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**LETTER
FROM THE
EDITOR-
IN-CHIEF**

Dear Readers,

Artificial Intelligence (AI) has emerged as a transformative force, revolutionising industries, enhancing decision-making processes, and reshaping the way we live and work. The advancement of AI presents us with immense opportunities, but it also poses multifaceted challenges that cannot be ignored. This applies to research and academic writing. It is imperative to acknowledge and address the challenges that AI presents and it is crucial to prioritise the ethical integration of AI into society in this and other fields.

To this end, collaboration between researchers, policy-makers, industry leaders, and the wider public, is crucial in shaping AI's trajectory. We should harness the potential of AI while safeguarding human values, fairness, and societal well-being. Academic research and dialogue, as well as its societal impact, has to remain human-centric, and we must now – more than ever before – strive to ensure that academic standards and ethics are met and respected. These are values we hold in high regard in our Journal. So, as we navigate the path ahead, and while Industry 5.0 seeks to strike a balance between human and machine involvement, let us address the challenges head-on and embark on this journey with caution, foresight, and a steadfast commitment to shaping an AI-powered future that benefits all.

It is with immense pleasure that I welcome in the CR Editorial Team a new Publications Editor, namely Petros Petrikkos. Petros is a PhD Candidate in International Relations and European Studies at the Department of Politics and Governance of the School of Law, University of Nicosia. His thesis examines the ontological security management of small EU member-states like Cyprus and Estonia in response to irregular and technological warfare, such as hybrid threats. Petros has extended reviewer and editorial experience, as he has previously held the post of Managing and Reviews Editor at the Studies in Ethnicity and Nationalism (SEN) Journal published by Wiley, where he still serves as a Consultative Editorial Board Member. I wish Petros every bit of success in his new role in the CR Editorial family.

This issue features five papers: the first, by Michalis Kontos (University of Nicosia), on state power, ideology, and societal beliefs in Cyprus, examines how civil society and opinion leaders incorporate affairs related to state power and inter-state

power distribution in their beliefs and assessments. In doing so, the author considers how society in a small state perceives uneven power relations.

The second paper, by Dionysis Panos (Cyprus University of Technology) and Stella Theocharous (Cyprus University of Technology), is a study on meta-memory in Cyprus through an empirical exploration of a new conceptual schema for understanding ethnic conflict in the country. More specifically, the authors examine the way intractable conflict is constructed by the transmission of memories from generations with lived experience of the conflict, and the personal experiences that the current generation has of contemporary events. In this context, they also explore the ways in which the political leaderships in both communities attempt to influence young Cypriots' conceptual framing of themselves and their imaginary other.

The third paper in this issue is by Jennifer Airiarebhe Aigbiremhon (Taraba State University), Buhari Shehu Miapyen (Taraba State University), Kayıhan Çırakoğlu (Taraba State University), Nguh Nwei Asanga Fon (International Governance Institute Cameroon), Gizem Çırakoğlu (Taraba State University) and Nsemba Edward Lenshie (University of Nigeria). Here the authors adopt a comparative method to evaluate and analyse the Cypriot and Colombian peace processes, through the lens of women's participation in formal peace negotiations. The authors acknowledge that, even though there are differences in the cultures and contexts of the two peace processes, the peace and negotiation processes in Cyprus have some lessons to learn from the Colombian peace negotiation model in relation to women participation.

The fourth paper is by Ioannis Rossidis (University of Nicosia), Athanasios Mihiotis (Hellenic Open University), Nikitas Koutsoukis (University of the Peloponnese) and Angelos Ntalakos (University of Thessaly) It explores the effect of digital transformation on the development of e-governance in Cyprus and Greece. The authors focus on an analysis of the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) for Cyprus and Greece and assess the digital maturity of the countries by identifying problems and gaps, as well as opportunities for improvement.

The final paper in this issue, by Petros Lois (University of Nicosia) and Spyros Repousis (University of Nicosia), examines the economic relations and the import-export balance in Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish trade in the period 2010-2021. In their analysis, the authors make an assessment on the increasing need to improve bilateral political relations and resolve bilateral problems in order for the countries to improve trade cooperation.

As always, the issue is enriched with reviews of a wide thematic range of books that are Cyprological in nature. More specifically, 19 reviews are included herein of recent bibliographical research pertaining to Cyprus.

As always, I wish to express my sincere gratitude and appreciation to everyone involved in the publication of this issue: the authors who contributed their insightful research and thought-provoking perspectives, enriching our publication and adding depth to the discourse surrounding the featured topics; the diligent peer reviewers who provided valuable feedback and constructive criticism, helping to ensure the quality and rigour of the articles; the book reviewers, who dedicated their time and expertise to write their contributions; the editorial team for the whole coordination process and tireless commitment to excellence. Everyone's dedication to maintaining high standards has been instrumental in shaping this issue. Lastly, I would like to thank you, our readers, for your continued support and engagement. It is indeed your enthusiasm and interest that motivate us to bring forth meaningful content.

Christina Ioannou
Editor-in-Chief

ARTICLES

State Power, Ideology, and Societal Beliefs in Cyprus How Society in a Small State Perceives Uneven Power Relations

MICHALIS KONTOS¹

Abstract

The general research purpose of this article is to examine how civil society and opinion leaders in Cyprus incorporate affairs related to state power and inter-state power distribution in their beliefs and assessments. A very important aspect of this relation is Cyprus' 'smallness' vis-à-vis other parties involved in the Cyprus Conflict. In this context, the article discusses Greek Cypriot perceptions of the Cyprus Problem. More specifically, it examines Greek Cypriot perceptions on two particular issues: i) the uneven distribution of capabilities between Cyprus and Turkey, and ii) the interaction among the directly-involved parties and other external actors, which forms a broader balance of power that impacts significantly on the structure of the Cyprus Problem.

Keywords: Cyprus Problem, State power, ideology, perception and misperception, cognitive consistency

Introduction

The general research purpose of this article is to examine how civil society and opinion leaders in Cyprus deal with affairs related with State power and Inter-State power relations, given Cyprus' small size and unfavourable power distribution, and more specifically, how they incorporate them in their own beliefs and assessments. To this end, I will discuss Greek Cypriot perceptions of the Cyprus Problem with special focus on an international aspect that relates to two particular issues: i) the uneven distribution of capabilities between the small island State of Cyprus and Turkey, which essentially dominates every possible ramification of the Cyprus Problem, and ii) the interaction among the directly-involved parties and other external actors, which tends to form a broader balance of power that impacts significantly on the structure of the Cyprus Problem.

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In relation to this remarkable set of interactions, I will argue that individuals, opinion leaders and organized groups in Cyprus tend to set forth ideas and express views on public affairs based on deeply internalised ideological stereotypes. These stereotypes stem from perceptions and assumptions on State power and power distribution. In some cases, though, hardly visible but significant contextual variables deriving from the international environment remain unseen by political observers. In other cases, trying to grasp some clearly visible contextual factors and introducing them in the public discourse usually happens through an ideological and stereotypical lens, with distorting consequences.

In the first part, I will analyse the international dimension of the Cyprus Problem with special focus on theoretical aspects of State power, distribution of capabilities, and balance of power, mainly from a realist point of view. In the second part, I will set forth a theoretical framework suitable for the discussion of the concepts of ideology and perceptions/misperceptions in international affairs. In the third part, I will critically evaluate some established societal beliefs on power-related issues, which are pertinent to the Cyprus Problem.

The article applies a process-tracing method to trace causal relations between historical facts, concepts, and beliefs. It does not predominantly aim to discuss the history of Cyprus or the Cyprus Problem, but perceptions that relate to particular contexts of beliefs regarding historical facts. Although to some extent some historical analysis is necessary, this will not take the form of historical evaluation. Instead, it will focus on specific chains of events that fall within the broader scope of the history of the Cyprus Conflict, justified on the grounds of the research objectives. Against this backdrop, I will pay more attention on how history is perceived by specific opinion leaders and societal groups, from an explaining (rather than a reflectivist) viewpoint. In the same vein, when discussing acts of States or international institutions, the emphasis is on how they are perceived and how these perceptions play out in the realm of societal beliefs. Of course, this attempt is not without challenges. First of all, societal beliefs are not monolithic, neither can we always observe and categorise them with unquestioned clarity. Consequently, using sets of beliefs as the main empirical pool to build hypotheses bears significant risks. I will try to contain these risks by putting forward two theoretical frameworks: one that focuses on the concept of power and one on ideology and perceptions, in an effort to narrow down the conceptual frames as much as possible. For hypothesis testing, I will use some smoking-gun tests that aim to put established societal beliefs to the test and highlight the relationship

between the independent variable (ideological stereotypes) and the dependent variable (views on power-related affairs in small States).

The Cyprus Problem and the question of power in international politics

The Concepts of Power, Balance of power, 'Greatness' and 'smallness'

The debate on State power is as old as social action and political thought. Ancient thinkers like Thucydides and Sun Tzu, and founders of modern political philosophy like Thomas Hobbes have set forth the original ideas that culminated in the contemporary understanding of State power and its role in international politics, mainly encapsulated in the theoretical assumptions of the realist school of thought. In contemporary international-relations theory, which focuses on the study of nation-States of various sizes and capabilities, this debate has culminated in categorisations that consider different levels of power possession (i.e. 'great powers', 'superpowers', 'small States', etc.) As of the mid-20th century, realist thinkers like Hans Morgenthau developed a remarkably influential debate on the issue of State power. After observing that '[p]olitical power is a psychological relation between those who exercise it and those over whom it is exercised,' Morgenthau underlines the inherent nature of power in human thinking and action by noting that those who would try to abolish power would 'simply fall victims to the power of others'.²

Among other related issues discussed in literature, this debate brought back to the fore the concept of 'balance of power', which has been identified with international politics in 19th-century Europe. In a world that continuously struggles for power, international relations theorists underline the importance of considering the power sources and capabilities, as well as the objectives of other units as a paramount feature of State policies in pursuit of security and survival. As the Cold War experience indicated, powerful States may seek dominance over less powerful ones, while peers will try to stop them, fearing that such a development could undermine their own interests and security. In this process, levels of power possession among States will be redistributed, and therefore power status will be readjusted. The inherent characteristics of these shifting international environments will define whether peace or war will prevail and when.³ The examination of these characteristics of international

² Hans Morgenthau, *Politics Among Nations: The Struggle for Power and Peace* (first published 1948, New York: McGraw Hill 2006) 30-36.

³ Kenneth N. Waltz, *Theory of International Politics* (first published 1979, Long Grove, IL: Waveland Press 2010); Robert Gilpin, *War and Change in World Politics* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press

systems that vary according to the number or poles of power in them (the concept of 'polarity') became the most important feature of the neorealist (or structural realist) approach that thrived following the publication of Kenneth Waltz' *Theory of International Politics*, in 1979. According to these theoretical assumptions, relations among interacting units with conflicting worldviews and interests could, under given circumstances, enter a status of oscillation between balance and hegemony.⁴ Whether States (especially great powers) tend to prioritise pursuing stability through hegemony⁵ or through balance⁶ is a matter of different theoretical interpretations.

Morgenthau's classical realism was based on human nature as the cognitive foundation upon which knowledge of power politics could be based. However, due to the theoretical evolution described above, realist thought eventually escaped from Morgenthau's human-nature theory and embraced a positivist approach that aimed to turn the scholars' attention towards the structure of the international system (namely the distribution of capabilities across the system), as the main apparatus governing power relations among States. Theorists like Waltz, Walt, and Mearsheimer made a significant contribution to the importance of dynamics stemming from the distribution of power among States in the international system, to describe and explain the universal rules that States obey. After the collapse of the Soviet Union and the end of the Cold War, the revolutionary change that took place in the international system stimulated the emergence of post-positivist theoretical approaches that put neorealist positivist determinism to the test and brought the human factor back to the center of research.⁷ Following this development, some realists re-evaluated the main pillars of their research program. As a result, the neoclassical realist approach has emerged, which attempts to combine attributes of systemic analysis with individual and State-level variables as a means of explaining foreign policy and power-related choices made by States.⁸ In this framework, issues like the leaders' perceptions of

1981); Kenneth N. Waltz, 'Structural Realism after Cold War' (2000) 25(1) *International Security* 5–41.

⁴ Adam Watson, *The Evolution of International Society: A Comparative Historical Analysis* (first published 1992, New York: Routledge 2009).

⁵ John J. Mearsheimer, *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (first published 2001, New York: W. W. Norton & Company 2014).

⁶ Stephen M. Walt, *The Origins of Alliances* (New York: Cornell University Press, 1990).

⁷ Yosef Lapid, 'The Third Debate: On the Prospects of International Theory in a Post-Positivist Era' (1989) 33(3) *International Studies Quarterly* 235–254; Steve Smith et al. (eds) *International Theory: Positivism and Beyond* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1996).

⁸ Gideon Rose, 'Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics' (1998) 51(1) *World Politics* 144–172; Radnall L. Schweller, 'Unanswered Threats: A Neoclassical Realist Theory of Underbalancing'

power distribution, as well as individual characteristics of each national political and governance system, gained attention as factors that may explain foreign policy and security decisions.

In the context of this article's topic, understanding how power relations among States play out and, especially, how power asymmetry reflect(s) on domestic social and political affairs constitute the main theoretical pillars. Therefore, it is important to direct the theoretical discussion towards the issue of power asymmetry and opposing asymmetric relations. Power relations, even between big and small States, involve a high degree of complexity. In fact, power relations can be more accurately assessed through a contextual approach that grasps potential intervening variables which could transform the causal nexus between means and goals in an asymmetric bilateral relationship.⁹ Beyond the classic Thucydidean dictum that 'the strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must,' which is central to the realist understanding of the world, Waltz¹⁰ takes a contextual approach to argue that comparative power advantages may not be enough for powerful States to impose their will upon weaker ones:

[W]hen great powers are in a stalemate, lesser states acquire an increased freedom of movement. That this phenomenon is now noticeable tells us nothing new about the strength of the weak or the weakness of the strong. Weak states have often found opportunities for maneuver in the interstices of a balance of power.

Other researchers focus on potential variations between the degrees of commitment of the involved parties in a standoff that rests on power asymmetry. The structure of motives and, especially the difference in their motives' volume and gravity in the case could take such a form that the outcomes of the dispute may not necessarily reflect the power equilibrium.¹¹ Another way to approach this issue is by examining the power sources that each State possesses, which define the public understanding

(2004) 29(2) *International Security* 159–201; Norrin M. Ripsman et al., *Neoclassical Realist Theory of International Politics* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

⁹ David Baldwin, *Power and International Relations: A Conceptual Approach* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 2016); Andreas Paul Spee, Paula Jarzabkowski, 'Strategy Tools as Boundary Objects' (2009) 7(2) *Strategic Organization* 223–232;

¹⁰ Kenneth N. Waltz, 'International Structure, National Force, and the Balance of World Power' (1967) 21(2) *Journal of International Affairs* 215–231, 222.

¹¹ Brantly Womack, *Asymmetry and International Relationships* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2016); Robert Jervis, 'Deterrence and Perception' (1982) 7(3) *International Security* 3–30;

on ‘greatness’ and ‘smallness’. As the experience of great powers has shown several times in the past, not all the means are suitable for achieving any kind of goals.¹² Therefore, a general theoretical assumption that stems from this discussion is the following: big States may be better suited in achieving their objectives at the expense of smaller opponents, but this is not an absolute axiom as several factors may play out in such a way as to undermine the efficiency of this power advantage.

The Post-1974 Phase of the Cyprus Problem:

Sources of Greek Cypriot Perceptions

Since its emergence in the 1950s in the dual form of Greek Cypriot anti-colonial armed revolt as well as Greek-Turkish ethnic conflict, even after the independence of the island and the establishment of the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960, the Cyprus Question has always involved significant international ramifications: disputes over Cyprus have affected relations between Greece and the United Kingdom, particularly so between Greece and Turkey, while balancing calculations have also drawn great powers in Cyprus-related power games.¹³ In the meantime, since the resurgence of intercommunal clashes in 1963-64, the RoC had been *de facto* governed only by the Greek Cypriots under the Doctrine of Necessity,¹⁴ while Turkish Cypriots had been enclosed in quasi-autonomous pockets. Turkey’s military invasion of Cyprus in July and August 1974 following a coup organised by Greece’s junta and the subsequent *de facto* partition of the island created a new situation on the ground, whereby Ankara recognises only the so called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) in the north, which was established in 1983. Ever since, Turkey has held a dominant role in the governance of the ‘TRNC’ that enjoys no international recognition by any other country. Therefore, after the events of 1974 and the forcible transfer of populations, the internationally-recognised government of the RoC has been essentially controlling only the southern part of the island.¹⁵

¹² Waltz (no 9); Samuel P. Huntington, ‘Conventional Deterrence and Conventional Retaliation in Europe’ (1983) 8(3) *International Security* 32–56; William W. Kaufmann, *The Requirements of Deterrence* (Center of International Studies, Princeton University, 1954).

¹³ Van Coufoudakis, *Cyprus and International Politics* (Nicosia: University of Nicosia/Intercollege Press, 2007); Michalis Kontos et al., *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions* (Newcastle Upon Tyne: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014).

¹⁴ Christos Papastylanos, ‘The Cypriot Doctrine of Necessity within the Context of Emergency Discourse: How a Unique Emergency Shaped a Peculiar Type of Emergency Law’ (2018) 30(1) *The Cyprus Review* 113-143.

¹⁵ Andreas Theophanous, *The Cyprus Question and the EU: The Challenge and the Promise* (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2004); William Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History* (London: Bloomsbury

As the UN Security Council Resolution 186/1964 implied, the original phase of the Cyprus Conflict after the independence was broadly understood as an intra-Cypriot affair. However, the events of 1974 significantly reconfigured the old Cyprus Problem: on the one hand, the *de facto* situation on the ground with the division of the island's territory in two ethnically solid areas, as well as the continuous diplomatic efforts under the auspices of the UN Secretary General in pursuit of an agreed solution between the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots, maintained the pre-1974 inter-communal aspect. On the other hand, despite the lack of official diplomatic relations, the RoC and Turkey often come across each other, as Turkey's application for accession to the European Union (EU),¹⁶ as well as the latest energy-related developments in the Eastern Mediterranean¹⁷ indicate. Most importantly, at the level of public perceptions, which is this article's special interest, Greek Cypriots tend to perceive Turkey as the main threat to their national security, not the 'TRNC' or Turkish Cypriots.¹⁸ Greek Cypriot perceptions of threat emanate not only from the traumatic experience of 1974, but also from the continuous deployment of vast Turkish military forces in the northern part of the island which, along with the small distance that separates Cyprus from Turkey, provides military advantages over the Greek Cypriot National Guard and the Hellenic Force of Cyprus in the south.¹⁹ These two elements combined, in conjunction with well-established beliefs about foreign interference in Cyprus,²⁰ have fostered the formation of a post-1974 'defeat syndrome' among Greek Cypriots. Similarly, Greek Cypriots developed the idea of a 'just cause' to 'liberate Cyprus', emanating from a sense of victimisation²¹ and the unlawful nature of the

Publishing, 2005); Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2010); Heinz A. Richter, *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus: 1878-2009* (Ruhpolding: Peleus, Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen, 2010).

¹⁶ George Kyris, 'The European Union and the Cyprus Problem: A Story of Limited Impetus' (2012) 3(1) *Eastern Journal of European Studies* 87-99; Nathalie Tocci, 'Unblocking Turkey's EU Accession' (2010) 12(3) *Insight Turkey* 27-31.

¹⁷ Michalis Kontos and George Bitsis, 'Power Games in the Exclusive Economic Zone of the Republic of Cyprus: The Trouble with Turkey's Coercive Diplomacy' (2018) 30(1) *The Cyprus Review* 51-70.

¹⁸ Constantinos Adamides, *Securitization and Desecuritization Processes in Protracted Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus* (London: Palgrave Macmillan, 2020), 90-91; Emiliou Solomou and Hubert Faustmann, 'Lessons from the Past for the Future' (2017) 29(1) *The Cyprus Review* 217-239, 221.

¹⁹ Aristos Aristotelous, 'The Military Situation in Cyprus' *The Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs*, 2015; Zenonas Tziarras, 'Turkish Foreign Policy and Security in Cyprus: Greek-Cypriot Security Perception' *PRIO*, PCC Report 06/2018, 12-13.

²⁰ Kontos (no 12).

²¹ Adamides (no 17) 109.

Turkish invasion.²² The idea of a Greek Cypriot's just cause as part of the public discourse on the Cyprus Problem is often associated with symbols of the past and stories of Cypriot heroism against foreign rulers and is often reflected in the State narrative, i.e. in school history textbooks.²³

Therefore, the post-1974 public discourse on the Cyprus Problem has generated concepts and beliefs, as well as historical interpretations and narratives that often take distinct and conflicting directions. Being an intractable conflict,²⁴ the Cyprus Problem has contributed to the formation of well-established societal beliefs, with profound political ramifications. As the institutional supervisors of the communal and State policies on the Cyprus Problem, Greek Cypriot Presidents of the RoC with different views regarding the negotiations strategy have played a paramount role in the formation and transformation of these beliefs.²⁵ A core issue in this discourse has been the feasibility and viability of the negotiated settlement, while issues like bi-communal relations and national security priorities have also gained impetus from time to time. The construction of societal and partisan identities, narratives, and material interests has largely been based on these views.

Under given historical circumstances, these ideological trends have also generated civil society movements. Some of them have been based on a concept of bi-communal, local patriotism, in contrast with the 'nationalist attachment to motherlands', like the New Cyprus Association²⁶ or Famagusta for Cyprus.²⁷ Others, like the Pancyprrian Citizens Movement,²⁸ were founded to express purely ethnic Greek Cypriot concerns against an 'unjust settlement' of the Cyprus Problem. Despite their temporal significance, these movements failed to gain broad popular appeal (except for the Pancyprrian Citizens Movement during the negotiations on the Annan Plan, in

²² Iacovos Kareklas, 'International Law and Diplomacy on the Turkish Military Intervention of Cyprus' (2011) *ELIAMEP*, Working Paper no 18.

²³ Yiannis Papadakis, 'History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the "History of Cyprus,"' PRIO Cyprus Centre, Report 2/2018.

²⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Societal Beliefs in Times of Intractable Conflict: The Israeli Case' (1998) 9(1) *International Journal of Conflict Management* 22–50.

²⁵ James Ker-Lindsay, 'Presidential Power and Authority in the Republic of Cyprus' (2006) 11(1) *Mediterranean Politics* 21–37.

²⁶ Neophytos Loizides, 'Ethnic Nationalism and Adaptation in Cyprus' (2007) 8(2) *International Studies Perspectives* 172 – 189.

²⁷ <https://famagustafortcyprus.org/>, last accessed 15 June 2022.

²⁸ Christiana Alexandrou, 'The Days that Shocked Cyprus: An Evaluation of the Campaigns on the Annan Plan' (2006) *ISCHYS*, 62; Michális S Michael, *Resolving the Cyprus Conflict* (London, Palgrave Macmillan, 2009).

2003-2004). However, they all embraced beliefs and political ideas with broad public appeal and remarkable resilience in the Greek Cypriot post-1974 public discourse.

In the next part, I will examine the main drivers of the public discourse on the international dimension of the Cyprus Problem among Greek Cypriots. To this end, I will outline a theoretical framework that will help the readers understand how these drivers have culminated in the formation of appealing public beliefs and political ideas.

Power-Related Issues in Greek Cypriot Public Discourse

A Theoretical Framework

The apparatus of ideology offers a useful tool that could help us understand how Greek Cypriots process information stemming from the international environment. After all, ideology constitutes a widespread intellectual mechanism in public political thought and action. Fine and Sandstrom offer ‘an approach that is theoretically “agnostic” in regard to the modern, rational, and discursive bases of ideology.’ They define ideology as ‘a linked set of beliefs about the social or political order, whatever the nature of the link and the beliefs.’²⁹ Dagger and Ball add that ideology ‘serves as a guide and compass through the thicket of political life,’ thus underlying its function as a guide to understanding and interpreting incoming information related to politics.³⁰ Kalmoe stresses the importance of interaction among political actors in the context of ideology’s role in politics by approaching ideology ‘as cohesive organizations of interdependent political views, with some elements exerting causal force on other elements in the belief system.’ He also pays attention to the inclusion of ‘views on issues, leaders, parties, symbols, and broad values’ in ideological beliefs.³¹ So, different approaches agree that ideology constitutes ‘a set of beliefs’, a ‘guide and compass’, a broad ‘belief system’ in politics. Ideologies are inherently normative, as they tend to organise political thought and action according to pre-existing figures. As Fine and Sandstrom put it, ‘[f]ascism, communism, and classical liberalism are quintessential examples of belief systems that explicitly claim a social judgment and a

²⁹ Gary Alan Fine and Kent Sandstrom, ‘Ideology in Action: A Pragmatic Approach to a Contested Concept’ (1993) 11(1) *Sociological Theory* 21–38, 23.

³⁰ Richard Dagger and Terrence Ball, *Political Ideologies and the Democratic Ideal* (New York: Longman Higher Education, 1991) 1-2.

³¹ Nathan P. Kalmoe, ‘Uses and Abuses of Ideology in Political Psychology’ (2020) 41(4) *Political Psychology*, 772.

proposed solution: they are self-conscious ideologies.’³² Or, according to Levi, ‘beliefs refer to ideas about what reality is’.³³

How can these concepts serve this article’s purpose? One possible method would be to outline several generic ideologies in the Greek Cypriot political system and connect them to respective beliefs on the international dimension of the Cyprus Problem. Obviously, this approach would follow the pattern of Greek Cypriot political parties (at least the mainstream ones), considering them as institutional bearers of respective ideological traditions. However, this would contradict the fact that Greek Cypriot standpoints on the Cyprus Problem do not necessarily coincide with pre-existing ideological or partisan frameworks: an external observer who lacks in-depth knowledge of Greek Cypriot history and politics could easily mix-up Marxist with liberal views on the Cyprus Problem, as well as centrist with far-right ones.³⁴ Political narratives of the Cyprus Problem can only partially be aligned along partisan lines, while to a large degree they cross them.

An alternative approach is to de-construct ideology as a political function and keep only its most useful elements: while institutionalised ideological depictions are not helpful to this article’s purposes, approaching ideology as a belief system at the individual level of analysis could work much better. To this end we need a bottom-up theoretical approach that would include a mechanism to examine and evaluate generalisable individual beliefs. Robert Jervis’ theory offers an excellent analytical framework. In his influential treatise titled *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (1976), Jervis examines the issue of consistent beliefs vis a vis actors and political phenomena, particularly in the realm of international politics. He argues that ‘consistency can largely be understood in terms of the strong tendency for people to see what they expect to see and to assimilate incoming information to pre-existing images.’³⁵ Jervis explains the way people think about other countries, their policies, and their intentions towards their own countries. He points out that

[w]e tend to believe that countries we like do things we like, support goals we favor, and oppose countries we oppose. We tend to think that countries that are

³² Fine, Sandstorm (no 28) 24.

³³ Werner Levi, ‘Ideology, Interests, and Foreign Policy’ (1970) 14(1) *International Studies Quarterly* 1–31, 4.

³⁴ Solomou, Faustmann (no 17).

³⁵ Robert Jervis, *Perception and Misperception in International Politics* (Princeton, NJ: Princeton University Press, 1976) 117.

our enemies make proposals that would harm us, work against the interests of our friends, and aid our opponents.

Jervis refers to 'rational' and 'irrational' consistency. By rational consistency he means

those ways of interpreting evidence that conform to the generally accepted rules of drawing inferences. Conversely, irrational methods and influences violate these rules of the 'scientific method' and would be rejected by the person if he were aware of employing them.³⁶

Jervis' cognitive consistency model comprises a very useful analytical framework for attempting to explain the way in which perceptions of foreign actors affect Greek Cypriot politics in relation to the Cyprus Problem. Greek Cypriot perceptions of Turkey, great powers, the United Nations (UN), the European Union, or, generally, the 'foreigners' and their past actions inevitably affect what the Greek Cypriots believe in relation to their future intentions as well. As Jervis argues,

the process of drawing inferences in light of logic and past experience that produces rational cognitive consistency also causes people to fit incoming information into pre-existing beliefs and to perceive what they expect to be there. (...) We ignore information that does not fit, twist it so that it confirms, or at least does not contradict, our beliefs, and deny its validity. Confirming evidence, by contrast, is quickly and accurately noted.³⁷

Jervis offers a framework that bridges different theoretical approaches and facilitates observations at the individual level of analysis. Since examining political parties or other forms of institutionalised belief systems does not fall within the scope of this article, I will focus on ideological stereotypes at the level of civil society. The hypothesis that will be tested below is that these ideological stereotypes stem from original perceptions and/or misperceptions and eventually become part of a self-reinforcing ideological vicious circle through the effect of rational cognitive consistency.

Cognitive Consistency in Greek Cypriot Perceptions

As explained above, post-1974 Greek Cypriot perceptions on the international aspect of the Cyprus Problem are subject to a pre-existing 'defeat syndrome' due to the events of 1974, as well as to the belief of a 'just cause'. These two sets of perceptions have often served as starting points to the deployment of stereotypes associated with

³⁶ Ibid., 119.

³⁷ Ibid., 143.

power-related issues like Turkish ‘greatness’ vis-à-vis Cypriot ‘smallness’, as well as with a concept of balance of power that involves more international actors. The first one has been generating fatalistic approaches that take seriously into account the relative weakness of the RoC. Fatalism, coupled with an opposition towards hardline approaches that have been associated with ‘lack of pragmatism’ or ‘our own crimes of the past’ contributes to the formation of views favoring a conciliatory approach on the Cyprus Problem that should avoid maximalist demands and assertiveness, even if this would entail painful concessions on the part of the Greek Cypriot side. The second one usually generates views that urge political leadership to overcome the ‘defeat syndrome’ and opt for a more assertive stance in the negotiations. While ‘pragmatists’ urgently desire a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem, ‘hardliners’ usually reject the idea of a swift settlement and prefer to wait for a better opportunity in the future instead of making ‘unacceptable concessions’ now.

These two approaches have been associated with two former Presidents of the RoC, with diametrically different views on the Cyprus Problem. The first one was Giorgos Vassiliou. Vassiliou won the presidential elections in February 1988 and became the first President ever to embrace the ‘pragmatist’ approach. After the end of a meeting with the British Prime Minister Margaret Thatcher in March 1988, Vassiliou made a statement that was considered a breakthrough in Greek Cypriot politics. He stated that ‘we want a solution yesterday’,³⁸ thus expressing a sense of urgency and resoluteness for making all necessary concessions to reach an agreed solution with the Turkish Cypriot community. The second one was Tassos Papadopoulos. Papadopoulos took office in February 2003, amidst negotiations on a UN plan for a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus Problem that was submitted by UN Secretary General Kofi Annan in November 2002. Although Papadopoulos accepted the Annan Plan in principle as a starting point for further negotiations, he was very much skeptical, since the Plan did not meet his red lines. At the end of the negotiations process, in a highly emotional televised speech in April 2004, Papadopoulos asked the Greek Cypriots to reject the Annan Plan in the upcoming referendum, even though Greek Cypriot ‘pragmatists’ and several foreign governments advised that the plan was the ‘last chance’ for a settlement.³⁹ Papadopoulos preferred to avoid signing a solution

³⁸ Giorgos Vassiliou, *Pragmatism vs Populism*, Vol. 1 (*Πραγματισμός vs Λαϊκισμός*) (Nicosia: Ellinika Grammata, 2007) 32 (in Greek).

³⁹ Giorgos Kentas, *2003-2008. The Preservation of the Republic of Cyprus and the Accession to the European Union and the Eurozone (2003 – 2008, Η Διάσωση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας και η Ένταξη στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση και στην Ευρωζώνη)* in Petros Papapolyviou (ed.), *Tassos Papadopoulos*

before the accession of the RoC to the EU, which was set to take place a few days after the referendum, believing that the accession would increase the negotiation power of the Greek Cypriot community in pursuit of a better settlement.⁴⁰

In these two approaches we see different perceptions in relation to issues like power, systemic limitations, and timing. Both are reasonable and rational, though from totally different viewpoints. To a large extent, they derive from different ideological backgrounds and express conflicting inferences. Both can be critically evaluated based on elements that they may have defied, either by choice or imperfect information. For sure though, if someone examines the political history of these two former Presidents, they will conclude that most of the time, their political decisions or views expressed on similar issues were placed in the same context of thought. In other words, they both followed a pattern of cognitive consistency. In the last part, I will implement this model to explain and critically evaluate appealing perceptions and arguments on the international aspect of the Cyprus Problem, expressed in the context of the Greek Cypriot public discourse. More specifically, I will test their validity against contextual variables, aiming to highlight the distorting impact of ideology and misperceptions on related assessments.

A Critical Evaluation of Appealing Perceptions and Arguments

The Greek Cypriot Framing of the Cyprus Problem

Since 1974, the Cyprus Problem has provided a political and societal framework for the development of policy-related perceptions and stereotypes. The related literature examines several aspects of Greek Cypriot public perceptions on the Cyprus Problem from various theoretical angles. A significant part of the literature focuses on intra-ethnic or bi-ethnic political and societal affairs and highlights the peculiarities that stem from the combination of domestic and broader international factors. For example, Kitromilides examines the ideological heritage of colonialism and its impact on independent Cyprus,⁴¹ as well as the bicomunal ideological boundaries

los: Archive (Τάσσος Παπαδόπουλος: Αρχείο) (Nicosia: Tassos Papadopoulos Research Center, 2021) (in Greek).

⁴⁰ Theophanous (no 14) 65-66, 106.

⁴¹ Paschalis Kitromilides, 'The Ideological Context of Cyprus' Political Life: A Critical Evaluation' ('Το Ιδεολογικό Πλαίσιο της Πολιτικής Ζωής της Κύπρου: Κριτική Θεώρηση') in Giorgos Tenekidis, Yiannos Kranidiotis (eds), *Cyprus: History, Problems and Struggles of its People (Κύπρος: Ιστορία, Προβλήματα και Αγώνες του Λαού της)* (Athens: Estia, 2009) 449-471 (in Greek).

and prerequisites for reconciliation.⁴² Several authors like Peristianis,⁴³ Mavratsas,⁴⁴ Stavrinides,⁴⁵ and Loizides⁴⁶ discuss extensively the impact of ethnic nationalism in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political thought and particularly the attachment to ‘motherlands’ vis-à-vis ‘Cypriotism’ as part of domestic ideologies.

In terms of inter-State power distribution and, particularly the small size of Cyprus and its policy implications, we can find some interesting approaches set forth by international relations experts. Some of them have applied the concept of ‘small States’ to deal with related issues. Evaghorou takes a systemic approach to examine Cyprus’ security options as a small State in an anarchic international system.⁴⁷ Pedi and Kouskouvelis focus on strategies that Cyprus, as a small State, may employ in pursuit of its own status in a complex regional environment.⁴⁸ The accession of Cyprus to the EU has also provided room for research on how small States may utilise their participation in a ‘rules-based’ supranational institution to gain international impact.⁴⁹

When it comes to bottom-up analysis of Greek Cypriot perceptions of Turkey and its role in Cyprus, not much attention has been paid. There has been some increase of interest, however, because of the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the structural changes

⁴² Paschalis Kitromilides, ‘Fifty Years Republic of Cyprus. Ideological Preconditions for an Agreement between the two Communities’ (‘Η Πεντηκονταετηρίδα της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας και οι Ιδεολογικές Προϋποθέσεις της Συμφωνίας των Δύο Κοινοτήτων’) (2011) 31 *Hellenic Political Science Review* 5-16 (in Greek).

⁴³ Nicos Peristianis, ‘Left-Right, Greekcentrism-Cyprocentrism: The Pendulum of Collective Identifications After 1974’ in N. Peristianis, G Tsaggaras (eds), *The Anatomy of a Metamorphosis. Cyprus after 1974: Society, Economy, Politics, Culture* (Η Ανατομία μιας Μεταμόρφωσης. Η Κύπρος μετά το 1974: Κοινωνία, Οικονομία, Πολιτική, Πολιτισμός) (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1995).

⁴⁴ Caesar V. Mavratsas, ‘The Ideological Contest between Greek-Cypriot Nationalism and Cypriotism 1974–1995: Politics, Social Memory and Identity’ (1997) 20(4) *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 717-737.

⁴⁵ Zenon Stavrinides, ‘Greek Cypriot Perceptions,’ in Clement H. Dodd (ed.), *Cyprus: The Need for New Perspectives* (Huntington: The Eothen Press, 1999) 83-85.

⁴⁶ Loizides (no 25).

⁴⁷ Evaghoras L. Evaghorou, ‘Small States’ Strategy in the International System: The Case of Cyprus’ (Τα Μικρά Κράτη και η Στρατηγική τους στο Διεθνές Σύστημα: Η Περιπτωσιολογική Μελέτη της Κύπρου) (2007) 12 *Institute of Defence Analysis* 61-72 (in Greek).

⁴⁸ Rebecca Pedi, Ilias Kouskouvelis, ‘Cyprus in the Eastern Mediterranean: A Small State Seeking for Status’ in Spyridon N. Litsas, Aristotle Tziampiris (eds), *The New Eastern Mediterranean: Theory, Politics and States in a Volatile Era* (Cham: Springer, 2019) 151-167.

⁴⁹ Roderick Pace, ‘Cyprus in the EU: A Small State Perspective’ in Constantin Stefanou (ed.), *Cyprus and the EU: The Road to Accession* (Aldershot: Ashgate, 2005) 238-258; Cetta Mainwaring, ‘Small States and Nonmaterial Power: Creating Crises and Shaping Migration Policies in Malta, Cyprus, and the European Union’ (2014) 12(2) *Journal of Immigration and Refugee Studies* 103-122.

that the Justice and Development Party and President Recep Tayyip Erdoğan's rule have brought about in Turkish politics, as well as energy-related developments over the last 20 years. For example, Tziarras examines Greek Cypriot security concerns and perceptions of threat in relation to Turkey's policy on Cyprus, both at the official (state) and non-official (societal) levels, and offers some interesting categorisations and distinctions between the two levels.⁵⁰ In a similar framework, Bryant and Yakinthou take a multidirectional approach to examine established perceptions related to Cyprus Problem among Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots and Turks, in an effort to identify their drivers and set forth ideas for breaking the negotiations' deadlock.⁵¹ In the most comprehensive work of this kind, Adamides employs the securitisation theory to examine Cyprus as a field of protracted conflict and how this environment stimulates the production of negative perceptions on the 'enemy other'.⁵²

Below, I will focus on the two aspects that fall within the scope of this article's interests: Greek Cypriot perceptions of balance of power and 'Turkey's greatness' vis-à-vis 'Cyprus' smallness'. I will review some publications on Greek Cypriot stereotypes related to the balance of power, particularly how great powers and intergovernmental organisations impact on the overall power distribution around the Cyprus Problem. Furthermore, I will examine some stereotypes related to State 'greatness' and 'smallness', which constitute the most under-researched area of interest to this article.

On the Balance of Power

When it comes to issues pertinent to the balance of power, lines of distinction between 'pragmatists' and 'hardliners' are not always clearly visible. However, students may clearly observe the appeal of 'just cause' perceptions. Such issues and, particularly, Greek Cypriot perceptions of foreign interference with Cyprus-related affairs, have been analysed in Kontos et al.⁵³ Among other issues, this volume examines the Greek Cypriot stereotype of the 'Anglo-American factor', an over-simplified concept applied by Greek Cypriot opinion leaders to imply that US and British policies on Cyprus are identical, without considering potential differences (or even conflicting interests) that may have emerged from time to time. This set of perceptions involves beliefs that refer to a historical pro-Turkish bias on the part of both the United King-

⁵⁰ Tziarras (no 18).

⁵¹ Rebecca Bryant and Chrystalla Yakinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey* (Istanbul: TESEV Publications, 2012).

⁵² Adamides (no 17).

⁵³ Kontos (no 12).

dom and the United States and date back to the 1950s and the 1960s. Greek Cypriots also tend to blame London and Washington (particularly the latter) for providing Turkey with the ‘green light’ to invade Cyprus in 1974. This perception has been boosted by public discussion and some published works on Secretary of State Henry Kissinger’s controversial role, as well as the role of the Greek military junta in designing and executing the coup d’état against Cypriot President Makarios and its relations with Washington.⁵⁴ At the same time, though, other analysts often emphasise the harsh treatment that Ankara received from Washington (particularly the US Congress) right after the invasion,⁵⁵ a matter that is systematically omitted from the Greek Cypriot public discourse.

Further on the role of great powers as pillars of a broader balance on Cyprus-related issues, Greek Cypriot perceptions of Russia offer one more interesting case study. Russia enjoys popularity among Greek Cypriots, across the ideological spectrum. Even at times of widespread anti-Russian sentiments in Europe, in the outset of the Russian invasion of Ukraine, this bias remained high. As revealed by a Eurobarometer study in May 2022, when asked whether they agree that ‘Russian authorities are responsible first and foremost for the current situation,’ only 21% of Cypriot respondents agreed, while the overall EU 27 average was 52%.⁵⁶ This bias can be explained by a combination of factors. After the end of the Cold War, Russian-Cypriot relations flourished on several fields. Economic relations were boosted due to Cyprus’ accession to the EU in 2004,⁵⁷ which rendered Cyprus an attractive business partner to Russian businesspeople, while, according to some observers, Nicosia was placed in a position to act as Moscow’s ‘Trojan horse’ in Brussels.⁵⁸ Russian investments have vastly contributed to the growth of the Cypriot economy in the post-Cold War era.

⁵⁴ Indicatively, see Gene Rossides, *Kissinger and Cyprus: A Study of Lawlessness* (Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute Foundation, 2014); Costas Venizelos, Michalis Ignatiou, *Kissinger’s Secret Archives (Τα Μυστικά Αρχεία του Χένρι Κισσιντζερ)* (Athens: Livanis, 2002) (in Greek); Alexis Pappachelas, *A Dark Room 1967-1974 (Ένα Σκοτεινό Δωμάτιο 1967-1974)* (Athens: Metechmio, 2021) (in Greek).

⁵⁵ James Goode, *The Turkish Arms Embargo: Drugs, Ethnic Lobbies, and US Domestic Politics* (Kentucky: University Press of Kentucky, 2020).

⁵⁶ ‘EU Response to the War in Ukraine,’ (May 2022) *Flash Eurobarometer 506-Ipsos European Public Affairs*, available at <https://europa.eu/eurobarometer/surveys/detail/2772> (last accessed 17 June 2022).

⁵⁷ George Christou, ‘Bilateral Relations with Russia and the Impact on EU Policy: The Cases of Cyprus and Greece’ (2011) *Journal of Contemporary European Studies*, Vol. 19(2), 225-236.

⁵⁸ Mark Leonard, Nicu Popescu, ‘A Power Audit of EU-Russia Relations’ (2007) *European Council on Foreign Relations* (policy paper) 27-31.

The business activity conducted by (and related with) the Russian offshore companies registered in Cyprus comprises a significant part of the Cypriot GDP, and it was enhanced after 2013 by a scheme-launched by the Cypriot government as a measure to tackle the financial crisis for granting Cypriot (thus EU) citizenship to foreign investors. This trend was partially reversed after a revision of Cypriot policy on shell companies in 2018, following pressure by the United States and the EU.⁵⁹ When it comes to relations in the fields of defense and diplomacy, Russia provided the RoC with a valuable source of arms sales in the 1990s, while a US embargo was in place. The agreement on the purchase of an advanced Russian anti-aircraft system in 1996, which provoked a vehement reaction on the part of Turkey and, to a large degree, the United States and European countries, is the most notable benchmark.⁶⁰ Furthermore, being a UN Security Council permanent member, Russia has often provided the RoC with diplomatic support. Probably the most marking moment for the Greek Cypriots was Russia's use of its veto right in April 2004: in that case, Russia made use of this extraordinary tool to block a resolution that aimed to outline new UN security arrangements that would take effect in Cyprus three days later, in case the Greek Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots approved the Annan Plan in separate referendums.⁶¹ The Greek Cypriot majority perceived this as an act of support to their objectives, given that President Papadopoulos had publicly rejected the Annan plan. Another influential field of bi-lateral exchanges is religion. The Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus and the Russian Orthodox Church have been historically involved in multiple levels of interaction.⁶² In this context, the first commemoration of the Ukrainian Church Metropolitan Epiphanius in October 2020 by late Archbishop Chrysostomos II was harshly disputed as being disruptive of Russian-Cypriot ecclesiastical relations, as the Ukrainian Church's autocephaly (autonomy) is considered schismatic by Mos-

⁵⁹ Michalis Kontos, 'Cyprus and the Great Powers: An Evaluation of Russian-Cypriot Relations in the New Eastern Mediterranean Environment' (2019) 21 *Journal of Law and Administration* 17-27, 21-22.

⁶⁰ Michalis Kontos, Andreas Karyos, 'The Threat of Use of Force under Conditions of Power Asymmetry: The Case of the S 300 Crisis' ('Απειλή Χρήσης Βίας σε Συνθήκες Ανισοζυγίου Ισχύος: Η Περίπτωση της Κρίσης των Πυραύλων S-300') in Emilianides, A. K., Ioannou, C., Sotiropoulos, Y. (eds), *Struggle for Survival. Aspects of Cyprus History after 1974 (Αγώνας για Επιβίωση: Πτυχές της Κυπριακής Πολιτικής Ιστορίας μετά το 1974)* (Nicosia: Nea Hestia/Hippasus/University of Nicosia, School of Law, 2021), 95-111 (in Greek).

⁶¹ Edith M. Lederer, 'Russia Blocks UN Cyprus Resolution' *Associated Press* (21 April 2004), available at <https://archive.globalpolicy.org/security/veto/2004/0421blocks.htm> (last accessed 12 July 2022).

⁶² Kontos (no 59) 23-24.

cow's Patriarchate. The Archbishop's action divided the Holy Synod of the Church of Cyprus, as several influential pro-Russian bishops refused to follow suit.⁶³

These three pillars combined can explain the Greek Cypriot pro-Russian bias. A significant part of Greek Cypriot society believes that, contrary to London and Washington, Moscow shares Greek Cypriot 'just cause' perceptions. At the same time, this belief defies indications of Russian inactivity on issues of high priority for the RoC. An indicative example is Moscow's refusal to rescue the Cypriot economy right after the rejection of Eurogroup's original bail-in proposal by the House of Representatives, in March 2013.⁶⁴ Even actions that could be considered detrimental to Cypriot interests may be defied, like the construction of a controversial, Russian-made nuclear plant in southern Turkey, only a few kilometers away from Cyprus' shores.⁶⁵

When it comes to intergovernmental organisations, an interesting field of study is Greek Cypriot perceptions of the UN and its role in Cyprus talks, in conjunction with what Greek Cypriots think this role should be.⁶⁶ In this context, there is a widespread view among Greek Cypriots that the role of the UN in Cyprus should be to focus on imposing or supervising the implementation and respect of International Law. This viewpoint clearly reflects the original perception of 'just cause', which predisposes every initiative on the Cyprus Problem according to the idea of Greek Cypriot victimisation and Turkish illegal aggression. However, it defies the fact that the UN role, as described in the mandate of the UN force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), is one of peace-keeping and mediation.⁶⁷ Obviously, a mediator seeks impartiality. Instead, Greek Cypriots tend to perceive this impartiality as an indication of pro-Turkish bias and unfairness which transforms the balance of power at their expense.

⁶³ Jonathan Gorvett, 'Russia's Battle for the Orthodox Soul' *Cyprus Mail* (29 November 2020), available at <https://cyprus-mail.com/2020/11/29/russias-battle-for-the-orthodox-soul/> (last accessed 8 July 2022).

⁶⁴ Ian Trainor, Josephine Moulds, Miriam Elder, Howard Amos, 'Cyprus Bailout Deal with EU Closes Bank and Seizes Large Deposits' *The Guardian* (25 March 2013), available at <https://www.theguardian.com/world/2013/mar/25/cyprus-bailout-deal-eu-closes-bank> (last accessed 12 July 2022).

⁶⁵ Sinem Koseoglu, 'Turkey's Nuclear Power Dilemma' *Al Jazeera* (10 March 2021), available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/3/10/turkeys-nuclear-dilemma> (last accessed 12 July 2022).

⁶⁶ Constantinos Adamides, Michalis Kontos, 'Greek Cypriot Perceptions of the United Nations' in Michális S. Michael and Yücel Vural (eds), *Cyprus and the Roadmap for Peace: A Critical Interrogation of the Conflict* (Camberley Surrey: Eduard Elgar Publishing, 2017) 145-154.

⁶⁷ UNFICYP Mandate, available at <https://unficy.unmissions.org/unficy-mandate> (last accessed 12 June 2022).

On ‘Greatness’ and ‘Smallness’

As explained above, the memory of the Turkish invasion, as well as the extensive Turkish military presence in the northern part of Cyprus, constitute the bedrock upon which Greek Cypriot perceptions of Turkey are based. On Turkey-related issues, ‘pragmatists’ and ‘hardliners’ have from time to time developed distinctly different views that highlight their opposing ideological origins.

An example of this tendency is the different approaches taken by columnists on how the government should deal with Turkey’s revisionist stance on the RoC’s quest for offshore natural gas discoveries. Following the first natural gas findings offshore Cyprus, in 2011, Turkey implemented a gradually escalating strategy of coercive diplomacy that aimed to force the RoC to terminate its offshore drilling program and persuade its partner international oil and gas companies that no such projects could be brought to fruition without Ankara’s consent.⁶⁸ In the framework of this strategy, Turkey and the ‘TRNC’ signed a ‘continental shelf agreement’, thus rejecting Greek Cypriot actions as ‘unilateral’ and claiming ‘sovereign rights’ on a significant part of the RoC’s exclusive economic zone (EEZ). Based on this agreement, Turkey has dispatched research vessels since 2014 and drillships since 2018 in the Cypriot EEZ to drill in search of natural gas reserves.⁶⁹ The RoC, which had declared and delimited its EEZ through bilateral agreements from the outset according to the provisions of the United Nations Convention on the Law of the Sea (UNCLOS), stresses that these moves violate its own sovereign rights.

Columnists who have been traditionally expressing ‘pragmatist’ views, have generally applied a narrative that denounces Turkish revisionism but at the same time blames the Cypriot government for not doing enough to solve the Cyprus Problem and, therefore, optimise perspectives for exploiting Cypriot natural resources.⁷⁰ This

⁶⁸ Kontos and Bitsis (no 16).

⁶⁹ George Psyllides, ‘Cavusoglu: Greek Cypriots Act as if Cyprus Belongs to Them’ *Cyprus Mail* (1 September 2018), available at <http://cyprus-mail.com/2018/09/01/cavusoglu-greek-cypriots-act-as-if-cyprus-belongs-to-them> (last accessed 2 September 2018).

⁷⁰ Dionysis Dionysiou, ‘Natural Gas: Who Buried Cyprus’ Hopes in the Mediterranean Depths?’ (Φυσικό αέριο: Ποιος Έθαψε τις Ελπίδες της Κύπρου στα Έγκατα της Μεσογείου;) *Politis* (20 February 2022), available at <https://politis.com.cy/politis-news/fysiko-aerio-poiios-ethapse-tis-elpides-tis-kyproy-sta-egkata-tis-mesogeioy/> (last accessed 12 February 2022) (in Greek); Kyriacos Pierides, ‘The Natural Gas Curse’ (Η Κατάρα του Φυσικού Αερίου) *Politis* (18 December 2021), available at <https://politis.com.cy/apopseis/analyseis/i-katara-toy-fysikoy-aerioy-toy-kyriakoy-pieridi/> (last accessed 12 February 2022) (in Greek); Makarios Droushiotis, ‘So, We Grayed the Whole Eastern Mediterranean’ (Έτσι Καταφέραμε και Γκριζάραμε Όλη την Αν. Μεσόγειο) *To Vima* (22 August 2020), available at

view is based on a reasonable assumption: Cyprus is too small to mess with Turkey; therefore, a conciliatory approach would be the only way to solve the Cyprus Problem. In the same vein, they argue that Turkey will find ways to hinder Cypriot natural gas projects as long as the Cyprus Problem remains unsettled, while such encounters increase the risk of military deterioration. However, this approach usually fails (or chooses not) to consider the long-term risk of having Turkey's strategic control extended all over the island, given its geographic position and massive power advantage.⁷¹ This point corresponds to the 'hardliners' worst nightmare, as they continuously underline that exceeding (what they perceive as) red lines in the negotiations could render Cyprus a Turkish satellite.

On the other hand, some columnists with 'hardline' views pay much attention to the RoC's lack of sufficient military means to deter (or meet) Turkish naval moves offshore Cyprus. As a matter of fact, Cyprus does not have military naval means that could be used to protect offshore investments. Columnists who express these views have been preoccupied with the issue of defense since the aftermath of the Turkish invasion, urging for sufficient public expenditures to create a credible deterrent force. In this context, they believe that Turkey's activity in the Cypriot EEZ, where the RoC enjoys exclusive sovereign rights, could have been avoided or sufficiently met had Cyprus developed a credible military naval force;⁷² or they argue that the RoC could enhance its power sources by participating in alliances with more powerful States, based on their common interests on energy-related affairs.⁷³ They often evoke Thucydidean realist thinking and dynamics of power politics to support their views. However, they usually distort the notorious dictum that the 'strong do what they can and the weak suffer what they must'. Although (as stressed above) history and theory often dispute this assumption, in the case under examination its explanatory value is

<https://www.tovima.gr/2020/08/22/opinions/etsi-kataferame-kai-gkrizarame-oli-tin-an-mesogeio/> (last accessed 12 July 2022) (in Greek).

