute rigorous campaigning, calling on the electorate to “back and empower the president.”<sup>47</sup> The tiny party “Neoi Orizontes” – preferring to vote for the “hard no” splinter group of DISY, “Coalition for Europe” in the euro-elections – lost half of its votes and dropped to 1.6 per cent. This group was led by veteran leader, Mr. Matsis, who won one seat (11 per cent), but later made a pact with his old party, DISY. Only EDEK regained what it once held – just under 11 per cent – failing, however, to win a Euro-Parliament seat by 35 votes. EDEK may have attracted a “sympathy vote” from old EDEK voters who defected to AKEL supporters in order “to help them out” and succeed in “sending a Socialist” to Europe. The (nationalistic) Greens more or less disappeared from the political map, whilst the pro-Annan EDY-based “European Cyprus” gained only 1.9 per cent. The irony is that the Left-wing AKEL (Progressive Party of the Working People), although apparently so concerned with party unity and the referendum – deciding “no, to cement the yes” – lost heavily in the Euro-elections. DISY, however, in spite of carrying only 38 per cent of its electoral support in the referendum and losing four MPs who split away, still managed to obtain the largest number of votes and secure two MEPs, even though 5 per cent of its vote was lost.

Beneath the surface however, lies a much more serious problem for the political parties: Abstention. AKEL dominated the abstention vote with 35 per cent of its traditional voters staying home (or voting for other parties). This has been interpreted by critics as a clear warning to the Party as well as a protest vote against their various policies: The party’s participation in a “rejectionist unholy alliance”, and above all, as punishment for AKEL’s “hermaphrodite” decision on the referendum. AKEL’s evaluation of the situation tried to downplay the role of the referendum and the reason why AKEL voters failed to turn up at the ballot box (for more see Christoforou, 2005).

The Parliamentary elections in May 2006 illustrated the tendency of the Greek-Cypriot political system to largely absorb the “shock” it received from the referendum outcome, with some gains for the “no” camp, but without managing to “capitalise” on the massive 76 per cent “no” vote. Hence, AKEL received 31 per cent (losing 3.6 per cent since 2001), DISY 30.6 per cent (losing 3.5 per cent), DIKO (increased by 3 per cent), EDEK (increased by 2.5 per cent), the new anti-federation party EVROKO, received 5.7 per cent and the other anti-federation party,

the Ecologists, 1.9 per cent. The small pro-solution party EDY, was borderline and ousted from Parliament and other “one-man-bands” failed to gain a seat. Some “consolidation” of the referendum results has been achieved by the two major parties, which were split over the UN plan, but remain in control of the situation even though they face new challenges. The 2006 election showed that abstention is seriously on the increase when compared to elections held in 2001 (but still less than in the 2004 elections).

The last Parliamentary election provided interesting reading as regards the shifts of opinion, whilst the next municipal elections are likely to be a precursor for the Presidential elections in 2008. In any case, what will be revealing about the prospects of a solution in this rather odd post-referenda era, is the way in which political forces position themselves in the light of the 2008 Presidential elections: Will there be a serious challenger to Tassos Papadopoulos from the Left and/or Right?

But let us reflect on how matters have evolved since then in an effort to analyse what happened.

### **The Greek-Cypriot Party Cleavages: The Cyprus Problem and the Annan Plan**

The political divide amongst parties in Cyprus is a political cleavage that goes back some years (see Attalides, 1986, Christophorou, 2003, 2005). Stein Rokkan’s work on political cleavages has defined the territory of understanding modern party politics (see Rokkan, 1970; Flora, 1999; also Bartolini, 1996 for the class cleavage). The post-referendum era of party and political opinion needs to be located within the historical divides of Greek-Cypriot politics.

The political party system is sharply divided along the Left-Right ideological lines but betwixt it there are matters that complicate and distort the traditional “Left-Right divide”. In the context of Cyprus there are factors that seem to crosscut the split, therefore, the different dimensions of the political divide between Greek-Cypriot political parties ought to be examined. They can be viewed as “axes of the political divide” in Greek-Cypriot politics.

(a) One Axis is “Radical” versus “Conservative” as Regards the Socio-economic Order

This more or less reflects the international ideological divide between the ideologies of Left (communism/socialism, social democracy, libertarianism, collective/class action), Centre-Left (social democracy, Keynesianism/welfare state, liberalism, libertarianism), Centre-Right (mixed economy, capitalism, Keynesianism/ welfare state, plus also stress on private initiative and enterprise), and Right (capitalism, mixed economy, private initiative, individualism and enterprise, privatisation, “less

state"). In practice, consensus politics means that 95 per cent of legislation is passed unanimously and the "tripartite" system of industrial relations and advanced social dialogue between the social partners keeps some of the rhetoric alive but not much of the actual conflict in terms of industrial disputes and direct action by workers.

(b) The Cyprus Issue Dimension

It may be assumed generally that Left-wing inclined parties, due to their proclaimed internationalism, are likely to be more conciliatory towards the Turkish Cypriots and are willing to live in peace with them. Historically, this has generally been the case: Left and liberals tended to be pro-peace, pro-compromise and rapprochement. Matters are, however, distorted as the question of nationalism cuts across the ideological and party cleavages: Apart from the nationalist camp and the far Right there has always been a social democratic and centrist hard line of nationalism attached to the Greek-Cypriot controlled State. It is well established from other contexts that nationalism is a complex phenomenon and takes different forms, affecting even those who are on the Left of the political spectrum, particularly in anti-colonial and post-colonial contexts where national-liberation and patriotism are motivating forces (see Balibar, 1991). Furthermore, strands of the Left who are anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, often see nationalism as a "tactical ally" in order to achieve their goal or they may even adopt nationalism as part of their programme of "self-determination of the nation" and "national liberations". The situation has become even more confusing since 1990 with the collapse of the USSR and their allies because some pro-Soviet Left-wing parties have taken up nationalism as their ideology to replace their dogmatic persuasion. In any case the relationship between socialism and nationalism has never been easy or straight forward (Davis, 1978; Nairn, 1979; Hobsbawm, 1989, pp. 119-143; Anderson, 1991, pp. 1-4; Nimni, 1991).

At least three sub-categories or sub-issues can be identified in the case of Cyprus:

Firstly, during the historical past, the position adopted in the major turning points that have defined modern Cyprus still operate as an important point of reference, i.e. the position as regards the anti-colonial struggle; or the position taken during 1960-1974 when the Greek-Cypriot political divide was between "pro-Makarios versus anti-Makarios forces"; later it was the position taken by the political forces over the 1974 coup. This divide appears to be fading as current politics on the Cyprus issue become more important for the immediate future, particularly after the 2004 referendum and the accession to the EU.

Secondly, the model employed by some researchers is that of dividing Greek-Cypriot political actors into "Cypro-centrists" versus "Helleno-centrists" (Papadakis, 1993, Peristianis, 1994; Mavratsas, 1998), with the two axes as the two extremes

and the two main political parties nearer the edges, while others take intermediary positions – AKEL and DISY respectively. Although these models explain some variations in the behaviour of parties in the past, such binary logics fail to capture the more sophisticated positionality shifts and changes on the ideological level. Zenon Stavrinides model (1999, p. 76) has a “Helleno-centric versus Cypro-centric” axis and a “moderate versus maximalist” axis which places the parties in position in this line accordingly. This model, however, grossly simplifies complex political positions and logics; it is not dynamic, it ignores the time factor and does not take into account where each party is coming from ideologically. In any case the location of political parties is debatable in his map.

Thirdly, the distinction “pro-federation/pro-solution” versus anti-federation” is important in assessing “the vision for the nation” as it materialises in the solution of the Cyprus problem: Irredentist nationalists are “anti-federation”, whilst accommodating/conciliatory and pragmatists, both nationalists and anti-nationalists, are “pro-federation”. The two camps could either be “Helleno-centric” or “Cypro-centric” as the cultural identity is not automatically translated into a direct political position; after all, both so-called “mother countries” gave their blessing to the Annan plan and old “nationalists” and “anti-nationalists” found their place in both camps, even if there was a hegemonic “no” based on nationalist rhetoric and discourse. AKEL, the most consistent anti-nationalist, Cypro-centric and moderate party (see Attalides, 1979; Papadakis, 1993) eventually aligned with the “no” camp on procedural grounds and for reasons of security.

With the Annan plan, however, we can go one step further. It is possible to distinguish between those who want minimalist changes that would not alter the philosophy of the bargain (i.e. the “soft no” together with those who see the problem in a more conciliatory manner) and those who are essentially opposed to a federal solution based on political equality between the two communities (i.e. the “hard no”). The referendum has defined a new dimension in Greek-Cypriot party politics, which is apparent in different contexts.<sup>48</sup> Even when there is no connection whatsoever, politicians are keen to present themselves as “victims” due to the stance they took in the referendum, even in the most bizarre situations.<sup>49</sup>

### (c) Social Issues

On these subjects the distinction is between “conservative” versus “liberal/libertarian”. Cypriot society is generally conservative, thus on issues such as homosexuality,<sup>50</sup> abortion, freedom of religion, immigration, the divide is not one of strict Left-Right partition.

Let us now turn to AKEL, the “soft no” of the Left.

### **AKEL's "Soft No": A Prisoner's Dilemma?**

#### **The AKEL Enigma and the Crisis of Anti-imperialist Rhetoric**

The stand of AKEL was the most striking upset in the referendum issue. It failed to support the Annan plan, despite the recognised prospect of being perhaps the greatest beneficiary from a reunified Cyprus under the plan. In fact, the party considered the plan's positive element:

"in spite of the dangers constituted a hopeful basis for the reunification of Cyprus".

The alliance with Mr. Papadopoulos seemed to have worked well up to the Swiss talks with the President appearing generally reserved and in-check by AKEL. It all changed, however, on the President's return to Cyprus and his address to the Greek-Cypriot people. AKEL called for a postponement of the referenda in order to obtain "necessary guarantees" for the implementation of a solution and security and to fill in certain "gaps", thus to "entertain" the fears and insecurities of the people.<sup>51</sup> Having realised that a deep divide was in sight and a "yes" by AKEL might have shifted the party over to the losing side, hence forfeiting its role in the Government, AKEL did not support the plan and called for a "no" vote at the last minute. Most of the party's voters followed the leadership, but a large section voted "yes". It distinguished its own "procedural no" to "cement a massive and substantial yes" for the plan "next time". In the process, however, it may well have injured its ties with Turkish Cypriots and intellectual sympathisers. Nevertheless, AKEL remains the key to the solution in the future. It insists that it supports a revised Annan plan; the formula of the party is the federal solution based on the Annan plan which should make amendments, as such, that would satisfy the Greek-Cypriot concerns, but will not alter the philosophy of the plan or take away any Turkish-Cypriot rights. Be that as it may, its position appears more blurred as the prospects for a solution fade away.

AKEL cannot be perceived as merely a political party like any other. The party organisation is only one part, admittedly the centre or the "nucleus" of a wider movement involving mass-based organisations (trade unions, youth organisations, women's groups, football teams, the cooperative movement etc.), in every neighbourhood and village across the country (see Adams, 1971; Panayiotou, 1999). It is the only party that has a following on the "other side of the island". It is a party that has internalised what one researcher called Cyprus' unique "boundary experience" (Panayiotou, 2005). The party was born out of the labour movement (see Lefkis, 1984; Servas, 1997, 2005; Leventis, 1997; Kalodoukas, 2003), and from its inception was a trans-ethnic movement as it transcended ethnic-communal barriers fighting originally for a "united anti-colonial and anti-imperialist front of

Greeks and Turks.”<sup>52</sup> “National liberation” in the original formulation of KKK (Communist Party of Cyprus), which was formed in 1926 uniting the nucleus into a clandestine party formation that would lead the working class, took a strong anti-nationalistic stance: “Enosis” or unification with Greece was viewed as a “chauvinistic diversion” from the real revolutionary stance, which demanded the transformation of society there and then (see AKEL, 1977; Servas, 1997, 2005; Katsiaounis, 2000; Leventis, 1997, 2002). Since that time the Left in Cyprus has been dominated by AKEL.<sup>53</sup> Contantinou’s (2003a) observation that AKEL is the second most ancient political institution after the church is pertinent and crucial. Due to its history, structure and praxis, AKEL has certain “special” characteristics as a communist party with a mass base and remains the only party with inter-ethnic support from the two large communities of Cyprus.<sup>54</sup> AKEL’s tactical retreat, which forced it into “rearguard action”, rather than going on the offensive – a practice that has disappointed many – may under certain conditions finally prove to be useful if we move towards a solution in the immediate future. Alternatively, if there is no solution in sight and there is no resumption of negotiations, it may become a tragic historic mistake.

We now turn to the root of AKEL’s ambivalence toward the Annan plan, to examine the ideological, social and political considerations that have shaped this ambivalence.

### **AKEL’s Ambivalence on the Annan Plan: Imperial(istic) Trojan Horse or an Historic Opportunity for Reunification?**

As stated earlier, AKEL’s dilemmas and vacillations between the “yes” and “no” reflect the tension within its twin tradition of, on the one hand, being the “rapprochement party par excellence” (labour movement, “common front of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriots workers” etc.), and on the other, being an “anti-imperialist party”. This very dilemma between “anti-nationalism” versus “anti-imperialism” also dominated the Greek Left, which was equally split into two camps that were unable to exchange views without accusing one another of “selling out the class enemies”, either “local bourgeoisie” or “imperialism and its comprador classes and lackeys”.

One of the major points of contestation was the role of the US, the UK and the other imperial powers in shaping the Annan plan and the way in which its content and particularly the potential implementation of it might be constructed as “serving the interests of these powers” contra to the “interests of the people of Cyprus”. This point requires specific attention, amid confusion and gross misunderstanding both at regional (Cyprus, Greece, Turkey) level as well as at international level concerning the “imperialism of our time”, to use Aijaz Ahmad’s title (Ahmad, 2004, pp. 156-181). In fact this is an issue that crosscuts the Left-Right boundaries and



is constantly under debate in the Cypriot media. Moreover, the problem seems to be a wide-ranging conceptual conundrum facing the “Left” (in all its shapes, shades and forms). In a timely volume of Socialist Register 2004, aptly titled “The New Imperial Challenge”, Leo Panitch and Colin Leys (2004, p. 13) note:

“It seems to us that an increasingly serious limitation of contemporary socialist thought is its lack of conceptual tools capable of analysing the nature of imperialism today rather than recycling theories developed in a much earlier era.”

The theoretical lacuna in analysing the “US-led globalisation and a new and more overt form of US imperialism” (Panitch and Leys, 2004, p. 13) is very much at the heart of the failure of the Left in Cyprus, including both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots as well as the Left in Greece and Turkey, to devise a common and insightful strategy that might properly influence the outcome of events as regards the Cyprus issue. In the three countries the political forces of the Left were deeply divided over the Annan plan at all points in the diametrically oppositional axis in a “debate” more akin to a hysterical outcry than a reasoned dialectical argumentation. Inter and intra-party and grouping rivalries were so intense, it was reminiscent of the collapse of the Second International over the First World War. The Left could no longer speak with anything resembling a common voice, not even in common language, and in the same vein the Right and Centre had also split itself. The Annan plan opened “Pandora’s Box” and the crisis of the Left was so blatant, even in a country like Cyprus where AKEL, the local Communist party, attracts about 31-35 per cent of the vote and is a principal player in local politics.

In Greece, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) entered into a strange alliance – Neo-Marxist, Stalinist, Maoist, and Trotskyite groupings with various nationalistic and Right-wing forces and took an utterly hostile stance to the UN plan. They called it an “imperialistic Trojan horse” which aimed to impose the US dominated “New World Order” designs on the fragile Turkey-Greece-Cyprus triangle. They alleged that the plan would impose Ankara, a USA ally, onto the EU and thus reduce the Cyprus Republic into an “ineffectual Anglo-American protectorate” with NATO (British, Turkish and Greek) troops at variance with the principles of national sovereignty and independence. On the polar opposite, the dominant forces of Synaspismos (the evolution of the Euro-communists) took the view that AKEL’s position ought to be a major consideration. However, they eventually decided, by majority, that the Annan plan was a great opportunity for rapprochement, not only between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, but also between Greece and Turkey. Within Synaspismos there were strong descending voices which echoed more or less the KKE position with a more Europhile twist. They viewed the Annan plan as an Anglo-American recipe to incapacitate the emerging European “third polar” that would threaten US hegemony.

The contrasts between Left-wing groups illustrate the disarray in the state of theory and anti-imperialist strategy in the specific context of Cyprus. The KKE was overwhelmed by the resounding “no” as it was viewed as another nail in the coffin of imperialism; another attack on the “imperialist chain” similar to the way in which resistance in Iraq and Palestine is developing. For Synaspismos the result was a regrettable slide into new irrational nationalism, which injures the opportunity for rapprochement, and which might lead to a permanent partition of Cyprus.

The case of Cyprus essentially exemplifies the complex current conjuncture and illustrates the poverty of their theoretical framework and the absence of a long-term strategy that would have a practical effect. The Cyprus problem consists of multiple sets of conflicts and is riddled with local, regional and international contradictions and only via a multi-layer and complex theory of “imperialism” today, the role of nationalism, class and other social conflicts, inter and intra-regional state projects and rivalries, can we gain the insight to appreciate it and devise the necessary strategies and tactics.

There is a delicate balance to be observed. The most important element in this “equation” is the “internal” versus “external” component of the Cyprus problem – both of which are of equal importance and priority. Whilst one has to be aware of the constant interplay between the “internal” and “external”, it is vital that this analytical distinction between the two is retained so that the analysis is not one-sided, which is tantamount to distortion of the real world we live in and is thus detrimental to the development of an effective strategy.<sup>55</sup>

#### **“Soft No” and Hard Choices: A Communist’s Post-modern Power Dilemma?**

AKEL’s drift away from its initial “soft no” is apparent from a mere glance at the position it took at its Extraordinary Conference on 14 April 2004 and the subsequent position taken in its 20<sup>th</sup> Pancyprian Congress. The party did not formally abandon its previous position but the wording illustrates the shift of position to a “harder no” but not quite a “hard no”. AKEL holds a vague position somewhere in between its original “soft no” (mostly procedural) and the “hard no” of the Papadopoulos line, but the 20<sup>th</sup> Pancyprian Congress did not specify the party’s areas of concern over the Annan plan. This gives enormous scope for discretion to the central committee, which in practice can be interpreted as discretion to the party leadership.

More recently, the AKEL spokesperson Andros Kyprianou<sup>56</sup> stated AKEL’s areas of concern, indicating a shift of position from being largely concerned with procedural and implementation issues to more substantive areas, although he acknowledged that AKEL had “no illusions” and did “realise that the historical compromise also entails the acceptance of unpleasant aspects”. He said that,

“the Annan Plan contains a whole number of serious negative elements, some of which are a source of extreme concern for the Greek Cypriots.”

He added that AKEL always stressed that its policy does “not aim to take away rights, even privileges, which the Annan plan conceded to our Turkish-Cypriot compatriots” and notes that “the disproportionate participation of the Turkish Cypriots, bearing in mind the demographic balances, in all the bodies and decisions of the federal state do not constitute an essential obstacle”. He suggests, however, that “the Annan plan leaves a huge number of settlers in Cyprus, greater than the number of Turkish Cypriots”,<sup>57</sup> and represents “a drastic change in the demographic balance on the island and it would of course bring an unfair advantage to the content of the solution itself”. The issue of the settlers itself, he argues, “gives an adequate explanation as to why the Greek Cypriots voted the way they did”. Secondly, he raised the issue of “the rights of intervention”, which is he says “another great source of concern of the Greek Cypriots”. What is unclear in AKEL’s papers is whether the party’s immediate objective in future negotiations is to denounce and abandon the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, something never decided at the congress. Although the removal of such imperial or neo-colonial elements are certainly important long-term goals of the party, such a drastic call for an immediate denouncing would require all other elements to be dropped and herald a radical change of policy. Thirdly, “an extremely lengthy timetable is set out for the withdrawal of the troops, whilst not all of the troops will be withdrawn in the end”. And fourthly, as far as the property issue is concerned, he refers to the provision that will give back “just one-third of what belongs to refugees”, as being problematic. In reality, many refugees will never be able to return because “so many new construction works have been built on existing buildings and exemptions that have been made that in fact they constitute the rule rather than the exception”. Overall he suggests that,

“there are also other issues that may be addressed such as the presence of foreign troops, the right to intervene, the number of settlers, some property issues and timetable and safeguards for implementation are issues that warrant renegotiation and can certainly be improved for the benefit of both communities. Solutions to such problems are possible and within sight as long there is goodwill by all sides.”

Kyprianou’s references are the latest issues raised; AKEL’s position remains vague – perhaps deliberately so – and at times contradictory.

AKEL’s dilemmas extend beyond the “soft no”, the “hard no” and the “yes”. We have already referred to the competing legacies of the Left between “anti-imperialism” versus “anti-nationalism.” The socio-historical and political context within which the Cypriot Left was born and from which it derives its popular

legitimacy is such that it can threaten its very base. This instability is accentuated by tensions over the lack of progress in the search for a post-referendum solution between its traditionally pro-solution, pro-rapprochement support, to the “disciplines” of being locked in a coalition with the “hard no” element as the party is forced into political acrobatics analogous to a “balance on tight rope” and simultaneously behaving within the coalition to play a guerrilla-like “quasi oppositional” role. This balancing act has two dimensions that are played together in an unsynchronised manner:

- Firstly, AKEL’s ambivalent stance and dilemmas during/after the referenda puts the party in “a permanent exceptional state”, to modify and apply Agamben’s terms (2005a, 2005b): The “soft no” was a temporary safety board that allowed Christofias an opportunity to avoid confronting the responsibility of the party’s self-declared “historic mission” as the “vanguard of the working class and its allies” in front of its dual constituency, the Greek-Cypriot Left and the Turkish-Cypriot Left. So far, however, this policy has failed to place any real pressure on the dominant “hard no” of the official Greek-Cypriot side. The situation is comparable to a time-bomb ticking away while time is running out.
- Secondly, the party’s flexible, practical and pragmatic policies, which were both criticised and praised for “deviating” from its ideological doctrines, may have reached a climax: Theory and praxis appear to be so divergent that the party’s ideology appears to be in flux. It is, of course, remarkable that the party has not only survived successfully the collapse of the so-called “really existing socialism”, but it has gained and stabilised its support. Nonetheless, the party has more or less ceased to produce any new “ideological lessons” for cadres since 1995. It has not really produced a theory of the world beyond the usual condemnation of the “new world order” and the occasional recycling of a largely formalistic rhetoric. AKEL’s adherence to a broad Communist ideology, which may in the past have appeared to its critics as “illiberal, austere and non-renewable rhetoric,”<sup>58</sup> has nevertheless proved to be much more adaptable, flexible and reflexive in practice (see Panayiotou, 2005). For example, it attempts to stir its own “concept of socialism” in an interesting document after the fall of the eastern European regimes<sup>59</sup> and intervened rather creatively in the debate over the modernisation of Cypriot society, even though the documents produced arouse some criticism for being eclectic, not very detailed and for containing incoherent elements.<sup>60</sup>

The party’s mass following and strong organisation since its early days in the 1950s to the 1960s is undoubtedly a source of its strength (see Adams, 1971; Panayiotou, 1999); but this, might also impede flexible decision-making that requires quick responses to changing events. Furthermore, it may prove to become

a serious problem when the party is in coalition with partners sporting a different ideological outlook and priorities. It may also result in failing to meet the expectations of the mass constituency due to its inability to properly “serve” its members as it wishes due to the inadequacy in the pace or the quality of delivery of Government policies. AKEL’s seemingly impossible position is defined by trying to provide both at the same time within the Government coalition, AND also lead the mass movement outside of the Government. It is a dilemma which has been similarly faced by other Communist parties throughout the globe.<sup>61</sup> To some extent the party’s presence in the current Government has managed to check any drift towards a more adventurous neoliberal agenda, i.e. policies on the privatisation of public utilities, reductions in benefits, trade liberalisation, flexibilisation, curbing trade union power, or the abolition of COLA, however, it has not been able to realise any major socio-economic reforms and the process of flexibilisation of the markets, including the labour markets continue (see Kattos, 1999; INEK, 2005). Also the disciplines of power with more conservative forces and the insistence that Cyprus achieves the Maastricht criteria and adopts the Euro by 2007 has generated further economic difficulties, insecurity and uncertainty for the lower strata and poorer sections of the population. The reforms derived from EU accession have brought high petrol prices, “tight spending” policies, reductions in earnings from tourism,<sup>62</sup> sometimes ill-designed reform packages as well as the employer’s invigorated post accession agenda. They have also produced a period of accentuated strike activity, popular mobilisations and frustration by farmers, lorry drivers, small shop owners, pensioners, students, Cyprus airways employees, teachers and temporary public employees, construction and hotel workers as well as migrants and asylum-seekers. The party has thus been forced to act as a “broker” with the Government in this unusual popular activism in the Republic. The only “success story” in terms of pushing forward AKEL’s agenda has been the adoption of the comprehensive proposal for education reform by the Ministry of education, but even this has been stalled because the reform has not been implemented.<sup>63</sup>

AKEL’s so-called “enclosure” to take Philippou’s formulation may turn out to be a serious stumbling block. The party decided that retention of its “unity” is much more important than “clarity” of position or even “dialogue”. This has created a particularly problematic issue since there is no release mechanism for the accumulating pressures derived from daily conflict and contestation. The more the party becomes integrated within the power/state structures the more the contradictions between theory and praxis will become evident and more pressure will be imposed on the leadership to “contain” debate. The core issue is the explosive character of the “lost words”, the unarticulated social and political demands that are denied or banned from becoming legitimate political discourses and platforms in contestation. The search for the lost words of Kavazoglou, the Turkish-Cypriot martyr of the party,<sup>64</sup> allows for a theorisation of the historic success

of Cypriot Left patriotism as the unconsciously Gramscian party that derived an outlook primarily from its praxis (Panayiotou, 2005, pp. 43-74); it may however account for the limitations and the party's historic failure to "speak for the subaltern", to apply Spivak's original post-colonial formulation (Spivak, 1988), in this case the Turkish-Cypriot Leftists (see Panayiotou, 2005). The fact that the politics of AKEL were shaped by the process of the "boundary experience" (Panayiotou, 1999) compelled to deal with "new boundaries" but not necessarily successfully. The erection of new borderlines and frontiers by "fortress Europe" (see Trimikliniotis, 2001) will in fact actuate the tensions and press the party's delicate balances to its limits. Thousands of new challenges promoting fresh scope for resistance will appear before the party and the social movements of Cyprus: Hardt's and Negri's search of "a thousand plateaus" (Deleuze and Guattari, 1988) of resistance in the struggle against Empire may at last find expression within the Cyprus of the new millennium (Hardt and Negri, 2001). AKEL is perhaps the most receptive microcosm of the dilemmas and challenges ahead: It will be compelled sooner or later to open up the process of dialogue, as transfigured following the collapse of the USSR and its allies, if it does not wish to be misfigured.

