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LETTER FROM THE EDITOR-IN-CHIEF
Dear Readers,

2021 was a year focused on strengthening our Journal’s international role and character. Towards this end, we expanded our Editorial Board by inviting leading academics, scholars and researchers in Cyprological studies. The new revamped Editorial Board (in alphabetical order) is the following: Dr Constantinos Adamides (University of Nicosia), Dr Othon Anastasakis (University of Oxford), Prof. Panayiotis Angelides (University of Nicosia), Prof. George Christou (University of Warwick), Dr Odysseas Christou (University of Nicosia), Prof. Costas M. Constantinou (University of Cyprus), Prof. em. Van Coufoudakis (Indiana University-Purdue University Indianapolis), Prof. Alfred de Zayas (Geneva School of Diplomacy and International Relations), Prof. Thomas Diez (University of Tübingen), Prof. Dimitris Drikakis, (University of Nicosia), Prof. Marios Evriviades (Neapolis University Pafos), Prof. Hubert Faustmann, (University of Nicosia), Prof. Kevin Featherstone (European Institute, London School of Economics and Political Science), Prof. Vassilis Fouskas (University of East London), Dr Michael Given (University of Glasgow), Dr Christina Hajisoteriou (University of Nicosia), Prof. Evanthis Hatzivassiliou (National and Kapodistrian University of Athens), Prof. em. Robert Holland (University of London), Dr Sofia Iordanidou (Open University Cyprus), Prof. Andreas Kapardis (University of Cyprus), Dr Vassilis Kappis (University of Buckingham), Prof. Savvas Katsikides (University of Cyprus), Dr Erol Kaymak (Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development - SeeD), Prof. Ilias Kouskouvelis (University of Macedonia), Prof. Mary Koutselini (University of Cyprus), Prof. Petros Lois (University of Nicosia), Prof. Neophyto Loizides (University of Kent), Dr Diana Markides (Independent Researcher), Prof. Farid Mirbagheri (University of Nicosia), Dr Yael Navarro (University of Cambridge), Prof. Phedon Nicolaides (University of Maastricht), Dr Petros Papapolyviou (University of Cyprus), Prof. Stelios Perrakis (Neapolis University Pafos), Prof. Constantinos Phellas (University of Nicosia), Prof. Oliver Richmond (University of Manchester), Prof. Heinz Richter (University of Mannheim), Dr Soterios Rizas (Research Centre for the Study of Modern Greek History, Academy of Athens), Prof. Spyros Sakellaropoulos (Panteion University), Prof. Paul Sant Cassia (University of Malta), Dr Sertaç Sonan (Cyprus Academic Dialogue), Dr Angelos Syrigos (Panteion University), Dr Ioannis Tellidis (Kyung Hee University), Prof. Andreas Theophanous (University of Nicosia), Prof.
Alina Tryfonidou (Neapolis University Pafos), Prof. Demetris Vrontis (University of Nicosia) and Dr Craig Webster (Ball State University). I would personally like to thank all new members for enriching our Editorial Board and welcome them to our team.

Another goal that we had set for 2021 was to expand and enrich the ‘Book Review’ Section of the Journal. It has been our firm belief that, as the leading Cypiological academic Journal, we should enhance our role in introducing our readers to the bibliography on International Affairs, Politics, and Social Sciences widely defined, as well as History, Governance, Law, Education and other related fields pertinent to Cyprus, through the publication of more book reviews. Our Consulting Editor, Prof. Achilles C. Emilianides has been instrumental in the realisation of this demanding project and a number of people worked very hard to make this a reality, amongst them Ms Andria Andreou, who I particularly like to thank. I would also like to thank all book reviewers for their contribution. This issue hosts 12 reviews in its final section, of books written between 2018-2021.

In its main section, the current issue hosts three articles. The first is by Epaminondas Epaminonda on the socio-cultural profile of Cyprus through a discussion of change and diversity in the country. Data relating to family, gender roles, social relations, and work-related attitudes are presented in the paper. Differences between social groups and how values might be changing are discussed, and Cyprus’ performance in relation to Hofstede’s value dimensions and the World Values Survey are studied and conclusions are drawn. The second article is by Magdalini Antreou and Nikolaos Stelgias; it examines negative perceptions of the Jewish settlement attempts in Cyprus during the early British rule (1883-1906). The article examines the breakdown of these settlement attempts within the sociopolitical framework of Cyprus. The authors argue that the Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-phobia’ and the hostility of local authorities condemned the Jewish vision of a home in Cyprus, and these attempts finally collapsed. The third article is by Ivan Majchút and Michal Hrnčiar, and it concerns Slovakia’s contribution to the solution of the Cyprus Problem. The authors discuss the historical background of Slovak involvement in Cyprus, Slovak diplomacy in the Cyprus Problem, as well as Slovakia’s military presence and active involvement in the UNFICYP.

The Articles Section is followed by a Policy Paper authored by Andreas Theophanous, entitled ‘A Proposal for a Normal State: The Cyprus Problem after the Five Party Informal Conference’. The author assesses the new state of affairs after the
informal five-party conference under the auspices of the UN Secretary General on 27-29 April 2021, and analyses his proposal for the Cyprus problem.

Following our Book Review Section at the end of the issue, you can find as always our Call for Papers.

Christina Ioannou
Editor-in-Chief
ARTICLES
Drawing a Sociocultural Profile of Cyprus by Reviewing Some Key Findings and Discussing Change and Diversity

Epaminondas Epaminonda

Abstract

This paper aims to draw a sociocultural profile of Cyprus and briefly discuss change and diversity in the country. Data relating to family, gender roles, social relations, Hofstede’s dimensions, the World Values Survey, and work-related attitudes are presented, and differences between social groups and how values might be changing are discussed. It is suggested that Cyprus has historically been a relatively conservative society, something which has changed in the last few decades to some extent. On Hofstede dimensions, Cyprus scores around the average on individualism, medium to high on power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation, and very high on uncertainty avoidance. In the World Values Survey, the results of Cyprus are close to the centre of the axes that represent the data (but somewhat shifted towards the more conservative end). It is finally argued that the significant numbers of Cypriots who studied abroad contribute to diversity and change within society.

Keywords: Cyprus, culture, values, change, diversity

Introduction

Outlining the sociocultural profile of countries has been a central theme in the social sciences, and particularly so in anthropology, sociology, politics and, more recently, management. In anthropology and sociology, this practice allows for a comparison between societies, while in politics and management it provides the background for a discussion on the impact of culture on managing and leading people. Numerous categorisations have been proposed, from the simplest one which involves only two categories (e.g., high vs low context countries) to more complex ones, such as the ten country clusters’ categorisation. In most cases, countries are classified

1 Dr Epaminondas Epaminonda, Assistant Professor, Associate Head, Department of Management and MIS, School of Business, University of Nicosia.
in geographically/culturally-defined categories (for example Eastern Europe, Latin Europe, Latin America, Nordic Europe, Middle East in GLOBE’s research). In the context of this discussion, classifying countries that do not fall clearly into one geo-cultural group can be particularly interesting. Whereas Sweden, for example, would clearly fall in the Nordic Europe group and Brazil in the Latin American one, countries such as Switzerland and Kazakhstan would be more difficult to categorise. Cyprus is an example of a country that does not fit neatly into one category of countries. The cliché that is often used to describe its position is that ‘it is situated at the crossroads of three continents, Europe, Asia and Africa’. Even though this statement might be considered accurate, geographically, by many, it does not provide information about the position of Cyprus socially – in terms, in other words, of its cultural values. Where would Cyprus, in other words, be in terms of its cultural values compared to other countries and how are these changing? This paper attempts to provide answers to the above questions.

Hence, the paper is organised as follows: it begins with a description of the historical social conditions – particularly in relation to the family and social relations—presents the results of Cyprus4 according to Hofstede’s value dimensions and the World Values Survey (WVS), and discusses changes in family structure and characteristics, as well as diversity within society. In summary, it is argued that Cyprus has historically been a relatively conservative society, while today its World Values Survey results are close to the world average on the two main dimensions that are used to summarise the survey’s findings (but somewhat closer to the conservative side of the dimensions). On Hofstede’s dimensions, Cyprus scores medium on individualism, medium to high on power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation, and very high on uncertainty avoidance. As far as change and diversity are concerned, this paper informs that significant changes in relationships-related values have been observed and that a noteworthy difference in values is also observed between individuals that have studied in Anglophone societies in the last few decades and individuals in the local population that have not had the same experience.

Methodology

This review paper synthesises data from related research work on Cyprus and other countries. Initially, it draws a historical sociocultural profile of Cyprus, in particu-

4 The data were collected from individuals living in the area controlled by the Republic of Cyprus.
lar in relation to family, gender roles, social relations, and trust in society, comparing it with other Mediterranean societies. Then, it presents data of the Hofstede’s survey and the World Values Survey. These surveys are selected due to the former probably being the most well-known and widely cited research on cultural values and the latter being ‘the largest non-commercial, cross-national, time series investigation of human beliefs and values ever executed’.⁵ Results are compared with international data and comments are made primarily in relation to diversity and change in the country.

Cyprus: A Historical Social Background

In Cyprus, as in many other societies of the Eastern Mediterranean, a relatively conservative social outlook regarding gender roles and a central role for the family had been key societal characteristics for much of the previous century and until recently.⁶ Gender roles had been clearly differentiated and the nuclear family —parents and children— but also the extended family —grandparents, brothers, and sisters of the adolescent members of the family and their families, and even uncles and aunts— had often been the main unit of economic and social life. Relationships between family members were strong and personal interests and desires had been typically suppressed in favour of family solidarity.⁷

A similar social situation was observed in Southern Italy and was described as ‘amoral familism’.⁸ In this context, as explained by the same author, the close family is often seen as the most important in-group and people act according to the principle ‘maximise material, short range advantage of the nuclear family’. In such cultures, one should expect to see authorities that consist of individuals interested primarily in enriching themselves or their families, and the upper class to be highly opportunistic and uninterested in furthering the community.⁹ Laws are disregarded unless punishment is probable, bribes for officials are common, those who claim to be interested in the welfare of the community are considered frauds, and there is limited popularity of voluntary organisations.

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⁷ Nicos Peristianis, Neofytos Charalambous, Michalis Koutsoulis et al., ‘The State of the Cypriot Family in Cyprus’, Report based on research commissioned by the Committee for the Family in Cyprus and conducted by the Intercollege Research Centre (2004).
This antagonistic way of thinking is also evident in individual behaviour in other Mediterranean societies. When competition between individuals arises, the tendency for it to become fierce is there. The competitive atomism of the Greek society, for example, has also been highlighted by other authors. The intense competition and jealousy that surfaces in individual relations in Greece has been noted, and an ‘anarchic individualism’, which is the tendency to consider liberty as conterminous with total irresponsibility toward the collectivity, the lay public and others rather than being an expression of identity as individualism as is often in the case of Anglophone societies, has been stressed.

This kind of atomistic behaviour often stands as a barrier when it comes to collaborating in teams. An intense focus on self-interest makes it difficult for people to work harmoniously for collective goals, and those in position of power often feel that they need to take control or even use coercion to direct the team effort more effectively. Otherwise, what is supposed to be a group effort may result in a collection of individuals working independently, probably in contradicting directions even. This contributes to making management styles in such societies more authoritarian compared to what the case is in Anglophone societies.

Intense focus on self-interest also contributes to the creation of a particularistic value system where actions are not judged by a universal standard that applies equally to all. The self is initially excluded by the moral standard applied to others, and reasons — or more rightly, excuses — come in abundantly to explain individual behaviour that promotes self-interest in a less than rightful way. Others close to the individual — family and friends — are also often excluded from a moral code applied to others. This way of thinking, added to the competitive nature of relations, leads to ‘clientism’, a system of reciprocal, interpersonal and voluntary exchange relations between actors commanding uneven political powers and conducting mutually beneficial political transactions. This link between people of often different social status shares a common interest in excluding respective peers and rival groups. The role of objectivity and impartiality in such an environment is thus limited.

12 Sykiotis (no 9).
Unsurprisingly, this social background leads to low-trust mentality in the wider environment, where both individuals and groups one does not belong to cannot be trusted. As self-interest and the relationships with groups closely related to the individual take precedence over following some set of universal rules, one can expect—probably rightly—that unknown individuals will be treated in a less favourable manner than known ones. Consequently, trust in strangers or ‘outsiders’ is limited in such environments. An obvious way to go around this situation is to try and establish a close personal relationship with unknown economic agents so that they are not ‘outsiders’ anymore, thus increasing trust within this in-group. Personal relationships therefore become very common in business transactions.

The above low-trust mentality is partly offset in Cyprus by an important feature which can act as a moderator setting a ‘high moral standard’ for people to follow, namely philotimo in the Greek language. There is no equivalent for this word in English; a literal translation would be ‘love of honour’ and is probably similar to what is called honneur in French.13 As a concept, it implies a self-imposed code of conduct based on trust and fairness. An individual with ‘philotimo’ often helps in overcoming difficulties and encouraging cooperation between workers or staff which no rule or order could otherwise impose. It also means that if, for example, an employee is treated ‘properly’, he/she will give more than what is normally expected to please his/her employers (‘properly’ translates to being respected, praised, and shown concern over personal matters). As Triandis indicates, a person who is considered ‘philotimos’ behaves towards members of his in-group in a way that is ‘polite, virtuous, reliable, proud, truthful, generous, self-sacrificing, tactful, respectful and grateful’.14

Cyprus’ Results on Hofstede and World Values Surveys

Even though the brief analysis above may provide a broad outline of some main features of the sociocultural environment in Cyprus, it does not indicate how the Cypriot society compares with other societies on these and other more rigorously defined theoretical dimensions. Social characteristics often have more meaning when compared with other social contexts, and research in this area has often been devoted to comparative studies. Are, for example, relations between superiors and

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subordinates more or less authoritarian than what the case is in other societies? Is the Cypriot society more individualistic than others? Are social values more conservative compared to other countries? Despite the challenges in doing cross cultural research and the limitations in comparing answers even to standardised questionnaires, comparative research can provide at least some indication regarding the extent or the kind of differences that are observed between societies. The results of the Hofstede model are presented first, followed by the results of the WVS.

Hofstede’s Model Results

Hofstede’s model is a framework developed by Geert Hofstede to compare cultural values. It was initially proposed by Hofstede in the 1970’s, at a time when the impact of culture on management was not yet obvious to many researchers in the field. As perhaps the first model of systematic comparison of cultures and one that was based on a large comparable sample —Hofstede was working at IBM at the time and compared responses of 117,000 employees working in the company in different locations around the world— it soon became widely accepted and used, and it remained prevalent in cultural studies and management ever since. It is used in this paper because of its predominance in comparing cultural values. Indeed, as de Mooij and Hofstede claimed, ‘in order to understand cultural differences, several models have been developed of which the Hofstede model is the most used’. 17

Initially, the model included four dimensions: Power Distance, Individualism-Collectivism, Uncertainty Avoidance, Masculinity-Femininity. It was later refined to include a fifth dimension, Long Term Orientation, and more recently a sixth one, Indulgence vs Restraint. The first five dimensions —on which there are data available for Cyprus— are explained in more detail below, before the results on each dimension are presented.

Power Distance

Power Distance relates to the extent to which the less powerful members of institutions and organisations within a country expect and accept that power is distributed unequally.\(^{18}\) The fundamental issue related to Power Distance is how a society handles inequalities among people. People in societies exhibiting a large degree of Power Distance accept a hierarchical order in which everybody has their place, and which needs no further justification, whereas in societies with low Power Distance people strive to equalise the distribution of power and demand justification for inequalities of power.\(^ {19}\) In high Power-Distance societies, relations are more paternalistic and autocratic, and centralised authority is more common. In lower Power-Distance societies, there are more democratic or consultative relations between those expecting and accepting power.

In the Hofstede survey, questions used to calculate this dimension included whether employees are afraid to express disagreement with their managers, the kind of manager they prefer, and the kind of manager they have now (in terms of how the manager handles authority). Cyprus did not participate in the initial survey but a survey conducted in the country later revealed a score of 75.\(^ {20}\) The highest score reported in the Hofstede survey was 104 in Malaysia and the lowest 11 in Austria (with the average score of all participating countries being 57). Based on the above, the Power Distance score in Cyprus would be best described as medium to high compared to international data.

Individualism-Collectivism

Individualism may be defined as a preference for a loose-knit social framework in which individuals are expected to take care of only themselves and their immediate families.\(^ {21}\) Its opposite, Collectivism, represents a preference for a tight-knit framework in society in which individuals can expect their relatives or members of

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\(^{18}\) Geert Hofstede, Culture’s Consequences: International Differences in Work-related Values (Newbury Park, CA, Sage, 1980).


\(^{20}\) Eleni Stavrou-Costea, Jacob Eisenberg, Chris Charalambous, ‘Mapping Cyprus’ Cultural Dimensions: Comparing Hofstede’s and Schwartz’s Values Frameworks’, A paper presented at the 18th International Congress of the International Association for Cross-Cultural Psychology (Spetses, Greece, 2006)

\(^{21}\) Ibid.
a particular ingroup to look after them in exchange for unquestioning loyalty. According to Hofstede, social identity in individualistic cultures is based on individual contribution, and basic social values emphasise personal initiative and achievement.\textsuperscript{22} In this context, there is greater employment mobility, since individuals are expected to look after their own interests. In collectivist cultures, on the other hand, social identity is based on group membership, and greater emphasis is placed on belonging vis-à-vis personal initiative. Hence, individual initiative is not highly valued, and deviance in opinion or behaviour is typically punished. In collectivist cultures, group decisions are considered superior to individual ones, and group-based responsibility and action are consistent with the culture. In individualist cultures, more explicit verbal communication takes place, whereas in collectivist cultures communication is more implicit.

Hofstede uses a combination of questions to arrive at ‘individualism scores’. These include rating the importance of job characteristics such as living in an area that is desirable by the individual and his or her family, cooperation with others at work, good physical working conditions (good ventilation and lighting, adequate workspace, etc.), and having a job which leaves sufficient time for personal or family life.\textsuperscript{23} The score of the Cypriot sample was not far from the international average (42 in Cyprus vs. 44 which was the international average).\textsuperscript{24}

**Uncertainty Avoidance**

Another widely used dimension that influences attitudes towards work is what Hofstede called Uncertainty Avoidance, which he defined as the extent to which the members of a culture feel threatened by uncertain or unknown situations.\textsuperscript{25} Countries exhibiting strong Uncertainty Avoidance maintain rigid codes of belief and behaviour and are intolerant of unorthodox behaviour and ideas. Weak Uncertainty Avoidance societies maintain a more relaxed attitude where practice counts more than principles.\textsuperscript{26}

\textsuperscript{23} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{24} Stavrou-Costea, Eisenberg, Charalambous (no 19).
\textsuperscript{25} Hofstede (no 21).
\textsuperscript{26} Hofstede Insights (no 18).
To measure Uncertainty Avoidance Hofstede used questions that examine the strength of a belief that company rules should not be broken (even when the employee thinks it is in the company’s best interests), the expectation that someone will continue working for the same company for many years, and the frequency that someone feels nervous or tense at work. Mediterranean cultures and Japan rank the highest in this category. The score in Cyprus is also very high (actually, its score is 115, which is the highest of all countries that participated in the survey). Cultures that score high on Uncertainty Avoidance prefer rules and regulations in the structure of the environment, and employees would be less likely to take individual risks in business situations. Approval from higher authority is normally sought for any decision that involves personal risk, and innovative solutions to business problems are less likely. A reason often given by employees in high Uncertainty Avoidance environments for avoiding taking personal risks at work and looking for security in employment is the fact that when others and formal institutions are not trusted, people feel that formal rules and regulations are the only means to increase both their security against being exploited and the possibility that what has been said orally or informally at the individual level or promised at the institutional level are actually materialised. This is likely to lead to excessive paperwork and bureaucratic procedures in organisations and disproportionate demand for more ‘secure’ jobs, like the ones in the public sector.

**Masculinity-Femininity**

The fourth dimension in Hofstede’s research was Masculinity-Femininity. According to Hofstede, social gender roles are clearly distinct in more ‘masculine’ societies: men are supposed to be assertive, tough, and focused on material success; women are supposed to be more modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. The focus in masculine cultures is in doing and acquiring rather than thinking and observing. In feminine societies social gender roles overlap; both men and women are supposed to be modest, tender, and concerned with the quality of life. In organisations with masculine cultures performance and achievement are important, while status is the presupposition of success, contrary to feminine cultures.

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27 Hofstede (no 21).
28 Stavrou-Costea, Eisenberg, Charalambous (no 19).
29 Hofstede (no 21).
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where people orientation prevails, small is beautiful, and status is not very important. Cyprus’ masculinity score was 58 (Japan was the highest with 95, Sweden was the lowest with 5, and the average was 50), so it could be described as medium to high.31

Long Term Orientation

Hofstede’s fifth dimension, Long-term Orientation, is high in societies that foster virtues oriented towards future rewards, in particular perseverance and thrift. Its opposite pole, Short-term Orientation, stands for the fostering of virtues related to the present and short-term future. Societies who score low on this dimension prefer to maintain time-honoured traditions and norms, while they view societal change with suspicion. Societies with a culture which scores high, on the other hand, take a more pragmatic approach: they encourage thrift and efforts in modern education to prepare for the future.32 On this dimension, Cyprus scores 59. The highest score (118) was recorded in China and the lowest (16) was recorded in West Africa (the world average was 46). Thus, Cyprus’ results may be described as medium to high.33

Cyprus’ results on the dimensions discussed above are summarised in the table below.

Table 1. Cyprus’ Results on Hofstede’s Dimensions in Comparison with Other Countries

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Indicator</th>
<th>Cyprus Results Compared to International Data</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Power Distance</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
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<tr>
<td>Individualism</td>
<td>Medium</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Uncertainty Avoidance</td>
<td>Very High</td>
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<tr>
<td>Masculinity</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Long term orientation</td>
<td>Medium to high</td>
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</tbody>
</table>

World Values Survey

The World Values Survey (WVS) is a global network of social scientists studying changing values. The WVS consists of nationally representative surveys conducted

31 Stavrou-Costea, Eisenberg, Charalambous (no 19).
32 Hofstede Insights (no 18).
33 Stavrou-Costea, Eisenberg, Charalambous (no 19).
in almost 100 countries which contain almost 90% of the world’s population, using a common questionnaire of more than 200 questions. Until now, 400,000 respondents have been interviewed.\(^\text{34}\) Moreover, the WVS is the only academic study covering the full range of global variations, from very poor to very rich countries, in all the world’s major cultural zones. The survey started in 1981, and seven waves of surveys have been executed to this day. The WVS has given rise to more than 400 publications in 20 languages.\(^\text{35}\)

Upon analysing the results, two dimensions dominate the picture: Traditional/Secular-Rational and Survival/Self-Expression values. According to Inglehart,\(^\text{36}\) the lead researcher of the WVS project, societies near the traditional pole emphasise the importance of religion, parent-child ties, and deference to authority, along with absolute standards and traditional family values. Those societies reject divorce, abortion, euthanasia, and suicide, and have high levels of national pride and a nationalistic outlook. Societies with secular-rational values have the opposite preferences on all these topics. The second major dimension is linked with the transition from industrial societies to post-industrial ones and the unprecedented wealth that has accumulated in advanced societies during the past generation. This has resulted in an increasing share of the population taking survival for granted and has led to a shift in child-rearing values from emphasis on hard work toward emphasis on imagination and tolerance as important values to teach a child.

Cyprus is located close to the centre of the ‘cultural map’ as seen on the WVS map below (its coordinates are a bit below zero on both axes). This means that Cyprus is somewhat closer to the traditional and survival sides of the axes. As it may also be seen from the map, the countries that are closer to Cyprus are Kyrgyzstan and Ethiopia, and, in an outer circle, Bahrein, Indonesia, Zambia, Vietnam, Thailand, and Macedonia. Other European countries that are near include Portugal, Croatia, and Greece which may be found a bit further out. If we counted the countries in the four quadrants with Cyprus at the centre, we would find 13 in the bottom left, 22 in the bottom right, 20 in the top left, and 33 in the top right. The distance of Cyprus from the top right country (which could be described as the most liberal) is approximately twice compared to its distance from the country in the bottom left (which


\(^\text{35}\) Ibid.

\(^\text{36}\) Ronald Inglehart, Modernization and Postmodernization: Cultural, Economic and Political Change in 43 Societies (Chichester, West Sussex: Princeton University Press, 1997).
could be seen as the most conservative). Thus, it may be claimed that, overall, the position of Cyprus is middle towards the more conservative end.

Another point that could be made is that Cyprus is included in the map area given the description ‘South Asia’, while Greece is in ‘Catholic Europe’. It would be more accurate, of course, if Greece was included in the ‘Orthodox’ section of the map. Another alternative would be to add another classification named ‘Mediterranean’ (or ‘Northern Mediterranean’ or ‘Southern Europe’) under which Cyprus, Croatia, Portugal, Greece, Italy, and Spain could be included ([North] Macedonia could also be included if the description was ‘Southern Europe’). This would create a thin section that stretches from Cyprus in the bottom left to Spain in the top right. It is understood that any classification and name given would not be perfect, and that the best that can be done is to achieve the best possible approximation/description.
Figure 1. Cultural map of the world - WVS wave 6 (2010-2014)

Work Related Attitudes

The above combination of values has an influence on work-related attitudes and behaviours. As Lincoln and Kalleberg pointed out, the kind of work that is sought, the priorities in making a choice, and job satisfaction are related to a number of long-standing beliefs and social conditions, and these vary considerably between societies.37 Two key influences on the way work is being viewed in the Cypriot context relate to the central role of the family and the high level of uncertainty avoidance. When priority is given to family and other relations, work is more likely not only to be rated as less important, but workers were also expected to react more positively to undemanding routine jobs that supply income without requiring a heavy motivational investment. A very common response in interviews with Cypriot employees when asked what they look for in a job was to allow them plenty of time to do what they want in their personal and family life.38 Rarely were features like an interesting job, self-fulfilment and the nature of the job itself mentioned, and these do not seem to only be abstract beliefs: one only needs to look at the relentless efforts of the vast majority of workers to obtain a job in the public sector to conclude that secure income and time-off are of primary importance in job selection.

In Culture’s Consequences Hofstede advocates the cultural relativity of motivation theories.39 American motivation theories, he argues, have an inherent element of American cultural reality both from the part of the researcher and the samples used. Even when seemingly contradictory theories are advanced (like McGregor’s X and Y theories), there are unspoken cultural assumptions behind, which include some or all the following:

1. Work is a valuable activity;
2. People’s capacities should be maximally utilised at work;

39 Hofstede (no 21)
3. There are organisational objectives that need to be achieved that exist apart from people;
4. People in organisations behave like unattached individuals.

Based on these observations, Hofstede attempts to adjust motivation theories in a way that would more readily fit characteristics of other societies.

In Cyprus, assumptions behind people’s relationship with work could be summarised as follows:

1. Work is a necessary evil, not a central life goal; to the contrary, family, friends and leisure are;
2. Organisations exist primarily to provide the rewards —mostly material goods and financial security— for workers to achieve their other personal and family objectives;
3. Job satisfaction is primarily related to how well a job provides these rewards and allows time for personal activities rather than being linked to whether workers’ capabilities are maximally utilised or how much job activities are liked;
4. If minimum work can provide the desired rewards, it is preferable.

It must be acknowledged here that statements like the ones above can be contested on at least two grounds. First, one may argue that, to an extent, these statements hold in all societies (for example, material rewards and security are sought after by employees everywhere, and minimising work hours while increasing returns is desirable by most employees). Second, like any generalisation, even though it may summarise a general tendency in a society at a particular point in time, the statements do not convey the diversity within it nor do they capture any change that may be taking place. As far as the first argument is concerned, what can be pointed out is that it is often the extent to which certain values and behaviours prevail in one society that differentiate it from others, and as the earlier discussion suggests, there are differences between societies. In Cyprus, the above observations seem to hold to a greater extent. Regarding the second point, what may be claimed is that the above observations seem to hold for most of the economic actors at the time of the research. Certainly, there are individuals and groups of people that may not share this view—one such group consists of those educated abroad for example—and there is also change taking place with regard to people’s values, for example in

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40 Epaminonda (no 37).
the values of younger employees. Even though estimating the extent of the diversity and the rate of change in people’s values are challenging research questions, and a separate research design would have to be needed to offer a comprehensive answer to such questions, these issues are addressed briefly in the following section.

Changes in Relation to the Family

One area that has seen considerable change in Cyprus is family organisation and structure. Historically, fundamental criteria for the preferences of parents on issues of marriage of their children focused on the socio-economic interests of the family. As Attalides explains41 the parents of the couple would need to certify the economic prosperity of the other family, the place of family in the social hierarchy, as well as the ‘morality’ of the girl and her family (‘morality’ in the case of women was invariably exhausted in issues relating to sexual behaviour —any sexual relationships before marriage were denounced.) A ‘good’ choice in marriage would certainly increase the economic resources and would raise the social standing of the family in the community or village. The parents would normally provide financial assistance in the form of dowry: usually, the bride’s family would supply the house and items related to its functioning, such as furniture, kitchen utensils, sheets, etc., and the groom’s side would supply land and animals. Essentially, marriage arrangements involved a give-and-take procedure by comparing the assets of both sides.