⁷¹ Petros Savvides, 'The Security Question of the Cyprus Problem: Strategic Implications,' (October 2017) 11 *Eastern Mediterranean Policy* 2.

⁷² Savvas Iacovides, 'How Cypriot Natural Gas Is Protected from the Predator' ('Πώς Προστατεύεται το Κυπριακό Φυσικό Αέριο από την Αρπακτικό') *Simerini* (10 February 2018), available at <https://simerini.sigmalive.com/article/2018/2/10/pos-prostateuetai-to-kupriako-physiko-aerio-apo-ten-arpaktiko/> (last accessed 12 February 2020) (in Greek).

⁷³ Michalis Ignatiou, 'Greece and Cyprus are Becoming the United States' "Strong Cards" in Eastern Mediterranean Gambling' ('Ελλάδα και Κύπρος Εξελίσσονται στα "Δυνατά Χαρτιά" των ΗΠΑ στο Σκληρό Πόκερ στη Μεσόγειο') *Hellas Journal* (10 June 2018), available at <https://hellasjournal.com/2018/06/ellada-ke-kypros-exelissonte-sta-dynata-chartia-ton-ipa-sto-skliro-poker-me-ti-rosia/> (last accessed 12 February 2022) (in Greek).

high: on the one hand, it would be extremely difficult for the RoC to deal with Turkish naval superiority in the open sea, where, contrary to narrow battle environments, numbers really matter. On the other hand, alliances are based on mutual defense clauses. Since the RoC does not have the military means to support other countries in case of need, how could it expect them to agree that they will come to its defense, particularly given the tremendously unfavourable power equilibrium vis-à-vis Turkey? While ‘pragmatists’ tend to over-emphasise the inherent drawbacks of State ‘smallness’, ‘hardliners’ often undermine them.

Conclusions

This article focuses on how Greek Cypriot civil society and opinion leaders in post-1974 divided Cyprus deal with power-related affairs, and how they incorporate them in their own beliefs and assessments. I presented some sets of perceptions of Turkey and other foreign actors involved in the Cyprus Problem that take into account the unfavourable power distribution. In this framework, I set forth the hypothesis that ideological stereotypes stem from original perceptions and/or misperceptions and eventually become part of a self-reinforcing ideological vicious circle through the effect of (what Robert Jervis defines as) cognitive consistency.

To elaborate on the main argument in a structured manner, I focused on two different fields of relevance to Greek Cypriot power-related perceptions: the concept of the balance of power, as well as these of ‘greatness’ vs. ‘smallness’. Furthermore, I assumed that two original sources of Greek Cypriot beliefs, namely the post-1974 ‘defeat syndrome’ and the perception of ‘just cause’, may be considered the starting points of a remarkable array of Greek Cypriot power-related stereotypes. I also observed that these beliefs may drive stereotypes towards two potential directions: a ‘pragmatist’ approach and a ‘hardline’ approach. I tested my hypothesis by investigating how fixed perceptions affect Greek Cypriot public views in these fields. On the issue of the balance of power, I examined the stereotype of the ‘Anglo-American factor’, the pro-Russian bias, as well as perceptions on the role of the UN in Cyprus. In relation to the concepts of ‘greatness’ and ‘smallness’, I examined conflicting views on how the RoC should deal with Turkey’s reaction to the Cypriot offshore natural gas project.

The analysis in the last section showcases a clearly observable predisposition to interpret incoming information according to pre-existing beliefs. These beliefs are defined by established perceptions that relate to the ‘defeat syndrome’ and/or the perception of ‘just cause’. For example, on the role of external actors, Greek Cypriots

tend to believe that these may play a significant role in the overall balance of power. However, they often evaluate this role through the stereotypical lens of ‘just cause’ that creates fixed and hardly-changing perceptions of who may be regarded as friends and who as foes. When it comes to Cyprus’ quest for natural gas findings and Turkey’s reaction, ‘pragmatists’ often express views that over-emphasise the inherent drawbacks of State ‘smallness’, while ‘hardliners’ undermine them, in both cases with reference to particular sets of beliefs on the history and politics of the Cyprus Problem. In all these cases, significant contextual variables that stem from the international environment are either defied or distorted.

Ideology, perceptions, and misperceptions can explain a wide range of political predispositions in all political systems and societies. It seems that in Cyprus they are characterised by some special historical and political attributes that reflect heavily on civil society and, particularly, on domestic public discourse. These attributes are directly associated with the small size of the country, particularly so when systemic interactions with bigger and more powerful opponents are in place. Furthermore, some characteristics of the case under examination highlight some intervening variables that seem to act as an impactful catalysts: Apart from Cyprus’ ‘smallness’ vis-à-vis Turkey’s ‘greatness’, the trauma of 1974 and the vast military presence of Turkey in the northern part of Cyprus also constitute crucial explanatory factors for the causal links described above. These variables are essential in the exclusive historical framework of the divided, *de facto* Greek-dominated RoC.

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Meta-Memory: An Empirical Exploration of a New Conceptual Schema for Understanding Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus

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Abstract:

Collective memory is the realisation of the past in the form of contemporary experience, a social construct formed in economic, social, cultural, political, and ideological frameworks. This paper examines the way intractable conflict is constructed by the transmission of memories from generations with lived experience of the conflict, and the personal experiences that the current generation has of contemporary events. Additionally, it explores the ways in which the political leaderships in both communities attempt to influence young Cypriots' conceptual framing of themselves and their imaginary other. Using a qualitative framework, a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews was conducted with individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots as the basis for an empirical exploration of their relationship to the events of the 1974 war and the subsequent division of the island. Through a critical review of the extant literature combined with the empirical findings of this paper, a new concept is proposed, that of 'meta-memory'. The concept refers to transmitted experiences combined with experiences occurred at a later stage or in succession of the initial conflict; it is a direct collection and accumulation of experiences from an ongoing conflict that affects current generations' lives in the present. The concept has wide applicability to conflict situations around the world since it offers a theoretical paradigm which can shed light into aspects of ongoing/intractable conflict that remain unexamined and/or neglected.

Keywords: collective memory, meta-memory, conflict, transmitted experiences of conflict

Introduction

Since 1974, the map of divided Cyprus has been a symbol loaded with different meanings for both communities,³ effectively creating an imaginary map as regards

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³ Yiannis Papadakis, 'Nicosia after 1960: A River, a Bridge and a Dead Zone' (2006) 1 *Global Media*

the assertion of sovereignty. The Cyprus Problem is an intractable conflict and an unwavering reality for many generations; it occupies a central role in the lives of both communities, influencing their members' individual and collective decisions.⁴ For almost 50 years, Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been divided along ethnic lines, with distinct language, religions and, crucially, diverging social representations of the Cyprus Problem and its origins.⁵ The long periods of conflict and confrontation between the two communities resulted in the accumulation of animosity and hostility; yet they also motivated initiatives which lifted hopes for a solution. In recent decades, both communities experience the conflict, on a daily basis, as it infiltrates, among others, the media, official narratives of each political leadership,⁶ and commemorative spaces,⁷ all of which serve as narrative mediums. Struggle museums, commemorations, memorials, monuments, and flags all seek to legitimise each community's histories

Journal: Mediterranean Edition 1; Rebecca Bryant, 'The State of Cypriot Silences' (2018) 22 *Cyprus Review* 10.

⁴ Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Sociopsychological Foundations of Intractable Conflicts' (2007) *American Behavioral Scientist* 1432–1433, available at <<http://journals.sagepub.com/doi/abs/10.1177/0002764207302462>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); Constantinos Adamides, *Securitization and Desecuritization Processes in Protracted Conflicts* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2020); Constantinos Adamides, 'A Comfortable and Routine Conflict' in James Ker-Lindsay (ed.), *Resolving Cyprus. New Approaches to Conflict Resolution* (IBTauris, 2015).

⁵ Charis Psaltis, 'Collective Memory, Social Representations of Intercommunal Relations, and Conflict Transformation in Divided Cyprus' (2016) 22 *Peace and Conflict: Journal of Psychology* 19; Niazi Kizilyürek, *Turkish Cypriots, Turkey and the Cyprus Problem (Οι Τουρκοκύπριοι, η Τουρκία Και Το Κυπριακό)* (Papazisis, 2009) 136–142.

⁶ Christophoros Christophorou, Sanem Şahin and Synthia Pavlou, *Media Narratives, Politics and the Cyprus Problem* (PRIO Cyprus Centre 2010); Harry Anastasiou, 'Communication across Conflict Lines: The Case of Ethnically Divided Cyprus' (2002) 39 *Journal of Peace Research* 581; Sanem Şahin, 'Journalism in Conflict-Affected Societies: Professional Roles and Influences in Cyprus' (2022) 15 *Media, War & Conflict* 553; Christophoros Christophorou, 'An Old Cleavage Causes New Divisions: Parliamentary Elections in the Republic of Cyprus, 21 May 2006' (2009) 12 *South European Society and Politics* 111; Adamides (n 2); Vasiliki Triga, Fernando Mendez and Constantinos Djuovas, 'Post-Crisis Political Normalisation? The 2018 Presidential Elections in the Republic of Cyprus' (2019) 24 *South European Society and Politics* 103; Nicos Anastasiades, 'Address by the President of the Republic of Cyprus, Mr Nicos Anastasiades during the Anniversary Event for the 1974 Turkish invasion'; Address by the Permanent Secretary of the Ministry of Interior, Dr Kostas Konstantinou, on behalf of the Minister in the workshop entitled "Issues that concern Local Authorities of the Occupied Communities"; Annita Demetriou, 'Speech by the President of the Cyprus Parliament for the Anniversaries of the Coup d'Etat and the Turkish Invasion'.

⁷ Yiannis Papadakis, 'The National Struggle Museums of a Divided City' (1994) 17 *Ethnic and Racial Studies* 400; Yiannis Papadakis, 'Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus' (2003) 14 *History and Anthropology* 253.

and narratives⁸ to motivate and mobilise society members and get support from the international community. The past is re-presented to serve hegemonic relations of power and authority,⁹ and establish the dichotomy ‘Us’ vs ‘Them’ or - where monuments and memorials in the public space are concerned – ‘Victim’ and ‘Villain’.

Collective memory is the realisation of the past in the form of contemporary experience, a social construct formed in economic, social, cultural, political, and ideological frameworks.¹⁰ In this sense, collective memory is an invented tradition that is often shaped by people and groups over long periods of time. It is linked to the objective perception of ‘history’ but usually goes beyond that to capture a mythical version of events,¹¹ people, and places that serve social or political interests. The two communities’ collective memory of the Turkish invasion is a double-edged sword. The single seminal event is seen from a different perspective by each side. For the Greek-Cypriots it is a tragedy and a violation of the legal order that led to the de jure partition of the island, while the Turkish Cypriots see Turkey as a ‘peace power’ and the intervention as a ‘peace operation’ that legitimised their ‘State’.¹² The ‘inferno’¹³ of one community is the ‘paradise’ of the other, as determined by their perspective on the historical event.¹⁴

⁸ Reuben Rose-Redwood, Derek Alderman and Maoz Azaryahu, (2008) ‘Collective Memory and the Politics of Urban Space: An Introduction’ 73 161.

⁹ Kenneth E Foote and Maoz Azaryahu, ‘Toward a Geography of Memory: Geographical Dimensions of Public Memory and Commemoration.’ (2007) 35 *Journal of Political and Military Sociology* 125, 129.

¹⁰ Maurice Halbwachs, *The Collective Memory* (Introduction by Mary Douglas. trans. Francis J. Ditter Jr and Vida Yazdi Ditter ed, Harper Colophon 1980); Barry Schwartz, ‘The Social Context of Commemoration: A Study in Collective Memory’ (1982) 61 *Social Forces* 374.

¹¹ Stephen Daniels and Denis Cosgrove, ‘Introduction: Iconography and Landscape’ in Denis Cosgrove and Stephen Daniels (eds), *The Iconography of Landscape: Essays on the Symbolic Representation, Design and Use of Past Environments* (Cambridge University Press 1988); Foote, K. E., & Azaryahu (no 9); Eric Hobsbawm and Terence Ranger (eds), *The Invention of Tradition* (Cambridge University Press 1992).

¹² Lukas Perikleous, Meltem Onurkan-Samani and Gülen Onurkan-Aliusta, ‘Those Who Control the Narrative Control the Future: The Teaching of History in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schools’ (2021) 8 *Historical Encounters* 124; Michalinos Zembylas and Loizos Loukaidis, ‘Affective Practices, Difficult Histories and Peace Education: An Analysis of Teachers’ Affective Dilemmas in Ethnically Divided Cyprus’ (2021) 97 *Teaching and Teacher Education* 103225; Dilek Latif, ‘A Challenging Educational Reform: Politics of History Textbook Revision in North Cyprus’ (2019) 49 *Compare: A Journal of Comparative and International Education* 30.

¹³ Kızılyürek (no 5) 113.

¹⁴ Perikleous, Onurkan-Samani and Onurkan-Aliusta (no 12); Zembylas and Loukaidis (no 12); Latif (no 12).

According to Bar Tal,¹⁵ the collective memory of past events determines how new events or prolonged experiences- even if unrelated- are understood, as long as this serves society's needs and aims. Such new events or prolonged experiences are then incorporated into the narrative and provide further evidence of the group's general representation; collective memory should thus be seen as a multi-layered narrative. The 'Cyprus Problem' is conceptualised here as an open-ended process; it not only encompasses memories of past events but is also on the receiving end of an influx of current developments in the conflict which are subsequently also converted into memories. We propose the term 'meta-memory' to capture the case of young Cypriots with no lived experience of the 1974 events, whose own memories of contemporary developments in the ongoing conflict are supplemented by the memories inherited from past generations. Using post-memory as a springboard, this research seeks to explore and expose the intricacies of the Cyprus Case and draw valuable insights for intractable conflicts more broadly.

This work examines how the perception of intractable conflict is constructed by the transmission of memories from generations with lived experience of the conflict, and the personal experiences that the current generation has of contemporary events. Additionally, it explores the ways in which the political leaderships in both communities attempt to influence young Cypriots' conceptual framing of themselves and their imaginary other. Using a qualitative framework, a series of in-depth semi-structured interviews was conducted with individual Greek and Turkish Cypriots as the basis for an empirical exploration of their relationship to the events of the 1974 war and the subsequent division of the island.

Historical Background

The establishment of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960 did little to reconcile the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities; quite the contrary, it fuelled Greek and Turkish nationalism further. The unworkability of the constitution and reluctance of the political elite to abandon Enosis and Taksim¹⁶ triggered intercommunal violence,

¹⁵ Daniel Bar-Tal, 'Collective Memory as Social Representations' (2014) 23 *Papers on Social representations* 1.

¹⁶ Two contradicting national narratives exist in Cyprus; on the one hand, the Greek Cypriot side identifies its historic path with Greece, with which it desired unification (Enosis). The Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, reacted strongly in the face of a possible Enosis and promoted division (Taksim). Enosis and Taksim remained the main aims of the ruling political elites of both communities.

leading to the collapse of the Republic's bicomunal power-sharing structures.¹⁷ On 21 December 1963 commenced one of the most violent periods in Cypriot history; the events, which came to be known as 'Bloody Christmas', cost the lives of hundreds of Turkish Cypriots, and would become ingrained in the collective memory of their community. For the first time, Cyprus was territorially partitioned and Greek and Turkish Cypriots were separated on account of their ethnic origin.¹⁸

Another defining feature of this period was the mass relocation of Turkish Cypriots and the creation of enclaves in the northern part of Cyprus,¹⁹ where a greater number of Turkish Cypriots resided, for the protection of the community from acts of aggression by Greek-Cypriot nationalists.²⁰ The movement was carried out in an organised manner, under pressure from the leaders of the TMT²¹ who were 'determined that the refugees shall not move back to the Greek-controlled areas from the Turkish enclave and the fortified villages at any cost'.²² From villages and areas near the green line '26,000 Turkish Cypriots – more than a fifth of the Turkish Cypriot population – fled into the enclave', where they were packed into Red Cross tents.²³ Due to the deterioration of bi-communal relations, the United Nations Security Council

¹⁷ Ayla Gürel, 'Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife: Report 4: Turkish Cypriot Legal Framework' (Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 2012).

¹⁸ Secretary General, 'Report by the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus' (United Nations Security Council, 1964).

¹⁹ According to Pierre Oberling, *The Road to Bellapais* (Social Science Monographs, Boulder 1982) 94., 3,000 out of the 5,000 Turkish inhabitants of Omorphita were 'safely escorted into the Turkish quarter of Nicosia' on 25 December 1963. The population exchange and the creation of ethnically 'pure' areas were requested by Denktash and Halit Ali Riza during the London Conference.

²⁰ Sotos Ktoris, *Turkish Cypriots. From Marginalization to Partnership 1923-1960* (Τουρκοκύπριοι: Από το περιθώριο στο συνεταιρισμό (1923-1960). (Papazisis, 2013); Metin Tamkoç, *The Turkish Cypriot State: The Embodiment of the Right of Self-Determination* (K Rustem & Brother, 1988); Ploutis Servas, *The Cyprus Issue, Responsibilities* (Κυπριακό, Ευθύνης). (Grammi Publishers, 1984); Richard A Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict 1963-1971* (Department of Geography, Faculty of Environmental Studies, University of Waterloo, 1989); Galo Plaza, 'Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General (S/6253)' (United Nations Security Council 1965); Michael Wall, 'Greeks Call on Turks to Surrender: ...And Tell British Troops to Keep out of Way' *The Guardian* (1959-2003) (London (UK), 10 March 1964) 1.

²¹ Cyprus Mail, 'Turks Move into Secure Areas "Refugee Problem" Created' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia, 13 January 1964) 1.

²² The Illustrated London News, 'Cyprus Waits for a "Miracle" [1965] *The Illustrated London News* 16, 17.

²³ Blair Granger W., 'Greek Cypriotes Enlarging Force' *The New York Times* (New York, 23 February 1964) 1, 4; Cyprus Mail, "'Neutral Zone" Around Nicosia' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia, 30 December 1963) 1; *The Illustrated London News* (no 22).

recommended the creation of a United Nations Peace-keeping Force in Cyprus with the aim of preventing the resurgence of hostilities between the two communities and restoring law and order.²⁴ The United Nations' (UN) peacekeeping force, the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), the longest running peacekeeping operation in the history of UN, remains in Cyprus to this day.²⁵

In 1967, Colonel Grivas²⁶ returned to Cyprus and commenced his efforts to undermine the Republic with the support of the Athens military junta. On 15 July 1974, the military junta instigated a coup d'état carried out by the Greek National Guard officers, assisted by the extreme right-wing nationalist allies of EOKA II²⁷ (National Organisation of Cypriot Struggle).²⁸ The coup d'état provided Turkey with a justification for military intervention based on the articles of the Guarantee Treaty.²⁹ Although the putschist government remained in power only for nine days, 42,000 Turkish military troops remain stationed on the island almost 50 years later.³⁰ The

²⁴ UN. Security Council (19th year: 1964), 'S/RES/186(1964) - Security Council Resolution 186 (1964) [on Establishment of the UN Peace-Keeping Force in Cyprus]'.

²⁵ Michael Wall, 'Cyprus - Island of Hate and Fear' *The New York Times* (New York, 8 March 1964) 278; Oberling (no 19); Patrick (no 20); Plaza (no 20).

²⁶ Georgios Grivas was the military leader of EOKA (National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) who waged an armed struggle against the British colonials in Cyprus. He later also acted as the founder of EOKA B', a paramilitary organisation that undertook a bloody campaign for the unification of Cyprus with Greece. The actions of EOKA B' that led to the overthrow of Makarios, the legitimate president of the Republic of Cyprus, are, even today, a subject of controversy among the political forces of the island and their followers.

²⁷ EOKA was a guerrilla organisation against the colonial government, active in the period 1955-59. The aim of EOKA was the unification of the island with Greece. EOKA II was a nationalist organisation that appeared in 1963 and 1967. In collaboration with the Greek junta, it targeted the Turkish Cypriots and aimed at the unification with Greece.

²⁸ Kostas Gennaris, *Ex Anatolon*. Ekdoseis Kastanioti, 2000.; J Asmussen, 'Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict during the 1974 Crisis'; *Vangelis Kofiidakis. Cyprus and the Superpowers, 1960-1979* (Η Κύπρος και οι Υπερδυνάμεις), in *Cyprus, History, Proplems and Struggles of its People*, ed. Yiannos Kranidiotis, Giorgos Tenekidis, (Athens, Estia Bookshop, 2009); Caesar Mavratsas, *Aspects of Greek nationalism in Cyprus* (Όψεις του Ελληνικού εθνικισμού στην Κύπρο)." (Katarti 1998).

²⁹ The Treaty of Guarantee was signed on the occasion of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1959 between Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey. Article II of the treaty established the obligation of the three guarantor powers (Greece, the United Kingdom and Turkey) to prohibit any activity aimed directly or indirectly at the unification of Cyprus with another State or the partition of the island. In the event of a breach of the treaty, the three guarantor powers had the right to take unilateral measures to restore order.

³⁰ M Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 'Unofficial Intercommunal Contacts and Their Contribution to Peace-Building in Conflict Societies: The Case of Cyprus' (1993) *The Cyprus Review*, available at <<http://search.proquest.com/openview/0f9e61a7f9e173b263eaec6f8e54ec65/1?pq-origsite=gscholar>> (last accessed 26 November 2015).

Turkish invasion caused geographical division and occupation of 37% of Cyprus,³¹ and the displacement of more than 215,000 Greek-Cypriots.³² A further 61,500 Turkish Cypriots were also displaced since the commencement of EOKA's anti-colonial efforts in 1955 and the founding of TMT³³ (Turk Mukavement Teskilati – Turkish Resistance Organization³⁴) in 1957.³⁵

The de facto partition of the island was followed by the establishment of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' in 1983,³⁶ with Denktash serving as its first president. Although the newly established state received no international recognition apart from Turkey, Denktash considered the matter closed arguing that 'there is not and never has been a Cypriot nation';³⁷ Greeks and Turks were merely forced to live side by side. As he proclaimed –quite characteristically, 'the only thing that is truly Cypriot are Cyprus donkeys.'³⁸

The dividing line stood in the way of communication between the two communities until the opening of the cross-points in 2003. Any attempt to cross the dividing line without the intervention of the UN before this was essentially tantamount to suicide.³⁹ The events of 1996, where two Greek-Cypriots were killed by Turkish Cypriots

³¹ Cyprus, 'S/2009/296 Letter Dated 5 June 2009 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations Addressed to the President of the Security Council', United Nations Digital Library, available at <<https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/656995?ln=en>>.

³² N Peristianis, 'Cypriot Nationalism, Dual Identity, and Politics' in Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis and Gizela Welz (eds), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict* (Indiana University Press, 2006).

³³ 'Denktash: Three People Established the TMT' *KIBRIS* (Nicosia, 16 June 2000) <<http://www.hri.org/news/cyprus/tcpr/2000/00-06-16.tcpr.html#06>>; Kizilyürek (no 5).

³⁴ The aim of the TMT was to prevent the unification of Cyprus with Greece on the one hand and the partition of Cyprus on the other.

³⁵ Rebecca Bryant, *Life Stories: Turkish Cypriot Community, in Displacement in Cyprus Consequences of Civil and Military Strife*. No. 2., (International Peace Research Institute, 2012).

³⁶ The 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' declaration preceded, on the 13th February 1975, merely to 'establish the Turkish wing of the envisaged Federal Republic of Cyprus' (Allen & Unwin; K. Rustem & Bro, 1982).

³⁷ *ibid* 13.

³⁸ Smith H Nuttall C., 'Rauf Denktash Obituary Hawkish Leader of the Self-Declared Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' *The Guardian* (15 January 2012) <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2012/jan/15/rauf-denktash-obituary>>.

³⁹ 'Letter dated 12 April 1993 from the Permanent Representative of Cyprus to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.'; 'Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the period from 11 June to 10 December 1996.'; 'Letter dated 6 June 1996 from the Chargé d'affaires a.i. of the Permanent Mission of Turkey to the United Nations addressed to the Secretary-General.'

during a peaceful march of motorcyclists,⁴⁰ are a striking example of the status quo that has been maintained, particularly by the Turkish Cypriot side.⁴¹ The long period of no-contact between members of the two communities provided a fertile ground for the leadership of both sides to construct the image of the ‘other’ based on the hegemonic narrative that supported their respective aims. Diachronically, each community maintained vastly different interpretations and memories of the same event, as pre-determined by the hegemonic narrative.

The Annan Plan for the island’s reunification was put before the two communities in two separate referenda before the accession of Cyprus in the European Union in 2004. While the Greek-Cypriots rejected the plan, Turkish Cypriots approved it.⁴² The then Secretary-General of the United Nations described the outcome of the referendum as the destruction of ‘a unique and historic chance to resolve the Cyprus

⁴⁰ ‘Report of the Secretary-General on the United Nations Operation in Cyprus for the period from 11 June to 10 December 1996.’ (n 32).

⁴¹ In September 1996, in an apparent revenge attack along the Green Line, attributed to Greek Cypriots, Allahverdi Kılıç, a Turkish Cypriot soldier was shot and killed, while another was wounded AP Archive, ‘Cyprus: Demonstrator Shot Dead By Turkish Troops’ (1996) <<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/da17661ec8c75ad08b0e2dd38448a5c>>; AP Archive, ‘Cyprus - Greek and Turkish Cypriots Clash’ (1996) <<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/83bd0a8acf55d-2c23a805c2197f5c010>>; AP Archive, ‘Cyprus - Turkish-Cypriot Soldier Killed’ (1996) <<http://www.aparchive.com/metadata/youtube/14549beed8a911878b4263198e61bf84>>.. The Greek Cypriot side rejected the accusations of the Turkish Cypriot side about a ‘revenge attack’ that led to the death of Kılıç Hurriyet Daily News, ‘Border Murder Highlights Volatile Cyprus Situation’ (1996) <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/border-murder-highlights-volatile-cyprus-situation.aspx?pageID=438&n=border-murder-highlights-volatile-cyprus-situation-1996-09-10>> accessed 3 July 2016.

⁴² Yücel Vural and Nicos Peristianis, ‘Beyond Ethno-Nationalism: Emerging Trends in Cypriot Politics after the Annan Plan’ (2008) 14 *Nations and Nationalism* 39; C Pericleous, ‘Cyprus Referendum: A Divided Island and the Challenge of the Annan Plan’; Jan Asmussen, ‘Cyprus after the Failure of the Annan-Plan’; George Wright, ‘Greek Cypriot Leaders Reject Annan Plan’ *The Guardian* (22 April 2004), available at <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2004/apr/22/eu.cyprus>> (last accessed 3 November 2022); Alexandros Lordos, ‘From Secret Diplomacy to Public Diplomacy: How the Annan Plan Referendum Failure Earned the Cypriot Public a Seat at the Negotiating Table’ in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds), *Reunifying Cyprus: The Annan Plan and Beyond*, 28 (IB Tauris New York, 2009); Kofi Annan, ‘Report of the Secretary-General on His Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus’ (United Nations, 2004); *The Economist*, ‘The Cyprus Problem: Intractable—or Insoluble? | The Economist’ (*The Economist*, 2014), available at <<http://www.economist.com/news/europe/21635025-hopes-settling-cyprus-problem-are-starting-look-unrealistic-intractableor-insoluble>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); Maria Avraamidou, ‘Exploring Greek-Cypriot Media Representations of National Identities in Ethnically Divided Cyprus: The Case of the 2002/2004 Annan Plan Negotiations’ (2018) 20 *National Identities* 439; Hubert Faustmann, ‘The Cyprus Question Still Unresolved: Security Concerns and the Failure of the Annan Plan’ [2004] *Südosteuropa-Mitteilungen* 44; Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds), *Reunifying Cyprus. The Annan Plan and Beyond* (IB Tauris & Co Ltd 2009).

problem'.⁴³ The results of the referenda led to an escalation of the tension between the two communities, with hardliner leaders Rauf Denktash and Tassos Papadopoulos of the northern and southern sides respectively speaking out against the plan.⁴⁴

The dividing line still exists and continues to shape dialogues and narratives. The interaction between Greek and Turkish Cypriots today is still influenced by each community's link with respective motherlands Greece and Turkey,⁴⁵ which determines what is collectively remembered or forgotten. The discovery of natural gas reserves and associated research activities undertaken by the RoC are the latest source of tension domestically and within the Eastern Mediterranean more broadly, putting peace and stability at risk.

Research Framework and Methodology

Interviewees were selected based on selection criteria that were defined on age, nationality and gender. A convenience sampling technique (snowballing) was selected.

The interview questionnaire consisted of 72 questions/discussion points covering three pillars that influence collective memory: (a) family environment, (b) school environment, (c) and personal environment. Questions referred to personal experiences of the age group under investigation with regards to the events of the period under research. Even though the research was purely qualitative in nature, the research topic under study required substantial investigation due to its perplexed and complicated nature.

Within the framework of this study, data were collected following a two-stage process through biographical, personal, semi-structured in-depth interviews. The major advantage of in-depth interviews is twofold: enabling participants to express ideas and suggestions on a particular matter, and enabling researchers to fully explore the variety of factors underpinning participants' responses, including reasons, feelings, opinions and beliefs, furnishing hence the explanatory evidence crucial to qualitative research.⁴⁶ Byrne-Armstrong⁴⁷ states that this type of research represents a shift in

⁴³ UN News Center, 'Cyprus Misses "historic Chance" as It Rejects UN Reunification Plan, Annan Says' (24 April, 2004), available at <<http://www.un.org/apps/news/story.asp?NewsID=10512&Cr=Cyprus&Cr1#.V3kww0Z96Uk>> (last accessed. 20 October 2022).

⁴⁴ Birol Yesilada and David Wood, *The Emerging European Union* (Routledge, 2015).

⁴⁵ Kizilyürek (no 5).

⁴⁶ Robin Legard, Jill Keegan and Kit Ward, 'In-Depth Interviews'(2003) *Qualitative Research Practice: A Guide for Social Science Students and Researchers* 141.

⁴⁷ Hilary Byrne-Armstrong, 'Whose Show Is It? The Contradictions of Collaboration' (2001) *Critical Moments in Qualitative Research* 106.

focus from individual meanings to cultural narratives and their impact on people's lives. Therefore, the interview aims 'to sign up many truths/narratives' rather than finding a universal truth.⁴⁸

At the initial stage, 40 interviews (N=40) were conducted with an equal number of Greek- and Turkish- Cypriots who had no direct personal experience of the events of 1974. At the second stage, ten further interviews took place with Greek Cypriots (N=5) and Turkish Cypriots (N=5).⁴⁹ The data was collected through biographical, personal, semi-structured, in-depth interviews. Interviewees, like the participants at the first stage, had only transmitted experience of the events of 1974. At both stages, structured interview guides were used to ensure the comparability of the data and to safeguard the validity and data consistency necessary to allow the use of the data as a single body. Interviews were then transcribed and coded. The data were then translated to English. To ensure validity and reliability, a random sample of six interviews were back translated by an independent researcher.

The data for both stages was collected as part of an ongoing research project with multiple dimensions. The theoretical background, research scope, and methodology of this project extends beyond its boundaries and applies to each publication/research report which stems from it. Both datasets were processed and analysed under a common research protocol, using common coding schemes derived by two different raters during the inter-rater reliability process, resulting in a high consistency score between the raters (92%). Data was fully anonymised according to the EU Ethical and Data Protection HORIZON2020 Guidelines. The interviews with the Turkish Cypriots were conducted in English, while those with the Greek Cypriots were conducted in Greek. All interviews⁵⁰ were later transcribed and analysed following a qualitative thematic analysis pattern⁵¹ using NVivo 12Pro.⁵²

⁴⁸ Legard, Keegan and Ward (no 46); Byrne-Armstrong (no 47) 110.

⁴⁹ As part of the Horizon2020 research program 'RePAST' (<https://www.repast.eu/>).

⁵⁰ Data were also collected from Greek-Cypriot enclaved population and will be used for a subsequent publication.

⁵¹ Mojtaba Vaismoradi and Sherrill Snelgrove, 'Theme in Qualitative Content Analysis and Thematic Analysis' *Forum Qualitative Sozialforschung/Forum: Qualitative Social Research* (DEU 2019); Chad R Lochmiller, 'Conducting Thematic Analysis with Qualitative Data' (2021) 26 *Qualitative Report*; Kristina M Scharp and Matthew L Sanders, 'What Is a Theme? Teaching Thematic Analysis in Qualitative Communication Research Methods' (2019) 33 *Communication Teacher* 117.

⁵² Tag_ID list in Data Presentation follows the pattern: first stage data: (GR)/(TC)_F/M_1..._40 and (GR)/(TC)_R_F/M_1...10 second stage data.

Official History, Narrative, and Memory

Memory is about the realisation of the past in the form of contemporary experience. It is a social construct formed in economic, social, cultural, political, and ideological frameworks.⁵³ In this sense, memory is an invented tradition that is often shaped by people and groups over long periods of time. Memory is linked to the objective perception of ‘history’ but is usually a mythical version of events,⁵⁴ people, and places that serve social or political interests.⁵⁵

As indicated by one participant (referring to the Turkish Cypriots):

‘[...] they did what they did to us back in 1974. You keep this in the back of your head. I will trust them but it’s better to keep one’s eyes skinned’.⁵⁶

The past is not an imaginary investment, projection or experience. Respondents have demonstrated the ability to make a critical assessment of events. They experience the consequences of events, and the self is projected as a result of the multiple effects of collective memory, which is enriched by the current events they witness:

‘What I don’t like about Cyprus is like a war [...] a never-ending conflict. [...] there are always negotiations that don’t get anywhere. [...] if we don’t get the Cyprus passport, we do nothing, apart from Turkey. We’re actually not here’.⁵⁷

‘My dad [...] is sixty years old... He’s history now...What am I doing? I see this is a problem, a major problem that has to be solved...’.⁵⁸

Hamber supports that populations that have experienced violence exhibit a high level of distrust for those seen as ‘the other’ and particularly as ‘aggressors’. He adds that in most conflicts a vague distinction is made between victims and perpetrators depending on the political context, while the experience of victimisation varies greatly across communities.⁵⁹ Hamber’s position is validated in the case of Cyprus. Characteristically, the following arguments were put forward by interviewees.

⁵³ Halbwachs (no 10); Schwartz (no 10).

⁵⁴ Daniels and Cosgrove (no 11); Foote, K. E., & Azaryahu (no 9); Hobsbawm and Ranger (no 11).

⁵⁵ Foote & Azaryahu (no 9); Schwartz (no 10).

⁵⁶ (GC)_F_16

⁵⁷ (TC)_F_22

⁵⁸ (CG)_M_7

⁵⁹ Brandon Hamber ‘Remembering to Forget: Issues to Consider When Establishing Structures for Dealing with the Past’, in *Past imperfect: Dealing with the past in Northern Ireland and societies in transition* (INCORE 1998).

‘They told me that Turkish-Cypriots are very different from Turks. Now, I don’t quite know why they say this. Sure, I hope that among many Turkish-Cypriots there will be good ones. What happened with Isaac and Solomos... if you watch the video of Solomos climbing up the flagpole and getting shot you feel hatred. Your instant reaction is to say, ‘what inhumane people’. And that applies to all of them. They’re all bunched together’.⁶⁰

‘We went to the Museum of Barbarism, in Nicosia [...] I had a memory there, as I recall it was in the bus that we were laughing with a friend of mine and the teacher came and scolded us saying ‘While you laugh people on the Greek side keep saying “The best Turk is a dead Turk”’.⁶¹

Until the opening of the cross-points in 2003, the younger generations of both communities learned about the events through formal history lessons, the media, and their family environment. The dominant forces of society, with their ability to shape social memory, legalised the official narrative. As a result, there are two formal ‘histories’ in Cyprus that refer to the same past but are interpreted in completely different ways. Both narratives focus on perceiving the ‘other’ as the enemy and ‘us’ as the victim. Thus, the ‘other’ is delegitimised through the projection of a particular aspect of history. Although free movement between the two communities without significant restrictions is now possible, the intolerance that has been passed on to the next generations is an obstacle in overcoming fear, prejudice, and hatred. As a result, reconciliation between the two communities remains difficult.

The opening of the cross-points sparked a discourse between members of the two communities, without the restrictions imposed by 29 years of isolation, and fuelled the radicalisation of their collective memories. Even in cases where antagonistic narratives are apparent, the members of the two communities are engaged in a dialogue that brings to light truths concealed by the existing monolithic hegemonic discourse; this fills the vacuum in their historical knowledge and makes evident their misinterpretations of historical facts.

The analysis of primary data revealed that students strongly question and are suspicious of the formal history taught in school. Their ability to study history from other sources played an important role in formulating their views and opinions. Most interview participants stated that they re-evaluated the facts and formed their own opinions during their studies.

⁶⁰ (GC)_F_16

⁶¹ (TC)_R_F_7

‘School has helped me to develop the right opposite influence. Because after you realize that you are being lied and you capture these lies once or twice, then you start to question everything they tell you’.⁶²

History sometimes appears to be a ‘crafted outcome’. Each community in Cyprus highlights only certain parts of historical events, leaving behind elements that undermine the community’s ‘interpretation’ of history. Understanding the history of the other side illuminates aspects of history that have been deliberately kept hidden and facilitates a greater understanding of the ‘other’.⁶³ The demand for this is evident in the following extract.

‘And when it was sorted out chronologically, we figured out that there were gaps. There was a major gap in Greek Cypriot side up until ‘74 they didn’t know what happened before ‘74 war, what caused ‘74 and there were many things for them after ‘74 and for it was the right opposite. We (Turkish Cypriots) had nothing after ‘74, we only had the 1983, and the establishment of TRNC⁶⁴ and before ‘74 we had a list of things to count. It was right the opposite. [...] If you put all of them in the same list, you have a full story line’.⁶⁵

‘[...] at school, we were never taught that Greek Cypriots also committed horrible crimes against Turkish Cypriots’.⁶⁶

Bourdieu⁶⁷ describes the formation of national identities ‘through classification systems inscribed in law, through bureaucratic procedures, educational structures and social rituals’, enabling the State to mould mental structures and to impose common principles of vision and division. The dominant narratives can be discussed as a modulating factor of the symbolic core of the social representation of the past and as organisational principles of the quality of relations of the in-groups as well as the contact between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. This is possible through the

⁶² (TC)_M_32

⁶³ Benjamin J Broome, ‘Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus: Their Contribution to the Peace Process’ (1998) 10 *Cyprus Review* 47; Chara Makriyianni, Charis Psaltis and Dilek Latif, ‘History Teaching in Cyprus’ (2011) 1 *Facing mapping, bridging diversity: Foundations of a European discourse on history education*, Part; Peristianis (n 32); Yiannis Papadakis, ‘Narrative, Memory and History Education in Divided Cyprus A Comparison of Schoolbooks on the ‘History of Cyprus’ (2008) 20 *History and Memory* 128.

⁶⁴ The self-declared ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’

⁶⁵ (TC)_M_32

⁶⁶ (GC)_M_6

⁶⁷ Pierre Bourdieu, Loïc J. D. Wacquant and Samar Farage, ‘Rethinking the State: Genesis and Structure of the Bureaucratic Field’ (1994) 12 *Sociological theory* 1, 7–8.

constant and intense repetition of the need to preserve and maintain national identity. Calhoun points to the example of the ethnic conflict in the former Yugoslavia, where the invocation of national solidarity and the identity of Serbs as members of an elite force led to an ideological mobilisation that required the heirs of the chosen ethnic group to be willing to kill and die for their nation.⁶⁸

‘About hanging out with Turkish-Cypriots, the fact that the Turks came and caught us creates enmity and hatred, and... I don’t know... and this... if I could be a friend with a Turkish-Cypriot. Whether he is good or not, as I said before, with those people (the Turkish Cypriots) I don’t know’.⁶⁹

The above excerpt shows that the construction of the ‘other’ is based on the evaluation of its actions.⁷⁰ Furthermore, the decision-making process in terms of how decisions are made about the present is clearly demonstrated through collective memory. The following extract further emphasises this argument:

‘I believe that because people don’t change easily. [...] I feel threat because if we become one community many things will change’.⁷¹

The use of Collective Memory by the two Leaderships

Azaryahu and Kellerman⁷² argue that history and memory, as a means of coming to terms with the past, are prominent figures in the politics of identity. Collective memory is socially configured and culturally formatted as a statement of group solidarity and distinction. According to them, collective memory is among the symbolic foundations of group identity because it tackles the fundamental question ‘who we are’ in terms of answering the question ‘where do we come from’. Only those references which highlight a positive self-image that gives the right to future claims are retained.

⁶⁸ Craig Calhoun, ‘Nationalism and Ethnicity’ (1993) 19 *Annual Review of Sociology* 211.

⁶⁹ (GC)_M_3

⁷⁰ Samuel Oluwadurotimi Akoni, ‘Education, Identity, and Conflict: A Comparative Study of Northern Ireland and Cyprus’ (Master’s thesis, Eastern Mediterranean University (EMU)-Doğu Akdeniz Üniversitesi (DAÜ) (2016); Kaitlin Peach, ‘Conflict in the Mediterranean: An Analysis of the Turkish-Greek Cypriot Conflict’ [2015] University of Oklahoma; Michalinos Zembylas, ‘Inventing Spaces for Critical Emotional Praxis’, *Peace Education in Conflict and Post-Conflict Societies* (Springer 2009); Broome (no 57); Maria Hadjipavlou, ‘The Third Alternative Space: Bi-Communal Work in Divided Cyprus’ (2012) 18 *Palestine-Israel Journal of Politics, Economics, and Culture* 102.

⁷¹ (GC)_M_3

⁷² Maoz Azaryahu and Aharon Kellerman B., ‘Symbolic Places of National History and Revival: A Study in Zionist Mythical Geography’ (1999) 24 *Transactions of the Institute of British Geographers* 109.

Neither political authority in Cyprus sought to suppress personal memories, although both sides clearly wanted to impose a particular way of remembering the past.⁷³ Thelen writes that ‘the struggle for possession and interpretation of memory is rooted in the conflict and interplay among social, political, and cultural interests and values in the present’.⁷⁴ In Cyprus, both leaderships seek to use the past in public representations in a way that stimulates collective memory to fulfil their political agendas, policies and aspirations.

Greek Cypriots

Papadakis⁷⁵ points out that for Greek Cypriots the events of 1974 were not but an injustice not yet resolved, rendering them an ‘open’ history. In the case of the Greek Cypriot community, more symbolic value was attached to the issue of the missing persons than to those who lost their lives. Their names have been officially registered since 1975 and reference is made to them at every opportunity.⁷⁶ A series of generations grew up with the memory of the missing persons that was enforced by the undue prominence of their family members.

The following excerpts add significantly to this dimension:

‘As long as there are these mothers of the missing, the enclaved, the refugees, this thing works rather against us because it does not allow us to have a comprehensive opinion and make this thing (the solution of the Cyprus Problem) possible’.

(GC)_1

Sontag reports that the understanding of war among people who did not experience it is the impact of images and footage of the conflict. The image of the mothers of the missing persons, in Sontag’s words, form ‘memory freeze frames’ that act ‘like a quotation, a maxim or a proverb’.⁷⁷ These images are stored in memory, to be instantly retrieved whenever a stimulus is presented.

⁷³ Paul Sant Cassia, *Bodies of Evidence: Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus* (Berghahn Books, 2005) 71.

⁷⁴ David Thelen, ‘Memory and American History’ (1989) 75 *Organization of American Historians* 1117, 1127.

⁷⁵ Yiannis Papadakis, ‘The National Struggle Museums of a Divided City’ (no 7).

⁷⁶ Natasa Iakovou and Nadia Kornioti, ‘Missing Persons in Cyprus: Observations from the past and recommendations for the future’ (PRIO Cyprus Centre Report, 7., 2019) 14-15.

⁷⁷ Susan Sontag, ‘Memory as a Freeze-Frame: Extracts from “Looking at War”’ (2004) 51 *Diogenes* 113, 113.

‘You realized that something bad happened without knowing more horrible details, and that it caused too much pain because you could see on TV the mothers of the missing, they were crying, they were mourning...’⁷⁸

A striking example of the repetition of traumatic events is the biology activity book issued in 2016 for the 10th grade by the Ministry of Education of RoC.⁷⁹ The ‘Cyprus Tragedy’, as the book calls the conflict, is conveyed through the teaching process. Each page of the book is titled ‘Searching for our Missing Ones’. Endowed with feelings of victimisation, the book explores cell division, genetic material, and genetic inheritance through the narrative of the family of ‘Andreas’, a missing person from the 1974 war. The story of the family and the verification of Andreas’ fate unravels through the pages of the book; the phrase ‘missing persons’ is repeated more than 147 times. As such, learning becomes an experience linked to the hegemonic narrative of victimhood and the injustice of ongoing conflict.

The missing persons are treated as victims of the invasion for whom the Greek-Cypriot side can mourn.⁸⁰ As a result, society remains trapped in a state of denial and mourning, unable to move forward. Remembering the missing ones creates a past that is particularly useful in the present.⁸¹

Did you know that none of them (the missing persons) are still alive? They (*the Turkish army*) executed them. Even now missing persons are found with a bullet in the back of their heads. Even if you do not want it, a feeling of hatred comes up. But the bottom line is that you have to deal with that hate, and I do not think you can talk about everyone the same way. The 27-year-old Turkish Cypriot and also the 27-year-old settler who may have been forced to come here by his parents may have done so to have a better life. But they (the 27-year-old) did not kill me and neither did their friends. I do not hate them. But their army, the grey wolves, I cannot help but hate them.⁸²

⁷⁸ (GC)_M_7

⁷⁹ Demetrios Mappouras and others, *Biology for the 1st grade of the Lyceum (Activities Workbook)* (Demetrios Mappouras ed, Ministry of Education and Culture, Cyprus Pedagogical Institute, Curriculum Development Unit 2016).

⁸⁰ Iosif Kovras and Neophytos Loizides, ‘Delaying Truth Recovery for Missing Persons’ (2011) *17 Nations and Nationalism* 520.

⁸¹ Oliver P. Richmond, ‘Ethno-nationalism, Sovereignty and Negotiating Positions in the Cyprus Conflict: Obstacles to a Settlement’ [1999] *Middle Eastern Studies*.

⁸² (GC)_M_7

After the Turkish invasion, the Greek-Cypriot side launched a large-scale public-ity project about the feelings of material, mental, and personal loss. This led to the formation of ‘symbolic groups’ that had a dual function:

- (a) As political signifiers, on which the loss and restoration of law become the object of political manipulation and are transformed into a hegemonic narrative.
- (b) As subjective signifiers, to emphasise the need to restore the injustice.

The historical narrative in the Greek-Cypriot community steers clear of any mention of the displacement of Turkish Cypriots; the topic of displacement is strictly limited in scope to the case of Greek-Cypriot refugees, advancing, thus, a one-sided, ethnocentric narrative that fails to capture both communities’ experiences equally.⁸³

The State uses subjective and collective feelings to enforce the narrative about the past, the present and the future, redefining in this way both the past and memories.⁸⁴ For Sontag, collective memory is not about remembering, but about ‘a stipulating that this is important, and this is the story about how it happened with the pictures that lock the story in our minds’.⁸⁵ She introduces to the discussion of collective memory the role of ideology in defining archives of images representative of collective ideas to evoke predictable thoughts and emotions.

[...] we’ve met from youth encounters for peace, and she said that ‘you know what, I mean you were monsters’ [...] It’s strange but who can tell that she is wrong? I mean she is learning that way, it’s not her fault’.⁸⁶

‘In the old days we lived with the Turkish-Cypriots, and then EOKA and TMT started, and animosities were created. If the Turkish-Cypriots come here again some people, some organizations, will stir up new trouble and we’ll live with fear. I’m certain of it. And there might be an invasion again. It isn’t impossible’.⁸⁷

A central aim of the Greek-Cypriot leadership as regards education is the preservation of the memory of the events of ’74. The message ‘I don’t forget’ (‘Δεν Ξεχνώ/ *Den Xehno*’) has been featured prominently in education, particularly in school textbooks, in the early years after 1974. Subsequently, the message was modified to ‘I

⁸³ Bryant, ‘Displacement in Cyprus Consequences of Civil and Military Strife - Report 2 - Life Stories: Turkish-Cypriot Community’, PRIO, 2012’ (no 35); Psaltis (no 5).

⁸⁴ Cassia (no 63).

⁸⁵ Susan Sontag, *Regarding the Pain of Others* (Penguin Books, 2003) 76–77.

⁸⁶ (TC)_F_32

⁸⁷ (GC)_M_18

don't forget and I struggle' (Δεν Ξεχνώ και Αγωνίζομαι/*Den xehno kai Agonizomai*).⁸⁸ Albeit with reduced intensity,⁸⁹ the message is still advanced by the Ministry of Education reading, in its current formulation, 'I acknowledge, I don't forget, I demand' (Γνωρίζω, Δεν Ξεχνώ, Διεκδικώ/*Gnorizo, Den xehno, Diekdiko*). Looking at how the message has taken shape throughout the years is indicative of the different audiences it has come to target: the generation who experiences the war sustains the memory of the occupied territories; the generation after does not forget but struggles for justice; and the new generation, with no lived experience of the occupied lands, remains devoted to sustaining the memories of the past and demanding justice no matter how long it might take.

The effect of the slogan is evident in the excerpts listed below:

'From school, I always remember those notebooks, in elementary school, that said 'I don't forget'.⁹⁰

'We painted our flag on October 1 and there was always the 'I don't forget and I struggle', we had corresponding songs and from the first grade I think there was also a lesson where they dedicated one hour a week [...] specifically to get to know the occupied villages, to talk to us'.⁹¹

Similarly, in the circular of the Ministry of Education and Culture of the RoC on the objectives of the school year 2014-2015 for public primary, secondary, technical and vocational schools:

'Visits or bus tour along the green line to increase the awareness (of the students) of the successive effects of the military and territorial occupation by

⁸⁸ Michalinos Zembylas, 'Unmasking the Entanglements of Violence, Difficult Knowledge, and Schooling' (2014) 109 *Religious Education* 258; Christalla Yakinthou, 'The Quiet Deflation of Den Xehno? Changes in the Greek Cypriot Communal Narrative on the Missing Persons in Cyprus' (2008) 20 *Cyprus Review* 15; Rebecca Bryant, 'Partitions of Memory: Wounds and Witnessing in Cyprus' (2012) 54 *Comparative Studies in Society and History* 332; Hakan Karahassan and Michalinos Zembylas, 'The Politics of Memory and Forgetting in History Textbooks: Towards a Pedagogy of Reconciliation and Peace in Divided Cyprus' [2006] *Citizenship Education: Europe and the World* (London: CiCe) 701; Miranda Christou, 'The Language of Patriotism: Sacred History and Dangerous Memories' (2007) 28 *British Journal of Sociology of Education* 709; Ministry of Education and Culture, 'Annual Report 2013 (Ετήσια Έκθεση) Ministry of Education and Culture' (Ministry of Education and Culture 2014).

⁸⁹ 'Annual Report 2021. Cyprus Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport and Youth.' (Ministry of Education, Culture, Sport and Youth 2021).

⁹⁰ (GC)_M_4

⁹¹ (GC)_F_14

Turkey and to directly familiarise them with our occupied lands even from a distance.

Churches-chapels that were built for religious gatherings and reinforcement of the memory of the displaced residents [...] St. Alexander's chapel for the missing persons'.⁹²

The above excerpts illustrate the State's effort to instil a hazy sense of conflict from early childhood. The State maintains the idea of conflict, but at the same time does not take a clear position on events. However, the sense of conflict is prevalent for young Cypriots in all aspects of their lives. When asked whether the portrayal of the 1974 events in the course or school lessons was neutral or reflected a particular viewpoint, a participant commented that:

'They didn't express a certain view, they always told us that we shouldn't forget, that we should keep on fighting, that there (in the occupied part) are our homes. There were more of positive messages but with a dose of sadness and bitterness than a political debate [...] That we are the victims and that it is somebody else's fault. Always this...'⁹³

Turkish Cypriots

For the Turkish Cypriot side, Kanlı Noel (Bloody Christmas) is a commemorated historic event. It refers to the intercommunal conflicts that sparked off on 21 December 1963, during which many Turkish Cypriots were killed or went missing. The incident is made up of a series of events, known as the 'Remembrance Week of Martyrs of the Struggle' whose main purpose is to commemorate those who lost their lives during the period of 1963-1974.⁹⁴ As a response to the Greek Cypriot 'I Do not For-

⁹² Ministry of Education and Culture, 'Curriculum Objectives for 2014-2015' (2014).