AKEL would be forced to open up the processes for democratic dialogue in order to aid the next phase of the democratisation of the party structure – its' own "unfinished revolution"<sup>65</sup> occurred after the collapse of the so-called "actually existing socialism" and the internal split of the party. The process was brought to a halt for pragmatic reasons as the party turned its attention to the governance of the country. As younger party cadres became more established and the internal party's bureaucratisation processes established their own "new order" sadly confirming Michels' pessimistic account of the drift to oligarchy in social democratic parties (Michels, 1997). For the time being the fear of division has imposed an "exceptional state of emergency" banning the questioning of the leadership's choices. However, the formulae of "putting the lid on the opposition" have been tested in the past and proved to be disastrous.<sup>66</sup> More centralisation is likely to create more disillusionment, whilst the lack of democratic dialogue is likely to lead to a dead end, strangling and suffocating whatever is live and vibrant in the party.

### **Exit Routes: A Sociologist's Explanations, Interpretations, Praxis?**

This section merely attempts to round up the concerns and extract some final questions for debate, rather than close the issues. It will start by returning to the referendum and what determined the outcome and then tackle the post-referendum politics: What determined the 76 per cent?

As far as the readily available explanations of the Greek-Cypriot "no" are concerned we have three types of reasons provided:

- The first explanation is the favourite one of the “official” Greek-Cypriot side: It was simply a “bad” plan for the Greek-Cypriots, who justifiably rejected it as “manifestly unjust”, “unfair”, “one-sided”, favouring Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots and “unworkable”. In other words it was the content of the plan that produced the appropriate outcome according to the vast majority of the population.
- The second is a structural explanation: Greek-Cypriot institutions as such (schooling, media, the army, the state functions, the church etc.), tend to perpetuate and freeze the situation. Old style Greek-Cypriot irredentism is out of fashion now and has been transformed into something “novel” or “mutated into an irredentism lite” (Constantinou, 2003b) to find expression in an implicit rejection of federal-based settlement that requires political equality at a communal level into a majoritarianism. According to the majoritarian doctrine “Turkish Cypriots are merely a minority and thus cannot be politically equal as a community”.
- The third explanation offers a conjunctural or symptomatic character. According to this view, the developments have been determined by specific positions taken by actors, such as the political parties. It is essentially a problem of “political leadership”: The vast majority of political forces supported “no”.

Although there is an extensive range of anti-Annan literature (Palley, 2005; Papasavvas, 2003; Theophanous, 2003, 2004; Emilianides, 2003; Kentas, 2003; Kontos, 2003; Mavromatis, 2003; Fokaides, 2003 etc.),<sup>67</sup> there is also literature that provides an equally, if not more convincing case for the Annan plan (Vassiliou, 2004; Markides, 2004; Tsielepis, 2004; Hadjidemetriou, 2006). A number of prestigious international legal experts suggested that the plan was viable and acceptable such as Crawford (2002), Alivizatos (2003), Drosos, (2003) etc., whilst others said otherwise (e.g. Chrysogonos, 2003). Recently a more balanced presentation of the Annan plan puts matters in a more sober perspective – the overall schema of the plan is sound; the main faults are the legacies of the past, but that there can certainly be some improvements to the plan (see Syrigos, 2005).

The assumption that the plan was “bad” and “one-sided” cannot stand closer scrutiny of the constitutional, political and economic dimensions of it, in spite of the substantial literature that reproduces the same linear thinking on the subject. Such perspectives assume an automatic, autonomous and unmediated behaviour by all voters without due examination – the reasons why individuals, groups and institutions in society vote for something for completely different reasons. In order to understand why Greek Cypriots voted the way they did in the referendum we must consider also a number of circumstantial, symptomatic or conjunctural reasons that were important in determining the outcome. All the same the sheer

magnitude of the result is illustrative of more deeply rooted and long-term factors in operation – as well as dissatisfaction with the process itself. Starting with the latter, it is crucial to appreciate how we ended up with the Annan plan and gain some idea about its content – a subject of gross misunderstanding and misinformation. Structural factors are equally as crucial as conjunctural. None of the above explanations alone can, therefore, really explain why Greek Cypriots voted the way they did. There are different reasons which motivate each individual's decision and there is an interesting debate amongst politicians, opinion survey analysts and researchers on the subject. Indeed it is a matter of ongoing research and interpretation. The content of the plan in conjunction with the context (local and international) and the way internal political forces competed, making use of structural (i.e. deep rooted institutional, power, social, economic, and cultural factors in society) as well as conjunctural or symptomatic factors (short-term issues relating to timing, campaign tactics and leadership), determined the outcome of the referenda. In other words it comes down to the way in which the interpretation of what the plan signifies is understood, together with the meaning of the compromise and the way it was to be implemented that determined the outcome. It was a contest for which interpretation was to become dominant but not necessarily the merits, strengths and weaknesses of the UN plan. In effect it is by studying the combination of all three explanations together that we are able to reach a conclusion on the subject.

### **Cypriot Society at the Crossroads: Can the “Soft No” Create the Conditions for a “Post-Annan Plan” to Overcome the Cyprus Impasse?**

This is the challenge for the “soft no”, and the challenge for AKEL. How does it act to open up and facilitate the transformation of a system that is unable to even discuss the issues, never mind find solutions? The Cyprus issue is not only a problem in its own right; it is a major obstacle to the modernisation and democratisation of Cypriot society, north and south of the barbed wire. AKEL's fate is common with that of Cyprus. It is a boundary party by its very nature. To push Panayiotou's (1999, 2005) argument further, it is the class, ethnic, national, gender boundary party, and the boundary. Its defensive strategy has prolonged suspense so far, but this seems to have reached a ceiling. The question however is, how can the party activate a debate on the issues? And what headings should be discussed?

In the first instance, AKEL must review how the “soft no” policy is working in terms of bringing about the desired results. Even if the party leaves the question of “anti-imperialism versus anti-nationalism” unresolved as an existential angst, it can and indeed is forced to proceed to clarify where it stands with regard to developing its long-declared goal of “a common front of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots” that might serve as a basis for the resolution of the problem. AKEL has little choice



but to begin to honour what it claims to be its own policies, i.e. that the Turkish Cypriots are to be “politically equal” at a communal as well as at an individual level. It must start to view them as a political subject with the option and autonomous representational rights. The trans-communal or trans-ethnic future can only come via a “transitional process” of coexistence within an Annan-like settlement, or better a post-Annan settlement. The recent Turkish-Cypriot uprising, which has never been properly recognised by the Greek-Cypriot community may have resulted in the integration of the Turkish Cypriots in the “state” and power structures of the north, but its shadow is a constant reminder that authentic popular politics also happened outside “our” doorstep. AKEL is in the unique position of being able to shape constitutional history with its CTP (Turkish Republican Party) counterpart, not only due to their historic ties but also due to the real daily social relations in the trade union and other popular movements that have been re-established since April 2003 when the barricades opened (see Trimikliniotis, 2003a and 2003c).<sup>68</sup> The opening of the closed militarily imposed border allows thousands of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots to cross over on a daily basis; there are over 5000 Turkish-Cypriots working in the south and others who interact on a daily basis. In July 2006 the first multi-ethnic or trans-ethnic strike took place consisting of Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, Pontians and other migrant construction workers, which was organised by Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot trade unions (about 25,000 workers in the sector – the strike was successful as far as mobilising support). The political climate is not the best, but things seem to be moving (see Trimikliniotis, 2006). Having said this, it is essential to appreciate that the mass party of the Turkish-Cypriot Left (CTP), is following more less the same dilemmas as AKEL. It seems comfortable with being in power north of the barbed wire and it is also responsible for the bad relations between the two major parties of the Left. Saying “yes” in 2004 is simply not enough; it is the aftermath of the referendum that shall determine whether we can overcome the de facto partition.

The second issue is closely connected to the first: AKEL's connection to the governance of the Republic. It will soon be forced to decide how to confront Tassos Papadopoulos whose Presidential term in office expires shortly. The post-referendum period has been marked by a regress and closure of the democratic debate of the Republic, a stalemate in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem, and social discontent due to many reasons. Sooner rather than later AKEL must decide where it stands on the various issues; moreover it will be pressed to decide who to champion in the 2008 Presidential elections.

Thirdly, on the subject of ideology the issue is a longer-term one: What sort of thinking processes will AKEL establish to rekindle a stalemate in political thinking and theorising that could guide its praxis? How will it respond to the challenges of globalised knowledge and the social movements? How does it handle the rise of nationalism, racism and xenophobia?

Finally, it seems that it is still impossible to have an informed dialogue over the Cyprus issue amongst citizens because there is no political space – a kind of “neutral zone for engagement in dialogue”– or “a third space”, as Sitas (2005) calls it,<sup>69</sup> to engage in a way forward on the kind of changes to the UN plan that is acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots. We have witnessed a “freezing” of the debate, in what can be thought of as a negative “structure transformation of the public sphere” that has been denied the possibility for critical thinking and the social action of citizens. Kitromilides’ reference (1979) to the post-colonial syndrome, called the “dialectic of intolerance”, seems to have survived into the new millennium. The “austere Cypriot enclosure” and the “absence of critical thinking” can be brought to an end thus allowing the Greek-Cypriot body politic to introduce reflexivity into their policies on the Cyprus question and a new politics of intercommunal, transethnic and transnational citizenship. The current climate is neither stable, nor permanent; it marks rather a non-sustainable transitional point of hegemony. Greek-Cypriot society remains deeply polarised, confused and uncertain; democratic and open dialogue is the only feasible way out, and the only way to introduce reflexivity and contrive to “move on” with the Cyprus impasse.

This article has concentrated on the contested relations between the policy of the “hard no” as represented by President Papadopoulos and the “soft no” personified by AKEL. The Government coalition has resulted in the obfuscation of the two alternative strategies for exit of the post-referenda impasse. They also each represent an alternative social and ideological trajectory for the future of the country. This is essentially the new Left-Right divide that allows for a new social imaginary of Cyprus. Will there be a divided Cyprus searching for a new “geopolitical partnership in Europe” to essentially absorb the Turkish Cypriots should the opportunities arise in the future, or alternatively, can the Greek-Cypriot official side come to an understanding with the new Turkish-Cypriot leadership in a limited renegotiation of the Annan plan to reunite the country and share on an equal footing the wealth, power and the future? The protracted contest between the “hard no” and the “soft no” is the key to unlocking the Cyprus problem. At last, after all these years, “the prospects for the reunification of their country now rest primarily in their hands” [the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots], as the UN Secretary General reminded us straight after the Referenda.<sup>70</sup>

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### Notes

1. The Cyprus Review covered extensively some of these debates. It even published a special issue on the subject 'Cyprus, the EU and the Referenda on the Annan Plan', Vol. 16, No. 2. See papers by Heraklides, 2004; Camp, 2004; Bahcheli, 2004; Coufoudakis, 2004; Veremis and Savvides, 2004. Similar discussions took place in the Greek-Cypriot press and Turkish-Cypriot press and in Greek and Turkish journals.
2. Such a review is attempted in a forthcoming publication, in Greek: Trimikliniotis, N. 'The Nation-State Dialectic – The Adventures of a National Question and the Euro-Cyprus Conuncture'.
3. The only exceptions are: Hadjidemetriou, 2006 and various papers in journals (see Trimikliniotis, 2004a, 2005a and 2005b).
4. These issues are elaborated further whereby I set out ways in which there has been a transformation of the political, social and economic priorities that created the momentum for a settlement in Cyprus and thus created the conditions for the UN plan to "emerge" (see Trimikliniotis, 2005a, pp. 168-204).
5. Most opinion polls on political issues have added an "independent variable" in their question list based on how people voted during the referendum.
6. These ideas were amplified in detail elsewhere (see Trimikliniotis, 2005a and forthcoming).
7. For an outstanding presentation of the global networks see the three-volume monumental work of Manuel Castells (1996, 1997, and 2000).
8. Even the generally pro-Western Economist speaks about the USA at least in part – "paying for self-inflicted mistakes" such as invading Iraq for no reason, picking a fight with Iran and Syria, being indifferent to the plight of the Palestinians and not guiding Israel towards peace (see the Leader's column Economist, 12-18 August 2006, pp. 9-10).
9. The determinants of this long-term decline are outlined by Wallerstein, I. (2003) *The Decline of American Power, the USA in a Chaotic World*, London, Verso. Also, the Economist recognises that "America is by no means as powerful as its friends and enemies think" (Leader's column Economist, 12-18 August 2006, p. 9).
10. An account of such contradictions is contained in Gill, S. (2005) 'The Contradictions of US Supremacy', *Socialist Register*, pp. 23-45.
11. In fact this is what the UN Secretary General said in his Report on Cyprus shortly after the referenda in 2004 and repeated again in 2005 and 2006.
12. The Cold War has been a prime determining force in the fortunes of the people of Cyprus, as is the re-configured "order" since. The involvement of the UN goes back to 1964 with the setting up of UNFICYP (United Nations Force in Cyprus): The problem did not start in 1963, as the Turkish-Cypriot official view dictates, nor did it start in 1974, as prescribed by the Greek-Cypriot official view – it was present in 1960 with the emergence of the Cyprus Republic and it has since passed through various phases and escalations.
13. Hitchens, 1997, p. 158 refers to the following four main but related questions which the

- Cyprus problem consists of: (a) The relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; (b) The long-standing differences between the states of Greece and Turkey; (c) The time factor – Hitchens was writing during the Cold War period; (today this would mean the politics of the “New World Order”); (d) The place factor (the regional strategic importance of the island).
14. The division between “internal” and “external” should never be viewed as rigid or in reality as neatly demarcating these processes. Attalides’ study of Cyprus from the point of view of “nationalism and international politics” provides a complex approach to the study of the problem(s) of Cyprus (Attalides, 1979), indeed “... the Cyprus problem represents a classic example of the interplay of domestic and international politics” (Coufoudakis, 1993, p. 41).
  15. If the works of the opponents of the Annan plan are read, i.e. Papasavvas (2003); the collective book by Emilianides, A., Kentas, G., Kontos, M., Mavromatis, M. and Fokaides, P. (2004); Ioannides, (2004); Theophanous (2004); Angelidou, K., Alavanos, A., Mihailides, A., Stoforopoulos, Th., Chrysogonos, K. (2004); Chrysogonos (2003); Kostantakopoulos (2004); Palley (2005), the journalistic style book based on “anecdotal data” (i.e. with little, if any references) by Venizelos, Ignatiou and Meletiou, 2005 (see endnote 36), it is apparent that they all consider the referendum date to be a crucial historic moment.
  16. An extensive effort was made as can be traced in a selected number of newspaper publications at the time. Another example was a poorly attended discussion at Intercollege in late 2002, chaired by Sia Anagnostopoulou when the prospects of the Swiss model of governance with reference to Cyprus were examined, which resulted in publications in the Cypriot journal *Ex Yparhis* and the Greek journal *Theseis* (see Constantinou, 2003c and Trimikliniotis, 2003a). For other journal publications see Constantinou, 2002, 2003a and 2003b and Trimikliniotis, 2003a, 2004a, 2004b, 2005b.
  17. And they are of male gender as a rule.
  18. From the survey of the Cyprus School of Tourism, as analysed by Webster (2005) to the research surveys of Lordos (2004) and Faiz (2006) as well as other research (Stavrinides et al., 2006; and opinion polls by CyBC.
  19. Any anti-Annan book or article is likely to contain such references.
  20. The concept “Grossraum” is a principle in geopolitics, which means “Great Area”, formulated by the German jurist Carl Schmitt. Grossraum is an area dominated by a power representing a distinct political idea. For the application of this idea to Cyprus see Constantinou (2002).
  21. Antonio Gramsci (22 January, 1891 – 27 April, 1937) was an Italian writer, politician and political theorist; a founding member and one-time leader of the Communist Party of Italy. He was imprisoned by Mussolini’s fascist regime. At his trial, Gramsci’s prosecutor famously stated, “For twenty years we must stop this brain from functioning”. Ironically, there he wrote 30 notebooks and 3000 pages of history and analysis, his celebrated “Prison notebooks” that would make him famous and influential internationally. Gramsci is viewed by many as one of the most important Marxist thinkers of the twentieth century, in particular as a key thinker in the development of Western Marxism. His writings are heavily concerned with the themes of culture and leadership and he is notable as a

- highly original thinker within the Marxist tradition. He opposed a “philosophy of praxis” to materialist dialectics and is renowned for his concept of hegemony as a means of maintaining the state in a capitalist society. As a theorist of the party he developed ideas about the need to master the “science and art of politics”, so that the party acts like “the modern Prince” (adapting this from Machiavelli) in order to build the “counter-hegemony” of the subaltern classes (see Gramsci, 1972).
22. For an extensive discussion the political debate of the Greek-Cypriot elections of 21 May 2006, see the journal *Peripeties Ideon*, Issue No.1, *Politis*, 21 May 2006; see also Christophorou (2005).
  23. This is the Vice President of DIKO, MP Nicos Pittokopitis (see Drousiotis, 2005). He was voted out in the May 2006 elections.
  24. In Greek he called it «ηχηρό όχι».
  25. The 20th Pancyprian Congress of AKEL took place in Nicosia from 24-27 November 2005.
  26. In Greek he stated: «εμείς δεν θέλουμε ηχηρό όχι».
  27. A glut of articles of this sort has been written in the newspaper *Alitheia* and some from “yes” supporters in *Politis*. Their style of criticism is many times characterised with bitterness and frustration due to the fact that they are not able to understand why AKEL behaved the way it has.
  28. The newspaper *Simerini* is articulating these sorts of arguments on an almost daily basis.
  29. Circles close to the Presidential palace referred to “36 small vetoes”, i.e. a veto for each of Turkey’s chapters.
  30. See Prendergast, K. UN Press Release SC/8422 on 22 June 2005.
  31. For a critique of both books see Trimikliniotis, N. (2005c) ‘The Cyprus Problem: An International Relations Debacle or Merely an Unclimbed Peak?’ *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (Spring 2005), pp. 144-153.
  32. Hadjidemetriou quotes David Hannay.
  33. According to *Kibris* newspaper the Turkish-Cypriot side proposes eight areas (administration, territorial issues, foreign relations, EU related affairs, international conventions, procedures implemented, foreign debts, security/guarantees); the Greek-Cypriot side proposes that the following issues be discussed: administration, EU relations, property, economic unification, the continental shelf, shipping, aviation, sources of energy, citizenship/nationality, immigration and asylum, education and cultural heritage. On everyday issues the UN proposes that the committees discuss ten issues: health, environment, water management, waste management, money laundering, crime prevention, road safety, migration and illegal immigration, crisis resolution and humanitarian issues. The Turkish-Cypriot side proposed five everyday issues: the creation of a Reconciliation Commission, Commission for Education and History, Radio-television frequencies, economic and trade cooperation and protection of cultural heritage.
  34. For a critical analysis of charismatic power in Cyprus, see Constantinou, 2006.

35. See Poulantzas (1980) for the dangers of “authoritarian statism”. This concept requires substantial adaptation and application to the Cypriot context before it can be appreciated properly.
36. Βενιζέλος, Ιγνατίου και Μελέτης, (2005) *Το Μυστικό Παζάρι, 129 μέρες που συγκλόμισαν τον ελληνισμό*, εκδ. Α. Α. Λιβάνη.
37. For a critique of the book see Trimikliniotis, N. “Η Συνομοσιολογία στην Υπηρεσία της Διχοτόμησης: Το Παρασκήνιο των Μεγάλων και των Μικρών”, *Θέσεις*, τ. 96.
38. The study was also presented as a documentary.
39. Only one day before the elections, on 20 May 2006, the most popular “serious” newspaper *Phileletheros* carried a half page article with the massive headline ‘Dance of Millions for the Plan’, blaming UNOPS for distributing millions of dollars for the “yes” campaign.
40. The “loyal” Ministers played their part in serving their President: Trade Minister Lillykas, a close associate of the President, and owner of an advertising and marketing company is said to have been the “marketing brain” in the “no” campaign.
41. There have been media reports that some pupils even shouted, “A good Turk, is a dead Turk”. Others called those who supported “yes” traitors.
42. Various statements by church officials, whilst the Bishop of Paphos said that he had the champagne ready as a “No vote equals union with Greece”.
43. The argument that the policy of the Greek-Cypriot leadership was to create a “second Hellenic state” («δεύτερο Ελληνικό κράτος») or “a small Hellas” («μικρή Ελλάς») has been made based on quotes by President Makarios himself. An analysis from this perspective is found in Milios, G. and Kyprianides, T. (1988a, 1988b, 1988c) and Kyprianides, T. and Milios, Y. (1988a and 1988b).
44. One faction, orientated and attached to the state, is sceptical, if not outright hostile to a reunified Cyprus, fearing the possible stiff competition from the unspoilt and beautiful northern coastal tourism.
45. Paphos, for example, was solidly against the solution, and so was Limassol.
46. The Ecologists/Greens are unique as they are the only modern Green party which supports the buying of missiles and armaments.
47. In Greek: «να θωρακίσουν τον Πρόεδρο».
48. The fact that the AKEL Minister of Interior, Andreas Christou, repeated in 2005 that he would still support “yes”, if there were to be a referendum again, has made him the target of tabloid and right-wing papers. He is often presented in *Simerini* and *Mahi* as “unpatriotic” and for being “too soft on Turkish-Cypriots”. Also, the stance at the referendum is often invoked to decide who would be supported in the next Municipal elections: DIKO proposed Ouranios Ioannidis of DISY (a well-known “hard no” supporter) as a common candidate for Mayor of Nicosia but this proposal was rejected by AKEL. Moreover, Eleni Mavrou, MP, who has been proposed by AKEL to stand as Mayor of Nicosia is said to be opposed by some “hard no” DIKO executive members for being a well-known “yes” supporter.
49. Yiorgos Lillykas makes extensive use of the fact that he was such an ardent supporter

of “no” and is “suffering” as a result, however, what we see is in fact the complete opposite: He has climbed up the political and Governmental ladder from an MP to Trade Minister and Government spokesperson, to be elevated to Foreign Minister (ousting the experienced George Iakovou). Doros Christodoulides, AKEL MP, complained that he suffered for being a “hard no” supporter, contrary to the party line. The DISY MP, Eleni Theocharous, claimed that when she stood in the European Parliament elections in 2004, the party machinery worked against her because she is a well known “no” supporter.

50. During the debate over the decriminalising of homosexuality, the archbishop threatened ex-communication to those politicians who voted in favour of the law.
51. The relevant section of the Party decision reads: “Today our Party is before a plan, the positive elements of which, with its possible acceptance, could have, despite the dangers, created a promising perspective for a peaceful living-together of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. We do not share evaluations of the President of the Republic regarding provisions of the Annan Plan and particularly the evaluation that this ‘does not do away with the de facto partition, but on the contrary legitimises and deepens it.’ The Party leadership will open a dialogue on these issues with the President in the framework of our cooperation”. See Website of AKEL [<http://www.akel.org.cy/English/akel.html>].
52. The labour movement became a mass movement in the 1940s when the first trade unions managed to mobilise workers for both socio-economic demands, as well as national liberation; the most important mobilisation being the mass strikes in the mines (asbestos) of 1947. The colonialists arrested the leadership of the miner’s union, which organised at a national level as the Pancyprian Labour Confederation (Παγκύπρια Συνομοσπονδία Εργατών – ΠΣΕ (PSE). In the CIA commissioned study on AKEL (Adams, 1971), the problematising of Western imperial forces about the growth of the Left and the Labour Movement can be examined.
53. For a discussion on the Left in the interwar period see George Leventis (1997) and Fifi Ioannou (2005) and the introduction by Nicos Peristianis (2005).
54. (a) Internationally it was a stable supporter of the non-aligned movement, but ideologically pro-soviet and Marxist-Leninist; (b) Internally it subscribed to a “stagist” approach to national liberation and Cyprus was considered to be chasing independence at a “national liberation phase”. Therefore, AKEL would not contest the Presidential elections but would seek political alliances within “centrist” supporters, what is branded as “democratic-patriotic forces”. AKEL supported Archbishop Makarios and would act in a “responsible” manner in the class struggle, i.e. subordinating ways, demands and labour militancy in general to the “national question”; (c) it promoted “national unity” of “democratic patriotic forces” in the Greek-Cypriot community (as political representation was essentially ethnic-communally based) whilst at the same time it promoted close collaboration with Turkish-Cypriot “democratic political forces”. In the labour struggles, despite the ethnic split of the trade union movement in the late 1950s and early 1960s, the PEO always had strong backing by Turkish-Cypriot workers. AKEL was formed in 1941 following the banning of KKK (which was set up in 1924). The KKK continued to work as a faction within AKEL until it decided to dissolve itself having completed its historic mission, leaving AKEL as its successor to “carry the torch”. AKEL’s historic vacillation between “Enosis”, “self-government” and “independence” continued up to

- 1974, although it followed, without hesitation, Makarios' pragmatic shift from the "politics of the desirable" ("Enosis") to the "politics of the feasible" (Independence) in 1967.
55. I have expanded on this view elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2005a).
  56. For his speech in Brussels, see A. Kyprianou, Member of the P.B. of the C.C. of AKEL "The Cyprus Problem – Developments and Perspectives – The Position of AKEL", Brussels 13 July 2006 at [<http://www.akel.org.cy/English/akel.html>].
  57. He clarifies: "We are not talking about immigrants, or even about illegal immigrants. We are talking about colonisation being carried out by the occupying force, something which according to conventional International Law is considered as a crime of war. We accept that humanitarian cases exist and as such we do not insist on the strict implementation of the relative rules of International Law. We are ready to accept that a reasonable number of settlers remain after the achievement of a solution. However, we are not ready to accept a number of settlers that would surpass the number of Turkish Cypriots."
  58. This is what Herbert Marcuse called "Soviet Marxism". Yiannis Milios (1996) referred to the distinction between "Marxism as a theory" versus "Marxism as an ideology of the masses".
  59. See the document "Our Concept of Socialism" at: [<http://www.akel.org.cy/English/kathodighsh.html>].
  60. See AKEL's proposal on modernisation of society as approved by the 19th Congress in 2000, at: [<http://www.akel.org.cy/English/synedrio19eksychronism.html>].
  61. This is a dilemma faced by many western Communist and radical socialist parties in Western Europe, but it is of particular interest to parties in the third world (see Trimikliniotis, 2005e).
  62. For an economic analysis of employment and the economy see the Annual Reviews on Economy and Employment (INEK, 2004, 2005, 2006).
  63. See Trimikliniotis, forthcoming.
  64. He was a Central Committee member of AKEL who was killed together with a Greek-Cypriot comrade by Turkish-Cypriot fascists in 1965.
  65. A number of constitutional provisions are in dire need of reform. Freedom of speech ought to be guaranteed and not punished. Electoral rules are problematic. It is, for example, at least anachronistic that candidates for the Central Committee are vetted and placed in a hierarchical order by a ranking committee; they ought to be placed in alphabetical order to make the elections genuinely democratic etc.
  66. Lenin's banning of "all fractions" was meant to be an "exceptional" action that was kept secret from the membership outside of the central committee. However, when Stalin took over he created a monstrous system of formalistic and ossified "democratic centralism" which was, in fact, a "bureaucratic centralism", suppressing any dissent or difference of opinion: see Gramsci's critique of "bureaucratic centralism" in (Gramsci, 1972).
  67. Most of the books and papers on the subject are listed in the bibliography.
  68. For more on this potential that has not been realised (see Trimikliniotis 2003a, 2000b).
  69. He defined this as a "third space" which allowed for what I termed an "ethic of reconciliation" to emerge" (Sitas, 2005).