Even though it cannot be argued that the financial conditions of the families do not still play a role in marriage decisions today, quite a few things have changed. For one, a large percentage of both boys and girls continue their education beyond high school,42 and this is considered to be part of the investment of parents for both sexes. It may be said that dowry in the traditional sense is almost extinct, even though it is common for parents, from both sides, to help the newlyweds in the first stages of their married life and even later. In addition, the opinions of both men and women are considered a more important factor in the marriage decision nowadays than in the past.

The mean age at first marriage has risen steadily in the last few decades, and according to the most recent available data it was 31.1 for men and 29.0 for women

41 Attalides (no 5).
42 Epaminonda (no 37).
in 2013, a figure that is close to the EU average.\textsuperscript{43} Similarly, the total fertility rate, which gives the mean number of children per woman, decreased further to 1.3 in 2013 and has, since 1996, remained below the replacement level of 2.1. The number of births outside marriage has also increased and stands at 19.6%, while the crude divorce rate has shown a constant increase over the years, reaching 2.2 in 2013 from 1.7 in 2000 and 0.3 in 1980.\textsuperscript{44}

With regard to family related norms, Peristianis, Charalambous, Koutsoulis et al.\textsuperscript{45} concluded that whereas traditional norms have remained relatively constant in certain areas, a significant change has occurred in others. More specifically, it was noted that important differences between the expectations from the two genders regarding gender roles remain, even though these seem to have decreased in some areas. Respondents were split, for example, on whether the father should be the financier of the house (44.6% agreed and 45.4% disagreed with this statement), and the majority disagreed with the idea he should manage the family’s finances (53.6% disagreed with this statement while 25% supported it). In addition, only 24.1% of those asked supported that ‘the place of the mother is in the house and not in the objective of professional career’ (compared to 60.7% who disagreed). On the other hand, a high percentage (61.9%) wants the mother to act ‘as mediator between the father and children’, probably indicating that this traditional aspect of the role of the mother as the ‘sentimental ring of the family’ continues to be considered important and is cultivated in the Cypriot family. Also, 50% support the statement that ‘the children should obey their parents independently of whether they agree with them or not’ and consider ‘respecting the old’ an important value.

Diversity

Even though analyses like Inglehart’s provide an overview of the differences of average results between societies, they conceal diversity that might exist within them. Differences in values between members of one society are common, and identifying the groups that hold significantly different opinions can help in understanding both value formation and change but also conflicts between groups holding contrasting values. In addition, such analysis could reveal that within societies

\textsuperscript{44} Ibid.
\textsuperscript{45} Peristianis, Charalambous, Koutsoulis et al. (no 6).
diverse groups may follow distinctively different paths in terms of value orientations. In Cyprus, one main difference that seems to exist is between workers who have had considerable educational and work experience abroad (in particular, the UK and the US) and those who have not. This difference is expected to be linked to the difference in life experience and the fact that the individuals that lived abroad were accountable to others who held significantly different values. As Epaminondas Epaminonda noted, there are important differences between Cypriot workers who lived their life in Cyprus on the one hand and those who studied in Britain and the US for more than three years. The shift in the values of workers who studied abroad were towards less authoritative concepts of authority.

**Conclusions**

This paper aimed to present a sociocultural profile of Cyprus and discuss change and diversity in the country. It has been suggested that, historically, Cyprus has been a conservative society regarding gender roles and family-centric roles, which led to antagonistic relationships between unrelated individuals and a particularistic value system in which actions are not judged by a universal standard that applies equally to all. This led to a low-trust mentality environment in which personal relations were important for business transactions.

In theoretically defined Hofstede dimensions, Cyprus’ score was average on individualism, medium to high on power distance, masculinity, and long-term orientation, and very high on uncertainty avoidance. In the WVS, the results for Cyprus were close to the middle of the axes on survival vs. self-expression values and traditional vs. secular values, but closer to the more conservative sides of the axes. These characteristics impact upon work-related attitudes which include placing priority to material rewards and security of employment.

Relating to change and diversity in the Cypriot society, it has been suggested that important changes in family structure and values have been observed. Moreover, it has been noted that a particular characteristic of the Cypriot society is the high number of individuals that studied in the last few decades in Anglophone societies, more specifically in the UK and the US. This seems to have led to changes in the values of these individuals, who, upon returning to Cyprus, exhibit a different

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value system. This dynamic nature of society is likely to influence the direction in which social values will develop in the coming years.

References


Peristianis N., N. Charalambous, M. Koutsoulis, et al. The State of the Cypriot Family in Cyprus, Report based on research commissioned by the Committee for the Family in Cyprus and conducted by the Intercollege Research Centre (2004).


The Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-Phobia’: Negative Perceptions of the Jewish Settlement Attempts in Cyprus During the Early British Rule (1883-1906)

Magdalini Antreou,¹ Nikolaos Stelgias¹

Abstract
In 1883-1906, Jewish immigrants made three attempts and developed one scheme to settle in Cyprus. Had these plans succeeded, a new Jewish minority group could have been established. However, the attempts failed due to several exogenous factors. What is rarely mentioned as a factor contributing to the said failure was the hostility towards the arriving Jews by most of the local population and the government. This article intents to examine the breakdown of the settlement attempts within the socio-political framework of Cyprus, using national and international literature as well as the local newspaper and government archives. Our aim is to argue that the Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-phobia’ and the hostility of local authorities’ condemned the Jewish vision of a home in Cyprus to collapse.

Keywords: Jewish settlements attempts, Greek Cypriot nationalism, British economic policy, Union

Introduction: A Minority Group in the Making During the First Decades of the British Administration of Cyprus

We are respectfully undersigned Jews of Romania who arrived here by last Austrian Steamer and purchased a Chiftlik with the necessary lands and houses near the village of Kouklia in the Paphos District, we have already taken the necessary title deeds. Our object in purchasing this property is the establishment there of 20 families amongst which some are artisans of different European professions and others are cultivators and which are coming here with the required agricultural tools and animals and the necessary money. We, therefore, beg Your Excellency to give them the necessary permission for landing at Limassol and every possible facility.²

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² SA1/4432/85 ‘Letter by Jews to Commissioner of Limassol, 26 October 1885’ (Nicosia: Cyprus National Archive, 1885)
The above excerpt is part of a letter sent by Jewish immigrants who arrived in Cyprus from Europe during the first years of British rule. The immigrants arrived on the island as part of the three attempts and one scheme to establish Jewish settlements that took place from 1883 through 1906. During this period, as anti-Semitism was on the rise all over Europe, Jews were facing significant pressures searched for a safe destination. At that time, the Zionist movement established the objective ‘to direct a people without land to a land without people’, whilst, in 1895, Theodore Herzl put forth his vision to create a Jewish State.

Seeing that Ottoman Palestine was then unavailable, other destinations such as Cyprus, that had been under British rule since 1878, were seen favourably. As Van Millinger put it in a letter to the island’s government, ‘all eyes are turned toward this experiment and if it succeeds many immigrants will come to Cyprus but if it fails Cyprus will be further discredited’. Therefore, had the settlement plans succeeded, a new Jewish minority group could have been established in Cyprus. However, Jewish endeavours to settle in Cyprus were gradually brought to an impasse. Several exogenous factors, such as the proximity to the expanding Jewish colonies in Palestine, the financial shortcomings of each plan, and the rejection of Cyprus as a destination by the third Zionist Conference let to their abandonment. But what is rarely mentioned as a factor contributing to the said failure was the hostility towards the arriving Jews by most of the local population and the government. This article intents to examine, the breakdown of these attempts within the sociopolitical framework of Cyprus. Our aim is to argue that the Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-phobia’ and the local authorities’ hostility condemned the Jewish vision of a home in Cyprus to collapse.

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6 SA1/1524/96 ‘Mr Van Millinger to Mr Ashmore 4 August 1896’ (Nicosia: CNA 1896).

In the case of Cyprus, as in the case of Europe, ‘Jewish phobia’ build on four ‘anti-Jewish narratives’\(^8\): race, religion, economy, and politics-nationalism.\(^9\) Within this framework, we will examine how the British economic policy of ‘minimum cost maximum gain’ affected the prospects of the Jewish settlements. In addition, we will analyse how the Greek Cypriot fears of Jewish domination in the field of economy led them to reject the attempts. Moreover, we will review the role of nationalism in the reactions of the Greek Cypriots towards the Jewish immigrants. We will also discuss how Greek Cypriots strongly objected the possibility of establishing a ‘foreign’ Jewish minority group that could delay or obstruct their national aim. Furthermore, we will investigate the racial and religious basis of the Greek Cypriots’ objections towards the Jews who wanted to settle in Cyprus.

Drawing on national and international literature as well as the local newspaper and government archives kept at the Press and Information Office and the National Archives of Cyprus, we aim to consider the reasons why a Jewish minority group was not established in Cyprus. In the first part of this article, we will discuss the socio-political context of the island during the late 19th-early 20th century and review the three attempts and one scheme for the Jewish settlements. In the second part, we aim to examine the question of why the Jewish settlements did not take root by focusing on the hostility of the British government and the Greek Cypriot community.

**The First Jewish Settlement Attempts in Cyprus**

**The Socio-Political Context**

In July 1878, a few years before the first Jewish settlers had set foot on the island, the British arrived in Cyprus. In the backstage of the international discussions in Berlin regarding the Anatolian Question,\(^10\) the British stroke a beneficial deal with the Ottoman Empire which allowed them to rule over the island, even though


\(^9\) According to Brunstein, the roots of anti-Semitism in Europe are categorised into scientific racism, and religious, economic, and political anti-Semitism. Ibid 49, 95, 177, 265.

Cyprus remained an Ottoman territory. 11 Thus, under the policy of ‘effective occupation’, 12 the British acquired a-place-of-arms 13 in the Mediterranean and promised to assist the Ottoman Empire. The British also agreed to pay an annual tribute of 92,800 pounds to the Sultan, respect the religious freedom of the island’s Muslim inhabitants, and finally return Cyprus to the Ottoman Empire if and when Russia returned Batum Kars and Ardahan. 14 Soon after, the occupation of Egypt made Cyprus the white elephant of the British Empire and framed both the British policy and the island’s future. 15

After the arrival of the British, two elements shaped the island’s political scene and fed the Greek Cypriot community’s anti-government feelings. First, the community’s national aspirations, namely the prospect of union with Greece, and second, the British economic policy of minimum cost–maximum gain. Moreover, the distinctions between ‘us’ and the ‘other’ based on race 16 and religion 17 were also crucial in the shaping of the national aspirations and the anti-government feelings. The dominant nationalist narrative of the time was based on the exclusion of any element which was considered ‘foreign’ to the Greek-Orthodox identity that most of the population embraced. 18 These elements functioned as communicating

12 Jeremy Black, A Military History of Britain: From 1775 to the Present (Greenwood Publishing Group, 2006) 98.
18 According to Papageorgiou, ‘From the very beginning the British had to face a solid community imbued with national conscience. The Christians in Cyprus, trying to acquire legitimacy in the present,
vessels and were the essential components articulating the demand for union. For instance, when the Greek Cypriots asked for the reduction, abolition, or payment of the tribute by Britain, they aimed to reduce the island’s economic burden and disengage Cyprus from the Ottoman Empire, thus bringing the union with Greece one step closer.

Since the early days of British rule, the issue of the union had been discussed at length both in Cyprus and Britain. The Greek Cypriots repeatedly declared their desire to continue to be governed by Britain and, simultaneously, their desire to be united with Greece when the circumstances allowed it. Throughout this period, the urban elites and the community’s leading political figures actively pursued and instrumentalised the demand for union as a means to consolidate their power over the rural masses.

The second element that shaped the community’s anti-government stance was the British financial policy implemented on the island. This policy paved the way for radical changes in the fabric of social class and influenced the island’s socio-political life. According to the British ‘minimum cost–maximum gains’ policy, Cyprus was meant to cover both its administrative costs and the tribute to the Sublime Porte without any assistance from Britain. Thus, the economic policy applied was orientated more toward the production of tax revenue and less toward any welfare provision. For instance, the government’s efficiency in collecting taxes led to the further rise of usury, resulting in the political and economic dependence of


20 For the Greek Cypriots, the idea of the union identified with freedom. For instance, see Sotiria Moustaka, ‘The Labor Movement in Cyprus during the British Rule of 1878-1955’ (‘Το Εργατικό Κίνημα στην Κύπρο κατά την Περίοδο της Βρετανοκρατίας 1878-1966’) (Phd Thesis, Panteion University, 2010) 54–56 (in Greek).


the rural majority and the urban minority. In addition, the implementation of free-market principles and the unprecedented agricultural crisis of 1887 caused a significant portion of the rural masses to move to the cities, which led to a wave of industrialisation.

Throughout this period, the pro-union rhetoric, which was both radicalised and crystalised, dominated most of the political and economic discussions that took place on the island and was perceived as a panacea for the Greek Cypriot community’s economic, social, and political problems. During the same time, the fragile collaboration between the Greek Cypriot urban elites and the British local authorities was gradually disrupted. In this tense environment, the Jewish efforts to settle in Cyprus became a part of the island’s politics and were an additional thorn in the relations between the locals and the government. The anti-Jewish feelings voiced by the local population in 1883-1906 were likewise related to the demand for union and were expressed in accordance with religion, race, national identity, and the economy.

Three Attempts and One Scheme

During the first period of the British rule, three major attempts and one political scheme were planned for a Jewish settlement in Cyprus. Jewish immigrants began arriving in Cyprus shortly after its transition to British rule. According to

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25 For instance, see ‘The Cypriot People Must Have One Goal, the Union with Its Motherland’ (Ο Κυπριακός Λαός Πρέπει να Έχει Ένα Στόχο, την Ένωσις με την Μητέρα Πατρίδα) Neon Kition (Nicosia: 25 May 1881) (in Greek). As Georgallides mentions, ‘Although the seeds for unionism were present before the beginning of the British rule, the movement took some years to develop fully. Soon after their 1901 electoral success the new Greek leaders embarked on that systematic enumeration of in arguments in favour of union with Greece which in due course became one of the chief features of Cypriot politics’. George S. Georgallides, A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926, With a Survey of the Foundations of the British Rule (Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, 1979) 81-83.
Ben Artzi, the island, that was seen as a ‘reasonable alternative’ to Eretz Israel, became an object of Jewish settlement. The first attempt was organized by the Syrian Colonization Fund in 1883 at Orides, and it was promoted by ‘19th century Protestant English Millenarian circles’. In May and September 1883, 35 families of Russian Jews settled at Orides. By April 1884, the settlers, who, according to their representative, Mr Ziffirin, had even sold their clothes to obtain food, asked the government for financial aid. The government’s response was to urge them to work in road making at Kouklia, and stated that ‘If these people refuse to work for wages, it can scarily be hoped that Government will assist’. By June 1884, the Commissioner of Paphos reported that most Jews had left Cyprus for Odessa, putting an end to the first Jewish venture.

The second attempt took place in 1885 at Kouklia, Paphos and was organised by Romanian Jews and Mr Friedland. According to Mathopoulou, in late 1885, a group of Romanian Jews joined the five families from the first settlement at Orides that chose to stay on the island and established the Kouklia settlement under the leadership of Michal Friedland. Little is known about what happened with the second attempt at Kouklia. But it seems that a number of those settlers remained in Cyprus.

The third attempt in 1895 at Margo was organised by the Ahavat Zion, founded in 1892 by Russian and Polish Jewish immigrants living in London. It later expanded at Chomlekzi and Kouklia in Famagusta with the financial support of the Jewish Colonization Association (JCA), created in 1891 to assist in the Jewish emigration. The Ahavat Zion bought land from the Greek landowner Georgios Papadopoulos at 3,725 pounds, payable in annual instalments. At the beginning, the two rep-

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28 Ben-Artzi (no 6) 361.
29 Mathopoulou (no 25) 88–89.
30 SA1/1297/84 ‘Jewish Colonists at Paphos, 22 April 1884’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1884).
31 SA1/1313/84 ‘Telegram from Commissioner of Paphos, 24 April 1884’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1884).
32 SA1/1877/84 ‘Commissioner of Paphos to Chief Secretary, 2 June 1884’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1884).
33 Mathopoulou (no 25) 92. Also, for further information about Friedland see Ibid.
34 SA1/4432/85 (no1); Mathopoulou (no. 25) 92–93.
35 According to the island’s census, the number of Jews increased from 68 in 1881 to 127 in 1891. Cyprus Blue Books 1881 and 1891.
36 SA1/224/99 ‘Registrar General, Mr Smith, to Chief Secretary, 19 January 1899’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1899).
resentatives sent to the Margo Chiftlik by the Ahavat Zion mailed disappointing reports back to London, but, according to the letter received by the island’s government in August 1896, the problem in developing the Margo settlement appeared to lie more with the representatives’ families than with the land itself. Soon after, as the efforts reached a halt, the heads of the Ahavat Zion secured the financial support of the JCA. The Association sent Walter Cohen to Cyprus to examine the Margo Chiftlik, and the High Commissioner instructed all the Commissioners to ‘facilitate [him] in his inquiries’. Walter Cohen found the Chiftlik satisfying, and he informed the High Commissioner that ‘15 families are to come out in September, and the rest of the Society by instalments’. In August 1898, thirteen more families, the majority of which were British subjects, came to the neighbouring village of Peroi.

Finally, the scheme for the Jewish immigration to Cyprus occurred between the years 1899-1906. It was organised by Mr Davies Trietsch, a German expert in migration who envisioned the establishment of Greater Palestine, individual organisations in Romania, and the Jewish Oriental Colonisation Society. In November 1899, Trietsch put forth his proposal to the High Commissioner of Cyprus, and his petition was sent to London for consideration. Soon after, many Romanian Jews began to arrive under his instructions. Promoting the idea of Cyprus ‘colonisation’, Trietsch attempted to purchase lands in the Eastern Messaoria in 1903. He and

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37 SA1/1524/96 (no 5)
38 SA1/224/99 ‘Margo Chiftlik to Chief Secretary, 27 March 1899’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1899). The JCA was a philanthropic association created in 1891 by Baron Maurice de Hirsch with the purpose of assisting the emigration of Jews. For the JCA settlements in Cyprus see, Yair Steltenreich and Yossi Katz, ‘Between the Galilee and its Neighbouring Isle: Jules Rosenheck and the JCA Settlements in Cyprus, 1897-1928’ (2009) 45(1) Middle Eastern Studies 87-109, 91-97.
39 ‘Mr. W. Cohen [was the] son of the late Lionel Cohen M.P., deputy of the Jewish Colonisation Society’. SA1/229/97 ‘Letter of introduction from Mr Walter Cohen who has been debuted by the Jewish Colonisation Society to proceed to Cyprus’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1897).
40 SA1/2997/97 ‘Chief Secretary, Arthur Young to Commissioners’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1897).
41 SA1/229/98 ‘W. Cohen to Acting Chief Secretary 24 January 1898’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1898).
43 Davies or Davis Trietsch was a German expert in migration who envisioned the establishment of Greater Palestine, an area which included Cyprus as a solution to the Jewish immigration issue. For further information on Trietsch’s plans see Oskar Rabinowitch, A Jewish Cyprus Project: David Trietsch’s Colonisation Scheme (Herzl Press,1962).
44 SA1/1232/00 ‘Proposed Landing of Jews in Cyprus, 27 April 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900); For the establishment of the Jewish Oriental Colonisation Society and its endeavours in Cyprus see SA1/1988/03, ‘Letter by Davies Trietsch to High Commissioner, 3 July 1903’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1903).
45 Richter (no 25) 140.
46 SA1/1232/00 (no 43).
his associates also asked for British citizenship to be granted to the potential Jewish settlers, but the request was turned down by the Cypriot authorities.\(^{47}\) However, the scheme soon proved to be a failure, and many Jewish immigrants found themselves stranded in Cyprus.\(^{48}\)

In 1906, representatives from the Jewish Oriental Colonisation Society sought again to promote colonisation through the establishment of factories on the island but were not successful.\(^{49}\) The discussions for the Uganda plan\(^{50}\) combined with the hostility of the locals and the government were meant to bring Trietsch’s plans to a halt. From March to July 1906 approximately 265 Jews came to Cyprus, and about one third of them left soon after.\(^{51}\) Therefore, the prospect of establishing a new Jewish minority group in Cyprus during the late 19th-early 20th century was abandoned.\(^{52}\)

\(^{47}\) SA1/1223/04 ‘Report by Chief Secretary, 4 May 1904’, (Nicosia: CNA, 1904).
\(^{48}\) The testimony of Netty Marcovich is evident of the difficulties these settlers had to overcome once they arrived in Cyprus. “I am a Romanian Jewess. Last February Her Trietsch told my husband that we could get work here. As soon as my husband came here he was given work at Acherito, there were about 15 Jews working there, and nearly all became sick we left because we were ill and had no milk. Then we went to Margo. Another woman with her child died at Margo. We remained two weeks but could get no work there. Sometimes we had nothing to eat there’. SA1/1936/00 ‘Jewish Immigrants left for Cyprus. Queen Advocate to advice action to be taken, 5 July 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
\(^{49}\) SA1/376/06 ‘Letter by Louis Brisih, Berlin, to His Excellency the High Commissioner of Cyprus 11 January 1906’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1906).
\(^{50}\) Ben Artzi (no 6) 378.
\(^{52}\) However, the history of Jewish presence in Cyprus did not end in 1906. During the 1930s as anti-Semitism was rising in Europe, Jewish organisations considered the settlement of Jews in Cyprus as a temporary stepping-stone to Zion. For instance, see Evangelia Mathopoulou, ‘Pioneers in Stagnant Economy: The Jews in British Cyprus, 1883-1939’ in Giorgos Kazamias and Giorgos Antoniou (eds), Historical Perspectives on Cypriot-Jewish Relations (Nicosia: University of Cyprus: 2015) 28-49. Moreover, after the end of World War II, Cyprus was designated as a ‘place for the temporary internment of Jewish refugees’ that intended to reach the Mandate Palestine. Alexis Rappas, ‘Jewish Refugees in Cyprus and British Imperial Sovereignty in Eastern Mediterranean, 1933-1949’, (2019) 47(1) The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History 138-166, 149. Also, for the local Jewish community of Cyprus after the 1950s see, Gabriel Haritos, ‘Israel’s entry to Colonial Cyprus’ (Fall 2020) 32(2) The Cyprus Review 29-49, 38-41, 44-46.
Why didn’t the Jewish Settlements Take Root? The Local Hostile Environment

The British Obstacle

One of the elements contributing to the failure of the Jewish settlements in Cyprus was the hostility of the local British authorities. The government’s policy regarding the prospect of establishing a Jewish minority group was based on two factors: the volume of the Jewish immigrants arriving in Cyprus and the internal socio-political conditions. On the one hand, the British reaction towards the arrival of a small number of immigrants, who had jobs waiting for them in the agricultural sector or security deposits for their repatriation, was positive. On the other hand, the government was negative towards the arrival of a large number of immigrants, who did not have the financial backing of respectable organisations like the JCA, and their arrival in Cyprus would have risked the island’s fragile socio-economic balances.

The archival sources indicate that, during the early stage of Jewish immigration to Cyprus, the British did not oppose the idea of the sporadic settlement of Jews provided that they had the means to support themselves. For instance, the representative of the Jewish Colonisation Association (JCA), Mr Cohen, received help to establish a school, appoint a government official as supervisor, and avoid payment of land registration fees for the Margo Chiftlik. This positive attitude changed when Davies Trietsch put forth his scheme to direct numerous destitute immigrants from Romania to Cyprus.

A predominant reason for the local government’s negative stance regarding the prospect of establishing a Jewish minority group in Cyprus was the understanding that this would add further friction in its relations with the Greek Cypriots, as well as disrupt the orderly function of the political system and, by extension, the

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53 Mathopoulou (no 25) 142–43.
54 SA1/ 229/98 ‘Inspector of Schools to Chief Secretary, 5 February 1898’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1898); SA1/3249/97 ‘Bovill to Chief Secretary, 9 November 1897’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1897); SA1/224/99 ‘W. Cohen to Chief Secretary, 21 November 1899’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1899).
55 ‘I do not think that Mr. Trietsch acts in a very straightforward way: before sending these Jews here or advising them to come here and find work he should have given security that his Society should maintain them and if necessary, pay the expenses of their deportation. No preparation appears to have been made for their proper reception and settlement and I propose to wire to the Collector that they cannot be permitted to land until security at the rate of 15 pounds per head is given’. SA1/1664/00 ‘Chief Secretary to High Commissioner, 21 July 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
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economy.\textsuperscript{56} Seeing ‘the restriction of Jewish immigration both as a political and economic defensive measure’,\textsuperscript{57} the local government reacted against the prospect of dealing with impoverished Eastern European Jews who were not ‘desirable citizens and have not yet succeeded as colonists’.\textsuperscript{58} These new immigrants could seek employment in fields other than agriculture, adding, thus, to the large number of the destitute Cypriot farmers that since the agricultural crisis of 1887 had been roaming the streets of the towns asking for a job as unskilled workers.\textsuperscript{59} Faced with the possibility of a massive Jewish settlement in Cyprus, the British officials invoked two government decisions in their effort to rebuff the waves of immigrants mainly coming from Eastern Europe. According to the Ordinance no. 1 of 1882 and the Proclamation of 27 July 1898, the local government had the power ‘to prohibit the landing of any destitute person to Cyprus’ and to also ask that provisions were made ‘for the proper support of such persons in Cyprus’, while assurances were given ‘for the payment of deportation if such person was unable to maintain itself in Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{60}

Within this framework, the government implemented stricter control of the passengers arriving in Cyprus and invoked several reasons for obstructing the landing of numerous destitute Jewish immigrants.\textsuperscript{61} For instance, as the Commissioner of Larnaca writes to the Chief Secretary in July 1900, ‘Now, Jews even in England are not very clean, but in Poland and Romania, they are filthy and I would respectfully suggest that so long as plague exists in the Eastern Mediterranean, the Government will not permit the emigration of Jews into Cyprus’.\textsuperscript{62} The government also announced that it didn’t desire, under any circumstances, to be forced to offer those settlers any form of employment. If there was work to be done in the island’s public works then ‘the Government were morally bound to obtain labour from the

\textsuperscript{56} Mathopoulou (no 25) 144.
\textsuperscript{58} SA1/376/06 ‘High Commissioner, Smith to Chief Secretary Young, February 1906’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1906).
\textsuperscript{59} SA1/1802/00 ‘Commissioner of Larnaca to Chief Secretary, 22 June 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
\textsuperscript{60} ‘Proclamation of 27 July 1898’, Cyprus Gazette (July 29, 1898).
\textsuperscript{61} ‘The terms of Proclamation of 27th July 1898 must be strictly complied with immediately on the arrival of these immigrants’ SA1/1936/00 ‘Circular from Chief Secretary to all Commissioners, 5 July 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
\textsuperscript{62} SA1/1664/00 ‘Chamberlayne to Chief Secretary, 15 June 1900’, (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
island. After all, according to the government officials, the ‘stupid Jews who had nothing arranged locally for their reception’ were to blame for their disheartening situation.

The Obstacle of the Greek-Cypriot Nationalism

The Greek Cypriot community’s negative stance towards the establishment of a Jewish minority group in Cyprus was also one of the factors leading to failure of the settlement attempts. Like the local government, most of the island’s population was against the prospect of numerous Jews settling in Cyprus. The reasons put forth by the Greek Cypriots related to the demand for union with Greece, and the safeguard of their community’s control over the economy. In this context, although the first and second plans received little attention by the local newspapers, the community’s opposition to the increased Jewish immigration had skyrocketed by 1891. Especially during the turbulent years of the Archiepiscopal question, the attempts became a part of the island’s politics. In conditions of political and economic turmoil these discussions comprised an additional thorn in the relations between the locals and the government and added to the confrontational atmosphere in the local Legislative Council.