⁹³ (GC)_F_14

⁹⁴ Presidency of the 'TRNC', 'President Ersin Tatar Attends Remembrance Ceremonies with Bereaved Families of Turkish Cypriots Who Were Massacred in the Villages of Muratağa, Sandallar and Athılar' (14 August 2022), available at <<https://kktcb.org/en/president-ersin-tatar-attends-remembrance-ceremonies-with-bereaved-families-of-10111>> (last accessed 28 September 2022); Ministry of Foreign Affairs ('TRNC'), '21st December National Struggle and Martyrs Week Begins Today; Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (21 December 2015), available at <<https://mfa.gov.ct.tr/21st-december-national-struggle-and-martyrs-week-begins-today/>> (last accessed 28 September 2022).

get' (Den Xehno),⁹⁵ the Turkish Cypriots came up with the slogan 'We will not Forget' (Unutmayacagız).⁹⁶

'Did you visit the museum of barbarism?'⁹⁷ It's in Nicosia. It's the house where the family was killed. (Shows photos of the museum of barbarism). It really effects. [...] You go there, you see like what they (The Greek Cypriots) caused you... People were dead here...'.⁹⁸

In the book 'History of Cyprus', by Vehbi Zeki Serter, which was taught in Turkish-Cypriot middle schools until 2003, the victimisation of Turkish Cypriots was pronounced. Referring to the book Hatay and Papadakis,⁹⁹ write that four out of the 14 photographs in the book regarding the period 1960-1974, depicted dead Turkish Cypriots, while six of them showed the 'glorified' Turkish army and air force. The book also included vivid descriptions of deaths of Turkish Cypriots. Referring to the history book participants characteristically noted:

'No, back then, the government we had was right wing government and they were using a book of a far-right author. And I remember phrases and adjectives that were used in that book for referring to Greek Cypriots they were very extreme they were like 'barbarian Greeks' for example killing Turks, innocent Turks for example and we were all suffering and suffering and suffering and

⁹⁵ Zembylas, 'Unmasking the Entanglements of Violence, Difficult Knowledge, and Schooling' (no 74); Yakinthou (no 74); Bryant, 'Partitions of Memory: Wounds and Witnessing in Cyprus' (no 74); M Christou, 'A Double Imagination: Memory and Education in Cyprus' [2006] *Journal of Modern Greek Studies*.

⁹⁶ Hakan Karahasan, 'Different Narratives, Different Stories: The Language of Narrative and Interpretation' (2005) 11 *Journal of Cyprus Studies* 115; Papadakis, 'Nation, Narrative and Commemoration: Political Ritual in Divided Cyprus' (no 7); Michalinos Zembylas, 'Personal Narratives of Loss and the Exhumation of Missing Persons in the Aftermath of War: In Search of Public and School Pedagogies of Mourning' (2011) 24 *International Journal of Qualitative Studies in Education* 767.

⁹⁷ In an upsurge of ethnic violence, which began on 21 December, 1963 Tamkoç (no 17)., two women and three children were murdered in the bathroom of their house in Nicosia where they were hiding from attacking Greek Cypriot militants Bilge Ömer, 'Rum Yalanına Yanıt İçin Geldim - Gündem Haberleri' (2007), available at <<http://www.hurriyet.com.tr/rum-yalanina-yanit-icin-geldim-6159622>> (last accessed 2 May 2016). The house was converted into a museum, in which pictures and stories, published in international newspapers about Greek Cypriot atrocities committed during and after 1963, are still exhibited 'a witness of the Greeks savage bloodshed... [...] a glaring example of Greek Barbarism' (abstract from a leaflet from the Museum of Barbarism, 'TRNC' Department of Antiquities and Museum'.

⁹⁸ (TC)_F_22

⁹⁹ Mete Hatay and Yiannis Papadakis, 'A Critical Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Official Historiographies (1940s To the Present).' in Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis (eds), *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory: History, Community and Conflict* (IB Tauris, 2012) 42.

they are barbarians they cannot be friends, this what they did showed their true animalistic face and very terrible adjectives were used in that book and they were pictures of the people with half their organs outside their body'.¹⁰⁰

'In school, they, I don't know why they did that, but it was, it was more brutal, you know. [...] they say, still, what they say for '74 is a happy peace operation. That was the title. But for me, the pictures are more, more like... sadder, you know...'.¹⁰¹

The following extract, according to which the official story is constructed and transmitted by invoking emotion, is a major example of the Turkish-Cypriot official narrative:

'Maratha, Sandallaris and Aloa.¹⁰² And there is a man there, still there whoever goes to visit, he is still there crying out telling how Greek Cypriots are barbarians and how they massacred three villages of people and there are pictures showing... It's very intense'.¹⁰³

In 2003, after the sliding victory of the left-leaning Republican Turkish Party (CTP), led by Mehmet Ali Talat, the history books were replaced with new ones, from which the nationalist/divisive comments were removed, even when it came to comments on the motherlands. However, with the change of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership following the 2009 elections, in which the National Unity Party (UBP) of Dervis Eroglu came to power, new history books were published, which served the principles of nationalism and had many similarities with earlier books.¹⁰⁴

In the middle-school book 'History of Cyprus, year 10',¹⁰⁵ the victimisation of Turkish Cypriots is again highlighted. 32 photos in the book, covering the period 1960-1974, show Turkish Cypriots suffering in concentration and refugee camps, while 14 photographs depict the glory of the Turkish army and air force. The book

¹⁰⁰ (TC)_M_35

¹⁰¹ (TC)_M_36

¹⁰² Mass executions of Turkish Cypriots by Greek Cypriot extremists took place in 1974, in the villages of Maratha, Aloa, Sandallaris and Tochni Cassia (no 63); Angelique Chrisafis, 'Bones Don't Speak' (*The Guardian*, 15 April 2008), available at <<https://www.theguardian.com/world/2008/apr/15/cyprus>> (last accessed 3 November 2022); Rauf R. Denktash, *The Cyprus Triangle.*, (London: K. Rustem and George Allen and Unwin, 1982).

¹⁰³ (TC)_M_35

¹⁰⁴ Hatay and Papadakis (no 81).

¹⁰⁵ KKTC Milli Eğitim, *Kıbrıs Türk Tarihi (10 Sınıf)*. KKTC Milli Eğitim E Kültür. (Ankara, Korza Basım, 2009)

also includes testimonies by military personnel who fought during the 1974 war and vivid descriptions of deaths and violence perpetrated by Greek Cypriots against Turkish Cypriots in 1963-1974.

The issue of the constant change of history books and the contestation and questioning of their content is evident in the following excerpts:

‘In the North, every time the government changes, so does the textbook’.¹⁰⁶

‘I remember, even though I do not want to... They (the books) were very subjective, very violent, I am talking about the content of the lessons, the history lessons and it was very nationalistic, it was overly nationalistic, and it was not history, it was dogma that was taught’.¹⁰⁷

‘There was a lack of information. It was only talked about that we suffered, but we were not told, for example, that Greek Cypriots lived in refugee camps for 3-4 months until December, until winter, when people in the areas had to leave their homes. Our people also lived in refugee camps, that’s fine, but we did not know that Greek Cypriots also lived in refugee camps. That was not in the book. So, there was something missing. Missing information’.¹⁰⁸

The above discussion shows that victimisation is political by its very nature.¹⁰⁹ In societies coming out of violence (such as the Cypriot society) taking control of the memory apparatus and history will enable societies to engage and develop collective memories of the conflict. Collective memory of the Cyprus problem thus becomes a political tool reconstructed and re-appropriated to serve the national and political agendas of both communities.

A Proposal for an Alternative Definition: Meta-Memory

Both communities reproduce and perpetuate these events. Therefore, the conflict has remained at the diplomatic level for almost five decades, with some sporadic outbreaks of heightened tension and fear of military escalation. At the institutional level, there is a ceasefire agreement, maintaining technically a state of war in the island. The current situation is institutionally, socially, and politically an unfinished

¹⁰⁶ (TC)_F_22

¹⁰⁷ (TC)_M_20

¹⁰⁸ (TC)_M_34

¹⁰⁹ James H Liu and Denis J Hilton, ‘How the Past Weighs on the Present: Social Representations of History and Their Role in Identity Politics’ (2005) 44 *British Journal of Social Psychology* 537; Jeffrey K Olick, ‘The Politics of Regret. Analytical Frames’, *The Politics of Regret: On Collective Memory and Historical Responsibility* (Taylor & Francis Group, LLC 2007); Hamber and Newbolt (no 56).

business. The memory of the past is instrumentalised to be used as a means of cohesion among the members of the two communities. The selective remembering of the past is used by both communities in an offensive way. The intractable conflict and the short temporal distance from the division resulted in the co-existence of the *milieu de memoire* (real environments of memory) with the *lieux de memoir* (sites of memory), according to Nora's concept.¹¹⁰ Sites of memory - such as the buffer zone and the deserted homes of refugees, or the 'TRNC' illuminated flag laid over Pentadaktylos hillside, visible from any point in the divided capital of Cyprus- act as a traumatic reminder of the consequences of the ongoing bi-communal conflict.

Hirsch¹¹¹ refers to post-memory as the experience that the 'generation after' has with the memories of those who experienced cultural or collective trauma, namely those who came before them. These experiences are transmitted to the new generation with such intensity, through the stories, images, and behaviours they grow up with, that they seem to form their own memories. As they grow up with these inherited memories dominated by narratives from before they were born, their own delayed stories are displaced by the stories of the previous generation, marked by traumatic events they can neither understand nor relate to. The void created in one's own memory is filled by the progressive memory reproduced through the collective narrative. Thus, the self is projected according to the multiple influences the person receives through oral and written narratives.

Following the above rationale and based on empirical findings, we propose the term 'meta-memory', to describe the case of young Cypriots who have not experienced the events that led to the division of Cyprus, arguing that the 'Cyprus Problem' consists of an open-ended process that carries elements of the past as 'memories' while at the same time being enriched by current developments that are also subsequently converted into memories. As mentioned above, the new generations acquire the memories of those with first-hand experience of the conflict through the official history and personal narratives. This is however only half the picture when it comes to Cyprus; due to the ongoing conflict, the 'generation after' form their own memories of events and incidents that occur during their lifetime. Such subsequent experiences pile on top of the inherited memories, perpetuating the conflict and its open-ended nature.

¹¹⁰ Pierre Nora, 'Between Memory and History: Les Lieux de Mémoire' [1989] *Representations*, 26.

¹¹¹ Marianne Hirsch, 'The Generation of Postmemory' (2008) 29 *Poetics Today* 103; Marianne Hirsch, *The Generation of Postmemory: Writing and Visual Culture after the Holocaust* (Columbia University Press, 2012).

Meta-memory differs from post-memory in intrinsic ways; ‘meta’ indicates the memories still produced by a non-resolved / ongoing conflict, while ‘post’ deals with the aftermath of a conflict that has since ended and the mediation of the traumatic memories of the generation with lived experience. ‘Post-memory’ refers to transmitted memory. ‘Meta-memory’ refers to transmitted experiences plus the experiences that occurred at a later point or in succession of the initial conflict; it is not only, in the words of Hirsch, an imaginative investment of the past, but rather a direct collection and accumulation of experiences from an ongoing conflict that affects current generations’ lives in the present.

Reversing Eva Hoffman’s position, the members of the age group considered in this study are characterised by a sequence of defining common events rather than a single event (as in the case of the Holocaust post generation addressed by Hoffman)¹¹². In the case of Cyprus, there is no single defining event in the past that constitutes ‘the prehistory’ of the post-war generation, but rather a sequence of ‘major events or public milestones’ that they experience and shape their own history and visions of the future. The post-1974 generation does not only have ‘symbolic reference points’ on an imagined community (borrowing from Anderson’s¹¹³ idea of the nation) but also apt reference points they can ‘touch on as on common scrolls’.¹¹⁴ The empirical findings of this study clearly demonstrate that the post-1974 generation has ‘affective ties’,¹¹⁵ that is, ties that bind together families, groups and generations, to the pre-1974 generations on both sides. Moreover, the meta-memories of the younger generations are fuelled by the intractable open-ended conflict that still prevails on the island. The presence of Turkish soldiers in the ‘TRNC’ is a constant reminder of the partition and the ‘green line’ that accentuate the territorial division of the island.¹¹⁶

¹¹² Eva Hoffman, *After Such Knowledge. Memory, History, and the Legacy of the Holocaust* (PublicAffairs, 2004).

¹¹³ Benedict Anderson, *Imagined Communities: Reflections on the Origin and Spread of Nationalism* (Verso Books, 1991).

¹¹⁴ Hoffman (no 88) 28.

¹¹⁵ Jan Assman, ‘Communicative and Cultural Memory’ in Astrid Erll and Ansgar Nünning (eds), *Media and Cultural Memory* (Walter de Gruyter: Berlin, New York, 2008) 111.

¹¹⁶ Katherine Georges, ‘The Cyprus Problem: A Way Forward; St Andrews Foreign Affairs Review’ (*Foreign Affairs Review*, 2015), available at <<http://foreignaffairsreview.co.uk/2015/02/the-cyprus-problem-a-way-forward/>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); The Economist (no 42); Eric Maurice, ‘Turkey Holds Key at Last-Ditch Cyprus Talks’ (*Euobserver*, 2017), available at <<https://euobserver.com/political/136470>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); Michele Kambas and Tom Miles, ‘Turkish-, Greek Cypriots Exchange Maps in Symbolic Breakthrough | Reuters’ (*Reuters*, 2017), available at <<http://www.reuters.com/article/us-cyprus-conflict-idUSKBN14V1AL?il=0>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); İpek Yezdani, ‘No

Over time, the relationship between the two communities and their motherlands has changed, affecting relations between Greece and Turkey: periods of tension and competition alternate with periods of tranquilly, a reality which maintains instability in the Cyprus Issue. What applies to the case of Cyprus is an open-ended meta-memory process that includes contradictory meta narratives,¹¹⁷ affecting the members of both communities deeply. Sant Cassia explains that the obsession with the missing-persons issue follows from the fact that the Turkish invasion is a time of shame that created an unacceptable state of affairs; the frustration of the defeat suffered by Greek Cypriots and the inability of their motherland to defend them led to the humiliation of their army and the rape of their women. The Greek-Cypriot side has used the issue as ‘a vehicle for collective ethnic imagining, both in the past and the future, ‘meta-narratives’ between history and individual experiences.¹¹⁸

Therefore, in the context of Cyprus, one can speak of a meta-memory, because the situation remains an open process that carries elements of the past as ‘memories’ and at the same time is enriched by current developments in the Cyprus Problem that are also transformed into memories through the lived experience of the people. Past and present are transformed into a single ontology, which is enriched by a parallel process, but which also remains an open-ended process. In the context of Cyprus, younger generations may not have experienced the conflict under the prism of armed conflict, but they continue to experience and respond to intense elements and features of that conflict that are actively present such as barricades, occupation forces, the peacekeeping force of the UN, the ceasefire line, or outbreaks of ethnic violence.¹¹⁹

The conflict between the two communities in Cyprus has dominated the public agenda for more than a century. There are two alternative public spheres with the same point of departure (ethno-religious identity), but which are in direct opposition

Sympathy for Turkish Army in Cyprus: Report - POLITICS’ (*Hürriyet Daily News*, 2012), available at <<http://www.hurriyetdailynews.com/no-sympathy-for-turkish-army-in-cyprus-report.aspx?page-ID=238&nID=24685&NewsCatID=338>> (last accessed 1 May 2017); Arthur Beesley, ‘Turkish Turmoil after Failed Coup Raises Fears for Cyprus Talks’ (*Financial Times*, 2016), available at <<https://www.ft.com/content/86ec770a-5974-11e6-8d05-4eaa66292c32>> (last accessed 1 May 2017).

¹¹⁷ Yehudith Auerbach, ‘National Narratives in a Conflict of Identity’ [2010] *Barriers to peace in the Israeli-Palestinian conflict* 99; Yehudith Auerbach, ‘The Reconciliation Pyramid—A Narrative-based Framework for Analyzing Identity Conflicts’ (2009) 30 *Political Psychology* 291.

¹¹⁸ Cassia (no 63).

¹¹⁹ Susan A. Crane, ‘Memory, Distortion, and History in the Museum’ (1997) 36 *History and Theory* 44.

to each other and compete for supremacy. The conflict in Cyprus is therefore diachronic in nature and is perpetuated by successive layers of events that evoke trauma, experiences, feelings, and reactions that arouse people's fears and fuel resentment, perpetuating the conflict and division. The memory of the conflict is deeply ingrained for each generation. However, the intractable conflict transforms the cumulative memory into a meta-memory.

The proposed concept is a theoretical contribution in itself since it fills a gap in situations where intractable conflict -which carries elements of the past as 'memories'- is enriched by current developments. The contextualisation of intractable conflict in temporal 'meta' terms provides a unique avenue for investigating past and present as a single interrelated ontology which is also parallel in nature. This approach, in addition to its theoretical properties, provides methodological insights since it allows the researcher to capture the parallel dynamics of conflict situations. The applicability of the concept can therefore be extended beyond the Cyprus Conflict.

Conclusion

Meta-memory is a form of memory that has a visible and continuous connection to its source. There is no break in the lifeline, but a series of events in Cyprus. The year 1974 is an incisive event for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots but with different official narratives enforcing their interpretation and justifying the 'us' while demonising the 'other'. The past haunts the present and becomes a weapon in the political struggle between the two communities, used to justify their respective causes. Instability in the relations of the two communities persists and provides a pervasive sense of conflict. Past and post generations share a common core of experiences (refugee camps, buffer zones, clashes between members of the two communities) as well as commemorations that manifest and legitimise the position of each side.

Education is a key factor in the creation and preservation of collective memory, with the power to either defuse or exacerbate conflict. A unique emphasis is placed on the role of education in the post-confrontational era. The curricula of both sides have not been developed with the aim of building peace. On the contrary, they have contributed in a rather instrumental way to perpetuating bigotry, prejudice, fears, and stereotypes between the two sides. In the case of Cyprus, education supports the conflict through the divisive dialectics it employs, the main purpose of which is to achieve the goals of the two sides. The divisive methods of official representation aim to (a) construct the 'other' in the actions of the 'other', which highlights the importance of collective memory for present and future actions, (b) construct history

by evoking emotions, and (c) construct the ‘other’ as an ‘other’ who is blamed for the current situation. In this way, an ideological conflict is maintained in which each side tries to counterpose its own alibi to that of the ‘other’. The failure to establish an official history that exposes the injustices and acknowledges the suffering of both communities is a *sine qua non* for reconciliation.

The analysis of the interviews has shown that the official narrative is intensely questioned, contested, and suspected, while at the same time there is a desire to understand the narrative of the other side. This can be interpreted as an attempt to understand the mindset of the ‘other’. As can be seen from the analysis, the official narrative of history offers vague clues to the conflict, starting with the lower tiers of education. Young people in both communities are confronted from an early age with an unclear and confusing narrative, but which is one that they seem to recognise, challenge, and question.

It is also suggested that the dominant narrative could be altered to mitigate differences and unite people to achieve peace. In order for the way that the two communities perceive reality to change, the communities must have a clear understanding of the content of each proposed solution. The creation of a new shared narrative cannot be based only on what is taught in school or in the media, but on a solid reality based on a solution that respects human rights, equality, and respect for diversity. Understanding the way in which the collective identities of the two communities have been formed under the influence of nationalism handed down from the motherlands will contribute significantly to the resolution of the conflict.

The long unresolved conflict, the built-up mistrust, and the problematic transmission of collective memory on a diachronic basis prevented the two communities from benefiting from the opportunities that would have arisen had the island been allowed to develop its full potential. As long as the members of the two communities do not enter the phase of dialogue and reconciliation, overcome antagonism, and put an end to blaming the other, the vicious circle of the Cyprus Conflict will persevere.

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The Cyprus Peace and Negotiation Processes: Lessons from the Colombian Peace Process and Women's Involvement

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Abstract

The Cyprus and Colombian conflicts have had a significant impact on women, as well as children, who are mostly under women's influence for the greatest part of their infancy; and early childhood. However, the level of women's participation in formal peace negotiations is different in either country. This study answers the questions of how women have participated in the high-level negotiation process in the Cyprus conflict when compared to their Colombian counterparts and why the Colombian women's efforts have been more successful than the efforts of the Cypriot women. This paper adopts a comparative method to evaluate and analyse Colombian and Cypriot women's participation in the peace process. Secondary data sources and reputable websites are utilised. This paper argues that even though there are differences in the cultures and contexts of the two peace processes, the peace and negotiation processes in Cyprus have some lessons to learn from the Colombia peace negotiation model.

Keywords: negotiation, peace process, women, Cyprus and Colombia

Introduction

The Cyprus conflict and peace negotiations appear to have reached an impasse due to the inflexible positions of the current leaders, Nikos Christodoulides (a Greek Cypriot) and Ersin Tatar (a Turkish Cypriot), as evidenced by the recently held five plus one (5+1) informal meeting organised by Antonio Guterres, the United Nations Secretary-General. The gathering sought a common foundation for future Cyprus peace'

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negotiations. The alternatives for the island's status include reunification (united Cyprus) or a two-State solution model (i.e., separate sovereignty and international identity). The conflict's two sides continue to hold divergent views on what a future settlement of the Cyprus Problem might entail. More specifically, the Greek Cypriot officials favour federal solutions, while the Turkish Cypriot leaders, together with Turkey, favour a two-sovereign-States settlement model for the future accord on the Cyprus Dispute.

This research paper is organised to offer the reader a concise overview of the methodological viewpoint it employs. This will allow the reader to comprehend the importance of women's engagement in high-level discussions in Colombia in comparison to the participation and involvement of the women of Cyprus. It adds to existing literature by employing comparative methods, which is rarely utilised in the study of the Cyprus conflict. The Colombia peace process and women's involvement are discussed, and, in particular, the accountability system is analysed, namely the Colombia Special Jurisdiction for Peace is analysed. Accordingly, The Cyprus peace process and women's involvement are discussed alongside women's involvement in the Colombian peace process and lessons for Cypriot women, as well as, the variations in the backgrounds and conflict settings in Colombia and Cyprus, and the roles of women in the peace processes. Consequently, this study presents a thorough examination of how women participation played a significant role in the Colombian war, as well as a brief overview of that conflict background. In conclusion, despite cultural and contextual disparities between the two peace processes, this research paper highlights the significance of Cypriot women learning pertinent lessons from their Colombian counterparts.

Accordingly, this study found out that the engagement of women as stakeholder groups was not the outcome of planned governmental policy decisions but rather the consequence of the advocacy of autonomous women's groups in Colombia. Despite these, the experiences of Colombian women appear to be richer, and they enjoy the more vigorous engagement contrary to their counterparts in Cyprus. In this regard, the women of Cyprus and the power elite of Cyprus have much to learn from their Colombian counterparts. Therefore, we argue that women in Cyprus should participate in the negotiation and peace process at the highest level, not only because they are peaceful and will likely promote a peaceful negotiated settlement, but because they are stakeholders.

Extant Studies

Existing methods for the subject are reviewed to add to the theoretical and methodological approaches to the peace and negotiation processes in Cyprus. Different researchers apply a variety of methodologies; based on the prevalent debates, interview techniques were often employed; for instance, an interview piece was performed that highlighted the significance of women's participation in negotiation processes at both the grassroots level of civil society and the official negotiating table.⁷ Various theories have also been utilised to analyse the Cyprus crisis and talks. Demetriou and Hadjipavlou have taken a feminist approach to the Cyprus conflict and peace discussions, focusing on how governmental authority may be shared. They then discussed and reviewed certain ideas (proposed by Gender Advisory Team (GAT)) for peace discussions offered to the negotiators and recognised by the United Nations.⁸ These ideas comprises of key issues; ensuring women's participation in important positions throughout negotiation processes, promoting gender equality and opportunity starting from grassroots to government, inclusion of languages in the constitution that indicates attention to gender concerns, to investigate and bring legal action against gender-related offenses since the start of the conflict among other proposal.

Cynthia Cockburn, a feminist researcher, has highlighted the limited participation of women in decision-making in Cyprus.⁹ Other scholars too, Hadjipavlou in particular, , emphasised the development of Cypriot women's organisations and gaining money for the women's groups.¹⁰

A research study that attempted to employ comparative methods on negotiation employed the 'ripeness theory.' This is evident in the works it analysed.¹¹ Critical techniques at many levels of analysis were also employed to investigate the Cyprus peace discussions and negotiations.¹² Those who apply the group-level method to analyse the peace process are closely related to the category of scholars that employ levels of

⁷ Cristiana Lavinia Badulescu, 'Interview with Dr Maria Hadjipavlou, Associate Professor,' Department of Social and Political Sciences, University of Cyprus, 2020.

⁸ Olga Demetriou and Maria Hadjipavlou, 'A Feminist Position on Sharing Governmental Power and Forging Citizenship in Cyprus: Proposals for the Ongoing Peace Negotiations,' (2014) 107(1) *Feminist Review* 98–106

⁹ Cynthia Cockburn, *The Line: Women, Partition and the Gender Order in Cyprus* (Zed Books., 2004).

¹⁰ Maria Hadjipavlou, 'No Permission to Cross: Cypriot Women's Dialogue across the Divide,' (2006) 13 (4) *Gender, Place and Culture* 329–51,

¹¹ Pruitt, Dean G. 'Ripeness Theory and the Oslo Talks,' (2003) 2(2) *International Negotiation* 237–50.

¹² Michalis S. Michael, 'The Cyprus Peace Talks: A Critical Appraisal,' (2007) 44(5) *Journal of Peace Research* 587–604.

analysis to examine the Cyprus conflicts. In the research works that employed levels of analysis, most often it is argued that perceived dangers to outgroups is frequent, and they are among those who have been exposed to political violence and conflict in the past.¹³ Gulseven used a historical method to analyse the history and formation of Turkish Cypriot identity and the growth of alternative identities. He used an intersectional approach to the core causes of the conflict, suggesting that, in addition to social issues, cultural and ethnic divisions between Turkish Cypriots and new migrants exacerbated antagonism between the two groups (Turkish Cypriots and Turkish from mainland Turkey).¹⁴ Other identities, such as Kurdish and Arab, have settled in and become part of the 'TRNC', although this identity has not been effectively accounted for despite its rising prominence.¹⁵

Although Amaral compared the Annan plan to the "Good Friday Agreement" using data from elite interviews, this comparison was restricted. Comparative approaches are infrequently employed in the analysis of the negotiation and Cyprus peace processes. However, comparative research is rarely employed.¹⁶ This study adopts a comparative methodology to expand the current literature on the peace process and negotiations in Cyprus. It will also add to the limited number of comparative methods by comparing the peace processes in Cyprus and Colombia using the comparative technique. The objective is to identify Colombia's parallels, distinctions, and lessons to be learned.

Understanding Comparative Studies and Their Significance

In the end, all social sciences can be considered comparative. This is because all observable phenomena may be compared to a specific point of reference that can be overtly or implicitly stated and assumed, allowing the differences and similarities of the item or subject being compared to be assessed, examined, and understood.¹⁷ The comparative approach is among the oldest techniques for conducting basic scientific

¹³ Charis Psaltis et al., 'Internally Displaced Persons and the Cyprus Peace Process,' (2020) 41 (1) *International Political Science Review* 138–54,

¹⁴ Enver Gülseven, 'Identity Contestations in the Turkish Cypriot Community and the Peace Process in Cyprus' (2020) 6(1) *Athens Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 21–38.

¹⁵ *Ibid*, 28.

¹⁶ Joana Amaral, 'Do Peace Negotiations Shape Settlement Referendums? The Annan Plan and Good Friday Agreement Experiences Compared' (2018) 53(3) *Cooperation and Conflict* 356–74.

¹⁷ Jochen Clasen, 'Defining Comparative Social Policy,' in *A Handbook of Comparative Social Policy*, (2nd edn, Edward Elgar Publishing, 2013) 74.

and philosophical researches.¹⁸ It is an approach that provides the researcher with a good understanding of how to evaluate, analyse, and interpret social and empirical indicators of variables. It may be simply stated as a technique for analysing the differences between two or more variables or phenomena. It makes use of research methodologies and procedures to determine the cause and relationship between variables, people, or objects.¹⁹ Comparison is a key technique of analysis that assists the researcher in describing and interpreting social events and the phenomenal world. It also plays a crucial role in the formulation of ideas by highlighting suggested similarities and contrasts among the researched facts.²⁰ The comparative technique is conceptualised and articulated as an analytical tool by comparing experimental and statistical approaches.²¹

It might also refer to an idea developed from the verb ‘to compare.’ Comparative studies seek to investigate, evaluate, and analyse, using both quantitative and qualitative methods, phenomena in distinct topic areas to uncover parallels and differences that may exist in the subject areas.²² Possibly, Hague and Harrop believe that comparative studies may be conducted using a variety of approaches and assessment procedures, including ‘case study,’ ‘targeted comparison,’ and statistical analysis.²³

In the social sciences, a comparative approach is a valuable tool for analysing differences and similarities among variables, elements, the structure of a system, the processes of the system, and the policies in global, regional, national, and local contexts.²⁴ It is essential for testing hypotheses and can aid in the development of new hypotheses and theories.²⁵ According to Bukhari, there are several reasons why comparative research has attained a prominent position among social scientists. Globalisation has played a significant role in enhancing the desire for an opportunity for educational reforms and intellectual curiosity about different civilisations.²⁶

¹⁸ Syed Aftab Hassan Bukhari, ‘What Is Comparative Study,’ SSRN Electronic Journal, 2011.

¹⁹ Mario Coccia and Igor Benati, ‘Comparative Models of Inquiry,’ in *Global Encyclopedia of Public Administration, Public Policy, and Governance*, 2018, 1-5.

²⁰ David Collier, ‘The Comparative Method,’ in *Political Science: The State of Discipline II*, (American Political Science Association, 1993) 105.

²¹ Arend Lijphart et al., ‘Comparative Politics and the Comparative Method’ (2007) 60 *Thinking about Democracy: Power Sharing and Majority Rule in Theory and Practice* 245–66.

²² Coccia and Benati (no 19)

²³ Rod Hague and Martin Harrop, *Comparative Government and Politics* (New York: Palgrave Macmillan, 2004) 69–85.

²⁴ Coccia and Benati (no 19).

²⁵ Collier (no 20) 105.

²⁶ Bukhari (no 18).

Information technology has eased the generation of more quantitative data for comparative purposes, and international communications technology has simplified the dissemination of this data. In a comparative study, two or more objects are compared. Comparative research is used to establish and quantify correlations between two or more variables by monitoring separate groups that are either voluntarily or involuntarily subjected to distinct treatments. In a comparative study, two or more groups, persons, or situations are compared. This comparison frequently focuses on a few attributes. Comparative research is essential to the construction of concepts because it highlights suggested similarities and differences between examples or subjects. It sharpens the researcher's descriptive skills and capacity.²⁷

However, the procedure is not devoid of difficulties and drawbacks. It must be generalised based on a very limited number of examples, even though there are multiple factors.²⁸ Despite the limitation associated with the small sample size that the method could handle, its analytical utility is significant, and this paper makes use of this advantage to argue for a new perspective on women's participation and involvement at high levels in the Cyprus peace and negotiation processes.

The Colombia Peace Process and Women's Involvement

The Colombian conflict began in the 1830s and 1840s, during the post-independence era. From colonial times to the present, Colombia has been characterised by 'spatial fragmentation, economic atomization, and cultural variety,' as Frank Safford and Marco Palacios describe.²⁹ With this structural framework, the power struggle became endemic at both the regional and local levels, and the institutionalisation of a productive central State was challenging to achieve.³⁰

Historically, there have been two political parties in Colombia: conservatives and liberals. Individuals defined themselves as either conservatives or liberals according to this political distinction. All Colombians, elites and non-elites alike, place a higher value on their allegiance to these political parties than to the Colombian nation-State. These stated allegiances created the impetus for a series of civic upheavals that cul-

²⁷ Ibid, 1–2.

²⁸ Lijphart et al (no 20),.

²⁹ Frank Safford and Marco Palacios, *Colombia: Fragmented Land, Divided Society* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2002) ix.

³⁰ Ibid.

minated in a 33-year civil war. Pollock and several other academics argue that these political party affiliations have established persistent core identities.³¹

The elites of both the liberal and the conservative parties drew the poor, who were required to fight, into the civil war and also backed the elites' political aims; as a result, the two parties evolved into multi-class parties dominated by the elites.³² The civil war is difficult to characterise, because, as Sanchez argues, it lacks a single description since academics' study it from several perspectives: narco-war, dirty war, guerrilla war, the president's war, and the bandits' war.³³ Between 1899 and 1903, Bergquist refers to the conflict as the 'great battle of a thousand days.'³⁴

With the signing of a peace deal in 1902, the 'War of a Thousand Days' came to an end. As a result of this peace accord, Colombia eventually had forty years of peace. Forty years later, in the second half of the 1940s, there was an outbreak of violence.³⁵ This period is known as 'La Violencia' and spans from 1948 to 1966. According to Pollock, the number of political violence-related deaths indicated that it was the most violent era in Colombia's history.³⁶

The parties to the Colombian conflict quickly recognised the need to counterbalance the majority of the men in the negotiation process with a greater presence of women. In addition, the development of Gender Commissions and other women's organisations to implement the final peace accords supported the Colombian peace process by setting a path that may lead to a durable peace. This gender dynamic increased women's involvement in the peace process and this war has caused a serious trauma to women, who were the principal victims of the violence that followed the

³¹ Catherine C. LeGrand, 'The Colombian Crisis from a Historical Perspective' (2003) 28(52-53) *Canadian Journal of Latin American and Caribbean Studies* 165–209; John C Pollock, 'Politics and Elite Performance: The Political Sociology of La Violence,' (1975) 10(22-50) *Studies in Comparative International Development*.

³² James Erwin Sanders, *Contentious Republicans: Popular Politics, Race, and Class in Nineteenth-Century Southwestern Colombia*, ProQuest Dissertations and Theses (Pittsburgh: The University of Pittsburgh, 2000) iv; R. J. Stoller, 'Liberalism and Conflict in Socorro, Colombia, 1830-1870' (Duke University, 1991) 4.

³³ Gonzalo Sanchez, 'Problems of Violence, Prospects for Peace' in *Bergquist, Charles, Peñaranda, Ricardo and Gonzalo Sanchez. Violence in Colombia, 1990-2000: Waging War and Negotiating Peace* (Rowman & Littlefield Publishers, 2001) 19.

³⁴ Charles Bergquist, *Coffee and Conflict in Colombia, 1886-1910* (Durham, NC: Duke University Press, 1978).

³⁵ LeGrand, (no 31) 171–172.

³⁶ Pollock, (no 31) 22–23.

trends of violent conflicts.³⁷ After decades of struggle, women in Colombia today enjoy a wide range of rights. Policymakers in Colombia make many efforts to initiate peace discussions involving women.

As a consequence of political changes, which constitute one of the most essential tools, a new constitution was drafted in 1991 under the leadership of President César Gaviria. The bloody combat persisted despite this effort. Although several guerrilla groups had signed peace accords with the government, the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC), the largest guerrilla group, and a portion of the National Liberation Army (ELN), the second largest guerrilla group, were still fighting against the government.³⁸ The 1991 constitution and subsequent legislative instruments recognised women's rights, criminalised their violation, and prohibited gender-based violence. Thus, women participated actively in the political process.³⁹

The United Nations Security Council (UNSC) approved Resolution 1325 in 2000, which, among other things, encourages women's participation in peacebuilding, peace negotiation, peacekeeping, and conflict prevention.⁴⁰ This resolution might have inspired Colombian women to participate actively in the political process. Women's participation in peace negotiations may be argued to be vital, not due to their peaceful dispositions or victimisation in most of violent circumstances, but because they have a stake in the conflict and its resolution.⁴¹

In addition, while women have the same rights as men to participate in social issues, neglecting their contribution, capacities, and commitment to the peace process is a sign of bad planning, illustrating how degraded a society that marginalises women's involvement may be.⁴² Therefore, it is the responsibility of women to campaign for these rights and persuade society, authorities, and influential voices of the necessity of a crucial role in women's participation. Women in Colombia were successful

³⁷ Virginia Marie Bouvier, *Gender and the Role of Women in Colombia's Peace Process* (Washington D.C.: United States Institute of Peace, 2016) 3–7; Fabio Andres Diaz Pabón, *Transitional Justice and the 'Colombian Peace Process' in Truth, Justice and Reconciliation in Colombia* (Routledge, 2018).

³⁸ Bouvier (no 37); LeGrand (no 31).

³⁹ Bouvier (no 37) 12.

⁴⁰ UN-OSAGI, 'Landmark Resolution on Women, Peace and Security' (Undated) *Office of the Special Adviser on Gender Issues and Advancement of Women*.

⁴¹ Kimberly Theidon, 'Peace in Colombia' (2016) 778 (115) *Current History* 51–56.

⁴² Sanam Naraghi Anderlini, *Women Building Peace: What They Do, Why It Matters* (Lynne Rienner Publication, 2007) 3–4.

in persuading both negotiators and relevant parties to increase the space for female involvement and engagement in the Colombian peace process.⁴³

As peacemakers, offenders, and victims, Colombian women were involved in the country's civil conflict in three distinct ways. Despite all of this, they were noticeably absent from the initial round of high-level negotiations.⁴⁴ Few women engaged in the negotiating process during these early eras (1990–1994 and 1998–2000). These women fought for enhanced inclusion of women in the negotiation process. Both the FARC and the government were involved in these uncommon female actions.⁴⁵ This agitation and yearning for increased engagement had enormous impacts on women as well as on society.

In the year 2000, women organised a public hearing in the town of Caguan, with the National Negotiation of Women, the Association of Indigenous, Afro-Colombian, and Peasant Women of Colombia being the majority of organizational participants. Six hundred (600) female participants discussed several economic and employment-related issues. During this summit, women once again demanded a stronger presence at the peace table, a larger role for women's movements in the negotiation process, and more visibility for gender equality. This facet of women's mobilisation ushered in innovation marked by creativity, symbolism, and rituals, which brightened the chances for women influence in Colombian peace process.⁴⁶

The efforts of these women's pressure groups bore fruit, culminating in the 2001 founding of 'Coalition 1325' by a network of women's organisations trying to monitor the implementation of UNSC Resolution 1325 in the Colombian peace process. Again, this coalition supplemented the work of *Mujeres por la Paz*; this initiative is a coalition through which petitions for the inclusion of women were made. When the negotiations between President Pastrana and the FARC broke down in 2002, twenty-five thousand (25,000) women organised a rally to demand more space. Their aims included, but not limited to, developing acts that would contribute to the attainment of peace and social justice, monitoring and managing the peace process, and ensuring the inclusion of women in the peace process.⁴⁷

⁴³ Anamaria Trujillo-Gomez, *The Role of Women in Peacebuilding in Colombia* (Georgetown University, 2013) 55.

⁴⁴ *Ibid.*, iii.

⁴⁵ Bouvier (no 37) 17.

⁴⁶ *Ibid.*

⁴⁷ Céspedes-Báez, Lina M., and Felipe Jaramillo Ruiz, "Peace without Women Does Not Go!" Women's Struggle for Inclusion in Colombia's Peace Process with the FARC' (2018) 94 *Colombia Internacional* 83–109; Trujillo-Gomez (no 43) 55

These acts led the national power elites and all negotiation parties to expand women's participation in the peace process. The success of the campaign to restore peace to the victims, the majority of whom are women throughout the country, was attributable to the unwavering determination of the women and the assistance of international allies such as the UN-Women. The Women for Peace National Summit in October 2013 was an additional key milestone in the women's movement. This was founded by nine Colombian women's organisations spanning a range of demographics.⁴⁸

The inclusion of women on President Juan Manuel Santos's national negotiating team was more proof of the women's efforts. In addition, two women were selected as plenipotentiaries (representatives).⁴⁹ To boost the participation of women in the negotiating process, the administration formed the 'Gender Sub-commission'. Additionally, there were ten (10) members on this committee (five from the FARC and five from the government side). This gender sub-commission partnered with the director of UN Women, Belen Sanz, between March 2014 and March 2016 to organise the women and their recommendations for the negotiating table.⁵⁰ Colombian women have been heavily active in all phases, significantly contributing to the development of the road to peace.

Again, at the level of civil society, Colombian women participated and advanced the peace process by participating in several civil society conferences, working groups (mesas de Trabajo regionales) in all nine Colombian regions, and research initiatives, as well as by influencing public opinion, supporting negotiated solutions, organising inputs, and building their capacity to engage in the peace and negotiation process.⁵¹

According to Bourvier, between 40 and 50 per cent of Colombian women engaged in the working group; their ideas were synthesised and made available to the Havana negotiators, and they actively participated in the discussions.⁵² This experience translates to what Henshaw (2020) describes as 'peace with a woman's face.' Women's participation in the Colombian peace process motivated them to highlight their significance in a peace accord that can end a protracted conflict that has decimated society, such as the Colombian government's fight with the FARC group.

⁴⁸ Bouvier (no 37) 20.

⁴⁹ Céspedes-Báez, Lina M., and Felipe Jaramillo Ruiz (no 47)

⁵⁰ Ibid (no 47) 97; Kristian Herbolzheimer, *Innovations in the Colombian Peace Process* (NOREF, Norwegian Peacebuilding Resource Centre, 2016) 6.

⁵¹ Bouvier = (no 37) 19–20.

⁵² Ibid, 19–20.

The Accountability System: The Colombia Special Jurisdiction for Peace

A society that has endured mass atrocities and major violations of human rights find it difficult to maintain lasting peace even after a war has ended. It is essential to listen to victims, extract confessions from perpetrators, investigate crimes, and regain the trust of many members of society. These objectives can be achieved by instituting an efficient system of ‘transitional justice.’ On November 24, 2016, the Havana-Bogota peace agreement established a system of ‘transitional justice’ between the Colombian government and the FARC.⁵³

According to the report by the Human Right Watch,⁵⁴ and the International Center for Transitional Justice’s website,⁵⁵ several mechanisms were previously established to address crimes and violent actions and ensure that there were consequences for such actions. In 2005, legislation addressing ‘justice and peace’ was passed to prohibit violent behaviour, and in 2011, a second law was enacted to provide victims with complete restitution. The transitional justice process in Colombia entails the establishment of a ‘Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition.’⁵⁶

In September 2015, the Colombian government and the Revolutionary Armed Forces of Colombia (FARC) reached an agreement on the fifth item on their agenda: care for victims. The agreement on institutions of transitional justice to preserve victims’ rights to justice, truth, and recompense marked the conclusion of the most difficult period of the three-year peace negotiations. It led to the establishment of the Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition (SIVJRNR), a set of mechanisms designed to guarantee the rights of victims to truth, justice, repara-

⁵³ Mustafa Erçakıca, ‘La Havana-Bogota Peace Agreement and the Transitional Justice in Colombia’ (2022) 7(14) *Comparative Cultural Studies-European and Latin American Perspectives* 125–38; Cynthia E. Cohen, ‘Reimagining Transitional Justice’ (2020) 14(1) *International Journal of Transitional Justice* 1–13.

⁵⁴ Human Right Watch (2022): Rights trends in Colombia, Human Rights Watch. Available at: <https://www.hrw.org/world-report/2022/country-chapters/colombia> (Accessed: 21 May 2023).

⁵⁵ International Center for Transitional Justice, ‘Colombia’, available at <https://www.ictj.org/location/colombia> (last accessed: 21 May 2023).

⁵⁶ Erçakıca, ‘La Havana-Bogota Peace Agreement and the Transitional Justice in Colombia’; Olasolo Hector and Ramirez Mendoza, *The Colombian Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2017); Pabón (no 37).

tion, and non-repetition, as stipulated in the Agreement for the End of the Conflict and to Build a Stable and Lasting Peace.⁵⁷

According to Olasolo and Ramirez, the Agreement focused on six interrelated issues to be addressed: rural development, political engagement, cessation of hostilities and disarmament, illegal narcotics, victims, and implementation procedures. The Agreement, which finally led to the establishment of an Integrated System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition, established judicial and non-judicial mechanisms, including (i) amnesty and pardon for FARC members and special treatment for state officials; (ii) a Truth Commission; (iii) a Special Jurisdiction for Peace; (iv) measures to provide comprehensive reparation for victims; and (v) additional measures. These processes cannot be individually evaluated. Each element of the agreement is an attempt to give a comprehensive response to the victims of the Colombian armed conflict.⁵⁸

The Havana peace accord in 2017 led the government of Juan Manuel Santos and the FARC rebel movement to decide to form the Colombia Special Jurisdiction for Peace (in Spanish: Jurisdicción Especial para la Paz, abbreviated: JEP), which was implemented in November 2016 by the Colombian government and FARC.⁵⁹ Technically, the JEP is a component of the Comprehensive System for Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition.⁶⁰ It is a system of accountability since it will be charged with defining and punishing measures taken against direct or indirect violators and perpetrators of human rights crimes committed during the war.⁶¹

⁵⁷ Comisión de la Verdad, *The Integral System of Truth, Justice, Reparation and Non-Repetition – SIV-JRNR*. Available at: <https://comisionverdadc-col-eu.org/en/multimedia/integral-system-of-truth-justice-reparation-and-non-repetition-sivjrnr/> (Accessed: 21 May 2023); Comisión de la Verdad, *Integral system, Integral System | Nodos Europa – Comisión de la Verdad*. Available at: <https://comisionverdadc-col-eu.org/en/sistema-integral/> (Accessed: 21 May 2023).

⁵⁸ Olasolo Hector and Ramirez Mendoza (no 56).

⁵⁹ Omur Bakiner, “The Comprehensive System of Truth, Justice, Reparation, and Non-Repetition: Precedents and Prospects,” in *As War Ends: What Colombia Can Tell Us about the Sustainability of Peace and Transitional Justice* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2019).

⁶⁰ Brian Harper and Holly K. Sonneland, *Explainer: Colombia’s Special Jurisdiction for Peace (JEP)* (Americas Society/Council of the Americas, 2018).

⁶¹ CNN Spanish, *¿Qué Es y Por Qué Es Tan Importante La Jurisdicción Especial Para La Paz En Colombia?*, CNN Spanish (2017) *¿Qué es y por qué es tan importante la jurisdicción especial para la paz en Colombia? What is it and why is the Special Jurisdiction for Peace in Colombia so important? (auto-translated)*, CNN, 2017, <https://cnnespanol.cnn.com/2017/03/15/que-es-y-por-que-es-tan-importante-la-jurisdiccion-especial-para-la-paz-en-colombia/> (Accessed: 21 May 2023).

According to Yoshida and Céspedes-Báez, the Havana peace pact covers a broad variety of subjects. Point five of the peace agreements between the FARC rebels and the Colombian government dealt with victim compensation and established a ‘complete system of truth, justice, reparation, and non-repetition’.⁶² The establishment of a judicial body, the JEP, to examine political offences and provide reparation for violations of human rights and humanitarian law committed before December 1, 2016, that were directly or indirectly related to the conflict is a commendable stride. This is one-of-a-kind forum that facilitated the adjudication of environmental damages related to the experiences of women and men during armed conflict.⁶³

JEP commenced operations in March 2018 and has given priority to several sexual and gender-based crimes. Cyprus may benefit from this legal system if the Cyprus problem is resolved. This plan will increase the level of trust and confidence among the various Cypriot groups, both inside and outside the borders of Cyprus. Unquestionably, this will pave the way for the construction and planning of a future that Cypriots may wish to experience.

The Cyprus Peace Process and Women’s Involvement

The origins of the ‘Cyprus conflict’ may be traced back to the invasion of the island of Cyprus by the Ottoman Empire in 1571, when the Turks first set foot on the island. Some researchers have linked the origins of the war to British colonial control from 1878 until independence in 1960.⁶⁴ Also, the early 20th-century British tactic of ‘divide and rule’ following World War I.⁶⁵ Through this tactic, the Greek Cypriots were replaced by the Turkish Cypriots as an auxiliary police force to wage a campaign against the leaders and members of Ethnikí Orgánosis Kipriakou Agónos (EOKA).⁶⁶ Therefore, the direct cause of the 1963 outbreak of violence may have been the ‘1960 constitution’ that established the ‘Republic of Cyprus’.⁶⁷ This was shown even more by the fact that the island of Cyprus has been split in half since 1964 because of fight-

⁶² Keina Yoshida and Lina M. Céspedes-Baéz, ‘The Nature of Women, Peace and Security: A Colombian Perspective,’ (2021) 97(1) *International Affairs* 17–34.

⁶³ *Ibid*, 32.

⁶⁴ Adamantia Pollis, ‘Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy’ (1973) 5(4) *Comparative Politics* 575–99.

⁶⁵ Maria Hadjipavlou, ‘The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding’ (2007) 44(3) *Journal of Peace Research* 349–65.

⁶⁶ Glen D. Camp, ‘Greek-Turkish Conflict over Cyprus’ (1980) 95(1) *Political Science Quarterly* 43–70.

⁶⁷ James M. Boyd, ‘Cyprus: Episode in Peacekeeping’ (1966) 20(1) *International Organization* 1–17.

ing between different groups, a coup in the Greek Cypriot community, and the Turkish invasion of 1974.⁶⁸

Since 1974, Cyprus has witnessed several efforts by stakeholder groups to settle the internecine and persistent societal problems that appear to defy traditional conflict resolution techniques. In 1974, during the era of the Turkish invasion that ushered in a dramatic change of events, settlement discussions were suspended and expectations for prolonged negotiations, at least for a unified solution, were destroyed. In 1983, North Cyprus unilaterally declared its independence as ‘the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus,’ bringing an end to the ongoing peace discussions (‘TRNC’). This research concurs with the assertion that the unilateral proclamation of independence in Cyprus initiated the peace process. It did not take more than a year from the start of reunification talks until the TRNC declared independence.⁶⁹

This initial round of discussions to reunite the island led by Rauf Denktash and Spyros Kyprianou under the auspices of the United Nations failed.⁷⁰ In 1986, Javier Perez de Cuellar, then-Secretary General of the United Nations, proposed a framework agreement that was eventually abandoned by the two presidents. In 1989, discussions resumed with the United Nations Secretary-General, who suggested he would facilitate the abandoned framework. This was rejected by Denktash and the head of the New Greek Cypriots; Glafcos Clerides likewise showed little interest.⁷¹

To reunite the island, Kofi Annan, the then secretary-general of the United Nations, proposed what was later to be called the Annan Plan (2002–2004). This was a comprehensive plan released on April 24, 2004, and was widely supported around the world, allowing each community to organise its referendum. The conclusion indicated that Turkish Cypriots preferred a bi-communal and bi-zonal power structure and a ‘loose federalism’ (where major institutions would come under a federal unit arrangement). Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, viewed the bi-communal and bi-zonal power structures differently, preferring a ‘tight federation’ in which the federal institution would be as dominant as possible.⁷²

⁶⁸ Faustmann, Hubert, and James Ker-Lindsay, ‘The Origins and Development of the Cyprus Issue’ in *Ker-Lindsay, James/Faustmann, Hubert (Hg.): The Government and Politics of Cyprus* (Oxford, 2009) 63-66.

⁶⁹ Faustmann and Ker-Lindsay; James Ker-Lindsay, ‘Social and Historical Background’ in *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know* (New York: Oxford University Press, Inc, 2011) 1–28.

⁷⁰ Ker-Lindsay (no 69) British Pathe, ‘President Kyprianou And Turkish-Cypriot Leader Rauf Denktash Begin Separate Talks At United Nations’ British Pathe, 2021.

⁷¹ Ker-Lindsay (no 69) 54–55.”

⁷² *Ibid.*

The absence of social objective and purpose agreement among the two communities and their leaders (Tassos Papadopoulos and Rauf Denktash) contributed to the plan's bad reception.⁷³ The rejection of this comprehensive solution was a setback in the decades-long effort to bring peace to Cyprus,⁷⁴ and Rauf Denktash remained the chief negotiator for the Turkish Cypriots even after he lost the election to the opposition party led by Mehmet Ali Talat.⁷⁵

The 2006 peace discussions were launched on a new basis, and both communities demanded that the peace and negotiating procedures be localised. This suggested that the Cypriots themselves would lead the peace discussions and that the United Nations could only function as a facilitator rather than a main third-party arbitrator. As a result, specialists organised a variety of working groups and technical committees to advise the negotiators. The two conflicting parties established separate working groups to give technical assistance in a variety of areas, including governance and power sharing, EU concerns, property, territory, economics, security, and citizenship.⁷⁶ By 2008, both the Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community had new leaders: Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, respectively. They decided to recommence the peace process, which lasted until 2011. Before that, in 2010, a new leadership developed in the Turkish Cypriot community under Dervis Eroglu, and negotiations proceeded until early 2011 when the peace process once again failed.⁷⁷

To address the concerns of culture, education, and gender equality, committees titled 'committees on culture, education, and gender equality' were formed after 2015.⁷⁸ By 2017, a peace process had begun in Crans-Montana. However, like all previous peace discussions about Cyprus, it was fruitless. Antonio Guterres, the Secretary General of the United Nations, Nicos Anastasiades, the Greek Cypriot president, Mustafa Akinci, the Turkish Cypriot leader; Mevlut Cavusoglu, the Turkish Foreign Minister, and Nicos Kotzias, the Greek Foreign Minister, were among the partici-

⁷³ Sözen, Ahmet, and Kudret Özersay, 'The Annan Plan: State Succession or Continuity' (2007) 43(1) *Middle Eastern Studies* 125–41; Neophytos Loizides and John McGarry, 'The 2002-04 Annan Plan in Cyprus: An Attempted UN-Mediated Constitutional Transition' *ConstitutionNet*, 2019; Ker-Lindsay (no 69).

⁷⁴ Amaral (no 16).

⁷⁵ Ker-Lindsay, (no 69) 63.

⁷⁶ Demetriou, Olga and Maria Hadjipavlou, 'The Impact of Women's Activism on the Peace Negotiations in Cyprus' (2018) 24(1) *Nationalism and Ethnic Politics* 50–65.

⁷⁷ Ker-Lindsay (no 69) 75–77.