70. Para. 96 of the Report of the Secretary General on his Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, Secretary-General's Statement to the Press, 2004.

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# **TOWARDS A ‘EUROPEAN SOLUTION’ OF THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: FALSE PROMISE OR REAL OPPORTUNITY?**

**Stelios Stavridis\***

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## **Abstract**

The existing academic literature argues that the EU’s enlargement policy provides for peace and democracy among applicant states. Central and Eastern European countries are cited as recent examples of such a process following the historic events of 1989-1991. Previous examples include Greece and the Iberian countries in the 1970s. Now that the Republic of Cyprus has joined the EU and that Turkey has begun its accession negotiations, this article argues that in both cases (Cyprus and Turkey), the EU has not acted in such a positive way, especially in failing to bring the Turkish occupation of the north of Cyprus to an end. This study then moves on to the new context of a possible future ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus Problem. It deals with this question both from a general perspective and from a specific angle: the views of Cypriot MEPs. As for the time being there are only Greek-Cypriot MEPs because of the ongoing division of the Island, this article only addresses their concerns, ideas and suggestions. The article concludes that when taken within its diachronic evolution, the EU’s record has not been that positive. Therefore, it seems at this stage at least, that a ‘European solution’ to the Cyprus Problem is more a ‘false promise’ rather than a ‘real opportunity’. This piece does not discuss what a European solution would look like all the same. Another conclusion of this study is that the EU as a whole, but also the European Parliament, may be using the Cyprus situation as a means to block, or at least delay, Turkey’s accession, but without having any real interest in finding a solution to the ongoing Turkish occupation of nearly 40 per cent of Cyprus’ territory. The wider implications are important not only for the credibility of the EU as an international actor but also for the impact of its enlargement policy in the future.

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## **Introduction**

Two very important developments in the European Union (EU)’s policy towards the Eastern Mediterranean occurred in 2004: first, in May, the Republic of Cyprus joined the Union in what has been its biggest expansion to date;<sup>1</sup> second, in December, the European Council decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey on 3

October 2005, negotiations which have now formally begun. In light of these recent developments, it is important to assess the role the EU has played in that region. The bulk of the academic literature argues that enlargement is the best foreign policy tool that the Union possesses for expanding peace, stability, democracy and prosperity. EU enlargement policy since the end of the Cold War, and more especially since the 1995 enlargement, is widely regarded to be a means to 'widening the zone of stability, democracy and prosperity that the EU stands for' (Nas, 2005, p. 2).<sup>2</sup> Although some authors claim that such a result does not necessarily imply that this is a policy by design (Vachudova, 2005), it remains clear that enlargement to the former Communist states in Central and Eastern Europe has been a major foreign policy success for the EU. A 'Europeanisation through enlargement' (or enlargement prospects) may be a good guide as to the 'power of attraction' that the EU represents for third countries.<sup>3</sup>

In contrast to this positive assessment, one needs to consider why the EU has failed in its efforts to use the 'catalytic effect' (another way of putting 'the power of attraction' argument) of accession in order to facilitate a solution to the Cyprus Problem. Moreover, why is it that the Union has decided to begin accession negotiations with Turkey at a time when this country does not even recognise the Republic of Cyprus, let alone continue with its illegal occupation of nearly 40 per cent of its territory? These two questions deserve particular attention not only from the enlargement policy perspective but also from that of a vast (and expanding) literature on the international role of the EU.<sup>4</sup> However, this article will not address these important dimensions as such, nor will it deal with the Cyprus Problem itself, (Brewin, 2000; Chiclet, 1997; Drevet, 2000; Fouskas and Richter, 2003; Pieridis 2001; Savvides 2002; Stavridis 2005a; Theophanous et al. 1999; Theophanous 2004).<sup>5</sup> Instead it will concentrate on the following questions:

- show the extent to which the EU has not been active in trying to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem. In fact, that it has conveniently hidden behind a general rhetorical support of UN efforts in the past.
- emphasise how negative the reactions of most EU states and institutions to the 2004 Greek-Cypriot referendum result were, thus creating a very hostile environment for Cyprus when it joined the EU in May 2004. This hostility was clearly visible in the European Parliament.
- conclude that despite a slight improvement in the overall approach to the Cyprus Problem, in part due to the active role of Cypriot MEPs, there is still a clear reluctance to deal with the issue on its own merits. Instead, it appears that the Cyprus Problem has become hostage to the future fortunes of Turkey's accession negotiations. Therefore, the possibility of a 'European solution' to Cyprus' ongoing occupation of part of its territory may not be so much a real opportunity but rather a false promise. Although, this article will not discuss any 'European solution' as such.

### **EU Policy towards the Cyprus Problem**

It could be argued that, overall, the EEC/EU's past record is not satisfactory. The EU took a backseat position over the Cyprus Problem at least until the late 1990s. Although its stance on not linking a solution to the island division with its eventual accession is commendable, it resulted more from Greece's threat of vetoing the whole enlargement process than from the application of any general principle. In brief the current situation represents, to use Jean Catsiapis' words, une 'passivité européenne'.<sup>6</sup>

In particular, this section will dismiss the claim that the lack of a solution to the Cyprus Problem in April 2004 was solely due to the Greek-Cypriot referendum result. Instead, it will present a critical assessment of how the EU has failed to contribute to a solution to the Problem over the years. This perspective shows that the 2004 failure represents just yet another example of such a policy. More worryingly for the future, the article will also try to show that since Cyprus' accession to the Union, the EU has continued to act in the same pattern by accepting to begin negotiations with Turkey without demanding an end to its illegal occupation and its non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. There were at least three opportunities to do so: first before granting a date for accession negotiations in December 2004;<sup>7</sup> second, in the leading-up to the extension of the EU-Turkey customs union agreement; and third, in the summer of 2005, before formally starting negotiations in October 2005.

#### **From non-existence to the need to come off the fence once Cyprus applied for membership**

In order to show how many missed opportunities to find a solution to the Cyprus Problem there have been to date, there follows a chronological review of key events in Greece, Cyprus and Turkey, and the way the EU did – or did not – react to them. At the time of the Turkish invasion, the EU was still the EEC and the CFSP (Common Foreign and Security Policy) was only a coordinating mechanism called European Political Cooperation (EPC).<sup>8</sup> Still, there is enough evidence to suggest that the Europeans did not offer more than verbal support to the invaded Republic of Cyprus. All this occurred in spite of their general condemnation of military interventions in third countries. EPC repeatedly claimed that:

“there are no ‘justified’ interventions or ‘good’ occupations, regardless of the validity of the motives invoked”.<sup>9</sup>

Even when it only amounted to words (and no action), there were cases where the EPC states abstained during a vote on a UN resolution on Cyprus in November 1978, on the spurious ground that:

“this passage may be interpreted as referring to the adoption of sanctions, whereas the Nine (...) consider direct negotiations the best way of resolving the problem on Cyprus”.<sup>10</sup>

During the 1980s, the same EPC absence of real active involvement continued, simply consistently calling for the withdrawal of those troops,<sup>11</sup> and a return to an independent and united Cyprus. Thus, EPC condemned the Turkish-Cypriot Unilateral Declaration of Independence (UDI) in 1983 and the so-called ‘presidential elections’ in the north of Cyprus in 1985 because both were considered to be attempts made to establish an independent state within Cyprus.<sup>12</sup> The EPC states also backed the many relevant UN resolutions and the role of UNFICYP.<sup>13</sup>

But at the end of the day, it must be stressed that the EPC’s role on the Cyprus issue was limited “to moral support for attempts of the United Nations Secretary General to mediate and bring the parties together in meaningful negotiations”. The fact of the matter was that on most UN resolutions on Cyprus there was not even a common EPC vote.<sup>14</sup> To a large extent, such a policy results from the foreign policy of the ‘big powers’, within and without the EEC/EU, and particularly that of the United Kingdom, but also the USA (see Güney, 2004), Greece and Turkey, (see Couloumbis, 1996). It is not exaggerated to argue that Cyprus represents an extreme case of interference in the internal affairs of an independent state, despite the supposed existence of the Westphalian principle of non-interference in internal affairs.<sup>15</sup>

It is revealing that when some European action took place, it was not over Cyprus but related to Turkey’s internal developments. As Aylin Güney argues:

“[t]he military rule during 1980-1983 in Turkey led to a suspension of EC-Turkey relations until the political situation and respect for human rights were improved. The resumption of the Association Agreement came only after the 1987 referendum that lifted political restrictions in the 1987 elections” (Güney, 2001, p. 203).

During the 1990s, especially over the Turkey-EU Customs Union saga, there was a revealing quid pro quo: Greece lifted its veto in exchange for the acceptance by all other EU member states that Cyprus could begin accession negotiations irrespective of whether or not there was going to be a solution to the island’s division before accession. This development is problematic in itself because, first, it meant that the decision to begin accession negotiations with Cyprus could be seen as a ‘favour’ to Greece (and Cyprus) and not as a matter of principle. Second, the Turkish side came out strengthened in its position on Cyprus because it de-linked it from the question of Turkey’s accession to the EU, hence needing new efforts at re-establishing that specific link later on. Third, it gave the EU the means to add

pressure on the Greek Cypriots to accept a solution before enlargement. That particular 'stick' remained in practice irrespective of the many declarations to the contrary (see in particular one relevant 1998 British Presidency declaration to that effect).<sup>16</sup> Thus, during months the question of how the 2004 enlargement deal would be eventually ratified led to serious concerns in Cyprus. This became particularly clear when several EU states, and/or their respective national parliaments, showed signs of dissent from the EU official line of not linking membership to re-unification. The Dutch Parliament became notorious in Cyprus because, only a few days after the 1999 Helsinki decisions, it had passed a resolution which stated that it was undesirable to allow a state with UN troops on its soil to join the EU. Cyprus was specifically mentioned.<sup>17</sup> This example is mentioned here just to show that the formal de-linking of the accession prospects from the reunification question did not necessarily play as positively in favour of Cyprus, as it has been argued elsewhere (Diez, 2000; Tocci, 2004a, 2004b).

Over the Customs Union ratification saga, just to add that a smokescreen of decency was offered when the European Parliament postponed its assent vote for a few months and finally gave its formal agreement a few days before the December 1995 elections in Turkey. The argument was that, by backing the Customs deal, it would have prevented an Islamist victory (thus facilitating the election victory instead of a pro-Western, modern, secular Tansu Ciller – a woman too, thus also gratifying the feminist lobby). No particular attention was given to the fact that Ciller eventually joined the Islamists in a coalition government (with a first half of the tenure under her leadership, and the second under that of Necmettin Erbakan), or the fact that Erbakan was eventually removed in a 'soft coup' in 1997. So much for democracy in Turkey.<sup>18</sup> When faced with a similar argument in late 2004 (to grant or not a negotiations date), and again in September-October 2005 (to begin or not accession negotiations), the European Parliament supported once more the Turkish request. Each time, the many MEPs – a majority – who voted in favour announced they were 'proud' of their decision (for details of the 2004 vote, see Soler, 2005).

Another such example can be found during the S300 missiles crisis.<sup>19</sup> Although the objective of the missiles purchased by Cyprus was to strengthen both the credibility of the defence of the Island and the 'Common Defence Doctrine' between Greece and Cyprus (which then had just been recently launched), there was a shower of criticisms from most EU countries, and in particular the UK, and Germany. The then British Defence Secretary George Robertson used vitriolic terms about the Cypriot decision to buy the S-300s, arguing that some states simply do not have the right to decide on their own defence. Interestingly enough, only a few days later, he used a totally different discourse about the sales of British weapons to Turkey. Those particular sales were made in the name of "self-

defence”, he said. He also assured that there was “of course” no risk of those weapons being used for internal repression or external aggression.<sup>20</sup> The absence of any EU support for the Republic of Cyprus continued. In particular, the lack of response to Cyprus’ proposal for a complete de-militarization of the island in exchange of the non-deployment of the missiles did not find any echo in the EU states and institutions.

**Not such a ‘catalytic effect’: accession but no solution (or ‘the failure of the Annan Plan’)**

Such discrepancy between words and actions becomes all the more striking when one takes into consideration the Association Agreement (later Customs Union) that exists between the European Community/Union and Turkey. There were some early signs about a logical linkage between Turkey’s accession aspirations and the Cyprus Problem. Thus, the June 1990 Dublin European Council meeting final communiqué declared that:

“the political leaders of the Twelve warned that ‘the Cyprus problem affects EC-Turkey relations’ and called for the ‘prompt elimination’ of obstacles to intercommunal talks”.<sup>21</sup>

In the period up to Cyprus’s EU accession, there was an additional fear in Cyprus of a freeze in the existing division of the island, therefore turning the northern part of Cyprus into a permanent occupation. Such a prospect should not be regarded as unrealistic. There were also a series of efforts, including those by academics and think tanks (for details see Stavridis 2005b, pp. 20-22), who questioned whether Cyprus would join as the ‘Republic of Cyprus’ or as something short of that. For instance, one must mention the Javier Solana interview in an Athens Sunday newspaper on 21 April 2002 where ‘Mr CFSP’ stated quite categorically that “if there is no agreement, then the Greek-Cypriot part will join [the EU]”. When pressed to clarify his position, he continued: “The whole Island will not enter the Union unless there is an agreement. One part of Cyprus will enter and the other part will have to wait”.<sup>22</sup> Despite a number of subsequent clarifications by Solana himself, and by a number of Commission officials, the damage had been done.<sup>23</sup> It led to the ‘institutionalisation’ of a political term on the island: ‘Euro-partition’, that is to say Cyprus’ EU accession with a permanent division of the island. In other words,

“there is a danger that Greek Cypriots might face the dilemma: accession and solution or no-solution and no-accession, and be forced to accept a ‘bad’ solution in order to join the Union” (Savvides, 2002, p. 45).

The key point here is what was mentioned above about the unnecessary EU pressure on the Greek Cypriots to find a solution before accession, and the

question of how bad a solution could they possibly accept (see the Annan Plans, below).

The above is mentioned to show how sensitive a subject the whole issue of Cyprus reunification and its entry to the EU were at that time. It provides a context to the debate over the Annan Plans but it also confirms that there were many doubts about whether the EU would really go ahead with its membership commitment in case a solution to the island division was not found. Finally, one should also mention that during the concluding stage of the negotiations on the final Annan Plan in Switzerland in early 2004, the EU had been included as one possible actor in case of difficulties: if there was no agreement between the two communities (as it happened), then Turkey and Greece would intervene. In case of further failure (as it also happened), the EU should then become involved. But at Turkey's request, this did not happen. Hence, there were clear signs as late as in 2004 of the divisions among EU member states on the subject.

**'Blessed ambiguity': how to blame the Greek Cypriots on the failure of the Annan Plan and create a general hostility towards Cyprus within the context of Turkey's 'rush' to join the EU**

After having openly supported the Annan Plan,<sup>24</sup> EU institutions and member states' governments tried to make sure that in order to avoid future problems with Turkey, they would blame solely and exclusively the Greek Cypriots for having rejected the UN plan. Shoot the messenger and ignore the message: how bad the Plan was did not matter at all.<sup>25</sup> What mattered was to show that the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey had done everything possible to reach an agreement and therefore should be rewarded. This stance was consistently taken by politicians, parliamentarians, commissioners, academics, and other observers (journalists and think tanks):<sup>26</sup> Oliver Richmond criticises the Greek Cypriots, and in particular President Papadopoulos, for taking an 'ethno-nationalist' position (Richmond 2005, p. 160). An International Crisis Group (ICG) Report claims that the President "play[ed] upon the public's fears and anti-colonial sentiments" (ICG, 2006, p. 6). In the wake of the May 2006 parliamentary elections results, Euronews TV repeated in its morning news programme (22 May 2006) that the parties that had supported the 'Reunification Plan' in 2004 had lost ground in favour of those that had opposed it. There was no mention of the fact that it was only 'one' possible plan, not 'the' only possible one, thus contributing to efforts at presenting the Greek Cypriots as the main culprits.<sup>27</sup> The (then) EU Commissioner for Enlargement, Germany's Günter Verheugen, attacked personally President Tassos Papadopoulos<sup>28</sup> by claiming that the Greek Cypriots had "cheated" their way into the EU.<sup>29</sup> In France, journalist Niels Kadritzke described the Cypriot President as "an old school Greek nationalist", and the referendum result as "saying 'no' to the future".<sup>30</sup> In Britain, Oxford-based historian Timothy Garton Ash called for President Papadopoulos to

be received “coolly as he deserves” by his June 2004 Dublin European Council counterparts.<sup>31</sup> (Then) Nicosia-based UK political analyst James Ker-Lindsay said that “Cyprus could end up being the most disliked new member”.<sup>32</sup> In Spain, Professor Francisco Veiga lamented what he called “the arrogance of the Greek Cypriots.”<sup>33</sup> In Greece, academic Alexis Heraclides made a very strong personal attack on President Papadopoulos, and to a large extent on most Greek Cypriots, if one considers that nearly 80 per cent of them turned down the Annan Plan (Heraclides, 2004, pp. 38-42, 44-50).<sup>34</sup> Similarly, Mehmet Ali Birand argued that there is “disappointment, furthermore [a sense of] betrayal” (Birand, 2004, p. 105). Finally, there were plenty of ‘prophets of doom’ both prior and after the referenda who argued that was the end of any chance of a future solution.<sup>35</sup>

Considering the EU’s poor past record (see above), those reactions simply represent a continuation of a not very supportive stance towards Cyprus. It is also important to note that contrary to claims (including by EU Commissioner Verheugen) that Greek-Cypriot public opinion had been ‘manipulated’, in particular by Papadopoulos’s 7 April 2004 ‘speech to the nation’, a recent study has clearly shown this not to be the case. This survey’s findings confirm that nearly 95 per cent of those polled considered they were aware of the Plan, but that only 5.8 per cent declared no awareness at all (Lordos, 2004, p. 26). Lordos therefore concludes that

“[t]he proposition that the understanding of the Plan by Greek Cypriots is distorted and partial and that the responsibility of such distortion lies with the Greek Cypriot leadership does not appear to be supported by the evidence” (Lordos, 2004, p. 75).

The Lordos survey (2004, pp. 37-64) also identifies clearly the reasons why the NO vote won (in decreasing order of importance): (1) there should be a withdrawal of Turkish troops much sooner than was foreseen in the Plan (76 per cent); (2) Turkey should pay compensation for those who do not get their property back (75 per cent); (3) A greater number of Turkish settlers should go back to Turkey than the figures provided for by the Plan (75 per cent); (4) the overall cost of reunification should be more equally shared by all parties, and not just by the Greek Cypriots (73 per cent); (5) there should be solid international guarantees for the implementation of a final agreement, with serious consequences in case of any future violations (72 per cent); (6) the new state should be the legal successor to the current Republic and not a totally new state (66 per cent); (7) the future influx of Turks should be limited (64 per cent); (8) the return of property should be greater than provided for by the Plan (63 per cent); (9) guarantor powers should not have the right to unilateral intervention (61 per cent); (10) all Turkish and Greek troops should eventually go (58 per cent). This represents a detailed list of clear demands, confirming the high degree of information and awareness of the Greek-Cypriot



community. As an observer on the ground during February-May 2006, I can only confirm this view.<sup>36</sup>

### **Towards a 'European solution' after all?**

In 2006, with Cyprus an EU member and with accession negotiations with Turkey already launched, there is little doubt that there is a clear 'European responsibility for peace in the Eastern Mediterranean' (Brewin, 2004). There is now a totally different context. This is the view taken by the President of Cyprus:

"We have always held the view that a solution of the Cyprus problem will be under the umbrella, the aegis, of the United Nations, we don't change from that position. But of course the situation has changed because since the 1<sup>st</sup> of May, 2004 the Republic of Cyprus is a full member of the EU. Many of the issues which are involved in a possible solution of the Cyprus problem touch upon provisions of the *acquis communautaire*, which are the directives or rules of the EU. It is therefore inevitable that in any new round of talks the EU should have a more active role in the discussion. I think they could be most helpful in guiding the parties as to what would be compatible or in agreement with the *acquis communautaire*, which the Republic of Cyprus will have to apply after a solution. After a solution both communities in Cyprus, both sides, will have to comply with the regulations of the *acquis communautaire*".<sup>37</sup>

There are now much stronger laws and principles to take into account (and to apply), and there exists a European Court of Justice whose role it is to make sure that the *acquis communautaire* is fully respected and implemented. All legal and political instruments for human rights protection have gained strength. Even though in the past Cyprus had obtained plenty of legal support from the Council of Europe and the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR), the power of European legislation within the Union is far more effective than the ones offered by Strasbourg. The reason is simple: EU decisions are legally applicable. Council of Europe ones, including those of the ECHR, depend heavily on the good will of the party condemned, as the *Loizidou Case* has clearly shown. Although that particular initial Court decision was taken in 1994 and Turkey repeatedly refused to comply with it for years, it was only when the question of Turkey's EU accession negotiations became a real possibility that the Turks finally decided to comply with it.<sup>38</sup>

Hence, the current debate about a 'European solution'. As noted in the introduction, this article does not purport to deal with any specific European solution as such. It simply takes the view that there is now a new context following Cyprus' EU accession. For instance, there is one press report<sup>39</sup> linking the Greek government to a number of possible confidence-building measures that would make the most of this new situation. They would include the EU administration of the

ghost city of Famagusta (Ammochostos) where Greek-Cypriot refugees could return home. This approach would build on the EU's experience in the Balkans (e.g. Mostar). Such a zone could be named the 'European Region of Ammochostos', and be patrolled by a European police force. There would be EU funds for restoring the city's basic necessities, and there would be no agreement over its final status until a global solution to the Cyprus Problem is found. Such a development would be accompanied by other measures, such as a 'customs union'-type relationship between the two communities on the island, and some compensation settlement for lost properties. This arrangement could be used as a 'prototype' for reunification according to the same press report. Furthermore, at the time of writing, another press report quotes Greece's new foreign minister Dora Bakoyannis as proposing what she calls a "Plan for a United European Cyprus". This Plan would, among other things, recognise the 'European reality that Cyprus has been experiencing in the past two and a half years' as a EU member.<sup>40</sup>

An International Group of Legal Experts (International Expert Panel Report 2005)<sup>41</sup> has also presented an alternative solution scenario to the island's division based on International and European Law. Its main objective is to show that the Plan did not respect fundamental international law, European law, and Human Rights law. Thus, the Report intends to set the wider parameters for future political negotiations, but it does not present an alternative solution to the Annan Plan. The Report also suggests the setting up of a Constitutional Convention on the issue, whose work would be followed by two simultaneous referenda, but without the participation of Turkish settlers this time round. Using the new context to the full, the Report also calls for the European Parliament to adopt a resolution confirming the need to respect International and European rules in support of the set of basic Fundamental Principles that the International Expert Panel Report proposes (2005, p. 15).

In Cyprus itself, there are plenty of examples of such a discussion to date.<sup>42</sup> For instance, EDEK's President Giannakis Omirou has repeatedly called for the appointment of a EU Special Representative for the Cyprus Problem during his electoral campaign (to the May 2006 parliamentary elections). Omirou stressed that such an envoy should also be responsible to the UN Secretary-General.<sup>43</sup> Similarly, on a TV programme on the last day of the electoral campaign (19 May 2006), EURODI President Prodromos Prodromou argued that EU human rights protection provisions go much further than anything that was provided for in the 1960 Zurich agreement. He reminded the viewers that for the first time the Cypriot Parliament had allowed (following a constitutional amendment) Turkish Cypriots who reside in the non-occupied part of the island to vote for Greek-Cypriot electoral lists.<sup>44</sup> Similarly, for the first time a Turkish Cypriot stood on a Greek-Cypriot list (the woman poet Nese Yiasin on the EDI list). These developments clearly contradict the 1960 arrangements with their strict distinction between Greek Cypriots and

Turkish Cypriots and might be a harbinger of future things to come as a result of European membership. A recent poll also confirms this general trend in favour of a 'European solution', or at least a European dimension to any future solution. To the question "should a solution to the Cyprus Problem now be based on the UN or the EU, or both?", 69 per cent answered both the UN and the EU, 22 per cent the EU, and only 5 per cent the UN (and 5 per cent did not know/answer).<sup>45</sup>

At this stage, it is also important to ask, as Keith Kyle has done, whether it is the case that "a bizonal, bicomunal federation does not sit well with the principles of European law" (Kyle, 2004, p. 112). This point is important because it would mean that the whole compromise agreed in principle by the two communities on the island is fundamentally flawed, but also because the EU has consistently reiterated that it would accommodate any solution between the two parties. By applying the *acquis communautaire* in a bi-zonal and bi-communal federation, any basic restrictions would have to be removed eventually.

However, all of the above needs to be contrasted to events since May 2004 when the Republic of Cyprus joined the Union. What follows will clearly show that perhaps there is unfortunately more 'false promise' than 'real opportunity' because many EU states and institutions simply continue with their, at best, 'ambiguous' stance on the Cyprus Problem, thus favouring Turkey in this matter. Such a bias can be seen clearly over the question of Turkey's continued refusal to recognise Cyprus. In brief, there has been no real pressure by the EU for Turkey to formally recognise it. Again, we can see many verbal statements but no real action. As was illustrated above, such a lack of pressure is not new. There have been more examples recently.<sup>46</sup> Similarly, there was initial EU enthusiasm about 'rewarding' the Turkish Cypriots with 259 million euros as promised by the Commission prior to the referenda. The real question is why? In other words, the content of the Plan was what really mattered, not who voted what? Despite a large number of efforts by many EU governments and politicians, such a process has not materialised because it involves legal considerations that cannot be ignored (because of the numerous Council of Europe European Court of Human Rights decisions against Turkey and because of the opinion of the European Commission's own Legal Service). This dimension is important for what follows, namely that the EU is now offering a new legal context that could not be used in the past. The Council of Europe's decisions and especially those of its ECHR are important but they miss the 'teeth' of European legislation. However, there is still a long way to go before many actors are convinced of the above. Thus, there are many more examples of a lack of strong EU pressure on Turkey to recognise the Republic of Cyprus. Note that, interestingly enough, the removal of its occupation forces does not even appear to be on the agenda any longer, if it ever was beyond mere rhetorical condemnation. I will concentrate on three such examples:

First, during the summer of 2005 there were declarations and counter-declarations about the need for Turkey to sign an extension of its Customs Union with the EU to all new EU members.<sup>47</sup> The real issue here is whether this would mean recognition of Cyprus or not. For instance as the then European Trade Commissioner Pascal Lamy put it:<sup>48</sup>

“The fact that Turkey has not yet implemented the belonging of Cyprus to this customs union is a problem. We understand that it is a tricky problem but a tricky problem remains a problem. At the end of the day it has to be resolved in a clear-cut mode. It has to be resolved with Cyprus being a member of the customs union” [emphasis added].