63 SA1/800/00 ‘Chief Secretary to High Commissioner, 23 March 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
64 SA1/1664/00 ‘Telegram of Cobham to Chief Secretary, 12 July 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
65 The archival material we have collected indicate that the Greek Cypriots were hostile towards the settlement attempts from the beginning. For example, Phoni tis Kyprou wrote in 1883 ‘We are not xenophobic but we admit that the settlement (of Jews) can be anything other than beneficial’, while in 1891 it writes, ‘Justly fear grew in many of us upon hearing that some Jews expelled from Russia seek to inhabit here’. ‘The Jews’ (Οι Εβραίοι) Phoni tis Kyprou (Larnaca: 19 May 1883) (in Greek); ‘Jews and Israelites’ (Εβραίοι και Ισραηλίτες) Phoni tis Kyprou (Nicosia: 21 August 1891) (in Greek).
66 Anastasia Yiangou, ‘The Orthodox Church of Cyprus, Enosis, Politics and the British authorities during the First World War’ (April 2020) 44(1) Byzantine and Modern Greek Studies 137-153, 139-140.
67 The issue was discussed in the Legislative Council when two questions, a resolution and a draft law, submitted by the Greek Cypriot representatives concerning the Jewish ‘colonisation’. It was also discussed on the occasion of the amendment of the law obstructing destitute immigrants from landing in Cyprus. SA1/1666/00 ‘Immigration of Jews. Question of Mr Francoudis to Chief Secretary, 15 July 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900); SA1/1289/04 ‘Resolution by Mr Theodotou that Jewish immigration into Cyprus may be prevented by government, 12 April 1904’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1904); SA1/1181/04 ‘Question by Mr Sozos for the immigration of Jews to Cyprus, 29 April 1904’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1904); ‘Law to prevent immigration of Jews by Mr Theodotou, 27 April 1906’ Cyprus Gazette (Nicosia: 1906); ‘The Legislative Council-Weekly deliberations’ (Νομοθετικό Συμβούλιο-Εβδομαδιαίες Συζητήσεις) Phoni tis Kyprou (Nicosia: 22 July 1900) (in Greek).
According to a petition of the inhabitants of Larnaca, the Greek Cypriots mention that ‘We are not anti-Semites, we have always sympathised with these wandering people’.68 Nevertheless, during this period they offered many reasons for opposing the influx of Jewish immigrants. Their objections were based on the assertion that the attempts were in contradiction to the history, religion, race, national interests, and economic prosperity of their community. These reasons were connected not only to one another but also to the demand for union. As the newspaper Salpinx put it, ‘Jews and Cyprus! [They are] two things that are in no way compatible, neither historically, nor religiously, nor ethnologically, nor politically, nor geologically’.69

Following in the steps of other European nations of the late 19th–early 20th century, the Greek Cypriots adopted an anti-Jewish position and saw the settlement attempts as a great danger to their present and future.70 Their ‘Jewish-phobia’ had two dimensions: the national and the economical. The Greek Cypriots feared that the Jewish immigrants would be used by the British government to delay or even obstruct the union with Greece. According to Theodotou, a Greek Cypriot member of the Legislative Council, ‘if 50-60 thousand Jews will live here, in a few years we will see 3 or 4 members sitting in the Legislative Council, who joining with the Englishmen will have the majority of vote, which is very bad for Cyprus’.71 Moreover, as the reporter of the newspaper Ethnos mentioned to Davies Trietsch, ‘since most of the inhabitants of Cyprus are Greek they ask the union of the island with the Greek kingdom. Your settlement here will be an obstacle’.72 Adding to this, the newspaper Evagoras argues that ‘the mass colonization of Jews will make our position much more difficult, because it will strengthen the dissident elements and will provide stronger weapons to the Government to sideline the dominant Greek element of the island’.73

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68 SA1/163/00 ‘Petition of the inhabitants of Larnaca to the High Commissioner, 23 January 1900’, (Nicosia: CNA, 1900). Although Greek Cypriots claim that they are not anti-Semitic, they use such insulting language when speaking about Jews. For instance, the newspaper Aletheia mentions that Jews are ‘leaches’. ‘Not so much Jewish-phobia’ (Όχι πάλιν τόση Εβραιοφοβίαν) Aletheia (Nicosia: 24 July 1891) (in Greek).

69 ‘Jews and Cyprus’ (Εβραίοι και Κύπρος) Salpinx (Nicosia: 13 July 1891) (in Greek).

70 ‘We warmly pray you will not allow the emigration of a Jewish populace which will endanger our national restoration’ ‘SA1/163/00 ‘Petition by inhabitants of Kato Drys, Vavla, and Lefkara to the High Commissioner, 22/7 January 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).

71 SA1/1289/04 ‘Theodotou’s speech in Morphou, September 1904’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1904).

72 ‘The colonisation of Jews. Interview with Davies Trietsch’ (‘Ο Αποικισμός των Εβραίων. Συνέντευξη μετά του κ. Davies Trietsch’) Ethnos (Nicosia: 2 December 1899) (in Greek).

73 ‘The Jews in Cyprus’ (‘Οι Εβραίοι εν Κύπρω’) Evagoras (Nicosia: 17 November 1898) (in Greek).
The idea that the British authorities were hiding behind the Jewish ‘colonisation’ ventures was popular among the local population. For instance, the newspapers Phoni tis Kyprou draws a clear line between the two saying that ‘The reasons for which you [government] are so concerned about the settlement of Jews in Cyprus can only be humble. [Either] to increase the taxpayers at the expense [or] to introduce a national feeling that is in opposition to the Greek feelings and the noble aspirations of the people’.74

The Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-phobia’ also had a religious and racial dimension. These arguments were promoted based on the belief that the Greek-Orthodox Christian majority of Cyprus was destined to unite with the Greek Christian Orthodox kingdom. From this perspective, the introduction of a new identity that was foreign to the Greek Christian Orthodox majority put the union in danger. Therefore, the Greek Cypriots believed that the Jewish attempts must be obstructed because as the newspaper Evagoras claims, ‘We consider the Jews ‘the unholy executioners of Christ’. They are responsible for the ‘slaughters of thousands of Greeks and have an undying hatred against the Greeks and especially the Christians in the East’.75 Furthermore, they argue that any settlement of the Jews will soon provoke religious and race disputes.

‘The people of Cyprus are not so revengeful as to recollect the abominable homicides committed in the days of Trajan against them by those who now ask for their brotherly hospitality, but we think that, that bloody experience has sufficiently proved that we cannot live together in peace. [Also, the new settlers] are not natives and they are not connected with us by the ties of race’.76

For these reasons, the people of Larnaca, ‘strongly protests against such colonisation of Jews who are absolutely strangers to the manners and habits of the Island, enemies to religion, the traditions and the interests of the country’.77

In addition to the national aspect of the Greek Cypriot ‘Jewish-phobia’, there were also economic reasons. According to the newspaper Aletheia, ‘the danger is

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74 ‘The Jews’ (Οι Εβραίοι) Phoni tis Kyprou (Nicosia: 13 July 1900) (in Greek).
75 ‘The Jews in Cyprus’ (no 72).
76 SA1/163/00 ‘Petition of the inhabitants of Limassol to the High Commissioner, 8 January 1900’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1900).
77 SA1/1544/06 ‘Resolution passed by the people of Scala-Larnaca, 2/15 April 1906’ (Nicosia: CNA, 1906).
double, national and economical. The government has of course her reasons for being in favour of the plans and perhaps for encouraging them [because] she will add thousands of taxpayers and reduce Cyprus’ deficit.\(^{78}\) The Greek Cypriots on the other hand had a lot to lose from the settlement of numerous Jews. ‘By accepting them, whether poor or rich, we shall either be deprived even of what little bread which we earn with so much venation and several sweat, because we shall have to share it with them, or we shall be subjected to their unlimited financial control’.\(^{79}\) Moreover, as Phoni tis Kyprou mentions, ‘we know what Jewish ability means in trade, arts, and sciences, and we fear what would happen if they were allowed to emigrate to Cyprus’.\(^{80}\)

Furthermore, the Greek Cypriot’s fears that the Jewish capitalists would, given the opportunity, dominate the island’s economy were crucial in the rejection of the debtor’s relief law. The reasons put forth were that,

‘If this Bill was passed all the Cyprus capitalists would at once withdraw their capital on account of great difficulties which would be caused by the Bill and then the properties would naturally sink in price and the Jews will find a proper opportunity to lend their money at interest and after some years all the properties of the Cypriots will go into their hands, having us as servants’.\(^{81}\)

Similarly, during the debates in the Legislative Council for the establishment of an agricultural bank, Theodotou claimed that ‘We want a Bank without foreign or Jewish capitals’.\(^{82}\) Due to this harsh environment made of the Greek Cypriot’s ‘Jewish-phobia’ and the local government’s hostile attitude, the Jewish aim to settle in Cyprus was led to collapse.

**Conclusion: Understanding the Failure of the Jewish Settlement Attempts**

The island of Cyprus was part of the Jewish plans to find a new homeland for the Jews of Europe during the late 19th-early 20th century. Although initially — unlike other countries such as Palestine— Cyprus received a limited number of immigrants, the island continued to attract Jewish interest throughout the 20th

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\(^{78}\) ‘Jews in Cyprus’ (‘Οι Εβραίοι εν Κύπρῳ’) Aletheia, (Nicosia: 18 November 1899) (in Greek).

\(^{79}\) SA1/163/00 (no 67).

\(^{80}\) ‘The immigration of Jews in Cyprus’ (‘Μετανάστευσις των Εβραίων εν Κύπρῳ’) Phoni tis Kyprou (Nicosia: 17 July 1891) (in Greek).

\(^{81}\) SA1/1289/04 (no 70).

\(^{82}\) SA1/1289/04 (no 66).
century. From 1883 until 1906, the Jewish community launched three attempts and planned one scheme for settling Jewish immigrants in Cyprus. However, as we have seen, these efforts gradually reached an impasse.

The main question surrounding these endeavours is why they failed. Why didn’t the Jewish settlements take root? Why wasn’t a Jewish minority group established in Cyprus? Based on the very informative existing literature and the study of local archives we believe that the answer to these questions is multidimensional. The breakdown of Jewish plans depended on several factors that were interconnected and deeply rooted in Cyprus’ socio-economic context of the first period of British rule. Borrowing from Brustein’s theory, we argue that the factors of race, religion, economy, and nationalism-politics were central to the development of the local ‘Jewish-phobia’.

The local government and the Greek Cypriots agreed that the influx of numerous destitute Jews in Cyprus would burden the island’s economy. Furthermore, the possibility of losing the control over the economy to the new Jewish capitalists alarmed the Greek Cypriot elites. At the same time, the government and the local majority also agreed that the arrival of Jewish immigrants could further complicate their relations and disrupt the orderly function of the political economical system. The Greek Cypriots on their part invoked several additional reasons, such as racial and religious, for objecting the Jewish settlements that were connected to the demand for union. As the Greek Cypriots clearly stated, ‘We are purely Greek people, enslaved people, that always have in their minds their national restoration. We don’t want pesky foreigners who will obstruct the realisation of our national aspirations’. Therefore, according to the Greek Cypriots, the island’s Greek and Christian Orthodox character was incompatible with other ‘foreign’ identities.

In this context, the Jewish attempts to settle in Cyprus failed mainly due to their incompatibility with the British and Greek Cypriot priorities and objectives. The government’s strict economic policy was a major obstacle for the Jewish immigrants. In addition, the coincidence between the climax of the settlement plans and the radicalisation of the Greek Cypriot’s pursuit of union with Greece could not possibly allow the Jewish settlers to acquire a foothold on the island.

83 ‘The Jewish Colonisation and the Government’ (Η Εβραϊκή μετοικεσία και η Κυβέρνησις) Aletheia (Nicosia:16 June 1900) (in Greek)
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Slovak Contribution to the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

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Abstract

Historical ties as well as current activities of Slovakia on the international scene are the reason that the Cyprus problem has become an important agenda of Slovak foreign policy. Hence, the Slovak approach to the Cyprus problem solution is reflected in the role of the mediator and as command country in Sector 4 with a robust military presence and an active involvement in UNFICYP peacekeeping mission on the island. The result of the study proposes a general overview of Slovakia commitments to Cyprus, pointing out Slovak diplomatic activities in the peace talks concerning the Cyprus problem solution as well as Slovak military contribution to the UNFICYP mission. The activities of Slovakia in Cyprus facilitating the process of reunification of the island and the long-term operation of Slovak military contingent in UNFICYP are constantly recognized and highly praised, not only by many representatives but also by the island's population.

Keywords: Slovakia, Slovak diplomacy, Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic, Cyprus, Cyprus problem, UNFICYP

Introduction

Slovakia is a young State established on 1 January 1993. This was preceded by significant political changes in the bipolar division of the world and the related regional change in Central Europe. The decisive event that preceded the establishment of Slovakia was the so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ in Czechoslovakia in 1989, which initiated the fall of the communist regime in the country and caused various political changes. Czechoslovakia was thereafter divided into two independent States, namely the Czech Republic and the Slovak Republic.

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Slovakia became a member of the UN almost immediately after its establishment.\(^2\) In the following period, the Slovak political administration managed to join significant world and regional organisations, like the North Atlantic Treaty Organization (NATO) and the European Union (EU)\(^3\), which were important for security and the economic development of the country.

Membership in the aforementioned organisations, economic development, political ambitions, and historical connection to Czechoslovak traditions in international politics and diplomacy oblige Slovakia to be an active player on the international scene and not only in the immediate vicinity. Even though Slovakia is young and small country, it must be said that its activities in the environment of diplomacy and international crisis management are on the rise.

The article’s aim from a ‘macro-level’ perspective is to illustrate a general overview of the relations between Slovakia and Cyprus. It covers the historical background from the existence of Czechoslovakia (Slovakia) to the beginnings of Slovakia involvement in Cyprus, and the political cooperation of nowadays. It analyses the main issues of relations between Slovakia (Czechoslovakia) and Cyprus in history, Slovak diplomatic activities in the peace talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem as well as Slovak military contribution to the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP).

The article consists of three parts. The first part is devoted to presenting the background of the Slovak (Czechoslovak) involvement in Cyprus from the historical perspective. The second part deals with the Slovak diplomacy in the talks for the solution of the Cyprus problem. The third part presents the Slovak military contribution to the UNFICYP mission. The article’s main contribution is a demonstration of the theoretical knowledge acquired by the authors, and empirical experience from deployments within Slovak military contingent in the UNFICYP mission. The article is based on the results of theoretical research and analysis of the authors. It is also based on knowledge from domestic and foreign scientific and profession-

\(^2\) Slovakia became a member of the UN on 19 January 1993, as one of the successor States after the division of the former Czechoslovakia. Czechoslovakia was one of the founding states of the UN in 1945. The Czechoslovak diplomat Ján Papánek of Slovak origin was one of the authors of the basic documents of the UN Charter. For more, see MoFEA SR, Slovak Republic and the United Nations Organization (UN) (Slovenská republika a Organizácia spojených národov (OSN)) (2009–2018), available at www.mzv.sk/zahranična_politika/slovensko_v_osn-sr_v_osn (last accessed 18 February 2021) (in Slovak).

\(^3\) Slovakia became a member of NATO on 29 March 2004 and a member of the EU on 1 May 2004. Slovakia and Cyprus joined the EU in one group together with eight other countries: the Czech Republic, Estonia, Hungary, Latvia, Lithuania, Malta, Poland, and Slovenia.
al publications, articles, studies, and qualifications, including national materials thematically focused on international crisis management. Last but not least, the article implies the practical experience of the co-author from his deployments in the UNFICYP mission.

**Historical Background of Slovak Involvement in Cyprus**

The history of Slovakia, a small country in Central Europe, is connected to the existence of Czechoslovakia. So, during the existence of Czechoslovakia it is not possible to speak about separate Slovak (and separate Czech) but about Czechoslovak involvement in Cyprus. Czechoslovakia, created on 28 October 1918 as one of the countries formed after the breakup of the Austro-Hungarian Empire, was developed as a democratic country. Among other relations connected with the existence of an independent State, it focused on the development of industry, of which the arms industry also became a very important part. The rapid revitalisation of this part of industry played an important role in the Czechoslovak economy, since the Czechoslovak arms industry was offering some modern and reliable weapons, which were highly valued abroad.⁴ The existence of Czechoslovakia (as the so-called ‘First Republic’ in the period 1918–1938) was historically connected with the geopolitics of Central Europe, where it faced various challenges and threats coming from different European power centres. The rise of Nazi Germany caused its temporary demise in 1938–1945. At that time, the German army used some products of Czechoslovak weaponry.⁵

After the Second World War, the existence of an independent country was restored, but after the communist coup in 1948, Czechoslovakia became a satellite of the Soviet Union, which influenced this country’s foreign policy for decades. It was only natural that Czechoslovakia followed potentials and traditional resources for its post-WWII development, including the arms industry. The Eastern Bloc in which the communist States were mostly associated in the Warsaw Pact and were led by the Soviet Union and the Western Bloc where the States mostly associated with NATO were led by the USA were clashing in many parts all over the world. We can say Cyprus was the one of them.

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⁵ Ibid. 637.
Somebody would say that Cyprus was politically included in the Western bloc, but rather than the NATO membership Archbishop Makarios chose to follow a path of non-alignment instead. Nevertheless, Cypriot communities had established and maintained pleasant relations with the communist States during the Cold War. Paradoxically, the President of the Republic of Cyprus was the archbishop, the highest representative of the church on the island, while, in the communist countries, the church was severely persecuted with the aim to suppress its influence in society.

The Eastern Bloc tried to advance its interests in the oil-rich Middle East through regimes in Egypt, Iraq, and Syria using their nationalist and anti-American elements, which came to power in these countries. The first wave of Soviet penetration into the Middle East was indirectly realised by Czechoslovakia. In 1955, Egyptian President Gamal Abdul Nasser signed an agreement on the delivery of Czechoslovak weapons. With this agreement, the region turned into a battleground of the Cold War, and the Soviet Union was inside the US sphere of interest. In this context, Cyprus also became part of the arena in the Cold War competition.

Czechoslovakia played a very important role in the Soviet Union’s policy. Since the interwar period, Czechoslovakia had had a very well-developed net of diplomatic and business connections in the so-called ‘Third World’, and it was very firm and active in its use as also a member of the Warsaw Pact.

In the case of Cyprus as a part of the British colonial empire, the AKEL’s attempts to gain support from Czechoslovakia (and other socialist countries) were warily received in the beginning. However, the good relationship between the Communist party of Czechoslovakia and AKEL was open. Many members of AKEL, who gradually gained important positions in the party and administration of Cyprus, had studied in Czechoslovakia (and other socialist countries), and this fact helped

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7 For more, see: Martina Fiamová, Pavol Jakubčin, Persecution of Churches in the Communist Countries in Central and Eastern Europe (Prenasledovanie cirkví v komunistických štátoch strednej a východnej Európy) (Bratislava: Ústav pamäti národa, 2010) (in Slovak).
10 The Progressive Party of Working People (Greek: Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού / Anorthotikó Kómma Ergazómenou Laou - AKEL) is left-wing party, successor to the Communist Party of Cyprus established in 1926. Although AKEL does not mention its communist identity in the name of the party, the stated position on the political scene is clear. Thus, it was an immediate party partner for Communist party of Czechoslovakia.
them advance their political contacts. In addition, Czechoslovak communists had already acquired experience in cooperating with the Greek communists, as they had established a connection with Greek refugees who took shelter in Czechoslovakia after the Greek Civil War. This fact was very likely to have also contributed to the good relations between Cypriot and Czechoslovak communists and, thus, between the two countries in general.

Countries of the Eastern Bloc supported the original concept of the Republic of Cyprus, which involved the Zurich–London agreements and the constitution of 1960. They also preferred a non-aligned and weak Cyprus that could be exploited for gaining influence and undermining Western interests. Usually, they urged the protection of territorial integrity and national independence, supported elected leaders, condemned external interventions, and denounced attempts to expand NATO’s influence on the island. This concept was also followed in the following decades, and Czechoslovakia harmonised its activities with it.

Czechoslovakia played a significant role in the events connected with Cyprus. During the crises of 1963–1964, Czechoslovakia was a non-permanent member of the Security Council and was directly involved in the deliberations over Cyprus in the Council in February and March 1964. Of course, the attitude of Czechoslovakia was in accordance with the intentions of the Soviet Union to influence the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. The disagreement between Greek Cypriots and the Greek leadership contributed to this intention and became more apparent after the Greek military coup in 1967.

Makarios, as a president of an independent country, had no reason to support pro-Enosis policy. However, this trend was contrary to the interest of the Greek

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11 Koura (no 10) 70–129.
14 Czechoslovakia established diplomatic relations with Cyprus immediately after the declaration of its independence. In the beginning, the ambassador in Athens was also accredited for Cyprus. An embassy was established in Cyprus in 1964, but until March 1973 it was administered only by the Chargé d’affaires (Ladislav Hladký et al., Relations between Czechs and the Nations and Countries of South-eastern Europe (Vztahy Čechů s národy a zeměmi jihovýchodní Evropy) (Praha: Historický ústav, 2010) (in Czech).
16 Enosis (Greek: Ένωσις, in translation to English: union) is the movement of various Greek communities that live outside Greece for incorporation of the regions that they inhabit into the Greek state.
junta (a far-right authoritarian military regime that ruled Greece from 1967 to 1974), which supported EOKA-B (a paramilitary organisation led by right-wing extremists) and managed to control the Cypriot National Guard. This situation forced Makarios to find diplomatic and operational support in the Eastern Bloc.\(^{17}\)

Czechoslovakia played an important part in these processes because Czechoslovak weapons helped to enforce the bargaining leverage of AKEL in Cypriot political life. From the perspective of Czechoslovakia, we can see this business from two points of view. On the one hand, it was in line with the policy of the Eastern Bloc; on the other, it meant there was a significant economic profit for it. The first delivery of the contract (infantry weapons) took place on 30 November 1966.\(^{18}\)

Both sides tried to keep the contract as secret as possible, but this failed and the event triggered a chain of diplomatic activities on the part of the USA, Greece, Turkey, and the Soviet Union.\(^{19}\) The next delivery of the contract (not only infantry weapons but also armoured personnel carriers) was cancelled on the intervention of the Soviet Union at the beginning of 1967. Weapons from the first delivery were under the pressure of the UN stored in the deposit of UNFICYP troops. A similar scenario was repeated after the contract was realised in 1972.\(^{20}\)

All indications show that Makarios’ efforts to create a military counterforce to the Cypriot National Guard failed. A significant part of the agreed deliveries did not reach the island, and the delivered part had to be handed over to the UN for keeping. It is questionable whether Makarios’ supporters actually handed over all the weapons. It is possible that some of them were retained from the delivery in 1966 and in 1972. However, it seems clear that the contracts themselves and their potential, although not fully executed, significantly affected the power struggle on the island.

In 1973, AKEL received 140,000 dollars from the Soviet Union through the international fund of help for left-wing working organisations. Moreover, at the beginning of July 1974, on the request from AKEL, the Soviet Union sent to Cyprus 100 guns and 2,500 cartridges secretly to protect the party leaders from the provocations and terror by the nationalist organisation EOKA-B.\(^{21}\) AKEL also negotiated similar activities with Czechoslovakia. Less than a week before the coup (15 July

\(^{17}\) Sakkas, Zhukova (no 14) 126.
\(^{18}\) Koura (no 10) 187.
\(^{19}\) Aslim (no 9) 253.
\(^{20}\) Koura (no 10) 190-191, 218.
\(^{21}\) Sakkas, Zhukova (no 14) 126.
1974), 1,000 submachine guns were secretly delivered from Czechoslovakia to Cyprus. They were hidden in the presidential palace, and only a small part of them was distributed to Makarios’ supporters due to lack of time.\(^22\) The Czechoslovak participation in the events on the island did not remain only at the level of secret arms supplies. The coup, the Turkish military operation, and the island’s division caused many casualties, and led to many persons being missing and displaced. Many countries from all over the world helped to solve the resulting humanitarian crisis, including Czechoslovakia, whose financial contribution amounted to 1.5 Million of Czechoslovak crowns.\(^23\)

The Eastern Bloc countries, including Czechoslovakia, continued to maintain intensive diplomatic relations with the Republic of Cyprus even after the division of the island, as evidenced by political representatives’ numerous reciprocal visits. There vival of Soviet interest in the Cyprus problem was maintained at large until the collapse of the Soviet Union in 1989.\(^24\)

The so-called ‘Velvet Revolution’ started on 17 November 1989, caused the fall of communism in Czechoslovakia and, together with similar situations in neighbouring countries, ultimately led to the withdrawal of the Soviet Union from the region of Central Europe. This fact also ended the status of Czechoslovakia as a satellite State. Internal political relations in Czechoslovakia caused its division in 1993 into two independent States, fortunately in a peaceful way. The way toward an independent foreign policy for Slovakia was open.

The very beginning of Slovakia’s existence was marked by an effort to join the international arena. It marked the beginning of the processes needed to meet the conditions for the country’s integration into the EU\(^25\) and NATO. The membership in the UN, the EU, and NATO have affected the activities of Slovakia in international crisis management. Cyprus is geographically far from Central Europe, so having a relatively significant geographical distance, but, at the same time, maintaining historical ties, as well as current activities of Slovakia on the international scene, are the reasons that the Cyprus problem has become an important agenda of Slovak foreign policy within the UN.

\(^22\) Koura (no 10) 234.
\(^23\) Ibid. 270.
\(^24\) Stergiou (no 16) 100.
\(^25\) The European Union was created in 1993. Its predecessor was the European Community or the European Economic Community. Regardless of the historical context, we will use the term EU in this paper.
Slovak diplomacy in the Cyprus problem solution

The history of the involvement of Slovak diplomats in Cyprus dates to the 1980s. The first concrete act in this process was the initiative of Emil Keblúšek26 in spring 1989, who presented the idea to bring political representatives of both communities to discuss possible outcomes of the long-lasting Cyprus problem. The main idea of these meetings was to get the leaders of the political parties from both communities together. It was not intended to organise the meeting of the country’s leaders for what de facto no one confirmed or refused to recognise the so-called ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’).

The leaders of both communities’ most important political parties attended the first meeting in Prague from 11 May to 16 May 1989. The Greek-Cypriot community was represented by five leaders (Glafkos Clerides – Democratic Rally, Tassos Papadopoulos – Democratic Party, Demetris Christofias – AKEL, Vassos Lyssarides – Socialist Party, Nikos Rolandis – Liberal Party), and the Turkish-Cypriot community was represented by three leaders (Özker Özgur – Republican Turkish Party, Mustafa Akinçi – Communal Liberation Party, Ismet Kotak – Democratic People’s Party).27 Some of them at that time or later had already held important positions in both parts of the island as president, speaker of parliament or minister.

The participants of the meeting talked about alternatives to resolving the Cyprus problem and took the opportunity to discuss legal and constitutional issues of Cyprus. In general, it can be said that all party leaders presented the common view that the meeting proved to be very useful and constructive and created a better understanding between political party leaders and amongst the people the political parties represented. Finally, they all signed a joint communiqué emphasizing their unanimous view that ‘their meetings are in no way an alternative, nor should be viewed as such, to the intercommunal talks carried out at present under the auspices of the United Nations Organisation’. In the same document, they committed to continuing these meetings in the future.28 At present, it can be said that those leaders established the framework of the bi-communal dialogue, and their commit-

26 Emil Keblúšek – a Czechoslovak diplomat of Slovak origin. In some resources we can also find his name version Emil Keblusek. He was ambassador of Czechoslovakia in Nicosia from November 1988 to December 1992. He was diplomatically active in attempts to reunify the island. For more, see: Jindřich Dejmek, Diplomacy of Czechoslovakia. Part II. (Diplomacie Československa. II. svazek) (Praga: Academia, 2013) (in Czech).
28 Ibid. 9.
ment is being fulfilled under the auspices of the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Nicosia until today.

After the meeting in Prague, several meetings of the leaders of Cypriot political parties took place at irregular intervals on neutral ground in the former Ledra Palace Hotel in Nicosia located in the buffer zone administrated by the UNFICYP contingents. The intensity of the bi-communal meetings was significantly influenced by the political situation in Czechoslovakia related to the change of regime and later to its division.

Slovakia established The Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Nicosia immediately after its creation on 1 January 1993, while the Czech Republic established its embassy in Cyprus two years later. Slovakia, shortly after its establishment, took the initiative and, after consultations with the leaders of the political parties of both communities, organised the first meetings through its embassy. They practically continued the previous meetings.29

The bi-communal activities in this format were intensified in early 1997. Gustave Feissel – appointed Deputy Special Representative and Resident Representative of Secretary-General in Cyprus - was a guest of the meeting, and he informed participants about planning steps directed by the UN in the talks of the solution of the Cyprus problem. The only major political party that never participated in the bi-communal meetings was the National Unity Party. It was headed by Derviş Eroğlu, the Prime Minister of the so-called ‘TRNC’ at the time, and the President of the ‘TRNC’ later.30

During this activity, The Slovak Embassy acted as an organiser and technical supporter. Its contribution also consisted in the fact that it drafted the text of the communiqué and, after the leaders of the political parties had signed it, presented it to the media of both communities. The communiqué was the first since 1989, and leaders of the political parties committed themselves to further mutual approach and other joint events. The afore mentioned meetings, held in a positive spirit, were the only forum for direct contacts between politicians from both communities, and they created opportunities for continuing discussions and presenting points of view. It became an unwritten rule to sign the communiqué af-

30 Ibid. 18.
The leaders agreed to create the coordination committee, which would prepare and submit proposals for specific events to the planned meetings. The hopeful process was influenced by the EU’s decision to open accession negotiations with Cyprus (the Republic of Cyprus) in 1998. The leader of the Turkish Cypriot community, Rauf Denktas, had banned the participation of Turkish Cypriot parties in bi-communal meetings in response to the EU decision. In the following period, the Slovak Ambassador met with the leaders of the political parties of both communities separately and organised social events within their communities.

The meetings of leaders of the political parties were temporarily annulled and so in 1999 The Embassy of the Slovak Republic came up with the initiative to organise bi-communal meetings of organisations for the protection of human rights in Cyprus in cooperation with the International Association for the Protection of Human Rights. The aim was to implement the bi-communal program Confidence Building Measures in Cyprus under the auspices of the Council of Europe. The Slovak Embassy soon organized several meetings of activists from both communities in the village of Pyla, located in the UN Buffer zone.