⁷⁸ Demetriou, Olga and Maria Hadjipavlou (no 76).

pants to the failed talks.⁷⁹ UN Secretary-General Antonio Guterres has organised a five-plus one (5+1) informal meeting for April 27–29, 2021, to continue discussions on resolving the situation. The purpose of the conference, which was to determine if Greek and Turkish Cypriots would discuss a long-term settlement in the future, was not accomplished.⁸⁰

By establishing ‘Hands Across the Divide’ (HAD) in 2001 and voicing requests for involvement in the peace process through this bi-communal, non-governmental, and non-partisan groups, Cypriot women have expressed their voices for participation. This organisation aimed, among other things, to arrange seminars on conflict resolution, assist with peace-related concerns, and create public awareness of gender equality issues.⁸¹ In the past, there was no autonomous women’s movement or feminist women’s organisation in Cyprus that was not linked with political parties that had a male-centric view of politics and viewed gender issues as less essential to address. As Maria Hadjipavlou emphasises, the founding of HAD represents the first attempt by women in Cyprus to establish an autonomous association unaffiliated with political parties.⁸²

The second women’s organisation, the Gender Advisory Team (GAT), was founded in 2009 and consists of activists and academics from both communities. The main objective of both parties is to integrate gender concerns into the Cyprus peace process through the UNSC Resolution 1325. GAT provided specific recommendations to the United Nations and the general public about government, property, the economy, and citizenship.⁸³ In 2015, gender focal points were introduced to the teams of negotiators, and in 2018, the Ministry of Foreign Affairs recruited a gender specialist to support a feminist foreign policy. It may be difficult to implement UNSC resolution 1325 since there are insufficient resources and no national action plan.⁸⁴

⁷⁹ Tom Miles, ‘Cyprus Reunification Talks Collapse, U.N. Chief “Very Sorry”’ 2017; J. Christou, ‘The Peace Processes: 2017 Crans-Montana’ *Cyprus Mail*, 2019.

⁸⁰ Anadolu Agency, ‘5+1 Cyprus Talks Start at the UN in Geneva’ 2021; United Nations, ‘Secretary-General’s Press Conference Following the Informal 5+1 Meeting on Cyprus’ *United Nations*, 2021.

⁸¹ Maria Hadjipavlou and B. Mertan, ‘Cypriot Feminism: An Opportunity to Challenge Gender Inequalities and Promote Women’s Rights and a Different Voice’ (22)(2) *Cyprus Review* 247–68; Anna Agathangelou, ‘Envisioning a Feminist Global Society: Cypriot Women, Civil Society and Social Change’ (2003) 5(2) *International Feminist Journal of Politics* 5 290–99, .

⁸² Hadjipavlou (no 10) 337.”

⁸³ Hadjipavlou and Mertan (no 81); Badulescu (no 7).

⁸⁴ *Ibid*

Since 2010, the reports of the United Nations Secretary-General (UNSG) on Cyprus have advocated for the participation of women, youth, and civil society in the peace process. Based on Maria Hadjipavlou's comments, UNSG Antonio Guterres stated on October 8 that 'if women had been present at the negotiation table in Crans Montana in 2017, the discussions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots may not have failed' (an excerpt from the interview conducted by Christiana Lavinia Badulescu).⁸⁵

The presence of women at the negotiation table during peace discussions and peace agreements increases the likelihood of lasting peace, at least 15 years by 35 per cent, argues.⁸⁶ In addition, the greater the gender equality in a society, the lower the likelihood of violent conflict occurring. This has been demonstrated and proven by the proponents of gender-equality, especially considering the fact that women's participation is crucial to the success of the peace process. However, women working behind the scenes, in the background of the Cyprus war, are typically unseen.⁸⁷ This further demonstrates that women have not participated in the high-level negotiations in Cyprus. Even when they are participating, it is frequently behind closed doors or behind the scenes. Their visibility is quite low in comparison to that of Colombian women.

Women's Involvement in the Colombian Peace Process and Lessons for Cypriot Women

The academic cycle has not given sufficient emphasis to the role of women in Cyprus' negotiations and the peace process, particularly their participation at the table of high-level negotiations. The knowledge gathered from this paper's analysis of Colombian women's participation in the negotiation and peace process is valuable for promoting a novel and innovative approach to incorporating women in the next round of negotiations. In both nations' negotiating and peace processes, several significant occurrences resemble one another. In the same breath, there are several differences between the two experiences. This distinction, especially in terms of the role and involvement of women, will serve as an essential lesson for future events, hopefully leading to a peaceful future in Cyprus.

The absence of women in the first phases of both peace efforts is a significant commonality. Independent women's groups applied pressure on the political system

⁸⁵ Ibid

⁸⁶ Ibid

⁸⁷ Ibid

for involvement; they had to organise and lobby for inclusion before the gradual creation of a space for their participation. Despite this, participation rates and levels in the two nations varied greatly. For example, Colombian women participated more actively and were able to influence public opinion; they supported the negotiated solution, organised inputs, and developed their capacity to participate in peace and high-level negotiation processes. In the case of Cyprus, the political sphere and civil society have remained predominately male-dominated sectors in terms of future decision-making.⁸⁸

Similarly, the engagement and efforts of women in the Cyprus conflict peace process are comparable to those of women in Colombia. Cypriot women efforts yielded fewer results comparatively, as they resulted in the formation of the Technical Committee on Gender Equality and the gender focal person assigned to the negotiating teams. The women of Cyprus have also been engaged in numerous working groups and civic organisations. Yet, the Cyprus women are not represented on the highest level of the negotiation table.

Variations in the Backgrounds and Conflict Settings in Colombia and Cyprus, and the Roles of Women in the Peace Process

The Colombian war began as a party battle between the Liberals and the Conservatives and then expanded into a complicated conflict involving several paramilitary groups. The Cyprus dispute matches the narrative of an ethnic war since it involves two large ethnic groups, the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and one major ethnic group's political, economic, and social dominance over the other. There are similarities between the political settings of Colombia and Cyprus in terms of a sense of unity. In Colombia, nationalism remained exceedingly weak, and similarly, nationalism in Cyprus has seemed quite weak. Thus, it has been challenging for women to significantly influence public opinion, particularly in Cyprus. Cypriot women have not participated in as many high-level discussions as Colombian women have. Women are represented at the highest level of negotiations in Colombia. In the case of Cypriot women, no representation at the table of high-level negotiations has been granted to women.

In addition to their persistent desire for a seat at the peace table, Colombian women have been active, confrontational, and an integral component of the conflict dynamics. It is estimated that 40 percent of FARC members were female. Women in

⁸⁸ Cockburn (no 9)142-143.

Colombia applied pressure on the government and the FARC (the largest and most powerful guerrilla group), resulting in the establishment of an all-female Gender Sub-Commission to emphasise the gender factor. With the establishment of negotiating teams and the commencement of the negotiation process, women were able to engage in high-level peace negotiations that were previously exclusively reserved for men. Before leaving the negotiation table, women's organisations were able to exert pressure on the government and the FARC to sign an agreement for women's participation. In addition, Colombian women engaged in civil society conferences, women-dominated working groups, and research projects.⁸⁹ With the assistance of UN Women, the Colombian women's recommendations were made accessible to the negotiators in advance of the Havana peace discussions.

Moreover, Colombian women were able to advocate for political solutions and participate in peace discussions.⁹⁰ These measures and efforts were crucial in creating the basis for discussions in Havana, Cuba. In 2016, a peace agreement brought an end to the protracted battle between the government and the FARC.⁹¹ In November 2021, the United States formally withdrew the FARC from its list of terrorist organisations, marking a significant step forward in Colombia's efforts to achieve lasting peace. United States Secretary of State Antony Blinken believes that eliminating the terrorist classification will make it simpler for the United States to support the 2016 peace accord.⁹²

The role Colombian women played and continue to play in the country's political climate has cleared the path for Ingrid Betancourt Pulecio to become the country's first female presidential candidate. She is recognised as an anti-corruption crusad-

⁸⁹ María Elvira Guerra-Cújar et al., 'A Peace Baby Boom? Evidence from Colombia's Peace Agreement. Evidence from Colombia's Peace Agreement' (2022) *SSRN Electronic Journal*, available at <https://dx.doi.org/10.2139/ssrn.3695131> (Accessed: 21 May 2023); Lina M. Céspedes-Báez, 'A (Feminist) Farewell to Arms: The Impact of the Peace Process with the FARC-EP on Colombian Feminism' (2019) 52(1) *Cornell International Law Journal* 39–63; Francisco Gutiérrez Sanín and Francy Carranza Franco, 'Organizing Women for Combat: The Experience of the FARC in the Colombian War' (2017) 17(4) *Journal of Agrarian Change* 770–78.

⁹⁰ Yoshida and Céspedes-Baéz (no 62); Bouvier (no 37)

⁹¹ Human Rights Watch, 'Colombia Event of 2019' 2020.

⁹² Aljazeera, 'US Lifts Colombia's FARC 'foreign Terrorist' Designation' *Aljazeera* (2021), available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2021/11/30/us-lifts-colombias-farc-foreign-terrorist-designation> (Accessed: 21 May 2023).

er who backed the 2016 peace agreement that ended Latin America's longest civil conflict.⁹³

Women's organisations in Cyprus have been effective in raising awareness about the gender narrative and gender sensitivity. However, there is a disparity because women in Cyprus have used Resolution 1325 of the UN Security Council less frequently than women in Colombia. Therefore, Cypriot women have not engaged in negotiations at the highest level, but they have been active in the technical unit and behind closed doors. This report highlights the need for the effective invocation of UNSC Resolution 1325 currently. This international law should be incorporated into the national political and economic systems. It should be a priority and a central element of the national peace process agenda. This will increase the legal influence of Cypriot women as they continue to strive for greater representation and involvement. Women from Cyprus should be given a prominent position at the negotiating table, and their participation in high-level representation should be highlighted. Even though we suggest the Colombian model be emulated by their Cyprus counterparts, this research, acknowledges that the Colombia approach has its challenges. This limitation is a result of the fact that a portion of the guerrilla group's struggle with the government has not been totally settled, and there is still a degree of fighting around the country. Since the Colombian experience with women's active engagement has been highly effective, the Colombian model should be utilised, but in the context of Cyprus' social, cultural, and historical experiences.

Conclusion

The Cyprus peace process and the numerous breakdowns of discussions are a significant cause of concern for the international community, the nations of the Mediterranean, and Cyprus itself. This article shares this concern and compares and analyses the peace and negotiation processes in Colombia and Cyprus appropriately. There are similarities, especially in the early stages of the wars, when women's participation is stifled. The engagement of women as stakeholder groups was not the outcome of a planned governmental policy decision but rather the consequence of the advocacy of autonomous women's groups. Despite these similarities, there are notable differences: the experiences of Colombian women appear to be richer, and they enjoy the more vigorous engagement. In this regard, the women of Cyprus and the power elite

⁹³ Joseph Contreras, 'Once Kidnapped by the FARC, Now Aiming for Colombia's Presidency' (2022) *Aljazeera News* (2022), available at <https://www.aljazeera.com/news/2022/2/15/once-kidnapped-by-the-farc-now-aiming-for-colombias-presidency> (Accessed: 21 May 2023).

of Cyprus have much to learn from their Colombian counterparts. Women in Cyprus should participate in the negotiation and peace process not only because they are peaceful and will likely promote a peaceful negotiated settlement, but also because they are key stakeholders in the negotiation and peace process and have the same rights to do so as their male counterparts.

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The Effect of Digital Transformation on the Development of E-Governance in Cyprus and Greece. A Critical Review Through the Analysis of the Digital Economy and Society Index

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Abstract

The need for ever-increasing administrative and socio-economic results combined with the demand for a more productive public administration has led to an ever-greater focus on the utilisation of IT and communication technologies through the implementation of integrated e-governance programs. By systematically measuring the implementation of e-governance strategies, their efficiency and quality are enhanced, and the wide use of services is achieved, creating value for society as a whole. The development of commonly accepted indicators provides the possibility of cross-national comparisons. The European Commission has established the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) to record the digital performance of the EU Member States, illustrating the quality and quantity of their development in digital technology. The present study will focus on the analysis of the DESI index for Cyprus and Greece through their comparison to the average of the corresponding indicators of the rest of the EU Member States. Ultimately, the digital maturity of the countries will be assessed by identifying problems and gaps as well as opportunities for improvement.

Keywords: E-Governance, Public Administration, Digital Economy and Society Index, digital transformation

Introduction

The use of Information and Communication Technologies (ICT) has changed the way businesses and organisations operate.⁵ The prospect of exploiting contemporary

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⁵ Richard Mancini, 'Raising the Bar for E-Government' (2012) 72(6) *Public Administration Review* 822-829.

technologies is now one of the most important administrative goals for public organisations claiming ever higher efficiency and effectiveness.⁶ In this light, public administrations around the world are adapting their operation, introducing digital reforms that will allow for an upgrade and thus help them better serve their role.⁷

This new management model refers to the transition to the ‘information society’, utilising modern information and communication technologies.⁸ Having recognised this fact, the European Union (EU) identified as a top priority the process of introduction, implementation, and continuous development of e-governance in public administrations of all Member States with the aim of their gradual digital transformation.⁹ In order to achieve this goal, specialized policies and individual action plans are structured while sophisticated administrative mechanisms and targeted monitoring indicators are monitoring their performance.¹⁰

The development of commonly accepted indicators provides the possibility of cross-national comparisons. To measure the digital performance, the EU has established the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), which illustrates the quality and quantity of the development of the EU Member States in digital technology.¹¹ This study compares the average of the corresponding DESI indicators of the EU Member States to Greece and Cyprus, in order to assess the digital maturity of the countries, and to identify deficiencies and possibilities for improvement.

Focusing on E-Governance

The need for administrative and socio-economic results combined with the demand

⁶ Qian Hu, ‘Preparing Public Managers for the Digital Era: Incorporating Information Management, Use, and Technology into Public Affairs Graduate Curricula’ (2018) 20(5) *Public Management Review* 766-787

⁷ Marijn Janssen, Nripendra Rana, Emma Louise Slade, Yogesh Kumar Dwivedi, ‘Trustworthiness of Digital Government Services: Deriving a Comprehensive Theory Through Interpretive Structural Modelling’ (2018) 20(5) *Public Management Review*.

⁸ Maxat Kassen, ‘Globalization of E-Government: Open Government as a Global Agenda; Benefits, Limitations and Ways Forward’ (2014) 30(1) *Information Development* 51–58.

⁹ Liang Ma, Yueping Zheng, ‘Does E-Governance Performance Actually Boost Citizen Use? Evidence from European Countries’ (2018) 20(10) *Public Management Review* 1513-1532.

¹⁰ Ramon Gil-Garcia, Sharon Dawes, Theresa Pardo, ‘Digital Government and Public Management Research: Finding the Crossroads’ (2018) 20(5) *Public Management Review* 633-646.

Ibrahim Osman, Abdel Latif Anouze, Zahir Irani, Baydaa Al-Ayoubi, Habin Lee, Asım Balci, Tunc Medeni, Vishanth Weerakkody, ‘COBRA Framework to Evaluate E-governance Services: A Citizen-Centric Perspective’ (2014) 31(2) *Government Information Quarterly* 243-256.

¹¹ Ekaterina Dolgikh, Tatiana Pershina, ‘Analysis of the Development of the Digital Economy in Europe’ (2022) 84 *E-management*.

for a more functional public administration¹² has led to a greater-than-before utilisation of Information Technologies (IT) and communication technologies through the implementation of integrated e-governance programs.¹³ The factors that contributed to the development of E-Governance (EG) are:¹⁴

- Electronic innovations and the overall development of information technology and telecommunications, which led to a new administrative environment, thus changing the ways of economic and administrative management.
- The transition to the information society, with information and data being key factors in the implementation of the strategic goals of businesses and organisations.
- The growing demand of citizens and businesses for faster and better service.
- The globalised environment, which imposes the cooperation of national administrations with other States' administrations to achieve synergies and collaborations in the context of the new administrative process.
- The perspective of European policies in the direction of a single European Public Administration through the expansion of the Public Administration in all Member States.
- The promotion of 'Good Governance' (effectiveness and efficiency in the implementation of public policies and programs, transparency and open access of citizens, coherence in the planning of public policies and programs, etc.)

E-governance refers to the use of information and communication technologies in public administration together with organisational changes, and new staff skills to improve public service, strengthen democracy, and support public policies.¹⁵ It is, in other words, a term used to identify the use of ICT in governance systems and processes with the aim of forming more functional, efficient, and economical admin-

¹² World Bank 'The E-Governance Handbook for Developing Countries' (Washington: Centre for Democracy and Technology, 2002).

¹³ Joydeep Guha, Bhaskar Chakrabarti, 'Making E-Governance Work: Adopting the Network Approach' (2014) 31 (2) *Government Information Quarterly* 327–336.

Andreas Pomportsis, 'Introduction to Electronic Governance' (Ηλεκτρονική Διακυβέρνηση) (Athens: Tziolas publications, 2017) (in Greek)

¹⁴ Ioannis Apostolakis, Eyrpidis Loukis, Ioannis Chalaris, 'Electronic Public Administration' (Ηλεκτρονική Δημόσια Διοίκηση) (Athens: Papazisi publications, 2008) (in Greek).

¹⁵ Dimitrios Belias, Efstathios Velissariou, Stefanos Papailias, Foteini Manta, Ioannis Rossidis, 'Change Management – Obstacles and Perspectives for the Integration of Changes in Greek Public Hospitals' (2019) 9(2) *Advances in Management & Applied Economics* 37-50;

Ioannis Rossidis, Dimitrios Belias, Georgios Aspridis, 'Change Management and Leadership' (Διαχείριση Αλλαγών και Ηγεσία) (Athens: Tziolas publications, 2020c) (in Greek).

istrative systems.¹⁶ Many definitions of EG can be found in literature. According to the World Bank (2002), ‘e-governance is the use of information and communication technologies (ICTs) to change administration, to make it more accessible, efficient and accountable’. Modern approaches state that EG contributes to more efficient functioning of public administration, to better quality services to citizens and businesses, and to better governance.¹⁷ E-governance is evolving into a field of reforming the public’s relationship with the administration,¹⁸ and it can bring multifaceted benefits both to the State and other interested parties.¹⁹

E-governance is considered to be the most important tool for the modernisation of public administration.²⁰ Its effective integration and comprehensive utilisation by State administrations present a strong administrative and socio-economic interest.²¹ The European Commission actively supports e-governance by promoting unified policies and strategies²² (despite the different rates of technological development between Member States), looking forward to achieving administrative convergence in all areas between EU Member States.²³

¹⁶ Jeremy Rose, John Stouby Persson, Lise Tordrup Heeager, Zahir Irani, ‘Managing E-Government: Value Positions and Relationships’ (2014) 25(5) *Information Systems Journal* 531-571.

Anna Kochanova, Zahid Hasnain, Bradley Larson, ‘Does E-governance Improve Government Capacity? Evidence from Tax Compliance Costs, Tax Revenue, and Public Procurement Competitiveness’ (2020) 34(1) *The World Bank Economic Review* 101-120

¹⁷ Gerrit Rooks, Uwe Matzat, Bert Sadowski ‘An Empirical Test of Stage Models of E-governance Development: Evidence from Dutch Municipalities’ (2017) 33(4) *The Information Society* 215-225.

Mitja Decman, Janez Stare, Maja Klun, ‘E-Governance and Cost-Effectiveness: E-Taxation in Slovenia’ (2010) 31 *Transylvanian Review of Administrative Sciences* 48-57.

¹⁸ Maxat Kassen, ‘Globalization of E-Government: Open Government as a Global Agenda; Benefits, Limitations and Ways Forward’ (2014) 30(1) *Information Development* 51-58.

¹⁹ OECD ‘OECD E-governance Flagship Report “The E-governance Imperative”’ (Paris: Public Management Committee, 2003)

²⁰ Andreas Pomportsis, ‘Introduction to Electronic Government’ (Ηλεκτρονική Διακυβέρνηση) (Athens: Tziolas publications, 2017) (in Greek)

²¹ Jeremy Rose, John Stouby Persson, Lise Tordrup Heeager, Zahir Irani, ‘Managing E-Government: Value Positions and Relationships’ (2014) 25(5) *Information Systems Journal* 531-571.

Michail Paraskevas, ‘Public Administration in the Information Society’ (Η Δημόσια Διοίκηση στην Κοινωνία της Πληροφορίας) in Paraskevas, M., Asimakopoulos, G., Triantafyllou, B. (eds), *Information Society* (Athens: Association of Greek Academic Libraries, 2015), available at <http://hdl.handle.net/11419/412> (in Greek); https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EGov_Upd_090318.pdf (in Greek) (last accessed 2 September 2022).

²² Neil Nugent, ‘Politics and Governance in the European Union’ (Πολιτική και Διακυβέρνηση στην Ευρωπαϊκή Ένωση) (Athens: Savvalas publications, 2009) (in Greek).

²³ Argyris Passas, Theodoros Tsekos, ‘National Administration and European Integration’ (Εθνική Διοίκηση και Ευρωπαϊκή Ολοκλήρωση) (Athens: Papazisis publications, 2009) (in Greek).

According to Osman et al.,²⁴ the benefits of e-services could be grouped into two categories: tangible and intangible benefits. Tangible benefits include saving time and money, while intangible benefits include the quality of information and services provided. It also contributes to improving citizens' trust²⁵ and fighting corruption.²⁶ As Porumbescu²⁷ reports, the use of social media by public administration agencies is positively related to satisfaction and perceptions of the credibility of the public sector.

The intention to move to an electronic public administration is a high priority goal for all public administrations internationally.²⁸ Nevertheless, according to literature, the achievement of this specific goal is a particularly demanding process that requires the fulfillment of specific conditions:²⁹

- Administrative conditions (formulation of the appropriate institutional framework, development of new organisational structures, readjustment of human resources management at the level of education/training/performance/ leadership/motivation/communication, management of technological change, etc.)
- Social conditions (informing and training citizens in the use of ICT, adoption of digital technologies by businesses, reduction of the educational and social gap in the use of technology, etc.)
- Technological conditions (creation of conditions for access to EG channels by all citizens, development of a high and secure technological level in the public sector, existence of the required technological infrastructures, implementation of digital services by public services, etc.)

²⁴ Ibrahim Osman, Abdel Latif Anouze, Zahir Irani, Baydaa Al-Ayoubi, Habin Lee, Asım Balci, Tunc Medeni, Vishanth Weerakkody, 'COBRA Framework to Evaluate E-governance Services: A Citizen-Centric Perspective' (2014) 31(2) *Government Information Quarterly* 243-256.

²⁵ Soonhee Kim, Jooho Lee, 'E-Participation, Transparency, and Trust in Local Government' (2012) 72 (6) *Public Administration Review* 819–828.

²⁶ Thomas Anderson, 'E-Governance as an Anti-Corruption Strategy' (2009) 21(3) *Information Economics and Policy* 201-210.

²⁷ Gregory Porumbescu, 'Linking Public Sector Social Media and E-governance Website Use to Trust in Government' (2016) 33(2) *Government Information Quarterly* 291–304.

²⁸ Dyah Setyaningrum, 'E-Governance as an Anti-Corruption Tool: Experience from Indonesia' (2020) *Accounting and Finance Review*, available at https://papers.ssrn.com/sol3/papers.cfm?abstract_id=3129311 (last accessed 09 August 2022).

Maxat Kassen, 'Globalization of E-Government: Open Government as a Global Agenda; Benefits, Limitations and Ways Forward' (2014) 30(1) *Information Development* 51–58.

²⁹ Indihar Štemberger, Jurij Jaklič, 'Towards E-Governance by Business Process Change – A Methodology for Public Sector' (2007) 27(4) *International Journal of Information Management*, 221-232.

Dave Griffin, Amanda Foster, Edward Halpin, 'Joined up E-Government: an Exploratory Study of UK Local Government Progress' (2004) *Journal of Information Science and Technology* 5883.

Evolution of E-Governance in Cyprus

The development of public administration in Cyprus is an extremely important goal, which, combined with the arrival of information technologies, has led to a large number of reforms over the last decades. At the end of the 70s, an early process of computerisation of public services in individual sectors was attempted (e.g. payrolls, budget, etc.). In 1980, the IT Services Department of the Ministry of Finance was created in the context of technological development and it took over the entire computerisation project, having completed it by 2003.

A particularly important contribution to the reform process was the passing of Law 158(I)/1999 on general administrative principles, promoting the principles of equality, transparent administration, good administration, and accountability, which shaped the necessity for utilising the principles of e-governance. At the same time, the accession of Cyprus to the EU in 2004 and consequently the obligation to endorse the *acquis communautaire* led to the widespread dissemination of ICT, aiming at the administrative convergence with advanced Europe (Department of Electronic Communications, 2012). This new administrative and political reality triggered the implementation of important e-governance programs, such as the Government Internet Portal, the Electronic Procurement System (eProcurement), the System of the Registrar of Companies and Official Receiver, the pilot Office Automation System (eOASIS), etc. In 2012, for the first time, a digital strategy was adopted, incorporating a dynamic and holistic approach. In 2014, all public tenders had to go through mandatory electronic submission through the Public Contracts System, followed by the creation of TaxisNet for the electronic registration of tax returns for individuals and companies. Then the National Open Data Portal 'Ariadni' was initiated. In June 2015, the Council of Ministers decided to replace the Computerisation Executive Council with the Electronic Government Council (GEC) with the aim of accelerating decision-making for project approval and rapid problem solving, as well as the implementation of the Unit's three-year Action Plan Administrative Reform (Administrative Reform Unit, 2015).

The next digital reforms are part of the 'Digital Strategy 2014-2020' which aimed to gradually upgrade e-governance in Cyprus, contributing to better services for citizens and businesses and promoting the better functioning of public administration. In recent years, the existing e-governance projects have been increasingly expanded, and other new and innovative projects have been added to the e-history of Cyprus. Among the existing projects, it is worth noting that the Ariadni System was expanded from 33 services to 40, the remarkable project of the Online Land Registry Portal was

upgraded, (operational since early 2016) offering a variety of services and the ability to navigate spatial maps, the eOASIS System was expanded, increasing its users to more than 1,100, the possibility of electronic payments was given to almost all government departments, etc. Other important innovations in the e-governance level are the Ippodamos Information System, which was upgraded by the Department of Urban Planning and Housing (TPO) (Informatics Services Department, 2020c) and the Land Registry Online Platform (DLS Portal).

Evolution of E-Governance in Greece

The development and evolution of e-governance in Greece was a challenging mission. The complexity of the multi-level hierarchical administrative model and the deficiencies in computerisation, as well as the limited technological infrastructures and the limited costs for ICT contributed to the challenge.³⁰ A stimulating factor for the development of e-governance in Greece was the European funding through the Community Support Frameworks (CSF), namely the second CSF for the period 1994-1999 and the third CSF for the period 2000-2006.³¹ In particular, the programs developed during the second CSF concerned the provision of the Public Administration with technological infrastructures and the familiarisation of employees in their use, as well as the development of government web portals for the provision of information, while through the third CSF provided some transactional electronic services.³²

In addition to the above, the ‘Kleisthenis’ program (1994-1999) holds a prominent place, as it marks the beginning of the functional and organisational modernisation of the Public Administration in Greece, introducing new technologies to the public sector: the supply of computers and network infrastructures combined with the training of civil servants, important actions from the ‘Kleisthenis’ program directed towards the development of the ‘TaxisNet’ web portal for the provision of information and tax services, as well as the first phase of the National Public Administration Network called ‘Syzeuxis’.

In the period 2000-2006, the operational program ‘Information Society’, which was financed by the 3rd CSF, aimed for a horizontal development program for the

³⁰ Demetrios Sarantis, Dimitris Askounis, ‘Electronic Government Interoperability Framework in Greece: Project Management Approach and Lessons Learned in Public Administration’ (2010) 7(3) *Journal of US-China Public Administration* 39-49.

³¹ Konstantinos Markellos, Penelope Markellou, Angeliki Panayiotaki, Eirini Stergianieli, ‘Current State of Greek E-Governance Initiatives’ (2007) 2(3) *Journal of Law and Governance* 67-88.

³² Panagiotis Hahamis, J., Iles, Mike Healy, ‘E-Governance in Greece: Bridging the Gap Between Need and Reality’ (2005) 3(4) *The Electronic Journal of e-Government* 185-192.

public administration with an emphasis on improving the quality of the services provided by the Administration through the utilisation of ICT, emphasising on e-learning and e-business. In the following years, the development of e-governance took on a more strategic character and digital strategies were developed.³³

Regarding the historical development of the government strategy in general for e-governance, the ‘White Paper’, drawn up in 1995, marks its beginning³⁴ focusing on the transition of Greece to an information society. Subsequently, the ‘Digital Strategy 2006-2013’, accompanied by the operational program “Digital Convergence 2007-2013”, constituted the transition from the utilisation of ICT to a comprehensive strategic proposal for improving the productivity of the economy and the quality of life of citizens. The ‘E-governance Strategy 2014-2020’ focuses on the modernisation of the Administration through IT tools, as well as policies to reconnect the citizen with the Administration. In conclusion, the ‘National Digital Strategy 2016-2021’ is a guide for the digital development of the country, promoting its harmonisation with the practices applied in Europe.³⁵ For the current period, the ‘National Digital Strategy 2020-2025’, as described in the ‘Digital Transformation Book 2020-2025’, refers to the strategy and the individual ways of implementation through an action plan and with a vision of creating ‘Digital Greece’.

The course of digital reforms in Greece can be traced through important e-governance projects such as ‘Syzefxis’, ‘Diavgeia’, the integrated information system ‘TaxisNet’, the ‘National Government Portal HERMIS’, the online portal of the OAED (for job hunting in the public sector), the electronic services of the Municipal and KEP Registries, the consolidated Insurance Funds (e-EFKA), the ‘Ergani’ system for employees, ‘Pothen’, as well as the recent e-governance services, such as vaccination management for the Covid-19 pandemic, etc.³⁶

Overview of the DESI Index

Cyprus and Greece have made significant progress regarding the implementation of

³³ Markellos, K., et al. (no 31).


³⁴ Apostolakis, I., Loukis, E., Chalaris, I. (no 14).

³⁵ Dianeosis, ‘The Internet in Greece. EKKE research’ (Το διαδίκτυο στην Ελλάδα. Έρευνα EKKE) (2020), available at https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2020/05/WIP_greece.pdf (last accessed 12 August 2022) (in Greek).

³⁶ Michalis Skordoulis, Panteleimon Alasonas, Victoria Pekka Economou, ‘E-Governance Services Quality and Citizens’ Satisfaction: A Multi-Criteria Satisfaction Analysis of TAXISnet Information System in Greece’ (2017) 22(1) *International Journal of Productivity and Quality Management*.

e-governance policies.³⁷ Nevertheless, they fall significantly short of the European average, occupying low positions in international rankings. An extremely important indicator is the Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI), which describes the digital performance of European countries in specific categories. The DESI index characterises the progress of the EU Member States in the development of the digital economy and society, while the European Commission oversees the digital improvement of Member States with the help of index reports.³⁸ On an annual basis, reports are drawn up for each Member State, identifying the area of their digitisation, highlighting the sectors that need immediate intervention and the thematic chapters that provide an evaluation at EU level to key digital sectors, which are elements of essential importance for the formulation of strategic and political positions.³⁹ From 2021 on, the DESI index has been adjusted to reflect the two important policy initiatives that will contribute to the EU’s digital transformation in the coming years. The first regards the Recovery and Resilience Mechanism, through which recovery and resilience plans of the Member States are financed. The second concerns the Digital Compass for the Digital Decade, which includes setting EU-level targets and

Figure: 1



Source: <https://digital-strategy.ec.europa.eu/en/policies/europes-digital-decade>

³⁷ Ioannis Rossidis, Dimitrios Belias, D., ‘Evolution of E-Governance in the Era of the Pandemic. May the Crisis Become an Opportunity. The Cases of Cyprus and Greece’ (2021) 33(1) *The Cyprus Review* 37-66.

³⁸ Dolgikh, et al, (no 11)

³⁹ Andriy Stavvitsky, Ganna Kharlamova, Eduard Alexandru Stoica, ‘The Analysis of the Digital Economy and Society Index in the EU’ (2019) 9(3) *TalTech Journal of European Studies* 245-261.

an EU- and national-level roadmap, creating a strong shared governance framework to monitor progress and address gaps, and promoting multi-national projects combining investment from the EU, Member States, and the private sector. The policies identified in the compass refer to innovative technologies, the regulatory and regulatory framework and the democratic principles governing the rule of law. To monitor the progress towards achieving the goals, the EU uses instruments such as National Strategies, Multi-State Projects, Committees, dialogue, and cooperation process, etc.

The DESI index was established by the European Commission as a tool for recording the digital performance of countries, recommending a set of qualitative and quantitative dimensions that reflect the digital evolution of the Member States of the European Union. It should be noted that the DESI index is a ranking index, and it does not reflect a country's performance in absolute terms but its performance in comparison to the rest. Therefore, a low ranking does not necessarily mean that the country has not made progress, but that other countries have probably progressed faster. The official definition contained in Article 3 of the Decision of the European Parliament and of the Council is:

Digital economy and society indicator (DESI): annual set of analysis and measurement indicators on the basis of which the Commission monitors the overall digital performance of the Union and the States members across policy dimensions, including their progress towards digital goals.

The index in its current form is structured in four dimensions:

1. Human capital, which measures the skills and familiarity of a country's citizens with the digital world.
2. Connectivity, which includes fixed and mobile broadband networks, as well as connection prices.
3. The integration of digital technology, which reflects the degree of digitisation of businesses and e-commerce.
4. Digital public services, which measures the degree of digitisation of public services giving a greater basis to the degree of e-governance and e-health services.

The analysis of the index can lead to the assessment of countries in relation to their performance both overall and in individual dimensions as well to check their progress over time and compare their performance both with digital integration leaders and their competing countries. Under these circumstances, the index is developing into a very useful tool for grading the digital level of European countries, providing the possibility for each country to identify deficiencies and shortcomings and

allowing the EU to approach the goal of a further administrative convergence of the Member States. The focus on the control of the digitisation of a country's economy and society provides the basis for the instrumentalisation of the index in the effort to develop public administration and especially Electronic Governance. Although only one of the four parameters refers specifically to public administration (digital public services) it is important to examine the remaining three parameters that make up the index (human capital, connectivity, integration of digital technology) as they contribute decisively to the shaping of the framework under which Electronic Public Administration is developed. Therefore, their consideration is of particular importance for the holistic evaluation of the level of Electronic Governance.

The index acts as a kind of cumulative overview of the results of a country's digital development by identifying the environment in which e-governance is developing. By identifying and examining areas of digital priority, it essentially contributes to the adoption of accurate political and administrative decisions, which will lead to the general improvement of the public sector and the economic and social development of the States. Ultimately, by highlighting the lags/problems, it contributes to laying the foundations for new e-governance priorities.

The Course of Digital Transformation in Cyprus and Greece According to the DESI Index

In recent years, Cyprus has marked an upward trend in relation to the digitization of the economy and society, carrying out important reforms in this direction. Accordingly, the field of Electronic Governance in Cyprus is developing rapidly, actively contributing to the overall upgrade of the Cypriot public administration. Nevertheless, compared to the course of most EU Member States (as reflected in the DESI index), it appears to fall short of the European average, noting deficiencies and problems in need of improvement. Currently, in the DESI 2022 index, Cyprus ranks 20th among the 27 EU Member States, rendering evident the need for individual improvements and corrective actions.

Despite ranking low among other European countries, when compared to the 2021 ranking chart, progress seems to have been achieved by showing improvements in almost all dimensions of the index, with the biggest improvements observed in connectivity, integration of digital skills, and digital public services. However, it should be noted that the index is comparative. Hence, any progress noted was not significant when compared to the rest of the European countries which showed an even greater progress.

Figure: 2

	Cyprus		EU
DESI 2022	rank	score	score
	20	48.4	52.3






Figure: 3



In recent years, Greece, like Cyprus, has presented important reforms in the direction of the digitisation of society and economy by integrating IT and communication technologies and by drastically strengthening the electronic services of the public administration. Currently, Greece ranks 25th according to the the DESI index.


Figure: 4

	Greece		EU
DESI 2022	rank	score	score
	25	38.9	52.3



Source: European Commission, 2022

Figure: 5



Source: European Commission, 2022

Despite maintaining a particularly low ranking, Greece demonstrates significant progress, having improved in almost all dimensions of the index. It should be noted that in the years 2020 and 2019 Greece ranked 27th, and in 2018 it came 28th. Despite the visible progress, the comparative dimension of the index points out short-

comings that need to be improved to achieve administrative convergence with the EU. It is a fact that although Greece has increased its score to 38.9 points, the EU average has also increased to 52.3 points.

The distance from the European average is largely due to the speed of integration of digital changes by most European countries in relation to Greece, which highlights the structural problems of the country. In the next chapter, each dimension of the DESI for Cyprus and Greece is presented and analysed on the relevant European Commission's reports.

Human Capital

Cyprus ranks 21st in the Human Capital dimension and is placed below the European average in all indicators (with the exception of the indicator regarding the percentage of women experts in ICT, in which it is equal to the average at 19% and the indicator regarding the percentage of companies providing ICT training, in which it exceeds the average - 25% against 20% of the average). At this point, it should be mentioned that despite the fact that Cyprus falls short of the European average, it is upgraded from the 23rd place in 2021 to the 21st in 2022. The low performance of Cyprus can be explained by the reduced number of workers with expertise in ICT, the population's lack of basic digital skills (50% of the population has basic digital skills and 21% has advanced skills), the low percentage of specialists in ICT in relation to the total workforce, (the percentage in question amounts to 3.9% compared to 4.5% of the average of the European Union and 8% of pioneer Sweden). Cyprus performs clearly better in internet use, as 97% of households in small towns and suburbs, 93% in cities and 91% in rural areas have access to the internet. A point of concern is the fact that 6% of citizens have skills exclusively in 'information and communication'. This dimension presents the lowest score of all the other dimensions and falls well short of the EU average.⁴⁰

The Commission's annual report mentions the actions promoted by Cyprus to accelerate its digital upgrade, which focus on education (through the creation of a new teacher and school evaluation system, including teacher training in digital skills), digital transformation of school units with the aim of strengthening digital skills and skills related to education in the fields of science, technology, engineering and mathematics (STEM), and digital skills in general, with a special mention of the program 'Digital Skills: Action Plan 2021 – 2025', which focuses on accelerating the digital transition through the creation of an open, digital society.

⁴⁰ European Commission, 'Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022 Cyprus' (2022).

Table: 1

1 Human capital	Cyprus		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	21	41.8	45.7

	Cyprus			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
1a1 At least basic digital skills % individuals	NA	NA	50%	54%
			2021	2021
1a2 Above basic digital skills % individuals	NA	NA	21%	26%
			2021	2021
1a3 At least basic digital content creation skills³ % individuals	NA	NA	60%	66%
			2021	2021
1b1 ICT specialists % individuals in employment aged 15-74	2.7%	3.1%	3.9%	4.5%
	2019	2020	2021	2021
1b2 Female ICT specialists % ICT specialists	19%	18%	19%	19%
	2019	2020	2021	2021
1b3 Enterprises providing ICT training % enterprises	31%	25%	25%	20%
	2019	2020	2020	2020
1b4 ICT graduates % graduates	2.6%	2.9%	2.7%	3.9%
	2018	2019	2020	2020

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Cyprus

Greece, on the other hand, ranks one place behind Cyprus in 22nd place with a score of 40.1 against the EU average of 45.7. Despite the undeniable progress it has shown compared to previous years, it still falls short of the European average in all subcategories of the Human Capital dimension. The low performance of Greece is derived from the reduced number of employees with advanced skills in information technologies (22% compared to 26.5% of average of the EU), and the particularly low percentage of ICT specialists in relation to the entire workforce, (2.8% compared to 4.5% of the EU). Greece’s performance is very good in certain indicators such as women with expertise in ICT (where it exceeds the European average with a percentage of 21% compared to 19% for the EU) and the existence of basic digital skills of the population (with a percentage of 52% approaching the European average, which amounts to 54%).⁴¹

Through the Ministry of Digital Governance (in collaboration with many other agencies), Greece has developed a strategy for the promotion of digital skills. The National Academy of Digital Skills, launched in 2021, aims to become the key development agency for digital education, for public and private sector workers. Particular

⁴¹ European Commission ‘Digital Economy and Society Index (DESI) 2022 Greece’. (2022).

emphasis is placed on the development of civil servants' digital skills by the Ministry of the Interior and the National Center for Public Administration and Self-Government by organising specialized training programs⁴². Moreover, the Ministry of Education designs upgraded study programs in areas of Computer Science and Communication, aiming to contribute to the overall development of citizens' digital skills.

Table: 2

1 Human capital	Greece		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	22	40.1	45.7

	Greece			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
1a1 At least basic digital skills	NA	NA	52%	54%
% individuals			2021	2021
1a2 Above basic digital skills	NA	NA	22%	26%
% individuals			2021	2021
1a3 At least basic digital content creation skills³	NA	NA	62%	66%
% individuals			2021	2021
1b1 ICT specialists	2.0%	2.1%	2.8%	4.5%
% individuals in employment aged 15-74	2019	2020	2021	2021
1b2 Female ICT specialists	22%	29%	21%	19%
% ICT specialists	2019	2020	2021	2021
1b3 Enterprises providing ICT training	15%	12%	12%	20%
% enterprises	2019	2020	2020	2020
1b4 ICT graduates	3.1%	3.4%	3.5%	3.9%
% graduates	2018	2019	2020	2020

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Greece

Connectivity

Cyprus is ranked 12th in connectivity this year, showing a remarkable rise in its ranking (note that in the year 2021 it was ranked 24th). Despite this, there is still a marginal deviation from the European average. This deviation is derived mainly from the low performance in several indicators, such as the fixed broadband penetration of at least 100Mbps, the penetration of at least 1 Gbps, the coverage of fixed very high-capacity networks (VHCN) and the coverage of optical fibers (FTTP).

The progress shown by Cyprus in this dimension originates from the development of next-generation access networks (NGA), where the 5G readiness indicator

⁴² Ioannis Papapolychroniadis, Ioannis Rossidis, Georgios Aspridis, 'Comparative Analysis of Recruitment Systems in the Public Sector in Greece and Europe. Trends and Outlook for Staff Selection Systems in the Greek Public Sector' (2017) 6(1) Academic Journal of Interdisciplinary Studies.

exceeded the EU average of 67% with a coverage reaching 75%. According to the Commission’s annual report, in order to achieve further improvement of Cyprus’ performance in the connectivity dimension, actions should be taken to strengthen the cabling of buildings to prepare them for Gigabit capacity (Gigabit-ready), to promote the adoption of very high-capacity connectivity and to strengthen the corresponding networks in underserved areas. A special mention is made in the ‘Broadband Plan of Cyprus 2021-2025’.

Table: 3

2 Connectivity	Cyprus		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	12	58.8	59.9

	Cyprus			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
2a1 Overall fixed broadband take-up	87%	92%	92%	78%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2a2 At least 100 Mbps fixed broadband take-up	2%	3%	26%	41%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2a3 At least 1 Gbps take-up	<0.01%	<0.01%	0.17%	7.58%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b1 Fast broadband (NGA) coverage	100%	100%	100%	90%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b2 Fixed Very High Capacity Network (VHCN) coverage	10%	26%	41%	70%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b3 Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) coverage	10%	26%	41%	50%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2c1 5G spectrum	0%	67%	67%	56%
Assigned spectrum as a % of total harmonised 5G spectrum	04/2020	09/2021	04/2022	04/2022
2c2 5G coverage⁵	NA	0%	75%	66%
% populated areas		2020	2021	2021
2c3 Mobile broadband take-up	84%	84%	91%	87%
% individuals	2018	2018	2021	2021
2d1 Broadband price index	37	42	64	73
Score (0-100)	2019	2020	2021	2021

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Cyprus

In the same dimension, Greece occupies the 22nd position for the year 2022 with a score of 49.6% against 59.9% for the EU. Despite its low position in this category, Greece has also shown significant progress in all indicators of this dimension. Particular areas of concern are: the coverage of very high capacity networks (VHCN) in which Greece receives a percentage of 20% compared to 70% of the EU, and the penetration of fixed speed broadband communications, where Greece has a percent-

age of 9% compared to 41% of the EU.⁴³ Despite this, the country's progress in all the individual sectors of this dimension indicate an upward course, creating positive estimates for the future. = The new National Broadband Plan initiated in 2021 is being prepared, and it aims to achieve the Gigabit targets for 2025 and the Digital Decade targets for 2030 by planning to create an investment-friendly environment.

Table: 4

2 Connectivity	Greece		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	22	49.6	59.9

	Greece			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
2a1 Overall fixed broadband take-up	76%	77%	82%	78%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2a2 At least 100 Mbps fixed broadband take-up	1%	3%	9%	41%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2a3 At least 1 Gbps take-up	<0.01%	<0.01%	<0.01%	7.58%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b1 Fast broadband (NGA) coverage	81%	87%	92%	90%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b2 Fixed Very High Capacity Network (VHCN) coverage	7%	10%	20%	70%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2b3 Fibre to the Premises (FTTP) coverage	7%	10%	20%	50%
% households	2019	2020	2021	2021
2c1 5G spectrum	0%	99%	99%	56%
Assigned spectrum as a % of total harmonised 5G spectrum	04/2020	09/2021	04/2022	04/2022
2c2 5G coverage⁴	NA	0%	66%	66%
% populated areas		2020	2021	2021
2c3 Mobile broadband take-up	67%	67%	76%	87%
% individuals	2018	2018	2021	2021
2d1 Broadband price index	49	53	58	73
Score (0-100)	2019	2020	2021	2021

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Greece

Integration of Digital Technology

In the digital technology integration dimension, Cyprus is ranked 17th, rising three places, compared to 2021. Thanks to the achieved progress, Cyprus can significantly approach the European average (35.6 points compared to 36.1 for the EU). The improvement in its ranking is mainly due to the increase in the percentage of SMEs (Small and Medium-sized Enterprises) with at least a basic level of digital intensity and the increase in companies using mass networking and cloud computing (el-

⁴³ European Commission (no 41).

ements which far exceed the corresponding European averages scores). However, Cyprus performs poorly in terms of big data, and the percentage of businesses using artificial intelligence (AI) applications, issuing e-invoicing, and selling online.⁴⁴

In order to strengthen digital technology, the ‘Industrial Policy of Cyprus’ established in May 2019 aimed at creating a technologically developed industry, contributing significantly to the development and competitiveness of the Cypriot economy. In January 2020, the national AI strategy was adopted and includes actions for the development and exploitation of AI in Cyprus. Meanwhile, since 2021, a new cyber security strategy has been implemented with the aim of consolidating a secure electronic environment in Cyprus, with special provisions and actions for the protection of critical information infrastructures, contributing to the formation of a solid economic development environment.

Table: 5

3 Integration of digital technology	Cyprus		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	17	35.3	36.1

	Cyprus			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
3a1 SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity % SMEs	NA	NA	66%	55%
3b1 Electronic information sharing % enterprises	33%	33%	34%	38%
3b2 Social media % enterprises	38%	38%	42%	29%
3b3 Big data % enterprises	5%	6%	6%	14%
3b4 Cloud % enterprises	NA	NA	42%	34%
3b5 AI % enterprises	NA	NA	3%	8%
3b6 ICT for environmental sustainability % enterprises having medium/high intensity of green action through ICT	NA	NA	NA	66%
3b7 e-Invoices % enterprises	11%	13%	13%	32%
3c1 SMEs selling online % SMEs	12%	15%	17%	18%
3c2 e-Commerce turnover % SME turnover	8%	5%	5%	12%
3c3 Selling online cross-border % SMEs	9%	9%	8%	9%

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Cyprus

⁴⁴ European Commission (no 40).

Greece ranks 22nd in the digital technology integration dimension, far behind the European average (Greece's score is 26.6 compared to the EU's 36.1). In contrast to Cyprus, Greece presents a very low percentage of SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity and businesses that use cloud computing. The areas where Greece approaches the European average are: social media, big data and e-commerce turnover, while in the area of SMEs selling online it exceeds the average performance of European countries. Sectors with relatively low performance remain: AI, electronic information sharing, and selling online cross-border.

Table: 6

3 Integration of digital technology	Greece		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	22	26.6	36.1

	Greece			EU
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
3a1 SMEs with at least a basic level of digital intensity	NA	NA	39%	55%
% SMEs			2021	2021
3b1 Electronic information sharing	38%	38%	35%	38%
% enterprises	2019	2019	2021	2021
3b2 Social media	19%	19%	29%	29%
% enterprises	2019	2019	2021	2021
3b3 Big data	13%	13%	13%	14%
% enterprises	2018	2020	2020	2020
3b4 Cloud	NA	NA	17%	34%
% enterprises			2021	2021
3b5 AI	NA	NA	4%	8%
% enterprises			2021	2021
3b6 ICT for environmental sustainability	NA	65%	65%	66%
% enterprises having medium/high intensity of green action through ICT		2021	2021	2021
3b7 e-Invoices	9%	NA	NA	32%
% enterprises	2018	2020	2020	2020
3c1 SMEs selling online	9%	NA	20%	18%
% SMEs	2019	2020	2021	2021
3c2 e-Commerce turnover	4%	NA	11%	12%
% SME turnover	2019	2020	2021	2021
3c3 Selling online cross-border	4%	4%	7%	9%
% SMEs	2019	2019	2021	2021

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Greece

Although Greece has not formulated a clear national strategy for the digital transformation of its industry, several improvement efforts have been attempted in recent years. In particular, efforts are being made to simplify the licensing process for industrial enterprises, numerous projects are being planned for the digitization of industries, such as comprehensive support for the digital transformation of SMEs in

e-commerce applications, telecommuting systems, digital upgrading, AI tools, cyber security systems, and cloud infrastructure (capital of the order of 375 million euros is foreseen).⁴⁵ A National Cyber Security Operations Center will be created to support security in critical infrastructures, implement individual proposals of the Hellenic European Center for Digital Innovation, and establish an independent research unit for artificial intelligence and data science, among others.

Digital Public Services

Cyprus is ranked 20th in the digital public services dimension, moving up one position compared to 2021. Despite the progress made, it is about 10 points behind the European average, highlighting not only the shortcomings but also the significant room for improvement. Cyprus approaches the EU average when it comes to e-governance users and exceeds it in open data and digital public services for businesses. However, it falls significantly short in the area of pre-filled forms (31% compared to 64% for the EU) and Digital public services for citizens (56% compared to 75% for the EU), which is a cause of serious concern. The adoption of the eIDAS Regulation (Electronic Identification, Authentication, and Trust Services) led to the introduction of a national electronic identification (eID) scheme which comprises several legislative acts adopted in April 2021. The creation of a national scheme on eID and the possibility for an e-signature will enable the public interaction digitally with the government through the Government Gateway web platform. More precisely, the adopted ‘Trust Service Provider (TSP)’ will provide eID to all citizens above 18 years of age. .

Furthermore, the Cypriot government aims to create a digital environment which will host governmental systems and services. This initiative foresees addressing the problem of scattered IT governmental systems and limited cyber security.

The project is in its initial stage, while its procurement phase is under preparation. However, the aim is to gradually expand it to cover all governmental departments.⁴⁶

Greece got 39.4 points, thus staying far behind the European average (67.3 points). It ranks 26th, being the worst performer among the four key dimensions of the index. Greece manages to score higher than the EU average only in e-governance users and open data, but it falls significantly short in all other categories. Although Greece’s performance is particularly low in several categories, the progress being made is particularly significant (not yet reflected in the index data), leading to a gradual narrowing of the gap (36 versus 63 in DESI 2021). Even though access to services

⁴⁵ European Commission (no 41).

⁴⁶ European Commission (no 40).

Table: 7

4 Digital public services ⁶	Cyprus		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	20	57.5	67.3

	Cyprus		EU	
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
4a1 e-Government users	58%	59%	63%	65%
% internet users	2019	2020	2021	2021
4a2 Pre-filled forms	NA	NA	31	64
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a3 Digital public services for citizens	NA	NA	56	75
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a4 Digital public services for businesses	NA	NA	86	82
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a5 Open data	NA	NA	91%	81%
% maximum score			2021	2021

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Cyprus

Table: 8

4 Digital public services ⁹	Greece		EU
	rank	score	score
DESI 2022	26	39.4	67.3

	Greece		EU	
	DESI 2020	DESI 2021	DESI 2022	DESI 2022
4a1 e-Government users	68%	67%	69%	65%
% internet users	2019	2020	2021	2021
4a2 Pre-filled forms	NA	NA	45	64
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a3 Digital public services for citizens	NA	NA	52	75
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a4 Digital public services for businesses	NA	NA	48	82
Score (0 to 100)			2021	2021
4a5 Open data	NA	NA	82%	81%
% maximum score			2021	2021

Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2022 Greece

for citizens and businesses have improved in 2021, Greece still scores well below the EU average on both indicators for digital public services for citizens and for digital public services for businesses with a score of 52 for citizens (EU average: 75) and 48 for businesses (EU average: 82).

From a thorough examination of the wider operation of Greece's e-governance systems, the main areas of concerns are: lack of long-term vision, gap between digital strategy, action plan and implementation, absence of a realistic implementation strategy plan, lack of continuity in Public Administration, absence of citizen-centric approach, inefficient process planning, problematic institutional and legal framework, ambiguity in the involvement and participation of competent bodies, problems in human resource management, lack of staff training, absence of high level software design, absence or non-application of common design principles, ambitious development of information systems that cannot be maintained, etc.⁴⁷

Greece has launched a comprehensive digitisation plan for its public services, based on the Digital Transformation Bible, implementing around 450 IT projects. A key digital reform is the implementation of the single portal ('Gov.gr') which hosts over 1,370 digital public services achieving for 2021 more than 566 million transactions (six times the 2020 level of 94 million). At the same time, multiple efforts are being made to improve the level of interoperability and the effective implementation of the 'once only' principle, permitting to foresee a significant increase in this indicator in the following year.