There was also the question of whether a de facto recognition would be acceptable if, as it was clear from the official Turkish declarations, that a de jure one would not be forthcoming. Again, interestingly there was no pressure to demand such recognition. All that was said was that according to the EU it was understood that an extension of the Customs Union to the new members would represent a de facto recognition of the Republic of Cyprus. Immediately, the Turkish government announced that it would not accept such an interpretation. Finally, when Turkey extended its Customs Union agreement with the new EU member states on 29 July 2005, it attached a declaration denying any recognition of Cyprus. The EU issued its own counter-declaration. No further practical action was taken. The situation is currently stalled as Turkey has yet to ratify the extended Protocol. Cyprus’ planes and ships (the eighth commercial fleet in the world) continue to be unable to use Turkish airports and ports.

Secondly, in the run-up to the ‘magic date’ of 3 October 2005, when accession negotiations were scheduled to begin, there was added pressure to ensure that Cyprus would not block the beginning of those negotiations. Again, there was no real EU pressure beyond a token opposition by Austria which had more to do with its own desire to see the start of negotiations with Croatia<sup>49</sup> rather than any real interest in postponing the negotiations with Turkey. Thus, it does not come as a surprise to the critical observer that the Principles governing the negotiations as spelled out in the Negotiating Framework for Turkey,<sup>50</sup> do not even mention the military occupation of the northern part of Cyprus. Its Point 6 refers to the fact that among other criteria, progress will be measured against:

“Turkey’s continued support for efforts to achieve a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem within the UN framework and in line with the principles on which the Union is founded, including steps to contribute to a favourable climate for a comprehensive settlement, and progress in the normalisation of bilateral relations between Turkey and all EU member states, including the Republic of Cyprus”.

The fact that the UN Plan was not accepted in 2004 has not been addressed either – that is to say that the Plan in itself is a problem. As long as any future plans on offer do not consider the needs of the majority of the Cypriots, Turkey can claim it supports them knowing very well that they could not possibly be implemented. This is a fact that has bedevilled UN efforts, mainly due to the US and the UK position on the matter. Furthermore by using the phrase “all EU member states, including the Republic of Cyprus”, it remains clear that the occupation of the island is no longer particularly important nor different from other relations and problems that Turkey may have with other EU states, including Greece. All this is declared in spite of the fact that Cyprus continues to be the only EU member state that Turkey refuses to even recognise. What such a framework pretends to do is to render banal the current situation in the Eastern Mediterranean.

The real issue remains the continuing de facto support of the Turkish position by a vast number of EU governments, including those of the ‘big states’.<sup>51</sup> There are also many recent British declarations about how it is impossible for Turkey to continue not to recognise Cyprus, but which really amount to mere rhetoric. For instance, Britain’s Minister for Europe Denis MacShane declared that “the sooner this happens the better, but it is not a precondition” [emphasis added].<sup>52</sup> Similar mind-boggling statements appear in the press, for instance in Spain (El País: “Blair apoya que Turquía negocie con al UE sin reconocer a Chipre [Blair supports Turkey’s EU accession negotiations without it recognizing Cyprus]”<sup>53</sup>). To confuse the average reader more, one of the two journalists who had written the just-mentioned article, Carlos Yáñez, then argued that Turkey had ‘recognised’ Cyprus.<sup>54</sup> A stance that is surprising because one must contrast it to his excellent coverage of other EU issues, especially his coverage of the Nice European Council meeting on 7-9 December 2000. But perhaps this is less surprising in light of the systematic effort being made in Spain to present Turkey in a positive light (see for instance PM Zapatero’s much vaunted Alliance of Civilizations, a project co-chaired with Turkey PM Erdogan).

Thirdly, the 9 October 2005 European Commission Turkey Progress Report offers ‘interesting’ reading in that respect. This ‘epilogue’ is divided into two subsections, one showing positive signs, and the other negative ones. Only time will tell which one of the two will prevail, but the past record clearly tends to favour a rather pessimistic prediction.

### **The ‘pluses’**

On the plus side, the democratisation of Turkey has now firmly been placed under the EU’s ‘watchful eye’. The Commission Report now offers a very detailed and comprehensive analysis of the situation in Turkey. The overall principles governing the negotiations are robust, including numerous specific criticisms.<sup>55</sup> As this article

is concerned with political issues, it will concentrate on the political criteria mentioned in the Report. Two important conclusions can be drawn: first, there is time and time again reference to the discrepancy between the legislation adopted in the past three years and the reality on the ground. That is to say that there is still no serious implementation of the policies introduced in the fields of democratisation, respect for human rights, minorities and the like. Second, on the international front, there is still no improvement in neighbourly relations with the notable exception of Greece. Similarly, Turkey's recognition of Cyprus is demanded once again. These can be seen as minimum demands that have to be satisfied in the future.

### **The 'minuses'**

On the negative side, it is possible that more rhetoric without substance is being repeated. There is no timetable for the implementation of these or other demands made in the Report. Neither are Turkish violations of Greek air-space mentioned (a 'non-issue' in the Western media except in Greece). The frequency of such violations has increased dramatically over recent years. When combined with the long-standing Turkish Parliament declaration that an extension of Greek territorial waters would amount to *casus belli* (reiterated most recently in late October 2005, i.e. after the beginning of Accession negotiations), the whole issue is made potentially explosive. The Report does not even demand the withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops from Cyprus. This has now been replaced by the 'user-friendly' phrase that:

“over the last year Turkey has continued to support efforts for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem within the UN framework and in line with principles on which the Union is founded”.

Surely, the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus is consistently condemned by the UN, and, surely, the EU does not accept military invasions and occupations as part of its principles. Similarly, although poor relations with others of Turkey's neighbours, especially Armenia, are mentioned as obstacles, its even worse relations with Cyprus appear not to really matter any longer.

Moreover, the Report begins with a complete inaccuracy. It says that one of the demands<sup>56</sup> to begin accession negotiations is for Turkey

“to sign the Adaptation Protocol extending its existing Association Agreement with the EU to all new Member States, including the Republic of Cyprus. Fulfilment of these requirements by Turkey resulted in the opening of accession negotiations on 3 October 2005 as planned” (emphasis added).

As shown above, this simply is not the case. Turkey issued a declaration where it clearly stated that it did not recognise the Republic of Cyprus. In response, all the

EU did was to say that it did not accept such a declaration. In brief, there is no real pressure on Turkey once again over Cyprus. Again, as a famous song goes: paroles, paroles, paroles!

Now that this rather hostile context has been clearly presented, the article turns to the role that Cypriot MEPs have played over the last two years.

### **Greek-Cypriot MEPS' Views towards the EU**

The main purpose of this section (for details see Stavridis, 2006c, pp. 16-31) is to present and assess the views of the Greek-Cypriot MEPs who have been sitting in the EP since June 2004.<sup>57</sup> The reason for doing so is to try and find out if these parliamentarians believe that parliamentary diplomacy has played (or, is playing, will, can, or should, play) a substantial role in efforts at finding a solution to the ongoing division and occupation of the island. The paper is empirical and does not try to add to the very small existing theoretical literature on parliamentary diplomacy, which has yet to attract the academic interest it deserves (Stavridis, 2002).<sup>58</sup>

Before doing that, it is important to begin with a cursory analysis<sup>59</sup> of recent EP resolutions and other documents (e.g. reports) on Cyprus (but also on Turkey) in order to show what the Parliament's overall approach to the Cyprus Problem is:

1. The first thing that strikes the observer is the amount of resolutions, debates, questions, reports dedicated to Cyprus and Turkey.
2. In the midst of the above plethora of documentation and other data, it is possible to identify a pro-Cyprus strand and an anti-Cyprus (meaning Greek-Cypriot) strand. Overall, the Right PPE-DE<sup>60</sup> and the United Left GUE-NGL<sup>61</sup> are more pro-Cyprus, and the Socialist PSE<sup>62</sup> less so. Similarly, the PPE-DE (European People's Party – Right) is anti-Turkish accession and the PSE is much more pro-Turkish accession. The Greens (Verts-ALE)<sup>63</sup> as a bloc, and the majority of the Liberals ALDE/ADLE,<sup>64</sup> especially those from the UK, are particularly anti-Greek Cypriots and pro-Turkish/Turkish Cypriots. These divisions within the EP were confirmed by the interviews with MEPs that were conducted for this piece (see below).
3. Despite, or perhaps because of, the above divisions, even what could be called 'positive' resolutions for Cyprus are not as 'positive'<sup>65</sup> as they may look at first (the same is true of converse resolutions). Often, a slim majority only approves 'positive' resolutions. That is to say that there is no clear support for Cyprus in the EP – or at least, not as clear as it is often presented in Cyprus. The same is true of other European-wide shows of 'support' (see the recent EPP resolution, below).

4. All of the above means that the overall atmospherics in the EP are not too positive for the Cypriot MEPs. The fact that the EP had consistently and overwhelmingly supported the 2004 Annan Plan makes this situation all the more difficult for them. Only one week before the April 2004 referenda, the EP had qualified the Annan Plan as a “shining example of handling equally difficult international issues”. More clear expressions of support to the Plan are found in the 21 April 2004 EP debates. EP President Borrell claimed that “[t]he presentation of the contents of the plan to the public has not always been equally balanced”, sharing “the concerns expressed by the UN Secretary-General in that regard”. MEP Jacques Poos, a rapporteur on Cyprus, argued that “C’est une illusion que d’espérer qu’en cas de rejet du plan, les problèmes difficiles du retour des réfugiés, de la propriété, des troupes turques, etc. pourront trouver une solution. Le contraire est vrai. La situation actuelle sera verouillée. Pas un seul réfugié de part et d’autre ne retournera dans son village natal et pas un seul soldat turc ne quittera la zone occupée”. In particular, the Liberals, and especially MEPs Watson, Ludford, and Davies, were very critical. Very few MEPs rejected such claims and centred their comments on the fact that the current situation was the direct result of an illegal invasion, an illegal occupation and an illegal colonisation of the north of Cyprus (Greek United Left MEP Alysandrakis; British EPP MEP Tannock).

But this paper is not about the EP and the Cyprus Problem per se.<sup>66</sup> In the 2004 elections, the following six candidates were elected as the first Cypriot MEPs: Ioannis Kasoulides (DISY); Panayotis Demetriou (DISY); Adam Adamou (AKEL); Kyriakos Triantaphyllides (AKEL); Marios Matsakis (DIKO); Yannis Matsis (‘For Europe’). The two Cypriot MEPs from the DISY and the one from ‘For Europe’ have joined the EPP, the two from AKEL have joined the United Left, and the one from DIKO the Liberal Democrats. This part covers 2004-2006 in an effort to assess the impact of the presence of six Cypriot MEPs in the EP. This section consists of the results of research carried out by the author in March-April 2006, thanks to a number of interviews with Cypriot MEPs,<sup>67</sup> together with a number of party officials or candidates to the May 2006 national parliamentary elections. There was also use of other primary sources (especially EP verbatim debates and resolutions), as well as secondary sources (academic work but also media coverage).

What follows in this section is a detailed study of how Greek-Cypriot MEPs address the Problem.<sup>68</sup> I have concentrated on four of the six MEPs. It represents two-thirds of them. Ideally, I would have liked to interview all six of them, but real life (my own time constraints) meant that it was not possible to interview one of them (MEP Adamos Adamou). The reason for not interviewing MEP Marios Matsakis is totally different. Matsakis has become involved in a national and



international political-judicial saga. First, Matsakis is accused of arts trafficking and there is an ongoing debate now as to whether to remove his parliamentary immunity with regard to his alleged involvement.<sup>69</sup> Second, in late October 2005, he entered the Green Line no-entry zone and removed a Turkish flag; when he attempted to return it, the Turkish-Cypriot 'authorities' arrested him. The Cypriot government subsequently condemned Matsakis' 'Turkish flag affair',<sup>70</sup> and DIKO has now kicked him out of the Party. The charges against him regarding the flag incident were eventually dropped,<sup>71</sup> but the saga is far from over. In April 2006, Matsakis staged a demonstration outside the British Base of Akrotiri (near the city of Limassol), claiming that British troops had 'pointed guns at him'. In early May, British police arrested him outside the Episkopi police station (again near Akrotiri), where only a couple of days earlier he had sprayed the acronym 'EOKA' on a car.<sup>72</sup> I, therefore, concluded that this was neither the best time nor the right person to interview for an academic study on the Cyprus Problem. This is not to say that his role is less important (see below). It simply means that his is a special case.

From the interviews, the following findings can be made:

First, all four MEPs agreed that there was a particularly hostile environment in the EP following the rejection of the Annan Plan. A particular incident sums up perfectly well what the situation was: MEP Demetriou said that in a chance chat he had with (then) EU Commissioner for Enlargement Verheugen in the European Parliament Hemicycle on 21 April 2004, that is to say three days before the referenda,<sup>73</sup> Verheugen told him almost verbatim (in Demetriou's own words):

"You cheated me, you will pay for it, there was an agreement for both accession and a solution, Papadopoulos had agreed at The Hague about the Annan Plan; do you have a democracy in Cyprus? Who are you to prevent me from addressing the Cypriot people on TV? I will kill Tassos Papadopoulos for what he did" (emphasis added).

In brief, the Greek Cypriots were perceived as a 'nuisance' (MEP Triantaphyllides). Therefore, the main priority of these first ever Cypriot MEPs was to try and change this negative situation. To a certain extent, they all agreed that they had achieved some degree of success. Now the European Parliament is not as critical of Cyprus as it has been in the recent past. The MEPs also confirmed the division that exists overall between the pro-Cypriot EPP and United Left, and the anti-Cypriot Greens and Liberals (especially MEPs Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Joost Lagendijk, and Cem Özdemir). The Socialists stand somewhere in between with some 'improvement' in recent years, especially as far as the very critical EP President Josep Borrell is concerned (although MEP Demetriou claims that Borrell remains unconvinced of the Cypriot President's genuine commitment to a 'feasible' solution; he also sees MEPs Schultz, Wiersma and Swodoba as particularly

unconvinced). They also made clear that their 'job' can only be productive if their colleagues are willing to listen to them. Thus, they all argued that some MEPs, in particular but not exclusively the Greens and the Liberals, are simply not interested in their views (according to Demetriou, this list includes again MEPs Daniel Cohn-Bendit, Joost Lagendijk, and Cem Özdemir).

Second, they all agreed that a future solution of the Cyprus Problem is needed because it represents a vital interest for the survival of the Republic of Cyprus. MEP Matsis stressed that the Annan Plan had compelled him to stand for MEP. At his age, he said (he has just turned 72), there was no other reason. He believed that the 'salvation' of Cyprus would come through the EU (and NATO) membership. MEP Kasoulides said that now that Cyprus has joined the EU, its 'political security is guaranteed'. Most agreed that the Annan Plan was a bad plan. Those who did not are from DISY, the main party that had supported the Plan (it is interesting to note that with the passing of time, even if MEP Kasoulides continued to be rather uncritical of the Plan, his colleague MEP Demetriou appeared much less inclined to do the same). Most agreed that there is a 'before' and there is an 'after' in EU-Cyprus relations that is defined by this Plan and its impact (MEP Triantaphyllides).<sup>74</sup> All agreed that they must act as Cyprus' ambassadors because of the importance of the subject. Kasoulides argued that they need to show that they are 'good parliamentarians' on many other issues in order to gain credibility and trust among their colleagues. Visibility is also important considering they are only six Cypriot MEPs out of 732 Euro-parliamentarians. The 'trick' in the EP (as in the rest of the EU) is to build coalitions. Matsis stressed the need to reverse the Turkey-isation of the northern part of the island, the urgency to "convince the Turkish Cypriots of the need to help us [the Greek Cypriots] to save ourselves in order to help them save themselves". He also emphasised how important it was to stop and reverse the cultural destruction in the northern part of Cyprus that has been taking place for some time now.<sup>75</sup>

Third, they all agreed that their presence in the EP means that parliamentary diplomacy must play an important role in the search for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, and that the EP is particularly suited to such an effort. MEP Matsis perceives the EP vis-à-vis other EU institutions and especially the Commission has increasing clout; MEP Kasoulides considers parliamentary diplomacy to be easier than traditional diplomacy as there exist fewer constraints, especially over double standards on human rights; MEP Demetriou thinks that for smaller countries it represents their only weapon; and MEP Triantaphyllides sees the EP as the best forum because of the way it works: it is not a traditional parliament, in that it does not have a government and an opposition. Compromise among all political groups is always needed. The EP is an important forum for political debate not only because it is where senior Commissioners and other Commission officials answer

questions (he stressed current Commission President Barroso's regular presence), but also where heads of states from third countries make important addresses.

They all also welcomed the fact that contrary to the PACE where Turkish-Cypriot members have now been given 'observer status', such a development was successfully blocked within the EP: only a 'contact group' with 'representatives' from the north of Cyprus has been set up (and not with 'elected representatives', as some had intended). The Contact Group consists of MEPs from all eight parties represented in the EP who must deal with civil society (and not Turkish-Cypriot 'institutions' as some had intended), and report to the Conference of Presidents (and not to the Plenary, as some had intended). Both Demetriou and Triantaphyllides stressed how important this development is because it makes it clear that it does not represent in any way the recognition of the occupied territories as an independent entity, let alone an independent state.

Fourth, they identified a number of problems in their daily relations with Cyprus and in particular with their Cypriot colleagues in Nicosia. The political system in Cyprus has yet to understand how important the EP is in general and in particular the Cypriot MEPs. MEP Kasoulides said that "institutionally speaking in Cyprus Cypriot MEPs do not exist". There are also practical problems as they cannot meet with Cypriot MPs on a regular basis considering that they spend Monday-Thursday in Brussels/Strasbourg, and therefore only two-three days in Cyprus, usually over week-ends. They also complained about travel connections between Larnaca<sup>76</sup> and Strasbourg (sometimes it takes fourteen hours to reach the Hemicycle in Strasbourg, and sometimes they must stay overnight in Athens airport).

Fifth, on the possibility of a 'European solution' to the Cyprus Problem, most agreed that this was now vital for the future of the country. The only one to disagree with this view was MEP Kasoulides who argued that there are far too many different opinions within the EU over that subject for it to be able to play any significant role. They were, however, all in agreement that the main reason why the EP is now slowly taking a more critical view of Turkey has more to do with Turkey's behaviour than with the Cyprus question.<sup>77</sup> Obviously this development worried them as they were unanimous that fundamental International and European principles and values are being trampled in the occupied north of the island and that the Cyprus Problem should, therefore, be important in its own right. But they welcomed the growing rejection of Turkish behaviour. In spite of this, they would all welcome Turkey in the EU provided it respected all the 1993 Copenhagen democratic criteria, as well as the 1999 Helsinki requirements to solve peacefully its territorial disputes with both Greece and Cyprus (meaning of course the withdrawal of Turkish occupation troops). This belief in a European future for Turkey is not limited to the Cypriot MEPs of course and reflects official Cypriot policy.<sup>78</sup> Therefore, all Cypriot MEPs

agreed that Turkey held the keys to a solution because it is the occupying force in Cyprus.

Sixth, it also stems from the current research that one of the weaknesses of the existing Cypriot presence in the EP is the fact that there is no Greek-Cypriot representative in the Socialist Group, the second largest political grouping in Strasbourg/Brussels. Moreover, the current EP President belongs to the Socialist Group, and the Group is one of the strongest backers of Turkey's accession to the Union. It is possible (but only possible) that a merger between EDEK and DIKO<sup>79</sup> takes place some time after the May 2006 parliamentary elections. Such a development would allow DIKO politicians to join the Socialist Group in the EP and the Socialist International worldwide. Such a lack of influence is further compounded by the particular problem of MEP Matsakis, who appears to be suffering serious personal problems. There seems to be general agreement that Matsakis represents a serious embarrassment for his party, the President of Cyprus, the Cypriot government, Cypriot parliamentarians, and for Cyprus itself.<sup>80</sup> As for the remaining two MEPs, they belong to the United Left Party, a group that had voted against EU enlargement in 2004.<sup>81</sup> The three remaining Cypriot MEPs, as noted above, belong to the EPP, but even they possess a limited influence if only because of their small numbers. Thus, the recently much vaunted (in Cyprus) EPP resolution on Cyprus only contains five positive elements versus four rather more negative ones.<sup>82</sup>

Seven, and as a final point, it must be stressed that because there are so few MEPs for Cyprus (due to its demographics), it is perhaps the country where parliamentarians are also very active in other inter-parliamentary assemblies. Something that could be seen as a drawback if only for reasons of time, but that could also be regarded as an advantage because of the 'communicating vessels' principle<sup>83</sup> that previous work on parliamentary diplomacy (Stavridis, 2002) has identified as a possible positive development (both in terms of parliamentary control – scrutiny – and in terms of information and knowledge in international affairs – parliamentary diplomacy).

### **Conclusions**

It is still possible to argue that the EU has contributed to stability in the region because Turkey's official position has moved from a negative, obstructive stance on Cyprus to one that would accept a reunification of the island. The initial Turkish position that the Cyprus Problem was solved in 1974 is no longer valid. Thomas Diez reproduces the famous Ecevit statement: "The Cyprus problem no longer exists, it has been solved". Ecevit also characteristically claimed in 2001 that there was no difference between "sacrificing the TRNC or a part of Turkish territory".<sup>84</sup> As

late as July 2002, on the 28<sup>th</sup> anniversary of the Turkish invasion, whilst on a visit to the occupied territories, the then foreign minister of Turkey, Sukru Sina Gurel, went as far as to 'joke' about whether Turkey would go ahead with its threat to annex the north of the island if a divided Cyprus joined the EU. His reported answer to a journalist's question was "[b]y annexation, do you mean the north or the whole of the island?"<sup>85</sup> The idea of annexing the 'TRNC' has now also finally been dropped.

Thus, by sticking to its initial position that a solution to the island division was not a precondition for Cyprus accession, and then by sticking to it until May 2004 (despite the failure of the Annan Plan), the EU has had a 'catalytic effect' at least in keeping the EU together. However, the question of whether this is a real contribution to solving the Cyprus Problem per se remains open. Indeed, what kind of result is it if, as Philip Gordon had noted as early as in 1998, the end product would mean a permanent division of the island<sup>86</sup> (the so-called 'Euro-partition', see above)? It is a position that is gaining ground all the same. See for instance the recent EU-25 Watch study of the Institut für Europäische Politik and nearly thirty other associated research institutes in Europe: there is only one reference to Cyprus under the heading "Are there any special interests and concerns [in your specific country] with regard to the continuation of the enlargement process towards (...) Turkey". With the exception of Cyprus, there is only one political party that expresses reservations over Turkey's accession roadmap for reasons which include the situation in Cyprus: Sinn Fein in Ireland.<sup>87</sup>

As to the question asked in this article's sub-heading (is a 'European solution' a real opportunity or a false promise?), the answer will largely depend on what the EU decides to do. The means are there, the possibilities too. What is clearly lacking is the political will to act. Everything to date seems to point to such a negative conclusion: the EU's past record; the negative reaction to the 2004 referendum result in the Greek-Cypriot community; the current EU policy to engage and to continue accession negotiations with Turkey whilst its military occupation of the island continues;<sup>88</sup> the current rhetorical demand to extend the Turkey-Cyprus Customs Union by opening up Turkish ports and airports to Cyprus, but without even mentioning the wider problems of recognition and of occupation; the EP as a microcosm of EU politics and its apparently exclusive 'use' of the Cyprus Problem vis-à-vis the question of Turkey's eventual accession, and not as an important issue in its own right. It is therefore difficult to be optimistic on this matter.

Are there any positive signs all the same? In October 2006 the European Commission will produce its now regular assessment Report for Turkey. The 15-16 June 2006 European Council has just given Turkey until the end of 2006 to open its ports and airports to Cyprus transport (but it revealingly used the neutral term of "the

fulfilment of Turkey's obligations under the Association Agreement and under its Additional Protocol"; there is no mention of Cyprus by name or of Turkey's ongoing occupation).<sup>89</sup> It will become almost impossible for President Papadopoulos not to use Cyprus' right of veto after all those times he did not do so (December 2004, October and December 2005, June 2006) especially in light of the 2006 parliamentary elections in Cyprus which confirmed the negative vote to the Annan Plan in 2004. Will there be a crisis with Turkey then? Possibly, but what counts is that, to a large extent, it is the absence of political will to tackle the Cyprus Problem until now that would lead to that situation. What also appears to be missing is a 'Plan B'. What happens if Turkey's accession negotiations stall? As with the European Constitutional Treaty, there seems to be no will to deal with the issue at stake and instead blame everything on "populism, egoism, chauvinism and stubbornness".<sup>90</sup> This ostrich-like attitude has been possible for a long time thanks to a 'permissive consensus' among the public opinions of the member states. Following the double rejection of the Constitutional Treaty in France and the Netherlands, this is clearly no longer the case. The well-documented democratic deficits in the EU, together with the growing democratic disjuncture between elites and public opinions will have to be addressed if European integration is to continue (see Stavridis, 2006a). Considering the rather overwhelming public opposition to its accession to the EU,<sup>91</sup> Turkey is an important test case for that matter. It would help everyone, including Turkey, to show how important it is to respect values and principles in Europe. To demand and obtain the recognition of Cyprus by Turkey as a matter of principle would be a good place to begin. There are some encouraging signs, such as the proposed establishment of a Human Rights Agency to cover all EU states but also candidate countries, or the emerging debate about more stringent accession conditions in the future (which would cover Turkey's accession process).<sup>92</sup> But not surprisingly, considering the EU's past record, Turkey does not appear to respond. As Erdogan himself has recently stated: "Tant que les Chypriotes turcs resteront isolés, nous n'ouvrons ni nos ports ni nos aéroports. Tant pis si les négociations [avec l'UE] s'arrêtent".<sup>93</sup> Will there be a 'European solution' to the Cyprus Problem? For the time being, it appears to be more of a false promise than a real opportunity. Only time will tell.

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electoral period and the elections to the Cypriot Parliament in May 2006. Special thanks go to the four Cypriot MEPs interviewed for this particular piece, as well as to: Costas Apostolides, Prof Van Coufoudakis, Dr Hubert Faustmann, Harris Georgiades, Dr Christos Iacovou, Prof Peter Loizos, Nicos Peristianis, Dr Marios Sarris, Prof Andreas Theophanous, Yannis Tirkides, and Christos Yiangou. The author would also like to thank two anonymous referees for their useful comments. The usual proviso about the author's sole responsibility applies here too.