Subsequently, the above mentioned participants were invited to Bratislava, where a bi-communal colloquium on human rights in Cyprus took place on 2–5 March 2000 at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic. Participants of the forum accessed the international aspects of resolving the problem in Cyprus within the framework set by the Council of Europe project. After ensuing meetings in Rome and Strasbourg, the final talks took place in Nicosia. There, all stakeholders highly appreciated the involvement of the Slovak Republic and its Embassy in Nicosia.

The EU’s decision at the Helsinki summit in December 1999 to accept Turkey as a candidate country marked a turning point in Rauf Denktas’s approach to holding bi-communal meetings of the leaders of the political parties. It helped to restart meetings in the coming years after a nearly two-year forced break.

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31 Ibid.
32 For more, see George Vassiliou, Cyprus Accession to the EU and the Solution of the Cyprus Problem (2004), available at https://www.interactioncouncil.org/sites/default/files/pvassiliou_world.pdf (last accessed 18 February 2021).
33 Rozbora (no 29) 18.
34 Ibid.
35 Ibid.
During the meetings in 2000 the leaders agreed on concrete proposals for bi-communal events. Probably the most important event of those discussed was the Festival of Mutual Understanding coordinated by the Slovak Embassy, which took place on 10 September 2000 in the garden of the Ledra Palace Hotel and which was attended by more than five thousand Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.\footnote{Peace-Cyprus, ‘Festival of Mutual Understanding’ (2000), available at http://www.peace-cyprus.org/Ledra/ (last accessed 18 February 2021).}

In the following years, the Slovak Embassy maintained the intensity of leaders’ meetings and organised bi-communal activities. Those included important events, such as the Bilateral Youth Festival in March 2001 or the bi-communal New Year’s meeting on 5 January 2002 with the participation of prominent politicians, journalists, and representatives from the cultural, scientific, educational, and diplomatic sphere.\footnote{Rozbora (no 29) 18.}

At the 20th anniversary of The Slovak Embassy Bi-communal Forum, Slovakia organised a gala meeting in Bratislava on 14–17 May 2009. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic, Miroslav Lajčák\footnote{Miroslav Lajčák is a Slovak diplomat and politician representing both the Slovak Republic and the international community. In some resources we can also find his name in the version Miroslav Lajcak. Between September 2017 and September 2018, he served as the President of the 72nd session of the UN General Assembly. He was also serving his four terms as the Minister of Foreign and European Affairs of the Slovak Republic. For more, see: GLOBSEC, Miroslav Lajčák (2008–2020), available at www.globsec.org/speakers/miroslav-lajcak/ (last accessed 18 February 2021).} invited the leaders of all important political parties of both Cypriot communities. Representatives of eight Greek Cypriot, six Turkish Cypriot political parties, and honourable guests from the UN and the EU accepted the invitation.\footnote{Financial Mirror, ‘Cypriot Parties in Slovakia to Mark 20 years of Bi-Communal Cyprus Dialogue’ (2009), available at www.financialmirror.com/2009/05/15/cypriot-parties-in-slovakia-to-mark-20-years-of-bi-communal-cyprus-dialogue/ (last accessed 18 February 2021).}

At that event, Miroslav Lajčák expressed that Slovak Ambassadors make an effort to serve as the facilitators and organisers of the Peace Dialogue and stated that, ‘In this way, Slovakia wishes to contribute to a process, which will bring a mutual satisfying outcome and will lead to a future in which all Cypriots may live in peace and harmony’.\footnote{MoFA SR (no 27) 6.} All participating leaders expressed their positive attitude towards the activities of Slovakia and especially the Slovak Embassy in Cyprus in the or-
The organisation of bi-communal dialogue, and also displayed deep appreciation for this mission.41

Meetings of the leaders of the political parties from both Cypriot communities have been established as a regular political event. The communiqués from each meeting are the messages to community leaders as well as the UN, the EU, and other international actors to intensify actions to resolve the Cyprus problem. An important factor was creating a working group composed of representatives of political parties delegated by their leaders. The task of this group is to propose and prepare concrete bi-communal social activities, such as festivals, discussions, roundtables, concerts, or visits to historical and religious monuments in the territory of both communities. It is possible to mention a tour of the buffer zone in Ledra Street to demonstrate the support for its opening, common social events hosted by both communities, a Bi-communal cultural event for the young generation in the Ledra Palace, a bi-communal painting exhibition, a visit to a bi-communal school, visits to hospitals and so on. All these activities are organised by the Embassy of the Slovak Republic in Cyprus (many of them in cooperation with the mission UNFICYP).42

Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and the Republic of Cyprus reached an even higher level in the following period. For example, good relations were developed by the opening of the Embassy of the Republic of Cyprus on 10 November 2010 in Bratislava.43 On 12 January 2016, European Commission Vice President Maroš Šefčovič officially visited Cyprus as part of his work agenda, which also contributed to the good relationship between Slovakia and Cyprus.45 Another sign of the cultivation of good relations on the island is, among other things, the opening of the Slovak Republic Honorary Consular Office for the consular region of Limas-

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41 Ibid. 14-40.
44 Maroš Šefčovič – Vice President for the Energy Union, European Commission (Brussels) is a Slovak diplomat and politician. In some resources, we can also find his name in the version Maros Sefcovic. European affairs have been at the centre of his career. In 2004, he was appointed Permanent Representative of Slovakia to the EU. Since November 2014, he has served as the Commission’s Vice President in charge of the Energy Union, one of the ten main priorities of the European Commission. For more, see: GLOBSEC, ‘Maroš Šefčovič’ (2008-2020), available at www.globsec.org/speakers/maros-sefcovic/ (last accessed 18 February 2021).
sol, Larnaca, and Paphos on 28 June 2017. Diplomatic relations between Slovakia and the so-called ‘TRNC’ in the form of institutional representations are not established; Slovakia has not proceeded to do so due to the fact it does not recognise the ‘TRNC’ as a State, although some European countries, such as Hungary, have done so.

On the 30th anniversary of The Slovak Embassy Bi-communal Forum, Slovakia organised a meeting at Ledra Palace hotel in Nicosia in June 2019 in the presence of many important guests, and a photo exhibit titled ‘30 Years of Peace Dialogue in Picture’ was on display. The Minister of Foreign Affairs of the Slovak Republic Miroslav Lajčák, who paid Cyprus a visit, said, ‘Slovakia will continue to support the bi-communal meetings between political parties on the island, as long as Cypriots find them useful’. Despite the existing impasse in reaching an agreement, the parties reaffirmed their will to enrich the dialogue and expressed their support for ongoing efforts by the UN Secretary-General for the resumption of the talks under the aegis of the UN. In the joint statement, participants said, ‘We still believe in the dialogue based on the spirit of friendship, cooperation, respect and mutual understanding to all Cypriots’.

The parties expressed their gratitude to the Slovak Republic, the Slovak Ministry of Foreign and European Affairs, and the Embassy in Nicosia for their persistence in facilitating the bi-communal dialogue for three decades already, as well as their appreciation for the patience, impartiality, and professional approach of all Slovak diplomats involved in the organisation of bi-communal meetings and activities in the context of confidence building measures.

The Covid-19 anti-pandemic measures in 2020 and 2021 influenced organisation and preparation of the meetings, hence the organiser and participants negotiated online, similarly to many others. The Slovak Embassy Bi-communal

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46 MoFEA SR, ‘Cyprus’ (online), available at www.mzv.sk/web/en/consular_info/slovak_honorary_consulates_abroad/-/asset_publisher/Uazsbsq51b8l/content/konzularny-urad-v-limassol/10182 (last accessed 18 February 2021)
49 Ibid.
The Forum is the only communication channel of this kind between the leaders and representatives of the political parties from both communities. It offers a unique opportunity for the participants to express their opinions on specific issues, as well as learn the reactions and positions of the other parties first-hand. The Bi-communal Forum under the auspices of the Embassy of Slovakia in Nicosia is important for the relationship of both Cypriot communities and for the position of Slovakia in foreign policy on a global scale. A group of members of the European Parliament (High-Level contact group for relations with the Turkish-Cypriot community) joins the meeting of the leaders and representatives of the political parties twice a year.\textsuperscript{51} The recent attendance of the members of ‘The Elders’ (Archbishop Desmond Tutu, ex-president Jimmy Carter, and ex-minister of foreign affairs Lakhtar Brahimi) at the meeting of the leaders of the political parties demonstrates their support to the ongoing peace negotiations.\textsuperscript{52} This activity is also respected, for example, by the UN and the meeting of leaders and representatives of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot political parties, while their joint communiqués are mentioned in the UN documents.\textsuperscript{53}

At each meeting, the parties delegate two or three members. The hosting party (appointed through a rotation system) suggests the topic, the Slovak Ambassador opens the discussion and delegates present their party’s position on the determined topic. The Ledra Palace Hotel in the UN buffer zone in Nicosia has become a traditional place for regular (almost) monthly meetings. After each meeting, a Joint Communiqué is issued. The bi-communal dialogue meetings regularly attract considerable media attention.\textsuperscript{54}

The ambition of the leaders and representatives of the political parties in these meetings is not to solve the Cyprus problem. They rather focus on maintaining the dialogue, on keeping and strengthening contacts and good relations between the two communities, on providing the right example as the leaders of the communities


\textsuperscript{54} MoFA SR (no 27) 44-86.
for the rest of the society, and thus on supporting the efforts of the highest leaders to negotiate and find a lasting, viable, and just solution for the situation in the divided country.

Positive attitudes of UN representatives, the interest of EU representatives, and especially the gratitude and positive reception of all these activities by the Cypriot leaders and communities prove the legitimacy and usefulness of the effort of Slovak Ambassadors. Slovakia wishes to contribute to help Cypriots live in peace and harmony and the Slovak Embassy can still serve as the facilitator and organiser of the dialogue to contribute to mutual satisfaction.

The afore mentioned mission of the Slovak Embassy in Nicosia was successful mainly because the Slovak Republic, as an intermediary and organising country, is not burdened with direct or strategic interests in Cyprus and acts as a neutral player in this dispute. Slovak diplomats play the role of impartial moderatos without interfering in the discussion, avoiding comments that could be perceived as an inclination toward one of the parties; in any case, they do not suggest possible solutions. The only ambition of Slovak diplomacy is to contribute to the rapprochement of both communities, maintain good relations between them, and facilitate their mutual dialogue and clarification of positions.

Slovak diplomacy is governed, in particular, by the applicable international treaties, resolutions of the UN General Assembly and the UN Security Council, as well as the UN Charter. This mission aimed to assist in the rapprochement process of both Cypriot communities in one of the longest unresolved problems in the world. As we can see, this concept is generally beneficial, and there is a high probability that it will continue to be so in the future, as long as the participants of the bi-communal meetings themselves want it.

Slovak Military Contribution to the Cyprus Problem Solution

The contribution of the Slovak Republic to the solution of the Cyprus problem is, in addition to the efforts of Slovak diplomacy, undeniably visible in the deployment of a military contingent in the UNFICYP mission, which is one of the UN-led peacekeeping operations in the context of international crisis management operations.\footnote{Radoslav Ivančík, Vojtech Jurčák, Peace Operations of International Crisis Management (Mierové operácie medzinárodného krízového manažmentu). (Ostrowiec Świetokrzyski: Wyżsa Szkoła Biznesu i Przedsiębiorczości w Ostrowcu Św., 2013) (in Slovak).}
Several historical events and transformations determined the actual deployment of the Slovak military contribution. First, it was the collapse of the Eastern Bloc as a result of the Cold War that generated a new security environment.\textsuperscript{56} In this security environment, liberated Central European States launched efforts to integrate into Euro-Atlantic structures. This process required, among other activities, active involvement in multinational peace operations.\textsuperscript{57} On the other hand, UNFICYP itself has undergone internal changes. These were forced by a series of failed negotiations between the UN and the governments of the countries contributing militarily to UNFICYP, which related to the financing of military contributions. The result was a partial, in some cases even complete withdrawal of contingents and the subsequent forced reorganisation and relocation changes in the organisational structure of the operation itself. At the end of the 1980s and in the first half of the 1990s, the Swedish, later Canadian and Danish contingents were withdrawn, and the number of British and Austrian military contributions deployed was reduced. As a result of the events in question there was a reduction in the overall number of UNFICYP staff, restructuring of the sectors and, finally, the required reform of the operation’s financing system.\textsuperscript{58}

The historical continuity, the operating environment, and the changed financing system of UNFICYP foreshadowed the ability of the Slovak Republic to actively engage in the operation militarily. In March 2001, the Slovak Republic accepted an offer for military participation in UNFICYP. Consent to deploy a 280–member military unit was expressed by the Slovak Government Resolution no. 353 of 19 April 2001 and subsequently by the resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic no. 1372 of 10 May 2001. Based on these resolutions, the first unit of the Army of the Slovak Republic was sent to UNFICYP in May and June 2001.\textsuperscript{59}

A mandate set out operational tasks to the Slovak contingent to prevent a recurrence of fighting, contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order, and help return to normal conditions.\textsuperscript{60} Those tasks were performed in the eastern

\textsuperscript{57} Péter Kacziha, Zoltan Egeresi, (no 47).
\textsuperscript{58} UN, ‘UNFICYP’, available at https://unficyp.unmissions.org/ (last accessed 29 Jun 2021).
\textsuperscript{60} UN (no 58).
part of the island, in Sector 4, thus replacing the Austrian and Slovenian contingents in this sector. The special position of the Slovak Republic in UNFICYP was highlighted by the takeover of Sector 4 on 18 June 2001 at 6 p.m. The official act of handover of the command of Sector 4 took place at the headquarters of Sector 4 in Famagusta in the presence of Force Commander UNFICYP (Major General Victory Rana) and other distinguished guests. Lieutenant-Colonel Milan Kováč, as the first Slovak commander, took over the command of Sector 4, thereby Slovak Republic became the so-called ‘Lead Nation’.61 Camp General Štefánik, located in the strategically and sensitively important city of Famagusta, not only serves as the headquarters of Sector 4 but also represents one of the most important UN bases stationed in the north of the island. The Slovak contingent deployment caused the transfer of responsibility for command and control in Sector 4 and also multiple changes in the composition, organisation and dislocation of the forces in Sector 4 over the years. Except for Slovak soldiers, other military contingents perform operational tasks, especially the large Hungarian contingent, but also the Croatian, Ukrainian, and Serbian contingents in 2018 in Sector 4.

At the end of 2017, a key milestone in the Slovak Republic’s involvement in UNFICYP was the strategic evaluation of the operation and a subsequent study of military capabilities performed by the UN and the Permanent Mission in New York. The aim was to make recommendations for reconfiguring and optimising the structures of UNFICYP within the existing mandate. The evaluation concluded with a proposal for changes to improve the synchronisation of the implementation of the newly adopted concept of Operation ‘Concept 802’ in line with the existing mandate and the strategic direction and operational development of the operation. An important part of the recommendation of the UN Evaluation Commission was to offer Sector 4 under the sole responsibility of the Slovak Republic and thus create a single-nation sector, which was meant to have a positive effect on command and control in this sector. This recommendation accelerated extraordinary political and diplomatic activity at several levels of Slovak diplomacy. The Slovak Republic, as the leading country in Sector 4, expressed a keen interest and ambition to accept the UN recommendation, thus clearly proclaiming its efforts to continue to be active in this operating environment and to continue to participate in resolving the

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The Cyprus problem in this way. The actual fulfilment of the recommendation of the UN Evaluation Commission and the final assumption of responsibility for the entire Sector 4 took place on 1 September 2018.\footnote{Ján Marek, UN Peace Operations (Mierové operácie OSN) (Liptovský Mikuláš: Armed Forces Academy of general M. R. Štefánik, 2019) (in Slovak).}

The Slovak Republic took over 99 positions in Sector 4 from the military contingents of the partner countries of Hungary, Serbia, and Ukraine, and the number of deployed members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic increased to 242.\footnote{Ibid. 61.}

The Slovak Republic thus became the third-largest contributor to UNFICYP after Argentina and the United Kingdom. The Slovak representation in UNFICYP exceeds the area of responsibility of Sector 4. Members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic operate not only in Sector 4 but also in the command structures of UNFICYP, in the engineer platoon, and in the military police unit.\footnote{MoD SR,'UNFICYP mission, Cyprus'('Misia UNFICYP, Cyprus'), available at/https://www.mosr.sk/misia-unficyp-cyprus/ (last accessed 29 Jun 2021) (in Slovak).}

The Slovak Republic is also represented in The United Nations Police (UNPOL),\footnote{UN (no 58).} where two members of the Police Force of the Slovak Republic are permanently employed.

**Conclusion**

The history of direct Slovak involvement in Cyprus dates to the 1980s when its first concrete act was the diplomatic initiative of the Czech-Slovak Ambassador of Slovak origin, Emil Keblúšek. The intensity of the effort of Slovak diplomats in the early 1990s was significantly negatively affected by the domestic political situation, which culminated in the separation of the Czechoslovak Socialist Republic. However, shortly after its establishment, the independent Slovak Republic, through its embassy in Nicosia, took the initiative and, in consultation with the leaders of the political parties of both communities, organised the first meetings, following on from those of previous years. Meetings of political party leaders from both Cypriot communities managed to get into the position of a regular, almost monthly political event. The communiqué adopted from each meeting has called on the leaders of both communities, as well as the UN, the EU, and other actors in the international community, to step up their efforts to address the Cyprus issue. The activity of the Slovak Embassy in Nicosia can be assessed as successful mainly because the Slovak Republic, as an intermediary and organising country, is not burdened by direct
or strategic interests in Cyprus. In the Cyprus problem, it acts as a neutral party, particularly governed by the applicable international treaties, and the resolutions of the General Assembly and the UN Security Council, as well as the UN Charter.\footnote{Rozbora (no 29) 17-20.}

The exemplary approach of the Slovak Republic to the solution of the Cyprus problem is reflected not only in the role of Czechoslovakia and later in the independent Slovakia to fulfil the role of the mediator but also as a command country in Sector 4 with a robust military presence and active involvement in UNFICYP. Even though the Slovak Republic never reached the accepted limit of 280 troops in operation by the resolution of the National Council of the Slovak Republic on the deployment of a Slovak contingent to UNFICYP, the Slovak military contribution never fell below 150 troops. For the Slovak Republic, UNFICYP in Cyprus is the operation with the largest deployed military contingent. At the same time, it is an international crisis management operation where members of the Armed Forces of the Slovak Republic have been active for the longest time (as of 18 June 2021, it has been 20 years).

The activities of Slovak diplomacy in Cyprus facilitating the process of reunification of the island and the long-term operation of the military contingent of the Slovak Armed Forces in UNFICYP are always acknowledged and highly praised not only by top government officials but also by the island’s population and by the UN Secretary-General and representatives of many other international organisations.\footnote{Rozbora (no 29) 20.}

One of the most recent examples is the statement of the Minister of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus, Charalambos Petrides. When the signature of the Memorandum of Understanding between the Ministry of Defence of the Slovak Republic and the Ministry of Defence of the Republic of Cyprus on Cooperation in the Field of Defence on 29 July 2021 took place, he said, ‘I had the opportunity to express our deep appreciation for Slovakia’s invaluable contribution to UNFICYP. An important contribution to peace and stability that is nowadays more important than ever’.\footnote{MoD SR, ‘By signing Memorandum of Understanding, Slovak MOD and Cypriot MOD Acknowledge their Common Interest in Intensifying Defence Engagement’ (2021), available at https://www.mosr.sk/49833-en/podpisom-memoranda-o-porozumeni-potvrzili-rezorty-obrany-slovenskej-republiky-a-cyperskej-republiky-spolocny-zaujem-o-intenzivnejšiu-spoluprvcu/(last accessed 1 September 2021).}

Moreover, Slovakia has signed only a few such Memorandums of Understanding
so far, which points to the significance the Slovak Republic attaches to the bilateral relations with the Republic of Cyprus.\(^{69}\)

The involvement of the Slovak Republic in the process of maintaining stability in this region represents an important dimension of operation in a multinational environment. It can be understood as a process that is influenced by the ambitions of the Slovak Republic to be a competent, credible, and reliable actor who participates in the activities of the international community,\(^{70}\) and who, in particular, wishes to contribute to solving problems and maintaining peace on a European and global scale.

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\(^{69}\) Ibid.


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POLICY PAPER

A Proposal for a Normal State: The Cyprus Problem after the Five Party Informal Conference

Andreas Theophanous

Introduction

The objective of this Policy Paper is to assess the new state of affairs after the informal five-party conference under the auspices of the Secretary General (SG) of the UN on April 27-29, 2021 and to submit a brief comprehensive proposal for the Cyprus problem. Despite not issuing a joint press release, the SG of the UN Antonio Guterres announced at the time a new five-party conference in the following three months. He also noted both the Turkish Cypriot position for a two state solution and the Greek Cypriot position for a bizonal bicommunal federation with political equality, as described in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council of the UN.

The current position of the Greek Cypriot side had been the flagship of the Turkish Cypriot side for years. It was an array of Turkish maximalist claims which eventually prevented such an outcome. With its current position in favour of a two state solution, the Turkish side aims at eventually moving toward a confederal solution. With such a settlement, Cyprus as a whole will become a puppet state of Turkey. This will be the likely outcome of any attempt by the SG of the UN ‘to square the circle’.

It is important for the Greek Cypriot side to explore a new approach, as the policy pursued for so many years has failed. The Republic of Cyprus should submit guidelines for a sui generis federal model which will give due attention both to the communities as well as to the rights of individual citizens. It must be stressed that any settlement will be the outcome of amending the Constitution of 1960 rather than enacting a new one. The amendment can be shaped with institutional arrangements promoting cooperation on governance, including the Presidency, security considerations, the Supreme Court, the territorial, and the property issues. Above all, it is essential to ensure that the Republic of Cyprus should function as a normal state after the settlement, as the

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1 Prof. Andreas Theophanous, Professor, Head of the Department of Politics and Governance, School of Law, University of Nicosia, President, Cyprus Center for European and International Affairs.
SG of the UN himself has acknowledged. Furthermore, President Anastasiades in his capacity as Head of State (and not the Greek Cypriot community leader) has the legitimacy to request from the two (out of the three) Guarantor Powers, namely the United Kingdom and Greece, as well as from the EU to contribute decisively to the reestablishment of the territorial integrity of the Republic of Cyprus. The proposed approach necessitates an evolutionary process including Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

In this respect, I reiterate and/or update comprehensive ideas which I submitted in the past as well.

The further enrichment of these ideas through their utilisation and adoption by the political forces may constitute a legitimate and substantial step to overcome the current deadlock. While the pursued policy was questioned from various political forces, there had never been a submission of an alternative comprehensive approach up until now. Such an approach is imperative as there is not much difference between a decentralised bizonal bicommmunal federation with two constituent states and a confederal solution.

This Policy Paper was finalised a few weeks after the illegal visit of the President of Turkey, Recep Tayyip Erdoğan, to the occupied part of Cyprus on 19-20 July 2021. In addition to the celebrations for the anniversary of the Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974, Erdoğan and Tatar made statements in relation to the gradual opening of Famagusta. Before this visit, Turkish plans to construct a new military base for unmanned combat aerial vehicles (drones) in the occupied part of Cyprus were announced.

Taking into consideration these very bleak prospects, the Republic of Cyprus ought to formulate a clear and specific policy for the day after; both at the level of defending it and of managing the conflict.
A Brief Historical Review

The Results of the Endless Cycles of Bicommunal Negotiations

While the Greek Cypriot side is facing a different political landscape in view of the next five-party conference (whenever this is held), it is essential to briefly assess the numerous cycles of bicommunal negotiations. In conjunction with the assessment of the Turkish positions, the escalating aggression of Ankara, as well as the continuing tolerance of the SG of the UN this will contribute to a better approach to the problem than the one previously advocated.

Before the Turkish invasion of 1974, the basis of the negotiations between the two communities, which had started in 1968, was a unitary state. Such a fair prospect was averted by the systematic, destabilising actions of particular internal and external players against President Makarios and his government.

The Turkish side raised the issue of a federal settlement on several occasions even before 1974. This position was rejected by President Makarios and the international community (including the Soviet Union which had supported the idea of a federation for some time) as there was no geographical basis for such a solution. After the invasion, the ethnic cleansing and the occupation of the island’s northern part, the Turkish side put forward the position that ‘any solution should take into consideration the new realities’. The Greek side gradually accepted the principle of a bicomunal federation on a geographical basis. But the ‘painful compromise’ was not enough for the Turkish side to have an agreement for a bearable federal solution.

Upon evaluating the negotiations since the invasion to the present day, it is obvious that their framework has shifted drastically towards the positions of the Turkish side. This has been the outcome of several factors including the imbalance of power, the inadequate assessment of issues by the Greek Cypriot leadership and Athens, the neutral stance of the UN, and the tolerance exhibited by the US, the EU, Britain, as well as other powers towards Turkey.

The policy pursued all these years has not achieved its objectives. It is noted that in his last speech on 20 July 1977, President Makarios underlined that despite the painful and substantive concessions of the Greek Cypriot side there was no reciprocity from the Turkish side. It was a simultaneous expression of disappointment. In addition, he declared the necessity of a long struggle for the reestablishment of the territorial integrity and the freedom of the Republic of Cyprus. He also clarified that this was not a choice but a necessity imposed by the Turkish intransigence.
instead. The position that the policy of the long struggle has failed is not valid, given that this option was never adopted or utilised; it is the policy of continuous concessions that has failed.

After the informal five-membered conference on 27-29 April 2021, Recep Tayip Erdoğan and other Turkish officials indicated that the future negotiations should be held on the basis of two states. It is known that, over time, the Turkish side has made substantial gains by gradually altering procedural issues. The Greek Cypriot side cannot make such a concession because the repercussions will not be reversible.

**The Positions of the UN and the EU**

*The Role of the UN*

Over time, Cyprus has held great expectations from the UN. And while the stance of the UN was positive for the Republic of Cyprus before 1974, there have been drastic changes after the invasion and the new state of affairs. Despite the primacy of the occupation over other dimensions of the Cyprus problem, the Security Council adopted a neutral position and supported the bicomunal negotiations for seeking a solution. This procedure has been sustained irrespective of the fact that the Turkish Cypriot leadership is not in a position to take any major decision(s) without the approval of Ankara.

While there are justified disappointments from the stance of the UN after 1974, it is important to understand that the functioning of this Organisation is influenced by the political realities and the balance of power. In addition, in the various conflicts where the UN acts as an intermediary it does not usually take a position on the substance of the conflict. Consequently, any illusions about the role of the UN should be put aside. Indicatively, it is also noted that the ex-Director General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs of Israel and Professor Emeritus of the Hebrew University of Jerusalem Shlomo Avineri stated in 2004, in relation to the Annan Plan, that it reflects a position which amounts to ‘the UN’s and the EU’s favourite occupation’.*

During the informal five-party conference on 27-29 April 2021, the Turkish Cypriot leader Ersin Tatar, with the support of Ankara, submitted a proposal for a two state solution. This proposal is outside the mandate of the Security Council of

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the UN. The reaction of the Greek Cypriot side to this was rather modest; perhaps this was the outcome of fear for the submission of the mandate by the SG of the UN for the continuation of the efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. Such an act would constitute a blackmail of the Greek Cypriot side, which, given the realities on the ground, is militarily disadvantaged. We should also be reminded that the systematic concessions made by the Greek Cypriot side after 1974 were to a great extent the outcome of the military imbalance on the island and in the Eastern Mediterranean.

In any case, it is clarified that the SG can only make suggestions. The change or the end of the mandate to the SG takes place only with a decision of the Security Council of the UN. Until such a decision is made or any other course is adopted by the Security Council, the SG is bound to follow the resolutions which describe his mandate.

It is also noted that the tolerance of the SG of the UN toward the actions of Turkey in the occupied part of Cyprus tends to undermine the credibility of the Organization itself. Even the terminology used is unfortunate to say the least. While according to the Constitution of 1960 the two communities are in equal standing, the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’), are not equal. It is essential to convey the message that in Cyprus there is a legitimate state member of the UN and of the EU and an occupation entity which has been created and recognized by Turkey. Consequently, there cannot be negotiations on the basis of two states.

The EU

When the Republic of Cyprus applied to become a member of the European Union (EU) in 1990, there were high expectations. Among others, there was a widespread conviction that the value system of the Union and its institutional framework in conjunction with the European ambitions of Turkey could contribute to a just resolution of the Cyprus problem. However, these convictions were not fulfilled.

The moral high ground of the Republic of Cyprus was eroded with the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004, while the occupying force, Turkey, claimed that it had done its own fair share toward the solution of the problem. The reality, though, was different. While the Annan Plan satisfied most of the Turkish demands, most Greek Cypriots felt that its implementation would have dissolved the legitimate state, and that their position would have deteriorated. In addition, the EU did not exhibit the
appropriate solidarity toward the Republic of Cyprus, while, at the same time, its tolerance for Turkey remains almost unlimited. This is because the various dimensions of the Euro-Turkish relations, as well as the entangled political and economic interests weigh much more than the principle of solidarity and other values of the EU.

The reaction of the EU in view of Turkey’s systematic violations of the Cypriot Exclusive Zone (EEZ), the continuing colonialisation and the hybrid warfare against the Republic of Cyprus was very limited. This persists even following the new fait accompli in the fenced city of Varosha and the involvement of Erdoğan in the elections for the new leader of the occupation regime in October 2020. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that the efforts of the Cypriot government for sanctions against Turkey have not had any results so far.