Discussion


From the preceding analysis, it is clear that both Cyprus and Greece have shown progress in the field of digital transformation, as they have managed to reach the EU average. However, since the index is comparative, Cyprus' and Greece's ranking does not change significantly, despite the indisputable progress (increase in their score over time).

Table: 9

DESI Index	Cyprus		Greece		EU
	Rank	Score	Rank	Score	Score
DESI Index 2022	20	48,4	25	38,9	52,3
DESI Index 2021	21	43,5	25	37,3	50,7
DESI Index 2020	24	44	27	37,3	52,6
DESI Index 2019	24	41,5	27	35,1	49,4
DESI Index 2018	23	39,4	28	32,3	46,5

⁴⁷ Dimoidis Spinellis D., 'Electronic Governance in Greece' (Ηλεκτρονική Διακυβέρνηση στην Ελλάδα) (Athens: Dianeosis, 2018). available at https://www.dianeosis.org/wp-content/uploads/2018/03/EGov_Upd_090318.pdf (last accessed 07/03/2023).

Figure: 6



Source: Digital Economy and Society Index 2018-2022 Cyprus/Greece

In Cyprus, although several digital reforms have been carried out, the bodies of the Cypriot public administration show great heterogeneity in relation to the inter-functional maturity and electronic transformation of internal processes.⁴⁸ The progress made in all areas sends encouraging signals for the course of digital transformation and electronic public administration. However, additional actions are needed for convergence with the EU and the general development of digital services. According to the analysis carried out regarding the dimensions of the DESI index, special emphasis must be placed on human resources and digital public services sectors where Cyprus presents the greatest deviation compared to the European average.

The analysis of the index elements identifies critical actions to improve e-public administration, since digital public services are obviously an integral part of the e-governance system.⁴⁹ Cyprus’ low performance in digital public services highlights

⁴⁸ Deputy Ministry of Research, Innovation and Digital Policy, ‘Digital Cyprus 2025’, available at [https://www.dmid.gov.cy/dmid/research.nsf/all/927EA351714F99EDC22587CE0028C090/\\$file/Digital%20Strategy%202020-2025.pdf?openelement](https://www.dmid.gov.cy/dmid/research.nsf/all/927EA351714F99EDC22587CE0028C090/$file/Digital%20Strategy%202020-2025.pdf?openelement) (last accessed 7 March 2023).

⁴⁹ Asgarkhani Mehdi, ‘Digital Government and its Effectiveness in Public Management Reform’ (2005) 7(3) *Public Management Review* 465-487.

the need to implement additional administrative reforms to strengthen the E-governance system itself. Accordingly, the analysis and consideration of the remaining three dimensions of the index can significantly contribute to the formation of the appropriate administrative and technological environment for the promotion of Electronic Governance. Connectivity is a basic condition for the utilisation of digital services.⁵⁰ The rapid development of Cyprus in this field created the foundations for the consolidation of Electronic Governance. The dimension Integration of digital technology is also at a fairly good level, marking a significant increase compared to 2021. An area of concern is the dimension of human capital in which Cyprus falls significantly short of the European average. The evaluative analysis of the European Commission's findings can highlight the areas in which emphasis should be placed for keeping pace with advanced Europe, such as: the development of basic and advanced digital skills, the provision of incentives to attract ICT specialists, etc.

Greece is also in a similar (albeit slightly more unfavourable) position (its ranking and overall score is at a lower level than Cyprus). Despite the efforts, Greece still lags significantly behind the European average in all parameters of the index.⁵¹ The Greek outdated infrastructure and the lack of an effective strategic plan of the previous years, combined with the pathogenic public administration⁵² and the multifaceted difficulties of integrating digital technologies, have led the country to a difficult position regarding the level of digital transformation, that of being at the tail end of the EU.⁵³ The need for additional digital reforms is imperative, while the requirement for implementation expertise is evident.⁵⁴

The reference to the DESI highlighted problems and shortcomings during the process of digital transformation of the country, which greatly affects the effort to

⁵⁰ Harekrishna Misra, Umanag Das, 'Role of Connectivity in Citizen Centered E-Governance in Myanmar: Learning from Indian Experience' (2014) EGOSE, Proceedings of the 2014 Conference on Electronic Governance and Open Society: Challenges in Eurasia.

⁵¹ Sokratis Katsikas, Stefanos Gritzalis, 'Digitalization in Greece: State of Play, Barriers, Challenges, Solutions. In Beyond Bureaucracy' (Springer Cham, 2017) 355-375.

⁵² Petros Katsimardos, Konstantinos Bouas, Ioannis Rossidis, Labros Babalioutas, 'Greek Crisis: It's Not About Growth. It's About Governance' (2017) 9(3) *International Journal of Current Research*.

⁵³ Spinellis (no 47).

⁵⁴ Haralampos Anthopoulos, 'Freedom of Information in the Age of Digital Platforms' (Η Ελευθερία της Πληροφόρησης στην Εποχή των Ψηφιακών Πλατφορμών) (2021) 1(1) *Public Administration Review* (in Greek);

Lucas Introna, Niall Hayes, Dimitra Petrakaki 'The Working out of Modernization in the Public Sector: The Case of an E-Governance Initiative in Greece' (2009) 33(1) *International Journal of Public Administration* 11-25.

transition to a purely electronic public administration. The DESI's dimension mostly connected to Electronic Governance, that of digital public services, is underdeveloped in Greece. The country is second to last in the European ranking, showing lags in many areas. Particular emphasis should be placed on the development of digital public services for citizens and for businesses by reforming the extroverted dimension of electronic public administration though a focus on the digital service of citizens and businesses. However, the analysis of the index showed that the other dimensions which constitute the digital environment in which the Greek public administration operates show serious deficiencies. The connectivity and integration of digital technology is insufficient and, as a result, the required technological conditions are not met to form the essential environment under which e-governance systems will operate effectively and efficiently. The formation of the required technological infrastructure is a decisive challenge for Greece in order to enable a leap in the development of electronic public administration. The human capital dimension is of similar importance. Citizens must be equipped with digital skills to be able to take advantage of the configured e-governance systems. It is a fact that Greece lags behind in all sub-parameters of human capital, making it clear that targeted public policies must be adopted in this direction.

The performance of Cyprus and Greece in relation to the Digital Economy and Society Index has prompted the Governments of recent years to take significant measures to modernise and develop strategic plans. The requirement to keep pace with advanced Europe in the context of an imperative need for administrative convergence, create an important means of pressure for multifaceted organisational and socio-political changes.⁵⁵ These evolving digital conditions should methodically lead to the formation of the appropriate technological and administrative environment that will support the development of Electronic Governance.⁵⁶ The DESI can develop into a particularly useful policy tool which highlights the problems and outlines the required actions to achieve the goal of developing an advanced digital society and economy for Cyprus and Greece.⁵⁷

⁵⁵ Christine Leitner, 'E-Governance in Europe: The State of Affairs' (2003) European Institute of Public Administration, Maastricht., EPIAScope, 37-39.

⁵⁶ Ramon Gil-Garcia, Sharon S Dawes, Theresa Pardo, 'Digital Government and Public Management Research: Finding the Crossroads' (2018) 20(5) *Public Management Review* 633-646.

⁵⁷ Rossidis, I., Belias, D. 'Combining Strategic Management with Knowledge Management. Trends and International perspectives' (2020a) 10(3) *International Review of Management and Marketing* 39-45.

Conclusions

From the preceding analysis, it becomes evident that a significant effort has been made to accelerate the digital transformation of Cyprus and Greece, creating the foundations for the corresponding upgrade of the Electronic Governance systems.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the significant shortcomings in relation to the European average make it clear that actions should be taken to further digitise society and the economy, focusing on redefining their strategic orientation.⁵⁹ The State's assistance through targeted public policies is a necessary condition towards digital transformation.⁶⁰ The development of a strategically targeted digital culture with the parallel cultivation of digital skills, also combined with the strengthening of digital public services⁶¹ will create the foundations for the two countries' convergence with the EU. According to Spinellis⁶² 'a key problem during the digital evolution project is found in the lack of a timeless vision for Electronic Governance despite the formulation and implementation of piecemeal goals from time to time'. A strategic vision and mobilisation of the entire society with activation and cooperation of all technological and administrative means is therefore required for the development of Electronic Governance.⁶³ In this context and in conjunction with the previous analysis, the following proposals are identified for the gradual improvement of digital perspectives.⁶⁴

- Adherence to a single strategic plan under which the digital transformation will be developed, with particular emphasis on human capital.
- Development of communication channels so that citizens are informed about the existence and usefulness of digital services in order to increase the level of trust.

⁵⁸ Giannis Kalogirou, Panagiotis Panagiotopoulos, 'E-Government' (Ηλεκτρονική Διακυβέρνηση) in Kalogirou, G. et al. (eds), *Information Society and Knowledge Economy* (Athens: Greek Academic Electronic Textbooks and Aids. Kallipos Repository, 2016) (in Greek).

⁵⁹ Ioannis Rossidis, Dimitrios Belias, Stefanos Papailias, 'Strategic Management and Performance in the International Environment' (2020b) Book of Proceedings, International Conference on Contemporary Marketing Issues.

⁶⁰ Veiko Lember, Taco Brandsen, Piret Tõnurist, 'The Potential Impacts of Digital Technologies on Co-Production and Co-Creation' (2019) 21(11) *Public Management Review* 1665–1686.

⁶¹ Joydeep Guha, Bhaskar Chakrabarti, 'Making E-Governance Work: Adopting the Network Approach' (2014) 31 (2) *Government Information Quarterly* 327–336.

⁶² Spinellis (no 47).

⁶³ Rossidis et al., (no 59)

⁶⁴ Hu Qian, 'Preparing Public Managers for the Digital Era: Incorporating Information Management, Use, and Technology into Public Affairs Graduate Curricula' (2018) 20(5) *Public Management Review* 766-787.

- Utilisation of human resource expertise combined with citizen participation in shaping digital political services.
- Development of citizens' digital skills through specialised training programs with special emphasis on civil servants.
- Incentivise the development/attraction of skilled IT professionals.
- Provide opportunities for all citizens to use IT and communications media by creating uniformed service conditions.
- Focus on shaping citizen-centric design of digital services.
- Further utilisation of digital technologies with the aim of improving the quality, efficiency and effectiveness of Public Administration.
- Development of modern electronic infrastructures in all public organisations to fully achieve the transition to digital services.
- Development of very high capacity fixed networks (VHCN) and fiber optic coverage (FTTP).
- Leveraging the European Connectivity Toolkit to reduce costs, increase the speed of VHCN deployment and ensure timely and investment-friendly access to the 5G spectrum.
- Alignment with European policies to facilitate the development of advanced network infrastructures (e.g. European Gigabit Society and Digital Compass 2030).
- Funding from European financial mechanisms to cover investments in connectivity and integration of digital technology.
- Establishment of security policies and implementation of a national strategy for security in digital infrastructures and the internet.
- Continuous monitoring, control and feedback of e-governance systems.

The goal of developing Electronic Governance through the establishment of digital transformation is a particularly laborious and difficult one, but at the same time it is also a necessary process for the development of public administration and society/economy as a whole. Greece and Cyprus have made significant progress, but they still have a long way to go to create the appropriate digital ecosystem that will allow them to develop a modern and efficient electronic public administration.

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Economic Relations and the Import-Export Balance in Greek–Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish Trade During the Years 2010-2021

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Abstract

The purpose of this paper is a brief presentation of Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish economic relations and, more specifically, of bilateral imports-exports during the years 2010-2021. Greek exports to Turkey increased and the trade balance was positive for Greece for a long period. During the last few years (2019-2021), the trade balance between Greece and Turkey was negative for Greece. Also, the trade balance with Turkey was negative for the years 2010-2021, with deficits for Cyprus. However, transactions are not important in comparison with the whole trade balance. The Greek-Turkish and the Cypriot-Turkish commercial cooperation have little importance for Turkey, with low and no significant transactions in value. The need to improve bilateral political relations and resolve bilateral problems to improve closely-linked trade economic cooperation and development is becoming apparent. The present study is mainly limited to a brief and descriptive presentation of the bilateral State relations, while future research can be extended to a statistical analysis of each industry or sector analysis.

Keywords: Greece, Turkey, imports, exports, trade balance

Introduction

The coupling between economics and international politics has always existed, but by the end of the Cold War it intensified.³ Similarly to democratic dialogue and diplomacy, economic diplomacy helps to limit tensions.⁴

Through economic cooperation, the promotion of interdependence is sought, i.e. the mutual consequences between States or between different countries.⁵ International-

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³ Charalambos Tsardanidis, *Economic Diplomacy (Οικονομική Διπλωματία)* (Athens: Papazisi Publications, 2018) (in Greek) 45.

⁴ Andreas Papastamou, *Economic Diplomacy: From Theory to Practice (Οικονομική Διπλωματία: Από τη Θεωρία στη Πράξη)* (Athens: Papazisi Publications, 2018) (in Greek) 117.

⁵ Ilias Kouskouvelis, *Introduction to International Relations (Εισαγωγή στις Διεθνείς Σχέσεις)* (6th edn, Athens: Quality Publications, 2007) (in Greek) 449.

al relations are more interconnected but not necessarily interdependent. Increasing interdependence and international cooperation does not mean eliminating conflict.

In the view of the theorists of economic interdependence, the role of the nation-State can be reduced, its traditional economic functions can be limited, and opposition and conflict can be reduced.

However, the ideological belief that economic cooperation or entanglement necessarily leads to the mitigation of geopolitical and political conflicts has no historical support.⁶ Between 1900 and 1914, French-German trade increased by 137%, German-Russian trade by 121%, and German-British trade by 100%, while more than half of international manufacturing cartels were jointly German-British (one even produced explosives).

All these indicators did not prevent the above countries from getting involved in one of the deadliest wars. Economic cooperation arises from economic needs and necessities that do not necessarily relate to friendly or hostile intentions from a political point of view. It is an indication of good political relations only when any geopolitical outstanding matter has been resolved.

The purpose of this paper is a brief presentation of Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish economic relations and more specifically of bilateral imports-exports during the years 2010-2021.

In the second part of this paper, there is a brief reference to the Greek-Turkish trade relations before 2010 as well as to basic bilateral agreements, while in the third and fourth parts, basic financial statistics for Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish imports and exports from 2010-2021 are presented. In the last part, the conclusions of the present research will be presented.

Greek-Turkish Trade Relations Before 2010 and Key Bilateral Agreements

The efforts to rewarm Greek-Turkish economic relations were a follow-up to the efforts made at a political level. The first meeting and approach took place between Andreas Papandreou and Turgut Özal in Davos in 1988 and the second attempt was between Constantinos Mitsotakis and Tanzo Tsiller in Davos in 1991.⁷ However, none of the two efforts brought the desired turn in Greek-Turkish relations.

⁶ Panagiotis Kondylis, *Theory of War (Θεωρία του Πολέμου)* (4th edn, Athens: Themelio Publications 1999) (in Greek) 404-405.

⁷ Panos Kazakos and Panagiotis Liargovas, *Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation (Ελληνο-Τουρκική Συνεργασία)* (Athens: Papazisi Publications, 1997) (in Greek) 60

In recent decades, economic relations have warmed and expanded, as a result. More specifically, exports to Turkey in the period 1987-1994 ranged between 113.2 and 138.1 million US dollars and, correspondingly, imports started at 45.4 million US dollars and reached 170.7 million US dollars.⁸

After 1999 and the contacts of former Foreign Minister George Papandreou with his Turkish counterpart, Greek-Turkish economic transactions increased and hopes that stronger economic relations would reduce the problems sprang. Ultimately, though, trade, tourism, energy cooperation, and direct foreign investment is unlikely to help overcome long-standing issues between the two countries' international relations.⁹

In 2000, trade between Greece and Turkey almost doubled compared to the previous year, while the upward trend continued throughout the following years.¹⁰ As an indicative example, it is worth noting that in 1995 the volume of trade between the two countries was only 320 million Euros, while by 2008 it had reached 2.4 billion Euros.

Until 2000, when the volume of bilateral trade was small, the trade balance was usually positive for Greece. After 2001 and for a whole decade, the trade balance was a deficit for Greece and, especially in 2007 and 2008, the deficit exceeded one billion Euros.¹¹

In 2009, the improvement in bilateral relations was palpable and, despite changes in governments, the determination to normalise relations remained the same. Economic cooperation through enhanced trade, joint ventures and investments, and foreign direct investment played a key role in improving relations.

At the same time, the possibility of a military confrontation between Greece and Turkey was considered to have been reduced, but it was still an open question whether the economic relations had been accepted and integrated into the political relations of dependence of the two countries.¹²

Today, Turkey's commercial relations with Greece are governed by the Greece Customs Union Agreement with the European Union. An important institution of

⁸ Ibid. 64.

⁹ Constantinos Papadopoulos, 'Greek-Turkish Economic Cooperation: Guarantor of Détente or Hostage to Politics?' (2008) 8(08) *SEESOX - South East European Studies*, Oxford 1-39.

¹⁰ Angelos Syrigos, *Greek-Turkish Relations (Ελληνο-Τουρκικές Σχέσεις)* (2nd edn, Athens: Pataki Publications, 2016) (in Greek) 571.

¹¹ Ibid. 572.

¹² Dimitris Tsarouhas, 'The Political economy of Greek-Turkish Relations' (2009) 9 *Southeast European and Black Sea Studies* 39-57.

Table 1. Greece's goods balance in the years 2010-2021 (in millions of Euros)

	2010	2011	2012	2013	2014	2015	2016	2017	2018	2019	2020	2021
BALANCE OF GOODS	-27,270.9	-23,391.4	-20,351.7	-19,672.9	-20,630.1	-17,666.1	-17,960.3	-19,833.9	-22,489.1	-22,833.3	-18,528.1	-25,623.2
FUEL BALANCE	-7,225.9	-8,169.8	-8,188.6	-7,145.8	-6,446.2	-4,134.3	-2,985.5	-3,717.6	-5,180.7	-5,040.5	-3,196.0	-5,876.5
BALANCE OF GOODS without fuel	-20,045.0	-15,221.6	-12,163.1	-12,527.1	-14,183.9	-13,531.8	-14,974.7	-16,116.3	-17,308.4	-17,792.8	-15,332.1	-19,746.7
BALANCE of ships	-758.1	-208.2	-436.9	-6.2	-96.2	-84.8	31.5	-39.9	-56.8	-345.1	-64.9	-19.7
BALANCE OF GOODS without ships	-26,512.8	-23,183.1	-19,914.7	-19,666.7	-20,533.9	-17,581.3	-17,991.7	-19,794.0	-22,432.3	-22,488.2	-18,463.2	-25,603.5
BALANCE OF GOODS excluding fuel and ships	-19,286.9	-15,013.3	-11,726.2	-12,520.9	-14,087.7	-13,447.0	-15,006.2	-16,076.3	-17,251.6	-17,447.7	-15,267.2	-19,727.0
Exports of goods	20,220.7	23,026.7	26,426.6	26,187.4	26,150.3	24,805.1	24,613.2	28,040.5	32,372.8	32,433.6	28,904.4	39,079.8
Fuel	4,438.2	5,903.3	9,177.8	9,225.0	9,039.4	6,643.3	6,162.5	7,887.8	10,016.9	9,078.8	6,102.5	10,142.8
Ships (sales)	117.9	72.1	182.4	83.7	100.6	144.4	119.8	102.0	130.9	91.5	153.1	121.5
Goods excluding fuel and ships	15,664.6	17,051.3	17,066.4	16,878.7	17,010.3	18,017.4	18,330.9	20,050.7	22,225.0	23,263.4	22,648.9	28,815.6
Imports of goods	47,491.6	46,418.0	46,778.2	45,860.3	46,780.3	42,471.2	42,573.5	47,874.4	54,861.9	55,266.9	47,432.5	64,703.0
Fuel	11,664.1	14,073.1	17,366.4	16,370.8	15,485.6	10,777.6	9,148.0	11,605.4	15,197.5	14,119.3	9,298.4	16,019.3
Ships (markets)	876.0	280.3	619.3	89.9	196.8	229.2	88.4	141.9	187.7	436.6	217.9	141.2
Goods excluding fuel and ships	34,951.5	32,064.6	28,792.5	29,399.6	31,098.0	31,464.4	33,337.1	36,127.0	39,476.7	40,711.1	37,916.1	48,542.5

Source: Bank of Greece, Balance of Payments Key Figures – Annual Data (Athens) (in Greek)

economic cooperation between Greece and Turkey is the annual convening of the Supreme Cooperation Council. The last (4th) took place in March 2016, in Izmir, and agreed, among others, the ferry connection between Thessaloniki and Smyrna and Istanbul-Thessaloniki with a high-speed railway line.¹³

Greek investments in Turkey in 2009 were 4.069 billion Euros or 13.67% of the total investments abroad.¹⁴ During the decade 2000-2010, more important agreements were signed between Greece and Turkey that constituted the legal bilateral contractual framework, and more specifically the following:¹⁵

- Law 3053/2002: Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the field of veterinary medicine.
- Law 3030/2002: Ratification of the Protocol for the implementation of Article 8 of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey on the fight against crime, in particular terrorism, organized crime, illegal drug trafficking, and illegal immigration.
- Law 3040/2002: Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the field of plant protection.
- Law 3246/2004: Ratification of the Agreement between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Turkey regarding the realisation of the Turkey-Greece interconnection for the transfer of gas and the supply of natural gas from the Republic of Turkey to the Hellenic Republic.
- Law 3228/2004: Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for the avoidance of double taxation concerning income taxes
- Law 3339/2005: Ratification of the Protocol between the Hellenic Republic and the Republic of Turkey for the establishment of a Joint Hellenic-Turkish Disaster Response Unit.

¹³ Hellenic Republic, Ministry of Foreign Affairs, 'Turkey' ('Τουρκία') (2022) (in Greek), available at <https://www.hmmm.gr/blog/dimereis-sheseis-tis-ellados-tourkia/> (last accessed 18 September 2022).

¹⁴ Papastamou (no 4) 382.

¹⁵ Greek-Turkish Chamber of Commerce, Bilateral Agreements (2020) available at <https://etee.gr/bilateral-agreements/> (last accessed 18 September 2022).

- Law 3445/2006: Ratification of the Agreement between the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the health sector.
- Law 3449/2006: Ratification of the Memorandum of Understanding between the United Nations and the Government of the Hellenic Republic and the Government of the Republic of Turkey for cooperation in the field of dealing with emergency humanitarian needs.

These agreements helped to promote better relations and the development of Greek-Turkish economic transactions.

Basic Statistics on Greek-Turkish Imports-Exports for the Years 2010-2021

The balance of goods, meaning imports – exports, of Greece for the years 2010-2021 was constantly in deficit and ranged from 17.6 billion Euros minimum in 2015 to 27.2 billion Euros maximum in 2010 (table 1). Most of the deficit was due to heavy reliance on imported goods (no fuel, no ships).

When the economic crisis began in Greece in the years 2009-2010, the imports of products decreased, which was something that subsequently affected the imports of Turkish products. On the contrary, Greek exports to Turkey increased and the Greece-Turkey trade balance again became positive for Greece, except in the year 2016 (table 2). However, during the last few years, that is 2019-2021, the balance was again negative for Greece.

Table 2. Exports - imports of Greece with Turkey

	Imports from Turkey	Exports to Turkey	Difference
2010	1,213,785,081	1,161,369,693	52,415,388
2011	1,881,566,200	1,156,693,766	724,872,434
2012	2,952,247,525	1,108,212,990	1,844,034,535
2013	3,148,423,032	1,130,653,216	2,017,769,816
2014	3,266,103,298	1,205,845,305	2,060,257,993
2015	1,710,681,563	1,272,642,889	438,038,674
2016	1,351,252,436	1,374,468,967	-23,216,531
2017	1,952,643,982	1,428,749,010	523,894,972
2018	2,035,442,762	1,847,783,850	187,658,912

2019	1,974,000,000	1,943,000,000	-31,000,000
2020	1,338,000,000	1,551,000,000	-213,000,000
2021	2,059,000,000	2,497,000,000	-438,000,000

Source: *Own processing of the Hellenic Statistical Authority, Foreign Trade statistical data, Table 9. Imports-Arrivals, Exports-Shipments, by partner country 2004-2019 and Annual Report 2021 of Greek Embassy in Ankara, (in Greek) (Ankara: May 2022)*

Greek exported products were mainly petroleum products, such as fossil fuels, mineral oils, and others (table 3). The importance of petroleum products is high for Greek exports to Turkey. The operation of the STAR refinery in Izmir, an investment by the Azeri State company SOCAR, as well as relevant investments that are being implemented at a rapid pace in other regions of Turkey, are expected to largely replace Greek exports of petroleum products in the next years. The trade balance was formed for Greece in 2021 with a deficit of €438 million, due to the significant increase in petroleum products/electricity exports.

The other main export products were: cotton, plastics, copper pipes, aluminum and aluminum products, boilers, machines, clothing, fertilisers, cereals, and mechanical and electrical equipment. Products such as jewellery, and precious/semi-precious stones were also in significant demand in the Turkish market.

Cotton is the most important export product after petroleum because it is the raw material for the Turkish textile industry. Turkey is a rather difficult market, given the protectionism of its agricultural and processed products and services, which manifests itself both with excessive tariffs and with the creation of additional obstacles (e.g. time-consuming bureaucratic procedures)¹⁶. In some sectors, such as in the food-beverage sector, Turkey is very competitive, mainly due to the low selling price of Turkish products, as well as the mentality of the average Turkish consumer to prefer domestic and cheap products.

On the other hand, Turkey is a neighbouring country with favourable demographics from a trade point of view, positive growth rates, and a population of 84.62 million.¹⁷ This data could be used to present Greek products as high quality (and with a

¹⁶ Embassy of Greece in Ankara, Office of Economic and Commercial Affairs, *Annual Report 2016 on Turkish Economy and Greece-Turkey Trade and Economic Relations* (Ετήσια Έκθεση 2016 για την Οικονομία της Τουρκίας και τις Ελληνο-Τουρκικές Εμπορικές και Οικονομικές Σχέσεις) (in Greek) (Ankara: July 2017).

¹⁷ Embassy of Greece in Ankara, Office of Economic and Commercial Affairs, 'Profile of Turkey' (Προφίλ της Τουρκίας) (in Greek) (Ankara: June 2022)

Table 3. Greek exports in Turkey (in Euro)

CN4	DESCRIPTION	YEAR 2019	YEAR 2020	YEAR 2021	% Change 2021/2020	% on total [2021]
	Total	1,973,888,939	1,338,326,675	2,059,382,957	53.88%	100.00%
	Total WITHOUT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS + ENERGY	874,631,495	855,700,294	1,146,461,109	33.98%	55.67%
	PETROLEUM PRODUCTS + ENERGY	1,099,257,444	482,626,381	912,921,848	89.16%	44.33%
	FIRST 50 PRODUCTS [2021]	1,826,257,343	1,198,020,905	1,926,901,030	60.84%	93.57%
	OTHER PRODUCTS [2021]	147,631,596	140,305,770	132,481,927	-5.58%	6.43%
1	'2710' Oils from oil or oil subproducts	1,088,692,182	454,904,310	871,492,129	91.58%	42.32%
2	'5201' Cotton, non-carded	256,247,037	193,331,532	399,968,582	106.88%	19.42%
3	'3902' Polymers of propylene	82,938,694	80,633,434	68,869,505	-14.59%	3.34%
4	'7606' Products from aluminum	37,223,040	41,193,732	61,973,817	50.44%	3.01%
5	'8471' Machines data processing	58,685,919	78,469,718	52,608,697	-32.96%	2.55%
6	'1001' Wheat and emery	13,261,383	:	44,273,536	:	2.15%
7	'3004' Medicines	3,257,039	23,067,577	40,175,351	74.16%	1.95%
8	'7204' Trash and fragments of iron	2,242,561	3,589,947	35,130,511	878.58%	1.71%
9	'7411' Piping from copper	26,368,526	26,642,778	33,622,963	26.20%	1.63%
10	'2709' Raw oils raw from oil	:	6,683,736	20,317,323	203.98%	0.99%
11	'2711' Gases oil and other gaseous	8,737,578	18,583,788	18,076,372	-2.73%	0.88%
12	'8903' Yachtsmen (yachts) and other ships	3,634,576	6,268,371	17,761,370	183.35%	0.86%
13	'7607' Leaves and products from aluminum	17,999,641	11,552,479	16,255,733	40.71%	0.79%
14	'8421' Machines and appliances centrifuges	7,443,161	10,781,088	14,940,244	38.58%	0.73%
15	'7108' Raw gold	15,962,717	21,600,008	13,593,467	-37.07%	0.66%
16	'3808' Insecticides, rat poisons,	11,929,687	18,234,837	11,732,187	-35.66%	0.57%
17	'4810' Paper and cardboard boxes coated	7,675,587	7,767,089	10,960,700	41.12%	0.53%
18	'3920' Plates, leaves, films	9,679,797	9,301,955	10,367,310	11.45%	0.50%
19	'6006' Other knitwear fabrics	7,306,686	11,207,858	10,097,618	-9.91%	0.49%
20	'3903' Polymers of styrene in initial forms	4,828,915	6,347,472	9,467,485	49.15%	0.46%

21	'4707'	Paper or cardboard for recycling	10,594,529	7,661,613	9,029,778	17.86%	0.44%
22	'2618'	Rusts blast furnaces with form	6,003,688	7,148,174	8,547,456	19.58%	0.42%
23	'9018'	Instruments and appliances for medicine	7,093,928	6,531,380	8,246,156	26.25%	0.40%
24	'3204'	Pigments materials synthetic organic	6,040,204	6,847,550	7,727,224	12.85%	0.38%
25	'3105'	Fertilisers containing nitrogen	10,604,204	14,672,353	7,547,045	-48.56%	0.37%
26	'2402'	Cigars and cigarettes	11,888,783	7,317,469	7,087,413	-3.14%	0.34%
27	'7602'	Trash and fragments	414,060	1,538,596	7,044,976	357.88%	0.34%
28	'7612'	Tanks, barrels, drums, boxes	4,749,869	4,247,228	7,025,296	65.41%	0.34%
29	'3304'	Beauty products and makeup	3,720,077	5,710,006	6,604,013	15.66%	0.32%
30	'8309'	Caps	5,964,471	5,265,244	6,352,167	20.64%	0.31%
31	'4805'	Papers and cardboard boxes for recycling	4,178,583	3,422,378	6,185,779	80.75%	0.30%
32	'8409'	Parts for pistons engines	5,348,989	3,429,575	5,477,135	59.70%	0.27%
33	'7407'	Rods and items with determined form	:	1,380,610	5,104,119	269.70%	0.25%
34	'3402'	Organic substances	3,573,057	4,447,300	4,982,359	12.03%	0.24%
35	'7106'	Silver	360,449	4,804,425	4,943,061	2.89%	0.24%
36	'9990'	Confidential products	1,856,113	4,308,012	4,909,191	13.95%	0.24%
37	'4102'	Raw skins from sheep	3,316,883	3,044,117	4,720,837	55.08%	0.23%
38	'9619'	Sanitary napkins, tampons, diapers	2,950,593	3,759,975	4,697,087	24.92%	0.23%
39	'3907'	Polyacetals, other polyethers	2,356,051	2,729,204	4,686,118	71.70%	0.23%
40	'7208'	Products rolling from iron	:	1,244,119	4,660,355	274.59%	0.23%
41	'4811'	Papers, cardboard boxes, cotton wool	5,144,117	6,038,305	4,481,124	-25.79%	0.22%
42	'3919'	Plates, leaves, films	3,797,402	3,598,608	4,435,279	23.25%	0.22%
43	'1006'	Rice	25,714,449	27,348,825	4,416,598	-83.85%	0.21%
44	'7604'	Rods and items with determined form	2,484,101	3,028,280	4,092,861	35.15%	0.20%
45	'3208'	Colors coating and varnishes	6,857,928	9,954,703	4,038,724	-59.43%	0.20%
46	'2818'	Corundum artificial and oxide	7,118,511	3,897,660	4,008,465	2.84%	0.19%
47	'6802'	Stones appropriate for carving	5,801,696	6,709,995	3,913,922	-41.67%	0.19%
48	'2941'	Antibiotics	5,719,538	3,975,382	3,516,745	-11.54%	0.17%
49	'2503'	Sulfur	5,854,789	247,789	3,488,458	1307.83%	0.17%
50	'8424'	Engineering appliances	2,635,555	3,550,321	3,246,389	-8.56%	0.16%

Source: Own processing of statistical data of Hellenic Statistical Authority and Office of the Greek Embassy in Ankara

Table 4. Greek imports from Turkey (in Euro)

CN4	DESCRIPTION	YEAR 2019	YEAR 2020	YEAR 2021	% Change 2021/2020	% on total [2021]
	TOTAL	1,943,311,517	1,551,208,890	2,496,719,331	60.95%	100.00%
	Total WITHOUT PETROLEUM PRODUCTS	1,586,202,226	1,403,887,773	2,011,574,943	43.29%	80.57%
	PETROLEUM PRODUCTS	357,114,522	147,322,390	485,144,388	229.31%	19.43%
	FIRST 50 PRODUCTS [2021]	1,225,932,525	953,155,263	1,698,571,238	78.21%	68.03%
	OTHER PRODUCTS [2021]	717,378,992	598,053,627	798,148,093	33.46%	31.97%
1	'2710' Oils from oil or oil subproducts	139,354,757	64,148,776	399,696,415	523.08%	16.01%
2	'8703' Cars for transportation of passengers	94,347,650	80,849,008	107,738,192	33.26%	4.32%
3	'7210' Products from iron	60,378,116	56,801,550	102,260,278	80.03%	4.10%
4	'2711' Gases oil and other products	202,245,135	66,717,773	66,621,972	-0.14%	3.92%
5	'0302' Fishes	50,984,630	56,193,353	57,702,960	2.69%	2.31%
6	'6006' Knitwear fabrics	39,769,803	40,605,748	52,646,237	29.65%	2.11%
7	'7601' Aluminium in raw form	8,576,318	3,003,742	52,486,027	1647.35%	2.10%
8	'7208' Products rolling from metals	51,776,080	38,667,420	49,538,633	28.11%	1.98%
9	'8418' Refrigerators and freezers	35,294,152	28,418,591	44,059,944	55.04%	1.76%
10	'8544' Wires and cables for electrical engineering	24,282,614	22,580,989	39,142,628	73.34%	1.57%
11	'3923' Items for transport/packaging	27,423,301	23,534,355	33,091,351	40.61%	1.33%
12	'8516' Water heaters, electrical heaters	34,111,718	29,857,697	32,544,941	9.00%	1.30%
13	'3920' Plates, leaves, membranes	26,327,246	25,389,294	30,720,382	21.00%	1.23%
14	'8528' Television receivers	34,713,513	27,301,730	30,201,284	10.62%	1.21%
15	'3901' Polymers of ethylene in the initial form	6,922,949	4,659,564	29,179,333	526.22%	1.17%
16	'4803' Paper cleanliness	29,776,928	13,788,343	27,647,984	100.52%	1.11%
17	'8702' Vehicles for the transport of 10 people and above	21,657,029	13,299,532	26,462,700	98.97%	1.06%
18	'0304' Fillet/ flesh fish	14,290,173	15,944,083	26,274,190	64.79%	1.05%
19	'4805' Papers and cardboard boxes for recycling	14,086,390	14,396,230	24,600,691	70.88%	0.99%
20	'7216' Items with determined form from iron	19,083,655	17,486,799	24,192,252	38.35%	0.97%
21	'7306' Piping and hollow items with determined form	19,645,975	15,777,675	22,787,195	44.43%	0.91%

22	'4011'	New types with pressed air	17,777,063	14,288,172	21,043,602	47.28%	0.84%
23	'9403'	Furniture	14,399,102	11,142,522	20,900,634	87.58%	0.84%
24	'2901'	Hydrocarbons uncirculated	14,435,499	25,902,914	20,754,957	-19.87%	0.83%
25	'5205'	Threads from cotton	12,491,751	12,090,722	20,090,389	66.16%	0.80%
26	'2523'	Cement plumbing	13,585,792	12,595,841	17,583,106	39.59%	0.70%
27	'8708'	Parts/accessories for tractors	13,546,375	12,446,882	17,194,410	38.14%	0.69%
28	'8450'	Machines for washing clothes.	18,088,214	13,635,038	16,471,067	20.80%	0.66%
29	'2905'	Alcohols acyclic and the halogenated	14,695,593	14,150,652	15,042,347	6.30%	0.60%
30	'1207'	Sperm and oily fruits	1,432,923	7,101,300	14,549,107	104.88%	0.58%
31	'3924'	Tiles	11,527,854	9,409,941	14,440,409	53.46%	0.58%
32	'8504'	Electrical transformers	4,434,880	7,433,052	14,281,515	92.14%	0.57%
33	'7209'	Products rolling from other metals	1,792,871	5,002,801	14,187,307	183.59%	0.57%
34	'2716'	Electric energy	11,416,964	11,902,280	14,128,695	18.71%	0.57%
35	'3907'	Polyacetals, other polyethers	4,581,989	4,822,189	13,830,376	186.81%	0.55%
36	'2008'	Fruits and prepared fruits	10,341,377	11,428,075	13,805,694	20.81%	0.55%
37	'6907'	Tiles and plates for topping	11,292,761	10,971,025	13,792,774	25.72%	0.55%
38	'7322'	Radiators for central heating	8,392,656	7,824,770	13,664,629	74.63%	0.55%
39	'6210'	Clothing from felting	1,423,206	16,461,643	13,373,476	-18.76%	0.54%
40	'6115'	Leggings, socks	7,791,217	6,479,097	13,335,797	105.83%	0.53%
41	'8704'	Cars trucks vehicles	10,047,880	13,117,085	12,605,077	-3.90%	0.50%
42	'7612'	Tanks, barrels, boxes	9,605,649	10,506,404	12,523,471	19.20%	0.50%
43	'5702'	Carpets and investments for floors	8,418,668	6,974,102	12,430,209	78.23%	0.50%
44	'2915'	Acids monocarboxylates acyclic	6,071,299	5,353,410	11,959,384	123.40%	0.48%
45	'7219'	Products rolling from stainless steel	4,337,535	6,419,491	11,633,972	81.23%	0.47%
46	'5603'	Coated fabrics, non-woven	5,834,088	7,941,747	11,522,228	45.08%	0.46%
47	'3909'	Resins amines, resins phenolics	7,919,344	6,428,516	11,376,258	76.97%	0.46%
48	'0802'	Fruits with shell, fresh or dry	8,983,923	8,402,007	11,237,632	33.75%	0.45%
49	'6104'	Suits-tagier, cardigans, dresses	9,018,574	6,482,724	10,727,917	65.48%	0.43%
50	'3906'	Polymers acrylics in initials forms	7,199,346	7,018,609	10,489,210	49.45%	0.42%

Source: Own processing of statistical data of Hellenic Statistical Authority and Office of the Greek Embassy in Ankara

high nutritional value in the case of food). Therefore, products akin to the Mediterranean diet with the additional advantage of their organic production could be favourably received in the Turkish market.

The most important products that Greece imports from Turkey are vehicles, petroleum products, products from iron/steel, fresh fish, knitwear fabrics, raw aluminum, refrigerators/freezers, electrical materials (wires/cables), plastic packaging items/stoppers and water heaters (table 4).

During 2021, an important increase took place in imports of raw aluminum (1647.3%), oils (523.1%), and chemicals, such as polymers ethylene (526.2%).

The trade deficit of Greece, which was observed in 2016 in trade relations with Turkey, and reasons for the unfavourable development of bilateral trade for Greek products can be attributed, mainly, to the following:¹⁸

1. the significant slowdown in the growth of the Turkish economy and the decrease of Turkish imports in 2016 by 3.8%;
2. the protectionism of the Turkish market, through tariff and non-tariff barriers, which take the form of strict controls (plant health certificates, specifications, checks on the origin of products, etc.);
3. to the competitiveness of many Turkish consumer products (ready-to-wear, textiles, furniture, household electrical appliances), food, as well as industrial products.

Also, Greek investments in Turkey amounted to 5.18 billion Euros in 2015 (before the sale of Finansbank by the National Bank), while the corresponding Turkish ones were calculated, by the Greek Embassy, at 400 million Euros. During 2020, direct investments of Greece in Turkey accounted for 57 million Euros and direct investments of Turkey in Greece accounted for 47 million Euros.¹⁹

Generally, the balance of foreign trade with all Balkan countries and Turkey in the years 2015 and 2016 was important for Turkey, because exports were more than imports, and thus the country had a surplus in its foreign trade with the Balkan countries²⁰.

¹⁸ Embassy of Greece in Ankara (no 16)

¹⁹ Greek Embassy in Ankara, *Annual Report 2021* (Ετήσια Έκθεση 2021) (in Greek) (Ankara: May 2022)

²⁰ Susmus, T., Baslangic, S., 'The Importance of Trade with the Balkan Countries for Turkey' in Syki-anakis, N., Polychronidou, P., Karasavoglou, A., (eds), *Economic and Financial Challenges for Eastern Europe* (Switzerland: Springer Proceedings in Business and Economics, 2019).

Greek-Turkish cooperation has low importance in the total of Greek exports, since in 2021, it represented only 5.26% of the total Greek exports of goods or 7.14% of total Greek exports of goods excluding ships and fuel. For Greece, Turkey in 2021 was in the 6th position as an export country for Greek products.²¹

For Turkey, its exports to Greece amounted to 2,497 billion euros in 2021. The importance of Turkish exports to Greece from the point of view of Turkey is extremely low if we consider that Greece was in the 23rd position as an export country for Turkish products.²² For Turkey, the main export partners were Germany, Iraq, and the United Kingdom, while the main import partners were Russia, China, and Germany.²³

Basic Statistics on Cypriot-Turkish Imports-Exports for the Years 2010-2021

The balance of goods (imports – exports) of Cyprus for the years 2010-2021, was constantly in deficit (table 5).

Table 5. Imports and Exports of Cyprus (in million Euros)

	Imports	Exports
2010	6,218.8	1,136.8
2011	5,951.2	1,404.0
2012	5,450.2	1,422.4
2013	4,579.4	1,609.3
2014	5,817.3	2,453.2
2015	5,908.4	3,027.3
2016	6,460.3	2,714.2
2017	7,305.9	2,968.4
2018	7,893.1	4,309.9
2019	7,373.5	3,137.0
2020	7,002.5	2,746.6
2021	7,716.1	3,286.7

Source: Statistical Service of Cyprus Republic,
Annual data for Foreign Trade by main economic category 1995-2021

Also, total imports (covering total imports from third countries and EU Member States) in January - June 2022 amounted to €5,672.7 mn as compared to €4,059.9

²¹ Greek Embassy in Ankara (no 19).

²² Ibid.

²³ Embassy of Greece in Ankara, Office of Economic and Commercial Affairs, *Study on Turkey's Foreign Trade and Greece-Turkey Bilateral Trade* (Μελέτη για το Εξωτερικό Εμπόριο της Τουρκίας και Ελληνο-Τουρκικό Διμερές Εμπόριο) (in Greek) (Ankara: 2014).

mn in January - June 2021. Total exports (covering total exports to third countries and to EU Member States) in January - June 2022 were €1,822.7 mn compared to €1,325.0 mn in January - June 2021. As a result, the trade deficit was €3,850.0 mn in January - June 2022 compared to €2,734,9 mn in the corresponding period of 2021.

Exports to the EU accounted for €546.6 mn in January - June 2022. Main exports were to Greece which accounted for €151.0 mn, to Germany for €55.4 mn, to France for €41.2 mn, to Italy €29.9 mn, to Sweden for €21.5 mn, to Malta for €19.6 mn, to the Netherlands for €15.7 mn, to Czechia for €14.5 mn, to Romania for €14.1 mn and to Bulgaria for €13.3 mn.

Exports to Near and Middle Eastern countries accounted for €337.6 mn in January - June 2022, to other European countries for €187.4 mn, to other African countries for €166.0 mn, to other Asian countries for €149.3 mn, to other countries in Oceania and Polar regions for €84.4 mn, to North Africa for €67.2 mn, to North America for €65.3 mn and to Central America and the Caribbean for €14.3 mn.²⁴

Cypriot-Turkish trade relations have low importance for both countries throughout the years in discussion, as can be seen in table 6. The volume and value of trade between Cyprus and Turkey are extremely low or with no significance.

Suspicious have always existed and still exist in economic relations because²⁵: a) any proposals from the Turkish side for bilateral economic cooperation may, behind attractive economic expectations, hide political motives, especially in the areas of the Aegean and Western Thrace and b) the monitoring of economic developments in Turkey by Greek and Cypriot public and private agencies need to be intensified.

Table 6. Exports - imports of Cyprus with Turkey (in million Euros)

	Imports from Turkey (c.i.f)	Exports to Turkey (f.o.b)	Difference
2010	14.8	0.6	14.2
2011	9.0	0.3	8.7
2012	6.6	0.3	6.3
2013	4.6	0.5	4.1
2014	15.3	0.6	14.7
2015	15.4	0.9	14.5
2016	24.3	2.3	22

²⁴ Statistical Service of Cyprus Republic, *Intra and Extra EU Trade Statistics (by commodity and country) January – June 2022, Foreign Trade Statistics, Series III, Report No.195*, Nicosia 20th September 2022 p.9

²⁵ Vyron Theodoropoulos, *The Turks and Us, II, (Οι Τούρκοι και Εμείς)* (in Greek) (Athens Kathimerini Editions, 2018) 88.

2017	93.3	2.9	90.4
2018	60.0	4.5	55.5
2019	29.1	8.5	20.6
2020	46.7	3.5	43.2
2021	111.1	3.1	108

Source: Statistical Service of Cyprus Republic, (August 2022), *Annual data for Foreign Trade by main partner country 1995-2021*, Cyprus Republic.

Discussion and Results

The purpose of this paper is a brief presentation of Greek-Turkish and Cypriot-Turkish economic relations and, more specifically, of bilateral imports-exports during the years 2010-2021.

When the economic crisis started in Greece, the imports of products decreased, which also affected the imports of Turkish products. On the contrary, Greek exports to Turkey increased and the trade balance again became positive for Greece. During the last few years, 2019-2021, the trade balance was negative.

Also, the trade balance with Turkey is negative for all years, with deficits for Cyprus, but transactions are not important in comparison with the trade balance.

The Greek-Turkish and the Cypriot-Turkish commercial cooperation have little importance for Turkey, with low and no significant transactions in value.

Although political efforts have been made to improve bilateral relations, Turkey, with its constant disputes and challenges to Greek and Cypriot sovereign rights and Erdogan's position on the 'borders of the heart', trade relations cannot be limited to their current borders, which could jeopardise any prospect of a smooth neighbouring relationship.

The need to improve bilateral political relations and resolve bilateral problems to improve closelylinked trade economic cooperation and development is becoming apparent.

The present study is mainly limited to a brief and descriptive presentation of the bilateral State relations, while future research can be extended to a statistical analysis of each industry or sector analysis.

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**BOOK
REVIEWS**

Seferis-Averof: the Breach **[Σεφέρης-Αβέρωφ: η Πήξη]**

Giorgos Georgis

Kastaniotis

Athens, 2017 [pp. 260]

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The book explores the disagreement between George Seferiadis, ambassador in London, and Evangelos Averof, Minister of Foreign Affairs, during a critical juncture in the history of Cyprus. Their differences and strong disagreements about the Cyprus problem and the discussed plans that led to the Zurich-London agreements between the Greek, Turkish and British governments respectively, resulted in a breach in their relationship. Apart from being a diplomat, Seferiadis was a Nobel Prize laureate and one of the most important poets of Greece, and he is widely known as Seferis. In the book under review Giorgos Georgis, who has a full grasp of the vast literature, besides Seferis' poems in *Logbook III*, which were inspired by the island, as well as his journals and his classified correspondence about Cyprus, makes usage of relevant literature which includes his own books and research work about the poet.

In the first chapter Georgis illustrates, in a nutshell, Seferis' arguments and disappointment over Averof's negotiations and cites the opinions of diplomats who were involved and knew about the issue from within. Alexandros Xydis, press secretary at the embassy in London, was the first to reveal and publicise these arguments. Georgios Pesmazoglou, the Greek ambassador in Turkey, acknowledges the fact that Seferis is excluded from the talks. Challenging the credibility of this view were Angelos Vlachos, the ambassador in Cyprus at the time, and Alexandros Bitsios, who worked in close partnership with the minister. These diplomats catch the interest of the author also in chapter ten, as holding different opinions to Seferis condemning him for being so much in favour of the Cypriots and blaming his lack of objectivity on his close relationship with Makarios.

The author claims that Seferis is by no means an unbiased intermediary as he feels a special affinity for Cyprus and adopts a strongly supporting stance towards a resolution of the Cyprus issue. As it is pointed out in chapter nine, due to the fact that he is rather skeptical about the Cyprus issue, he approached the problem from a philosophical standpoint. Georgis provides an account of his diplomatic course in

chapters three and six. From his post, first in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in Greece from 1956 to 1957 and then from 1957 to 1961 as a Greek Ambassador in London, Seferis devoted all his energy and emotion to Cyprus. He felt that the government had conscripted him to serve in the diplomatic corps for his insight into the Cyprus problem and his close relationship with Makarios.

Through the times he had been to Cyprus, Seferis had made many intimate friends, among whom Makarios was the most prominent figure. In order to stress his support, respect and appreciation to the gifted and dynamic archbishop, in chapters two and seven Georgis cites his letters to the exiled archbishop. What the author also indicates is that Seferis discerns a negative political climate when Makarios is released and a great deal of inconvenience and fatigue caused by the Cyprus problem. Furthermore, he worries about the signs of disunity between Athens and Nicosia over the operations of EOKA. Although Averof was a keen opponent of the EOKA struggle, it is he who was actively involved in the secret arms procurement to Grivas, as Georgis states in chapter eight. The author wonders at this ambiguous attitude and puzzles over the fact that high ranked officers like Vlachos and Konstantinos Tsatsos, who were informed about the arms sent, strongly opposed EOKA.

In chapters four, five and eleven, Georgis covers the main points of the Radcliffe and Macmillan constitutional plans, as well as the appeals to the United Nations. Seferis is not only preoccupied, but also disappointed with the ease Averof considers partition as a possible solution. He shows his opposition on the strategy deployed by the latter and the activities undertaken. He vehemently disagrees with any possible involvement of NATO that will divert them from the discussions at the United Nations. The author illustrates that he attributes responsibility to Averof who seems to prioritise the relationship with Turkey and co-opt Turkey's views on the solution. He even provides evidence that the idea of an independent Cyprus belonged to him and Vlachos amongst other contested issues as the concession to the Turkish demands for a final solution. He supports the view that, although the minister undertook some bold initiatives he intended to downplay his own responsibility. On the other hand, as underlined in chapters three and five, Seferis respects Karamanlis' views and approves of his conduct of the Cyprus problem. From his post in the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, he not only attended the ongoing government discussions and debates, but also knew from within that Karamanlis often disagreed with Averof.

The author states that Seferis did not approve of Averof's negotiations that led to the Zurich-London agreements. The fact that the two men do not endorse the same

point of view is explained in detail, in chapters twelve to eighteen. Averof played a crucial role in the exercise of diplomatic practice, as he was the one who took several initiatives when he embarked on talks with Zorlu, the Turkish Foreign Minister. His initiatives and strategy worry and puzzle Seferis, whose authority is curtailed. With his diplomatic powers depleted, he expresses his opposition through his logbooks and his correspondence. Georgis a diplomat himself, cultural attaché at the Cyprus Embassy in Athens, and cognizant of the functions and conduct of diplomacy, believes that Seferis should have been able to facilitate agreements and offer advice about how Greece could act at negotiations, albeit he was not authorised to do so after all.

In order to establish a clearer picture of the disagreement between the two men, Georgis offers a detailed overview of the correspondence between the two men. Thus, he elaborates on the cited letters or extracts of letters and highlights Seferis' point of view enhancing his arguments. He juxtaposes versions of the same events and shows that there were differences of approach in matters of high policy, like delicate diplomatic relations and strategic considerations. Furthermore, he argues that the points of settlement discussed were much in favour of Turkish Cypriots and emphasises that Seferis is prodigiously industrious in explaining how inconclusive the agreements would be if they were accepted with such unequal concessions. He ruefully points out the dangers involved in accepting a plan which might lead to undiluted tragedy. His letters are filled with skepticism and continual frustration. In attempting to explain the aroused resentment over the agreements, in chapters twelve to sixteen, the author provides a fair account of the diplomat's correspondence, not only with the minister, but also with his wife and his sister. The author chooses to include letters to Tsatsos, the Secretary of State, and also his sister's husband, who confronts Seferis with sternness and aligns with Averof.

Accordingly, the author discerns, in Averof's letters, his efforts to make the plan unassailable and acceptable with the full backing of Karamanlis. Polemics should be avoided and reactions unduly expressed were considered a nuisance. The aggravated climate between the two men became acute. To corroborate the fact that Seferis faced opprobrium from the minister as far as their official correspondence, was concerned, Georgis quotes the letters they exchanged. In chapter seventeen, in particular, the author puts emphasis on the fact that he was rather improperly downgraded and consequently exposed in the eyes of British politicians and foreign diplomats. Although his movements were not circumscribed, the diplomatic actions conducted by

the minister did not include him. It is stressed that, despite the fact that 18 Turkish representatives attended the Zurich talks, only five Greek representatives, with Seferis excluded, were present.