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### Notes

1. Former Cypriot President and Chief Accession Negotiator (Cyprus-EU) George Vassiliou described the 2004 enlargement as 'certainly the most important political event of post-WW2 history in Europe', during his Stein Rokkan Lecture delivered to the 25-30 April 2006 ECPR Joint Sessions of Workshops, Nicosia, 27 April 2006.
2. The latest European Council meeting conclusions also make this claim: 'Enlargement has proved a historic opportunity contributing to ensure peace, security, stability, democracy, the rule of law as well as growth and prosperity in the European Union as a whole', European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 15-16 June 2006, p. 17 [www.europa.eu], accessed 19 June 2006.
3. To use Gabriel Munuera's claim that the EU's 'power of attraction' worked with Slovakia over its dispute with Hungary and also on its treatment of minorities (Munuera, 1994), as quoted in Christou (2002).
4. For a review see Stavridis and Fernández (2005).
5. On Turkey and especially on EU-Turkey relations, see Basri Elmas (1998); Font (2005); Hughes (2004); Insel (1999); Kirisci (2004, 2005); Lorca et al. (2006); Moutsoglou (2000); Müftüler-Bac and McLaren (2003); Oguzlu (2003); Robins (2003); Tezcan (2004); Turunc (2001); Vaner (2004). See also Chislett (2004); Fisher (2005); Ülgen and Zahariadis (2004).
6. Catsiapis (1996, p. 156) makes this assessment on the EU stance over the 1996 Imia incident between Turkey and Greece but it can be used more generally.
7. See the 16-17 December 2004 European Council Presidency Conclusions (Doc 16238/04), Brussels [www.eu2004.nl], accessed October 2005.
8. What follows draws from Stavridis (1991), Chapter 5 ('EPC reactions to military interventions'), pp. 162-219, and esp. pp. 171-174.
9. "Statement by the Presidency on behalf of the Ten on Cambodia at the 36th session of the UN General Assembly, New York, 19 October 1981", in EPC, Press and Information Office of the Federal Government, Bonn, 1982, p. 286.
10. "Answer (of 6 April 1979) to written parliamentary question No. 868/78 on the position of the Nine at the UN on Cyprus, Strasbourg, 7 December 1978", in EPC, 1982, pp. 152-153.

11. See “Communiqué by the Nine Governments on the Situation in Cyprus (16 July 1974)”, in EPC, 1982, p. 71.
12. Respectively: “Statement by the Ten on Cyprus (Athens, 16 November 1983)”, in EPC, 1988, p. 172; “Declaration by the Ten on Cyprus (Rome, 10 June 1985)”, *ibid.*, p. 198.
13. For instance: “Statement by the Foreign Ministers on the Situation in Cyprus (Dublin, 13 February 1975)”, in EPC, 1982, p. 75; “Statement by the Dutch Ambassador on the situation in Cyprus at the 31st General Assembly of the UN (New York, 3 November 1976)”, *ibid.*, p. 99.
14. The quote and information is from Tsardanidis (1984).
15. The 1960 Treaties and Accords also represent extremely tough powers for external actors (including the right of military intervention, collectively or individually).
16. Tony Blair, Press Conference, London, 8 January 1998.
17. For details, see Stavridis (2003, p. 348).
18. See Rouleau (2000); Turkey’s current PM Erdogan has also recently complained of the lack of democracy in his own country, according to one of his declarations to CNN on 7 June 2005, in-news: [www.in.gr].
19. See Hadjiantoniou (2000); see also Güney (2004, pp. 35-37).
20. [In Greek] NET TV ‘News’ (16 September 1998) and BBC1 ‘Nine o’clock News’ (22 September 1998) respectively.
21. Cyprus News, No. 13, 1-30 June 1990, p. 1.
22. To Vima, [in Greek] interview with Anny Podimata, a respected Greek journalist.
23. See Kathimerini – English edition; [in Greek] Eleftherotypia; [in Greek] To Vima; all on 23 April 2002.
24. For the EP’s clear expressions of support to the Annan Plan, see below. The European Commission did so by confirming that it would amend the Cyprus Accession Treaty without any problem if a solution was to be found before 1 May 2004. Similarly in the name of the Irish Presidency of the EU Council, Irish PM Bertie Ahern commended the Annan Plan: “I would like to commend the Secretary-General of the United Nations and his colleagues for their tireless efforts in seeking to bring about a settlement to the Cyprus problem. The European Union has all along expressed its strong preference that a united Cyprus enter the Union on 1 May and has indicated its readiness to accommodate the terms of a settlement in line with the principles on which the Union is founded. The decision on the Plan for a settlement that Mr. Annan presented yesterday to the parties now rests ultimately with the people of Cyprus, who are to vote in separate simultaneous referenda on 24 April”, Ahern commends Annan and colleagues for “tireless efforts” in seeking Cyprus settlement, Press Release, 1 April 2004 [www.eu2004.ie], accessed November 2005.
25. For excellent critiques of the Plan, see Palley (2005); Coufoudakis (2004); Theophanous (2004b). See also Melakopides (2004, 2006, pp. 84-90). Both Andreas Theophanous (2004a, pp. 81-90, 2004b,) and Van Coufoudakis (2004, pp. 74-75) dissect the many problematic dimensions of the Plan (from security concerns, to economic problems, to political constitutional complications). As for Palley she shows how biased towards



- Turkey the negotiations for the Plan(s) were. As Coufoudakis put it: “‘Annan 5’ was a Christmas tree loaded with gifts for everyone but the Greek Cypriots” (2004, p. 75). See also Keith Kyle who offers a critique of the way the Plan was set up to bypass Denktash’s traditional obstructionism without thinking about the wider implications of such a decision, and by taking for granted the Greek-Cypriot electorate (Kyle, 2004, p. 111), although he also puts some blame on President Papadopoulos.
26. For details, see Stavridis (2005b, pp. 24-27, 2006c, pp. 9 -11).
  27. These attacks were not limited to European actors. UN Secretary-General, Kofi Annan blamed the Greek-Cypriot President as the man responsible for it. See Report of the UN Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus (2 June 2004). See also the Cyprus President’s reply (Letter by the President of the Republic, Mr Tassos Papadopoulos, to the UN Secretary-General, Mr Kofi Annan, dated 7 June, which circulated as an official document of the UN Security Council, 9 June 2004), Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus [www.moi.gov.cy], accessed 19 October 2004.
  28. In-news, 21 April 2004 [www.in.gr].
  29. International Herald Tribune, 26 April 2004 [www.iht.com], accessed on that day.
  30. In the May 2004 issue [www.mondediplo.com], accessed 15 October 2004.
  31. El País, 1 May 2004. See also Soler (2004).
  32. The Star, 26 April 2004 [www.star.co.za], accessed 15 October 2004. See also Ker-Lindsay’s more recent academic article (2006).
  33. El País, 5 October 2004.
  34. For milder critiques see Veremis and Savvides (2004), but also Faustmann (2004) and Loizos (2005). Especially the latter two are torn between, on the one hand, what one sees as important reasons for rejecting the Plan (security considerations) and what the other sees as an important fact (there is an overwhelming opposition to it and therefore it cannot be ignored), and, on the other, the fact that they both really think that the Plan was not as bad.
  35. For such Greek and Greek-Cypriot academic views, see [www.eliamep.gr] (Opinions throughout 2004, especially those made on 12 March 2004, 17 March 2004, 3 April 2004, 29 May 2004).
  36. I also noticed plenty of resentment among Greek Cypriots for being accused of not knowing what they were voting for. This ‘foreign’ arrogance is greatly resented and, considering Cyprus’ past and recent history, it is not difficult to see why.
  37. Press Conference by the President of the Republic Mr. Tassos Papadopoulos in New York, 19 September 2005 – in New York after his participation to the UN Annual Assembly.
  38. The wider international context has also changed drastically since 1974. Human rights and other democratic principles in the world have now gained prominence, especially in the post-Cold War era.
  39. Taki Miha, [in Greek] ‘Ammochostos under European administration’, Kyriakatiki Eleftherotypia, 28 May 2006.
  40. In-news, 18 June 2006 [www.in.gr], accessed on that day.

41. Professor Andreas Auer, Switzerland, Professor of Constitutional Law, University of Geneva; Professor Mark Bossuyt, Belgium, Professor of International Law, University of Antwerp; Professor Peter Burns, Canada, Former Dean of the UBC Law Faculty, Professor of Law, University of British Columbia, Vancouver; Professor Dr. Alfred De Zayas, USA, Geneva School of Diplomacy, Former Secretary, UN Human Rights Committee; Professor Silvio-Marcus Helmons, Belgium, Emeritus Professor of Université Catholique de Louvain, Public International Law and Human Rights; Professor George Kasimatis, Greece, Emeritus Professor of University of Athens, Constitutional Law, Honorary President of the International Association of Constitutional Law; Professor Dr.h.c. Dieter Oberndorfer, Germany, Professor Emeritus, Political Science, University of Freiburg; Professor Malcolm N Shaw QC, UK, Sir Robert Jennings Professor of International Law, University of Leicester.
42. See Andreas Theophanous, 'Two years after: 10 fundamental guidelines for a Cyprus solution', *The Cyprus Weekly*, 12-18 May 2006; see also his [in Greek], *The Next Step: what should we do after the Annan Plan?*, Intercollege, Nicosia, July 2004; see also Andreas Siamarou, [in Greek] 'A solution through the harmonization of the European *acquis*', email distributed in the spring of 2006 by its author, a professor at Intercollege, and a EUOKO parliamentary candidate in the May 2006 parliamentary elections.
43. Various TV programmes during the electoral period.
44. PIK 1 TV programme 'Vouleftikes 2006', 19 May 2006.
45. PIK TV, 3 April 2006. The poll was carried out after the 28 February 2006 Paris meeting between President Papadopoulos and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan.
46. For instance the October 2004 incident when Turkey invited the 'TRNC' as an independent state and forced the EU states to withdraw from that particular session of the joint UE-OIC (Organisation of Islamic Conference) meeting. It is strange that the whole EU bowed to Turkey's intransigent position when one of its own member states was concerned. The total boycott of the event was surely of little concern to Turkey, *El País*, 2 October 2004, see also *Communiqué de Presse au sujet du Forum commun UE-OCI* [[www.eu2004.nl](http://www.eu2004.nl)], accessed 1 October 2004.
47. What follows draws from TV news reports, newspaper articles (mainly from *Le Monde*, *El País*, *International Herald Tribune*), as well as news websites, in particular [[www.in.gr](http://www.in.gr)], but also the *Fondation Robert Schuman Newsletter*, and the *Joint University of Athens Politics Department and EKEM Newsletter*; both available respectively at [[www.robert-schuman.org](http://www.robert-schuman.org)] and at [[www.ekem.gr](http://www.ekem.gr)].
48. *Kathimerini*, supplement in English to the *International Herald Tribune*, 23 July 2004, p. 2.
49. Although Austria objected to the beginning of Turkey's negotiations without the addition of the magic phrase "privileged partnership" mainly due to public opposition at home (and the holding of local elections on the week end prior to Monday 3 October 2005), the main reason for its objection was its effort to get a *quid pro quo* for the beginning of the delayed accession negotiations with Croatia. Accession negotiations with Croatia had not started as scheduled in March 2005 because Zagreb showed no cooperation with the *International Tribunal on Yugoslavia* in The Hague.
50. [[www.europa.eu.int](http://www.europa.eu.int)].

51. For instance Italy: see [www.in.gr] 6 September 2005, [in Greek] "Italian 'yes' to the beginning of accession negotiations with Turkey without a recognition of Cyprus". The Italian position was reiterated by the Italian foreign minister Gianfranco Fini at a meeting in Athens with his Greek counterpart, Petros Moliviatis.
52. "Turkey must recognise Cyprus before joining the EU-UK's MacShane" [www.afxpress.com], 22 October 2005. See also Le Monde, 22 October 2005.
53. W. Oppenheimer, C. Yárnoz, in El País, 28 May 2005.
54. El País, 30 July 2005: "Turquía 'reconoce' a Chipre al firmar un acuerdo de la UE".
55. See the 9 October 2005 European Commission Turkey Progress Report; see also The Negotiating Framework for Turkey [www.europa.eu.it].
56. The other was to bring in a number of pieces of legislation on human rights and on the judiciary.
57. Such a study falls in the growing tradition of work based on elites-perceptions. The interviewing of elites is important, not only for their expert knowledge, but also as 'opinion shapers' and decision-makers. For a similar approach to the current study, but this time applied to Turkish parliamentarians and their views on the EU, see Müftüler-Baç and McLaren (2003).
58. For a practitioner's view see Spanish Senator Elorriaga's book (2004).
59. There is growing interest in the subject but overall it remains an under-studied area.
60. Group of the European People's Party (Christian Democrats) and European Democrats.
61. Confederal Group of the European United Left – Nordic Green Left.
62. Socialist Group in the European Parliament.
63. Group of the Greens/European Free Alliance.
64. Group of the Alliance of Liberals and Democrats for Europe.
65. I owe this point to Harris Georgiades.
66. For such a preliminary assessment, see Stavridis (2006d).
67. All interviews took place in Nicosia: MEPs Matsis, 31 March; Kasoulides, 3 April; Demetriou, 12 April; Triantaphyllides, 13 April. They lasted 70, 60, 40 and 55 minutes respectively. Special thanks to Kyriakos Georgiou for arranging two of the four MEPs interviews and to Harris Georgiades for organising the other two.
68. There are no MEPs from the occupied territories. Moreover, parliamentary input needs to be conducted under democratic conditions. The current political situation in the north of the island does not satisfy these conditions. The mere presence of Turkish troops is surely an impediment to a more assertive Turkish-Cypriot policy on the issue of reunification (see Bahcheli, 2004, pp. 58-59).
69. [www.in.gr/news] 1 November 2005.
70. Ibid.; see also [www.in.gr/news], 1 January 2006.
71. The Cyprus Weekly, 10-16 March 2006.
72. The Cyprus Weekly, 7-13 April 2006; [in Greek] O Fileleftheros, 1 May 2006; The Cyprus Weekly, 5-11 May 2006.
73. In the presence of Greek MEP Ioannis Marinou.

74. There is little doubt that the impact of the Annan Plan on current Greek-Cypriot domestic politics is here to stay. See for instance its impact on the May 2006 parliamentary elections (Stavridis, 2006b).
75. He characteristically referred to the 1994 PACE Cucó Report. See also the book published by the Greek Parliament to that effect (Cyprus- A Civilization Plundered, Athens, 1998).
76. Larnaca airport is the main airport on the island as the Nicosia airport has been closed to civil traffic since the 1974 Turkish occupation and is only used by the UN. For more about the problems faced by Cypriot MEPs in their daily life, see also Kosta Pavlowitch, "Who want to be an MEP? A gruelling brief" [incorrect spelling in the original text], Sunday Mail, 2 April 2006 [www.cyprus-mail.com], accessed 3 April 2006.
77. In Triantaphyllides' view, it only represents one of the three main dominant issues on Turkey, the other two being human rights violations within Turkey, and the way Turkey deals with its Kurdish population.
78. For the most recent statement on this question, by President Papadopoulos in Larnaca on his way to the Brussels European Council meeting of June 2006, see [www.in.gr], 15 June 2006.
79. DIKO parliamentary candidate Christos Yiangou (Nicosia, 31 March 2006).
80. This came out quite clearly in all interviews, and also in other informal meetings.
81. It is interesting to note that during the pre-2004 enlargement phase, Greek Communist MEPs had differentiated their position from that of their fellow MEPs by abstaining on Cyprus. However, in the very last vote they joined the bloc's opposition to enlargement on the traditional communist ideological grounds that the EU is an economic arm of US imperialism. Officially, the final vote was justified on the grounds that the Greek Communist Party had also opposed Greece's accession to the (then) EEC (Kathimerini-English Edition, 15 April 2003). It is, however, equally important to note that after having initially opposed Cyprus' candidacy for EU membership, the Cypriot AKEL (Communist) Party later agreed to support it in a bid to facilitate a solution to the island's division. So it is even more surprising that the Greek Communist MEPs do not agree with their Cypriot counterparts.
82. On the rather positive side, one could list points 1-4-6-7-8; on the rather negative side, points 2-3-5-9. See the EPP Resolution presented by DR (Cyprus) [Democratic Rally or DISY], EPP Congress, 30-31 March 2006, Rome [www.eppcongress2006.org], accessed 16 May 2006.
83. Thus, during the 2002 Cyprus-EU JPC (Joint Parliamentary Committee) meeting in Nicosia, MEP Pere Esteve had been invited to attend in order to organise a meeting between Israeli and Palestinian parliamentarians on its fringe. Due to unforeseen circumstances (the 'Bethlehem Church' siege), the event did not take place, despite Esteve's presence in Nicosia, but it shows how the 'communicating vessels' principle might work in parliamentary diplomacy.
84. Respectively in Diez (2000, p.5), and in Le Monde, 4 December 2001.
85. In-news, 15 July 2002 [www.in.gr].
86. "A great irony [would be] that the European Union, having set out by offering Cyprus EU

- membership to provide incentives for the reunification of the island, would have succeeded in making permanent its division" (Gordon, 1998, p. 44).
87. EU-25 Watch No.1, Institut für Europäische Politik, Berlin, December 2004 [www.iep-berlin.de], especially p. 112.
88. MEP Kasoulides enjoyed telling the author that on a recent visit to the occupied north, the EP's Contact Group led by MEP Grossetête had asked the Turkish Cypriots they met, what was the need for the continued presence of thousands of Turkish troops when the Green Line can be crossed so easily nowadays.
89. European Council Presidency Conclusions, Brussels, 15-16 June 2006, p. 19.
90. This is the way one political analyst describes the main reasons for the current opposition to the Constitutional Treaty, see José Ignacio Torreblanca, 'Niebla en el Canal', *El País*, 4 June 2006.
91. As reported in [www.in.gr], 20 December 2005, most EU public opinions are opposed to Turkey's accession. The EU's average against membership now stands at 55 per cent. In countries where there is a relative majority in favour (that is to say the positive view is larger than the negative one), it does not even reach 50 per cent (Spain, Poland, Portugal, Slovenia, Sweden). In Greece 79 per cent oppose Turkey's accession. See also Jan Repa, 'Analysis: EU views on Turkish bid', BBC News, 30 September 2005 [www.newsvote.bbc.co.uk], accessed 15 June 2006.
92. "La UE estudia endurecer las condiciones para nuevos miembros", and "La UE debatirá crear un organismo de derechos humanos", *El País*, 29 May 2006 and 12 May 2006 respectively. See also "La France plaide pour un élargissement 'maîtrisé' de l'Union européenne", *Le Monde*, 16 June 2006 [www.lemonde.fr].
93. Turkey's PM Recep Tayyip Erdogan as quoted in *Le Monde*, 16 June 2006 [www.lemonde.fr], accessed 17 June 2006.

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# THE CYPRIOT COLONIAL CIVIL SERVANT: PRACTICAL AGENCY THROUGH UNCERTAIN IDENTITIES

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## Abstract

The colonial government of Cyprus was composed by an overwhelming majority of “indigenous” civil servants, headed by a handful of British administrators. Challenging the widely accepted representation of the Cypriot colonial civil servant as a mere performer of the British policy in Cyprus, this paper proposes a microanalysis of two cases taken from 1928: alternatively the recruitment of a higher, and the dismissal of a subaltern, Cypriot civil servant. Contrasting these two cases, the paper suggests that the split identity of the Cypriot civil servant, both a “Cypriot” and a “colonial official”, constituted a political stake both for the British authorities and the local press. It further suggests that the lower his position, the more the Cypriot colonial servant could actively participate in the elaboration of an identity which would safeguard certain of his rights, sometimes forcing his employer, the colonial government, to respect them.

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## Introduction: Collaboration, Brokers and Native Colonial Civil Servants

In the frame of Colonial Studies, the issue of “collaboration” between coloniser and colonial subjects has been approached with much circumspection, particularly because this concept referred primarily to the ideology developed by colonial administrators themselves according to which colonial rule rested upon the paternalistic cooperation between the colonial ruler and the indigenous subject.<sup>1</sup> Nonetheless, in an article dated 1972, Ronald Robinson re-legitimised a study of “collaboration” which allegedly would provide an understanding as to how Europeans were able to uphold their colonial empires in spite of the weakness of their financial and human resources.<sup>2</sup> Since then, some historians have taken up the adventurous task of studying patterns of “collaboration” between colonisers and colonial subjects and have offered as many interpretations as there are definitions for this term.<sup>3</sup> Despite this diversity however, their common feature is to focus their analyses on the relation between the colonial state and the local broker, the latter being generally depicted as an influential and rising indigenous member of the colonial society, exchanging his informal services against a strengthening of his

social status by the colonial authorities. Beyond the obvious risk of reifying both terms of this relation – the local broker and “colonial authorities” – almost none of these analyses deal with the most obvious of “collaborators”, that is, the native colonial civil servant.<sup>4</sup> This is mainly due to the fact that this figure is generally considered as an integral part of the colonial state, a simple peg in the colonial bureaucratic machinery.

Without having to resort to the magic trump card of the “broker”, one needs only to observe that colonial administrations, which constituted the seat of formulation and implementation of official colonial policy, relied on a personnel which in most cases was composed of subaltern “natives” (sometimes up to 90 per cent of the total manpower of the colonial bureaucracy). By identifying them with their European superiors and by denying them any other agency than that of being the underlings of an essentialised colonial will, historiography tends to reduce them to mere functions of a system. In fact, as native colonial civil servants, they were identified in a double, paradoxical way by their European superiors: as colonial civil servants they were indeed seen as the tools of the administration’s control on the colonial society; as natives, however, they were simultaneously viewed as “objects” or “subjects” of this control. Based on a study of the native colonial civil servants of a small British Colony, Cyprus, run through direct rule and a powerful bureaucracy, the aim of this paper is to suggest that, conscious of this double identity created by their belonging to the colonial administration, and by playing with one or the other of its features, native colonial civil servants could have been in a position to secure administrative, social and even political power vis-à-vis their British superiors who depended on their cooperation: they were in fact able to play with the fundamental inner contradiction of any colonial administration which was to be and to present itself as a civil service with all its attributes of impersonality but at the same time representing a political organisation which relied on a clear distinction between ruler and ruled. In other words, this double identification was an opportunity as much as a constraint for native colonial civil servants; it was precisely what allowed them to be actors within the system. Up to now the historiography of Cyprus dealing with the interwar period has by and large insisted on the political dimension of the relations between British administrators and administered Cypriots. The second aim of this analysis of the Cypriot colonial civil servant is to underline the limits of such an approach by suggesting that the divide between British administrators and administered Cypriots was first and foremost cultural in its nature; “politics”, as it were, was an epiphenomenon of a cultural estrangement during the interwar period.<sup>5</sup>

A convenient way to understand the various issues at stake around Cypriot colonial civil servants is by observing the debates taking place at the time of their recruitment and, alternatively, at the time, of their dismissal, that is as they entered and as they left the administration. Within the specific political context of Cyprus –

characterised by the struggle of the Cypriot-Greek elite in favour of the union of the island to Greece and their consequent confrontation with their Turkish fellow countrymen – it seems more appropriate to focus on the case of the appointment of a Cypriot to a higher post of the administration since this was the only type of recruitment likely to provoke a public debate; conversely, insofar as the aim of this paper is also to suggest that Cypriot colonial civil servants, regardless of rank, had in certain circumstances the ability to work, sometimes effectively, against the system they were a part of, it is more suitable to observe the case of the dismissal of a subaltern Cypriot civil servant, which as a rule entailed a lengthy procedure through which the sanctioned officer was given the opportunity to make his representations. The methodology adopted here is, therefore, that of the microanalysis, as such an approach is the only one likely to help us envision the scope of the Cypriot Civil Servant's agency.

Hence the argumentation is constructed around two cases. The first one concerns the appointment of Neoptolemos Paschalis to the post of Solicitor-General of the colonial government in 1927. The second one concerns the dismissal of Private Ioannis Vassiliou from the Cyprus Military Police in late 1926. The paper first suggests that the political foundations of the appointment of a Cypriot to a higher governmental post, transformed what was seemingly a political opportunity both for Paschalis himself and the Cypriot-Greek elite into a normative constraint: Paschalis, it is suggested, was sooner rather than later compelled to identify himself with the colonial civil service than with the aspirations of his fellow countrymen. Opposed to this is the case of Ioannis Vassiliou, whose identity as a colonial civil servant is perceived in purely bureaucratic terms, at the exclusion of any political stake. In contrast to Paschalis, his identification with the colonial state constituted an opportunity for the native civil servant. In this case, the rules of the system which aimed to serve the ruler appeared to be binding for the ruler also and constituted the native civil servant's objective ally against the system.

### **Recruiting Higher Cypriot Civil Servants: The Paschalis Case**

Writing his memoirs in 1937, Sir Ronald Storrs had at heart to remind his readers that he was the first governor of the island to promote Cypriots to higher posts in the colonial government. His decision was motivated, as he writes, because he believed “[t]he appeal to Empire sentiment is a mockery worse than useless unless accompanied by the offer of Imperial opportunities.”<sup>6</sup> Notwithstanding its Ciceronian elegance, this statement appears to be a considerable embellishment of the governor's more down-to-earth motivations. When, in January 1927, he proposed the appointment of Neoptolemos Paschalis to the newly-created post of Solicitor-General, Storrs wrote to the Secretary of State for the Colonies that:

“Another weighty reason why this particular appointment should be offered to a Cypriot is that the office does not appear in the Estimates and has not been approved in principle by the Legislative Council; and it would greatly strengthen the position of the Government with the Electives and with progressives throughout the country if it were known that a Cypriot had at any rate been offered the post.”<sup>7</sup>

The office of the Solicitor-General had been created in the wake of a plan to restructure the judicial system of the island. This plan, devised under Storrs’ predecessor, Sir Malcolm Stevenson, provided – in the frame of a broader judicial reform – for the creation of two supplementary posts in Cyprus’ Court of Appeal (High Court) destined to be filled by Cypriot puisne judges, one Cypriot Greek and one Cypriot Turk. The then Attorney-General, Charles Geharty, had asked for the appointment of a Solicitor-General to help him implement the reform. Geharty and the Colonial Secretary, Reginald Popham Lobb, originally wanted to entrust the new post to a Briton. Storrs’ own intervention can be traced in his insistence to appoint a Cypriot to the new position and his choice was to elect Neoptolemos Paschalis.<sup>8</sup>

The political motive behind Storrs’ decision can be traced to the afore-quoted lines in the passage on the Estimates. “Estimates” were annually discussed in the partly-elected Legislative Council, and usually gave rise to bitter confrontations between the elected Cypriot-Greek members on the one hand and the governor-appointed British official members on the other. The annual budget, or “Estimates”, was indeed one of the very few possible fields of intervention of the Legislative Council and it certainly was the only possibility for Cypriot-Greek elected members to occasionally enlist the support of the elected Cypriot Turks who usually would otherwise join the official members to block the Cypriot-Greek resolutions, particularly when these hinted at the question of “Enosis”, or Union of Cyprus to Greece. On 29 November 1926, one day before Storrs’ arrival on Cyprus and barely two months before his proposal to appoint Paschalis as Solicitor-General, the Cypriot-Greek members had rejected the Estimates for 1927 because it still contained a provision for the infamous “Turkish Tribute”.<sup>9</sup>

Hence, Storrs’ move was meant to short-circuit the Cypriot-Greek elected members’ preferred strategy: as the new Estimates would provide for the creation of a post of Solicitor-General to be entrusted to a Cypriot, the Cypriot-Greek members would no longer be in a position to reject them. The skill of the manoeuvre was closely connected to the Governor’s capacity, in presenting and defending his decision both locally and to the Colonial Office, to reveal Paschalis’ identity, underlining one or other feature according to the specific interlocutor he would have to persuade.