In the informal five-party conference on 27-29 April, the presence of the EU was downgraded due to Turkey’s insistence. And while, in the discussions for the future of Cyprus, two out of the three major guarantor powers which are not members of the EU, namely Britain and Turkey, were present, the Union, of which the Republic of Cyprus is a member, was in essence a mere spectator. Consequently, it seems that a dismal precedent has been created for the Greek Cypriot side. President Anastasiades should have been more demanding on this issue. But, above all, the EU itself should not have accepted its downgrading.

The Turkish Narrative and the Appropriate Greet Cypriot Response

The moral high ground, in conjunction with military strength and economic power (in the broader sense of the term) constitute three of the major factors of power in international relations and the international environment. The Republic of Cyprus had a comparative advantage in the domain of the moral high ground. This advantage, however, was eroded in certain dimensions in favour of the Turkish side following the Annan Plan. This was a result, among other factors, of the absence of a comprehensive and common narrative from the Greek Cypriot side. The objective should be the full reestablishment of the moral high ground of the Republic of Cyprus as an indispensable, even though not adequate, condition for vindication.
The Turkish and the Turkish Cypriot Narrative

The moral high ground was one of the major pillars on which the Republic of Cyprus relied upon after the invasion of 1974 and the ensued occupation. A main element of the position put forward was that Turkey had committed crimes in Cyprus, and that the occupation should end so as to reestablish the human rights and the basic freedoms of all citizens.

Turkey, in addition to its military superiority, had systematically attempted to change perceptions by promoting its own narrative. It is important to assess the Turkish narrative, which is the following: ‘During the period 1963-1964, the Turkish Cypriots were expelled from the Republic of Cyprus and as a result the legitimate state ceased to exist. Since then, the Republic of Cyprus has been defunct, as it is unilaterally governed by the Greek Cypriot Administration.

In 1974, after the coup of the Greek Junta which overthrew President Makarios, Turkey intervened in accordance with the relevant article 4,2 of the Constitution in order to reestablish the constitutional order, protect the Turkish Cypriot community, and prevent the annexation of Cyprus by Greece. The peaceful Turkish intervention in Cyprus, also contributed in the reestablishment of democracy in Greece. Since then, there has been peace on the island.

Turkey tried repeatedly to contribute to a solution of the Cyprus problem, but this did not prove possible due to the intransigence of the Greek Cypriots. The year 2004 was a turning point as Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots said yes to a balanced plan of the SG of the UN, Kofi Annan, and the Greek Cypriots rejected it because they did not and do not want to share power, wealth, and the benefits of participation in the EU with the Turkish Cypriots. There were additional opportunities for the resolution of the Cyprus problem; the initiative which ended in failure at Crans Montana at the beginning of July 2017 due to the stance of the Greek Cypriot side was the most important one. Despite this, the Turkish Cypriots are in isolation, and Turkey is unjustifiably being accused and faces problems and obstacles in relation to its accession process’.

The Turkish narrative is misleading and inaccurate. The truth of the matter, though, is that it influences several decision-making centres in various countries. Turkey spends millions of dollars on University Chairs, think tanks, mass media, and human capital. And so far it has achieved a major change of perceptions. Even in the occupied part of Cyprus, Turkey has invested in universities and in think tanks as well. On the contrary, the Republic of Cyprus pursues an antiquated policy
of ‘enlightenment’ which is not as productive as it could have been. And it has not yet understood the importance of such institutions. Thus, it is not surprising that, in essence, there is no Greek Cypriot narrative. Without a doubt, however, the Republic of Cyprus as a member of the EU has the potential to achieve better results.

The Appropriate Narrative of the Republic of Cyprus

The moral high ground of the Republic of Cyprus was eroded as an outcome of several factors. Simultaneously, the Turkish narrative promoted effectively its own very specific positions. Two major reasons for the inadequacy of the Greek Cypriot narrative are still, on the one hand, the absence of strategy and vision and, on the other, great confusion. In any case, one dimension of the narrative of the Republic of Cyprus could be the following: ‘During the period 1963-1964, the Turkish Cypriot leadership in cooperation with Turkey attempted to destabilise the newly founded state using various means, including violence. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot insurgents did not achieve their objectives. The state continued to function legitimately based on the Doctrine of Necessity and international law. This development was confirmed by the UN Security Council Resolution 186 on 4 March 1964.

When Turkey invaded Cyprus on 20 July 1974, utilising the window of opportunity created by the overthrow of President Makarios by the American-led Greek Junta on 15 July, it claimed that its intervention aimed at the reestablishment of the constitutional order and the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community.

On 23 July, the Junta and the putschist regime in Nicosia collapsed. G. Clerides assumed presidential duties in accordance with the Constitution (thus reestablishing the constitutional order) and suggested the return to the Constitution of 1960. Turkey rejected this proposition and continued to violate the agreed cease fire. On 14 August Turkey made a new offensive, and by 16 August it had occupied 37% of the territory of Cyprus.

It should be stressed that two days before the coup, the two constitutional experts from Greece and Turkey, M. Decleris and O. Alticasti respectively, finalised the terms of an agreement based on a unitary state with elements of local and communal autonomy on issues of low-level politics. The draft was to be presented to the two negotiators, G. Clerides and R. Denktash, on 16 July 1974, for endorsement.

Aiming to reverse the occupation, the Greek Cypriot political leadership accepted as a painful but ultimate compromise a bi-regional bicomunal federation in 1977, which was notably interpreted differently by the two sides. The Greek Cyp-
riot perspective was that there would be a strong central government and the two geographical zones would just be regions/provinces. The right to return for all refugees, as well as the three fundamental freedoms were considered inalienable. Conversely, the positions of the Turkish Cypriot side were much different as the focus was on a loose confederation.

Over time, one Greek Cypriot concession was followed by another to achieve a solution, but this objective did not materialise. When finally, the end result of these series of concessions took the form of the Annan Plan, the Greek Cypriots rejected it with a strong majority (75,8%). They did so as they considered that its implementation would not solve the Cyprus problem, but that, instead, it would worsen the status quo for them.

The Turkish policy in Cyprus is hegemonic and expansionist. This is evident in its continuous colonialism, the usurpation of Greek Cypriot properties, the non-recognition of the Republic of Cyprus and its right to exist, the attempt to legitimise the ethnic cleansing (thus, strict bizonality), its insistence on maintaining the guarantees, and the channeling of illegal immigrants from Turkey and the occupied part of Cyprus to the government-controlled area of the Republic of Cyprus. It is not an exaggeration to say that Turkey uses the Turkish Cypriot minority community like Nazi Germany did in Sudetenland just before the outbreak of the Second World War in order to conquer Czechoslovakia.

The solution of the Cyprus problem cannot depend on, and thus legitimise, the results of occupation and the expansionist policy of Ankara. On the contrary, it should seriously take into consideration the historical account and the current and future requirements for a sustainable arrangement. Such an arrangement could be based on the 1960 Constitution and its amendment, the European value system and the relevant UN resolutions. Among the major pillars of the constitutional amendments will be the disengagement from the guarantees or at least the reform of the system of guarantees, the respect of the communities and the civil liberties of individual citizens, as well as the promotion of common institutions. In addition, it is essential to have some common objectives and values.

Such a solution will secure the rights of all citizens and simultaneously turn Cyprus into a major asset for the EU and the international community in general. Among others, it will contribute to the promotion of a value system in the broader area which will include peaceful coexistence, reconciliation, democracy, and viable development.'
By utilising the proposed narrative, the Republic of Cyprus can move forward with self-confidence and have objectives which inspire its people and convince its partners.

Federal Models and Cyprus

Until recently and for many years, the negotiations framework for the solution of the Cyprus problem revolved around a bizonal bicommmunal federation. Nevertheless, despite the convergence on various issues that has been reached between the two sides, there were different interpretations on the relevant themes. It is important to assess some major issues of federal polities and at the same time explore the implications for Cyprus. To begin with, we must see how federal polities are created:

Category A: A federation is created by the union of two or more states/component entities with the objective to achieve common goals. These include security and economic prosperity. In addition, it is implied that the component/constituent parts of a federation share a minimum set of values and objectives.

Category B: One country may evolve/transform to a federal system via the reform of its political system which has been based on a unitary state. This can be done for decentralisation purposes and/or for the satisfaction of specific objectives of some ethno-communal and/or religious groups.

Category C: These are sui generis polities in which it is possible to identify elements of a unitary state and federation. It could be said that the political systems of Britain and Spain belong to this category. In both countries there is broad autonomy for some regions (i.e. Scotland in the United Kingdom, and Catalonia in Spain). In addition, in these sui generis federal systems, it is possible to have asymmetrical situations. For example, one region may have greater autonomy and specific privileges that may not exist in other parts of the country (i.e. the Aland islands in Finland which are inhabited exclusively by Swedish-speaking people).

Another dimension of the theory of federalism is the assessment of different types of such political systems. A specific category is that of integrationalist federal models with V. Horowitz being the major theoretician. The political system of the US is a classic case. These political systems, which rely on constitutional patriotism, underline the unity of the state as well as the autonomy of the component entities. These constitutions reject ethno-communualism as a pillar of politics and give special emphasis on the respect of civil liberties and of the rights of minority groups.
Another important category is that of the models of consociational democracy, with A. Lijphart being the major theoretician. These models are based on ethno-communal and/or religions pillars. Bosnia, Belgium, and Lebanon are classic examples of such models. The Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus is also based exclusively on the model of consociational democracy. Peaceful coexistence and effective governance require a very high level of cooperation and mutual respect of the parties involved. In practice, though, this constitutes a theoretical approach rather than a reality on the ground. The success of such models is extremely difficult or even impossible, especially if the component parts are only two.

In Cyprus, there was no base for the creation of a federation before 1974. The violent displacement of a great part of the population as a result of the Turkish invasion of 1974 created a new situation on the ground.

Furthermore, Turkey has been trying to promote the creation of a federal state in Cyprus in such a way so as to influence the entire country utilising the Turkish Cypriot constituent state.

At the same time, although the Turkish Cypriots have acquired the passport and the identity card of the Republic of Cyprus and enjoy benefits as European citizens, most of them do not respect/recognise the legitimate state. Furthermore, they call the Republic of Cyprus, the legitimate state, ‘Greek Cypriot Administration’ and their loyalty is to the ‘TRNC’ and Turkey. In addition, there is no common vision as to which will be the common state: the Republic of Cyprus that will evolve or a new state that will be created as a result of the mutual recognition between the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘TRNC’. Until now the UN has been trying to overcome these thorny issues by the method of constructive ambiguity.

In addition to having to deal with the great imbalance of power, the Greek Cypriot political system and society do not seem to exhibit an adequate understanding of federalism. Consequently, the political leadership found itself discussing the creation of a federal system as an outcome of the union of two constituent states and on the basis of the model of consociational democracy. As it has already been noted, it is extremely difficult to have a promising future, especially when the constituent/component parts are only two.

Given the current situation, a settlement on the basis of a bizonal bicomunal federation with the specific provisions as those discussed until recently would be prospectively non-viable. And because the argument put forward is that the disengagement from this specific philosophy of a solution would entail a high cost,
I underline that the cost of the perpetuation of this approach, and particularly its implementation, would be much higher than the disengagement. If this hypothesis is valid, then a convincing alternative policy is strategically imperative.

The prospects could be manageable if what was discussed involved the transformation of the Republic of Cyprus to a federal polity or to a sui generis federal model utilising provisions from the integrationalist paradigm. Under these circumstances it would be feasible to construct a viable federal system with an evolutionary process. This is a difficult task but obviously indispensable.

**The Current Situation and the Assessment of Various Scenarios**

Taking into consideration all relevant factors, including the escalating Turkish assertiveness, it is of vital importance to assess the various scenarios for a solution.

**Unitary State**

This option is not feasible. It is noted that the 1960 Constitution was not based on a unitary state but on a model of consociational democracy, which was in essence a form of administrative federation. In the case of Cyprus, the Constitution also relied on bicommmunalism. The record of such models of governance is not encouraging. The unitary state was the basis of the negotiations between the two communities before the invasion. Unfortunately, the sustained destabilisation efforts, the coup against President Makarios and, finally, the Turkish invasion frustrated this just prospect. When one takes into consideration all relevant factors, with the current imbalance of power, it is clear that the Turkish side would never consent to such a solution.

**Bizonal Bicommunal Federation**

Despite the endless cycles of bicommmunal negotiations, from the two high-level agreements (1977 and 1979 respectively) until today, it has not been possible to reach a resolution on the basis of a bizonal bicommmunal federation. Such a settlement has not been achieved despite the fact that the negotiating framework has drastically shifted toward the Turkish positions over time. In addition, the precise definition of the concept of bizonal bicommmunal federation continues to be unspecific. In the event of such a solution, it is doubtful whether this will be viable. Such an entity will face problems of legitimacy, functionality, and economic viability.
The fact that the 1960 settlement collapsed in about three years cannot be ignored. In sum, it is very difficult or even impossible for a such a state to be viable and functional.

**Two State Solution**

While the Turkish side has put forward the position of the division of Cyprus in two states, at the same time it continues to demand provisions with which Ankara would continue to influence issues of high-level politics throughout Cyprus. Turkey would never wish the stationing of a credible military power of a third power in the free part of Cyprus. In addition, with a two state solution, the Republic of Cyprus would not be a bicommmunal state anymore. Moreover, the Turkish Cypriot state would not become a member of the EU. The Union would not accept it as a member given that it will be controlled by Turkey and, furthermore, it would function, among others, as a back door for Turkish immigrants to the EU. Consequently, I consider a two state settlement with internationally recognised borders and EEZ a very distant scenario, despite the benefits that the Greek Cypriot side may gain in terms of territorial adjustments that would be part of such a settlement.

**Confederation**

Ideally for its own interests, Turkey prefers a confederal arrangement. And this is because the Republic of Cyprus would be replaced by two equitable states that will decide on issues of security, foreign policy, and energy together. With such a settlement, the strategic control of Turkey over Cyprus would be secured. I consider that the submission of the position for a two state solution by the Turkish side aims at reaching a confederal arrangement. Certainly, such a settlement would not be functional. Among others, it is noted that the Turkish Cypriot state will not be able to follow the rules of the Eurozone. Such a settlement would not be to the interests of the EU. Furthermore, other states would not see such an outcome favourably. In sum, the interests of various regional and other powers are not served with the growth of the influence of Turkey in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader region.
Status Quo

It is underlined that the status quo is, on the one hand, not static and, on the other, not a desirable situation. However, it is an outcome of developments from which at least one side considers that the continuation of the status quo is preferable to a specific agreement for the solution of the Cyprus problem. Since the Cyprus question is considered an intractable problem, it is important to examine other approaches which may, perhaps, contribute to the end of the deadlock. If Turkey does not change its policy which focuses on the dissolution of the Republic of Cyprus though, the continuation of the status quo is unavoidable.

Sui Generis Federal Model

Any federal solution of the Cyprus problem today is extremely difficult or even non feasible. Nevertheless, it is important to have objectives for the future. The objective for a federal polity (as described in Section VI of this Policy Paper) may be the end of the road of an evolutionary process (Section VII). In sum, it is noted that this will provide, among others, the continuity of the Republic of Cyprus, the amendment of the Constitution of 1960 and the inclusion of provisions from the integrationalist federal paradigm. Such a polity points to a normal state. The President of the Republic has the legitimacy to adopt and promote similar suggestions especially after the submission of proposals by the Turkish Cypriot side for a two state solution. It is unlikely though that the Turkish side will accept such a proposition. Nevertheless, it is essential that the Greek Cypriot side submit such proposals which will at least maintain the prospect of a solution in the future.

Annexation of the Occupied Territories by Turkey

Although distant, such a scenario cannot be excluded, especially if we take into consideration the personality and the objectives of Recep Tayyip Erdoğan in view of the 100 years of the Turkish Republic in 2023. In any case, the occupied part of Cyprus is under the tight control of Turkey. Such a political action would lack legitimacy if it were not preceded by the recognition of the Turkish Cypriot entity in the occupied part of Cyprus.
Guidelines for the Solution of the Cyprus Problem

A Proposal for a Normal State

The Republic of Cyprus as a Normal State After the Solution

During the discussions for the Annan Plan, those who were against it were asked about their proposition, given their stance. In addition to the analysis of various models that could be adopted in Cyprus, I had, since 2002, submitted the position that it was essential to have a normal state. It was therefore with satisfaction that I heard after many years, in 2017, the use of this term from the President of the Republic, Nicos Anastasiades, the Minister of Foreign Affairs of Greece at the time, Nicos Kotzias, as well as from the SG of the UN, Antonio Guterres.

In this regard, it is essential to have in mind some guidelines as follows:

(1) The evolution of the Republic of Cyprus:

The continuity of the Republic of Cyprus should be ensured within the framework of the resolution of the Cyprus problem. It is inconceivable for a member state of the UN and the EU to cease to exist by its own choice, to equate itself with the ‘TRNC’, a Turkish protectorate, and after an indirect/instant mutual recognition a new common state to be created.

Until recently, the basis of negotiations, which is codified in the relevant resolutions of the Security Council of the UN, if successful would lead to the creation of a dysfunctional political system based on ethnonationalist pillars. Such an outcome would worsen the status quo. Consequently, the starting point should be the Constitution of 1960 which will be amended. After all, when Turkey invaded in 1974 it declared that its major objective was the re-establishment of the constitutional order. We should be reminded that, today, the Republic of Cyprus functions on the basis of the Doctrine of Necessity, which was legitimised in March 1964 with the Resolution 186 of the Security Council of the UN.

(2) Guarantees, Foreign Troops, and the Cypriot Army:

The current guarantees system should be put aside or at least be revised, given that it was one of the sources of the problem. The Security Council of the UN could have a special role in the guarantees system. It is in any case paradoxical for any country member-state of the EU, to have guarantor powers, two of which are not even members of the Union. By the same token, there
must be no foreign troops in the Republic of Cyprus. While there should be withdrawal of all foreign troops for which there is no provision in any Treaty, it would be useful to have an enhanced, strengthened multinational force under the auspices of the UN for a provisional period. It is also noted that in this sui generis federal state, there should be a Cypriot Army on the numerical base of 3:1.

(3) Presidency and Governance:
After the referendum of 2004, I submitted the proposal for a common ticket for the President and Vice President who should not be from the same community. This suggestion, which emanates from an integrationalist federal philosophy, is democratic, and, in addition, encourages the creation of common objectives.

The provisions for double majorities in the decision-making process should be revisited. Double majorities and even strong ones (i.e. 66.7%) should always apply in the cases of constitutional amendments. For certain serious issues there should be provisions for enhanced (and not absolute, i.e. 40%) double majorities, while on other issues there should only be a simple majority of those voting (and irrespective of their ethnic origin).

Taking into consideration the mixed composition of various bodies, as well as the equal representation in the Upper House, we can presume there will always be effective Turkish Cypriot participation in the decision-making process.

(4) Supreme Court:
The Supreme Court should consist of four Greek Cypriot and four Turkish Cypriot judges and one judge from the other three smaller communities (Maronites, American and Latins) of Cyprus. It is noted that in the plan that had been finalised before the coup in 1974 there was a provisional agreement for six Greek Cypriot and three Turkish Cypriot judges. In the Annan Plan the relevant provision provided for three Greek Cypriot, three Turkish Cypriot, and three foreign judges.

(5) Bicommunality:
The philosophy of bicommunality should be considered as an integral but not exclusive element of the solution framework. The same number of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Senators in the Upper House secures the political equality of the two communities. Nevertheless, it is not possible to address all
issues with the perspective of bicommunality. That is why, and among others, in the issue of the Presidency a specific idea which emanates from an integrationalist federal philosophy (see point 3) is advanced.

(6) The Importance of the Economy and of a Modern State:
The content of the solution of the Cyprus problem should be enriched with the rules of smooth operation of the economy, of society and the institutions of a contemporary state. At the same time, it is essential to take into consideration the European acquis and, in general, the overall developments in the EU. Among others, the creation of a unified economy is vital. The market economy should be considered as a necessary, though not sufficient condition for the convergence of the standard of living between the two communities.

(7) Settlers:
Colonialism is by definition a war crime, while at the same time it entails political dimensions. The ultimate objective of Turkey is the gradual demographic transformation not only of the occupied territories but of Cyprus as a whole. Consequently, the issue is serious. It is within this framework that the relevant humanitarian issues which arise should be assessed. The relevant agreement between Christofias and Talat for maintaining the demographic base 4:1 and its implementation is of vital importance.

(8) The Territorial and Property Issue:
The importance of the territorial issue will be altered if instead of two constituent states there are six regions. If the Turkish Cypriot community insists on one indivisible region under its own administration, it should be accepted. Needless to repeat that, in that case, this should be a region and not a constituent state. The property issue can be addressed within the framework of the tentative agreements made so far, as well as within the market forces. It is noted that a compensation fund endowed from foreign sources as well will be supportive of the efforts of resolving this thorny issue. Nevertheless, a considerable amount is not expected to be secured. The Turkish Cypriot region, which will be around 28,7% of the territory, will have the broader possible autonomy. In the territory under the Greek Cypriot administration, it is possible to have five regions. This arrangement will not affect the composition of the Upper House which will be 50-50.

(9) Cooperation:
It is of vital importance to encourage the creation of an environment of coop-
eration between the two communities and the promotion of a framework of common objectives. Without such environment, any attempt of state-building will be futile. The above chapters may be explored and expanded even more. In addition to the evolutionary approach, the positive stance of Turkey, or at least its tolerance, is also significant.

There is no doubt that it is extremely difficult for these ideas to be accepted by Turkey. On the other hand, though, in case of implementation, the until recently negotiating framework will lead to a non-normal dysfunctional state and the deterioration of the situation. Consequently, the proposed philosophy must by all means be promoted, as it maintains the prospect of an eventual settlement. Toward this direction, hard work, multilateral cooperation, a pragmatic foreign policy, an effective state, and a comprehensive narrative are required. And while the Republic of Cyprus will continue to work for a settlement of the Cyprus problem, at the same time it must continually enhance the factors of power in order to face the Turkish expansionism.

The Evolutionary Process

The Evolutionary Approach and the CBMs

The rejection of the Turkish positions for a two state solution is not enough. It is important for the Greek Cypriot side to have specific positions as well. Furthermore, it is essential to take into consideration that it is impossible to have a federal solution and enter a new state of affairs in 24 hours. Even in the best case scenario in which there was no distrust, suspicion, and a heavy historical past, an evolutionary path and approach would still be required. It is also underlined that the narratives of the two sides are quite opposite. The fulfillment of several prerequisites is necessary for the building of a viable federal polity; these include a minimum framework of common objectives. Currently, such a framework and a common vision for the future do not exist.

Despite a very difficult situation, the submission of suggestions for the following major CBMs, as well as the parallel simultaneous discussion of the guidelines for a settlement may prove useful and create a new momentum.

(1) Co-exploitation of the energy sources between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots with the simultaneous delimitation of the Exclusive Economic Zone
of the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey. Such a development will also help the Greco-Turkish dialogue. The parallel delimitation of the EEZ between Greece, Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus could also be proposed by the Greek Cypriot side. A common recourse to the International Court of Justice at The Hague will facilitate such a development.

(2) Acknowledging the occupied territories as Region under Turkish Cypriot administration with the implementation of the acquis communautaire (i.e. suspension of Protocol 10). It is significant that the EU should undertake its responsibilities in the process of harmonisation of the occupied territories of the Republic of Cyprus with the acquis communautaire. Such an action will most likely upgrade the relations of the Turkish Cypriots with the Republic of Cyprus and especially with the EU.

(3) Return of the legitimate residents and their beneficiaries to the fenced city of Varosha under Greek Cypriot administration.

(4) Gradual return of territories under Greek Cypriot administration. With the beginning of normalisation, the occupied village of Achna should be immediately returned under Greek Cypriot administration, and the utilisation of the entire Buffer Zone should immediately commence without obstacles.

(5) The functioning of the airport of Tymbou and of the port of Famagusta under the auspices of the UN and the EU. The implementation of such measures will take place in a way that the legal status of the Republic of Cyprus will not be negatively affected.

(6) Implementation of the Ankara Protocol by Turkey. Such an action entails the implementation of the Custom Union Agreement of Turkey with all member states of the EU, including the Republic of Cyprus.

(7) Part of the normalisation of the situation would be the further encouragement of trade between the two sides; the necessary legal and health standards will be taken into consideration for this purpose.

(8) Immediate ending of the colonisation of the occupied territories and of the hybrid warfare against the Republic of Cyprus by Turkey. These issues concern not only the Greek Cypriots, but also the Turkish Cypriots and the EU.

(9) Discussion of issues of common interest such as the extension of cooperation as well as addressing the concerns of the two sides within the framework of a sui generis federal model. It is essential that the Constitution of 1960 that is based on consociational democracy is amended in a way that will include elements of an integrationalist federal model.
(10) Turkey should assume its responsibilities. We should be reminded that when Turkey invaded Cyprus on July 20, 1974 it claimed that its objective was the reestablishment of the constitutional order and the protection of the Turkish Cypriot community. Consequently, it has to contribute toward this direction by gradually normalising its relations with the Republic of Cyprus; the first steps will include the beginning of the withdrawal of the occupation troops.

(11) In the next elections for the European Parliament, the EU should offer two extra seats to Cyprus that will be taken by Turkish Cypriot residents of the Region under Turkish Cypriot administration. These two MEPs would come from the Republic of Cyprus.

(12) Any solution should be the outcome of a voluntary agreement between the two sides in Cyprus. An evolutionary approach will offer the required time for the gradual strengthening of the relations between the two communities and the forging of the concept of an integrationalist federal model. In case that this is not feasible, other ways should be sought to promote peace and security within the framework of the participation of the entire territory of Cyprus, given that this has been ensured by the accession in 2004 including Protocol 10. This cannot take place on the basis of two independent states. It is possible, though, for one region to exist under Turkish Cypriot administration, which will have the greatest degree of autonomy.

In case such measures are implemented, great benefits will accrue for all the parties involved; in addition, there will also be a drastic reduction of tension in the Eastern Mediterranean. It is understandable that for the implementation of such measures the consent of Turkey is indispensable. Even in the most likely case of rejection of these suggestions by the Turkish side, the Republic of Cyprus will have enhanced its moral high ground and will have submitted a road map for the creation of favourable conditions that will facilitate the solution of the Cyprus problem. Although this may not be possible currently, the prospect for positive developments in the future will nevertheless be maintained.

Epilogue

At the theoretical level, a question that is raised is whether the London-Zurich Constitution could have been functional. It is stressed that with such a Constitution, tolerance, mutual understanding, maturity and mutual respect are required. These characteristics did not exist then and do not exist today at the required level.
Consequently, under the current circumstances it is not possible to secure a viable and functional settlement on the basis of a bizonal bicomunal federation. I note that, taking all relevant factors into consideration, the legitimacy deficit that existed with the birth of the Republic of Cyprus will appear again on the day after a settlement if in essence this is considered as an outcome of imposition.

In addition, while federation is discussed all these years, there has not been an adequate understanding of the federal systems as well as the different approaches. It was not comprehended that there are federal polities/systems which are not based only on ethnonationalist pillars and the model of consociational democracy. The fact that there are other forms of federation and especially those that fall under the integrationalist federal philosophy was ignored. Such a system is that of the USA, where the Constitution secures the rights of citizens irrespective of ethnic origin and religious beliefs, and, does so without relying on ethnocommunal pillars. It is noted that in 1960 in the USA, John Kennedy was elected not because it was the turn of a Catholic to become President, but as an outcome of the triumph of politics. The same, and in a more intense way, took place with the election of Barack Obama, an Afroamerican politician, in 2008 and 2012, to the Presidency of the USA.

If we judge by their results, the endless cycles of bicomunal negotiations that took place since 1974 until today, have obviously failed. It may be also said that the negotiating framework from 1974 up until today moved toward the positions of the Turkish side; nevertheless, the Turkish maximalism prevented a solution. Despite the passing of time, the Greek Cypriot side should try to promote a new negotiating framework based on a federal approach in a way that would acquire legitimisation in Cyprus and simultaneously support externally. With Ersin Tatar as the leader of the occupation regime and the submission of the position for a two state solution, the opportunity is offered to the Greek side to take initiatives for a new approach.

At the current juncture, it is important that the Greek Cypriot side submits new ideas. Among others, it is possible to stress that in Cyprus there is a legitimate state and an illegal occupation entity. In addition, any federal arrangement must take into consideration four decisive factors:
(a) the Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus;
(b) the events of 1974;
(c) the accession of the Republic of Cyprus in the EU and subsequently in the Eurozone;
(d) the relevant resolutions of the Security Council of the UN.
Taking into consideration the suspicion and the absence of common objectives between the two communities, we must adopt an evolutionary path and process. The discussion must include the reassessment of the kind of a federal system within the framework of a settlement of the Cyprus problem. Understandably, though, no development can take place without the consent of Turkey.

It would be a pleasant surprise if Turkey changed its policy and accepted an honourable compromise. In this regard, the evolutionary process and the CBMs would facilitate finding a sui generis federal solution of the Cyprus problem. In such a polity, the region under Turkish Cypriot administration would have the greatest possible autonomy. At the same time, there would be effective participation in the institutions of the federal state. The gradual building of a minimum framework of common objectives would also be feasible.