In the last two chapters of the book, it is noted that the relations between the two men are exacerbated to such a degree that it seems they will never be restored. There is no better proof of that than the fact that Seferis never responded to the telegraph Averof sent him when he was awarded the Nobel Prize. Even one year after the Zurich - London agreements, there is a resurgence of their disagreement and there is no sign of an effort to reduce the hostility they feel towards each other. The dispute between the two men intensified when Seferis found out that he was, once again, accused for indiscretion because he registered their correspondence instead of recording it as classified information, though he claimed he had done so.

Overall Georgis achieves his main aim to offer a thorough description of the disagreement between the two men and sheds light on the events which led to a breach in their relationship. Moreover, thoroughly conversant with the great poet's life and work, he devotes himself to the study of a controversial issue and manages to open a constructive dialogue with the existing literature and with scholars who have different perspectives and approaches to the theme of the book. One may wonder why the full text of the letters is provided and not just extracts. By doing so, the author, especially regarding some crucial points, explicitly contrasts Seferis' letters with those of Averof and lets the reader discover contradictions, identify different dimensions and, perhaps, draw conclusions. In such manner, the book adds great value to the better understanding of this period and can be consulted by scholars and students who study the history of Cyprus.

Sophia Argyriou

The Turkish Invasion and the Uprooting of the People of Kyrenia through the Testimonies in the Archive of Oral Tradition of Occupied Areas

[Η Τουρκική Εισβολή και ο Ξεριζωμός των Κερυνειωτών μέσα από τις Μαρτυρίες στο Αρχείο Προφορικής Παράδοσης Κατεχομένων Περιοχών]

George A. Kazamias
Cyprus Research Centre
Nicosia, 2021 [pp. 229]
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In the first part of the book, oral history is presented as a special branch of historical science, one with its own theory and methodological tools. Following that, is an introduction to Cyprus and the pioneering of the Oral Tradition Archive of the Cyprus Research Centre, from which the research program and the writing of this book arose. Then, the author attempts a bibliographic review of the Greek literature, with a brief reference to the English-language and corresponding Turkish sources regarding the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.

In addition, reference is made to the available archival documents of Greece, Britain, Turkey, the United States of America, and other countries which were directly involved in the Cyprus conflict, identifying the researchers' challenges regarding access. A valuable historical outline of the political and military events of the invasion is also provided for the reader. The first phase of the invasion, with important elements of a military nature, the truce between the two belligerents and the efforts to reinforce the National Guard by the Greek Armed Forces, are recorded.

In another subchapter, Britain's initiative to protect the foreign nationals who were on the island, by transferring them to its military bases, is presented. It is impressive that, by the second day of the invasion, more than ten thousand civilians of various nationalities had arrived at the two bases. In particular, due to the fact that Turkey was causing problems in allowing the transportation of the tourists who were in the region of Kyrenia to the bases, intricate measures resulted in their passage by sea.

It then explains the circumstances under which the truce was implemented, which

the author calls a 'partial cessation of military operations in places', after which the Turkish army continued to advance in many areas, in late July and early August, finding an opportunity to land more troops on the island. Therefore, the Greek side was faced with the dilemma of projecting resistance, which would, however, potentially cause the ceasefire to be broken.

An unknown aspect in the history of the Turkish invasion presented in the book is the idea of intervening units of the British Navy between the northern coast of Cyprus and Turkey, implementing a naval blockade in order to stop the transfer of Turkish military reinforcements. The proposal, submitted three days after the armistice, included a provision for patrols by Royal Navy ships as part of the United Nations force. Moreover, the author explains the reasons for its non-implementation.

Next, the situation of the Cypriot defence and the efforts of military reinforcement from Greece are described, with the most important one being the 'NIKH' (Victory) operation, that took place on the evening of 21 July, transporting the 1st Commando Squadron of the Greek Army. Additionally, the idea of forming and transferring a Greek division to the island, in the presence of Prime Minister Konstantinos Karamanlis and Minister of National Defence Evangelos Averof, which was finally abandoned, and the unsuccessful attempt to transfer Cypriot students to the island, are mentioned.

The failure of the Geneva talks, on 14 August, led to the second phase of the invasion, proving Turkish expansionism in the most tragic and crude way. A ceasefire was finally ordered on 16 August, however some villages were seized by the Turkish army in late August and early September. Finally, the book lists the main losses in dead, wounded, captured, missing, displaced and trapped, due to the Turkish invasion and occupation. Looting of cultural heritage sites is another scourge.

The primary material of the book was drawn from the Oral Tradition Archive of the Occupied Territories of the Republic of Cyprus established in 1989 by the Cyprus Research Centre. In the second part of the book, the testimonies of citizens of the towns and villages of the province of Kyrenia during the invasion are commented on, and relevant passages in the Cypriot dialect are cited. It should be mentioned that the book follows a chronological narrative, helping the reader to better understand the course of events. In particular, the first part presents the occupation of Kyrenia and its neighbouring villages, the second the occupation of the large villages of Karavas and Lapithos, and the third and fourth, the occupation of the western and eastern sectors of the province, respectively, during the second phase of the invasion.

For the topographical understanding of military operations, the map listed at the

beginning of the book proves quite helpful. At the end of the book, also included is an appendix with a selection of transcribed testimonies of residents of the province of Kyrenia, which vividly capture the feelings of anxiety, fear and uncertainty of the residents, due to the captivity by the Turkish army. The writing style of the book is direct and understandable without that affecting its scientific attributes.

Such studies are welcome in a field that has been so understudied, particularly regarding the province of Kyrenia, which bore the brunt of the Turkish landing and advance in the summer of 1974. This book is useful for researchers of the history of 1974 as well as the local history of the island. Furthermore, it is a useful guide for the general public who are interested in their refugee origins. In conclusion, it would be legitimate and important to record the history of other geographical areas occupied by the Turkish army in 1974, such as Karpasia, Morphou, Nicosia, Mesaoria and Famagusta.

Andreas Christofi

The Cypriot Referendums for Union with Greece [Τα Ενωτικά Δημοψηφίσματα στην Κύπρο]

**Giorgos Georgis, Christos Kyriakides, Charalambos Charalambous (eds)
Elias Epiphaniou Publications
Nicosia, 2022 [pp. 277]
ISBN: 978-9925-581-66-5**

The significant collective volume, edited by Giorgos Georgis, Christos Kyriakides, and Charalambos Charalambous, and published by Elias Epiphaniou Publications, refers to the Cypriot referendums for union with Greece. Based, inter alia, on contemporary archival research, the various contributions narrate the lasting demand of Greek Cypriots for union with Greece during the British Rule of Cyprus, a demand that was expressed, not only through the well-known referendum of 1950, but also with three previous, mostly unknown, referendums, in 1914, 1921, and 1930. Restructuring the history and the universality of the demand for union with Greece confirms that the Cypriot referendum of 1950 was the culmination of a lengthy procedure of demanding union with Greece that had started from the beginning of the British Rule of Cyprus.

In 1878 the Ottoman Empire still maintained the bare ownership of Cyprus, whereas Britain had acquired the island's possession. The British could therefore argue that they still did not have full 'ownership' of Cyprus until 1914, when they unilaterally annexed the island, as a reaction to the decision of the Ottoman Empire to join the war with the Central Powers. With the Treaty of Lausanne, Britain was recognised as the ruler of Cyprus and the Ottoman Rule officially ended. In 1925 Cyprus was declared as a Crown colony. 1914 marked also the 50th anniversary of the union of the Ionian islands with Greece. Following the Balkan wars, where Cypriots had volunteered, and the military and diplomatic victories of Greece, and with Britain being viewed as a Greek ally, Cypriots felt that the time had come when the Ionian precedent could be adopted, and thus they demanded that Cyprus be ceded to Greece. As Georgis has correctly noted, the Ionian precedent was the guiding narrative of Cypriots for at least the first 50 years of the British Rule.

The General Assembly held in the Archdiocese on 15 May 1914 decided that it was proper to coordinate the efforts for demanding union with Greece through a resolution addressed to the King of England. The people of Cyprus signed a referendum

in towns and villages, which -as all other referendums during the British Rule of Cyprus- was a collection of signatures supporting an official resolution; this was delivered to the British on the anniversary of the cession of the Ionian islands to Greece. It is important to note that the drafting of the resolution was prepared by a committee with the participation of the Metropolitan of Kition, and subsequently Ecumenical Patriarch, Meletios Metaxakis, a close associate of the Greek Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos.

The 1914 referendum is analysed in three separate contributions. Constantine Kouratos explains how contemporary Greek Cypriot press assessed the referendum. Michalis Stavri offers a detailed evaluation of the historical and political context, within which the decision to hold the referendum was reached, the manner in which the decision was implemented, and the perception of the referendum by the Greeks of Cyprus, the British administration, and the Greek press. Following the outbreak of the First World War, the referendum remained incomplete, despite the high participation to it, a fact that caused, inter alia, ironic comments by Nicolaos Katalanos. The views of Katalanos on the 1914 referendum are the topic of the contribution of Kyr-iacos Iacovides. Whereas, Katalanos, who originated from Mani, Greece, was one of the leading figures of the demand for union with Greece, he criticised the organisers of the referendum, i.e. the Committee of Political Struggle, for failing to properly promote the referendum, as well as for being partial against his newspaper, the *Cyprus Guardian* (*Κυπριακός Φύλαξ*). He further argued that the Greek representatives to the Legislative Council should have resigned so as to prove their serious intentions. Katalanos felt that the British would not repeat their Ionian precedent 'generosity' through requests, and that demand could be amplified only through political struggle. He further proposed that an option was to request autonomy under the supervision of the Ottoman Empire, as an interim stage to union with Greece, arguing that the success of the Greek army would unavoidably eventually lead to the desired objective.

The first complete referendum was held in 1921, on the occasion of the 100 years from the Greek Revolution, and pending the -eventually disastrous- Greek military operation in Smyrna. The 1921 referendum was signed on 25 March 1921 by priests, teachers, members of school and village committees, immediately after the completion of the solemn doxology in Greek Orthodox churches. The 500 copies of the signed resolution stressed the 'one, only and unchanged' intention of Cypriots to unite with 'our motherland Greece', and were signed in three identical volumes. The first volume was sent to the Greek Prime Minister, the second to the British Govern-

ment, and the third was kept at the Archdiocese. The British reacted by arresting and deporting from the island Katalanos and Filios Zannetos, two leading figures of the organisation of the referendum. The referendum of 1930 was organised in a similar manner, and coincided with 100 years from the foundation of the Greek state. The British indifference towards it, was one of the factors leading to the 1931 insurrection.

The 1921 referendum is assessed in separate accounts by Christos Kyriakides, and Panayiotis Stefanou, whereas the referendum of 1930 is evaluated by Maria Filaretou, and Charalambos Charalambous. Stefanou and Charalambous illuminate the referendums through the Greek Cypriot press of the era, whereas the contributions of Kyriakides and Filaretou elaborate on the wider historical and political framework in which the referendums took place. The officials of the British Ministry for Colonies, while noting that the wide participation to the referendums was an evidence of the desire of the Greek population to unite with Greece, questioned whether they would be willing to fight in order to succeed in their aim. This was eventually answered in 1955, when the EOKA struggle began.

The referendum of 1950, which followed the failure of the Consultative Assembly (Διασκεπτική, Diaskeptiki), marked the beginning of a new dynamic stage of the efforts of the Greeks of Cyprus to unite with Greece, which culminated with the EOKA struggle. The referendum was organised by the Ethnarchy and was supported by AKEL. Contrary to the 1921 and 1930 referendums, it did not consist of signatures via representatives, but the entirety of the people would sign the resolutions with a single demand: 'union and only union'. There are six separate contributions focusing on the 1950 referendum. Andreas Karyos sets the general framework, and evaluates the procedure for the organisation of the referendum. It is striking that this was the first time that the female population of Cyprus was allowed to participate in general elections, and there was particular interest in informing the women of Cyprus about the referendum. Karyos discusses not only the many successful parts of the organisation of the referendum, but also the least successful, such as the unwillingness of the Ethnarchy to satisfy AKEL's request to participate in the organising committees; this led, in many cases, to the establishment of separate committees by AKEL. Another drawback was that there was no official invitation to smaller minority religious groups to participate in the referendum, although they were allowed to do so.

Kypros Giorgallis based his own contribution on the archives of the Archdiocese of Cyprus, and this is of importance, since the Church organised the referendum, whereas Maria Pantziari discusses the impact of the referendum in the Cypriot and

Greek press. Andreas Christoforou, and Andreas Christofi evaluate AKEL's position in the referendum, and its decision to support the demand for immediate union with Greece, following the (inaccurate) prediction of the General Secretary of the communist party of Greece Nicos Zachariades that the left would win the Greek civil war, and that, accordingly, Cyprus should set union with Greece as an immediate objective. It should, of course, be clarified that the previous position of AKEL also had set union with Greece as the ultimate objective, but differentiated in the manner in which this goal would be achieved, i.e. that this could potentially be achieved with an interim stage of self-administration rather than immediately. Following the change of position, AKEL was at the forefront of the demand for union with Greece, which led to an even more intense effort by the Ethnarchy.

Alexis Alecou further evaluates the referendum within the wider anticolonial movement. He expresses the view that the active participation of the left could associate the referendum with the anti-imperialistic movement and the beginning of the Cold War, whereas this changed when the Ethnarchy assumed the primary role. At any event, my view is that the relationship between the Ethnarchy and AKEL was a missed opportunity for the Greeks of Cyprus during this era. Aliko Georgiou focuses on the narrative of the left party, comparing the articles written in newspapers regarding the 1930 and 1950 referendums.

Whereas newspaper *Neos Anthropos* hosted 11, mainly unsigned, articles on the 1930 referendum, there were multiple signed articles on the 1950 referendum. Of interest is also the smaller contribution of Christos Kyriakides offering a local case study of how the villagers of Omodos reacted to the various referendums organised during the British Rule of Cyprus.

The volume concludes with the contribution of Antonis Klapsis, which elaborates on the referendums that took part in Greece, i.e. the object at the centre of the demand for union. The first referendum took place in 1862 as a result of the revolution that led to the dethronement of King Otto. The great majority supported the candidacy of Prince Alfred, the second son of Queen Victoria of England. The Great Powers, however, considered that the new King of Greece should not hail from either of them, and did not abide by the results of the referendum, opting instead for George I as the new King, despite the fact that he had received only six votes in the 1862 referendum. In 1974, pursuant to another referendum, constitutional monarchy was substituted by a system of presidential democracy, with Constantine II of Greece dethroned (and eventually passing on 10 January 2023). It is, however, striking that the latest Greek

referendum, that of 2015, had a similar ultimate result as the 1862 one, i.e. ignoring the public vote, with then Prime Minister Alexis Tsipras unilaterally changing the 'no' to the agreement with troika he had demanded, to a 'yes'.

To conclude, this is a comprehensive collective volume that contributes in a defining manner to the study of the lasting impact of the demand for union with Greece during the British Rule, and of the manner in which this was exercised through successive referendums. The book confirms that the objective of union with Greece survived in Cyprus irrespective of any encouragement by metropolitan Greece, and that it was continuously and universally supported during the British Rule. Praise is due to the editors of the volume, the authors, and the publisher, for this publication which has now covered an important vacuum, and which shall act as the starting point for any further work on the issue.

Achilles C. Emilianides

Struggle for Survival - Aspects of Cypriot Political History after 1974

[Αγώνας για Επιβίωση – Πτυχές της Κυπριακής Πολιτικής Ιστορίας μετά το 1974]

Achilles C. Emilianides, Christina Ioannou, Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos (eds)

Hippasus Publishing

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The Turkish invasion of Cyprus, in the summer of 1974, undoubtedly constitutes a milestone in the evolution of not only the unresolved Cyprus issue, but also in the institutions of the established Republic of Cyprus, whose government found itself cut off from 34% of its territory.

Time has not stood still since the summer of 1974. Life has gone on and the Republic of Cyprus was called upon to adapt to the new realities. As everyday life on the island was changing, it was only natural that the state institutions would evolve, adjusting to the fact that the legitimate Cypriot government was no longer able to control its entire state territory. In the spring of 2003, the reopening of the previously barricaded Ledras Street checkpoint, an event independent of any permanent political solution, explicitly represents the current phase of transition that the island has been experiencing, albeit with an unknown future. The ongoing areas of contention for the Cypriot government include the aftermath of the Turkish occupation and the negotiations aiming to reunify the island.

'Struggle for Survival - Aspects of Cypriot Political History after 1974' is a collection of 15 original scientific essays, presented by 19 academic researchers in a conference on contemporary political history of the Republic of Cyprus, which took place in October 2018, at the University of Nicosia. The contributors present a number of rationales, reviewing and recording the way in which the post-1974 semi-occupied Republic of Cyprus has described and perceived itself, while being aware of the temporary nature of the current status quo, and negotiating the answer to the critical *quo vadis* question.

The Greek Cypriot interpretation of the course of negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem and the various effects of the ongoing Turkish occupation are described in the first nine chapters of the book. It is portrayed from the perspective of

Nicosia, and how it judges the Athens attitude regarding the national problem. The course of Cypriot institutional integration into the European Union is also examined, as well as how the ideological agenda of Cypriot foreign policy is affected by the path of the island's colonial past.

The remaining six chapters discuss particular aspects of the evolution of the society and its institutions, including the attitude of the mass media during the financial crisis of 2013, the formation of centrist political parties and the dialectic between politics and literature.

Chapters 1-9: The Republic of Cyprus in the Shadow of Occupation

Petros Papapolyviou analyses the evolution of party affiliations and emphasises the discrepancies in the historical narrative dealing with the post-occupation reality, from the 1970s up to the present day.

Andreas Theofanous clearly describes the Greek Cypriot pluralism of concepts over the definition of the 'bicomunal bizonal federation', which has been promoted by the international community as the constitutional model for the solution of the conflict. In addition to the agenda of the negotiations, Theofanous highlights, not only the criteria that led to the rejection of the Annan Plan, but also the anticipated constructive role that the European Union could secure.

Sotiris Rizas, by pointing out the similarities and differences between the Nimetz plan (1978) and the proposals of de Cuellar (1984-86), describes the Greek Cypriot concerns as to 'what would be the correct content' of the island's federalisation – a question that has been pondered on by all Cypriot governments, without exception, from 1974 onwards.

Andreas Stergiou evaluates the possibility of a federal solution to the problem, while pointing out that a possible 'two-state solution' should not be regarded as anathema. Also of interest are the remarks by Georgios Angeletopoulos, presenting a critical overview of the Turkish media coverage of the negotiations leading to the Annan Plan and the results of the double referendum which took place on 24 April 2004 in both sides of the divide.

Given the realities of the ongoing *status quo* of 'non-solution', Michalis Kontos and Andreas Karyos revisit the role of Greece and Turkey, the two 'Mother Countries' of the Cyprus conflict, by presenting a critical evaluation of the management of the S-300 missile crisis during 1997-98. The decision not to install this particular defense system in the territories controlled by the Cypriot government, as a consequence of Athens' decision to back down at Ankara's insistence, caused disappointment in Nic-

osia -a fact that left its own distinctive mark on the relations between Cyprus and Greece from 1974 onwards.

Another interesting aspect examined in the book is the remarkably fast and smooth institutional integration of the Republic of Cyprus, in order to adapt to the terms and conditions set by the European Union. As Christina Ioannou very aptly observes, the accession of Cyprus to the EU was perceived by the political leadership, as well as by Greek Cypriot society, as a 'national goal' and a common 'national effort', taking on the character of a nation-building process through the Europeanisation of the independent Cypriot State.

The ideological basis of the legal opinions prepared by the Republic of Cyprus in the framework of the International Court of Justice in the Hague, when the latter was called upon to rule on the status of Kosovo and the Chagos Archipelago in Mauritius, is demonstrated in the article by Nikolas A. Ioannidis. Emphasising the anti-colonial views of the Republic of Cyprus' foreign policy, Ioannidis recalls that the demand for decolonisation is still relevant, since the insignia of the British Sovereign Bases yet remain from the 'pragmatic' London-Zurich Agreements.

Concluding the presentation of the impact of the 1974 Turkish invasion on Cypriot reality, 'Struggle for Survival' examines the issue of missing persons. Due to the passage of time, Mary Antoniou and Emilios A. Solomou soberly explain the choices and criteria of the Cypriot governments over the last 50 years, which co-shaped the modern post-occupation Greek Cypriot narrative.

Chapters 10-15: Society and Institutions

Following the 1974 invasion and the admission of Cyprus to the EU in 2004, the third milestone in the history of the young Cypriot State was the economic crisis of 2013. Sofia Iordanidou, Emmanuel Takas and Kyriakos Kolovos examine how the economic crisis affected the credibility of the Greek Cypriot media. Using comparative examples, they conclude that the local media outlets, either out of necessity or by choice, showed tolerance to government decisions, which, in some cases, served as a bulwark against social reactions, trying to convince the audiences of the necessity for taking harsh emergency measures. Interestingly enough, this was in contrast to what had occurred in Greece and in some other European countries when faced with similar economic challenges.

Vassilis Protopapas examines the formation and consolidation of a new political pole in the post-invasion Cypriot political system, focusing on the emergence of two major centrist parties, the Democratic Party (DIKO) and the socialist EDEK, which

have both withstood the electoral contests since the 1970s. By comparing their ideological origins in relation to the two main poles of the local political system (the right-wing Democratic Rally - DISY and the left-wing AKEL), Protopapas presents, succinctly and comprehensibly, the pool of 'centrist' votes in Greek Cypriot society and the post-1974 electoral behavior, within a multi-party environment, which was actually consolidated only after 1977, following the death of Archbishop Makarios, the influential first President.

The last four chapters creatively connect politics with literature. Firstly, Ioanna Alexandrou, highlighting the intellectual work of the first female Greek Cypriot MP, Rina Katselli, emphasises the presence of women, both in State institutions and within society. Secondly, using their literary talent as point of reference, Dimitris P. Sotiropoulos sketches the personalities of three diplomats, Nikos Kranidiotis, Rodis Roufos-Kanakaris and Giorgos Seferis, by demonstrating their influence in the shaping of contemporary Cypriot history at crucial times and specific places. Thirdly, Achilles C. Emilianides, prompted by the Athenian playwright Dimitris Psathas' political satire contributions in the Greek press in the turbulent years of 1974-75, graphically states how attached (and yet how detached, too) Greek public opinion was from the post-invasion Cypriot trajectory. Finally, Marilena Neokleous collects Cypriot literary texts that describe the emotions of those Greek Cypriots who visited their ancestral homes in the occupied north, after the reopening of the checkpoints, in the spring of 2003, giving the reader the opportunity to get to guess if and when yet another wound caused by the Cypriot tragedy, could ever be healed.

As a final comment to make; the added value of this book, published in 2021 by the quarterly review '*Nea Estia*', Hippasus law publications and the University of Nicosia, lies in the fact that the narrative of the past takes a backseat, as academic researchers build new bridges between the past and the present, in contrast to the vast majority of Cypriot and international bibliography focusing solely on the past. The '*Struggle for Survival*' describes in what way the Republic of Cyprus perceives and narrates itself during an ongoing *de facto* transitional period, which began in the summer of 1974, continued with the opening of the checkpoints in the spring of 2003, and since then, continues with no indication of a political breakthrough. This collective work postulates a multidisciplinary description of current Cypriot realities, providing opportunities for further reflection. In this sense, '*Struggle for Survival - Aspects of Cypriot Political History after 1974*' is an original, self-perceived autobiographical monologue of a semi-occupied European country, presented in a collec-

tive academic work, fulfilling the criteria of a reliable historical source, useful to the researcher in Cyprus and abroad.

Gabriel Haritos

The Secret Negotiations: The Birth of the Cyprus Republic (1959-1960)

[Οι Μυστικές Διαπραγματεύσεις: Η Γένεση της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας (1959-1960)]

Achilles C. Emilianides

Papazisis

Athens, 2022 [pp. 477]

ISBN: 978-960-02-3877-8

This book marks a turning point in Cypriot studies, especially in the fields of institutional and political history. Moreover, it fills major gaps in the available bibliography. The study of Cypriot affairs, Cypriot history and institutions has suffered much due to the prominence of the Cyprus question itself. Until relatively recently, research on the Cyprus question, in its various forms and phases, had dominated the academic agenda, literally to the effective exclusion of everything else. For many decades, scholars turned their attention to the international deliberations regarding the future international status of Cyprus, or the successive crises of the Cyprus question from the early 1950s until the period after the 1974 Turkish invasion. In this process it has not been unusual for scholars –at least many among them– to take the complicated legal issues for granted, and display a painfully large degree of barren legalism, without even having the legal background to shape an informed analysis.

With the exception of two earlier reference works,¹ the systematic research on Cypriot institutions started only some years ago.² Although these studies also usually placed the institutional development of Cyprus in the context of an evolving Cyprus question, they arguably contributed to shifting –even partially– the focus to the ways

¹ Stanley Kyriakides, *Cyprus: Constitutionalism and Crisis Government* (Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1968); Criton G. Tornaritis, *Το Πολιτειακόν Δίκαιον της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας* [The Legal System of the Republic of Cyprus] (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1982).

² Dimitris K. Melissas, *Η Οργάνωση της Πολιτικής Εξουσίας στην Κυπριακή Πολιτεία* [The Organisation of Political Power in the Cypriot State] (Athens-Komotini: Sakkoulas 1996); Kypros Chrysostomides, *The Republic of Cyprus: A Study in International Law* (The Hague, Boston, London: Martinus Nijhoff Publications, 2000); Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *The Cyprus Question, 1878-1960: The Constitutional Aspect* (Minneapolis: Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, 2002); Nikos Christodoulidis, *Τα Σχέδια Λύσης του Κυπριακού, 1948-1978* [The Plans for a Solution of the Cyprus Question] (Athens: Kastaniotis, 2009). See also the works of Professor Emilianides in note 3.

that institutions functioned *within* Cyprus – thus to the levels of Cypriot constitutional history, political culture and the evolution of political forces. Essentially, this was an integral part of a larger development, namely, the emergence of a strictly academic bibliography, by people who were really trying to understand what happened and why, rather than to be part of international disputes, or crusaders seeking to ‘steer’ political developments to the desired direction. Still, the specialised works on Cypriot institutions and parliamentary history again remained relatively few, and it was Professor Emilianides who took the lead in providing much needed relevant studies, thus contributing the element of an inter-disciplinary approach, and adding the perspective of Constitutional Law to the works of political science, international relations or international history.³

The new book by Prof. Emilianides, however, arguably exceeds his earlier studies in scope. It is the best manifestation of the emergence of a Cypriot constitutional history. Emilianides has located the archives of the Cyprus Joint Constitutional Committee (JCC), the body that drafted the Cyprus Constitution of 1960. The archive includes the records of the plenary sessions of the JCC, of the sub-committees, as well as correspondence and drafts of the Constitution. The author has also consulted the British archives and the memoirs or specialised publications of members of the Committee; and he has exhaustively used the relevant bibliography. Thus, the book is the product of a large-scale historical/archival research, combined with the knowledge and background of a major expert in Constitutional Law.

In order to assess the importance of this material, it may be briefly necessary to sketch the role of the JCC in the making of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution. This was a very peculiar case of Constitution-making. The ‘basic principles’ of the Constitution of independent Cyprus were agreed upon in the Greek-Turkish agreement, reached in Zurich in February 1959, providing for the setting up of a Cypriot state which would not have the right to unite, either in whole or in part, with a different country, Greece or Turkey. This was the concept of ‘guaranteed independence’, excluding union with Greece or partition between Greece and Turkey. The agreement was confirmed a few days later in London, by Britain and the leaders of the two Cypriot communities,

³ Achilles C. Emilianides, *Η Υπέρβαση του Κυπριακού Συντάγματος* [The Transgression of the Cypriot Constitution] (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2006); Achilles C. Emilianides, *Πορεία προς την Καταστροφή: Κοινοβουλευτική Ιστορία της Κυπριακής Δημοκρατίας, 1964-1976* [A Course towards Disaster: A Parliamentary History of the Cyprus Republic, 1964-1976] (Nicosia: Aegean, 2007); Achilles C. Emilianides, Christos Papastylianos and Constantinos Stratilatis, *Η Κυπριακή Δημοκρατία και το Δίκαιο της Ανάγκης* [The Cyprus Republic and the Doctrine of Necessity] (Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas, 2016).

Archbishop Makarios and Fazil Küçük. Thus, the backbone of the Cypriot Constitution – a document which normally should have resulted from processes involving only its own citizens – was in practice ‘given’ by an international agreement between two other states. We now know that this process was agreed upon between the Greek government and Archbishop Makarios, but this element, however important, cannot lead the researcher to ignore the fundamental fact that the basic provisions of the Constitution had been agreed at an international level before the start of the drafting of the Constitution itself. As if this particularity were not enough, the JCC presented a further, unusual to say the least, characteristic: its membership was expanded to include, not only representatives of the two Cypriot communities, but also of Greece and Turkey, while it was also presided by a ‘neutral’ expert, Professor Marcel Bridel of the University of Lausanne. In other words, the drafting of the Cyprus Constitution arguably ran counter to some fundamental principles of Constitution-making. The process was bound by an international agreement, and in the drafting body itself two other states played a hugely important role, at least in the sense that they provided expert opinion and even (in the Turkish case) guidance for the Cypriot representatives involved.

Is this, then, a study in Constitutional Law or in international politics? The student of Cypriot affairs knows that it is all of these. In essence, it is part of an effort to understand the multiple Cypriot deviations that, in the view of this author, a future settlement will have to avoid. One of the major complexities of the Cyprus question, and a cause of possible further trouble, is the constant breaking up of every sensible rule of institution-making, because of the ‘invasion’ of international political considerations (especially of the geopolitical interests of a third state) in processes which should normally remain internal Cypriot, and be settled by the citizens of the state in question.

Even with these important deviations from normal institution-making, or perhaps because of them, the story that Emilianides tells us is extremely interesting. Despite the limits that the Zurich-London agreements had imposed on the JCC, there was a huge spectrum of issues that the JCC had to settle. The most important of these was the question of the powers of the (Greek Cypriot) President of the Republic as opposed to those of the (Turkish Cypriot) Vice-President. This existential problem was finally solved through an agreement to give the presumption of competence to the Council of Ministers with its Greek Cypriot majority. This meant that, in all issues in which the President and the Vice-President were not expressly competent accord-

ing to the Zurich-London agreements, the Council of Ministers would be competent. Thus, albeit in an indirect manner, the Cyprus Constitution finally provided for majority rule, even if this was tempered by the excessive powers of veto of the Vice-President or the powers of the Turkish Cypriot deputies in the House of Representatives in specific, expressly mentioned subjects.

Emilianides, however, as a good law expert, does not stop there, as others (including the author of this review) have done in their works. He also deals with the shaping of the Constitutional provisions for the Cypriot communities and minorities (including their membership); the nature of the state (a unitary state or a 'federation' of some sort –he concludes that it is a unitary one); the fundamental rights of citizens; the powers of the executive, of the legislative and communal assemblies, of the judiciary; local administration (with its huge peculiarities in the Cypriot context of the late 1950s and early 1960s); and the issues of public service and armed forces. It should be noted that the issue of separate municipalities finally became the breaking point which triggered the crisis of 1963-64.

It is really difficult for a student of the Cyprus question to exaggerate about the importance of this book. It goes many steps forward, compared to the available bibliography. It provides a factually reliable –indeed, accurate– picture of a hugely crucial aspect of the only Cyprus settlement recorded so far. As such, it marks a turning point in our understanding of the dynamics of Cypriot institutional development, political culture and, perhaps, prospects for the future. The book shows what has been done in 1959-60; but also, what went wrong with this process. And what transpired, was a fundamental mistake: the Constitution was called upon to serve not only internal but also international interests, which, by the nature of things, is not the job of a Constitution; and an international agreement had to be implemented by a body consisting of representatives not only of the Cypriot citizens, but also of third states. The result was a hugely detailed Constitution, providing for excessive over-regulation: an unacceptably rigid document which could break up rather easily, as was proved in 1963-64.

Moreover, the book is not simply a huge contribution to the available bibliography. It sets the stage for the necessary development of a Cypriot constitutional/political history, which the obsession with the Cyprus question had impeded until now. It calls for the emergence of a younger generation of scholars, who will look at the relevant issues from the point of view of contemporary institutions, Constitutional Law,

the law of human rights, and without being burdened by the priorities, geopolitical, ethnic and other, of the traditional 'Cyprus question'.

Last but not least, it is, albeit indirectly, a call for reliable Constitution-making. Emilianides' work shows that a Cyprus settlement cannot but be relevant to, indeed dependent on, some fundamental principles which govern the organisation of human societies. Respect for the people who will implement these institutions, and their right to shape them, has to be an integral component in any future settlement, if we want it to have a fair chance of successful implementation. Realistically, one inevitably has to accept that the international interests will have to be taken into account, at least to some measure; but these should not devour the interests of the people concerned, namely, the citizens of Cyprus. The need –indeed, the realistic necessity– to show respect for the people concerned: this, perhaps, is the most important conclusion for the reader of this book.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou

The Cyprus Legislative Council (1878-1931) – Establishment, operation, and parliamentary controversies: Constitutional freedoms under constraint and challenges

[Το Κυπριακό Νομοθετικό Συμβούλιο (1878-1931) – Ίδρυση, λειτουργία και κοινοβουλευτικές αντιπαραθέσεις: Συνταγματικές ελευθερίες υπό περιορισμό και αμφισβήτηση]

Christos Kyriakides

House of Representatives, Republic of Cyprus

Nicosia, 2016 [pp. 616]

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It is a fact that bibliography about Cyprus under the British rule lacks studies around the institutions of British administration. For example, we know very little about the way the Executive Council worked, the atmosphere of their meetings, etc. This gap of knowledge prevents us from a better understanding of the British administration, the relations between people and the administration, and the general political environment.

For the reason above, Christos Kyriakides' book is a valuable contribution to historiography. The Legislative Council may have been a gift wrapped with restrictions, as the author aptly argues, but it became the cradle for the political life in Cyprus. During the ottoman times, only the high hierarchy of the Church was able to take part in the political/administrative life, through the Medjilis Idare. On the contrary, during the British era the Legislative Council included lawyers, merchandisers, land-owners, doctors, and created a generation of politicians who were central figures in the political life of Cyprus until 1931.

Kyriakides makes a strong argument stating that Britain's motive behind the offer of the Legislative Council was to isolate the Church's influence, creating a generation of young politicians free from the direction of the church and ready to cooperate with the British administration. It is safe to say that they were unsuccessful; the Church's influence not only did not decrease over the years, but on the contrary increased. High profile members of the Church, like Nicodemos Mylonas, were members of the

Legislative Council and had strong influence over their Greek colleagues. Mylonas is the one who urged the MPs to quit the Council just before the October riots (1931). On the other hand, British attempts were not fully unsuccessful. For example, several members, during the interwar years, remained unaffected from the church's influence and were closer to the British administration (like Triantafyllides Antonios, lawyer, who, just after being elected as a member of the Legislative Council in 1930, was appointed by the British as a member of the Executive Council, a position he accepted, leaving his position at the Legislative Council). In this category of the legislative members closer to the British administration, clearly I don't include 'Eptadikoi', their time in the Legislative Council constituted an abnormality of the legislative body, as they did not have the acceptance of the Greek people.

Going one step further, I dare say that the presence of a legislative body up to a point eased the tension of the Enosis movement and brought firebrands of the Enosis movement closer to the British administration, such as Christodoulos Sozos (MP, 1901-1906, 1906-1911), a considered hardliner of the Enosis movement, who became a member of the Executive Council (1911-1912). I think it is not a coincidence that the most hardcore union believer, Nikolaos Katalanos, by choice did not participate in the Legislative Council, wanting no cooperation with the British.

At the beginning the writer presents the case of the Legislative Council in Malta, afterwards moves on to the first Legislative Council (1878) where all the members were appointed by the High Commissioner as an introduction to the more democratic form of 1883, where the Greek and Turkish members were elected. Then Kyriakides' observant eye points out that after 1910 things got heated. As a result of the Italian-Turkish war, the anticipated Enosis for Crete, Greek members become more and more demanding. It was during those times that the Greek members of the Legislative Council decided to quit from the Legislative Council in search of more liberties. It was a turning point. The act of quitting the Legislative Council was the ultimate political act against the British administration -impolitely the Greeks return the British 'gift' of 1882. They used the 'gift' as part of their political resistance, an act that will be repeated in the years post World War I. The act of quitting, even though the members of the administration did not admit it, brought an embarrassment to the British.

Among the many qualities of this book, one can point out the amount of information on the Greek-Turkish relations inside the Council, from their first years of cooperation to the first disputes, also the warm British-Turkish relations up to the point that Kemalists such as Necati showed up in the Council causing serious damage

to the British-Turkish cooperation inside the Council. Along with the books by Sotos Ktoris¹, Altay Nevzat², Niyazi Kizilyurek³, and Alexia Koupanou's⁴ PhD thesis (University of Cyprus), Kyriakides' book provides a great understanding on the Turkish minority behaviour up to 1931. Kyriakides demonstrates the insecurities of the Turks stemming from the demand for Enosis and their strong attachment, as a result of that, to the British.

Kyriakides is analytical, goes into detail and provides a whole spectrum of the discussions on the Legislative Council, proof that he thoroughly examined the large volumes containing the discussions of the Legislative Council. 'Foros ypoteleias' or the matter of establishing an agricultural bank, seems to be among the most significant matters for discussion among the MPs. It is worth mentioning that the agricultural bank was a matter that seemed to more or less unite the Turkish and Greek members of the Council. Generally, the economy seemed to unite the two communities, unlike matters with a political aura (such as education).

It is also easy to understand that the elective members, as showed by Kyriakides, had no real powers due to the veto of the High Commissioner/Governor, giving more a sense of participation rather than a real participation. One can think: Had the British been more generous and provided real participation to the Greek members, they might have increased their chances of creating a strong party of British sympathisers (a long-standing aspiration) and eventually avoided the decisive rift between them and the Greeks with the 1931 uprising.

Kyriakides provided a book which is already considered fundamental for the understanding of British administration up to 1931 and the British administration relations with the Greeks and the Turks. He has successfully paved the way for deeper research into the aspects of the British administration.

Kyriakos Iakovides

¹ Σώτος Κτωρής, *Τουρκοκύπριοι. Από το Περιθώριο στο Συνεταιρισμό (1923-1960)*, [Turkish Cypriots, from outcasts protagonists (1923-1960)] Αθήνα, 2013.

² Altay Nevzat, *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, Doctoral Thesis, University of Oulu, published by *Oulu University Press, Finland*, 2005.

³ Niyazi Kizilyurek, *Μια Ιστορία Βίας και Μνησικακίας. Η γένεση και Εξέλιξη της Εθνοτικής Διένεξης στην Κύπρο*, Τόμος Α', [Bicomunal relations in Cyprus, a history of violence] Λευκωσία, 2019.

⁴ Αλεξία Κούπανου, *Η Διαμόρφωση των Σχέσεων Χριστιανών και Μουσουλμάνων της Κύπρου κατά την Πρώτη Περίοδο της της Αποικιακής Διακυβέρνησης (1878-1914): Ο Δημόσιος Λόγος, τα Πεδία των Αντιπαραθέσεων και οι Αποτυχημένες Προσπάθειες για Κοινές Διεδικήσεις* [Christian and Muslim relations in Cyprus, 1878-1914], διδακτορική διατριβή κατατεθειμένη στο Τμήμα Ιστορίας και Αρχαιολογίας του Πανεπιστημίου Κύπρου, Λευκωσία, 2017.

Social Movements as Agents of Change: A Social Analysis of the Popular Labour Movement in Cyprus

[Κοινωνικά Κινήματα ως Φορείς Αλλαγής: Μια Κοινωνική Ανάλυση του Λαϊκού Εργατικού Κινήματος στην Κύπρο]

Gregory Neocleous

Iamvos

Athens, 2022 [pp. 256]

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While there is a rich literature on several dimensions of the modern political history of Cyprus, this is not the case with its social and economic dimensions. Academic studies about Cyprus' labour movement are scarce and often tend to be quite specific, focusing on some dimensions and time periods. Neocleous' book offering an overview of the labour movement from the late 19th to the early 21st century is thus a welcome contribution to Cyprus studies. More importantly, the fact that it is written in Greek and with limited academic jargon, makes the book accessible to a much wider audience in Cyprus.

The book is structured chronologically, covering the transition from the Ottoman to the British rule, and subsequently the early and late colonial eras and the early and late independence eras. While the first chapters set the scene by describing the appalling socio-economic conditions that prevailed before the development of the labour movement, the ones that follow trace the rise and achievements of trade unionism, which transformed the socio-economic field by the end of the British colonial rule. The main argument the author develops is that the welfare state in general and the social insurance system in particular, did not come about through the initiative of the British Colonial Authorities or the Cypriot politicians of the late colonial period, but as a result of the constant and accumulating pressure exerted by a rising social movement based on the forces of labour which developed and grew stronger during the 1930s, 1940s and 1950s. Through adopting a broad Marxian perspective, the author sees the establishment of social insurance as the outcome of sustained social conflict and the legislative reforms as reflecting a shift of the class balance of power already happening at the socio-economic realm.

Neocleous recognises the limitations of the initial social insurance scheme intro-

duced in 1956 and accounts for its weaknesses and excluded groups. At the same time, he acknowledges the significance of labour legislation and the revision of the public benefit law, a few years earlier, all of which contributed to the alleviation of poverty in Cyprus. In the following chapters covering the independence period, the author examines the operation of the social insurance system, focusing on its actual consequences on the elderly population and on the reforms undertaken to make it stronger, fairer, and more efficient. A lot of attention is given to the 1980 social insurance reform, which has effectively shaped the system as we know it today. The shift from the flat rate to the pro-rata model was both superior in terms of coverage and much more just. Yet the benefits of the new system were not available to all immediately, as those already at pension age at the time continued to be covered by the old system, creating the paradox that the cohort that had struggled most to have social insurance established, ultimately benefited less than the subsequent cohorts.

In the historical narrative developed by Neocleous, strong emphasis is placed on the political context and the intense ideological conflict that structured developments in the late colonial period. The mobilisation of the Cypriot working class faced the opposition, not only of employers, but also of the Church and the Colonial Authorities who were opposed both to the extension of labour and to welfare rights. Yet the opponents of the popular classes were only able to delay, not prevent, the introduction of the social insurance system.

One of the main strengths of the book is the use of archival material, as well as published sources that have been neglected or insufficiently analysed, including the experiences and the voice of activists. Although the author does link Cyprus' case with international experience and he does situate his analysis in theoretical frameworks, the theoretical and comparative dimensions remain less developed than the empirical analytic ones. The key contribution of the book is the detailed historical account, not only of the establishment of social insurance in the late colonial times, but also of its elaboration and development during independence. As a comprehensive account of the history of social welfare in Cyprus and an analysis of the role of the organised working class in bringing it about, the book constitutes a valuable resource for both the academic and the general audience.

Gregoris Ioannou

The Institution of the House of Representatives **[Ο Θεσμός της Βουλής των Αντιπροσώπων]**

Achilles C. Emilianides, Christina Ioannou,
Dimitris Kourtis, Sylvana Vanezou (eds)
House of Representatives, University of Nicosia – Law School
Nicosia, 2022 [pp. 342]
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Introduction

The volume entitled ‘The Institution of the House of Representatives’ is the fruit of the largest scientific conference on parliamentary studies that has taken place in Cyprus, which was co-organised by the House of Representatives and the University of Nicosia Law School.

The aim of the volume is to present institutional, regulatory and legal aspects of the House of Representatives, while at the same time seeking to rekindle interest in parliamentary studies in Cyprus.

With more than 30 contributions, the volume covers classic topics, such as the autonomy of the parliament, representative democracy, parliamentary work, diplomacy and scrutiny, as well as the participation of the parliament in European and international institutions, the ‘conflicts’ between parliament and the judiciary, the activities of parliamentary committees and the representation of religious groups as well.

Structure and Content

The volume is divided into two parts, each of which consists of four thematic sections. The first part includes speeches by political figures, while the second part includes studies or interventions by academics and researchers.

The first section, entitled ‘The Cypriot House of Representatives’, includes five speeches. Vassiliki Anastasiadou, former Minister of Transport, Communications and Works and former Director General of the Parliament, shared her experiences and described the parliament’s evolutionary and maturing course. Former AKEL MP Giorgos Georgiou referred to the principle of separation of powers and the process of administrative and financial autonomy of the parliament. Former AKEL MP Skevi Koutra-Koukouma focused on the work of the parliamentary committees, giving examples of good practices during the vote and discussion with the government. For-

mer Secretary General of AKEL and MP Andros Kyprianou referred to the role of the parliament as a legislative body, but also as a means of controlling the government. Finally, former DISY MP Michalis Sophocleous spoke about the role of a member of the parliament, emphasising the political status and skills required from an MP.

The second section, entitled 'Representative Democracy and Parliament' includes four speeches. Former independent MP Anna Theologou criticised the modern system of representative democracy, saying that party parliamentarism does not allow for the real representation of people's will. Former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former MP of the Citizens' Alliance George Lillikas developed his proposal for participatory democracy, transparency and accountability, through the use of modern technology. Former AKEL MP Evanthia Savva referred to the application of the principle of free mandate. Finally, AKEL's Secretary General and MP Stefanos Stefanou referred to the connection between parliament and democracy, expressing the position that tackling the democratic deficit in the EU must begin with respect for national institutions.

The third section, entitled 'Parliamentary Work', contains four speeches. Former DIKO MP Andreas Angelides pointed out the long-standing failure to legislate on the possibility of sanctions in case of non-immediate enforcement of court decisions. Former Solidarity Movement MP Michalis Giorgallas focused on the impact of poor legislation on public administration. AKEL MP Aristos Damianou referred to the urgent need for initiatives to tackle corruption, pointing out that the upsurge of the phenomenon is altering the quality of democracy. Finally, DISY MP Demetris Demetriou spoke about the possibility of digital governance to improve transparency in legislative work and MPs' productivity.

The fourth section, entitled 'Parliamentary Diplomacy and Parliamentary Scrutiny', contains four speeches. The President of the Parliament and DISY MP Anni-ta Demetriou elaborated on the actions of the parliament regarding the systematic promotion of the foreign policy of the state and stressed out the importance of how international cooperation magnifies Cyprus' small geographical range. Former DISY MP Xenia Constantinou spoke about the exercise of parliamentary scrutiny and the role of the parliament as a monitoring body. AKEL's parliamentary spokesman Giorgos Loukaidis referred to the need for consultation between the government and the House of Representatives. Finally, the parliamentary representative of DISY Nikos Tornaritis elaborated on the actions of the Cypriot delegation to the Asian Parliamentary Assembly and stressed the need for further development of outward-looking parliamentary diplomacy.

The fifth section, entitled 'International and European Aspects', contains four contributions. Dionysos Alexiou, lecturer at the Department of Languages and Literature of the University of Nicosia, examined the function of cultural diplomacy as a pillar of foreign policy and the role of parliament in the development of initiatives in the field. Katerina Kalaitzaki, lecturer at UCLAN Cyprus, developed the role of the parliament as the guardian of the European authorities. Evangelos Parras, member of the scientific team of the Secretariat of the Interparliamentary Assembly on Orthodoxy, analysed the participation of the parliament in the assembly from the perspective of exercising parliamentary diplomacy. Finally, Christiana Fryda, European affairs officer at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs, elaborated on the evolution of the role of the permanent representations of national parliaments in the European Parliament and underlined the importance of interparliamentary cooperation.

The sixth section, entitled 'Parliament and the Judiciary', includes three studies. Alexis Antoniadis, parliament's international relations officer, addressed the special issue of the parliament's *locus standi*. Ioannis Kastanas, lecturer at the University of Nicosia, referred to the particular issue of the judicially unchecked *interna corporis* of the parliament. Petros Konstantinides, also lecturer at the University of Nicosia, pointed out the need to define methodological tools for the interpretation of the Cypriot Constitution.

The seventh section, entitled 'Legislative Work', includes three interventions. Lawyer Simos Angelides referred to the passing of legislation, in 1999, which codified the principles governing administrative action. Assistant Professor Vagia Polyzoidou and Professor Achilles Emilianides conducted a comparative and empirical research, analysing the options for introducing a regulatory framework for lobbying in the Cypriot legal order, in order to enhance transparency and citizen participation in policy-making. Finally, the research team of Nicolas Kyriakides, Petros Petrikkos, Georgianna Kelo, Andreas Pattichis and Leah Deniz, addressed how technology can improve transparency of parliamentary procedures. They also focused on the creation of an electronic legislative observatory and inclusion of parliament in the wider e-government efforts.

The eighth and final section, entitled 'Aspects of Parliamentary History', includes four studies. PhD candidate Ioanna Alexandrou conducted a comprehensive review and evaluation of the activities of the refugee committee. Researcher Konstantinos Delimatsis examined the principle of *non privilegium contra publicum* and its application in the Cypriot legal order. Associate Professor of Law Christos Papastylianos studied the distribution of power in the bicomunal system of government of 1960.

Finally, researcher Michael-Alexandros Hadjilyras referred to the representation of the three religious groups in the parliament.

Analysis and Evaluation

From a personal standpoint, I believe that the volume achieves its initial purpose, which was to present institutional, regulatory and legal dimensions of the House of Representatives. The reader can receive interesting insights from political figures, academics and researchers, on the way the Cypriot parliament operates, the political implications of representative democracy and the importance of parliamentary diplomacy. It also provides useful information on the international and European aspects of the parliament, the relations between the parliament and the judiciary, the modernisation of legislative work and parliamentary history. Some of the most important contributions of the volume are further explained below.

Vassiliki Anastasiadou, former Minister of Transport, Communications and Works and former Director General of the Parliament, in her speech entitled ‘House of Representatives-Milestones in the History of the Last Thirty Years’, clearly describes how parliamentary workload increased rapidly in the 1980s, as well as the reasons that led to this change. In my view, this contribution is important because it demonstrates the organic evolution of the Cypriot parliament and its ability to adapt to new circumstances.

The former Minister of Foreign Affairs and former MP of the Citizens’ Alliance Giorgos Lillikas, in his speech entitled ‘Representative Democracy in the 21st Century’, recognises the need to move to a more participatory democracy that encourages transparency and accountability. Furthermore, DISY MP Demetris Demetriou, in his speech entitled ‘How the House of Representatives Can Act as an Assistance of Digital Governance and a Space for Healthy Dialogue with Citizens’, highlights the need of live streaming in parliamentary committees as a measure of transparency and digital modernisation. In my opinion both contributions are important because they underline the need to transform the political process from representative to participatory democracy.

AKEL MP Aristos Damianou, in his speech entitled ‘Legislative Initiatives to Address Institutional Corruption: Conflict of Interest, Incompatibility, Asset Declarations’, emphasises a severe issue regarding systemic corruption and also indicates the need for immediate measures to be taken into consideration for better legislative regulation on conflicts of interest, incompatibility and asset declarations. I believe

that this contribution is crucial because it demonstrates the severe issues that have been a result of corruption, which need to be immediately resolved.

Former DISY MP Xenia Constantinou, in her speech entitled ‘The Parliament as a Monitoring Body: Means of Parliamentary Scrutiny’, successfully outlines the main means of parliamentary scrutiny, such as the examination and amendment of bills, the establishment of ad hoc parliamentary committees, the procedure for submitting questions and law proposals, as well as the discussion on various issues at the competent committees. From my point of view this contribution is important, because it clearly records the most basic means of parliamentary scrutiny, which are often sidelined by the parliamentary body, due to the tendency of some MPs to choose different means of governmental criticism.

Assistant Professor Vagia Polyzoidou and Professor Achilles Emilianides, in their intervention entitled ‘The Regulatory Framework of Lobbying and the Cypriot Legal Order’, underline the need to understand lobbying as a legal act, which is an essential part of the democratic process, and not as an act identical to corruption. It is my belief that this contribution is important, because the analysis of the regulatory framework of lobbying highlights the positive impact of institutionalised lobbying, while at the same time eliminates the prejudices that identify lobbying as an act of corruption.

The research team of Nicolas Kyriakides, Petros Petrikkos, Georgianna Kelo, Andreas Pattichis and Leah Deniz, in their intervention entitled ‘Transparency and Accountability for Cypriot Legislature: An Online Legislative Observatory for the House of Representatives’, addressed how technology can improve transparency of parliamentary procedures and focused on the creation of an electronic legislative observatory. In my opinion, this input is vital, since it demonstrates the benefits an electronic legislative observatory can have, exercising supervisory control and positive pressure towards the parliament and the MPs.

As mentioned above, the volume achieves its initial purpose, which is to present institutional, regulatory and legal dimensions of the House of Representatives. Nevertheless, in addition to the positive contribution of the volume, I think that there are several pathogenies and possible ways of enhancing the existing parliamentary work in Cyprus, which have not been sufficiently highlighted and which need to be examined.

Some of the pathogenies are, a poor internal communication in the parliament, MPs not showing up well-prepared for the committees’ meetings, and the process for examining draft laws being questionable. Also, as far as I am concerned, the parliament jurisdiction in terms of feedback from stakeholders, is not sufficiently used, the

absence of MPs at the committees' meetings constitutes a significant issue, and the separation of the existing permanent committees is insufficient as well.

Some possible ways of improving the existing parliamentary work are, the amendment of the Rules of Procedure governing the process for the examination of draft laws and the obligation for MPs to participate in committees and plenary meetings, the creation of advisory groups, as well as the redefinition of the existing permanent committees.