In writing to the Secretary of State, Storrs stressed the fact that Neoptolemos

Paschalis was an “exceedingly clever Advocate and an able Lawyer and ha[d] probably the best practice in the island”.<sup>10</sup> Whereas this was written in anticipation of the Colonial Office’s possible objections with regard to Paschalis’ competence or lack thereof, it should be noted that this was the first instance when “being an exceedingly clever Advocate” was positively connoted by a British colonial official in Cyprus; the statement could for instance be contrasted to Storrs’ own usual perception of lawyers as a “numerically insignificant class of parasites who made a living out of [the peasant producer]”.<sup>11</sup> Another feature that the Governor voluntarily omitted to remind his addressee in London, was that Paschalis had, for years, been a leading figure of Cypriot-Greek irredentism, himself a member of the elected Legislative Council (1916-1921) and one of the leaders of the election-boycotting movement and non-cooperation policy in the early 1920s.<sup>12</sup> This was merely hinted at in the Governor’s mention of Paschalis as being “prominent” in the aforementioned despatch, thereby implying that he was socially influential. There is little doubt that appointing Paschalis, who was also a collaborator of the Cypriot-Greek, Nicosia-based and highly influential bi-weekly newspaper *Eleftheria*, was further meant to neutralise this former “politician’s” activities.

In London the proposition was met with a certain recalcitrance. Arthur Dawe, then principal at the Colonial Office, expressed his concerns with regard to what he perceived as a “new policy”<sup>13</sup> which would put into question the principle according to which “higher posts in the administration ha[d] hitherto been confined to Englishmen”. He noted that once he was appointed, nothing could legally prevent Paschalis from claiming promotion to the post of Attorney General (the highest in the Legal Department) when its current holder, an Englishman, was eventually transferred; as a matter of fact, in the temporary absences of the Attorney General on leave, the “Cypriot Solicitor-General” would de facto be acting for him and as such would be an ex-officio member of the Executive Council, the highest administrative institution of the Colony. “We should thus have a Cypriot, so to speak, in the ‘Cyprus Cabinet’”. Finally, though Dawe had “no doubt that many of the educated Cypriots [were] quite able, (...) the question [was] whether they ha[d] the attributes of character which are required for the successful working of Government institutions on the Anglo-Saxon model.”<sup>14</sup> Dawe did not specify what he meant by “attributes of character”. Far from being synonymous of “competence”, these remained abstract and their rhetorical function was designed to stress Paschalis’ “otherness”. Indeed at the Colonial Office the whole problem was centred on Paschalis’ “Cypriotedness”. The Governor’s move, it was implicitly feared, might compromise the unwritten, tacit, but nonetheless fundamental rule, referred to by Partha Chatterjee as the “rule of colonial difference”,<sup>15</sup> according to which, within a colonial administration, there should always have been a clear-cut distinction between the British rulers and the local subalterns.

Unfortunately there are no sources that we know of which might help us to understand the dilemmas posed to Paschalis himself by the proposition. When the official proposition was put before him on Wednesday, 9 March 1927, he was reported to have expressed his gratitude to the Governor and the need for some reflection time. Five days later, on Monday 14 March, he is reported to have officially accepted the post by saying to the governor that he “considered it his duty not to refuse his services to the island and that he accepted the post”.<sup>16</sup>

What exactly went through the mind of Paschalis during those five days is open to conjecture. What is certain, however, is that the news of his appointment triggered a series of enthusiastic articles in a significant part of the Cypriot-Greek press. The editors of the journal *Eleftheria* stressed their pride “as Cypriots” for a decision taken on the part of the “foreign government” which was tantamount to the first step “in the administration of the Island along ‘Greek lines’”. Somewhat denoting from Storrs’ presumed aspirations, the editors specifically wrote:

“Providing lively evidence that the Island has men capable of administering the place, the new Solicitor-General offers a most highly [recognised] contribution to the struggle for the liberation of this country, which shall not be achieved by means of violence and arms, but through steady evolutionist tactics, by which we shall conquer, one after the other, all of the bastions of the foreign yoke. Under the gown of the Solicitor-General, a truly Greek heart shall be beating, and under the wig of the Legal Adviser the straight and profound mind of Mr. Paschalis will find the way to combine the true interests of the Crown with his deepest love for his Fatherland, for the honour and benefit of both.”<sup>17</sup>

In contrast to the Colonial Office’s concerns, the above lines in the mind of the author perceived Paschalis’ “Cypriotedness” as an opportunity, and not a handicap. The message conveyed was addressed to both British officials and to the Cypriot readership. On the one hand, this appointment was taken as an illustration, and thereby an implicit acknowledgement on behalf of the colonial government, of the redundancy of the presence of British officials on the Island: Cypriots were able to administer the country, and would do so in the “true interests of the Crown”. On the other hand, and this was addressed to the Cypriot-Greek readership, Paschalis’ appointment should have inspired a new strategy for the “liberation of the country”: this constituted the first public statement in favour of self-government as an intermediary milestone to be reached before “Enosis”. As a matter of fact, very soon after he assumed his functions, Paschalis found himself at the centre of a wide Cypriot-Greek public debate on the expediency of self-government as a national strategy.

On 24 April 1928, the Cypriot-Greek elected members of the Legislative Council presented a resolution asking for the widening of constitutional liberties for the



Cypriots. Paschalis, who at the time was “acting Attorney General” in the temporary absence of the English post-holder and, as such, an ex-officio official member of the Legislative Council, voted against the resolution. This event spread confusion among the learned Cypriot Greeks. The editors of the newspaper *Neon Ethnos* “condemn[ed] unreservedly” the Solicitor-General’s action, and reinstated that if higher posts in the administration were to be obtained and considered as part and parcel of the wider Cypriot-Greek national struggle, the “functionarisation of a person” should not, however, “necessarily imply [that person’s] renunciation [of] the people’s ideal[s]”.<sup>18</sup> Conversely, *Eleftheria* opened its columns to articles written by prominent political figures to share their impressions on the event. Interestingly, H. Michaelides, a Cypriot-Greek member of the Legislative Council and one of the authors of the rejected resolution, stressed that Paschalis did not vote “as Neoptolemos Paschalis, but as an employee of the government having the formal obligation (...) to vote according to the government’s views”.<sup>19</sup> Acknowledging this, the influential politician, Ioannis Kyriakides wrote that Cypriots should continue to encourage the promotion of Cypriots to the highest government posts which constituted “the beginning of self-determination”.<sup>20</sup>

Self-government, self-determination or immediate Union? Paschalis’ split identity – at once that of a Cypriot and of a colonial official – spawned two conflicting views on the meaning and the purported orientation of the “national struggle” against the “colonial yoke”. Paschalis himself, now under the restraint of colonial regulation No. 57 which forbid any officer to “publish in any manner anything which may be reasonably regarded as of a political or administrative nature”,<sup>21</sup> could take no part in this debate, rooted on conflicting perceptions of his own identity. As the issue of his identity was captured by the public space, and thus constructed as a political problem, his inability to intervene was tantamount to a deprivation of his own subjectivity.

During the same year, while this debate fuelled the passions of the political elite, somewhere in Limassol, far away from the spotlight, a Cypriot ex-policeman was finishing his letter to the Secretary of State for the Colonies protesting against his dismissal from the police force. In this letter, he proceeded to claim his rights, which he articulated on a claim of a specific identity.

### **Dismissing Subaltern Cypriot Civil Servants: The Vassiliou Case**

During an official inspection of the rural police stations by the Local Commandant of the Cyprus Military Police, Private Zaptieh No. 3576 Ioannis Vassiliou was found “untidily dressed and dirty” and had “failed to enter his Diary for five days, viz from 5<sup>th</sup> November, 1926, to 10<sup>th</sup> November, 1926.” To Vassiliou’s misfortune, this occurred while the Local Commandant was accompanied by Herbert Laynard

Dowbiggin, Inspector General of the Ceylon Police then on special duty on the island. Consequently Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Ernest Gallagher, Chief Commandant of the Cyprus Police, no doubt feeling humiliated in front of his distinguished guest, requested the immediate dismissal of the said Private on the grounds of “gross neglect of duty and dirtiness while stationed at Kolossi on the inspection of the Inspector General, Ceylon Police, in November, 1926.”<sup>22</sup> Governor Sir Ronald Storrs approved.

According to colonial regulation No. 51, Vassiliou, who received an annual salary of less than £100 could be “dismissed by the Governor, provided that in every such case where the officer [had] not been convicted on a criminal charge the grounds of intended dismissal [were] definitely stated in writing, and communicated to the officer in order that he may have full opportunity of exculpating himself, and that the matter was investigated by the Governor with the aid of the head of department.”<sup>23</sup> The Vassiliou file does not contain the details of this first part of the dismissal procedure, but it seems to have taken the longer part of two years and to have confirmed Gallagher’s decision and the Governor’s authorisation. At the end of it in any case, Vassiliou, using his right guaranteed by colonial regulation No. 212 stating that “every individual has, however, the right to address the Secretary of State, if he thinks it is proper”,<sup>24</sup> decided to appeal against his final sanction.

In a memorandum dated 26 March 1928 and aptly signed “Ioannis Vassiliou, Ex-Policeman No. 3576”, the aggrieved officer made the following representations:

“I was serving at the above station, as I mentioned, quite alone, and I had to look after a large volume of business, trying always to present myself worthy of the confidence given to me, and taking not into consideration anything else than my duty, I had to sleep [sic]<sup>25</sup> for five whole days and nights, looking after a lot of robberies, and other troubles which happened.

And just for the reason stated, I was found to be unshaven and my patrolling not passed in the proper book. My explanations and right justifications were not at all taken into consideration, and this was enough for my honesty, good conduct, long services, to be overlooked. Dismissed of my duty after a period of 12 years honest services, was the punishment I sustained [sic].

I was and I am, a loyal man, and I understand that I had to sustain a punishment, but I am of the humble opinion, that Your Excellency will agree to that the punishment I sustained was hard.

Being a father of a family, I have to protect my children and wife, while I am dismissed of my duties, and out of business whatever. My applications to the Governor of Cyprus, and the Chief Inspector of the Cyprus Military Police, were not taken into consideration.”

By pleading guilty to the charges, Vassiliou imputed them to the hefty workload to which he was entirely committed. The gravity centre of the memorandum was centred on the two middle paragraphs of the quoted passage. These were multi-layered and in them, Vassiliou underlined four things: one, his seniority; two, his dedication to his work; three, his loyalty and four, the rights to which such attributes entitled him as a civil servant and which, in fact, had been disregarded. Finally the last paragraph appealed to the sentimental feelings of the reader. All in all, the memorandum was balanced, straightforward and clear and aimed at crafting the image of a sound civil servant.

As such, it made a very positive impression at the Colonial Office. Arthur Dawe in particular noted that the Local Commandant who was inspecting Vassiliou's station – a highly-respected Cypriot Greek by the name of Michael Kareklas<sup>26</sup> – “informed Mr. Dowbiggin [the Ceylon Inspector of Police] that Private Vassiliou was a very good man” and that “Mr. Dowbiggin also [said] that the man was not to blame. He submitted that it was the system which required consideration”. But what is even more interesting, is that Dawe appeared to be receptive to Vassiliou's own arguments, particularly those concerning his seniority. Insisting on the fact that “the right of an aggrieved officer to petition the Secretary of State is one of considerable importance and that it should be treated with respect” he wrote that “it might appear (...) that the man had been dealt with too severely in being dismissed after twelve years”. Vassiliou, the 3/7 cp. per diem Limassol policeman, thus created a bridge between himself and the Downing Street powerful bureaucrat by using language which conveyed an ethos, the importance of seniority in the civil service, to which the bureaucrat in question appeared to be sensitive.

Consequently, the Secretary of State's despatch to the Governor, drafted by Dawe and his collaborators, asked for more details concerning the facts reproached to the dismissed officer and a full memorandum by the Chief Commandant of Police. In the memorandum in question, Lieutenant-Colonel Albert Ernest Gallagher wrote that even if the petitioner was of “good character, he belonged to the old school, without any chance of promotion and consequently of the time serving type, which is fast disappearing from the Police by elimination”.<sup>27</sup> The way he worded his memorandum, the Chief Commandant of Police seemed to imply, therefore, that his decision merely quickened a process of natural extinction of a certain class of policemen. This argumentation was found to be unconvincing at the Colonial Office, to say the least. Principal Bottomley noted that “[t]he penalty seem[ed] to be out of all proportion to the offence”. He added that the absence of “some sort of machinery for a trial or enquiry before a man is dismissed” and the “summary nature of this man's dismissal seemed to [him] to be all wrong”.<sup>28</sup> Much stronger though were principal Fiddian's observations. In reaction to one of his colleagues' suggestions that it might be necessary to endorse the Chief Commandant of

Police's decision in order to protect Gallagher's authority and preserve the discipline of the Cyprus Police corps,<sup>29</sup> he wrote that this

"[was] an argument that [he had] met before, and it always made [him] sick. Whenever any more than usually scandalous act of injustice was committed in a Colony, we used to be told that we should undermine the authority and prestige of the Colonial Government if we got it put right. It is difficult to stigmatise this doctrine without using language too indecently strong for a minute. It is much more important to maintain the authority of the Government and the confidence which Colonial Civil Servants ought to feel in the justice of the British administrator than it is to maintain Colonel Gallagher's authority and uphold discipline."<sup>30</sup>

Fiddian's remark was more ambiguous than it seemed. In order to contest his colleague's outward defence of the racial hierarchy within the administrative apparatus, he appealed to what might be termed a "public servant ethos", whereby the colonial civil servant's confidence – and it should be noted that no ethnicity was ascribed to the colonial civil servant – had become the keystone of the Government's authority. Yet, this confidence was directed to the "British administrator's justice" and not to the impersonal rules of the public service. In that sense, Fiddian implicitly acknowledged the very racial hierarchy he appeared to be criticising, but he suggested that this hierarchy should be built on a feeling of the "justice" in, rather than "prestige and authority" of, the British administrator. This illustrated a deviation and adaptation of the public servant ethos to the context of a colonial bureaucracy: indeed the logic of the racial hierarchy was entirely reversed here; whereas in his colleague's rationale it functioned as a principle for the preservation of the British superior's prestige, in Fiddian's remark this same racial hierarchy functioned as a guarantee for the indigenous civil servant's rights.

The Assistant Under-Secretary of State for the Colonies, Sir John E. Shuckburgh, wrote to the acting governor, R. E. Nicholson, that "we cannot help feeling that this man was dealt with too severely in being punished with dismissal, after 12 year's service, for what would seem, so far as our papers show, to have been a single and isolated offence". Admitting that, two years after the incident, it was too late to reinstate the man in his original post, he asked however that something be done for him, i.e., "find him some small job, such as messenger or porter in some Government department". He concluded by stating that "it does seem undeniable that there should be some definite procedure for the trial at any rate of offences which may involve serious punishment".<sup>31</sup> In short, Shuckburgh not only transformed his advisers' concerns into an official decision, but also suggested the implementation of measures which would further protect the indigenous civil servants, in the future, against what was perceived as their arbitrary treatment by the colonial government.

The case was officially closed with Nicholson's answer on 20 December 1928 stating that Vassiliou "turned down an offer of employment as a Temporary Guard [in the Customs Department] on the grounds that the post is only temporary; and this in spite of the fact that he was told he would be employed permanently later on if found suitable".<sup>32</sup> The reasons commanding Vassiliou's alleged decision are open to conjecture. Could the man have rejected what appeared to him to be a rather humiliating act of charity when, feeling sincerely aggrieved, he expected full rehabilitation?

### **Paschalis and Vassiliou: Conflicting Conceptions of Identity of the Actors**

The cases of Paschalis and Vassiliou, the former's recruitment and the latter's dismissal, although radically different, intersect over and around at least three common and closely intertwined issues: identity, subjectivity and agency.

The first issue which stems from the analysis of both cases is that of the existence of different and conflicting levels and understandings of the native colonial civil servants' identity. In the case of Paschalis, his identity was defined by three main actors or groups of actors: the Colonial Office, the Governor and the Cypriot press. In the eyes of the officials of the Colonial Office, Paschalis was viewed as a Cypriot. His Cypriotedness superseded his eventual ability as a colonial civil servant and his promotion to one of the highest posts in the government would likely change the nature of the fundamental political tacit rule of colonial difference. The Governor on the other hand played with both features of Paschalis' identity: in order to secure his appointment, he tended to blur the Cypriot origin of Paschalis by putting forward his competence and ability as a potential Solicitor-General; simultaneously he hinted at the political motive of his decision which was to promote a Cypriot to a higher post in order to tame the Cypriot-Greek members of the Legislative Council – as Karl Mannheim would put it, "turn[ing] a problem of politics into a problem of administration".<sup>33</sup> In the case of the press, the perception of Paschalis followed two successive stages: the press first applauded the appointment of a Greek, more than a Cypriot, to this high post; however, as soon as Paschalis began to perform his duties, it perceived a growing contradiction between his Greekness and his office as a Solicitor-General, since being Greek meant working for the national restitution, with a hint of bitter realisation of the superiority of the office to the origin. Paschalis himself was a "subject", rather than an "agent" in the whole debate: he had undergone passively more than he participated in the elaboration of this multi-faceted identity and ultimately he became unable to conciliate his opposite allegiances, and found himself trapped in his gown and under his wig.

The case of Vassiliou was totally at variance with that of Paschalis. In his

memorandum Vassiliou presented himself as a civil servant with considerable seniority, dedication to his duties and loyalty to the administration, and it was as such that he demanded the revision of the disciplinary action he had received. This rhetoric hit the bull's eye in the Colonial Office where the officials flew to the assistance of a civil servant who was entitled to some consideration. Vassiliou's Cypriotedness was not central; as a matter of fact, his very identity as Vassiliou the family man was obliterated; what mattered was that he was an aggrieved officer who used his fundamental right to petition the Secretary of State and that his plea should have been given the appropriate consideration. The Colonial Government, in the person of the Chief Commandant of Police, blatantly demonstrated their disregard for an individual who was considered a subaltern, and therefore an expendable officer, a local human resource. Vassiliou, therefore, actively participated in the elaboration of an identity perceived and acknowledged by the civil servants in London. This constructed identity created a bridge of communication with the colonial authorities in London and allowed some space for Vassiliou to become an active agent in the whole procedure. This "agency" was demonstrated up to the tragic ending of the case, when Vassiliou made the choice to refuse the accommodation proposed by the Colonial Government.

The issue of Paschalis' and Vassiliou's conflicting identities is therefore crucial to understand the functioning of the colonial administrative machinery. Here we could suggest, following Frederick Cooper and Rogers Brubaker, that "identity" is neither a fixed nor an inherent quality of the actors; identity, or rather "identities", are a set of permanently reconstructed representations of an actor or a specific group of actors by various agents. And these reconstructed – and at times overlapping – representations reveal the stakes of each of the agents involved in the elaboration of a specific actor's, or group of actors', identity.<sup>34</sup> This fluidity of the two Cypriots' "identities" however, seem to distort, to a certain extent, the rules regulating the colonial administration's mechanism.

### **The Rules of the System**

Cyprus' colonial government is almost a textbook case for Max Weber's definition of a bureaucracy: an organisation staffed by officers recruited through the impersonal procedure of the examination sanctioning their competence; placed on incremental salary scales in the frame of a strict administrative hierarchy; assigned to precisely defined tasks and managed by a set of impersonal rules regulating their activity and determining their promotion according to merit or seniority; and subjected to disciplinary actions that might be taken against them.<sup>35</sup> "Almost" since this rational frame is closely intertwined with an irrational one by virtue of which an invisible yet very effective "colour bar" separates the native from the English civil servant.

What, however, is revealed from the analysis of the two cases is the anxious and devout observance by the British authorities, the Colonial Office in particular, of the legal implications of the chain of command. This commitment of the metropolitan officials was determined by the practical and legal aspects of our specific cases. What caused concern in the case of Paschalis was the fact that should he finally be appointed to the post of Solicitor-General, this would have set off an irreversible legal mechanism by which he would be endowed with powers which would have put him at the core of the colonial policy. In particular, there would have been no legal device to prevent him from being promoted to the highest post of his department. The press was also aware of that fact and revelled in the idea that this appointment could eventually give the Greek community what they believed to be the keystone of the government. In the case of Vassiliou, the Colonial Office was extremely anxious to certify the legality of the whole affair, and tried to understand it in legal and regulatory terms. In the absence of any rules which would allow a rational interpretation of the case, the Colonial Office even suggested to the colonial government to set up “some definite procedure for the trial at any rate of offences which may involve serious punishment”; for it was precisely the legality of the working of the colonial administration which would “maintain the confidence which the Colonial Civil Servants ought to feel in the justice of the British administrator”.

Naturally, this metropolitan anxiety over procedure exceeds the case of Vassiliou or Paschalis. It was the expression of the perennial tension and mistrust between the metropolis and the colonies – a mistrust that Jack P. Greene felt was rooted in the loss of the American colonies<sup>36</sup> – and the eagerness of the former to set up devices that would allow it to control the latter. However, this “over-conformity” with the rules, to use Robert Merton’s words, was likely to provoke dysfunctions in the colonial bureaucracy, or a “displacement of its primary goals”.<sup>37</sup> The rules were meant to regulate the functioning of a bureaucracy, the aim of which was to secure colonial domination. Yet this unwritten but fundamental task of establishing the domination of the British on the Cypriot might sometimes be at variance with the written rules of a system that allowed a Cypriot like Vassiliou to protest or which provided no limit for the ascension of a Cypriot like Paschalis to posts which were thus far tacitly reserved for the Englishmen. As E. P. Thompson suggested, “the rulers are, in serious senses, whether willingly or unwillingly, the prisoners of their own rhetoric; they play the games of power according to rules which suit them, but they cannot break those rules or the whole game would be thrown away”.<sup>38</sup>

### **Securing Protection as a Native Colonial Civil Servant**

This paper aimed to suggest that the Cypriot colonial civil servant was in a position to secure, through the uncertainty that surrounded his dual – though constructed – identity as a “native” and as a “civil servant”, “a minimum of liberty to beat the

system” as Crozier put it.<sup>39</sup> Although Vassiliou did not exactly “beat the system”, he remained up to the end an active agent in the procedure he was subjected to. Indeed as a subaltern civil servant, Vassiliou belonged to the impersonal and bureaucratic sphere of what may be termed the “merely administrative”, where rules still matter. In fact, Vassiliou’s case highlights that “natives” may at times have been in a position to change the nature of the colonial will by the mere fact of abiding by its rules: in a paradoxical way, “resistance” to the colonial administration was here achieved through the exploitation of the latter’s rules framing “collaboration”. Paschalis on the other hand, as a higher civil servant, belonged to the sphere of “politics” where there were no other rules but those of his direct employer, the colonial government: his agency vanished in the five days it took him to reach a decision over the Governor’s proposal for his appointment as Solicitor-General; as soon as he assumed his functions, he was identified, rather than he identified himself, with the colonial government.

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25. One of the officials corrected the wording, writing “no sleep” which presumably is what Vassiliou meant.

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# **THE IMPACT OF YOUTH PEACEBUILDING CAMPS: CONNECTEDNESS, COPING, AND COLLABORATION**

**John Ungerleider**

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## **Abstract**

Young people from Cyprus who attended bicomunal youth camps in the United States developed new competencies for leadership and peacebuilding. These capacities were measured in terms of 1) deeper connection to peers from the opposite community in Cyprus, either Greek or Turkish Cypriot, 2) increased capacity for coping, when the political situation became or remained difficult in Cyprus, and 3) collaboration in follow-up activities and projects with peers from the other community. The impact of these two-week intensive, summer peacebuilding camps conducted at the School for International Training in Vermont was measured with a survey administered at a follow up reunion of programme graduates held in the UN administered buffer zone in Cyprus. Former participants attested to significant development of inter-communal connections, sustained hopefulness and ability to cope with a negative and divisive political climate, and ongoing commitment to collaborate with peers across the island to maintain bicomunal relationships and work for a peaceful future.

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## **Introduction**

Since 1990 the School for International Training (SIT) in Vermont has organised a variety of youth programmes focused on global issues, social action, and peacebuilding between young people from communities in conflict around the world, particularly Cyprus, Northern Ireland, and Israel. People always ask about the impact of these programmes when these students return home from the United States. These teenagers feel that they have changed, but they go back to an unchanged and still difficult social and political environment. Anyone who has seen the joyful friendship and tears that these young people share when parting and at reunions cannot doubt the transformation that has occurred in them as individuals representing communities in conflict with each other. Still the question remains: do these students remain connected back at home after this intimate experience of the other in a positive summer camp environment?

It has been suggested over the years that we are setting these teenagers up for great disappointment and disillusionment after they go home – that we will make it worse for them psychologically by building up their hopes and dreams, which could be let down when they are back at home in divided and sometimes violent societies. A second key question then arises: how will these young people cope with the difficult realities they will face when they return home?

While the camps are an exuberantly positive experience in and of themselves, critics and funding agencies question whether these adolescents go on to significantly impact their societies by taking effective action for peace. No matter what their motivation, it is guaranteed to be hard for them to work together on peacebuilding activities and projects at home. So the third question we must answer is: Do these youth continue to collaborate effectively with members of the other community in working for peace in their home countries?

This research project seeks to determine what qualities, characteristics, and capabilities remain active in these young people after the end of these peacebuilding camps. To explore the three critical questions above, the criteria for measuring the ongoing impact of a one-time youth peacebuilding programme are isolated as capacities for 1) connectedness, 2) coping, and 3) collaboration. Exploring the criteria of connection is done to assess the relationships that have been built between young people at the camps and whether they have been lasting. Understanding the criteria of coping assesses how these young people have developed mental and emotional coping mechanisms, individually and with group support, while living within an atmosphere of inevitably difficult social and political challenges in their communities. Focusing on the criteria of collaboration reveals whether the students have or have not worked together towards building peace in their homeland after the conclusion of these programmes.

Many who doubt the long-term impact of youth peacebuilding programmes had watched an episode of the CBS television show 60 Minutes, on which a number of graduates of Seeds of Peace, the Middle East youth peace camp in Maine, described how many had grown distant from their friends from camp once they returned to the extreme atmosphere of animosity and violence between Israelis and Palestinians that emerged during the second Intifada. Cynics evoke this episode as evidence that youth peacebuilding programmes do not work. This sobering documentary episode revealed a painful scenario of acute violence and mistrust, with fresh wounds, explosive anger, and no glimmer of political hope. Seeds that are not nurtured have no realistic chance to grow. Yet even in this sobering show ex-campers exhibited a glimmer of possibility, evidenced in dormant kernels of relationship, sometimes only retained through rare online communications or queries about mutual safety during outbreaks of violence.

In less acute cases of inter-communal violence, such as Cyprus or Northern Ireland – which can even be seen as essentially post-conflict divided societies – where there are recurrent moments of political hope and where violence has become a rare occurrence, the impact of youth peacebuilding work reveals genuine cause for optimism. Teenagers are capable of dramatic re-assessment and shifts within their personal and collective identities. Monolithic, exclusive communal identities can become transcendent (Kelman, 2002), inclusive of people who were formerly seen as enemies. The novel identity of ‘peacebuilder’ itself gets added onto an ethnic or religious sense of self. This identity can be something to hold onto in challenging times or developed into a leadership role.

The results of personal change and group cohesion are impossible to miss at the tearful end of these peace camps. The fun, the mutual celebration and support, and the camaraderie are tangible. But what happens when they re-enter a society that has not changed along with them? Can this transformation last? Assessing the connection, coping, and collaboration that remains in these students after the thrill of the camp experience is behind them can begin to answer these questions.