However, the expected scenario is the insistence of Turkey on a settlement in which the Republic of Cyprus would be pushed aside and the new three-headed entity that will be created would, in essence, be a Turkish protectorate. Obviously, the Republic of Cyprus would not dissolve itself; under these difficult circumstances, it must continue to function with the Doctrine of Necessity. The official state has the legitimacy to take all necessary decisions for its survival including additional constitutional amendments as well as the strengthening of the National Guard.

Finally, the projection of a narrative and a targeted communication policy are indispensable. If Turkey insists on its expansionist policy, it is appropriate to project the point that Ankara denies minority rights for the millions of Kurds of Turkey, while in Cyprus it demands a two state solution. This is a great contradiction. It is not an exaggeration to also note that the Turkish policy in Cyprus reminds us of the practices of Nazi Germany in relation to the German-speaking people of Sudetenland and the capture of Czechoslovakia before the beginning of the second World War.

Combined with the militarisation and the islamisation of the occupied part of Cyprus, the Turkish demands remove the possibility of an understanding and a final settlement. In either case, the Republic of Cyprus must have a comprehensive policy. In addition to adopting a holistic approach and submitting specific proposals for the Cyprus problem, the continuous enhancement of the state entity is very significant. The maximum objective is the reestablishment of the territorial integrity and the end of the Turkish occupation. The minimum objective is the protection and security of the free part of Cyprus. Simultaneously, it is imperative that the Re-
public of Cyprus continuously enhances all the factors of power including defense. Furthermore, the enhancement and the deepening of networks of cooperation with other powers is indispensable. Lastly, Cyprus should ask Greece and Britain to coordinate their efforts as Guarantor Powers and work toward the reestablishment of its unity and territorial integrity.

Postscript

Given an overall environment of extremely low expectations for a breakthrough in the Cyprus stalemate, the SG of the UN did not proceed with a new informal five-party conference as he had stated in April 2021. Instead, he followed up with an informal meeting between President Anastasiades and the Turkish Cypriot leader Tatar on September 27, 2021. The meeting did take place but, not surprisingly, without any tangible results. The SG tried to maintain a line of communication between the two communities.

It should be noted, however, that the specific mandate of the new UN Envoy for the Cyprus problem, who has not yet been appointed, became a new matter of diplomatic dispute. It is obvious that the Turkish side would like to dissociate the Cyprus problem from the Security Council of the UN as much as possible.

It is essential to also note that since April 2021 the Turkish side escalated the rhetoric for a two state solution. Most likely, however, the Turkish objective remains a confederal settlement through which Ankara would exercise strategic control over Cyprus as a whole. Indeed, the Turkish Cypriot leader stated on September 10 that Cyprus should be returned to Turkey. Additionally, given the Turkish actions in relation to Varoshia, the Cypriot government decided to withhold the Republic of Cyprus issued passport of the Turkish Cypriot leader and of other officials of the occupation regime.

The President of Turkey Recep Tayyip Erdoğan tried to promote the narrative of a two state solution in Cyprus while addressing the UN General Assembly on September 22, 2021. It may be appropriate to raise the question whether what Erdoğan recommends as a solution of the Cyprus problem could apply to the Kurdish issue in Turkey.

While Cyprus celebrated its 61st anniversary of independence, there is no doubt that the prospects for a solution to the Cyprus problem in the near future are not

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2 On top of that, the Vice President of Turkey Fuat Oktay stated on October 16 that, given that the Ottoman Empire occupied Cyprus in 1571, Turkey has legitimate claims on Cyprus as a whole. Oktay also stated that ‘Cyprus has been ours since 1571’. It is not the first time that he has made such statements.
bright. Despite this, and in addition to improving its position in the areas of defense, demography, knowledge, and above all the economy, the Republic of Cyprus must develop a comprehensive policy towards the goal of keeping the prospect of a settlement alive. Suggestions for such a policy have been put forward in this Policy Paper.

Finally, I need to stress that irrespective of whether someone agrees or disagrees with the philosophy of the suggestions in relation to the substance of the Cyprus problem and the evolutionary process, he/she will see much merit with the suggested methodology. It is extremely important to be specific with the major guidelines for the solution of the Cyprus problem as well as with the suggestions in relation to the CBMs and the evolutionary process.
Books on Makarios per se are few and far between, especially in English, and Assos’ study is a useful, well set out and coherent account and explanation, with a wide range of primary and secondary sources. The title is, however, a bit of a misnomer: a more accurate one would be Makarios’ Ten-Year Struggle for Cyprus, which is what the book is really about. The author appears to have relied to some extent particularly on Robert Holland’s (his Ph.D. supervisor) Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959,1 Stanley Mayes’ Makarios: A Biography,2 and Stephen Xydis’ Reluctant Republic.3 That being said, let us look more closely at the book’s many strong points, and then at the few weaker ones.

First, the book helps the reader to appreciate the immense problems that Makarios faced, and also analyses well the Steppenwolfish relationship between the priest and the politician. Second, Assos is correct when he writes (p.3) that it was Makarios’ drive and determination which launched the ‘internationalisation’ of the Cyprus Question as a means of applying pressure on an intransigent Britain. The account that follows shows this par excellence. Third, Chapters One and Two provide the reader with thoughtfully presented —and necessary— background on Cyprus’ religion and politics, and on Makarios himself, before 1950. Fourth, Assos draws our attention to Makarios attacking communism, from a Christian viewpoint (p. 20), thus ridiculing by default a later American description of him as ‘the Red priest’. Fifth, he skilfully juxtaposes Makarios’ ‘purist’ rival, the Bishop of Kyrenia, Kyprianos, with the subtle and diplomatic archbishop, thus shedding light on some of the petty backbiting with which Makarios had to cope. Sixth, he explains,

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analyses, and evaluates the tensions between Makarios and the Greek governments (bringing out the weakness of the latter), particularly regarding Karamanlis. It seemed at various moments that the Cypriot tail was wagging the Greek dog. Seventh, Britain’s intransigence comes across as a major factor in Greek attitudes, just as Washington’s pressure on London to release Makarios from exile does, although Assos might have made more of Britain’s having to hand over its leadership role in the Eastern Mediterranean (and Middle East) to America, after the Suez debacle of 1956. Eighth, Assos explains well the tensions between the rumbustious Grivas and the more moderate Makarios. This connects to Makarios’ insistence that Grivas’ EOKA should not kill people but restrict its activities to sabotage and diplomacy. This did not prove to be the case, but Grivas certainly had to be careful not to overstep the mark. Ninth, Chapter Five effectively explains the semantic gyrations of the British in negotiating with Makarios, along with Grivas’ undermining of the archbishop’s diplomacy, if not expressly, then surely by default. Tenth, the pièce de résistance of the book is surely Chapter Eight, where Makarios has to bite the bullet, and succumb to ‘the least bad solution’ (in Makarios’ words), namely ‘independence’. It reads almost like a tense thriller, and, given Assos’ background to Makarios in Chapter Two, the pages almost become palpable.

So much for the positive aspects of the book. There are however a small number of inadequacies which must be mentioned.

First, Assos should also have used Foreign Relations of the United States (FRUS) in his research. This explains why he forbore to mention that the US simply wanted a solution that would not weaken NATO, and that was of course to ensure that Britain kept part of Cyprus for its military. As US worry about the Soviet Union increased, so did Washington’s pressure on ‘post-Suez Britain’. Second, on page 76, we read that the British officials had to cajole the Turkish government into taking a firm stance over Cyprus. This is indeed true, but there was rather more to it than that. To give a properly full picture, Britain helping Turkey with its propaganda needs to be demonstrated. Herewith two telling quotes:

‘First, Turkish representatives abroad, particularly in London and Washington, might be more active in their publicity about the Turkish attitude to Cypru. In the United Kingdom, their efforts might be directed (in this order) to: a) Members of Parliament, b) the weekly press (they have already been helped by the journalists’ visit last year). The same appears to be true in the United States and other countries. Turkish propaganda should however be presented with
tact. For example, the Turkish Press Attaché in London has done no good by distributing leaflets of the ‘Cyprus is Turkish’ Association.’

‘Our attitude to this question [Cyprus] is that we wish to assist the Turks as much as possible with the publicity for their case, but must at the same time be careful not to appear to be shielding behind them and to be instigating the statements.’

In the above connexion, the fateful British-instigated 1955 conference has not been dealt with fully enough. Again, a quote by the Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office serves well:

‘I have always been attracted by the idea of a 3 Power conference, simply because I believe that it would seriously embarrass the Greek Govt. And if such a conference were held, I should not produce any British plan or proposal until a Greek-Turkish deadlock has been defined.’

Similarly, although Assos makes Britain’s attitude clear, he does not mention that bringing Turkey into the equation was a breach of Article 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne, which stipulated that Turkey renounce all rights over any territory beyond its frontiers.

A final criticism: although in Chapter Eight, Assos writes that Rauf Denktaş admitted many years later that the bomb that exploded in June 1958 at the Turkish Government Information Bureau was the work of Turkish agents, he had in fact admitted it at the time, to the British Governor, Hugh Foot, who wrote:

‘All the evidence at present available regarding the bomb incident at the Turkish Press Counsellor’s house suggests that this was staged by Turks as a pretext for the subsequent arson and rioting. It is most unlikely that Greeks would deliberately precipitate trouble at this juncture by an attack on Turkish Government premises. The explosive in the bomb was of a kind which had been used in the past in bombs found in the possession of Turks but we have no record of this material being used by Greeks. The placing of the bomb suggests that

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5 Cox to Fisher (13 July 1956) letter, FO 953/1694, file G 11926/23, in ibid. 28. The FO 953 series relates to the FO’s then propaganda department, Information Research Department. Neither Assos nor his doctoral supervisor have listed this important series in their bibliographies.

6 Kirkpatrick to Nutting (26 June 1955) memorandum, PRO FO 371/17640, file RG 1081/535.
it was not intended to do any real damage. There is also the fact that no-one was inside at the time. The Press Counsellor had gone with the Turkish Con-
sul-General and Denktash to attend a Turkish Youth meeting in Larnaca and this must have been known to Turks in Nicosia.\footnote{Governor to Secretary of State, telegram 744, June 1958, FCO 141/3848.}

To add to this, the Governor then wrote:

‘The four Turkish leaders were obviously shaken by the events of the night. They did not attempt to deny to me that the bomb at the house of the Turkish Press Councillor \(\text{sic}\) had been put there by Turks (though they said that they could not admit this publicly).\footnote{Ibid., Governor to Colonial Office, repeated to Ankara and Athens, 8 July [sic] 1958, telegram no. 751. Although the Governor, Hugh Foot, knew of Turkish responsibility for the riots, he does not mention this in his memoirs, presumably because he was not allowed to release secret and top-secret information. This is a shame, since it gives a warped and incomplete picture. See also my two-part article in Ο Φιλελεύθερος of 4 and 5 May 2014.}

Although the Governor knew of Turkish responsibility for the riots, he does not mention this in his memoirs, presumably because he was not allowed to release secret and top-secret information. This is a shame, since it gave a warped and incomplete picture until the documents were released some seven or so years ago.

Assos’ thesis was awarded in 2009, and is a good account, analysis, and evaluation of ten vital years. It appears, however, that neither his supervisor nor he were aware of the documents that I have referred to above, perhaps because the latter is more au fait with Colonial Archives than Foreign Office ones, which explains the occasional documentary lacuna.

Assos’ book ends with the apposite adage: ‘Those who write history have the gift of revision, while those who make it get only one chance’. To this A. J. P. Taylor’s words can be added: “A historian must not hesitate even if his books lend aid and comfort to the Queen’s enemies [...], or even to the common enemies of mankind.”\footnote{Alan J. P. Taylor, The Origins of the Second World War (London: Penguin Books Ltd., 1964) 8-9.} His book is backed up by a host of original sources that don’t leave much space for revision, but rather shed extra light on a personality who has remained somewhat enigmatic. It is healthily devoid of IR theory with its often intellectually suffocating models and paradigms.

As Assos writes, his book is based on his doctoral dissertation. Had he had time to visit the British archives in the nine years between the award of his doctorate...
and the publication of his book, the latter would, however, have been considerably enhanced. It is nevertheless a solid book that should be read by those interested in those vital ten years, and who may still be wondering whether Makarios should have accepted Harding’s proposals.

I end this review with a quote by the British High Commissioner to Cyprus, with which Assos might agree:

‘Makarios has the intellectual abilities, which would enable him to make his mark in a country of a hundred times the population. His mind is both clear and agile. He is a good psychologist and, although he sometimes cannot keep back a trace of arrogance, he is good at managing men […] For a Greek, he is astonishingly undevious […] I do not believe that he ever told me a deliberate lie […] perhaps because he thinks such a thing beneath him.’

William Mallinson
Spiros and Petros’ book contribute significantly to informing the public on the Cypriot Financial Crises that peaked on 25 March 2013 when a €10 billion international bailout by the Eurogroup, European Commission (EU), European Central Bank (ECB) and International Monetary Fund (IMF) was announced. In return, Cyprus agreed to close the country’s second-largest bank, the Cyprus Popular Bank, imposing a one-time bank deposit levy on all uninsured deposits there, and possibly around 48% of uninsured deposits in the Bank of Cyprus (the island’s largest commercial bank). The purpose of the book is to record the events during the 2012-2013 that plagued and continue to plague the Cypriot Economy. It is known that, during this period, events which shocked the Cypriot Financial and Banking System occurred, resulting in decisions that affect the future of Cypriot Economy and Society.

Spiros and Petros’ contribution stems from a chronological recording of the historical moments that Cyprus and its financial system went through. They make a considerable effort to reveal the truth of the events, and they attempt to help the reader to understand the mistakes, actions and decisions that may have negatively affected the Cypriot Economy. The book provides a very comprehensive historical timeline of the events, as it aims to inform the citizens directly impacted by the haircut and educate the new generation to avoid any similar mistakes in the future.

Part I of the volume presents the events which led to the Cypriot banking crisis. The chapter reveals that the main causes of the catastrophe in Cyprus were the losses of the Cypriot banks due to the cutting of the Greek government bonds. The Cypriot financial institutions were highly exposed in the Greek financial system compared to a nominal GDP of €19.5b. The banks had amassed €22 billion of Greek private-sector debt with bank deposits of $120b, including $60b from
Russian business corporations. Repousis and Lois provide a comprehensive and meticulously documented overview of the various events that took place during the critical period of negotiations. Those were a traumatic outcome for the Cypriot Banks as they had to sell their branches in Greece. The sale of the branches was set as a precondition by the creditors of Cyprus for the provision of financial support. The Central Bank of Cyprus played a key role in the negotiations, mainly due to its know-how. The authors reveal that Laiki Popular Bank in just eighteen months moved from emergency liquidity supply of €490m to €9.1b. This fact came into the limelight with the statement of the President of Cyprus that problematic banks should initially address their old and new shareholders for financial injection prior to turning to the State. The book reveals that a major reason behind the collapse of the banking system in Greece was the gap between lending and deposits.

Part II presents the expansion of Cypriot Banks. Strategically, the Banks in Cyprus expanded in Greece and in the emerging economies of Eastern Europe. Prior to 1955, the Bank of Cyprus expanded in London to serve the large Cypriot community. Efforts took place to penetrate the large market of Russia with the opening of a branch in 2007. The book reveals that ‘Uniastrum’, the targeted bank, was the 9th largest banking company in Russia. Its competitive advantages were the large amount of deposits in comparison to borrowings. Furthermore, the Bank of Cyprus was involved into an investment in Banca Transylvania in Romania which had its headquarters in Cluz-Napoka. Spiros and Petros indicate that the Hellenic Bank, which is the third largest in the country, has expanded in Russia and started the operations in a self-owned property.

Part III discusses the role of Cyprus Cooperative Bank (CCB) in the Cypriot Financial Market. The bank was established in 1937 and covered a wide range of services. The financial crises affected the bank, and it has been the Hellenic Bank that acquired a part of the assets of CCB (i.e. €10.3b including loans of €4.6b, bonds of Cypriot government of €4.1b, cash of €1.6b and deposits of €9.6b) in an effort to save it from bankruptcy. Spiros and Petros nicely present all the events that took place and inform the reader on the deal. In addition, Hellenic Bank was given access to an additional 400,000 customers of CCB. The book indicates that Hellenic Bank was going for a share capital injection of €150m to serve the agreement. The CCB will continue its mission to serve the communities and small medium enterprises.

Part IV provides a thorough event study using the efficient-market hypothesis of Fama (1970). The book nicely categorises the empirical tests of efficiency into
'weak-form', 'semi-strong-form', and 'strong-form' tests. It is widely known that weak-form tests study the information contained in historical prices. Semi-strong form tests study information (beyond historical prices) publicly available. Strong-form tests regard private information. Later, the chapter explains the method of business fact analysis. This one builds on the use of econometric models which calculate the projected returns of companies’ share.

Part V is a very interesting inclusion in the book. It provides the daily stock-closing prices of Piraeus Bank, Bank of Cyprus, and Cyprus Popular Bank. The observable period of the event window is 10 days before the announcement (i.e., 15 March 2013). The authors do not examine the period following the announcement, as the trading of shares was suspended. The readers can extract very useful conclusions from the deep observation of the stock movements. The chapter proceeds with tests on cumulative abnormal returns of the observable banks.

Part VI provides a review of the preliminary report of the parliamentary committee that investigated the matter and its causes. Based on the information presented to the committee and the initial findings of the special audits carried out by the Central Bank of Cyprus on the matter, the committee concluded that serious issues arose from the investigation of possible responsibilities on the critical issue of bankruptcy of Cyprus Popular Bank of Cyprus. For 18 months, the agency based its sustainability policy on a tool that should only be used in the short term, since by its very nature Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) is given to banks only for emergency liquidity response. The authors highlight that the committee expressed strong dissatisfaction with the lack of information received by the Parliament.

On the important issue of funds outflow from deposits in the financial institutions of the Republic, it can be said that the amounts of these outflows were not examined in depth. The authors examined the returns of the banks, and they reached the conclusions that they were not statistically significant. Cyprus Popular bank that has been acquired by Piraeus Bank showed positive but non-statistically significant cumulative abnormal returns during the 10 days prior to the event. The results for the Bank of Cyprus have been similar.

In sum, this excellent book explores the extremely critical situation in which the Cypriot economy found itself in 2012-2013. This is the second biggest catastrophe in Cyprus’ modern history that the island Cyprus suffered after the tragic events of 1974. The book narrates the events with special care without assuming a stance. The judgment of the conclusions is left to the reader.
By also taking into account the education foundations of the authors and their academic credentials, it is to be expected that there are no surprises in the neutral position that the authors advocate. Spiros and Petros have produced this very interesting book that can be read for many years ahead, as it will be a very good example for the future generation of what to do and how a bank should be protected from bankruptcy. The authors reach the conclusion that further research is requested and take it upon themselves to pursue this task in the years to come.

Dimitrios Gounopoulos
Cyprus: Legal and Political Reflections: Republic of Cyprus 60 Years On

KYPROS CHRYSOPIOMIDES
Nicosia: Alfa Dimiourgiki Ltd, 2021
pp. xiii + 443

Dr Kypros Chrisostomides is a notable personality of modern Cyprus, with unique characteristics and identities: a multilingual scientist, an ethical jurist, a creative international lawyer of and for peace and human dignity, an active citizen, a politician with a noteworthy social and political contribution in society, a parliamentarian, member of the Government and representative of his country before different Institutions. With a constant interrelation of politics in his legal analyses, he has treated all aspects of the Cyprus Question and the international status of the Republic of Cyprus since its emergence in the international legal order in 1960. All of his approaches adopted a perspective which respects international Law and international justice.

Dr Chrysostomides has a substantial legal background and knowledge of International and European Law with experience in International Bodies and Institutions – such as the Council of Europe – and with a particular familiarity with international practice. He is an active jurist and a practicing lawyer in Cyprus with level-headed arguments, which are always scientifically based on the values and principles of International Law and the European legal culture. He was at the forefront of the very first cases-applications that came before international judicial organs (European Commission and European Court of Human Rights), as well as those handled in the framework of the European Convention of Human Rights in Strasbourg, and before the Court of Justice of the European Union in Luxembourg, as well.

In fact, for more than 35 years, he has written and published a considerable number of books, essays, studies, articles, and comments that form a rich basis for the bibliography on Cyprus and its intertemporal international stance as a State and an active member of the international community. His book The Republic of
Cyprus: A Study in International Law is without doubt an excellent and valuable instrument of legal analysis of Cyprus and all aspects of the Republic since its creation and after the Turkish intervention in 1974 and the later occupation of the island. It is a truly unique monograph of legal theory and practice.

It is not a coincidence but his personal choice to concentrate on the scientific and academic research of the applications of international law in Cyprus, since the island is an authentic laboratory for issues concerning the implementation of international law, and rules and principles that the Republic of Cyprus duly uses. His last contribution with Cyprus: Legal and Political Reflections: Republic of Cyprus 60 Years On, which is his most recent publication on the occasion of the 60th anniversary of the Republic of Cyprus, reflects his passion in his public/scientific journey that comes together with his rich source of action for Cyprus. This extensive collection of various papers covers all developments, particularly in the last 3 years, 2018-2020 (Part I, pp. 11-135). In this context, the author not only offers a simple description of the situation under international law, but also interesting—or even ‘audacious’—proposals, such as to bring the case of Varosha or the acts of aggression by Turkey in Cyprus’ Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) before the International Criminal Court (ICC). But also the important issue of settlers, established in occupied Cyprus, considered as an international crime.

It is interesting to note that the Part IV of the book (pp. 281 et seq.) includes interesting reflections concerning EU Cyprus relations and connections with international law. As he is a person with strong convictions and commitment, Dr Chrysofostomides persists in promoting ideas and policies in conformity with international law, values, and principles in all his approaches, even when Turkey does not act in the same way. At the same time, he does not hesitate to propose alternatives that are sometimes challenging and deemed ‘difficult’ to implement.

One could say that this book is, in reality, a corpus of legal and political reflections of the author’s own life, following the historical itinerary of the Republic of Cyprus and its contemporary stance, in the midst of various challenges. All in all, it is an interesting source of information and arguments that serve as a basis for a global reflection on Cyprus and its future as a sovereign, independent, and undivided Republic.

Stelios Perraklis
The newly published monograph by Achilles C. Emilianides sheds light to the negotiation which led to the final status and land size of the Sovereign British Areas (SBAs) within the territory of the Republic of Cyprus for the United Kingdom’s (UK) military and defence requirements. Through a vast collection and presentation of primary archival sources, the author eloquently illustrates the political timeline, main figures, and the negotiating positions of each side during the intense and robust negotiations that ensued after the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements in February 1959 until 1 July 1960 when the final agreement was reached which allowed the Republic of Cyprus to be proclaimed an independent state on 16 August 1960. The author has managed to compile and capture the essence of the tense negotiations for this issue during the transitional period. The book is divided into five complementary chapters which provide unique clarity for the sequence of events and the positions of each side during negotiations.

The five chapters cover the following topics: 1. Introduction, 2. The issue of the size of the SBA’s at the London Joint Committee, 3. The Conference in London (January 1960), 4. The Negotiations in Nicosia, and 5. The final compromise. Given the very concise length of the monograph, I will refrain from presenting each chapter separately, as the reader can effortlessly go through the book in one go and explore the main issues discussed in the book.

Noteworthily, the book helps the reader realise that the period that elapsed from the signing of the Zurich and London Agreements and the actual signing of the
establishment of the Republic of Cyprus was, indeed, quite long and protracted. Over the period of 18 months, and specifically until 16 August 1960 when Cyprus was proclaimed an independent State, a very important issue which stalled this announcement was the finalisation of the agreement on the size, scope and status of the SBAs that were to remain on the island.

I would be remiss if I did not refer to the foreword by Ambassador (ret.) Tasos Tzionis, a Cypriot diplomat with unique insights and knowledge on the issue of the SBAs and more broadly on the UK policy vis-à-vis the Republic of Cyprus. As Ambassador Tzionis points out, the book serves also as a manual for conducting negotiations. In this sense, the lessons identified and the lessons learned are still valid, in any sort of negotiation, between States, companies and the private sector. The author himself, an acclaimed law professor, practising lawyer and academic, also points out in the introduction that this publication contributes mostly to the political and diplomatic history of the period.

Having said this, what is important to grasp and realise is the fact that the – about to be– new founded State of the Republic of Cyprus had no experience whatsoever in conducting complex international diplomatic negotiations with no government machinery or bureaucracy in its disposal whatsoever. On the contrary, the UK had an abundance of diplomatic and international legal experiences to that end. Hence, it is critical to understand that the conduct of the negotiation in question required perseverance, resilience, clear tactic, and strategy. It is also noteworthy to mention some key figures who were involved in this negotiation from the parties: Mr Zenon Rossides from the Cypriot side, a lawyer who was later to become the first and longest serving Cypriot Ambassador/Permanent Representative to the United Nations, and Julian Amery MP, from the side of the UK, who was Under Secretary for Colonies at the time of the negotiations. In the past, Amery had served in the secretive Special Operations Executive (SOE) during WWII and maintained close ties with the British intelligence establishment (SIS/MI6) throughout his political life.1

From the sources that the author provides, it is clear that Makarios and Rossides had a clear desired end state of the negotiations with regards to the SBA, and there was not a concern about the possible postponement of the official establishment of the Republic. In this sense, the burden of time pressure was on the UK, which want-

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ed to finalise all aspects as quickly as possible. We should not forget that the UK was on the dawn of its ‘wind of change’ policy, as proclaimed by Harold Macmillan, for accelerating the granting of independence to a number of colonies after 1960.

The desired end state of the negotiations, from the point of view of Makarios/Rossides was: a) the minimisation of the territory of the British Bases to the minimum extent possible, b) fewer inhabited villages within the administrative boundaries of the British Bases and c) a guarantee that in the event that the UK would relinquish the territory of their Bases, the territory would be given to the Republic of Cyprus and not to any other third State. Mr Rossides’ opening position was that the SBAs should be 36 sq. miles without any inhabited villages. The UK’s initial requirements in March 1959 was for 170 sq. miles. Eventually, the agreement was reached for 99 sq. miles.

I would therefore argue that the added value of this publication is that it provides a fresh perspective to this mostly unknown chapter of the 18-month transitional period, prior to Cyprus’ independence, as the tendency is to adopt a merely legal perspective and associate the issue of the SBAs with the discussions for the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. This publication differs, as it offers a vivid political diary of the negotiating process, which also includes what other Cypriot political figures were discussing with foreign diplomats/emissaries in the background.

Very interestingly, the author illuminates what former President and at the time transitional Minister for Justice Glafkos Clerides and some others were conveying in private to the US Consul in Nicosia, either by expressing their disagreement with Zenon Rossides’ negotiating tactics, referring to them as ‘intransigent Cypriot positions’ or that Rossides was ‘a bad influence to Makarios’ or even proposing alternative ideas for circumventing official proposals submitted by Rossides at the negotiating table.

Another important dimension which merits mentioning was the unified stance between Makarios and Küçük, as expressed in certain instances of the negotiation. At important moments in the discussion, the support offered by Küçük to the arguments presented by Makarios and Rossides came as a surprise to the other parties and had a disrupting effect to the UK strategy. Throughout the book, Emilianides provides various cases in which the Cypriot representatives acted jointly, for example when they submitted a joint memorandum with regards to the issue of the administration of the SBAs. Because of this growing tendency, the UK side asked, on
numerous occasions, the Governments of Greece and Turkey to provide advice to Makarios and Küçük respectively. The unified stance of the Cypriot side constituted a critical element—especially at the culmination of the negotiations at the beginning of 1960—and was a catalyst for reaching a compromise a few months later.

The issue of the UK SBAs in Cyprus has attracted over the years, and rightly so, important academic and political attention due to its wider legal and international implications. International relations and politics are not static. What transpired during those negotiations, and the outcome with regards to the land size and scope of the British Bases in Cyprus is still pertinent today. When assessing whether the Cypriot positions—for example to include as few inhabited villages as possible in the territory of the SBAs or to limit the territory of the Bases as much as possible or to have a safeguard clause in case the UK ever decided to relinquish the SBA's territories in the future—we should remind ourselves of the history of the Republic of Cyprus over the past six decades.

Indeed no one could have predicted back in 1959-1960, when Rossides was conveying his 'intransigent' (according to some members of the Cypriot political establishment) positions, the local and global developments that would have since occurred and how that negotiation and its outcome would have diachronic relevance. Among those developments, there was the pressing need for the non-military development of the Cypriot villages and areas in the administrative boundaries of the British Bases, the safeguarding of the status of the inhabitants residing in the said areas following the UK’s exit from the European Union (Brexit), the recurring issue of the return of part of the territory of the SBAs as part of the negotiations for the Cyprus settlement, and the International Court of Justice (ICJ) case for the Chagos Archipelago brought forward by Mauritius for which the Republic of Cyprus had an active interest and engagement, just to name a few.