Conclusion

The purpose of the volume is to present institutional, regulatory and legal dimensions of the House of Representatives, and contribute to the revival of interest in parliamentary studies in Cyprus.

In my judgement, the volume achieves its initial purpose. Furthermore, the undertaking of such an initiative, contributes to the establishment of a constructive dialogue, allowing the reinforcement, reconfiguration and improvement of both parliamentary work and interest in Cyprus.

George Isaia

**‘Cypriot Archives - Archival Testimonies on
Asia Minor Hellenism of Cyprus’
Proceedings of the 3rd Scholarly Symposium
[«Κυπριακά Αρχεία και αρχειακές μαρτυρίες
για τον Μικρασιατικό Ελληνισμό της Κύπρου»
Πρακτικά Γ’ Επιστημονικού Συμποσίου]**

**Charalampos Chotzakoglou (ed.)
Association of Asia Minor Greeks of Cyprus
Nicosia, 2020 [pp. 200]
ISBN: 978-9925-7414-3-4**

The interest on Asia Minor and its interaction with other lands of Hellenism has always been relevant. The work being presented under the title ‘Cypriot Archives - Archival Testimonies on Asia Minor Hellenism of Cyprus’, which was issued by the Association of Asia Minor Greeks of Cyprus, is included accurately in this framework. The Proceedings of the 3rd Scholarly Symposium, which took place in Nicosia on the 21st of October 2017, are presented in an elegant volume edited by Dr. Charalampos G. Chotzakoglou.

The subject matter is structured as an exposition of the nine scholarly studies based mainly on archival research, which elaborate equal-number individual matters of the activity of Asia Minor Greeks in Cyprus. They are preceded, on the one hand by the Foreword Note of the President of the Asia Minor Greeks of Cyprus and by the editor of the publication, and on the other hand by the greetings of the President of the Association of Asia Minor Greeks of Cyprus, by the Secretary General of the Federation of Refugee Associations of Greece and by the Ambassador of Greece in the Cypriot Republic.

In the main part of the work, Ms. Antonia Prodromou researches the Archive of the Holy Archdiocese of Cyprus and highlights matters related to the Asia Minor Hellenism of Cyprus. The following study, by Costas F. Colakides, itself constitutes archival research. Interesting topics are presented from the personal Archive of the Asian Minor Greek politician St. V. Theofanidis, who served as Deputy Minister of Mercantile Marine in the government of E. Tsouderos during the turbulent period of 1941-44 in Greece. There follows the study by Stelios Irakleous, which is devoted

to the Karamanlidian publications in Cyprus which were linked to the island via the Kykkos Monastery, utilising the manuscripts and incunabula of the permanent Collection of the Association. Savvas Lambrou deals with a special topic: the operation of the quarantine station (Λοιμοκαθαρτήριο in the original text) of Dekeleia and the presence of refugees therein. In parallel, it also highlights the attitude of the British administration on it investigating the State Archive of Cyprus. There follows an additional original archival research. Angelos Kuriacoudes presents the findings of his investigation with regard to the Asia Minor Greek Freemasons, who were members of the Lodge 'Zinon', number 18, of Limassol and the process of their integration in the social and cultural life of Cyprus during the early 20th century. The last, out of the archival researches, which is included in the Volume is the study by Charalampos G. Chotzakoglou, who studies the Archive of the Holy Church of Virgin Mary Faneromeni of Nicosia and collects News on Asia Minor Greeks. The following study constitutes a *post mortem* presentation of the work of Aristeidis Koudounaris on the Curricula Vitae of eminent Asia Minor Greeks who lived in Cyprus, upon the editorship by Dr. Chotzakoglou. In turn, Andreas Makrides presents Letters from the Hellenic Post of Smyrna a few months prior to the Disaster, utilising his personal Archive. The part of the scholarly studies is completed with a special topic. Androula Hadjiyiasemi deals with the 'needle lace' of Asia Minor as an element of the intangible heritage of Cyprus. All the studies are accompanied by an abstract in the English language. A considerable number of studies contain graphs and tables, while the tables which are included in the studies are cited in the Annex of the Volume.

Furthermore, following the scientific studies, the reader can utilise the highly thorough Greek – language and foreign – language index drafted by the Editor of the Volume. In the Annex, in addition to the images of the scholarly studies, the reader can find photographs from the proceedings of the Symposium, the contact information of the authors and a Publications List of the Association of Greek Asia Minor Greeks of Cyprus.

In summary, this is a remarkable publication, which highlights interesting aspects of Hellenism of Asia Minor in martyrical Cyprus. In this year (2022), on the centenary of the 1922 Asia Minor Disaster, more relevant as ever in the past is the reading of such works, which stimulate historical memory and bring to mind the words of our

National Poet Dionysios Solomos: «Δυστυχής! Παρηγορία/ μόνη σου έμενε να λες/
περασμένα μεγαλεία/ και διηγώντας τα να κλαις»¹.

Ioannis E. Kastanas

¹ D.Solomos, 'Υμνος εις την Ελευθερίαν 5. G.Veloudis (ed.), Dionysios Solomos Poems and Works [Διονύσιος Σολωμός. Ποιήματα και Πεζά] (Athens: Patakis, 2008) (in Greek) p.67

'Miserable! The only solace/ left for you was to talk about/ past grandeurs/ and while narrating them you cry'. (An author's translation.)

Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State

Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay
University of Pennsylvania Press
Philadelphia, PA, 2020 [pp. 323]
ISBN: 9780812252217

‘An Impossible Possibility’

Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State is a significant yet flawed academic book. On the one hand, it reflects what is unquestionably the painstaking research, considered thinking and nuanced arguments of two experienced writers with much to say on subjects of utmost importance. On the other hand, *Sovereignty Suspended* suffers from a fundamental flaw, which I shall identify in this review.

In the opening sentence of the Introduction of their book, Bryant and Hatay set the scene for what follows. ‘In early 2016,’ they recall, ‘the World Economic Forum in Davos, Switzerland, welcomed the so-called president of the so-called Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC).’¹ With these words, Bryant and Hatay indirectly remind us that the World Economic Forum has emerged as an influential yet controversial institutional actor on the global stage. At the same time, Bryant and Hatay imply that, whereas the ‘TRNC’ is a so-called ‘state’ lacking international legitimacy and recognition (save for the recognition accorded by Turkey, which occupies the territory *de facto* administered by the ‘TRNC’), its ‘President’ holds a so-called executive office bearing the same shortcoming.

The ‘two aims’ of *Sovereignty Suspended* are set out in its Introduction:

‘This book uses extensive archival and ethnographic research in one de facto state for two aims: (1) to ask what the case of de facto state-building can tell us about state-building as such; and (2) to use this case to interrogate the singularity of the “de facto”.’²

Since the publication of *Sovereignty Suspended*, in 2020, these ‘two aims’ have retrospectively increased in importance. After all, both before and after re-invading

¹ Rebecca Bryant and Mete Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended: Building the So-Called State* (Philadelphia, PA: University of Pennsylvania Press, 2020), 1. For a recording of the event in question, see ‘Davos 2016 – Reuniting Cyprus’, 21 January 2016, World Economic Forum YouTube Channel, www.youtube.com/watch?v=B7hg0Yls1No (accessed 16 December 2022).

² Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 4.

Ukraine, on 24 February 2022, Russia has purported to recognise new *de facto* ‘Republics’ and other secessionist entities.³ Despite widespread international condemnation,⁴ these entities have joined a number of others already dotted around the world. That being said, to Bryant and Hatay, the ‘TRNC’ is distinguishable for the following reasons:

‘Our case, in contrast, is one of a territorial state being built *ex nihilo* in a space that had not previously existed as such and that had to be ethnically cleansed and resettled. Moreover, it was an administration being built in full knowledge that only a negotiated solution with the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus would bring recognition, or legitimacy for their new entity. *Realizing* one’s state, then, was always a project for the future, deferred until after a settlement...’⁵

A Fundamental Flaw

In the Introduction to *Sovereignty Suspended*, Bryant and Hatay ask an interesting question and offer a follow-up comment:

‘Throughout the book, we ask what *de facto* state-builders were thinking as they crafted an entity that the rest of the world told them should not exist and would never have statehood. It is a state whose sovereignty is suspended from its inception, a state whose ultimate form, and the sovereignty that will presumably come with it, are indefinitely deferred.’⁶

³ See *inter alia* the following publications on the official website of the Kremlin in Moscow: ‘Signing of documents recognising Donetsk and Lugansk People’s Republics’, 21 February 2022, en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/67829; ‘Executive Order On Recognition of Zaporozhye Region’, 29 September 2022; www.en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/69463; ‘Signing of treaties on accession of Donetsk and Lugansk people’s republics and Zaporozhye and Kherson regions to Russia’, 30 September 2022, www.en.kremlin.ru/events/president/news/69465; and ‘Federal Constitutional Law On the Accession of the Donetsk People’s Republic to the Russian Federation and the Establishment of a New Constituent Entity of the Russian Federation, the Donetsk People’s Republic’, 5 October 2022, www.en.kremlin.ru/acts/news/69513 (all accessed 19 December 2022).

⁴ See *inter alia* the following publications of the UN and the General Assembly Resolution to which they refer: ‘General Assembly resolution demands end to Russian offensive in Ukraine’, UN News, 2 March 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/03/1113152>; ‘Ukraine: UN General Assembly demands Russia reverse course on “attempted illegal annexation”’, UN News, 12 October 2022, <https://news.un.org/en/story/2022/10/1129492>; and ‘The UN and the war in Ukraine: key information’ <https://unric.org/en/the-un-and-the-war-in-ukraine-key-information/> (all accessed 19 December 2022).

⁵ Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 5.

⁶ *Ibid.*, 6.

Herein lies a fundamental flaw in *Sovereignty Suspended*. When referring to ‘sovereignty’ as being ‘suspended’ and ‘deferred’, Bryant and Hatay do not appear to have in mind the enforced *de facto* suspension of the *de jure* sovereignty and effective control of the Republic of Cyprus over the areas occupied by Turkey since 1974.⁷ Instead, Bryant and Hatay appear to have in mind the purported ‘suspension’ of the ‘sovereignty’ which the so-called ‘TRNC’ claims to have been endowed with since its ‘independence’ on 15 November 1983. However, in view of its illegality *ab initio*, the ‘TRNC’ is legally incapable of being endowed with any form of *de jure* sovereignty, be it ‘suspended’ or ‘deferred’. Put simply, the ‘TRNC’ has always been a nullity and a subordinate *de facto* administration of Turkey, the occupying power in effective control of 36 per cent of the territory as well as 57 per cent of the coastline of the Republic of Cyprus.⁸

To be fair to Bryant and Hatay, they indicate that the ‘TRNC’ was created by what they term ‘violence’.⁹ Moreover, they stress that, upon its purported establishment, this entity ‘was immediately condemned by the United Nations’ and it ‘remains unrecognized by any state besides Turkey.’¹⁰ Even so, Bryant and Hatay could have done more to clarify why that is so, particularly in view of UN Security Council Resolutions 541 (1983)¹¹ and 550 (1984),¹² which they do cite but do not adequately explore, and the Judgments or Advisory Opinions of several national and international courts.

⁷ The concept of suspension is built into Article 1 of the Protocol under which the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the European Union on 1 May 2004: ‘The application of the *acquis* shall be suspended in those areas of the Republic of Cyprus in which the Government of the Republic of Cyprus does not exercise effective control.’ See ‘Act concerning the conditions of accession of the Czech Republic, the Republic of Estonia, the Republic of Cyprus, the Republic of Latvia, the Republic of Lithuania, the Republic of Hungary, the Republic of Malta, the Republic of Poland, the Republic of Slovenia and the Slovak Republic and the adjustments to the Treaties on which the European Union is founded - Protocol No 10 on Cyprus’, *Official Journal*, L 236, 23/09/2003, P. 0955 – 0955, EU website, <https://eur-lex.europa.eu/legal-content/EN/ALL/?uri=CELEX:12003T/PRO/10> (accessed 19 December 2022).

⁸ To quote Kofi Annan, the then UN Secretary General, in 2003: ‘112. The area currently under Turkish Cypriot control is slightly more than 36 percent of the territory of the 1960 Republic of Cyprus, including 57 per cent of the coastline.’ See ‘Report of the Secretary-General on his mission of good offices in Cyprus’, 1 April 2003, UN Security Council Document S/2003/398, paragraph 112, UN Digital Library, <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/491574?ln=en> (accessed 19 December 2022).

⁹ Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 170, 182 *et al.*

¹⁰ *Ibid.*, 163.

¹¹ UN Security Council Resolution 541 is available on the UN Digital Library at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/58970> (accessed 19 December 2022).

¹² UN Security Council Resolution 550 is available on the UN Digital Library at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67600> (accessed 19 December 2022).

The latter include the Advisory Opinion of the International Court of Justice in The Hague, in the case formally known as *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*. To quote two pertinent passages in this Advisory Opinion handed down in 2010, which Bryant and Hatay do not cite:

‘81. Several participants have invoked resolutions of the Security Council condemning particular declarations of independence: see, *inter alia*, Security Council resolutions 216 (1965) and 217 (1965), concerning Southern Rhodesia; Security Council resolution 541 (1983), concerning northern Cyprus; and Security Council resolution 787 (1992), concerning the Republika Srpska.

The Court notes, however, that in all of those instances the Security Council was making a determination as regards the concrete situation existing at the time that those declarations of independence were made; the illegality attached to the declarations of independence thus stemmed not from the unilateral character of these declarations as such, but from the fact that they were, or would have been, connected with the unlawful use of force or other egregious violations of norms of general international law, in particular those of a peremptory character (*jus cogens*).¹³

It follows that, despite the purported ‘declaration of independence’ made on 15 November 1983, Turkey remains the occupying power in the north of the Republic of Cyprus. To quote the European Court of Human Rights in a Judgment handed down on 29 January 2019 (but not cited in *Sovereignty Suspended*), ‘the Court notes that Turkey is regarded by the international community as being in occupation of the northern part of Cyprus’ and ‘the international community does not recognise the “TRNC” as a State under international law.’¹⁴

It also follows that *Sovereignty Suspended* may be an eye-catching title but, by intimating that the ‘TRNC’ is invested with or entitled to a ‘suspended’ form of sovereignty, it creates an impression which is apt to mislead.

¹³ *Accordance with International Law of the Unilateral Declaration of Independence in Respect of Kosovo*, Advisory Opinion, I.C.J. Reports 2010, 403-453 at 437, International Court of Justice website, www.icj-cij.org/public/files/case-related/141/141-20100722-ADV-01-00-EN.pdf and www.icj-cij.org/en/case/141/advisory-opinions (accessed 19 December 2022).

¹⁴ *Guzelyurtlu and Others v Cyprus and Turkey* [2019] ECHR 100 [193], <https://hudoc.echr.coe.int/spa#%22itemid%22:%22001-189781%22>] (accessed 19 December 2022).

‘The Aporetic State’

Whereas *Sovereignty Suspended* has three Parts entitled ‘The border that is not one’ (Part I), ‘Enacting the aporetic state’ (Part II) and ‘The aporetic subject’ (Part III), each part has three chapters; thus, the book is subdivided into nine chapters, in addition to the Preface, Introduction, Conclusion and miscellaneous other contents. As the term ‘aporetic’ appears in the titles of Part II and Part III, as well as in the title of the Introduction named ‘The Aporetic State’, an obvious question arises. Why has such prominence been given to an evocative English adjective of ancient Greek origin?

Bryant and Hatay write that the term ‘aporetic’ applies to ‘the gap between the real and the realizable’, something which ‘constitutes’ what they depict as ‘the *aporetic* state.’¹⁵ In venturing this thought, Bryant and Hatay draw inspiration from the French philosopher Jacques Derrida:

‘In his brief book *Aporias*, Jacques Derrida poses the aporia, the space of non-passage, in tension with the border, which he defines as that which one is able to cross even when one knows one should not. The aporia is in tension with the border, because it represents the point at which crossing is impossible despite there being no border to stop us.’¹⁶

Bryant and Hatay move on to note that ‘what is significant for Derrida about the aporia is that it represents an impossible possibility, a refusal or prohibition, that is both unknown and inexplicable, seemingly arbitrary.’ From this philosophical starting point, Bryant and Hatay suggest that, in their book, ‘the aporia represents the known distinction, present in *de facto* states from their very inception, between the *real* and the *realizable*.’ In the next sentence, Bryant and Hatay go further, by suggesting that ‘*De facto* states are those entities, such as the TRNC, that look like states and act like states but do not have the international recognition that makes them *de jure*, or states “in law”’.¹⁷

‘The Paradox of the De Facto’

If *Sovereignty Suspended* has any overarching argument, it is the circuitous one found in Chapter 4 entitled ‘The So-Called State’. There, Bryant and Hatay define

¹⁵ Bryant and Hatay, *Sovereignty Suspended*, 3.

¹⁶ *Ibid*, 3.

¹⁷ *Ibid*, 3.

‘the crux’ of what they call ‘the paradox of the de facto’. This ‘crux’ is ‘that the de facto always already contains its own denial’. They reason that:

‘While that denial is most obvious in the factitiousness of their statehood, it appears already in the materiality of statecraft, which quite obviously *does* exist even as it *should not*. These practices of statecraft that always contain elements of obfuscation we call “*state*” *craft*, to emphasize state-builders’ perpetual awareness that what they are creating is not a state but a “state”.’¹⁸

In their ‘Conclusions’, Bryant and Hatay ram home this argument.¹⁹

Orwellism

On reflection, *Sovereignty Suspended* makes a twofold contribution to the academic literature.

Firstly, the book provides a wealth of material drawn from archival documents, together with details and insights which enrich our understanding of the ‘TRNC’, its apparatchiks and those living under their *de facto* governance. The latter include those discussed in Chapter 3, entitled ‘Planting People’. Among them are citizens of Turkey who were illegally encouraged to colonise the occupied areas –contrary, I might add, to Articles 1, 49(6) and 147 of the Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949.²⁰ By extension, the book enhances our understanding of the concept of the *de facto* state and its inter-relationship with demographic engineering.

Secondly, although Bryant and Hatay do not cite George Orwell, they effectively demonstrate that, from the day of its purported establishment, on 15 November 1983, the so-called ‘TRNC’ has been an Orwellian *de facto* entity steeped in absurdity, obfuscation, self-delusion and denial. To be sure, albeit in different circumstances, these forms of Orwellism have likewise gripped the non-Turkish-occupied parts of the Republic of Cyprus, not to mention the two remnants of the British Crown Colony of Cyprus which, in Orwellian fashion, have been rebranded as ‘the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dhekelia’. However, these are subjects outside the scope of *Sovereignty Suspended* and, thus, outside the scope of this review.

What should not go unsaid in this context is that the Orwellism of the ‘TRNC’ has

¹⁸ Ibid, 132.

¹⁹ Ibid, 269.

²⁰ *The Geneva Conventions of 12 August 1949* (Geneva: International Committee of the Red Cross, undated), 167 and 202, International Committee of the Red Cross website, www.icrc.org/en/doc/assets/files/publications/icrc-002-0173.pdf (accessed 19 December 2022).

been accompanied by the Orwellian ‘doublethink’ of the UN Security Council. This is symbolised by the aforementioned UN Security Council Resolution 550 (1984).

On the one hand, in Resolution 550 (1984), the UN Security Council affirms, in its Preamble, that it is ‘gravely concerned about the further secessionist acts in the occupied part of the Republic of Cyprus which are in violation of resolution 541 (1983)’. Then, in its main body, the UN Security Council *inter alia*:

‘2. Condemns all secessionist actions, including the purported exchange of ambassadors between Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership, declares them illegal and invalid and calls for their immediate withdrawal.’²¹

On the other hand, in common with other toothless Cyprus-related UN Security Council Resolutions adopted outside the enforcement framework of Chapter VII of the UN Charter,²² Resolution 550 does not take any effective action with the aim or effect of clamping down on the ‘further secessionist acts in the occupied part’. In parallel, Resolution 550 fails to envisage or deliver any form of international criminal justice. This despite the countless international crimes which Turkey, plus other state and non-state actors, appear to have inflicted on the Republic of Cyprus since December 1963 and, even more so, since Turkey invaded the Republic, on 20 July 1974.

The Orwellian ‘doublethink’ of the UN Security Council is all the more shocking if one considers that, by purporting to recognise and prop up the ‘TRNC’ in its purported capacity as a ‘state’ endowed with ‘sovereignty’, Turkey has effectively denied that it is an occupying power with corresponding duties under the Law of Occupation, International Humanitarian Law and International Criminal Law. In consequence, systemic forms of illegality and inhumanity have flourished amid an ongoing climate of impunity.

To sum up, *Sovereignty Suspended* represents a substantial if flawed addition to the academic literature.

Klearchos A. Kyriakides

²¹ As noted earlier, UN Security Council Resolution 550 is available on the UN Digital Library at <https://digitallibrary.un.org/record/67600> (accessed 19 December 2022).

²² *Charter of the United Nations and the Statute of the International Court of Justice* (San Francisco: United Nations, 1945), 9-11, UN website, <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/CTC/uncharter.pdf> (accessed 19 December 2022).

Cyprus: An Ancient People, a Troubled History, and One Last Chance for Peace

Lawrence Stevenson and Glynnis Stevenson

Sutherland House

Toronto, 2022 [pp. 280]

ISBN: 978-1-989555-633-7

Having just read and understood what the authors of this book appear to have set out to achieve, the following quote came to mind: ‘But the past is eternal reality. [...] the loss of memory is, indeed, the chief and fundamental sign of insanity.’¹ This quote is not as extreme as an indignant analyst might claim: after all, if one were to consider various longstanding problems of humanity, one might well conclude that some loss of memory, whether contrived and rationalised or not, has contributed to humanity’s inability to resolve various matters logically and peacefully. Emotion and atavism stand in the way. So it is with many others of those well-meaning books avoiding or forgetting the fundamentals of history, and the precise origins of various international problems, usually the interests of large powers using small ones to their own ends, as the killing in the Ukraine demonstrates so well.

This book is well-meaning. Before setting out to comment, this reviewer was slightly flummoxed by the lack of either an index or a bibliography. Footnotes and acknowledgements are insufficient, and it is odd that the publishers did not insist on this.

Considering that the author(s?) spent time in Cyprus and ‘fell in love with the island’ and are clearly well-meaningly, even possibly slightly emotionally, involved in seeking a long-term peace deal, it is hardly surprising that, as Canadians, they think that a Canadian-style confederation would be the best solution, but then dismiss this because ‘the Greek Cypriots would prefer a unitary government’. How one can, in any case, compare French- and English-speaking Canadians to Greek- and Turkish-speaking Cypriots, with their different histories, ethnicities and religions, is beyond the ken of this reviewer. Nevertheless, the idea is at least thought-provoking, which is a strength of this book.

But now to the grindstone. The object of the book is clear: ‘Failure in the next

¹ Nikolai Berdyaev, <https://www.youtube.com/watch?v=261Hf31ueZ8> *The Meaning of History*, Routledge, 2017, pp. 72-3; first published in 1936, by Geoffrey Bles.

round should be followed by an acceptance by both sides and by the international community at large that is time to negotiate a velvet divorce.’ (p.14); ‘This has gone on far too long. Both sides would be better off than they are under the status quo if they negotiated a velvet divorce.’ (p.222); and ‘BZBC would be a wonderful outcome, however unlikely. A velvet divorce, the probable outcome, would at least be preferable to the status quo and the unpromising future that will attend inaction.’ (p.224).

The book clearly promotes, inadvertently or otherwise, the Turkish government’s standpoint. I say ‘inadvertently’, because the author/authors has/have in the main used books which themselves promote the Turkish view and/or the Annan Plan. At the risk of sounding slightly snide, a detractor would say that the book is a eulogy to the late Clement Dodd who, while clearly a solid academic, was imbued in his knowledge of Turkey and its language. Similarly, the authors use James Kerr-Lindsay, a staunch supporter of the abortive Annan Plan. They also appear to support (pp. 99-102) Turkey’s putative membership of the EU -a highly controversial issue- and criticise the EU’s negative stance. They would have done well to balance the debate, by referring to the late French President Giscard d’Estaing, who said: ‘Turkey is a country that is close to Europe, an important country ... but it is not a European country. Its capital is not in Europe, 95% of its population are outside.’ Before elaborating on what seem to be the book’s weak points, let us consider some passages which seem pretty sensible and perceptive.

First, he quotes (pp. 26-7) Woodhouse as saying that the occupier turned the Greeks and Turks against each other. This is hardly news, but shows that the author(s) has/have studied the background to some extent.

Second, they clearly agree (p.30) that the 1960 arrangement was unworkable. This reviewer’s view is that the collapse was due at least as much to the complicated set of treaties as to the extremists on both sides, for whom the unworkable constitutional arrangements were fertile ground.

Third, he quotes (p.97) Stavrinides as writing that, if the Republic of Cyprus joined the EU without a settlement, the ‘TRNC’ would to all intents and purposes become a province of Turkey. This is true today, *de facto* if not *de jure*.

Fourth, echoing Hitchens, the authors comment (pp. 209-10) that Cyprus is a sovereign country and that the bases are an affront to Cypriot legitimacy and an unfortunate remnant of Britain’s colonial past. In any court of international justice, ‘the UK would lose the right to maintain these sovereign base areas’.

Fifth, they write (p.88): ‘Failure to understand the full dimensions of history leads to unwarranted bias and stands in the way of acceptable and lasting solutions, as the

EU, by now, should have learned.’ This reviewer could hardly agree more, but must qualify this by stating that he is not himself convinced that the authors themselves understand the full dimensions, as we shall see.

Let us now turn to some negative criticisms.

First, the authors state (p.12) that the fact that the Cypriot national anthem is also the Greek national anthem does not help bridge the ethnic divide in Cyprus. Yet they forget to mention –presumably accidentally– that the ‘TRNC’ uses the Turkish national anthem.

Second, they write (pp. 188-9) that ‘Europe has not stepped up to help Ukraine’, that they ‘talked tough and imposed economic sanctions on Moscow but did little else’. Given that the book was published in May this year, and that almost every EU state has delivered massive military aid and paid large sums to the Ukraine, they ought to have at least had time before publication to set the record straight.

Third, they write (p.156) that ‘Cyprus is a pawn on a much larger chessboard, where Putin can encourage NATO powers like Greece, Great Britain, and Turkey to fight one another and destabilise a peaceful world order’ and that ‘it is a strategy from the same playbook that Putin has used in other parts of the world, most visibly in 2016’s American presidential elections.’ This clearly is speculative, and oversimplifies Moscow’s position on Cyprus: the whole 1960 arrangement was predicated on maintaining the British bases, and was intended to be a NATO solution, to keep the Soviet Union at bay. The authors could have balanced matters by pointing out that, whatever the sensible, indeed laudable, pleas, for rebuilding trust between the two communities, there can be no solution without UN Security Council agreement. This agreement will be highly unlikely, since Russia will not accept a draft agreement that favours NATO and the effective continuation of what looks like a new kind of Annan Plan. The Russian position has always been simple: a united, neutral Cyprus, with no foreign forces. Whenever the USSR/Russia has suggested an international conference, NATO has rejected the idea. This has proven unacceptable to NATO. As regards the British bases, NATO ones in all but name, it is highly unlikely that NATO would agree to remove them. Hence Moscow’s position.

Fourth, they write (p.2) that Greek Cypriots would not abide by the minority rights that had been granted the Turkish Cypriots, and that in 1964 the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios, unilaterally abolished many of those enshrined rights which led to intensified intercommunal fighting. Again, this is too simplistic: to blame the Greek Cypriots alone for the 1963 breakdown is off-beam. The lack of precision of

the drafters of the 1959 agreements vis-à-vis the municipalities were also to blame, as were the Turkish Cypriots, who, for example, refused to participate in a single national army, and to support an extension of the country's tax laws. And if the Greek Cypriots were determined to revise the constitution without Turkish Cypriot consent, it is vital to point out that it was the British Foreign Office that both encouraged and helped Makarios to introduce the Thirteen Points. The Turkish-instigated riots of 1958 meant that extremists on both sides would continue to arm themselves after the unworkable accords of 1959. Although the Greek Cypriots share much of the blame for not helping to improve the economic conditions of the Turkish Cypriots in the early 1960s, the authors come across as being inadvertently biased towards the Turkish arguments.

Fifth, and in this connexion (p.126), the author's contention that Makarios was prepared to commit genocide to achieve Enosis is balderdash. Certainly, the likes of Ioannides (who despised Makarios) may well have been happy to kill Turkish Cypriots, but to slander Makarios without one iota of evidence is simply over the top, and betrays bias. Makarios' disagreements with Grivas, particularly after 1970, are well known. David Hunt, a former British High Commissioner to Cyprus would surely disagree strongly that Makarios would commit genocide: 'Makarios has the intellectual abilities, which would enable him to make his mark in a country of a hundred times the population. His mind is both clear and agile. He is a good psychologist and, although he sometimes cannot keep back a trace of arrogance, he is good at managing men [...] For a Greek, he is astonishingly undevious [...] I do not believe that he has ever told me a deliberate lie [...] perhaps because he thinks such a thing beneath him.'² While on the subject of killing, it is certainly true that both sides indulged in some atrocities during the summer of 1974. However, it was only *after* the Turkish invasion that matters became nasty. On 18 July 1974, just before the first stage of the invasion, the British High Commissioner Stephen Olver sent a telegram to the Foreign and Commonwealth Office: 'I have no (no) evidence of any immediate threat to the Turkish Cypriot community. There have been no attacks on the community during the past few days. The Turkish Cypriot Minister of Defence, Mr Orek, confirmed to a member of my staff this morning that the Greek Cypriot Community, and in particular the National Guard, had been behaving with admirable caution: there had been a few minor casualties through bullets straying inadvertently across the Green

² Hunt to Foreign Secretary, 17 December 1996, *Valedictory Despatch*, NA/FO 371/185620, file CC1015/16.

Line, but in general the Turkish Cypriot Community had no cause for complaint in this respect.³

Sixth, the authors seem unaware that the 1958 rioting that so embittered the Greek Cypriots was instigated by the Turks in a false flag operation, as the archives in London show.⁴

Seventh, the authors state (p.34) that ‘trouble returned to Cyprus in 1967, again precipitated by Makarios. He sent police patrols into two Turkish Cypriot villages, Agios Theodoros and Kophinou, at a “cost of over thirty Turkish Cypriot lives”’. The UNFICYP report, however, stated that, at Agios Theodoros, Greek Cypriot police had entered the (mixed) village [as they were entitled to do], and that three shots and a burst of automatic fire had come, ‘from the evidence at hand’, from the Turkish Cypriots.⁵ The then Grivas-controlled forces then retook control of the two villages in a massive response, resulting in the death of 24 Turkish Cypriot and two Greek Cypriots.

Eighth, the authors argue (pp. 59-61) that the Treaty of Guarantee forbids Cyprus from ‘any political or economic union with any state whatsoever’, and that Cyprus therefore had no right to join the EU. Although they do cite an EU Commission official as saying that the EU is not a nation, they go on to split various hairs, parroting the Turkish position. This seems rather naïve, since the EU is not a state (it only has observer status at the UN), and since the ‘TRNC’ can have no *locus standi* in the question, as it is recognised only by Turkey.

Ninth, the authors write (p.6) that ‘today the UN is an obstacle to a solution’. But they do not even speculate on the potential dangers of the UN pulling out.

To Conclude

This book comes across as very pro-Turkish, and should be read by those wishing to acquaint themselves with the Turkish and therefore the Turkish-Cypriot position. I am not convinced that it is expressly biased, but rather the result of the authors having read only a narrow, and mainly *pro* official Turkish position. This is a pity, as it covers a good deal of ground chronologically. The book also falls into the trap (*viz.* the title) of saying that now is the last chance for a solution, when we have heard this

³ NA/WO/386/21.

⁴ Governor to Colonial Office, 8 July [sic, should read ‘June’] 1958, NA FCO 141/3848, *telegram 751*.

⁵ United Nations security Council Document 5/8248 of 16 November 1967, in NA/FCO 9/164/CE 33/8. See also Farid Mirbagheri, *Cyprus and International Peacekeeping*, Hurst & Co., London, 1998, p.54.

umpteen times before. Just as Hannay's book, to which the authors refer, ends with what can be interpreted as a subtle threat –'But if Turkey's candidature stalls or is blocked, it is not easy to be so sanguine.'⁶– so this one ends with the words 'But time is running out'.

Whatever solution may or may not be found, it is likely to have to involve Moscow. Perhaps the following FCO minute is germane: 'The benefits that we derive from the SBAs are of major significance and virtually irreplaceable. They are an essential contribution to the Anglo-American relationship. The Department have regularly considered with those concerned which circumstances in Cyprus are most conducive to our retaining unfettered use of our SBA facilities. On balance, the conclusion is that an early "solution" might not help (since pressures against the SBAs might then build up), just as breakdown and return to strife would not, and that our interests are best served by continuing movement towards a solution –without the early prospect of arrival.'⁷ Although written in 1980, the situation is not so different today, apart from new names and colours.

If this review may appear slightly promiscuous, it is a reflection of the book itself.

William Mallinson

⁶ David Hannay, *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, I.B. Tauris, London and New York, 2005, p.246.

⁷ Fergusson to Private Secretary, minute, 8 December 1980, FCO 9/ 2949, file WSC 023/1, part C.

Historical Dictionary of Cyprus (2nd Edition)

Farid Mirbagheri and Emiliou A. Solomou

Rowman and Littlefield

London, 2022 [pp. 322]

ISBN:9781538111581

Twelve years after the publication of the first edition of the *Historical Dictionary of Cyprus*, written by Farid Mirbagheri, I predict that Cyprus watchers will be happy to embrace the seriously expanded, mildly revised and further refined new version. For this second edition, signed by its original author, accompanied by his University of Nicosia colleague, Dr Emiliou Solomou, is a most valuable source, not only of anticipated entries on essential or major historical issues, items and actors, but also of unexpected minutiae and psychocultural insights on Cyprus and its people.

Faithful to the structure established *ab initio* by the Historical Dictionaries Series of Scarecrow Press and today under the auspices of the parent organisation (Rowman and Littlefield), the book's title borders, one might playfully say, on a self-effacing... misnomer. For in its 322 pages, the work goes beyond a -deeply satisfactory- coverage of material that is *stricto sensu* 'historical'. That is, it is not confined to merely presenting and commenting upon important events, dates, conditions, protagonists and main actors involved in Cyprus' long and tempestuous life and times. In fact, this Dictionary constitutes a delightful mental gallery that also offers a treasure of information on matters related to Cypriot archaeology, architecture, culture, economy, energy, geography, literature, religion, and even provides brief portraits of major cities. In that sense, it forms a harmonious pair with Dimitris Keridis' excellent *Historical Dictionary of Modern Greece*, published in the Scarecrow Press Series in 2009.

After a most informative historical *tour d' horizon* in the Preface, the 15-page Introduction, and a rich and rewarding 21-page Chronology, the book, besides the main 'historical' corpus, adds a series of ten useful Appendices, recalling, inter alia, the Special Representatives of the UN Secretary General to Cyprus, enumerating the British Personnel from 1878 to 1960, and covering the UNFICYP Force Commanders from March 1964 to March 2021. (Incidentally, while the first edition's Chronology ended on 19 April 2009, the second edition's reaches 15 September 2020.)

The Dictionary of Mirbagheri and Solomou is written clearly and even elegantly. Fully sensitive to the supreme need for objectivity and precision in addressing a most

convoluted and often mind-boggling subject-matter, the authors have succeeded overwhelmingly in avoiding facile evaluations of events and personalities.

And yet, perhaps inevitably, such an ambitious opus could not avoid a few, indeed very few, minor weaknesses, in terms of evaluative judgments, inaccuracies or omissions. If I choose to submit my take on some apparent oversights and a couple of arguable omissions, this is only in a spirit of utter respect for this wonderful contribution to *Κυπριολογία*.

An instance of an inaccuracy would, in my opinion, be the statement (p. 185) that former Greek PM Costas Simitis ‘tended to distance himself from the Cyprus problem; he did not become personally involved and allowed others to deal with the issue.’ In fact, although it may be true that Simitis was ‘cautious on issues concerning Turkey’, given his 1996 early experience vis-à-vis Imia (ibid.), it cannot be overlooked that, only days before the historic April 2004 Referendum on the Annan Plan, Costas Simitis became most ‘personally involved’ in one of the most dramatic moments of Cypriot History. Through his notorious article in Athens’ *Eleftherotypia*, the former Greek PM boldly ‘advised’ the Greek Cypriots to vote ‘Yes’ in the referendum, in contradiction both to the well-known anti-plan stance of President Tassos Papadopoulos and to the solid opposition by the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriots, as repeatedly demonstrated in numerous opinion polls.

In my view, many readers might express discomfort as regards the statement about Henry Kissinger’s role in the 1974 Turkish invasion. Apparently opting to err on the side of caution, the two authors wrote that ‘Henry Kissinger, then secretary of state, is believed by many to have played a major part in the events of 1974’. (p. 110) Manifestly, the wording of ‘is *believed* by many’ aims clearly to pronounce on Kissinger’s role in contradistinction to *knowledge*. There is, however, devastating evidence revealing Kissinger’s anti-Cyprus (and pro-Turkey) ‘realist’ conceptual and geopolitical machinations. Such evidence is contained in such distinguished relevant works as Laurence Stern’s *The Wrong Horse: The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy* (Times Books, 1977); Christopher Hitchens’ *Cyprus* (Quartet, 1984); Michalis Ignatiou and Costas Venizelos’ *Τα Μυστικά Αρχεία του Κίσσινγκερ (Kissinger’s Secret Archives)*; and William Mallinson and Vassilis Fouskas’ brilliant essay, ‘Kissinger and the Business of Government: The Invasion of Cyprus, 15 July–20 August 1974’, published in the *Cyprus Review* (2017, pp. 111–134). Given the enormous importance of revealing Kissinger’s deeply illegal and unethical decisions and actions, that manifestly endorsed and variously facilitated Turkey’s double invasion, there is no need for the application of such (positivist) ‘caution’.

After all, Mirbagheri and Solomou's *Historical Dictionary* exhibits throughout clear signs of optimism and even 'idealism', that are most refreshing in our confused and melancholy times. A characteristic example of palpable 'idealism' is presented in the last two sentences of the Introduction's 'Prospects for the Future': 'Cyprus may thus continue, as in the past, to be a hostage to international politics. But as before, it will most probably survive them'. (p.15)

Similarly, extending the 'idealist' approach –that gives pride of place to the norms of international law and international ethics- the two authors did not hesitate in the slightest to employ throughout the term '*invasion*' describing Turkey's *illegal 1974 military intervention*. In this manner they fully respected the technical definition of the term, even though they knew that endorsing 'invasion' was bound to infuriate many Turkish Cypriots, most Turks, and many Turkophiles who refuse, for obvious reasons, to adopt the proper terms.

Finally in this connection, it is appropriate to point out that, whereas Mirbagheri and Solomou have tended to avoid evaluations of various personalities' personal character traits, in one instance they could not resist the expression of genuine respect for the virtues of a Cypriot politician. He is Ozker Ozgur (1940-2005), chairman of the Republican Turkish Party, who was, 'throughout his political career, at odds with the Turkish Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktas'. For many, this observation may suffice already to elevate Ozgur's prestige, given the serious reservations most observers have accumulated regarding the authoritarian and controversial TC leader. But Ozgur's positive portrait is fortified further by two statements: first, that 'he strived to support the interests of the Turkish Cypriots for equality, freedom and peace'. And second: 'Ozgur was a man of principle and never appeared willing to compromise his beliefs for personal gain'. (p.151)

As already intimated, the very nature of a Historical Dictionary of over 320 pages makes rather unavoidable that some readers may identify potential weaknesses, such as arguable omissions. In this spirit, I am inclined to suggest that, in view of the special status of Cyprus' protracted and rich relations with Moscow as a capital of the Russian Empire, the Soviet Union and now the Russian Federation, an entry sketching these relations deserves to be included in a third edition of the two authors' Historical Dictionary of Cyprus. The suggestion is supported by the fact that the present edition contains abundant, and fully justified, material about Cyprus' relations with the United Kingdom, the United States of America, the Hellenic Republic, and, of course, Turkey.

Another serious reason in support of my proposal comes from an intriguing fact: namely, that Greek Cypriots (together with the Greeks of Greece) appear to be only partially aware of the special relations that developed over the centuries between Cyprus and Moscow and between the Russians and the Hellenism of Cyprus. Moreover, besides ‘methodological’ disagreements concerning the analysis of these bilateral relations, there are also political, ideological, and even psychological reasons that can explain why the Greek Cypriots entertain, with a passion, totally contradictory readings of the bilateral History of the two sides. For there is no doubt that, while many are enthusiastic about the rich and multidimensional benefits accumulated by Russians and Cypriots over the centuries –especially after the Second World War, and primarily after the birth of the Russian Federation in 1991- there are others who oppose this stance bitterly and fanatically.

The inclusion of an entry on Cyprus-Russia relations in the dictionary’s future edition will have to enumerate the multiple bonds and benefits enjoyed by the two countries and their peoples –political, diplomatic, military, economic, cultural, religious, and of course related to energy and tourism. But, most unfortunately, it will have to handle the tragic developments in Ukraine since 24 February 2022, which obliged Nicosia to take a clear stance of legal and moral condemnation of ‘Putin’s War’. Admittedly, this earth-shaking war and its endless implications will render the job of writing such a new entry deeply challenging. But this is no reason for avoiding the task. And the authors are more than capable of navigating treacherous waters.

In view of the enormous importance of the crime of settling illegally in the occupied northern territory of the Republic of Cyprus, I submit that an entry potentially called ‘Illegal Turkish Settlers’ may have to be added in the future. Similarly, those less tutored regarding Ankara’s apparent project to send refugees to the free territory of the Republic in order to destabilise Cyprus and potentially Europe itself, will certainly benefit from an entry that would spell out the Republic’s corresponding insecurities and Ankara’s devious intentions and actions.

Finally, allow me to submit a couple of notes regarding what many Greek Cypriots may perceive as ‘evaluative inaccuracies’. The first emerges concerning UN secretary general, Antonio Guterres, because the two authors exhibit, in my view, exceeding generosity towards him, when they write that he ‘has been working consistently for a Cyprus settlement’ .(p.92) Given that the present edition covers Cypriot developments up to September 2020, I believe it would have been more appropriate to mention that serious complaints are being voiced by serious analysts and commentators

objecting to Guterres' protracted diplomatic passivity, that frequently amounts to blatant favoritism towards Turkey.

The second reservation is known to be shared by even more Cypriot analysts and members of civil society. It is related to Norwegian politician, Espen Barth Eide, who was appointed by UN secretary general Ban Ki-moon as special adviser on Cyprus in August 2014. The present edition, quite surprisingly, contains a deeply flattering portrait of this deeply controversial UN official. In fact, however, Eide managed, in a very short while, to infuriate repeatedly the Greek Cypriots for his outstanding weaknesses, including his penchant to misrepresent reality in international fora. This behaviour culminated in the widespread conviction that Eide 'was clearly serving Turkey's interests'. Hence, at the end, Espen Barth Eide was openly treated as a *persona non grata*.

These few, mildly critical comments, do not even remotely amount to reservations about the quality of this praiseworthy addition to the Bibliography on Cyprus. Indeed, Mirbagheri and Solomou's Historical Dictionary is a truly valuable contribution to the inexhaustible study of the countless dimensions of Cyprus' life and times, written clearly and conscientiously, with numerous insights, and an evident love and respect for the country and its people.

Costas Melakopides

**Grigoris Afxentiou. The Life and Actions
of the Golden Eagle of Machairas**
**[Γρηγόρης Αυξεντίου. Η Ζωή και η Δράση του
Σταυραετού του Μαχαιρά]**

Andreas Kaouris

Vol. 2, Nicosia, 2010 [pp. 663]

ISBN: 978-9963-7669-3-2

Vol. 3, Nicosia, 2022 [pp. 560]

ISBN: 978-9963-7669-4-9

Penning the biography of such an emblematic figure in modern Greek history as Grigoris Afxentiou is not an easy task. Perhaps the best-known fighter of the liberation struggle of 1955-1959, Afxentiou is undoubtedly a personality that has been imprinted in the collective historical memory of Greek Cypriots like very few others. As such, a book about his life, actions and sacrifice -which have assumed legendary proportions- is expected to be received with keen interest.

The so far three-volume monumental biography of Afxentiou is the result of a long and arduous work, typified by the painstaking effort of the author, journalist and current mayor of the occupied village of Lysi, Andreas Kaouris, to collect data from personal interviews with people who came in contact with the leading member of EOKA. This is evident in the long interval between the publication of the first three volumes (bearing the same title), the first having been published back in 1996, the second in 2010 and the third in 2022, to be followed by the fourth and fifth.

The second volume consists of 663 pages. The first pages include, among other things, poems by Afxentiou's father and mother and by folk poets from Lysi about their fellow villager and fighter, as well as the author's second letter -full of mixed emotions- to Grigoris, modelled after the first one, which was published in the first volume. The introductory part retraces the key milestones of Afxentiou's life and actions -from his birth, on 22 February 1928, to the historic battle of Spilia, on 11 December 1955- which have been covered in the first volume. What follows next is a summary of the contents of the second volume, covering the period of Afxentiou's actions immediately after the battle of Spilia until May to June 1956, a time when the wanted guerrilla was hiding in the monastery of Machairas, disguised as 'Archimandrite Chrysanthos'.

The author himself admits, in his introduction, that he did not exhaustively con-

sult the archives in Cyprus and abroad, especially the British archives. His goal, as he notes, was to capture the greatness of Afxentiou with the unadulterated colours and simple brushstrokes of the humble people who had first-hand experiences of him, many of whom were speaking for the first time about their contribution and their association with him. He also tried to interfere as little as possible in the narratives he quotes, adhering, as he explains, to exactly the same method that he had used in the first volume of the book. He notes that there are also testimonies that do not entirely agree with each other, which is perfectly normal, as memory fades over time. He quotes them vividly and unaltered, avoiding interfering with their speech and expression, in order to preserve their authenticity. The author's aim has been to enable those who participated in the events to describe what they saw and lived, without expediency and evasion, something that was not an easy task, given the time distance from the events and what followed after the end of the EOKA struggle.

In addition to these narratives, personal and public archives, newspapers and part of the literature, personal diaries, published testimonies, and evidence of the written word of Afxentiou are also utilised, in an effort to provide a multifaceted view of the Lysian fighter and his actions.

The rich photographic material, which frames the narrative and documents the events, is also crucial to this publication. The text is interspersed with hundreds of photographs of areas, villages, houses, mountains and the surrounding area in general, but especially of people. The author writes:

In particular, however, I focused with religious reverence on the individuals. On the sacred individuals that are our heroes and martyrs. But also on those who went along in their own way on the journey of life and death with Grigoris Afxentiou, most of whom, after the Struggle was over, preferred and preserved their anonymity, humbly returning to their villages, families and jobs, just as humbly and quietly as when they had joined the Struggle. I make no secret of it, they made it difficult for me. Many a time I was discouraged by hearing the phrase 'It is not necessary after so many years. What are we and what have we done compared to Afxentiou?'

The author tried to fill the void left behind by those who did collaborate with Afxentiou but passed away before he could talk to them, by relying on their own kin, books, and other sources through which their testimonies were available.

The second volume consists of 28 chapters. The narrative begins with Afxentiou's wanderings in the villages of Agia Irini of Kannavia, Kannavia and Lagoudera, after

the battle of Spilia, and then with his attempt to organise the area of Pitsilia, where the Leader of EOKA, Georgios Grivas Digenis, had appointed him sector commander, with Palaichori serving as a refuge and base. With the establishment of his group in the Papoutsia hideouts, he began a great effort to organise, initiate and train fighters, and later moved to the Forestry Station in Kionia, the highest mountain peak of the Machairas forest. The volume also presents, to some extent, the organisational structure and operation of EOKA: the way of communication and correspondence, the movement and supply lines of the guerrillas, the transport and concealment of ammunition, the ingenuity of the fighters, which was necessary for the unorthodox way of conducting the Struggle and the equipment of the guerrilla groups, the construction of hideouts in houses and in remote parts of the Cypriot mountains. Among the incidents, in which particular emphasis is given, it is worth noting the Christmas celebration of 1955, in a hut in the mountains of Lagoudera, the Cyprus-wide campaign of EOKA to collect hunting weapons in January 1956, the battle of Agridia - Chandria (16 March 1956), where Christos Tsiartas was killed and which was the largest ambush of EOKA (one of the most important chapters of the volume), the daring transport of Afxentiou to Limassol for an appendectomy. A separate chapter, interspersed with a wealth of photographic material, is dedicated by the author to Lysi, and the wider contribution of its inhabitants to the Struggle. Various chapters, of course, remark on the participation and contribution of various villages and regions.

Kaouris also presents the persistent efforts of the British to create a network of informants that would lead to the tracks of Afxentiou (and, generally, the practices and means they used to collect information and infiltrate the Organization), while approaching the complex issue of his betrayal. Moreover, he makes special reference to the horrific torture suffered by EOKA fighters, citing relevant accounts/testimonies, and touches on the very sensitive issue of the executions of traitors-collaborators with the British, which has been plaguing Cypriot society for many decades.

The last chapter is dedicated to Afxentiou the man and the leader, outlining his ethos and his multidimensional personality through accounts and recollections of past events. Finally, there is a preface to the third volume, followed by a reprint of the author's letter to Afxentiou, which was included in the first volume, a glossary (with the explanation of words in the Cypriot dialect), sources and bibliography, and a table of contents.

The third volume, comprising 560 pages, was published only recently, in 2022. Evidence of the written and spoken word of Afxentiou, an excerpt from an account by his

friend and classmate, Kyriakos Plisis, and poems by his parents, are listed in the first pages of the book. In lieu of a prologue, the author re-sketches his leading personality and points out the impact of his death on the course and evolution of the Struggle.

This is followed by the 'third letter to Grigoris' and then an extensive introductory chapter for the third and fourth volumes, covering the period from June 1956 to February 1957. The third volume follows exactly the same practice and methodology as the previous two volumes, with the author deriving all the data and information about the historical course and actions of Afxentiou from people who lived through his lesser and greater moments. As he himself notes, there are chapters in the volume that cover vital aspects of the Struggle, without necessarily referring solely to the Pitsilia sector commander, such as the importance and construction of hideouts in houses and mountains (see chapter 6). And, while referring to the small tributes to villages and heroes who acted under Afxentiou, he notes: 'It may seem at first that I am straying and moving away from the path of Afxentiou. Far from it. In every corner of Pitsilia, there is a sign of Grigoris'. Back to the subject of the chain of treason against Afxentiou, the author emphasises that it is not his intention to vilify and belittle anyone and that what he has always been interested in is historical truth, considering the revelation of the identity of traitors a historical necessity and not an end in itself. An important contribution to the volume is the personal diaries of Afxentiou's fellow fighters, which they entrusted to the author.

The first chapter records key milestones in the life and actions of Afxentiou in chronological order, as they are presented in the first two volumes, up to May 1956; these are indeed useful for the reader. This is followed by a short chapter on his pseudonyms and noms de guerre, which leads to the main content of the volume. Being in the last stage of his recovery after the appendectomy, Afxentiou was appointed by Digenis second in command of EOKA, by a letter-order on 3 June 1956, taking charge of the city and district of Limassol, Pitsilia and the area of Machairas, and with the Leader assigning him more and more responsibilities and duties. The author follows his tracks in the villages of Pitsilia and in the wine-producing villages of Limassol, while highlighting the role and participation in the Struggle of the people in the area. Special mention is made of the contribution of Chandria, as well as of the action of the hero Stylianos Lenas, with whom Afxentiou worked closely; of the villages of Agios Mamas and Agios Theodoros Pitsilias; of Agros, where he set up his new headquarters (in the house of priest Christodoulos Avgousti) in the summer of 1956; and of other villages in the area. An extensive chapter is devoted to the Omodos hideout,

which was betrayed to the British on 21 January 1957, resulting in the arrest of Nikos Spanos' group and the subsequent conviction of those arrested.

Separate chapters are devoted to Afxentiou's associates, such as Andreas Stylianou, one of his four companions in the Machairas hideout; his liaison, Dimitris Nikolaidis; his deputy, Giorgos Matsis; the station master of the Agros police station Polydoros Polydorou; Dimitris Polycarpou; his childhood friends, Antonis Papadopoulos and Pavlos Pavlakis. There are also references to Kyriakos Matsis and others (as was the case in the first volume). The third volume concludes with the chapter on the general offensive of EOKA, on 2 November 1956, without an epilogue.

Through the pages of these two volumes parade dozens of personalities, men and women, ordinary people of the rural and mountain villages, known and unknown fighters, clerics, policemen, and others, persons who collaborated with and helped Afxentiou in various ways, either on the battlefield, or as caterers, messengers, liaisons, people who hosted and hid him and his comrades.

The sizeable two volumes cover a period of only about 11 months (December 1955 – November 1956) and are, therefore, very detailed. It is a fact that the author does not avoid some repetitions or prolixity and digressions. There are references and elements that are not directly related to the subject of the research or that interrupt the flow of the narrative -but they also seem to serve the broader purpose of writing the book. In any case, Kaouris largely succeeds in keeping the reader's interest undiminished -the rich photographic material and the simple language do help in this regard- by illustrating, through the authentic testimonies that he records, the multifaceted personality and character of Afxentiou.