### **Background of the Camps**

In 1990 we began a summer youth programme at the School for International Training under the auspices of the Governor’s Institute of International Affairs. This programme brought together American students from Vermont with Soviet students from Leningrad. In the second year the Soviet students had become Russians from St. Petersburg and the Cold War was over. The Governor’s Institute programme has continued with a focus on current issues and youth activism. In 1996 Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot youth began coming to SIT for an inter-communal Confidence Building Workshop for college-aged participants in the Cyprus American Scholarship Programme (CASP). Since that time over 500 young people have participated in peace building programmes for Greek and Turkish Cypriots, Catholics and Protestants from Northern Ireland, and Arabs and Jews from Israel. With summer attendance ranging from 45 to 165 each summer since 1990, there have been over 1500 participants involved in these youth empowerment programmes. Most youth campers are 15-17 years old (for a description and photos of the camps online go to: <http://sit.edu/youth>).

The Cypriot Youth Camps in particular were an outgrowth of citizen bicomunal activities begun in the 1990s particularly under the auspices of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission and with the assistance of visiting scholars who conducted joint trainings in conflict resolution for Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot citizens (Broome, 2004). These trainings grew into a range of bicomunal citizen dialogue groups run by Cypriots themselves in which participants sought to understand the

perspective of members of the other community (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis). When the Turkish-Cypriot authorities forbid members of their community to enter the UN buffer zone for dialogue groups at the end of 1997, it became more pressing to find ways for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to meet off the island. The off-island youth camp model also allows young people to get away from the pressures of living in communities in conflict and creates a fresh context to reconstruct relationships with members of both Cypriot communities in a retreat setting (Ungerleider, 2001).

During the recent era in which Cypriots cross to both sides of the island with regularity, initial research reveals that contact between the two communities contributes to optimism about coexistence (Webster, 2005). Still, opportunities for structured or systematic dialogue between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, either on or off the island, remain very rare. Bicomunal citizen dialogue groups that were proliferating and gaining momentum in the mid-1990s have not recovered to pre-1997 levels of activity. Bicomunal programmes like the SIT Youth Camps are still providing an opportunity for deep inter-communal dialogue that has not yet become commonplace in Cyprus.

The design of the programme consists of a combination of skills training, dialogue sessions, outdoors teambuilding activities, social and recreational activities, and the learning that goes on from living together in a common and positive social milieu (Ungerleider, 2001). For students from communities in conflict, the dialogue leaders are adult representatives of those communities. These “trainers” have some, often limited, training in dialogue facilitation, sometimes through SIT’s CONTACT (Conflict Transformation across Cultures) graduate professional certificate programme (<http://sit.edu/contact>). These facilitators have ongoing supervision from programme directors and SIT faculty during the camp session. A sub-set of adult trainers have acquired multiple years of experience by working at the SIT Youth Camps, Seeds of Peace, and in the Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) programme back in Cyprus, and have gained significant expertise in bicomunal youth dialogue facilitation.

### **Research Methodology and Results**

In order to determine what measure of connectedness, coping, and collaboration were developed in graduates of the youth peacebuilding camps, former participants from Cyprus were asked to respond to a questionnaire with narrative questions and a numerical ranking designed to measure the emergence and sustenance of connectedness between programme graduates from the communities in conflict. This questionnaire was administered in Cyprus at a reunion of camp graduates held at the Fulbright Centre in the United Nations administered buffer zone in Nicosia in January, 2004. Forty-one former campers attending this reunion were from camp

years 2000-2003, with most coming from summer 2003 programmes.<sup>1</sup> (Unable to cross between the Turkish north and Greek south since 1974, Cypriots are now able to pass freely into the buffer zone, and since April 2003 they can show passports to cross into the other side of the island for the day.) At the time they took the survey, respondents were secondary students, university students, or serving in the military. For most participants this survey was completed six months after their camp experience, for the rest it had been eighteen months – three years since they were at the camp. Forty students attend each programme, twenty Greek Cypriots and twenty Turkish Cypriots, with either one or two sessions per summer.

### **Connectedness**

Connectedness can be represented as a relation assessed within a matrix, in this case wherein former camp participants numerically express their dynamic subjective experience of connectedness with other participants from the other community, in this case Greek Cypriots experience of connectedness to Turkish Cypriots, and vice versa (Shakun, 2003). Former youth campers were asked to rate their connectedness on a scale of zero (unconnectedness) to 5 (full connectedness) reflecting how connected they felt – before, during, and after camp – to five specific programme participants from the other community whom they were asked to name. That is, each participant listed three scores, 0 to 5, next to the names of friends from the programme to express their sense of connectedness: 1) before camp, 2) during camp, and 3) now (i.e., after), which ranged from six months to four years after their experience at the programme.

Since none of the campers knew each other, there was a nearly guaranteed dramatic improvement in connection from before camp to during the camp, unless no connection was made at the camp at all. This proved true, as the average increase from before to during camp was close to 4 (3.89) on a scale of 5 with a frequency of 47 per cent students listing the maximum score of 5 as their sense of connectedness to new friends from the other community.

The trickier question was the comparison of connectedness scores during and after camp. Did these connections last? The connectedness increase stayed at an average of 3 (3.01) six months after camp, a drop of .88 from during camp. Twenty-two per cent of students still cited a score of 5 for feeling maximally connected to these new friends.

Scores reveal both increased and decreased connectedness after the camp among various participants. One might expect the teens to lose the intensity of the residential camp experience and feel less connected months or years after the programme. This was evidenced in their responses to some extent, but there are also examples of participants who felt even more connected to specific counterparts

from the other community well after the camp had ended. This revealed that some friendships that had been started at the camp were deepened and developed over the months or years since the end of their time together in the US.

Since the end of the programmes, all of those who took the survey had visited with campers from the other community. The average number of visits with campers from the other community after camp was 4.41 visits per camper over a six-month period. Of course these results are biased by the fact that those taking the survey were willing to come to a reunion. Those who did not come may not in fact have stayed in touch with acquaintances from the other community. Though some expressed regrets due to private lessons and family obligations, which are common in Cyprus and keep teenagers too busy to attend reunions, clearly others had not been motivated enough to remain in contact with their new friends from the other community. This was the case with one particularly challenging cohort of Greek Cypriots, where a few negative leaders discouraged their peers from mixing bicommunally; Turkish Cypriots from this session complained that their Greek-Cypriot counterparts had made no effort to get together with them when back in Cyprus. While positive results were revealed, the impact of the programmes, or lack thereof, on those not participating in the study remains hidden.

One-hundred per cent of survey respondents said that they continued friendships with campers from the other community. Ninety-eight per cent utilised the Internet as a source of communication with friends from the other community. Eighty per cent attended reunions with friends from the other community. Thirty-two per cent said that they made personal visits across the island to see friends from the other community. Only 22 per cent said that they use the telephone as a form of communication, though it must be mentioned that it is somewhat complicated to place a call to phone lines on the other side of the island.

There was a built in bias in the research sample as it was more likely that former campers who had friendships with others would attend the reunion and thereby fill out the questionnaire. Still, beginning with the fact of zero connection between these teens, who also had been socialised to see members of the other community as enemies, the increase and sustenance of these friendships is a pro-social fact.

### **Coping**

On the questionnaire, former participants were asked a set of questions to determine how the camp had helped them cope with the political and emotional challenges caused by the conflict that remains unresolved on their island since they returned home. A resounding 97.6 per cent reported that the camp experience made them feel more hopeful about the future of Cyprus. When asked how the camp influenced their thinking about the Cyprus conflict, the impact of the camp



experience on improving the general sense of hopefulness in these teens toward the future of their island was nearly universal among those who participated in the survey. This sense of hope was revealed in representative comments, given in English by the Cypriot youth:

It has made me believe that there is hope for freedom for Cyprus and that we can as people from different communities live together peacefully.

The camp made me understand that the candle of hope still exists.

I started feeling much more confident that the problem can be solved soon.

They also saw similarities between the two communities:

I think that we can live together without any problems, we are the same and we create good friendships. We can live peacefully.

It made me think of the Turkish Cypriots as ordinary people with so many similarities with us and that we could easily live together.

At past, I thought that Greeks are really opposite people to our community but after camp, I saw that they are just like us and I started to look positive to peace.

Positive thinking towards solutions, an active rather than just a hopeful stance, seemed to be a lasting result as well:

It allowed me to have a more positive outlook on the problem. I realised that we can live together and we have so many things in common.

At the camp, we talked and discussed about our history. We learned many things that we didn't know and when we tried to find a solution we were successful. So I believe that we are the seeds of peace and we want peace. Where there is a will, there is a way.

Such positive thinking translated to advocacy in political discussions:

It has influenced me a lot since now I am able to take part in discussions actively, as I have more knowledge on the subject and I feel more confident in defending my views.

I have become more open-minded and my negative image about Turkish-Cypriots has faded away. I have also tried to convince and discuss with others that we can live together in peace.

Yet it wasn't completely easy to come home. They are well aware that camp provided an idealised environment for them to become friends. They understand the limitations they face at home: in terms of how little power they have as teenagers in controlling the policies of their county, and of managing the challenges of their busy daily schedules as teens:

At the camp, things weren't as real. There I thought that everything was very easy, but coming back to Cyprus, I found out that things weren't so easy.

When I was at SIT, I thought that we will be good friends and never forget each other, but when we came back we can't usually meet.

There have been many politically difficult periods in the recent Cypriot history, as various politicians continue all variety of machinations to retain the status quo in the face of strong international pressure to move forward. Negotiations repeatedly stall or fail. The international community struggles to promote progress in the peace process and then, as so many times before, withdraws its efforts in frustration. In such difficult times, did the camp experience affect former participant's thinking and behaviour?

After they returned to Cyprus, from six months up to several years after the camp, an overwhelming 92.5 per cent reported that the camp still helped them feel more hopeful and positive, even when the political situation was negative. In such times, students felt that their camp experience bolstered their hopes and determination for the future.

In such times, I feel more hopeful because I learned from camp that through discussion, problems can be solved.

We will be the next generation, the next politicians. We want peace. We know we can change everything. So, even though the political situation was negative, I will not lose my hopes!

### **Collaboration**

The most tangible way that these students kept their hopes for a peaceful Cyprus alive was by becoming active in bicomunal peacebuilding activities and ongoing projects. A set of questions sought to assess their level of participation in bicomunal activities back at home. There is evidence that these programmes not only build friendships and break stereotypes in the short term, but also have an ongoing impact back at home – not only interpersonally, but socially and even politically. While only a very few had been involved in bicomunal programmes before attending the programme 53 per cent of the respondents claimed to have participated in bicomunal activities and 41.5 per cent claimed to have worked in

more substantive bicomunal projects after the camp. They listed participation in:

1. A Bicomunal Youth Orchestra
2. A Tree Planting Event in Pyla (see below\*)
3. Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) weekend workshops
4. Bicomunal Projects for School
5. Youth Promoting Peace (YPP), meetings to organise a Bicomunal Rock Concert, Festival, and Party
6. A Bicomunal Folk Dance Group meeting in Pyla
7. Dinner, shopping, swimming, playing pinball together
8. The organisation of a Bicomunal Hip Hop Party
9. Environmental activities such as the Bicomunal Green Project
10. Bicomunal Drama Clubs
11. UNDP Sponsored Bicomunal Projects
12. A Drawing for Peace Activity

Furthermore, the extension of cross-community contacts was not limited to friends that were made at camp. Seventy-three per cent of the graduates said that after the camps they met new individuals from the other community who had not been to SIT, and they met these new friends as a result of bicomunal activities that they entered only after participation at the camp. Most of these new contacts were made in Nicosia or in the unique, mixed village of Pyla\* located within the buffer zone, which bicomunal activists utilised to meet at times when they were forbidden to cross the checkpoints in the capital. Others met at Youth Encounters for Peace (YEP) workshops, the only long-standing and consistent bicomunal youth programme in Cyprus, at the annual United Nations Peace Day, and at various reunions, including at the American Academy of Larnaca.

Former participants were also asked to do a quantitative assessment of how often they discussed bicomunal issues before, during, and after camp. They rated the frequency of their participation in political discussions on a scale of 0-5, ranging from "0 if you never discussed/discuss these issues" to "5 if you discuss them very frequently." The frequency of political discussions before camp averaged at 2.42. Participants increased discussion on political matters by 1.86 while at camp, up to 4.28. More impressive is that the participants continued to maintain relatively similar levels of discussion after camp as discussion decreased by a mere .13, to 4.15. In a frequency analysis by individual participants of discussions before versus after camp, the general trend was to more political discussions after camp, with the frequency focused in the 2-3 range before camp and in the 4-5 range afterwards. Two individuals marked that they had no discussions of this sort at all (0) before camp and frequent discussions after camp (5).

This scale reveals that former campers began to think and talk more about Cypriot politics and bicomunal issues after the camp. There is evidence that increased levels of engaged discussion and action continues for at least the first 3-4 years after the programme, a time when Cypriot youth are extremely busy completing secondary school and entering college or the military. Hopefully this increased engagement in considering and acting on strategies for peacebuilding in Cyprus is a step towards becoming more analytical, responsible citizens who are better prepared for an active, effective role as future Cypriot leaders.

### **Conclusions**

Cyprus is no longer an active violent conflict, yet stubbornly divisive ideologies remain in need of peacebuilding interventions. While these young people have not changed the adult politics of their conflicted homeland, they have rewritten the script of their socialisation and prejudices. Previously unimagined friendships with Cypriots, who used to be seen as Greeks or Turks in the most condescending sense, have changed their own sense of who they are in relation to their neighbours. While still aware of their differences, these young people articulate a newfound, transcendent Cypriot identity. This expanded perception of belonging to one of two communities sharing a small island combines with an emerging sense of oneself as a peacebuilder. The result manifests a nascent transformation, a shift that in many programme graduates is rooted and stabilised during the first year after the camp experience.

The connections between campers have remained: some thinned by busy schedules, yet some deepened by having endured the reality of re-entering a divided society and successfully maintaining a friendship with an “enemy.” Former campers have demonstrated the coping ability to withstand, with their hope intact, the initial exposure to ongoing intolerance and divisive politics, and continually dampened hopes of social reconciliation. These young people will continue to be tested over the years, but have identified a foundation and touchstone to refresh the truth of their inter-communal experience and their inspiration for peace. It may be too soon to say whether their commitment to a peaceful future will grow into the perseverance that will be needed to successfully advocate for the progress they envision. They have proven to themselves, however, that they are committed to each other and to the simple truth that they should be able to live in peace on their small island, without fear or the threat of violence.

**Note**

1. Attendees by year: 2003 = 24 (two sessions); 2002 = 13 (one session); 2001 = 3 (one session); 2000 – 1 (one session).

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# Commentary Article

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# In Memoriam Prokopis Papaloizou, 1907-2002

**Peter Loizos**

The text which follows this Introduction is a footnote to a footnote to Cypriot colonial history. The English Romantic poet William Wordsworth wrote about his perceptions of the early days of the 1789 French Revolution

“Bliss was it in that dawn to be alive.” But in later life he became a conservative.

In an earlier article, (Loizos, 1985) following an idea in the conclusion to Georghallides’ *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs* I suggested that during the British colonial period, Cyprus emerged from being an Ottoman backwater, to a kind of feverish modernity; from being a place where sons followed in their fathers’ footsteps, and respected their authority, to being a place full of rebellious young men challenging all kinds of authorities. Greek nationalists challenged the authority of British rule. The Communist Party challenged ruling class leadership and the authority of the Church. In Cyprus, arguably, the French Revolution of 1789 did not reach Cyprus until the Oktovriana, 1931 or – if we prefer 1955 as the watershed date – even later. That is one difference between the political legacy of being an Ottoman province, and a French or Austrian province. British rule, with its various modernisations, was secure for 50 years before the first modernist Cypriot rebellion took place. Cyprus was a “late developer” in comparison with, say Corsica, which had had republican revolutions **before** 1789.

This brief Commentary catches the flavour of one tiny act of rebellion, and suggests how quickly the Church moved to the counter attack. At the time, 1930, both Governor Storrs and the Greek Consul, Kyrou were, for rather different reasons, apprehensive about the growing interest in communism on the island. As will be clear in a moment, the Church was also following the activities of the handful of fledgling communists with an interest which was to prove unhealthy for some of them.

Our story goes like this: The Greek-Cypriot poet who wrote under the name Tefkros Anthias had published several volumes of verse in quick succession. The second volume’s title poem was ‘Holy Satan, have mercy on me’ and although its intentions are debateable, it is hardly surprising that it caused a stir. And Anthias

was already seen as an important figure in leftwing circles. The third volume, 'The Second Coming,' published early in 1931, was even bolder. And it rapidly drew criticisms from the Church.

To give a sense of what Anthias was saying, here is the title poem of the second collection, in my own translation, with some help from Zenon Stavrinides:

**Holy Satan, have mercy on me.**

Have mercy, Holy Satan, this evening  
And listen if you will to my gut's rumble  
Its clarinets, hornpipes – my innards' drumrolls are festive.  
Nightmarish memories circle me round  
Laughing, my haggish dreams enclose me.

Once, I was a human being  
Then I became a beast from those dreadful days  
Yes, some animal with its feet hobbled  
Which cannot browse on the field  
Nor can he throw his master off  
Because his feet are hobbled fast.

My hellish life oppresses me  
Stifling my every moaning cry,  
But I am waiting for that which when it comes  
Into the light with great joy will let me breathe my last,  
If I see just one new dawn, one shining day.

For every tear that's fallen from my eye  
Will become fire to burn the thing which crushes me.  
The blue night will be dancing  
Starlight will debauch the scene.  
Holy Satan, now that God has grown old  
Let you lead me, let you be my guide.

I do not propose to risk an interpretation of what is implied here. There is room for debate, and my first attempts were at variance with what the poet himself told his daughter Prof. Floya Anthias, about intentions and meaning. However, whatever the intentions, and whatever would come across in Greek to a Greek reader, there would have been nothing here to reassure nervous churchmen.

One young schoolteacher, Prokopis Papaloizou, from Argaki village, had become an early member of KKK, the Communist Party of Cyprus, having been impressed by things he had read in newspapers from Greece, as well as hearing speeches from Vatiliotis suggesting that Christ's teachings and Marx's teachings

had much in common, only Marx – focused on the here-and-now – would do more for the poor in the difficult days of the Depression, which had already affected the working class. Prokopis had seen poor men on their knees pleading with moneylenders not to foreclose. For the rest of his life he remembered the coldness with which the moneylender turned his face away in denial of the plea for mercy.

Having himself literary aspirations, Prokopis took up his pen and under the pen-name, Petros Athonas, wrote a spirited ‘Open Letter’ in *Laiki Dynamis*. The original letter is dated Nicosia, 17 February 1930, but that date may have been a misprint for 1931. The tone was challenging, confident, and full of ideas about art, and the irrelevance of the traditional Church. Another young teacher, Patapios Christodoulides apparently did something similar.

The text of the letter now follows in Zenon Stavrinides’ translation:  
(He found at least one passage of the letter “irredeemably obscure”)

**Open Letter  
To His Beatitude the Archbishop and other Bishops**

“Your Beatitude, Most Reverend Fathers,

For the past two or three weeks you are upset by a certain work of the Cypriot poet Tefkros Anthias. The cause of your agitation: that Anthias in his work pokes sarcastic fun at divine providence and he kills God in people’s consciousness.

First of all, Art has nothing to [do] with Church politics, especially as your action resembles the efforts which political leaders make to prevent any reduction in the numbers of their supporters. Art is a social phenomenon which mirrors the pulse of society as it develops. No organisation, whether religious, political or social, has the ability or right to impose orthodoxy on the thought of writers and artists. Art is everywhere free.

And something else. Let us suppose that you do have the power to destroy the work of Anthias, who had the tragic fortune to express freely an opinion which is in the nature of a common secret – do you think you have justification for doing so? If you do so, it means that you are scared that people’s religious beliefs will be shaken by reading the book. However, if they are shaken, it means that they are not firmly founded, either because the people who espouse this religion have never penetrated its meaning, or else because its ideology no longer serves society. If this is how matters stand, why don’t you take steps to provide these beliefs with proper support and thank Anthias for pointing things out for you?

Anthias gives expression to contemporary anxieties, he cries out that divine providence is dead. Under similar psychological states the simplest peasants find its silence suspect. It is an intellectual anxiety, a conviction which springs from contemporary social reality. Can you argue in support of a contrary position? Do it then. Suspicions are not to be attacked, but they have to be cleared up, and people who experience concerns are not to be thrown out in the streets, but they have to be reassured and calmed down. After all, we are not living in the time of Byzantium when the Church supported its position by the use of eunuchs and the practice of excommunication. The religious sentiment of a people does not risk destruction by a work of Art; Art does not destroy well founded convictions, it only creates emotion.

In his work Anthias represents the anxious religious pulse of the age. He does not attack the Christian religion considered as a set of theoretical teachings, as a religious ideology, but only the particular form and essence of God, in the sorry state they have fallen into. This is the sentiment that pervades his work. This is evident in his verses:

Even if this crowd judges you to be alive  
Don't think for a moment that it understands your existence  
Behind your grotesque, fantastical countenance  
It knows that some merchant moves satanically  
Holding the scale in his hands  
Selling his sweat.  
So in speaking to you the crowd speaks to its merchant  
And in condemning you, condemns him.

For this reason you are wrong in acting against Anthias in an anti-Christian way. All your actions simply bear testimony to the degree of your erratic behaviour towards the spiritual movement at an age when the freedom of thought and will have taken on the character of a symbolic standard. And every gesture of the kind you make does not [sic; but possibly the word 'not' is typed in error, ZS] appear to show religious fanaticism and professional zeal. Your zeal might have received praise if it were directed to some social benefit, if it aimed at alleviating social misery.

Can you approach sincerely and warmly poverty, humiliation, pain, and work to restore a heart that has been broken by despair; to cleanse souls soiled with a death-wish and the mud of bitterness; to do a good act which will enable 60-year old people experience the meaning of their life, to pull them back from superstition and religious bigotry to the brightly lit palaces of the true essence of religion? Can you give a piece of land to an unemployed man for whom one moment of life takes the endless duration of eternity, and to cleanse the dark condition of those who are neither alive, nor dead? Do it then. This is the true ideology of he who chose to ascend the steep

mountain of pain. This is precisely the deeper meaning of the essence for which Anthias struggles in a different way, a contemporary way. Listen to him when he says:

Father when you came home in the evening  
You sat tired, sweating  
In front of your home's poor fireplace  
And every one of your sighs was poison for us,  
An eternal slave of your field, of the factory,  
Of worry, of the need for bread. Poor clown  
Why can't I forget even for a moment  
Your secret sadness as you looked at us in church amid the crowd  
And bid to us a tearful goodbye?

And now tell me, Your Beatitude and Most Reverend Clergy, who is more truly Christian – you in your cheerful demeanour and calm life or Anthias in his much more human poetic mood? And tell me again please which one has good cause to take the side of the humble and the humiliated? You who always experienced the pleasures of satisfied appetite, who never got strayed outside the framework of comfortable life, who looked at Christian mass in books like obstinate high school pupils, or Anthias who was seized by the whirlwind of life, was thrown down the staircase of humility and came to know Man, the most secret corners of want, the consequences of humiliation, and lived through every aspect of the Christian world-view in its highest intensity? And considering all this, is the poet's mental state not human, entirely human, when he expresses himself in the following way?

Lord God! I looked for you in the tree, in the fire  
In the enormous rock, in the river bed  
In the dark forests, the light of the Evening Star  
The large expanse of the sea  
The chiselled marble, the painted wall  
On the altar, in the Holy of the Holies, the endless sky  
But alas, I never found you anywhere!

Instead of trying to condemn people who seek to pull man back from the deep darkness of superstition and dogmatism, to build in him healthy emotional foundations and make him love life on earth, you could try something else. Our religious system has gone stale after so many centuries of paralysis and lack of fresh air, and so it cannot serve the advancement of society, its collective surge towards a higher meaning of life. It has stayed entrenched in pathological fanaticism and has died, since everything that does not evolve – whether a political, a social or religious system – dies.

Society is no longer informed with the humane spirit of Jesus – the most enlightened figure among the founders of religions – in an age in which

beggars and tramps are considered to be so precious in the emotional plane. We may recall Bernard Shaw's words: Society depends on fear. As for religion, it lives off society without offering any service in return.

This is what you have achieved, Reverend Fathers, during your centuries-long service to the Christian religion. You have eliminated the power of the most socially beneficial ideology that has ever appeared in the form of religion. You thickened the darkness engulfing the crowd and exploited its religiosity – which is a phenomenon constituted of psychological elements such as fear in the face of mystery, the worship of mystery, the need to explain it, and man's wish to live permanently. You have maintained alive dogmatic beliefs and legends – all those flashy devices which all religions employ in order to overwhelm the crowd.

Nevertheless the present social situation will not permit you to sacrifice the essential nature of religion to dead dogmas, which are elements constituted of mystical tendencies of men in periods of intellectual obscurantism. The essence of religion springs from people's mental world and is directed at this world. The emotional world of post-war people has changed. It embraces elements which are nervous, anxious, alert. It seeks effective action, enlightened action, truth and the meaning of life, and is indifferent to other thing[s]. Gone is the time when it was thought that truth was not a suitable food for every stomach. Even if people felt certain that strong light blinds the eyes it strikes on, they deem it preferable that one generation may be blinded than that a succession of generations should swim in oceans of darkness.

This is then the kind of post-war man, troubled and deeply Christian man, which Anthias seeks to express. And your actions against him do the Church no credit, especially after the Lambeth Conference in which European churchmen – those eternal protestants – sought to impose on the state birth control in accordance with people's financial condition for the benefit of the whole society. In times such as these you should not regurgitate various terms such as "virtue, morality, our forefathers, holy fathers", terms which never had any content and which were launched by short-sighted moral bigots. Moreover in times in which the energies and activities of other clerics have acquired torrential force, do not confine yourselves to an unintelligible journal, annual visits to villages and gestures of excommunication.

Nicosia, 17 February 1930

**PETROS ATHONAS"**

The Church took a year to respond, but when it did, it acted decisively. It called Anthias, Papaloizou and the Karpassiot teacher, Patapios Christodoulides to a

hearing to explain themselves. Anthias declined to attend, wrote a letter to the Bishop of Paphos instead, and was later excommunicated but for his poetry. Papaloizou and Christodoulides attended, and were persuaded – almost certainly by threats of excommunication and loss of their employment as teachers – to withdraw their defence of Anthias, and apologise to the Church. They were required to sign formal statements to this effect. These were immediately published by the Church in its Gazette, *Apostolos Varnabas* 7 May 1931, pp. 289-295.

Prokopis Papaloizou felt deeply humiliated by what he had now done. He was by nature somewhat unsure of himself, but he felt he had let Anthias down, as well as his newly found ideals as a communist. He was already in hot water for personal matters with one of his close relatives in Argaki: His sister Maria had died of post-partum infection, and her husband blamed Prokopis for having first brought a younger doctor he had preferred, instead of the older doctor his brother-in-law had wanted. Without modern antibiotics, it is doubtful if Maria could have been saved in any case. But hard words had been said to Prokopis suggesting he was to blame for his sister's death. It was characteristic of him that he took these words to heart. In his shoes I would certainly have done the same.