It is, I believe, noteworthy to stress how the UK viewed the importance of the SBAs after the issue was settled. The Foreign Office directive to the first UK High Commissioner to the Republic of Cyprus, Sir Arthur Clark, is quite telling. As the principal objective, the directive stated that the newly appointed High Commissioner was responsible for:

the maintenance of such friendly relations with the Government of the Cyprus Republic as to ensure that they do not dispute (i) the continued exercise by Her Majesty's Government of sovereignty over the two areas in the Island of Cyprus known as the Sovereign Base Areas of Akrotiri and Dkekelia; (ii) the continued
exercise by Her Majesty’s Forces of certain rights and the use of certain installations and sites within the territories of the Republic of Cyprus as prescribed under the settlement.\(^2\)

The British Bases in Cyprus have been, since 2019, home of the ‘largest Permanent Joint Operating Base and permanent deployment of British troops overseas’ and with the recent upgrade of its facilities a ‘modern, safe, 21st Century facility, capable of supporting operations for the next 20 years and beyond’.\(^3\) Hence, the ‘long game of chess’, as Sir Hugh Foot eloquently described the negotiation that took place in 1959-1960 vis-à-vis the UK SBAs, will continue to be part of the Cyprus-UK relationship and conundrum for the foreseeable future.

Consequently, Emilianides book also serves as an important reminder and compass for the need to have an inherent strategic foresight for issues of high importance and magnitude that are associated with the sovereignty, national security, and survivability of a State.

Andreas Eliades

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\(^2\) ‘Instructions to UK High Commissioner in Nicosia’, TNA, FO 371/160387.

The History of Preschool-Preprimary Education in Cyprus
[Ιστορία της Προσχολικής-Προδημοτικής Εκπαίδευσης στην Κύπρο]

MARIA MICHAELIDOU
Nicosia: Elias Epiphaniou, 2020

Dr Maria Michaelidou, an outstanding educator, who climbed up the ladder of educational leadership through her career, details the establishment and progress of Early-Childhood Education in Cyprus in her book The History of Preschool-Preprimary Education in Cyprus. To bridge the gap in the literature with regards to the development of Preschool and Preprimary Education in the Republic of Cyprus, she builds a historical narrative extending from as early as the archaic and classical times to the 21st century. Her book is an essential read for all of us educators in Cyprus, as it encourages a critical reflection on the ways contextual socio-political and historical factors may challenge and/or enhance Preschool and Preprimary Education. At the same time, the book is a must-read for policy-makers and curriculum developers in Cyprus, as it highlights the need to overcome —through highly-organised initiatives, policies, and practices — the detrimental, prevailing assumptions that are still undermining the role of Preschool and Preprimary Education in Cyprus.

When considering the book as a whole, one observes that it successfully builds a coherent and comprehensive narrative by drawing upon meticulous research and in-depth and longitudinal study. The book is organised in a way that masterfully links the historical narrative developed to portray Preschool and Preprimary Education in Cyprus with theory, evidence-based research, biographical data and memoirs, press releases, state reports, and photographic material. To this end, the book contributes to the scientific foundation of Preschool and Preprimary Education in Cyprus building on research data, historical comparisons, and modern approaches that draw upon teachers’ voices. In terms of the analysis, the author has been very descriptive of her findings stemming from both primary and secondary research,
and has done a great work on bringing an extensive core of research studies and evidence together. Her detailed study provides a platform for macro-micro integration, as it encompasses multiple levels and axes of analysis: from the State to the school, the teacher, and the parent.

The monograph is written in a scientific way that is better suited for readers who are already familiar with educational discourse, on the one hand, and the history of Cyprus, on the other. In more detail, it draws linkages between the history of Cyprus and the formation and development of Preschool and Preprimary Education. In the first six chapters, the author highlights that Early-Childhood Education is part of the evolving history of Cyprus that is grounded in our culture, and which is thus manifested not only in pertinent policies, curricula, and structures, but also in teacher education and training, as well as parental involvement. In the last chapter of her book, Dr Michaelidou highlights the legacy of outstanding pedagogical personas from Europe, Greece, and Cyprus, whose work should also be embedded in Early-Childhood Education and guide its development. Although all chapters add to the development of the historical narrative, some chapters stand out. For example, it is noteworthy that Chapter 2 analyses every single article in the press that related to infants and Preschools and was published throughout the whole period of the British rule extending from 1878 to 1960.

In addition, Chapter 6 is one more notable chapter, as it draws upon primary data from a survey conducted with early-childhood educators examining their perceptions of Preschool and Preprimary Education in Cyprus. The researcher placed a number of questions to the participant teachers, such as the following: ‘What would you concern as the highest achievement of Preprimary Education in Cyprus?’, ‘Do you have a role model in your career?’, and ‘What can be done to enhance Preschool teachers’ roles?’. The analysis of teachers’ perceptions is indeed invaluable, especially for the improvement of Early-Childhood Education in Cyprus. Nonetheless, over the past two decades, there has been a growing interest in listening to children’s voices in educational research and scholarship. Thus, there is an evident need for the pursuit of a richer understanding of the policies, practices, and experiences pertaining Preschool Education through children’s eyes. The monograph would have benefitted substantially by incorporating children’s voices with regards to their experiences in Pre-School Education in the author’s primary research and analysis.
Moving a step forward, the title of the book righteously differentiates the institution of Preschool Education from the institution of Preprimary Education. Whilst Preschool Education in Cyprus is optional for children up to the age of five and mostly provided by private or community schools, Preprimary Education is obligatory and mostly provided by public schools administered by the State. In the book, the author thoroughly reflects on this distinction in Chapters 5 and 6, where she discusses the various types of Preschools (private, communal, and public), and the development of Preprimary Education in the 21st century, respectively. However, it would be interesting to see separately, nonetheless comparatively, the specific challenges and suggestions for Preschool Education vis-à-vis the challenges and suggestions for Preprimary Education.

Coming to the concluding chapter of this book, the reader would expect to be provided with some specific reflections and suggestions stemming from the preceded well-organised and thorough analysis. Having said that, it is clear that the analysis could have further been enriched by the discussion of the implications of this historical research of Early-Childhood Education in Cyprus. It would be interesting to see the author’s remarks in response to questions such as the following: What are the implications of this book for future policies and curricula of Early-Childhood Education in Cyprus in terms of development and implementation? What are the lessons to be learned for teacher education and training, parental involvement and other crucial issues raised in the book? What are the wider implications for other studies to be carried out in the field?

In conclusion, this monograph is a manifesto of Dr Michaelidou’s passionate love for Preschool and Preprimary Education. Her devotion to the institution is imprinted on every single page of her book. At the same time though, her extended examination of the landscape of Preschool and Preprimary Education in Cyprus from both a historical and a practical angle provides sound and robust arguments for the long-term benefits of quality early education. This book is therefore a political manifesto for the need to expand and improve publicly- or privately-funded Early-Childhood Education.
Public Administration After the Crisis
[Η Δημόσια Διοίκηση μετά την Κρίση]

Spyros Vlachopoulos, Stavroula Ktistaki, Charalampos Anthopoulos (eds)
Athens/Thessaloniki: Sakkoulas
pp. XVII + 234

The book Public Administration After the Crisis deals with the extremely interesting, contemporary issue of managing public sector during and after the economic crises in Greece and Cyprus. The evolution of public administration is an issue with high administrative/economic and socio-political interest, as it is a field of research and reflection for academic, political, and administrative communities. The book includes studies by renowned academic, legal, and administrative staff on current administrative issues during both economic crises, framing the need for critical reforms and operational adjustments to lead public administrations to appropriate action towards these goals. The collective volume is consisted of six sub-chapters with separate thematic areas under a common orientation referring to the multifaceted analysis of public administration in recent years in the light of both economic crises.

The first chapter entitled ‘Political System, Public Administration and Crisis, consists of three contributions. In the first contribution, an analysis of the disciplinary law of civil servants is carried out. The study examines the effects of memoranda on disciplinary civil-service law focusing on the institution of self-imposed leave, the statute of limitations for disciplinary offenses, and the way disciplinary councils are set up. The analysis carried out highlights problems of lack of coherence and legal completeness, raising the crucial question of whether successive legislative changes promote legal certainty and the effectiveness of administrative action. The second contribution examines the prospect of turning the crisis into an opportunity to promote a new strategy for human resource management in public administration. This contribution focuses on reducing operating costs (as a key aspect of fiscal pressures) by decisively influencing the way in which human resources are
managed in the public sector under the weight of memorandum checks. The author presents in a very apt way the main reform projects of the period, which aimed at the better utilisation of human resources, while at the same time identifying the prospect of developing a new strategy for human resource management based on three distinct axes: rational planning, evaluation, and continuing education. The study highlights the importance of seizing the opportunity to shape a human resource management strategy that will lead to hiring the right number of people, with the right skills, in the right place, at the right time. The third contribution examines the relationship between the motion of individual distrust in relation to the motion of trust/distrust towards a Government. The institutional analysis of the motions of individual distrust (imputation of an issue of political responsibility to a Member of the Government) and trust of the Government (confirmation of the political and constitutional power of the Government) is carried out. It is argued that the submission of an individual motion of censure is the most effective means of parliamentary scrutiny against an individual Minister, leading to his disapproval by Parliament and subsequently to his resignation, while the conclusion presents with the highly interesting view that a motion of censure against the entire Government should not be considered a motion of confidence in it.

The second chapter is entitled ‘Independent Authorities After the Crisis’ and includes two contributions. The first one describes the evolution of the Independent Authorities in relation to the implementation of the memoranda in Greece. This particularly interesting contribution examines the establishment of new independent authorities, as well as the impact of institutional characteristics of existing independent authorities on the memorandum requirements. The dimensions of institutional, functional, and personal independence are identified in the light of the memoranda, while individual examples of independent principles are presented, highlighting the range of changes brought about by the implementation of the memoranda. The second contribution addresses the hot issue of the independence of the Independent Authorities by describing the critical points of independence and their distinctions: the process of selecting members, the adequacy of their term of office, the uninterrupted term of office, the stable regulatory framework, financial autonomy, and the exercise of parliamentary control.

The third chapter, which consists of two contributions, is entitled ‘Public Administration and European Economics Governance’. The first contribution describes the importance of the Court of Auditors as a key factor in implementing
reforms, since, on one hand, it has the necessary means to conduct objective and impartial investigations and the prestige and common acceptance of clear or other findings on the other. The second contribution presents the constitutional aspects of the obligations of public administration. This contribution carries out a particularly interesting analysis of the principle of conditionality (being incorporated into European Union law) and its impact on the functioning of public administration, largely determining the prospect of economic growth.

The fourth chapter is entitled ‘Social Administration After the Crisis’ and includes three contributions. The first contribution describes the issue of the effectiveness of social administration in relation to informal payments in the field of health. The analysis presents the extent of the problem and seeks solutions and policy proposals focusing on, among other things, the development of five factors: comprehensive interventions with well-defined policy tools, a defined insurance package, restructuring of the health care provision and compensation system, adequate and stable public funding, and the absence of a culture of blame. The second contribution analyses the Greek social policy after the crisis in the light of recent findings and proposals of international organisations. The reported findings describe negative evaluations referring to widespread violations of economic and social rights. The study presents concluding remarks on the insufficient social policy pursued in Greece during the crisis, concluding with some very interesting proposals from the aforementioned reports. The third contribution provides an overview of public administration in pre-crisis and post-crisis health services. The study describes the course of health services before the crisis using financial data. It identifies the applied administrations practices in contrast to the practices used during the crisis, as well as after the end of the crisis. The attempted reform projects are analysed in a very clear way by conducting a critical review of the results achieved. The study concludes that the public health system needs a new vision and a new strategy of change that will first focus on patients (access and quality), then on taxpayers (cost/benefit) and lastly on health professionals applying contemporary practices of New Public Management.

The fifth chapter refers to the ‘Impact of the Crisis on the Cypriot Public Administration’ and includes two contributions. In the first contribution, a very interesting analysis of the discrimination of powers in the Cypriot legal order is carried out, focusing on the issue of the appointment of civil servants. This contribution demonstrates in a particularly auspicious way how the implementation of the prin-
The principle of separation of powers is strictly implemented in the Cypriot constitutional law (although it is noted that its implementation is not always clear due to the lack of sufficient criteria). A critical evaluation of the Cypriot case law is carried out as to the principle of separation of political power from administrative action, while the prohibition of the involvement of the legislative power in the process of appointing civil servants is presented as a positive element. The second contribution refers to the challenge of developing strategic planning in the Cyprus Public Sector. The study carries out an excellent analysis of the theoretical framework of strategic planning in public administration, while also presenting the evolution of strategic planning in Cyprus. It concludes with the presentation of the contemporary strategic planning system in the Cypriot public service (through which public organisations can now perceive and control how they apply for and spend the appropriations allocated to them from the State budget). The study identifies the indisputable progress that has been made as well as the significant opportunities for improvement in relation to the potential tools of public management.

The sixth chapter is entitled ‘What Reforms in the Public Sector Post-Crisis Management?’ and includes three contributions. The first contribution introduces individual introductory thoughts on the implications of public administration problems and the need for reform. The second contribution analyses the operation of public enterprises and the importance of applying the principles of Public Management in Greece. The analysis describes the conditions and tools for promoting the development of effective public bodies and concludes that the new public-sector architecture must ensure sustainability and soundness in the long run. The third contribution identifies reform challenges of the Greek public administration by describing the dilapidation of the Greek public administration (with the main characteristics being hypertrophic organisations, customer relations, high inefficiency, intense politicisation, etc.) as the main causes of economic derailment. The study concludes with very interesting proposals for the establishment of a well-functioning and efficient public administration, focusing on five critical issues: the executive function of the Government and the effective coordination of the public administration, the quality of regulation and the development of public consultation, the utilisation of human resources, the evaluation of the efficiency and effectiveness of public services, and the development of a new relationship of cooperation with the market and civil society.
The book is an excellent contribution to science examining critical administrative issues, the analysis of which can be a particularly useful set of tools for improving the functioning of public administration in Greece and Cyprus. The value of the book increases significantly as it refers to a particularly difficult period during which public administrations suffered from the economic crisis and were in search of solutions that would lead them to a more prosperous future. A thorough analysis of the multifaceted aspects of public administration renders this collective volume an excellent textbook capable of contributing to both to the development of academic knowledge and the promotion of administrative action.

Rossidis Ioannis
Constantina Constantinou’s book examines the consequences of the Greek Civil War (1946-1949), a four-year conflict which, among other things, affected the political discourse in Cyprus. This period, which coincides with the beginning of the Cold War, was, as evidenced by the author, crucial for the political history of Cyprus: both the Left and the Right in Cyprus were affected by the Greek Civil War at its climax and developed along similar lines to the Greek political sides during that war. From demonstrating simple solidarity with the two opposing sides in the Greek Civil War to participating by sending fighters and/or financial support to their comrades in Greece, both sides in Cyprus viewed the war as a development that mirrored their respective ideologies.

The book, apart from the Introduction and the Conclusions, is structured in ten chapters and examines the political history of Cyprus since the founding of AKEL, in April 1941, and the escalating reaction and attempt of the anti-communist camp to organise itself, mainly as a response to AKEL. In the chapters that follow the introduction, the importation of the intense civil-war climate is presented, highlighting the bipartisan confrontation during 1948 and 1949 in the areas of the Church, education, mass sports and football, trade unions, and in every form of economic activity. Finally, the contribution of the Greek Cypriots in the two camps of the Greek Civil War is recorded, both in soldiers and material or financial aid, although the names and the number of participants is not accurate. As the author points out, it was not possible for AKEL to support the Communist Party of Greece as much as
they wanted due to logistic reasons, as well as because of the internal crisis of AKEL which started to appear around that period.

The differences between Left and Right were unbridgeable and would ultimately lead to a frontal collision. The introduction, however, of the civil-war climate to Cyprus launched these differences to maximum heights: left and Right now crossed swords in a divided political climate which was re-contextualised by the Greek Civil War. Both Right and Left adopted the propaganda of the conflict but, for a number of reasons, most of them internal, they avoided armed confrontation.

The transposition of the climate which was prevailing in Greece at the time was completely normal, as the majority of Greek Cypriots had been furiously seeking union with Greece. The fact that Greek Cypriots considered themselves an integral part of Greece justified their great interest and their partial involvement in the events of the civil war. The Right not only sought the introduction of a civil-war confrontation to satisfy its political principles but also for the sake of expediency, since, in this new arena, it could pursue arguments which were ancillary to its purpose, namely its efforts to convince the majority of the population to fear an internal enemy, AKEL, which was accused of conniving with its ‘fellow travellers’ and for having completely associated itself with EAM and the DSE to unite a ‘free Cyprus with a free and democratic Greece.’

The influence of the civil war on political developments in Cyprus is part and parcel of the partial two-way relationship between the two sides of the Greek Civil War and their commensurate Greek Cypriot factions. More specifically, the Greek government never relented in its attempts to control the Greek Cypriot Right and the Church of Cyprus. In consequence, Cyprus either as an internal matter for the political leadership of Greece or as an irredentist issue, was a continual point of reference: the claim for union (enosis) made by Greek Cypriots, and the British response to these claims had a direct impact on Greek foreign policy. The decisive interventions of successive Greek governments to push enosis forward or back were significant. The participation of the Greek Right, through its Consulate, in the confrontation between the Cypriot Left and the Right, as well as the Consulate’s contribution to conveying the atmosphere of the Greek Civil War to Cyprus, are of importance, as proven by a number of Greek Ministry of Foreign Affairs documents and correspondence from Greek consuls in Cyprus with Athens.

AKEL might have considered the British Communist Party as the metropolitan party with which it consulted, particularly during critical periods and, especially,
with regard to the Cyprus issue, but official guidance came from the national party, the Communist Party of Greece (KKE). KKE monitored AKEL’s internal affairs, keeping up to date with every move its leading officials made. Apart from the visit to the Greek mountains and the subsequent change in AKEL’s stance toward self-government—enosis, the instances wherein KKE decisively steered AKEL were many. KKE understood that within Cyprus lay many pitfalls for the Greek government, since ‘Greece today breathes with two lungs, one American and one British, and thus cannot, because of the Cyprus issue, risk suffocating.’

So, besides its responsibility to guide its fellow travellers in Cyprus, KKE was interested in how it could use the political situation in Cyprus to weaken the two ‘lungs’, figuratively speaking, namely American–British imperialism, and its opponent, the Greek government, by exposing it and therefore suffocating it.

The British occupation of Cyprus and the strict police measures were the main reasons why the transfer of the Greek Civil-War climate didn’t escalate or lead to domestic bloodshed. As for its internal effects on Cyprus, Constantinou’s book analyses to some great extent phenomena such as the anti-communist discourse of the Cypriot Church, the role of the Greek Consulate in Nicosia in intensifying political passions in Cyprus in 1948-1949, the relation between AKEL and KKE, the establishment and the action of the organisation X in Cyprus, etc. The consequences in sports and the division of football clubs are also analysed, in addition to the trip of then general secretary of AKEL, Fifis Ioannou, and the leader of PEO, Andreas Ziartidis, to ‘Free Greece’, which was controlled by the guerrillas of the Democratic Army, in December 1948.

This is a book that constitutes a significant scientific contribution to the Cypriot historiography based on original archival material which enriches our knowledge about a period of national importance for Cyprus and Greece: the formation of the political discourse of the two rival wings and the polarising division in Cypriot society, which minimised the chances of political cooperation and conciliation just a few years before the beginning of the EOKA struggle. I strongly believe that this book is among the most systematic studies for this critical period. Despite some minor flaws, this book is an original contribution and rich with new findings, while it surely succeeds in providing constructive knowledge and a new perspective on the study of the contemporary political history of Cyprus.

Alexis Alecou
This monograph by Maria Hadjiathanasiou provides an original critical analysis of propaganda during the Cyprus revolt (1955-1959), as used both by the British and the Greek side. The author clarifies that she chose propaganda as her focus exactly because it had a radical effect on the development of events in Cyprus. The overarching argument of the study is that propaganda was an indispensable weapon of the insurgents and a vital aspect of the counter-insurgency campaign during Cyprus’ decolonisation, which shaped to a large extent the development of events in Cyprus during the years of the revolt until, and after, the island’s independence in 1960.

Hadjiathanasiou’s starting point is that the significance of propaganda in the Cyprus revolt has been underestimated in the existing historiography, as research is rather focused on the political dimensions of the decolonisation in Cyprus. This book is therefore the first attempt to investigate and bring the propaganda issue to the foreground, with the aim to learn and comprehend what role it played during the island’s decolonisation.

The book is based on primary material, previously inaccessible, untranslated, or unpublished, and retrieved from a variety of archives, mainly the recently declassified ‘Migrated Archives’ of the Foreign and Commonwealth Office. It is also based on recent historical debates about propaganda during the British Empire’s ‘small-wars’ of decolonisation. The quantity of the research material and the quality of the author’s analysis significantly expand the limited academic research done on this topic.

Beyond the Introduction (Chapter 1) and the Conclusion (Chapter 6), the book is split into four main parts. Chapter 2 is a prelude to the study of the propaganda war raging between 1955 and 1959. It explores the start of the policy of Govern-
ment propaganda in an attempt to understand just how urgent and important this was, why it was important, and how it was meant to contribute to the British counter-insurgency campaign in Cyprus.

Through archival material that dates to before the start of EOKA's campaign in April 1955, the author reveals that, since the early 1950s, the Cyprus colonial government was in desperate need of propaganda to influence the Greek Cypriots. However, no matter how doubtful the British propaganda venture for Cyprus may have been, the colonial government needed to reshape Cypriot consciousness by turning people’s identities from Greek to Cypriot, as the discussion on ‘Cypriotism’ has shown. Moreover, in this chapter Hadjiiathanasiou examines and supports the argument that there was a severe lack of British experts on propaganda, while those who did exist could not simply parachute into diverse colonial fields of conflict (for example from Malaya to Cyprus) to help colonial government take back control.

Chapter 3 investigates Field Marshal Harding’s propaganda plans for Cyprus upon becoming the island’s governor. His close collaborators are identified, and their role in the propaganda process is reconstructed and analysed, along with an examination on the importance of ‘public opinion’ and a ‘crisis of trust’ on the domestic (Greek Cypriot) front. As Hadjiiathanasiou presents, Harding’s use of coercive measures to contain the revolt and to re-impose law and order on top of his undiplomatic handling of the situation brought about a total ‘splitting of sympathy’ between the British colonial government and the Greek Cypriot population. His strong-arm tactics and mishandling of propaganda were also parameters that resulted in the alienation of a large section of international public opinion. On the other hand, Archbishop Makarios’ and Colonel Grivas’ propaganda had an emotional appeal to the Greek Cypriot audience towing to the strong messages; liberation from foreign rule and political union with motherland Greece. These messages also resonated with international developments.

As the author notes, it was during that time when British propaganda supported the ‘divide and rule’ policy. The incitement of Turkish Cypriot public opinion and feeling, and, by extension, the stirring up, prompting, and urging of the Turkish government to step up its propaganda campaign on the legitimacy of the Turkish case over Cyprus’s future, was a significant aspect of the British propaganda effort. As an answer to the colonial government’s miscalculated propaganda policies and coercive measures, EOKA embarked on its own ‘propaganda of the deed’ to attract
international attention, sympathy, and support. By this time, the propaganda war for Cyprus was on full blast.

Chapter 4 is a diversion from the chronological route of the analysis. It focuses on three case studies on different media used for propaganda purposes: sound (radio, voice aircraft), print (newspapers, publications, leaflets) and vision (television, cinema).

‘Sound’ explores the history of radio broadcasting and radio jamming in Cyprus during the 1950s, and how Athens Radio and the Cyprus Broadcasting Service (CBS) competed for the Greek Cypriots’ attention and loyalty. The second case study, ‘Print’, consist of two sections: the first one looks at newspapers and publications, and the second one at leaflets. The study explores how print media were given primary importance by the opposing sides during their campaigns, with the aim of winning over local and international public opinion. During this analysis, the inefficiency of the British propaganda and the inability of the colonial government to come up with innovative methods to reply to Greek Cypriot and Greek propaganda becomes evident. Therefore, British propaganda resorted to the unimaginative and arguably desperate technique of imitating the leaflets of EOKA. The third case study reconstructs the history of television in Cyprus. The establishment of a television station in Cyprus by the colonial government intended to take the lead in British efforts in propaganda. However, when it was finally inaugurated in the island, in late 1957, it was arguably too late for it to influence the Cypriots to believe in the benefits of the British rule. Finally, in this Chapter it is argued that borrowed propaganda techniques (from Southeast Asia, Ireland, and Palestine) had limited effect in the Cypriot setting, where Cypriots had little in common with the populations of other territories under British rule. This is a conclusion drawn early on the discussions on propaganda media in Cyprus and recurs throughout the book.

Chapter 5 investigates the use of propaganda in Cyprus during the last period of British rule, under Governor Hugh Foot. EOKA’s propaganda policies of passive resistance and boycotting are also investigated, demonstrating the Greek Cypriots’ collective struggle against the British colonial ruler and Foot’s difficulty in designing effective propaganda measures. This chapter strengthens the argument being made throughout, which is that personal attitudes, such as Harding’s and Foot’s, inevitably affected policymaking and, consequently, the development of events.

More importantly, however, attention is drawn to the fact that even though Foot knew that by that time propaganda had not persuaded the Cypriots into renounc-
ing EOKA, he was nevertheless eager to get Leslie Glass’s advice on the next steps British propaganda should take. However, the intention of the colonial government to redesign psychological warfare for Cyprus had been cut short by the end of the emergency and the political agreement on the future of Cyprus.

All in all, the book establishes propaganda as a vital aspect of the history of the Cyprus revolt and underlines the decisive role it played in the development and outcome of the revolt. It also reconstructs the history of propaganda in Cyprus at the end of the British empire by analysing the propaganda deployed by both the British and the Greek sides. In addition, the study intervenes in wider debates about propaganda at the end of empire and suggests new and well-documented arguments. Finally, the book is worth reading because, as it is based on a bulk of newly released primary material, it shifts the focus of the current historiography away from an overwhelming emphasis on the use of ‘wholesale coercion’, and clearly proves that propaganda was, along with coercion, a joint driver in the conflict for Cyprus.

Haralambos Alexandrou
State of Exception in the Mediterranean: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community

Nikos Moudouros
Cham: Palgrave-Macmillan, 2021
pp. xiii + 276
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2020 passed into modern Turkish Cypriot history as an important milestone. Amid the pandemic and economic turmoil, Ankara’s interferences in the internal political scene of the Turkish Cypriot community, and the impasse in the process of resolving the Cyprus Problem based on the bi-zonal, bi-communal federal formula, the Turkish Cypriot community’s leadership changed. In the shadow of these historical developments, the historian and academic Nikos Moudouros, who has for many years been following closely the contemporary Turkish Cypriot reality, proceeded to the publication of his new work titled State of Exception in the Mediterranean: Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community. Moudouros, who has recently completed his two-year Post-Doctoral Research at the Department of Turkish and Middle Eastern Studies of the University of Cyprus before assuming the position of Lecturer, with his new work introduces us to the historical and theoretical background of the new sweeping developments in the second largest community of Cyprus.

In general, Moudouros’ recent work is divided into three parts. With the introduction, and especially the second chapter, the author introduces us to the contemporary Turkish Cypriot socio-political reality, which he characterises as ‘state of exception’. In this part of the study, Moudouros analyses the peculiar Turkish Cypriot socio-political context through the prism of Turkey’s policies on Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriots. Then, in the third, fourth and fifth chapters, the author takes us on a journey through the modern history of the Turkish Cypriot ‘state of exception’. The author seeks the roots of the ‘state of exception’ in the period 1963-1974, when the Turkish Cypriots withdrew from the short-lived bi-communal Republic of Cyprus and, under the guidance of Turkey, focused on the creation of alternative state structures. After the war of 1974, in the period 1974-1983, the effort to cre-
ate a second state unit in the Cypriot territory sped up. The last stop of this effort was the creation of the internationally unrecognised ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)’. Alongside the analysis of these developments, the author records the internal, socio-political processes in the Turkish Cypriot community, focusing especially on its resistance to the joint effort of the Ankara-nationalist Turkish Cypriot Right to build a second Cypriot state. The author’s approach is important, as it is a rare attempt to present the Turkish Cypriots as an autonomous protagonist of the contemporary Cypriot history and not just as a passive recipient of external developments and policies. In the third part of his study, the author focuses on the interaction of the contemporary autonomous Turkish Cypriot socio-political reality with the political and economic tendencies of modern times. Thus, the author studies the introduction of neoliberal practices and pan-Turkism into the modern Turkish Cypriot socio-political scene. Finally, the scholar frames this analysis with the contemporary wave of socio-political contestation that grew in the shadow of the great economic decline at the end of the 20th century and culminated for a short time during the period of the submission of the UN solution plan for the Cyprus Problem.