The author, of course, is not a historian, nor does he claim to be one. He does not aspire to deliver a comprehensive scientific study on the life and actions of Afxentiou (the limited use of archival sources makes this *de facto* impossible), and sentimentality is evident in places. After all, Kaouris makes no secret of his admiration for his heroic fellow villager, whom he wants to highlight as a model of life. The book, as he characterises it, is a reverent tribute to Afxentiou. Undoubtedly, however, it is the product of systematic and laborious research.

In the final analysis, and despite any drawbacks one may point out, this biography of Grigoris Afxentiou is irrefutably a reference book, necessary for any relevant historical research, with the author deservedly securing the title of the hero's main biographer.

Thomas Papageorgiou

A Dark Room: 1967-1974 **[Ένα Σκοτεινό Δωμάτιο: 1967-1974]**

Alexis Papachelas

Metechmio

Athens, 2021 [pp. 632]

ISBN: 978-618-03-2742-7

Alexis Papachelas' study on the events that led to the Turkish invasion in Cyprus and the occupation of 37% of the Cypriot territory is much more than a reportorial work. As has already been pointed out before, his work has the virtues of a solid research that resembles that of an academic historian. Through a massive number of primary and secondary sources, the author sheds light onto one of the more important periods of Greek history. The author quotes extensive extracts from the sources and provides direct access to most of them through the use of PQR codes incorporated in the book, yet he avoids guiding the reader himself by use of his own comments. His comments are clarifying when necessary or link the content of the source to its wider context, but in fact the author lets the sources speak on their own and allows the reader to come to their own conclusions.

Papachelas commences his research from 1964, this chronological choice being not at all accidental. In 1963/1964, it became obvious that the life of the Cypriot State in the form designed by the Zurich agreements was not sustainable. From there on, the three main agents of the so-called Cypriot issue or problem, namely Cyprus, Greece and Turkey, have been trying to untangle the bonds that the Zurich agreements imposed upon them. However, they do not share a common perception about what kind of a settlement could be an acceptable solution for all three 'players' involved. In fact, their perception about a future settlement have been contradictory to one another.

According to Archbishop Makarios, President of the Republic of Cyprus, who was backed by the majority of the Greek Cypriots, the only feasible solution was that of independence through the enforcement of the principle of self-determination, meaning the exclusion of the unification of the island with Greece, which had been the main goal of EOKA's struggle between 1955 and 1959. The solution of independence was also supported by AKEL, the biggest organised political party at that time. Makarios' policy was challenged by his opponents among the Greek Cypriots, but

during the critical decade 1964-1974 they failed at changing that policy. The policy of independence supported by Makarios kept -from the package of the Zurich agreements- the exclusion of unification or partition of the island which had been the main goals of Greece and Turkey during the time of EOKA's revolt, but rejected all other settlements included in the agreements, regarding the bicomunal structure of the independent state's governance. However, the success of such a policy depended on factors which were beyond Makarios' control. The Turkish consent to a solution (independence) that did not guarantee the national security of Turkey while at the same time diminished the guarantees to the Turkish Cypriot community (guarantees which were considered a security safety valve for Turkey), could never be given. Furthermore, the support of such a solution by the USSR did not imply any will on behalf of the Soviets to change the status quo in the region. It is one thing to attempt to cause problems for the western alliance and it is a quite different thing to try and challenge the whole balance of the post war equilibrium, as Makarios himself realised several times during this period (see Papachelas, p.130). Nevertheless, Makarios seemed to believe that an intervention by one of the two superpowers could rein in Turkey and would allow him to achieve the goal of independence, at least in the way that he perceived the said goal.

On the other hand, the main objective of Greece during this period seemed to be that of unification between Cyprus and Greece, with some tradeoff for Turkey. The Acheson Plan was part of such a strategy. The main disadvantage of this strategy was that its success presupposed its acceptance by Cyprus. Yet all the available data from that period do not indicate that such a solution was acceptable by the majority of the Greek Cypriots, or President Makarios. Furthermore, the available data do not clarify beyond any doubt what the reaction of Turkey to such a plan would be. Turkey had made clear that it would not accept any plan which would not concede sovereignty over part of the Cypriot territory, a request that could not be accepted by any Greek government. Acheson's epistle, which was published in 2002, says that he would have to exercise pressure on Turkey in order to accept the plan. Yet Turkey rejected the final draft of the Plan that was submitted by Acheson, which provided for the hiring -instead of concession of sovereignty- of some part of the Cypriot territory, after its prior rejection by the Greek side. We can conclude then that Turkey's consent to the Acheson Plan had not been granted from the beginning and that the rejection of the final draft was due to its clause of hiring instead of concession of sovereignty on part of Cypriot territory. It is worthy to note that, three years later, in a meeting between

the leaders of the Greek junta and the Turkish Prime Minister, which took place at the Greek-Turkish border, the Turkish delegation rejected the Greek proposal for the concession of sovereignty over a small part of the Cypriot territory as a tradeoff for the unification of the rest of the island with Greece (id. p.125). However, the Turkish rejection of the Greek proposal, which was not far from a proposal made by Turkey three years prior in the context of the negotiations on Acheson Plan, should have been an indication about Turkey's intentions regarding the content of a settlement that it could find acceptable from that time on.

Turkey's perception about what could be an acceptable settlement was not vague. Any settlement should have included two elements: a) The de jure or de facto sovereign control over a part of the Cypriot territory, in which Turkish Cypriots would be settled, and b) the security dimension, namely the avoidance of it being taken over by Greece. The proposals, which were based on offering a tradeoff to Turkey on the condition that it would accept the unification of the island with Greece, might have satisfied the former presupposition, but not the latter. On the contrary, the 'settlement' which is the outcome of the Turkish invasion of 1974, fulfils both presuppositions. Turkey gained the de facto control over 37% of the Cypriot territory, in which Turkish Cypriots were settled and, instead of having an extended borderline with Greece, has a borderline with Cyprus, whose ability to exercise the full range of its competences on the military and foreign policy field is highly restrained by the very fact of the Turkish occupation and the stationing of a considerable number of Turkish troops in the occupied areas.

The crucial question then is, how did Turkey achieve such a goal. It is well documented in Papachelas' book that USA was not against a kind of double unification as a settlement of the problem, since 1967 or even earlier (id. pp. 125, 141). It is also well documented that since 1972 Henry Kissinger had not been eager to intervene in case of any attempt to overthrow the Cypriot President through use of Greek military forces that were stationed in the island (id. p.140). It is also well documented in the book that, when Ioannides informed USA officials about his intention to overthrow Makarios, there was no clear negative reaction to his plans (id. pp. 304-305). It is also clear that, just after the coup against Makarios, USA officials were aware of the Turkish plans to proceed with the partition of the island through a military intervention (id. pp. 315, 329). The most shocking evidence that the book provides is a 38-minute extract from a transcript of a meeting among Greek officials just after the Turkish invasion, in which Ioannides seems to be assured that Turkish troops are going to

occupy Kyrenia and then stop (id. pp. 377, 380). It is interesting that the source of his assurance is someone called 'Chief' (id. p.377), probably the Chief of the Greek Army.

The documentation that the book provides sheds light to some of the crucial facts that led to the Turkish invasion and the occupation of northern Cyprus and offers a clear image about the positions of all those involved. However, the book is important for one more reason. It makes clear that what happened might have fulfilled the maximum of the Turkish intentions and the USA's policy about a 'viable' settlement with regard to the so-called Cyprus problem, but was also the result of fatal mistakes and omissions by the Greek junta. This, thus, is a book that contributes to national self-consciousness and encourages an honest collective self-reflection on one of the darkest periods of the Greek history.

Christos Papastylianos

Between Nation and Class: The Left and the Cyprus Issue, 1920-1974

[Μεταξύ Έθνους και Τάξης: Αριστερές και Κυπριακό, 1920-1974]

Nikos Christofis (ed.)

**(Authors: Andreas Panagiotou, Alexis Alekou, Ahmet Cavit An, Antonis Antoniou, Spyros Sakellaropoulos, Nikos Trimikliniotis, Nikos Christofis)
Psifides Publications**

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During the 20th century most books on history attempted to deal with the past by interpreting it. This methodological resurrection of history as an academic field was based on the theoretical grounds of empirical determinism, positivism, and, to put it more in essence, Marxism. On the contrary, the postmodern world invents the scholar that can be found outside of his observations or subjects of study, merely by renouncing the analytical and interpreting dynamic of science. This trajectory is responsible for the creation of articles and books full of inquiries and questions, but without clear standpoints and analytical theses. The collective volume *Between Nation and Class: The Left and the Cyprus Issue, 1920-1974* manages to incorporate these distinct and sometimes unconsciously silent approaches on how history should be written. The book attempts to start a debate within the left -but also engage in a dialogue with it- analysing its role on the Cyprus Issue. The significant contribution of this collective volume lies on the intriguing attempt for a comparative approach to the Cyprus Issue, both between its interaction with the mother countries, Greece and Turkey, but also within Cyprus itself, namely between the two dominant communities, the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot.

Nikos Christofis, in his introductory chapter as an editor, tries to set the context of the volume by highlighting the essential deficiencies of past attempts; most of all, the acknowledgement of the Cyprus Issue, as justified by the clash between two hostile nationalisms –the Greek and the Turkish- in their Cypriot versions. To put it differently, he implies that we focus on this matter as if the Cyprus Issue had -and still has- nothing to do with the social and political dynamics that arose in the island; as if the only prism of understanding or even interpreting the issue lies on the dominant

national narratives that emerged in Greece and Turkey. Furthermore, in a second important add-on of this volume, Christofis exceeds the limitations of an historicism approach, by focusing on the greater scenery of connotations, meanings, ideologies, such as colonialism, imperialism, and nationalism. Some chapters of this volume acknowledge that the distinction, as well as the exact sketching of these terms for each and every period of study, are of essential importance in order to examine the wider perspectives of a changing world, that affects and shapes the mother countries and the parallel inner-Cyprus level. The volume studies the 1920-1970 era, with extensive reference on past events as a prerequisite for understanding changes in views, party choices and strategies on the Cyprus Issue. In this era, the fading of colonialism on a global scale provides to the forces of the left the opportunity to embrace nationalistic narratives -concealed under the goal of national emancipation. Moreover, the dominance of the greater forces that reflects the imperialist status quo, provides the left with the opportunity of rebaptizing, in terms of radicalism, anti-west views and, most of all, anti-capitalist rhetoric, that in some cases espouses internationalism.

Alexis Alekou approaches the Cyprus Issue as forever pending issue, but with significant differences through time. He focuses on the Greek Cypriot left -the two dominant parties, the KKK and AKEL- and the formation of their views in favour of the so called 'union' of Cyprus with Greece. At the same time, this union demand, espoused and articulated by the mainstream left Greek Cypriot parties, incorporates the relations with the Turkish community and forms of anticolonial movements. Alekou points out that the demand of unifying Cyprus with Greece initially emerged as an ideological standpoint of the Cypriot bourgeoisie, not only for national reasons, but also as an anti-communist alternative. The Cypriot Communist Party (KKK, founded in 1926) originally claimed for independence and the formation of a labour-rural democratic state, as part of a broader socialist Balkan republic. KKK evolved to another formation, AKEL, in 1941, and since its first days the newborn party adopted the 'union' stance and, in its 1945 4th convention, the party clearly supported 'Union with Greece, against colonialism and pro-labour demands'. Yet the most interesting contribution of this chapter pertains to the relations between KKK/AKEL and the Greek Communist Party (KKE), especially during the Greek Civil War, and the potential formation of a broader socialist republic. In this context, for the Cypriot left the union with a socialist Greece offered an even deeper ideological legitimation. But how did this demand remain untouched since the defeat of the communist forces in Greece? Alekou implies that the pro-union stance provided the Cypriot left with

an opportunity to initially survive and politically/electorally grow within the Greek Cypriot society. In other words, the left accepted and resonated a pro-union profile in order to achieve legitimation and political success, even if this stance provoked ideological inner conflicts.

Christofis and Cavit shed light on the Turkish minority of Cyprus and the problems that arose between the forces of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot left. They imply that, while the union demand as expressed by the Greek Cypriot side acted as a separating factor, everyday life unified the political parties of the left. They elaborate on the time lag of the Turkish Cypriot side regarding getting in touch with the revolutionary left ideas and ideologies. In addition, this chapter provides evidences of a unified Greek and Turkish Cypriot agenda until the 1940s and the turn of AKEL towards accepting -by any means- the demand of union with Greece. This rupture caused severe conflicts between Greek and Turkish Cypriots within trade unions and provided a strong alibi to the Turkish political framework for substantial critique to the communist ideology, as a de facto enemy of their national identity. Finally, the chapter analyses the political developments after the foundation of the Republic of Cyprus and the official conceptualisation of the island as a multinational state.

Spyros Sakellaropoulos focuses on Greece and the views of the Greek Communist Party (SEKE and KKE) from 1918 to 1959. These views shifted over time due to international developments, as well as inner party changes. At first, since the aftermath of the First World War, socialist parties such as SEKE espoused the direction of self-determination and independence. Hence, during the 1919-1935 period the Greek left asserted that the Cypriots themselves, both Greek and Turkish, should decide for themselves. Yet the year 1935 appears to be a turning point for KKE in Greece. For the first time, union of Cyprus with Greece is conceived as acceptable solution, in the context of an anticolonial rebellion. Until the 1950s, KKE persisted on the union stance, especially when aligned with the potential of a socialist Greece. Sakellaropoulos then notes that KKE intensively criticised AKEL (1955-1959) for a sectarian and slack anticolonial struggle, tolerance and compromise regarding the Greek Cypriot bourgeoisie and strong ties with the Cypriot Orthodox Church, especially under Makarios' leadership.

Antonis Antoniou intends to correlate the Cyprus Issue with the anticolonial movements that emerged during the post War era. In this context, the left found itself at a crossroads between international reality, domestic political developments and opposing social dynamics. Since the end of the War, Antoniou asserts that the revo-

lutionary liberation movements that emerged or regrouped had shared a strong national identity as a base of their ideological formation. Even if marxists within these movements differentiated themselves from nationalists, their revolutionary agenda that was aiming towards a proletarian revolution accepted patriotism on the basis of independence. The Cyprus Issue proved to be an ideal opportunity for the Greek left to become familiar with the foreign policy agenda and, at the same time, cultivate anti-west views. This is to say that the acceptance of the union goal by KKE could be perceived as an anti-west and, above all, an anti-NATO stance.

Christofis focuses on the Turkish left and attempts to interpret how the dominant progressive views on the Cyprus Issue emerged and evolved. Hence, for the Turkish forces of the left, the issue was used in order to shake up or reinterpret the dominant ideologies, especially Kemalism. The island proved to be a safe place for the left, both Greek and Turkish, to develop nationally accepted views and, at the same time, views that were anticolonial and anti-imperialist. The Turkish left stemmed out of two distinct entities: the first one, known as a radical Kemalist stream, transpired by a radical nationalism, and the second one, organised under a Marxist party that was founded in 1961 (Workers Party of Turkey, TIP) by trade unionists. TIP was a reformist party in terms of believing in socialism via parliamentary democracy. Regarding the Cypriot issue, TIP resorted to Kemalism, combining nationalism, anti-imperialism and antifeudalism as the defining ideological frame. The party accepts an essential connection between nationalism and socialism. TIP expressed its theses on the Cyprus Issue after the December 1963 crisis, differentiating its narrative from the official Turkish standpoint. TIP accused the imperialist forces of the west of dragging Turkey into redemptive politics, whereas the Cypriot inhabitants were fully satisfied with the 1960s Constitution and the independence of the Republic of Cyprus. The party attained a clear anti-union view, aimed at the cessation of hostilities among Greek and Turkish Cypriots and, above all, spoke of a demilitarised federal state island over time. Similar to the case of the Greek left (SEKE-KKE-EDA), the Turkish left instrumented the Cyprus Issue in order to develop a form of 'good' nationalism and therefore expand its electoral influence. The question that remains unanswered is whether there is such thing as a radical or 'good' nationalism and, moreover, if this narrative fits into the context of the left. This inquiry, yet intrinsic and pivotal for Cyprus, needs an extension of the study time frame, as the 1974 invasion gave to this broader discourse a new dynamic.

Nikos Trimikliniotis, with an intriguing addendum, focuses on the contributions

of the book, pointing out that even if it concerns the past, specifically the era 1920-1974, it also refers to the present and future. In other words, by illuminating unknown perspectives of the history of the left in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus, the book sets an important dialectical cognitive understanding regarding the Cyprus Issue that exceeds the study's time frame. He supports that the independence of Cyprus works as a pivotal historical landmark with no return to the status quo ante. Yet, the same is true for the 1974 invasion and a future collective work with the same inner-dynamics (studying the triangle of the left forces) seems necessary. Trimikliniotis intends to describe the framework of social cleavages in Cyprus, implying that, apart from the vertical axis of social stratification -thus the class cleavage-, a horizontal clash between two indigenous and politically independent classes also emerged. Needless to say, social cleavage theory requires data and extensive analysis in order to set the content of cross-cutting divisions. Finally, he discusses the chapters of the book with a critical view on historicism, opting for a more analytical and methodological approach for interpreting purposes.

Overall, the collective volume *Between Nation and Class: The left and the Cyprus Issue, 1920-1974* constitutes a great contribution to the understanding of how the progressive forces in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus elaborated their political views regarding independence, union with Greece and wider anticolonial views and actions. Based more on historical analysis and less on the field of political science, the book provides interpretations and theoretical explanations. Regarding my view, a special chapter should be needed, designed for describing the forces of marginal-extreme left -Trotskyists, anarchists, Maoists- and their views on the Cyprus Issue. Once all mainstream left forces in Greece, Turkey and Cyprus utilised the Issue in order to develop a positive national-patriotic narrative and establish themselves in parliamentary terms, marginal left forces might have worked as forts of the genuine internationalist approach, condemning union demands or agendas that did not accept social class as superior to national identities. Finally, the end of the study prior to the 1974 Turkish invasion defines a period of tensions and historical fluctuations, but also promises a sequel that would shed light on the left after the most important event of the 20th century in Cyprus.

Costis Pierides

The Class Structure of Cypriot Society

[Η Ταξική Δομή της Κυπριακής Κοινωνίας]

Thanasis Alexiou (ed.)

Promitheas Research Institute

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Introduction

The book *The Class Structure of Cypriot Society*, edited by Professor Thanasis Alexiou, constitutes a unique edition for developing a Cypriot literature on political economy, since it is the first systematic, analytical and dynamic look at how Cypriot society is structured. The book is both ‘academically sound’, as is the case with rigorous and analytic methodology, and also a political tool for policy making and developing political demands by mass movements. This special edition is an endeavour, on behalf of the Promitheas Institute, that started as a concept, back in 2017, and had become a concrete proposal by 2019, which might explain the dual purpose of this work. The book entails eight chapters; a theoretical and methodological chapter, economic class data of the Cypriot social formation, structure and action in the Cypriot social formation, class structure of the Cypriot society in real-time, main findings, a detailed account of statistical data used, findings from the analysis of secondary data, and presentation of findings using primary data.

Thanasis Alexiou, being the editor, was the one who analysed the primary and secondary data through a theoretical lens (an approach of the Marxist tradition), which concerns the bigger part of the book; Christina Paraskevopoulou has worked closely with Alexiou’s theoretical approach, to shape and interpret tables and figures (chapters 6, 7 and 8, where primary data of the study is presented). The team is also assisted by Michalis Poulimas, who worked on the presentation and evolution of variables of the class map based on the work of E.O Wright (1997), which is used throughout this work. An important point that has to be made regarding this book, is that the data and the subsequent analysis concern only the Republic of Cyprus and the Greek Cypriot community. As such, areas that are not government-controlled are not included and, by extent, the Turkish Cypriot community (even those who are employed in the government-controlled areas) is not included either.

Methodology and Theoretical Framework

One of the major problems when distinguishing classes in both academic and activist literature, has been the issue of differentiated experiences of individuals of the same class location. There has been a variety of class analyses, that focus on different aspects of class, and thus, draw quite different conclusions. From more simple ones to more complicated, the underlying common denominator is that class exists, however different perspectives have active or passive understandings of class (class as a description of a position in the labour process or as an active category and basis for organising in class struggle). The basic umbrella categories of interest can be summarised based on the work of Marx and/or Weber. However, it would be helpful in setting the debate that, still, the major theoretical critique aimed at frameworks of class analysis, can be summarized in the form of a question. Alexiou has had to make a decision on which one to follow for his study, a narrow framework based on classical Marxism or one of the broader ones, that Erik Olin Wright identified in his scrutiny of neo-Weberian approaches, presenting not only a different perspective but also an increasing number of factors shaping class ¹. Namely, to what extent do the extra details and descriptions of the different locations within the labour process, or life chances according to such positions, help rather than obscure the concept of class itself?

Alexiou keeps the theoretical framework clean from the distractions and the noise that sometimes surround schemata of class analysis. He recognises two main oppositional understandings of class analysis, one based on the sphere of production (Marx) and the other on the sphere of consumption, political power and recognition, and status (Weber). Despite the two approaches, he also acknowledges and engages in the debate which already exists. There have been several neo-Marxist and neo-Weberian approaches, which converge at points, attempting to show the supplementarity (giving more detail of description or highlighting different aspects of class) of some of the insights of each approach, rather than them being mutually exclusive.

Emphasis is given to Wright's extensive work² on how comparative class analysis is done from the late 20th century to the start of the 21st. He suggested that the varieties of class conceptualisations have been analysed in terms of relations or gradations, however, the relations conceptualisation entails a number of different varieties

¹ Erik Olin Wright (ed), *Approaches to Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005), p.43.

² Erik Olin Wright, *Understanding Class* (London: Verso Books, 2015).

itself; some class relations are analysed in terms of market differentiations, in terms of production, technical division of labour, authority in the labour process or a system of exploitation. Thus, although the gradation concepts refer directly to Weberian analyses, the concepts of class as social relations have been integrated to assume a number of Weberian features as well. In this respect, Alexiou claims that anything that diverges from the class analysis as analysis of relations, endangers the subversion of the theoretical rigour of a Marxist approach, which is a system of exploitation. Putting an emphasis on levels of authority, for example, or positions in the division of labour, means that there is a chance of confusing the base of analysis, suggesting that the labour process itself might be the basis of the formation of social classes. This entails the possibility to argue that, not only the bourgeois class, but also the petty bourgeois class, can be an exploitative one, as individuals can take advantage of their position in the division of labour due to their skill, knowledge, networks etc. and acquire higher wages or access authority.

From the standpoint of connecting the scientific/social relations approach with some subjective features (for example how subjects view themselves in class structures and locations), Alexiou and his collaborators attempt to show some of the contradictions which emerge from some class locations in the labour process, as they are mediated through the class consciousness of the subjects. Although not accepting Wright's revisionist approach, Alexiou suggests that the team has utilised the class map provided by him as a reliable tool that has been tried and tested in comparative class analysis in a variety of countries. Most importantly, the class map provides the opportunity for a dynamic analysis, looking into the relational aspect between class structure, class relations, class consciousness and class struggle. The book aims to show that, although class consciousness is relational between individuals in different positions within the labour process, or even mediated through extra-class divisions (e.g. gender, race experiences etc.), nonetheless the views ultimately cannot transcend class structure, as it represents the material potential and imposes limits on actors. The originality of this work is that it attempts to show how individuals have opinions related to their class locations and structure, which can serve to understand why and how individuals transform themselves into political subjectivities through setting organisations to engage in class struggle; this analysis can also serve to show how individuals in similar class locations can associate and show solidarity between each other, looking at the broader picture of the 'world of work'.

This is an innovative approach that takes into account the type of data available,

and looks to expand on the effectiveness of data gathered via primary sources in relation to secondary data acquired from CYPSTAT (the official statistical service of the Republic of Cyprus). However, this could also prove to weaken the arguments made by the author, given that the qualitative data were mostly interviews with questionable reliability of answers on the part of the participants (given the structure of the fieldwork), or that the participants have formed opinions in their answers (it is accepted by the authors that, at a micro-level, it is rather impossible to measure class consciousness accurately). Despite some reservations, Alexiou is well aware that such a micro-level approach to class consciousness does not sum up to macro-level approaches, as the latter entail the mediation of class consciousness through class struggle conducted through mass organised politics (political parties, trade unions etc.). The relational definition of this class analysis is ultimately in contrast to phenomenological Marxism, which emphasises individual experience³, or structural Marxism, which emphasises class positions departing from consciousness, or that class practices play a critical role in the emergence of class consciousness⁴. While this is not a middle ground analysis, it nevertheless seems as looking to find patterns in a micro-level of analysis, a description of the situation in situ and its dynamics, that can potentially lead to a macro-level in the future.

Main Findings

The main findings that stem from the analysis of the secondary data are on the one hand very clear. These form the basis of class structure based on the type of work and occupational situation. During the two first decades of the 21st century, companies with employees have been in steady decline (from 6,1% in 2000 to 4,5% in 2011, and 2,1% in 2018), the same with the category of self-employed without employing anyone (14,9% in 2000 to 11,6% in 2011, and 10,2% in 2018). This is in direct contrast with the category of employees, which has seen a direct increase (from 75,8% in 2000 to 81,9% in 2011, and 87,1% in 2018). At the same time, intermediary situations, such as family businesses without pay, have experienced a decline as well. The primary data gathered by the study have suggested a slight deviation in relation to CYPSTAT, which can be assumed to provide a largely correct and evaluated data set. Another important finding is the decline in the primary sector of the economy, whereas the data suggests an increase in the service sector; concerning manufacturing, there is a

³ Edward Palmer Thompson, *Poverty of Theory* (London: Monthly Review Press, 1978).

⁴ Nicos Poulantzas, *Social Classes in Contemporary Capitalism (Οι Κοινωνικές Τάξεις στον Σύγχρονο Καπιταλισμό)*. (Athens: Themelio, 1984) (in Greek).

clear decline in the occupations which are characterised by craft. At the same time, the supervisory type of work has increased, as businesses have adapted their formal processes in the production sphere. The wage system has been extended and as such mediates a large portion of the population in various locations within the labour process. This shows the maturity and extent of the capitalist mode of production in the economy of Cyprus, and the decline of different modes that have historically existed in parallel (hybrid mode, simple/petty commodity production etc.).

Based on the findings concerning structure, the study continues with semi-structured interviews to capture the Cypriot class formation, how individuals experience and give meaning to their class locations. Ultimately, the authors suggest, the micro-level can give an understanding on how and why individuals choose to develop collective organisations, who abide with more accuracy to class structures in their behaviour. Thus, this is a vice versa approach to the one followed in the class structure analysis (from theory towards the subjective level) from the subjective to the theoretical level. The class structure, whether individuals are in a class location that is dependent on the wage system or not, and the ability to control or be controlled within the labour process can give a dynamic understanding of individuals' ability to create affinities within the workplace or form their ideas, perhaps also resulting in subcultures of meaning.

In the qualitative phase, authority is a category based upon the study that has suggested it played an active role in class formation. This was an important finding, as the authors have used some labour process characteristics to distinguish classes according to the class map that was utilised⁵. The authors claim that not all wage earners are part of the working class (as not all work is understood to be productive work), and as such some of wage earners can be classified under the bourgeois class, because of the authority they exert in the labour process. Others, such as self-employed, owners of family businesses or divisions that have to do with the labour process itself (supervision, autonomy, and skills), can be found in contradictory locations, either in the middle strata or in the new and older petty bourgeoisie strata. The book authors argue that the class structure, as well as the mediation of class through ideological superstructures (mainstream media, state education, etc.) shape, to a large degree, the consciousness of individuals who are not part of collective struggles through organisational vehicles (e.g., political parties). The study has integrated ideologi-

⁵ Erik Olin Wright, *Class Counts: Comparative Studies in Class Analysis* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1997).

cal positions (left wing, communist, nationalist, liberal, conservative, independent) alongside class locations, to understand the extent to which the class location shapes individual intent to political ideas. The intersubjective experience of individuals has produced some contradictory results in relation to the quantitative data. For example, only 75,33% of the participants are understood to be in the working class, in relation to the 87,1% which the CYSTAT suggests are the employed individuals and thus mostly belong to the working class. The study goes on to suggest a number of reasons for this deviation, from characteristics in the sphere of reproduction (consumption practices, availability of resources and social climbing opportunities) to a subjective understanding of the class location within the labour process. Finally, a histogram of pro and anti-capitalist sentiments was compiled according to class segments (working, middle and capitalist). The study found that, in general, the Cypriot society -according to participant answers- is more pro-work than pro-capital, with most of the working class segment (despite ideological position) to offer pro-work statements, same as most of the middle segment (except the part of the segment which is closer to capitalist class location).

Conclusion

The book opens a path where there was none, perhaps because no one deals with such a small economy as Cyprus', or because politically there might have been low interest in the production of such works. Perhaps the greatest strength of the book is overcoming such matters and conceptualising a way to offer to readers a genuine analytical approach to the study of class and class relations for the case of Cyprus, albeit containing just parts of the population strata. The marriage of quantitative data with the theoretical approach and then the trying to draw qualitative conclusions is done with intent and adds to the validity and richness of the study. This edition reminds the reader of a bygone era of academia, where consistency of rigorous analysis and theory were not sins in quantitative research, and quantitative data were not irrelevant to theoretical analysis or considered superfluous or, even worse, an obstruction to further clearing theoretical matters.

Contrary to a general defeatist feeling in the intellectual landscape of the island's (growing via capital investments in the last few years) academic life, or more precisely the direction of class analysis leaving room to other analytical lenses, such as that of economic development or nationalism, this book stands out by going another way. The fundamental idea of this work is that class analysis is still very much needed because society is still very much tied in class relations. Furthermore, class analysis

makes it indeed possible to understand economic relations, as well as developments in other areas of social, economic and political life, as class relations that derive from a fully integrated (and even expanded during the last decade) capitalist economy on the island, form the basis that permeates all aspects of life.

This work can be enriched with a series of other studies, perhaps of the characteristics of classes and strata, or delving into the tools it develops (e.g., the dimension of foreign-Cypriot workers, small and large businesses, more in-depth analysis of cases, etc.). There is certainly quite a gap in the literature for many of the things that this research brings to the fore. The book will appeal mostly to those interested in social/political science and humanities, political economy or economics. A weak point in the study would be the attempt to convert some of the statistical data collected by CYSTAT, aligning them to class analysis, which might have an effect on the accuracy of the results. At the same time, whilst the sample size was substantial for the type of study conducted (323 people), drawing generalisations should be taken with a slight reservation, at least until evaluative and comparative studies become available.

Leandros Savvides

**International Law: Violation and Decline
The Puppet State in the Occupied Part of Cyprus
[Διεθνές Δίκαιο: Παραβίαση και Παρακμή
Το Κράτος Ανδρείκελο στην Κατεχόμενη Κύπρο]**

Dr. Kypros Chrysostomides
Rizes Books [Εκδόσεις Ρίζες]
Nicosia, 2022 [pp. 366]
ISBN: 978-9925-7899-2-4

Dr. Kypros Chrysostomides needs no introduction to the Cyprus Review readers. Not only does he stand out as a highly reputable and much respected member of the Cyprus legal profession and a political figure of exemplary ethos and integrity, he is also an expert on the Cyprus issue and a fervent supporter of the rule of International Law. Back in 1994, when his first major book on the Cyprus issue *The Republic of Cyprus in International Law (Το Κράτος της Κύπρου στο Διεθνές Δίκαιο)* had been published, I had just been recruited as a rookie advocate at his law firm and I vividly recall receiving from him, with sheer pride and excitement, a signed complimentary copy of his book. Twenty-nine years down the road, having been invited to review his latest and, ever so sadly, last book, I cannot but consider my contribution as a humble tribute to a great Cypriot International Law scholar and practitioner.

This book, albeit overlapping to a certain extent with his previous work (*The Republic of Cyprus in International Law*) is, in my view, an admirable piece of work for a number of reasons. Firstly, it purports to create, as the author states in his concluding remarks, a consolidated source of reference for refuting the arguments put forward by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership in asserting sovereignty/sovereign equality for the secessionist entity established in the occupied areas. This might arguably be described as a risky exercise, given that each chapter could very well form the subject matter of a separate thesis. Yet, despite the wide scope of issues covered, a core position underlies his whole analysis, forming a solid backbone for the book: adherence to International Law must be *the* core guiding principle for any ‘player’ involved with the Cyprus problem, be it States, International Organisations or International Judicial Organs. Secondly, his approach is not static, as it provokes further analysis and, on certain points, further debate among diverse categories of readers: politicians, political analysts, academics, and international law practition-

ers. Thirdly, he defends and develops very skillfully the tough title selected. His message comes across loud and clear. On the one hand, as the author strives to explain, the arguments put forward by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot side claiming separate 'sovereignty' for the secessionist entity in the occupied area are meritless in terms of international law. On the other hand, in the political arena of a negotiated solution, the gradual 'upgrading' of the notion of equality between the two communities and the acceptance of 'political equality' have been manipulated by the Turkish side to promote its longstanding claim for separate sovereignty of the secessionist entity. His analysis is dense and his criticism is blunt, expressing with unhindered honesty his disappointment, frustration even, as to the lukewarm response of the international community to the flagrant and continuing violations of international law in Cyprus.

Chapters 1-3 deal with the core arguments regarding the illegality of the 1974 military invasion and continuing occupation, as well as the inherent illegality of the declaration of independence of the seceding entity in the occupied areas. The analysis, predictably, focuses on the violation of the prohibition of use of force, a rule of customary international law and *jus cogens*, set out in Article 2.4 of the United Nations Charter (Charter), as well as on the violation of the Treaty of Guarantee. The Treaty must be interpreted in accordance with customary international law and *jus cogens* principles enshrined in Article 2.4 of the Charter; in any case, even if a conflict is said to exist between the obligations under the Treaty and those under the Charter, it is the Charter that prevails. Interestingly, he also touches upon the issue of humanitarian intervention, stressing that it is highly doubtful whether this has survived the prohibition of use of force in Article 2.4 of the Charter.

The human rights and international law violations, some of a continuing nature, caused by the invasion and continuing occupation, also constitute grave violations of international humanitarian law, including the 1949 Geneva Conventions and international crimes set out in the Rome Statute for the establishment of the International Criminal Court (ICC). The latter aspect is further developed in Chapter 13, where, more specifically, the author discusses (a) whether Turkey's recent illegal activity in the Cyprus Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) constitutes aggression under the Rome Statute, and (b) whether the gradual opening of the fenced-up area of Varosha for development and settlement constitutes a war crime under the Rome Statute. Surely the constraints of this review do not leave room for a full discussion of these ideas. Yet, a red flag of caution needs to be raised when it comes to proposing the investigation of the possible commission, by Turkey, of war crimes or the crime of aggression

under the Rome Statute. Like any multilateral treaty, the Rome Statute is the product of compromise between contracting States, and the acceptance of the ICC jurisdiction in investigating and prosecuting international Crimes has strict jurisdictional boundaries, *ratione temporis* and *ratione materiae*. Regarding, in particular, Turkey's illegal activity in the EEZ of the Republic of Cyprus, it is, in my view, highly debatable whether this can legally substantiate a referral for investigation into the commission of the crime of aggression. Additionally, there appear to be insurmountable procedural obstacles for such referral, the understanding being that, except for a referral of the situation by the United Nations Security Council (UNSC), both States concerned have to be Party to the Rome Statute.

The 'Turkish Federated State' ('TFS') and the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC') are direct emanations of Turkey's illegal invasion. Arguments that the declaration of the 'TFS' and the 'TRNC' created a new legal entity in international law, have been consistently rejected by International Courts, International Organisations and States. The European Court of Human Rights (ECtHR) expressly held that the presence of Turkish troops in the occupied area of Cyprus prevents the government of the Republic of Cyprus from exercising effective control. Nor can the argument be sustained that, even if no new subject of international law has been created, there has been a lawful transfer of power by the Turkish army to the *de facto* local authorities resulting in the termination of occupation. Such transfer of power must be made to the lawful government of the occupied State. Similarly unattainable is the argument that the 'TFS' and the 'TRNC' are the 'natural evolution' of the Turkish Cypriot authorities that have existed since 1964, given that such authorities had no territorial jurisdiction, hence no independence. United Nations General Assembly Resolutions 33/15 (1978), 34/30 (1979) and 37/253 (1983) include express references to the occupation and eminent scholars, as well as the ECtHR jurisprudence support this position. The 'TRNC' falls squarely in the category of 'puppet states', a term which, according to Crawford, is used to describe 'nominal sovereigns' subject to foreign control, particularly in cases where the establishment of the puppet state purports to disguise a flagrant illegality, such as the illegal military occupation following an illegal military invasion.

In Chapters 8-10 the author addresses the reasons why a claim for separate sovereignty of the 'TRNC'/Turkish Cypriot community cannot be sustained, based on the rules of international law pertaining to state sovereignty, sovereign equality and self-determination. Sovereignty, being synonymous to independence, signifies the

existence of a separate and independent state directly subject to international law. The illegal secessionist entity, an emanation of the illegal use of force, can neither be recognised as a state, nor secede from the Republic of Cyprus and be recognised as a separate state. The same applies to the constitutional structure of federal states, with only the federal state and not the constituent states being constitutionally sovereign. Sovereign states may join only in a confederation in order to maintain intact their previous sovereignty. In the case of Cyprus, even if it can be argued (*quid non*) that sovereignty was to be transferred to a population unit and not to a successor state, this should be effected to the people of Cyprus as a whole. In the author's view, the people of Cyprus exercised effectively, albeit indirectly, the right to self-determination, by terminating the colonial rule and attaining independence. In any event, the Turkish Cypriots do not enjoy a separate right to external self-determination. There are no two *pare jure* entities with separate sovereignty which can be waived or relinquished in favour of a federal constitutional structure.

The legal analysis is complemented by a useful digest of relevant case-law of international and national Courts, set out in Chapter 7.

In Chapters 4-5, 11 and 14, the author turns to the international law 'decline' aspect, as proposed by the book's title. Chapters 4, 11 and 14 focus on the situation at the level of the UN. In a nutshell, although it is acknowledged that the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot claim to separate sovereignty has been a long-standing one, due, mainly, to the UN Secretary General's approach of 'equidistance' (which he openly criticises) in the context of the UN-brokered negotiations, it has been allowed to endure, purporting to elevate the Turkish Cypriot community to a 'people' who will equally and sovereignly co-create the new federal state of Cyprus. In an extensive discussion of the relevant UNSC Resolutions and the United Nations Secretary-General's reports, with particular emphasis on the years 1990-91, the author strongly criticises UNSC Resolution 716(1991), which, in paragraph 4, introduces a new element pertaining to the substance of the proposed solution [namely that the UNSC's '*position on the solution of the Cyprus problem is based on one State of Cyprus comprising two politically equal communities as defined by the Secretary General in the eleventh paragraph of annex I of this Report of 8 March 1990*'], departing from the previous references to only the procedural notion of '*equal footing during the negotiations*'. Chapter 5 deals with the situation at the EU level. It chronologically sets out the various phases that led to the accession of the Republic of Cyprus to the EU, each step encountering Turkey's strong opposition, noting in sheer disappointment that the EU

has not taken substantial measures or imposed sanctions against Turkey for the flagrant violations of international law and EU law against a member State of the Union.

Overall, I consider this book as essential reading for everyone involved in the study of the Cyprus issue, be it from a legal or a political perspective. As already highlighted, it constitutes a comprehensive and useful source of reference for the core legal arguments and relevant case-law refuting Turkish allegations regarding the 'sovereign' status of the puppet regime in the occupied area and, by extension, of the Turkish Cypriot community's participation in a prospective federal state solution. What, sadly, proved to be the swan song of Dr. Kypros Chrysostomides, can truly be described as his legacy on the study and understanding of the Cyprus problem.

Mary-Ann Stavrinides

Rewards of the Fighters of the Greek Revolution 1828-1844

[Ανταμοιβές των Αγωνιστών της Ελληνικής Επανάστασης, 1828-1844]

Soteroula Vassiliou

Papadopoulos

Athens, 2021 [pp. 392]

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This book by Soteroula Vassiliou focuses on the ‘workshop’ of political rewards during, the first post- revolutionary period 1828-1844, thoroughly presenting the main means of material and moral rewards offered by the Greek state to the fighters. At the same time, it explains how those policies became a qualification for state rewards in later wars of the nation too, until the 20th century.

The rewards game had two sides: the demands of contributors and the ideology of state policies.

Foreign factors, personal likes and dislikes, selfish interests, social differences, and, finally, national aspirations, are interposed between them.

The book is based on primary sources from a variety of archives, mainly the Archives of Excellence, which is part of the Military Archives of the General Archives of the State of Greece. The research also extended to include other files of the General Archives of the State, mainly the endowments of Philanthropists.

Special mention should also be made of the finding, in the Manuscripts and Holographs section of the National Library of Greece, of minutes of the last evaluation committee of the fighters works.

The second important source of the author was the press of the period examined in the research.

The author made use of the fruits of archival research, used widely published archives, correspondence, diaries, accounts of local and foreign observers and memoirs of fighters.

The choice of chronological structure was dictated by the interaction of reward policies with wider political, social and economic developments.

The six chapters correspond to an equal number of reward cycles. Vassiliou’s starting point is always the presentation of the political coordinates and the thorough

negotiation is the core of the theory and implementation of the laws, decrees and resolutions that promoted restoration.

The first chapter traces the evolution of the restoration of the fighters during the Kapodistrian period, the period of anarchy, but also the prehistory of the issue.

In the second chapter the discussion focuses on the measures by which the regency tries to co-opt the local leaders and pacify the young men. The third chapter is crucial, and traces the full unfolding of reward policies from June 1835 to February 1837.

The main theme of the fourth chapter is the first reform of the rewards system, with the aim of fiscal consolidation. The chapter starting with the assumption of the prime ministership by Alexandros Mavrokordatos.

The fifth chapter explores the chain developments, which gave birth to the September 3rd Movement. In the sixth chapter, the reward debates, the laws and resolutions of the Assembly and the parallel, unprecedented distributions of excellence, are thoroughly examined.

As the author notes, the purpose of the epimetre is to highlight the course of implementation of the resolutions of the National Assembly and the role of the overall institutional framework and the experience of the period 1828-1844 in the rehabilitation of the fighters until the end of the century.

The conclusions attempt to reconstitute the society of the fighters, as it was shaped by the fighting action, the request of rewards, compensation and care and the state policy.

The complex role of excellence is analysed and dialogue between hopes, denials, traumas, glory, anguish and pride, is highlighted.

Finally, in the appendix, the chronological table of the institutional framework of the restoration can also read as a map of the study.

All in all, the multifaceted story of the rewards emerges from a multitude of sources, as they combine in a way that highlights the interactions of fighters and governments, visionary and public discourse, glory and agony, recognition and denials, that always characterise the transition from the escalation of national struggles to compromises and next day pragmatism.

Savvas Stavrou

**Cyprus Problem Zero Hour:
The Thorny Issue of Property
[Κυπριακό Ώρα Μηδέν:
Το Αγκάθι του Περιουσιακού]**

Andreas D. Symeou
Papazisis Publishers
Athens, Greece, 2020 [pp. 216]
ISBN: 978-960-02-3575-3

The book entitled '*Cyprus problem zero hour: The thorny issue of property*' deals with a difficult aspect of the Cyprus problem, that of property, as the title suggests. It is addressed to a wide public, which includes not only politicians, academics, technocrats and people whose properties are affected, but also anyone who is interested in the Cyprus problem. It aims at presenting the property issue in a concise and comprehensive way. As Mr. Symeou states, the book seeks to (a) help towards a better understanding of the property issue, (b) classify and simplify its various parameters, (c) lay out number details, data and possible scenarios, (d) locate past mistakes and overt dangers for the Greek Cypriots, (e) suggest specific solution ideas, (f) draw the red lines of the Greek Cypriot side, and (g) demolish myths that go round from time to time. It is worth noting that the academic and professional training of the author and his practical occupation with the property issue are conducive to writing a book with the aims stated above. Mr. Symeou is a lawyer and has served in the Land and Surveys Department of the Republic of Cyprus for 40 years. In addition, he headed or participated in the Greek Cypriot task force for the property issue in the context of the negotiations for the Cyprus problem, during 2008-2012 and 2014-2015.

Structurally, the book can be divided in three parts.

In the first part, the author presents the firm positions of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, the Guterres framework, the basic case law of the European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) relating to the property issue, as well as relevant aspects of the European Union law (EU law). As regards the positions of the two sides, Mr. Symeou starts by making the point that the agreed solution framework of the Cyprus problem is the Bizonal Bicomunal Federation. In this respect, the position of the Greek Cypriot side on the property issue has been and continues to be that (a) priority must belong to the owner, (b) there should be no ceilings to the right of resti-

tution, and (c) any limitations to the exercise of the right to property must be temporary. By contrast, the position of the Turkish Cypriot side has been and continues to be that (a) priority must belong to the user, (b) there should be ceilings to restitution so as to ensure a 'clear land majority', and (c) there must be permanent limitations to the exercise of the right to property. As regards the Guterres framework, the author notes that the two sides disagree not only on its interpretation, but also on its precise wording. He maintains that the most prevalent version of it is the following: In the areas of territorial adjustments, i.e. the areas that would be liberated, priority should be given to the owner, but not 100%. In the areas outside the territorial adjustments, priority should be given to the user, but not 100%. At this point, it has to be noted that the above version is not the one reflected in the Guterres document as delivered to the two sides on 30/6/2017. It resembles the version of the document as recorded by the Greek Cypriot side following the oral clarifications given by Mr. Espen Barth Eiden on 4/7/2017. The author succinctly singles out certain issues that arise from the above. What is the content of the terms 'owner' and 'user'? What does it mean that priority should be given to a certain person? In which cases will the owners and users have no priority in areas of territorial adjustment and areas outside territorial adjustment respectively? Mr. Symeou's position is that the Greek Cypriot side must insist on a strict definition of the word 'user', on restitution being compulsory where it is deemed to be possible and on cases of exemption being clearly defined. Likewise, he argues that a collective right to 'clear land majority' for the Turkish Cypriot side should not be accepted and that there should be no ceilings to the right of restitution -as a rule at least. Concerning the ECHR case law, the author lays emphasis on the *Demopoulos a.o. v. Turkey*. In this case the ECHR recognised for the first time the Immovable Property Commission -which is based and functions in the occupied areas- as an effective legal remedy of Turkey, i.e. as a national legal remedy to which the owners of affected properties in the occupied areas must resort before and in order to apply to the ECHR. The court also recognised that the users have acquired certain rights worthy of protection, since after the passage of so many years it would be arbitrary and unfair to impress on Turkey to provide restitution in all cases. As regards EU law, the author notes the effect this could have, especially the freedom of capital movement, on the support of the Greek Cypriot positions. Mr. Symeou seems to believe that, from all the above, a series of *faits accomplis* emerges, on which the solution of the property issue shall be built.

In the second part, these facts are presented and approached in a critical light. The

author starts by stating that restitution, exchange and compensation are concerned as available remedies, while he notes that alternative property, i.e. the exchange of property with other property in the same constituent state, was put forward during the negotiations. An issue on which the author also lays emphasis is whether the right of priority for the owners and users in areas within territorial adjustments and outside territorial adjustments respectively would mean that they have an absolute right to choose remedy or they have no right at all to choose remedy. He personally maintains a middle ground approach. An expression of it is the support of the categorisation of properties, accompanied by a proposition for a specific approach to each category. Another expression is the support of the remedy of alternative property versus, in particular, the remedy of compensation. Mr. Symeou also supports the view that a series of alternative remedies could be used, such as the long-term lease of property to the user, the granting a life-long right of residence or usufruct to the user, and the granting of ownership to the user with a priority right to the owner in case the former decides to sell.

The difficult issue of compensation is examined next. The basic question that arises is how to define the compensation due. The author states that the ECHR case law does not give any guidelines on the matter, while noting that, depending on the parameters and factors taken into consideration, the compensation due is subject to great changes. In order to prove this, the author presents two hypothetical scenarios for calculating compensation using different factors, whereby different amounts are produced. He also presents the compensation amounts claimed by the Greek Cypriots who apply to the Immovable Property Commission and the substantially lesser amounts awarded by the latter. It is argued that the use of the market value as a basis of calculation for the compensation owed should not be accepted by the Greek Cypriot side. The current value and the nominal value are preferable as bases for compensation. He also argues that, in any case, there should be provision for loss of use compensation and that during the latter's calculation the benefits already received by the person entitled to it shall be taken into account. Yet another major question raised is who will shoulder the expense of the compensation. According to the author, a large part should be borne by Turkey, while it is expected that the Republic of Cyprus will be called to provide part of the compensation related to the Turkish Cypriot properties in the free areas. Part of the revenues from hydrocarbon exploitation could be used relevantly.

Mr. Symeou goes on to stress the importance of gathering and using real numbers

and data concerning the property issue. In this context he proceeds to make an interesting exercise on paper. Initially, he presents the area and percentage of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot properties (a) in the occupied areas, (b) in the buffer zone, and (c) in the free areas as applicable in 1974. Then, he presents the changes that would affect these figures in five different scenarios.

In the first scenario a 'total' exchange of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot properties of equal area takes place. In the second scenario a ceiling of 1/3 on the area of the properties to be restored is imposed. In the third scenario concurrent ceilings of 1/3 on the area and 1/3 on the value of the properties to be restored are imposed. In the fourth scenario all the properties 'apportioned' in the two constituent states are exchanged. In the fifth scenario all the properties 'apportioned' in the Republic of Cyprus and in the 'TRNC' are exchanged.

Mr. Symeou suggests, in the context of confidence building measures, an exchange of numbers and data in relation to the properties in the free areas and the occupied areas to take place and technical support in computerising the properties in the occupied areas to be provided by the Greek Cypriot side to the Turkish Cypriot side. Likewise, he suggests a committee of technocrats to be set up, in order to deal with the property issue on the basis of gathering and using real numbers and data. Finally, he stresses the need for political decisions to take numbers into account and be geared towards them, so as to show practical results and avoid sudden developments that would prove, as has happened before, adverse for the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, Mr. Symeou refers to the significance of having in place an effective implementation mechanism for all things included in the solution of the property issue. It should be noted that the setting up of a joint Property Commission with equal participation of the two communities has been agreed upon, which would be tasked with the implementation of the relevant provisions. The conferral of a particularly broad scope of powers to this commission is proposed.

The author supports that the institution of land redistribution could be used as part of the solution of the property issue. Indeed, illustrated scenarios of property management are presented in a hypothetical area of a solution case, in order to demonstrate the advantages of land redistribution. He proposes, as an extension, the creation of a Redistribution, Development and Housing Department under the umbrella of the Property Commission, which would have a broad scope of powers related to the redistribution process.

In the last unit of the second part, the author focuses on the importance of aware-

ness by the people for the solution of the Cyprus problem to become feasible. The starting point here is that any solution agreement should be put before the two communities in simultaneous and separate referenda. In order to have a positive majority in both referenda, public opinion should (a) be sounded out early enough and its concerns be taken into consideration to the greatest extent possible, (b) be prepared for and familiarised with the Bizonal Bicomunal Federation and its particularities, and (c) be fully, objectively and timely informed about the solution agreement that would be placed before it. Finally, it is stressed that the maintenance of the status quo cannot lead to any solution or improvement concerning the property issue. To the contrary, it could only have a negative effect on it.

In the third and last part of the book, all the above are summarised under the basic concepts/parameters of the property issue. Due to the extensive analysis so far, it is deemed suitable not to expand further.

It is a fact that the book is written in a simple, concise and comprehensive way. It can be read and understood easily by any person interested in the Cyprus problem, particularly in the property issue. It also truly serves the objectives set by the author as stated above. These are its basic advantages.

To fully understand the property issue, one has to fully understand the Cyprus problem as a whole. And this cannot be done without a thorough and critical examination of the historical, political, legal, even the social aspects of it. It is stated that this is not the purpose of the author and this is not a disadvantage, since it is more than useful to have manuals on the issue addressed to a wide public. Notwithstanding, we consider that a further analysis would be beneficial regarding the points which although they appear and/or are approached as being *faits accomplis* on the political level, they should not be so or indeed they are not. A characteristic example of this is the Guterres framework. As the author himself notes, the two sides disagree not only on its interpretation, but also on its precise wording. It is also a document which, due to its nature, is not legally binding, the two sides have not accepted it as such, while it is a basic principle of the negotiations that nothing is agreed until everything is agreed. It is therefore too risky -if we may use the term- to assume that whatever is stated in the Guterres framework has been agreed by the two sides and should be treated as a binding and unavoidable basis for talks on the property issue.

Moreover, as Mr. Symeou writes, any solution should be applicable in practice. This holds both for its substantive as well as its procedural provisions. The property issue is by nature complicated. It directly affects a significant number of people with

conflicting interests, it has to do with property not only as an economic load, but also a sentimental one, it being intertwined with other aspects of the Cyprus problem. This makes imperative the need for its solution to be as simple as possible. Providing for many alternative remedies, many categories, many criteria, instruments with many and wide powers, obviously offers certain advantages. However, at the same time, it may make things more complicated, even inapplicable or non-feasible. Drawing guidance from examples in other countries, where large scale changes on immovable property have taken place, can be particularly helpful.

In conclusion, the book is a positive example of how to approach not only the property issue, but also every aspect of the Cyprus problem and the Cyprus problem as a whole: multi-prismatically and critically, with exercises on paper, political strategy and technocratic analysis. This is undoubtedly an important addition to the relevant bibliography.

Salome Yiallourou