Prokopis decided to leave the island, which he must have done shortly before the Oktovriana and he spent most of the rest of his life in London. He came to the notice of the British official Hart-Davis, who reported – on 2 October 1935 – to a Minister for the Colonies, Fletcher-Cook, that he was the leader of a group of communists who met in Soho.

“Communism is gradually gaining ground among them. There is an active cell at 52 Berwick Street, housed at a café belonging to Christophoros Christodoulides. Their leader at present is one Prokopios Papaloizou from Argaki [known as Petros Athonas]. He is educated, he studies at the British Museum, and writes for the Athens-based communist publication ‘To Mellon’. The cell has about thirty active workers, and perhaps a hundred followers who are not active” [Ta Nea [London] 14 May 1937, page 6].

Both Prokopis and Ezekias Papaioannou gave me identical versions of a humorous anecdote which illustrates how far he was in fact from being the dedicated revolutionary of Hart-Davis' Memorandum:

The two men had been sharing a room. They were both penniless and hadn't eaten for several days. Papaioannou [showing the leadership skills for which he would become famous] suggested Prokopis go out and bring back some milk, as British milkman left bottles of milk early in the morning outside their customers' houses. (They still do!) Prokopis went out, saw milk but was afraid to take it,

fearing the consequences as a young foreigner if caught. He returned to the room and told Papaioannou he couldn't find any milk! Papaioannou expressed disbelief and disappointment. He went out and soon returned with a number of milk bottles, which he divided equally between them. He went on to fight in Spain and become General Secretary of AKEL, while Prokopis remained virtually unknown.

Prokopis spent the rest of his life in London, mostly as a private-schoolteacher, except for some war service in Egypt in the RAF, a period as a night-time telephonist, and two brief holidays in Cyprus – the first in 1968. He left or drifted away from the Communist Party after the 1939 Moscow trials of Old Bolsheviks. He said about this:

“I joined the Party because I believed all men were equal, and I left when Pravda started writing about Stalin as if he was God. And I couldn't believe that all these old comrades on trial had truly betrayed the revolution.”

During the 1968 youth rebellions in Paris, one of the slogans on a wall of the Sorbonne said “Please leave the French Communist Party as clean on your departure as you would like to have found it when you joined.” And how very perceptive of the youthful rebels, for when it came to taking sides, the Parti Communiste français (PCF) decided to side with the French State, and leave the rebels to dry out. The PCF would not be the last Communist Party to do such a U-turn.

To have joined a Communist Party during a World Depression as a young man, in the 1920s was to show some imagination and empathy. To have left it in the late 1930s was to show an equally admirable kind of good sense.

I wish the last vignette of Prokopis Papaloizou in public life to be entirely positive. In the 1980s, he had become friendly with an Argaki man called Sophronis Michaelides, a self-educated left-wing farmer, who taught himself both Russian and English so he could read their literatures. He had developed a rare cancer of the spine, and was dying a slow death in hospital in Bloomsbury. During this period poetry poured out of him. Prokopis visited him often, and they had long conversations on many matters. They made an agreement that whoever died first, the other one would speak a eulogy at his funeral, and would read Palamas' poem 'The Grave' to the mourners. In the event, Sophronis died first from his incurable condition. Prokopis spoke at his funeral in North London, which was well attended by his family, by other Argaki villagers, and family friends. Prokopis used all the skills he had learned in a lifetime of school teaching to talk with great clarity and warmth about his dead friend – his love of literature,



his progressive political ideas, his bright mind, his decency, and his courage in the face of death. People listened with great attention. This is the way I prefer to remember him – exercising his pastoral and oratorical skills in fulfilling a promise undertaken to a dying man he had befriended. He proved better in this role than as a youthful and hesitant revolutionary.

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### **Acknowledgements**

I am most grateful to Zenon Stavriniades for having sent me items he came across about Prokopis Papaloizou, and for translating his letter. I believe I have George Georghallides to thank for the Apostolos Varnavas item. Thanks also to Andis Panayiotou for sending me some translations of Anthias' poems, and to Floya Anthia for discussing her father with me and checking my text. Thanks to Andreas Panayiotou for encouraging me to reflect on Prokopis' letter. Thanks to Nikos Philippou for searching the Archbishop newspaper archives for 1930 and 1931. None are responsible for any errors or emphases in this text.



# Book Reviews

**VOLUME 18**  
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# **Step-Mothertongue: From Nationalism to Multiculturalism the Literatures of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey**

**Edited by Mehmet Yaşın  
Middlesex University Press, (London, 2000) 207 pp.**

This is a most important publication examining the national and cultural identities of Greeks, Turks, and Cypriots through their literatures. Step-Mothertongue aims to draw attention to the cross-cultural and multicultural traditions through a comparative analysis of the literature and literary traditions of Greece, Turkey and particularly of Cyprus. Step-Mothertongue is timely because it approaches nationalism from a socio-cultural and literary-historical framework, rather than a traditional ethnic identity agenda.

The articles in this publication were originally presented at a conference at Middlesex University on 12-13 December 1997, which aimed to build a body of work around the critique of nationalisms in the literature of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus. There are eight articles, an interview of Vamik Volkan by Yael Navaro-Yaşın, and an after word by Djemal Kadir. Seven of the eight articles are separated into two sections, and a section of Cypriot poetry divides them. The first section titled “National Literatures in a Global Era” comprises four articles.

The first article, by Gregory Jusdanis, Ohio State University, questions the absence of contemporary Greek literature from the branch of Western European literature. Twenty years ago critics considered it highly, but the supremacy of Western literary discourses within global literature and the dominance of the English language, have made contemporary Greek literature (and others written in the non-English tongue) a “stranger at the feast”. Jusdanis also argues that the lack of a contemporary Greek literary intelligentsia sophisticated enough to reorient Greek society and deconstruct the mainstream nationalist identity is also to blame, but he fails to answer why such an intelligentsia does not exist. How far has Greek society actually developed, especially vis-à-vis its neighbours whose culture had a vital and undeniable influence on Modern Greek culture?

The next article by Hasan Bülent Kahraman, of Sabancı University, Istanbul, considers the transformation of Turkish literature since the 1980s, from its traditional duty of formulating the nation-state identity, to its deconstruction and the establishment of new multi “selves”. The literary change depended on the new

social, political, and cultural changes in identity formation within Turkish society, which deviated from the traditional nationalist framework. The development of an understanding of Turkish multi “selves”, Kurdish, Armenian, Assyrian, and Turkic, was largely due to the emergence of Turkish-Cypriot poets and their success in bringing a consciousness of “other selves” and “other identities”. The article, however, does not reveal how mainstream is the understanding of the “multi” selves syndrome. Nevertheless, the article provokes thoughts of a similar investigation of Greek society and a comparison.

The article by Vangelis Calotychos, New York University is the most ideological and political and thus the most confrontational. Calotychos chides the academics who refused invitations to the conference because they assumed, from a deterministic reading of the conference subtitle “New Interpretations of the Literatures of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey” that it was examining three languages and three literatures. Calotychos argues that Greek literature was propelled and dominated by national identity and repressed an exotic other self – the Ottoman, Turkic, Slavic, Balkan, Romaic and other influences that were often suppressed as “not Greek”. Calotychos studies two post-modern novels, written by a Greek and a Turk, with historical themes that present the shifting nature of national identities. Calotychos emphasises the importance to identity of the hagiography, folklore, oral family traditions, and the history, culture and traditions of the village. Although there have been changes in literary focuses from national identity to multicultural, the impression is that the Turks have taken greater steps than the Greeks.

Part Two is an extraordinary compilation of poetry, which is termed “uncanonised” and of a “multicultural society”. The anthology comprises Phoenician, Assyrian, Lusignan, Venetian and Ottoman poetry of Cyprus; works hitherto suppressed from the developed and accepted Cypriot Greek national consciousness. Then poetry from the second-half of the twentieth century, written by Cypriots in Greek, Turkish, Armenian, English and French, highlights the multi-lingual and multicultural realities of Cypriot literature and society. The compilation suggests that being a Cypriot is more than simply being a Greek and a Turk from Cyprus, but a person that has a multicultural identity, touched by numerous cultural and linguistic influences of non-indigenous peoples who ruled or settled in the island.

Part Three, entitled ‘Poetries and Narratives on the “Other”’ takes the focus to Cyprus. The first article by the cultural anthropologist Moira Killoran, explores the change in Turkish-Cypriot perceptions of their identity and the “other”; the Greek Cypriots. Killoran argues that Turkish Cypriots have gone from emphasising notions of national identity to emphasising cultural and social ideas. Poetry used in the past to emphasise “Turkishness” is now used to emphasise “Cypriotness”. Poets, like

Mehmet Yaşın, first publicly questioned Turkish-Cypriot “Turkishness”, encouraging the Cypriot Turkish opposition, which had always believed in the peaceful co-existence of the Cypriot communities, to do likewise. This resulted in a battle between ideologies (Right vs. Left and Centre) and for a history and an identity. This article lacks a corresponding comparison of the Greek-Cypriot responses to the Turkish-Cypriot questioning of their identity and whether the Greek Cypriots have questioned theirs. It seems that the silence by the author on this point answers the question in the negative.

The article by the cultural historian Bekir Azkin investigates the poetry translations of the two Cypriot communities and concludes that the multilingual and multicultural traditions they share in folk literature and culture has not found expression in the “high culture” of the intellectuals. Azkin believes that the nationalism pervading the two communities prevented intellectuals from discovering the “other’s” literature and only since 1974 has there been some effort to do so, but more needs to be done. This is especially true in light of recent events which have seen the latest UN thrust for a settlement result in a “revolution” in Turkish-Cypriot political life from grass roots society rebelling against the nationalist narratives of the Rauf Denktash regime, while in the south, the Greek-Cypriot political leadership moved to the extreme right and reasserted the nationalist paradigms that dominated society in the 1950s and 1960s.

The last article, by the conflict resolution expert, Maria Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, is important for its exploration of counter-nationalist narratives in their inter-lingual communication because these narratives are suppressed in official exclusionary discourses in Cyprus. Her work in conflict resolution, however, has revealed that a group identity can form once experiences are shared and the new multicultural understanding of the history of Cyprus which develops allows the participants to look forward with a new vision of Cyprus. But there are many obstacles to the conflict resolution initiatives that mirror the obstacles the UN plan faced when it was put to the Cypriot communities in April 2004; ethnocentrism; super-nationalism; chauvinism; threats to peace-builders and participants and to all who challenge the dominant nationalist narratives. Another significant problem is the failure of peace-builders to effectively use the media, which for the most part is dominated by the ideologies of the nationalist forces.

Part Three ends with the interview of Vamik Volkan the veteran psychiatrist and psychoanalyst by Yael Navaro-Yashin. Volkan discusses his work with various ethnic groups and the trans-generational narratives about history, identity, and the impact of language shifts on political psychology and culture.

This review would be incomplete without a few words about the man who made

it all possible – not simply the book but also the questioning by the Turkish Cypriots of their identity. This study owes itself to the emergence of a Turkish-Cypriot intelligentsia, spearheaded by the journalist-poet-academic Mehmet Yaşın. Born in 1958 in Neapolis, a cosmopolitan area of Nicosia, during the 1963 inter-communal violence, Greek-Cypriot extremists looted and burned his family home. He fled with his mother to Lefka, until the Turkish invasion of 1974 when they returned to their home in Nicosia. But it was not the same: there were no Greek, Armenian or Latin Cypriots left. In 1976 Mehmet enrolled at the Faculty of Political Sciences, Department of International Relations, at Ankara University, where he was elected vice-president of the Federation of Cypriot Students. The repressive military dictatorship and the involvement of the army in political life repulsed him. He reflected this in his poetry, published in leading Turkish literary journals. He returned to Cyprus in 1981 after another military coup in Turkey and published a literary journal that caused ripples in the chauvinistic establishment for the questions he posed to Turkish-Cypriot identity. Then between 26 April and 17 May 1982, he published four articles in the weekly magazine *Olay*. Yaşın provided the most comprehensive information to that date on the extent of the plundering, destruction and illicit trade in antiquities. With the title ‘Perishing Cyprus’, Yaşın described the policy to estrange Cyprus from its past. It took great courage. His courage allowed members of the opposition to challenge the dominant nationalist discourse, but these groups were marginalized until the prospect of a united Cyprus joining the EU became a reality and the Turkish Cypriots and many Anatolian settlers, who have also developed a complex multi-identity, united to clamour for a solution to the Cyprus problem.

One criticism of the publication is the failure to situate Cyprus within the theories of identity formation – specifically nationalism. Broadly, there are three approaches to explaining nation formation: the primordial, which believes that nations are intrinsic to human nature, necessary for humans to live and timeless, existing in every epoch (see works by Edward Shils and Steven Grosby); the perennialist, which asserts that nations and nationalism are modern phenomena with “ethnic” roots from pre-modern time (see studies by Anthony Smith and Adrian Hastings); and the modernist (see works by Elie Kedourie, Benedict Anderson, Ernest Gellner and Eric Hobsbawm), which argues that nations are products of the modern age and that, as Ernest Gellner stated, nationalism “engenders nations, not the other way around”.<sup>1</sup> Rebecca Bryant’s *Imagining the Modern* showed that the latter approach applies very well to Cyprus, but there is more that can be said, especially the transition from the Ottoman to the British system of rule.

*Step-Mothertongue* is both timely and ahead of its time and it is this paradox that makes it one of the most significant studies to deal with nationalism in Cyprus. Since the victory of the Turkish-Cypriot oppositional forces in the 2004



parliamentary elections and the overwhelming support they received for their “yes” campaign in the UN referendum for the reunification of Cyprus, it can finally be said that they have won the battle. On the other side, however, the battle was won by the old nationalist paradigms personified by the campaign of President Tassos Papadopoulos. In the south, those advocating a multicultural and inclusive approach to a solution were defeated. One reason why the nationalist forces won in the Greek-Cypriot south is answered by the research in this collection; the lack of a true change in Greek-Cypriot society away from nationalist and chauvinist approaches and ideologies towards a multicultural and multi-self identification.

**Andrekos Varnava**

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1. Gellner, E. (1983) *Nations and Nationalism*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, p. 55.



# **Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession**

**Edited by Constantin Stefanou  
Ashgate (Aldershot, Hampshire, 2005) 294 pp.**

Every time a country becomes a member of the European Union there is a flurry of books describing the history of its application and progress towards membership, reviewing the agreed terms of accession to the EU and analysing the impact of membership on itself and the EU.

The book on “Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession” provides a bit of the history but focuses mostly on the agreed terms of accession and the required adaptation of the Cypriot laws and policies.

It contains chapters dealing with important issues of accession, mirroring to a large extent the organisation of the accession negotiations themselves, such as agriculture, transport, competition and state aid, movement of capital and monetary union, movement of services, intellectual property, social policy and employment, and justice and home affairs.

It is not obvious why other issues such as movement of workers, regional policy or budgetary issues are not covered. The latter two have been particularly contentious for Cyprus. Perhaps the reason is that almost all contributors are lawyers and their analysis, naturally, concerns the adaptation of Cypriot law. In this sense the book complements with extensive technical information the account of the accession negotiations written by the former President George Vassiliou who was the Chief Negotiator of Cyprus. Mr Vassiliou has written a forward to this book as well.

While the various chapters are exhaustive and competently written, my only gripe is that they are mostly descriptive. For a book that aims to assess the “successes and failures” of Cyprus it does not offer enough of its own assessment and independent analysis. The exception is the chapter on justice and home affairs.

I also believe that the book should have given particular attention to how Cyprus, a very small state, has coped with the demands and obligations of membership. A methodology or approach should have been developed and followed across all chapters. The small size of Cyprus and its public administration are mentioned in several chapters but only in passing and without in-depth investigation of the consequences of small size and the solutions that have been found. The exception

here is the last chapter written by Stefanou himself. This chapter touches on important aspects of the necessary adaptation of a country that accedes to the EU but which is not subject to the formal negotiations [e.g. the training of civil servants]. There is also a chapter on the role of Cyprus as a small state but that looks at its external relations rather than at its domestic legal, political and economic system.

On the whole the book is a valuable contribution to understanding what Cyprus had to do to enter the EU.

**Phedon Nicolaides**

# **Cyprus A Modern History**

**William Mallinson**  
**IB Tauris (London, 2005) 264 pp.**

William Mallinson's book emerges at a timely moment to add yet another book on Cyprus and by implication on the long-debated 'Cyprus Problem'. There is, however, a difference that distinguishes Mallinson's book in that most of the books published in recent years refer and cover mostly some aspect of the Cyprus Problem. There are a number of books authored by people who were involved in some capacity or other with the events they describe. Mallinson's book contributes to the debate on the Cyprus Problem but does so in the wider context of modern Cypriot history. In reviewing this book I was tempted at first to partly answer a particular article that had been written about it, but on reading the author's own response, I felt that a more than satisfactory answer had been given and that no greater weight should be given to views that are very personal and in many respects unsubstantiated.

Mallinson opens his book with a general survey of recent years, and places 'modern' Cyprus history in the 1950s. One could argue that in order to understand the events of the 1960s and the early years of the Republic it is useful to have a more detailed coverage of the period from at least the beginning of British Rule in 1878. This would have given a better perspective to the later events through a better understanding of the origins of Greek-Cypriot nationalism and the development of the "enosis" movement amongst the Greek-Cypriot community. The EOKA struggle for union with Greece and the ultimate result of the Zurich – London Agreements that led to independence and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus contain the seeds and explain the tumultuous early years of the Republic. However it is understood that the author decided to cover this particular period and, after all, there are other books to which an interested reader can turn to.

The second chapter begins with 1955 and unravels the involvement of Britain in the events that were to follow.

The section on 'Divide Et Imperia' is particularly revealing and well-documented in analysing the role of Britain in the triangle of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey. The outbreak of the liberation struggle was to further aggravate the British Colonial Government, which would embark on further measures of 'divide and rule'. These are of particular significance since they help to explain much of what was to

transpire and be incorporated in the Zurich – London Agreements of 1959. These were to lead to internal conflict between the two communities.

One cannot deny the fact that the Cypriots themselves (both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots) made mistakes that contributed to the creation or intensification of the inter-communal conflict. But Mallinson also clearly indicates in a well-documented way, that Britain's role was not conducive towards promoting good relations between the two communities – the British appear quite ready to offer their services to 'solve the problem' after their policy had largely contributed to its creation. Some critics may see in Mallinson's approach and analysis the 'conspiracy theory', but how can one explain the British encouragement of President Makarios to propose amendments to the constitution (13 Points, November 1963) and the subsequent policy of Britain once the inter-communal violence erupted in December 1963? The mistakes of the leadership on either side, or the exploitation of the situation by extremists on both sides, do not provide sufficient excuse for the role of British diplomacy prior to and after the events of 1963-1964.

I would very much agree with Mallinson's statement that "Britain's essential aim was to preserve its military bases on Cyprus" (p. 49). The importance of the bases in the formulation of British policy on the island and the wider Eastern Mediterranean area has produced different interpretations but perhaps one can see a consistency in the British approach to the 'solution' of the Cyprus Problem all the way to the Annan Plan and its provisions regarding the bases and British sovereign rights on the island.

Another important aspect that is also covered extensively in the book is the increased involvement of the United States in the affairs of the area and in Cyprus in particular. This is not surprising in the context of the Cold War, the threat to NATO interests in the eventuality of a Greco-Turkish conflict and the wider US interests in the area involving Israel and the oilfields of the Middle East and beyond.

The events of 1967 in Greece are crucial to an understanding of the developments in Cyprus that were to lead to the July 1974 coup against Archbishop Makarios and the Turkish invasion that followed. The attempts at a negotiated settlement, the involvement, not only of the main actors within Cyprus, but also of the major powers (with emphasis on Britain and the United States) are covered in chapters 7 to 10. Further analysis of Greco-Turkish relations in the context of the Cyprus Problem is provided in chapter 11; the last chapters embody the attempts at reaching an agreement in Cyprus and the NATO, EU and UN dimension is well covered.

Chapter 15, aptly titled “The United Kingdom Nations Plan”, raises a number of interesting points and poses intriguing questions as to what really happened in 2004 and what lies ahead in the future. The extent to which the “Annan Plan” was a “United Kingdom-Hannay Plan” or not is debatable, but what is clearer is that for the majority of the Greek Cypriots who voted “No” in the referendum this was very much so. Furthermore, the British role is seen as extending considerable and unacceptable support to Turkey; this support, in an effort to promote a spirit of ‘compromise’, went as far as accepting and justifying violation or exclusion of the basic human rights as provided in the UN Charter and the EU’s *acquis communautaire*.

Overall, Mallinson has produced a well-researched and well-balanced book on the “Modern History of Cyprus.” Minor inaccuracies or misinterpretations cannot detract from the value of the book. It stands as another contribution to modern Cypriot historiography. There are always bound to be certain omissions in a work of this range but since the events described are so recent it is up to others to supplement this and other similar works with new contributions as and when more facts and documents become available.

It is possible that our view of events might alter in time and we might acquire “a more balanced history of Cyprus.”

**Emilios Solomou**





# **Cyprus 1900 – 2000 Footprints on the Sands of Time**

**Edited by John A. Koumoulides  
Pella (New York, 2002) 259 pp.**

Professor Koumoulides' association with Cyprus goes a long way back. As he states in his book "Cyprus 1900 – 2000 Footprints on the Sands of Time" his "introduction to the rich history of Cyprus has its genesis in 1961 when he started his doctoral studies". In 1965 he came to the island to visit the Phaneromeni Library and the "archives" of the Archdiocese of Cyprus in Nicosia; since then he has continued his interest in Cyprus and has written and edited a number of books on various aspects of Cyprus history ("Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence"; "Greece and Cyprus in History"; "Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985" and "Cyprus: The Legacy, Historic Landmarks that influenced the Art of Cyprus, Late Bronze Age to A.D. 1600"). In 2002 he published his book under review, "Cyprus 1900-2000 Footprints on the Sands of Time".

Cyprus has a long, rich and tumultuous history dating back to Neolithic times but since the 1950s this history has become even more complex with the onset of the development of the 'Cyprus Problem'. The decade from 1950 to 1960 experienced some of the most significant, and in some cases tragic, events in the history of the island. The 1950 Referendum for "enosis" organised by the Greek Orthodox Church, the attempts at a constitutional settlement of the future of Cyprus, as well as the EOKA liberation struggle are important landmarks that shaped future events.

Professor Koumoulides' book is invaluable in that it imparts vital information that will prove useful to any students or scholars who are concerned with Cyprus history. The author himself states on page 12 that, "The purpose of this volume is to bring to the attention of students of Cyprus certain events in the history of the island during the twentieth century". The book evidently does far more than this; it embraces a wealth of material which is certain to become an indispensable source for the historian interested in modern Cyprus history.

Chapter I of the book provides detailed information on the British offer of Cyprus to Greece in 1915 as recorded by Sir John Stavridi in his diary. Professor Koumoulides had secured access to the papers of Sir John Stavridi deposited in the library of St. Antony's College, Oxford. A careful study of this material provides a fair amount of information on the attitude of the British Foreign Office in relation to

the First World War, the Balkans and the possible involvement of Greece in the War. It also covers interesting material relating to the internal politics in Greece and on Eleftherios Venizelos. Venizelos stands out as a dominant figure in Greek politics and someone who had a vision for Greece that was much greater than the king's and the politicians attached to the palace. The letters and extracts from the diary of Sir John Stavridi give the reader a clear picture of how the fate of Cyprus was being deliberated and manipulated in the context of the more pressing issues of the First World War. The fact that "the offer of 1915" is regarded by many as an important landmark in the series of "missed opportunities" relates to the ultimate fate of Cyprus and gives particular importance to the information provided in the book. Future scholars studying the history of Cyprus will find a lot of raw material on which to base a critique of the period. What would have happened if Greece had accepted the offer and entered the war as requested by the British? Would Britain have honoured its promise and given Cyprus to Greece? These and many other questions cannot be answered in any definitive way.

In Chapter II "Πέμπτος Τροχός", Professor Koumoulides presents the "notes" of Ambassador Demetris S. Petrounakos. The notes provide us with some first-hand accounts on the period leading to the independence of Cyprus in 1960. The period 1959-1960, covering the events culminating in the Zurich-London Agreements and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, still provides rich ground for further examination by historians, and the notes of Demetris Petrounakos can be effectively utilised.

Sir David Hunt's "Farewell to Cyprus" provides a tempered British view on various personalities in Cyprus as well as an analysis of the situation prevailing on the island at the time of his departure as British High Commissioner. Sir David Hunt makes incisive comments on Archbishop Makarios, whom he seems to admire and respect, as well as on General Grivas and the Turkish-Cypriot leader Kutchuk. Despatch No. 17 was written in 1966, two years after the inter-communal conflict of 1963-1964 and one year before the coup in Greece that marked the beginning of a new relationship between the two governments, culminating in the coup by the Greek military junta against President Makarios in July 1974. Cyprus, as described by the British High Commissioner was not going to be the same after August 1974. The new status quo created after the Turkish invasion, and which is still in existence 32 years later, makes the reader of Despatch No. 17 look back with nostalgia to a period when a solution to the Cyprus problem seemed more feasible.

The controlled and carefully worded despatch of Sir David Hunt in Chapter III comes into contrast with the content of Chapter IV, which explores Henry Kissinger and Cyprus, 1973-1977. This basically is an actual record of the conversation that took place between Henry Kissinger and other US officials with the Vice Foreign

Minister of the People's Republic of China on the occasion of a dinner held by the Secretary of State. The cynical approach of Kissinger towards Cyprus and his support for the Turkish positions explain much of what happened in the area in those critical years before, during and after the invasion of the island by Turkey. The information given in the particular document is brief but it is helpful in understanding the attitude of the Secretary of State of the United States who played such an important part in the politics of Cyprus and the Middle East in general. Once further official documents become available historians should be able to create a clearer picture as to the role of the United States, and of Henry Kissinger in particular, in those tragic days of July and August 1974.

The material in the last chapter of the book really constitutes an invaluable primary source on an important period in Cyprus history when the 'Cyprus problem' was experiencing very significant and complex developments. The correspondence of Evangelos Averof Tositsas and Andreas G. Papandreou on Cyprus throughout the period 1983-1984 presents the views of two leading politicians who played determining roles in Greek and Cypriot politics. Evangelos Averof Tositsas played a principal role in the pre-independence days as Greek Foreign Minister and was instrumental in the formulation of the Zurich – London Agreements that led to the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. Andreas Papandreou was an outstanding and charismatic personality, with very strong views on the Cyprus problem and its solution. As party leader and Prime Minister he was a key player in the attempts to solve the Cyprus problem.

The Chronology of events, which appears at the end of the book, is a useful tool for anyone who wishes to examine an overview of Cyprus history, and the Bibliography brings together the basic books covering all major aspects of the history of Cyprus.

With this book Professor Koumoulides makes a significant contribution to Cypriot history. He has brought together important primary material that should enable future researchers to unravel the complex issues that led to the creation of the 'Cyprus Problem' as well as to the subsequent attempts at a solution. This is an authoritative contribution which, due to its nature, will stand the test of time.

**Emilios Solomou**



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