Regarding Turkey’s attitude towards the modern Turkish Cypriot community, Moudouros, in the second chapter of his study, points out that Ankara’s intervention and military dominance were followed by a strategy of transforming the threat to Turkey’s national security in the region into an empty virgin land on which a completely new order was built. The effort to convert and transform the northern part of Cyprus included strategies of defining ‘borders’, establishing checkpoints, creating a specific economic model and an integrated political and administrative system, as well as introducing settler colonization policies. Therefore, in the absence of an international recognition, Northern Cyprus was transformed into a ‘particular state of exception’, which has a hierarchical power relation with Turkey. The author describes the northern part of the island as a space where the Turkish community had been besieged, secluded, alienated, and marginalised. This development was accompanied by the emergence of opposition voices that are putting forth political demands contesting partition. Moudouros reminds us that in the modern Turkish Cypriot reality, in addition to the passive recipients of Turkey’s policies, there are also centrifugal forces who question the boundaries of the division politics. The opposition’s front is a diverse political reality, which includes many shades of the Left, political parties, trade unions, and organisations.
In the third chapter of his study, the author discusses the roots of the Turkish Cypriot state of exception. Here, the reader observes the emergence and formation of separate power structures in the Turkish Cypriot community. After their withdrawal from the bi-communal Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots scattered to many areas and gathered in enclaves, which were dominated by the ‘militant’s system’. The system was controlled by the armed organisation ‘TMT’, Ankara’s military personnel and agents, and the nationalist Turkish Cypriot leadership. At the political level, the headquarters of this edifice were the General Committee, which set up committees at provincial level that operated as ‘Ministries’, composing a kind of ‘revolutionary council’ where the leadership role was undertaken by the military. Moudouros points out that, in combination with the detachment of Turkish Cypriots from production, this edifice was ultimately unable to suppress the appearance of demands such as cultural pluralism, which put forth the idea of coexistence and coming into an agreement with the Greek Cypriots, as well as the need for autonomy from Turkey. This weakness resulted in the gradual emergence of the first opposition centres of the Turkish Cypriot community.

In the fourth chapter, Moudouros focuses on the development of the dynamics of the opposition in the Turkish Cypriot community after the war of 1974, during the period of 1974-1981, when the ‘Federal Turkish Cypriot State’ was de facto created in the northern part of the island. In this effort, the author discusses important developments, such as the resettlement of the Turkish Cypriots in the northern areas of Cyprus and the state-building process based on Greek Cypriot properties and funding from Turkey, the Turkification of space and state planning, and the strong state interventionism in economy. The scholar frames this record with the consolidation of the Turkish Cypriot opposition in new political formations and the occurrence of dynamic interventions in the Turkish Cypriot socio-political scene, such as strikes.

The record of the attempt to establish a second state entity in Cyprus continues in the fifth chapter. The author relates the creation of the internationally unrecognised ‘TRNC’ to the effort of the Turkish Cypriot leadership to pressure the Greek Cypriots to accept the equality of the two communities. Also, he describes the effort to position the left-wing circles under the umbrella of independence and, thus, to widen the social base which would support the idea of establishing a second separate state in Cyprus. As in the previous period, this effort faced the reaction of the opposition which is examined by the author.
In the sixth and seventh chapters, Moudouros focuses on the interaction of the ‘TRNC’ and its forces of contestation with recent phenomena and currents that were introduced to the Cypriot scene during the last two decades of the 20th century. The writer analyses the effort for the neoliberal ‘TRNC’s financial reconstruction and transformation of the northern regions of Cyprus into a free trade zone. At the same time, he summarizes the imposition of the economic discipline measures introduced by Turkey on the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot opposition reacted to these initiatives, arguing that the economic underdevelopment of the Turkish Cypriots reinforced ‘external tutelage’, meaning the political and economic dependency on Turkey. Apart from imposing its own economic prescriptions on Turkish Cypriots, during the last two decades of the 20th century, Ankara approached the ‘TRNC’ as an ‘experimental laboratory’, where the effectiveness of pan-Turkish post-Cold War visions could be tested. Therefore, the adjustment of the community to the context of the ‘great Turkic world’ of the post-Cold-War period was crucial in this experimentation.

In the eighth, ninth and tenth chapters of his study, Moudouros introduces us to the socio-economic impasse experienced by the Turkish Cypriot community at the end of the last century, and the reaction of the Turkish Cypriot opposition to the great crisis. During this period, Ankara and its nationalist Right attempted the reproduction of their right-wing and nationalist policies. The intensification of political violence formed one of the basic tools in this direction. The Turkish Cypriot opposition attempted to resist the authoritarianism of the Right both through its participation in power and the utilisation of various resistance practices. As Moudouros points out in the ninth chapter of his book, the resistance peaked during the period of the great crisis in the banking sector (1999-2000), when the Turkish Cypriot opposition reacted to the unprecedented crisis with a series of strikes and demonstrations. In the tenth chapter of his new book, Moudouros turns his attention to the culmination of this wave of political and social dissent during the period of the UN solution plan (2002-2004).

In the conclusions of his study, the author refers to the ideological collapse of the four-decades-long status quo and the complete delegitimisation of the ‘TRNC’. Also, he makes mention of the opposition current that lives on during this period. Moudouros concludes that ‘the contradiction of the illegal structures lies in the fact that they were, on the one hand, generating the political and economic integration of the Turkish Cypriots in power, and were therefore building the framework
for the maturity of this power, but on the other hand, these same structures were undermining the prospect of this power being fulfilled due to the heavy shadow of Ankara at all levels’.

All in all, Moudouros’ book constitutes a most valuable tool for the multidimensional analysis of the contemporary Turkish Cypriot reality. However, the analytical scope of the study could be broadened if more emphasis were to be applied to Ankara’s view of the whole of Cyprus as a Turkish sphere of influence. At the same time, some aspects of the Turkish Cypriot Right, which holds a multidimensional cooperation with Turkey, remained unexplored. Except for the limited reference to the emergence of the opposition within the community of Turkish citizens in Northern Cyprus towards the end of the Chapter 8, the study neglects to make mention of the vocal opposition pockets that exist within the Turkish Cypriot Right. Nevertheless, Moudouros’ innovative and original work adds a great deal to the contemporary Cypriot historiography, being a scientific study that approaches the complex Turkish Cypriot reality as an authentic, autonomous, and colourful aspect of the Cypriot reality of the 21st century.

Nikolaos Stelgias
The Turkish Arms Embargo: Drugs, Ethnic Lobbies, and US Domestic Politics

JAMES F. GOODE
Lexington: University Press of Kentucky, 2020
pp. 179

James F. Goode, an experienced historian and recognisable expert on Middle East affairs, has made a valuable contribution on the study and deeper understanding of the factors and dynamics involved in the decisions for the initial imposition and, finally, the lifting of the US arms embargo on Turkey, following the invasion of Cyprus in 1974. More specifically, he offers a thorough analysis on three intricately interconnected issues that constitute significant pillars of the main topic: the political impact of poppy production in Turkey and illicit drugs exports to the United States; the activity of Greek American lobby and, generally, the implications of ethnic identities and interests in US domestic politics; and the role of the Congress in the making of US foreign policy. The author successfully incorporates the international historical context of the 1970s and early 1980s and sets forth interesting hypotheses through the connection of political views and decisions with contemporary developments at the international level, particularly in the geopolitical complex of the broader Middle East.

The author makes some well-grounded points by examining how supporters of Greece and Cyprus in the United States exploited the looming social anxiety on drug addiction among young Americans to spoil Turkey’s image and promote the idea of an arms embargo to press Ankara for concessions on the Cyprus talks. He closely follows the actions taken by the so-called ‘gang of four’, namely Senator Thomas Eagleton, House Representative John Brademas, Senator Paul Sarbanes, and House Representative Benjamin Rosenthal, who worked hard to persuade the White House and the Congress for the necessity of an arms embargo. He highlights the persistence of the lobby, particularly the consistent efforts to exercise influence on the White House in relation to Cyprus. He provides some very interesting details
regarding the role of Secretary Henry Kissinger and the broader issue of relations between the Congress and the executive branch on foreign policy matters. He also thoroughly describes the turn from the Congress’ support of the embargo to its dismissal, which provides some very useful evidence on how States consider their national interests when making foreign policy decisions. President Carter’s shift from supporting the embargo before his election in 1976 to working for (and achieving) the lift of the embargo is indicative of this tendency: sooner or later, foreign policy will adapt to hard-core national interests as defined by the State bureaucracy.

An issue that merits special attention is the author’s analytical approach of the events in Cyprus and, particularly, the way he perceives the Greek American lobby’s efforts to demonise Turkey in the eyes of the American society, vis-à-vis his perception of what actually happened in Cyprus in the summer of 1974. In my view, the author’s historical assessment bears a degree of pro-Turkish bias that, in some instances, distorts his inferences. This is particularly evident in chapter three, where the author examines organised Greek efforts to present Turkish actions in Cyprus as war crimes. For example, on the events that followed the Turkish Cypriot mutiny in 1963-64 and the Turkish Cypriots’ gathering in enclaves, the author observes that, ‘The Makarios government in Nicosia had shown little interest in reversing this informal separation between the two communities. In fact, it had contributed to the situation by steadily whittling away at the minority guarantees provided in the 1960 constitution’. This conclusion is very close to the official Turkish and Turkish Cypriot narrative, but it could also be supported by many Greek Cypriot pundits, especially if we consider the Greek Cypriot ideological polarisation around these unfortunate events that eventually culminated to the forcible geographic division of Cyprus in 1974. Someone would expect an experienced historian to offer well-grounded evidence in support of such an argument. Surprisingly though, the author just offers the following reference in a footnote: “Observations based on the author’s visit to Paphos, September 1969”. I wonder whether a site visit to a socially divided destination could by itself offer credible knowledge on decisions made behind closed doors and amidst ethnic violence and severe external pressure.

In another case, the author evaluates the Greek American accusations against Turkish ‘barbarianism’, in relation to what took place during and right after the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. Particularly, he stresses that ‘[o]ccasionally, such vitriol made its way into the publications of the major Greek-American organizations. (...) There were tales of looting, rape, and intentional destruction of
churches in the area under Turkish army control’. On these allegations communicated to Washington D.C. by members of the lobby and Archbishop Iacovos, the author argues that ‘there is little incontrovertible evidence to support these lurid tales. Someone may wonder whether we could expect to find such evidence in an ethnically cleansed area, where Turkish army was (and to a large degree still is) exclusively in charge. While the author seems too eager to underline Greek zeal for lashing out on Turkey (which, indeed, was sometimes excessive and pompous), in some instances the reader gets the impression that he is trying to water down Turkish war crimes that took place in Cyprus (in fact, the term ‘war crimes’ is never used by the author). Even if ‘tales’ about rapes can hardly be verified, what about the self-evident looting and/or destruction of hundreds of churches, monasteries and cemeteries? Photos have been extensively published, while someone may easily see (even visit) such sites in the northern part of Cyprus, which have turned to barns, warehouses, and even pool bars and casinos. It would definitely be easier to check this on a site visit than Makarios’ ‘little interest in reversing separation’ back in 1969.

James F. Goode’s work is very helpful for a researcher who aims to study and deeply understand the factors that played out regarding the imposition and the lifting of US arms embargo on Turkey, while it offers very useful conclusions on the issues of ethnic politics in Washington D.C. and the balance between the Congress and the executive branch on US foreign policy. However, his analytical framing of historical events in (and regarding) Cyprus suffers from a significant degree of bias. In any case though, such biases, which are common in history books, may contribute to the stimulation of public and scholarly debates and the enrichment of one’s analytical lenses.

Michalis Kontos
Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in Post-Conflict Cyprus

STRATIS ANDREAS EFTHYMIOU
Switzerland: Palgrave Macmillan, 2019
pp. 261
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‘The origin of the world’ is a very popular painting produced in 1866 by Gustav Goubert, which attracts attention and conveys messages to this day. The painting pictures the body of a naked woman from the neck down, focusing on her genitalia, as she is lying halfway down with open legs. Taking its cues from this classic piece, a similar painting by Orlan in 2011 portrayed a male body, in a similar posture, with an erect penis. Its title is ‘The origins of the war’. While the first painting has a biological undertone, the second one is more explicit about gendered social life, which is masculinised to self-division. More specifically, human organisation is gendered in such a way that masculinity is tied to conflict, suffering, oppression, or other outcomes or facilitators of war. Masculinity then feeds into social ills and phenomena that arise in countries where national peace has been undermined. To the average progressive, these commonly include both nationalism and militarism. These phenomena are intertwined in Cyprus, since it resembles a case of conflict and post-conflict nationalism, bordering, otherness, and excessive military spending, where all aspects are gendered and hegemonically masculinised: conscription, high-level negotiations, heroes, and enemies.

This is why Stratis Andreas Efthymiou’s book about the relationship between masculinity, nationalism, and militarism in the post-conflict landscape Greek-Cypriots find themselves in, is long overdue. For decades, there has been widely circulating, albeit dispersed and disorganised, evidence, that all three of these concepts haunt our past and future. Efthymiou’s book is one of the first studies connecting them into a triadic interrelation, and applying them to Cyprus. In realising that gender has always been relevant to situations of conflict, militarised societies and ethnic antagonism, the triad must be disaggregated into its constituent components.
Then we would have to study how these interact and interpenetrate each other, or in the author’s terms how they are ‘co-constituted’, as a political complexion, and a reproductive force sustaining power structures and undermining new beginnings. We would also need to look into how this co-constitution evolves, as each aspect of the triad is affected by social and political developments.

Effectively, this is what Efthymiou does with his book: he treats each concept individually, and then puts everything together to flesh out their co-constitution and how it evolves in a situation of open borders, or a post-conflict environment, which breeds a post-conflict form for each of the triad’s parts. The chapters are accordingly structured. Chapter 2 is about the relationship between nationalism, militarism and masculinity after the Green Line and closed borders were established. Chapters 3, 4, and 5, deal with each of these concepts respectively after the opening of the border. Chapter 6 brings together these concepts in the post-conflict era and focuses especially on the ‘radical far right’. It also provides several appendices, which facilitate the contextualisation of the study’s main line of argumentation by illuminating in brief a number of relevant events, such as the Isaak-Solomou incidents, agreements on energy, defence, expenditure and cultural artifacts, among others. Chapter 7 analyses how the triad played out in the energy disputes about economic resources and exclusive economic zones in the Eastern Mediterranean during the 2010s. These chapters follow the introduction, which focuses on the anthropological significance of the issue at hand in the author’s own life, a broad conceptual grid, the method, and a chapter outline. Then, the conclusions address the original concerns and include policy implications and a thoughtful finale on future research.

Efthymiou successfully accomplishes two tasks that are fundamental for any book of this kind but also harder for a book arriving at the top of tens of others on the Cyprus conflict. First, he pieces together a wealth of secondary sources that have already dealt with militarised borderlands, nationalist frenzy, and patriarchal traits of Greek Cypriot social and political culture. He then expands upon it to look at the aforementioned phenomena as a web-like, ‘integral relation’, filling gaps in a largely under-researched perspective and generating resonance across a number of social science fields and disciplines. To a considerable extent, and in its treatment of both empirical evidence and secondary literature, the book is a largely integrated view of how the Cyprus Problem is gendered and what the implications are. In fact, although the key concept is post-conflict masculinity, and the key contribution is herein, we learn a lot also about feminised aspects of the conflict, the connections
Nationalism, Militarism and Masculinity in Post-Conflict Cyprus

of womanhood as a subsidiary force to the ‘national struggle’, and feminisation as counter-hegemony. This enables further insights into the dialectics of gendered conflict.

Second, Efthymiou takes the discussion another step forward by tracing ‘the persistence of ideological positions sustained in the face of new realities’ (p.13) and explaining how the co-constitution of the triad adapts instead of disappearing when the border opens and de-solidifies each component separately and the three of them together. It is also discussed how social structures, such as the Cypriot family, or external forces, such as cultural developments in the EU, are intermediaries of adaptive responses by both elites and the public. The author additionally provides a very convincing analysis of how new processes of otherisation are born through a shift in focus from land to maritime borders; and how these produce new forms of nationalism (‘from victim to fighter’), militarism (‘from defensive to assertive’) and masculinity (‘from a protective to a [modern and well positioned] strategist force’) (p.16).

The problematic is not only impressive but also quite a challenge to disentangle. Indeed, one can identify some nuanced deficiencies given the exploratory scope of the book. There is the lack of a clear theorisation from the outset about the triad’s post-conflict adaptation. As the author writes, preliminary fieldwork leads him to reject his initial hypothesis and thus turn to an evolutionary perspective, formulating new questions. These questions are put together as exploratory in intention, essentially asking how ‘an analysis of the co-constitution of GC nationalism, militarism and masculinity contribute[s] to a better understanding of Cyprus after the opening of the borders’ (p.17). Providing answers for each of these topics could still benefit from a more systematic discussion either about the initially assumed plausibility or the sort of hypotheses that would replace it and, certainly, about where related literature stands on the subject (i.e. the temporal dimension of the triad or its individual components). In fairness, theoretical insights of this sort consistently intercept the narrative of the empirical chapters, but a more solid departure point might have been required for reaching more analytical conclusions on the adaptation of hegemonic narratives, the interaction between those taking the sides of hegemony and counter-hegemony, and a more schematic connection to what is already there on these matters.

By extension, while the book details how nationalism, militarism, and masculinity become domains of contestation and therefore adapt to changing circum-
stances, more insight might have been necessary for identifying the social sources and agents launching the contestation of hegemonic imaginaries and thus leading to adaptation. There is a relative lack of attention to the social drivers and actors in the political process, and, indeed, a largely bi-polar setting on questions of nationalism and militarism, as well as on economic issues. For example, we read very little about the emergent feminist movement, the actors sustaining the image of the cosmopolitan Euro-Cypriot woman, the social forces leading to more individualised teenagers or those springing out of their aggregated individualised perspectives, decreased military service, conscientious objection, the intellectuals of Cypriotism, or the protest movements, anti-nationalist parties and citizen initiatives that pushed for opening the borders. In these agential interactions one would be able to locate the ideological and social coordinates of contentious collective action that determines how and in which ways nationalism, militarism, and masculinity are undermined. Given ‘hegemonic masculinity’ features centrally in the book, the political sociology connecting it to post-conflict matters.

Moreover, although largely justified given the methodological approach of ethnographic observation, interviews and discourse analysis, certain claims are not sufficiently consolidated from a comparative historical perspective; for example, the argument that ‘the strong emergence of radical far right political agendas in Cyprus should be understood as a discursive response to the weakening co-constitution of this threefold relationship’ (p. 246). Efthymiou is careful in his phrasing but may still suggest causality that is not there or is more qualified than implied. Since right-wing extremism in Cyprus has reached into the centre-right space and has more or less commanded about 10 per cent of the vote diachronically, we needed to hear more about the overall response to open borders. Such as about how ELAM came about formulating a position of closed borders; or where else this position, was voiced, before and after the emergence of ELAM and the existing far right organisations under study. Hence, an opportunity goes missing here to delve into the historical association between right-wing extremism and masculinity, or to touch on how contemporary far-right groups in Cyprus involve women while reproducing the triad.

In retrospect, it might be the case that the right-wing extremism of any period and any form, within either the centre-right or the far-right space, would want to consolidate a strong link between nationalism, militarism, and masculinity. Yet, this does not necessarily ‘explain’ its emergence or climbing poll numbers, in the
sense that, ‘it is the changing post-conflict context that opened the space for the formation of radical far-right organisations’ (p.192). ‘Radical nationalism’, used across chapter titles, is never defined, and herein lies another underdeveloped point, which is that nationalism doesn’t only come in moderate and radical colours but involves shades, forms, and ideologies to which it attaches in ethnic, civic, egalitarian or nativist, left-wing or right-wing terms. These may be in turn, connected to conflict, masculinity, and militarism in distinct fashions. In other words, the small lacuna is located in the insufficient material about where radical nationalism stands in relation to militarism and masculinity but within the broader political terrain of Greek-Cypriot politics. It is thus not entirely clear why only the far radical right is incorporated as a distinct political space in the interview process, or why there are not at least a few references to the discursive responses of other spaces. After all, the author’s analysis itself already shows that the triad informs formal, institutional policy.

These are relatively minor points (and quite strict, given the book’s anthropological purview) in a thoroughly researched, eloquently written, and scientifically argued monograph, which shapes the path for exciting new work. In so far as it allows us to see how nationalism, militarism, and masculinity, albeit adaptable and adapted, can only be a breeding ground to conflict and ethnic hate, the book is also a type of political statement. A pro-peace, anti-patriarchal, and internationalist spirit seems to be holding the pen. It is good then that this book has come at a time when it is needed the most due to the trajectory towards partition that Cyprus is in, not least because of the interplay between nationalism, militarism, and masculinity. Efthymiou’s contribution is multi-faceted, the book’s method is coherent and careful, and the narrative is personalised and rich in entrenched echoes of the Greek Cypriot nationalistgeist and the everyday experience of ethnic claims, discourses of heroism, the National Guard, and the politics of manliness. The book is likely (and hopefully) to be of interest to a wider audience than a strictly academic one. In any case, however, it makes a scientific advancement in the direction away from the origins of the war towards the origins of peace and reconciliation: a new world for Cypriots. Above all, Efthymiou shows with precision why such a transition and the political effort it requires are anything but unrelated to gender and masculinity.

Giorgos Charalambous
Peace negotiations in conflict cases are not always easily resolved. In the wider context of Conflict Studies, it is of paramount importance to engage lively in conversation with the complex nature of negotiations for cases that have experienced violent conflict and ethnic division. Not only does the conflict-ridden community itself have the capacity to shape the negotiation process, but it is also possible for the negotiator themselves to impact opinions and shape perceptions either positively or negatively. Nonetheless, when the process itself is hindered from the rest of society, and the conflict in case is put into popular vote with a simplistic ‘yes’ or ‘no’, the outcome of such a vote can be different as compared to more open, transparent, and visible negotiations for the rest of society.

Joana Amaral’s Making Peace with Referendums offers a compelling and insightful argument on why referendums are not a favourable tool in addressing certain cases that have historically experienced conflict, rivalry, and ethnic violence. It is a useful contribution and addition, first to the wider study of conflict analysis, and secondly, to studies pertaining to Cyprus and Northern Ireland, both in the comparative sense, but also as independent cases. The usefulness is highlighted in how Amaral notes both the differences and the similarities in both referendums, while exploring the literature on peace negotiations and referendums. Conversely, this book also explores the differences in how negotiations took place, what different outcomes emerged from the Good Friday Agreement and the Annan Plan respectively, and how and why support at a local and communal level was different in each case study.

The central argument put forward in the book is that referendums work best when negotiations become an inclusive process, incorporating a wide range of
diverse stakeholders: from government to civil society and other political actors. When such a process is rather ‘secretive’ (p. 4), then referendums, according to Amaral, are often ‘rejected by popular vote despite strenuous political negotiations’ (p. ix). The author therefore explains the antithesis observed in the cases of Northern Ireland, whose Good Friday Agreement put an end to violence and reformed the model of governance on the one hand, and in Cyprus, whose Annan Plan ultimately failed to engage with the rest of society on the other. To this end, the theoretical foundations of the book discuss the definitions of ‘the outcome of peace negotiations’ (pp. 1-15) and then look at the literature on the political audience as both a recipient and shaper of the negotiation (pp. 16-30), highlighting the causal relationship of how the negotiator can affect the audience’s decision during referendums.

In structuring the argument, therefore, Amaral expands on the theoretical puzzles in the first two chapters, including detailed literature debates on referendums and peace agreements. Chapter 3 offers a generic account on each case study respectively. It briefly walks through the timeline of events and key political figures that have shaped the conflict, in a bid to provide a coherent background on how the differences at community level led to conflict and violence that brought political instability and ethnic (in the case of Cyprus) and religious (in the case of Northern Ireland) division. This chapter is also particularly important, as it provides a strong base for understanding the peace process itself and what each proposed peace plan entailed by expanding on the conceptual approach of the author in the research design process (p. 43). Even more important is the elaboration on the author’s methodological approach, which draws accounts from notable leadership figures within the political and civil society spectrum, researchers, experts, as well as journalists, who were all observers and/or participants in the peace processes. Data was collected through archival and media research, and semi-structured interviews.

Furthermore, Chapters 4 and 5 look at the Annan Plan and the Good Friday Agreement respectively. Amaral explains that the book itself, while not addressing each plan in a chronological order, begins with the case of Cyprus due to how the research itself was conducted. For the reader, this is particularly important, as Chapter 4 first highlights the failures of the negotiation process, including the political differences at communal level, and hints on the ‘secretive’ nature of the process itself. whereas Chapter 5 presents the experiences drawn from the agreement in Northern Ireland, and what the settlement means for its model of governance, the
political establishment, and the people themselves. Chapter 6, therefore, compares both case studies, or ‘experiences’, as the author describes them. It offers an overview of the different mediation strategies and the impact these have had on each community respectively, while building on the perceptions and divisions within political parties that either supported or rejected each proposed peace plan. This enables the author to clearly identify the peace referendum spoilers and supporters, making it easier for the reader to follow the argument. Chapter 7 clearly demonstrates how different it is for negotiations to be concluded by leaders alone, instead of putting an agreement to the popular vote. Amaral emphasises that the peace process must be inclusive throughout if a proposed solution to conflict disputes require the public’s consent. As the author explains, ‘the context must be prepared for the referendum experience’ (p. 132). The conclusion itself offers the author’s reflections on the case studies and the wider literature on peace negotiations and referendums, reaffirming the opportunities, risks, and challenges of putting complex conflict questions to the popular vote.

The analysis offered in this book is rather promising. The author demonstrates extended knowledge derived from a concise, qualitative methodological approach, utilising open and accessible archival resources, as well as engaging with key and politically active figures across a wide range of actors, including political party representatives, civil society organisations, campaigners, and interest groups. Not only does the author cross-reference the sources used and back them up with additional secondary reading, but the ability to deliver to the reader a clearly constructed argument is noteworthy to say the least. A particular aspect that would be welcome, and which would perhaps reinforce the central argument even more, would be the examination of more statistical data derived from the referendums, as well as the wider public perception of how society feels at a communal level post-referendum. Although I agree with the author’s good use of existing quantitative studies to first extract data and then identify how the public was informed or disinfomed (p. 48-49), perhaps additional remarks would offer richer and even more captivating insights. It must be noted, of course, that the author also recognises that additional research is required to fully grasp the role of peace referendums ‘as an extension of the political process of peace negotiations’ (p. 139). As such, this book is also a great attempt at fostering dialogue on additional theorisation and reflection on what factors may ultimately shape peace referendums.
All in all, Joana Amaral’s Making Peace with Referendums offers a holistic account that paints a vivid image for the reader to understand with great ease the core argument, which is that inclusive peace processes often yield more settlements to disputes. On the contrary, restricting the diversity of stakeholders involved, while also lacking in visibility and transparency throughout the negotiation process does not yield positive outcomes. Thus, referendums in those cases do not procure a ‘yes’ vote. What should be equally considered, however, are the political motives behind negotiators, and political and media elites, in shaping public perception towards a ‘no’ vote, in that regard. Therefore, Amaral’s critical insight, throughout both case studies, helps the reader identify how peace referendums on a potential agreement for conflict disputes may either exacerbate divisions or bring forth a new future for conflict-ridden communities, depending on how the process itself is mediated not only between negotiators, but also between the negotiator and their respective community.

Petros Petrikkos
Call for Papers
The Cyprus Review
Forthcoming Special Section

The Cyprus Review invites submissions for a Special Section on

The State and Organised Social Groups in the Republic of Cyprus

The political and legal aspects of Cypriot institutions rarely utilise a sociological imagination that places State and administrative structures opposite or in relation to organised social groups and more broadly civil society actors, whether trade unions, professional organisations, social movements, networks, or campaigns. It is thus unsurprising that there is meager research on the political and legal aspects of State and administrative linkage to and interaction with social politics. How do social groups approach the State and what strategies do they craft to oppose it, utilise its structures and services, complement or influence it? What institutional response does collective action outside the State evoke by State and government institutions themselves?

In the Eastonian tradition, every democracy is an input-output system and thus institutional outcomes reflect either directly or indirectly the pressures on political and bureaucratic elites from society at large. Fleshing out the interactions or lack thereof in the processes between input and output can help draw conclusions about responsiveness, accountability, transparency, equality of access and the broader pathologies, historical inertia or openings in public governance. Overall, a key piece of information about democracy for social scientists is how hard the shell of formal governance is vis-a-vis organised society. These are important questions both at the time of another impending economic crisis, set off by the COVID-19 pandemic, and for Cypriot democracy in particular, which has been undergoing a legitimacy crisis in terms of high abstention, low trust in institutions, a generalised anti-politics sentiment, and corruption scandals.

This Special Section of The Cyprus Review will focus on The State and Organised Social Groups in the Republic of Cyprus. The issue intends to serve as a platform for inter-disciplinary studies in the domain of institutions and the nature,
quality and challenges of contemporary democracy in Cyprus. We encourage authors to contribute to this effort through interrogating various aspects of State-society relations, with focus on the interaction between political institutions or their bureaucracies on the one side and organised social actors that mobilise for particular beliefs or interests on the other side. At core, lies a key theme with four dimensions: the extent, ways, prospects, and limitations in the interaction between State and organised society.

We especially encourage original proposals on one or more of the following topics:

• Trade unions, sectional interests and the Cypriot State
• The State and value groups in Cyprus
• The State and emerging social movements
• Political and legal parameters of lobbying in Cyprus
• Local government structures and social groups
• Parties as linkage between social groups and the State
• Social group strategies towards the State
• The social roots of politicians in Cyprus
• State-society relations and crises
• Organised group experiences with public administration

This is not an exclusive list. Papers can research related aspects of State-society relations in the Republic of Cyprus and can be contemporary or historical in nature. All papers will be focused on Cyprus, so as to enhance Cyprological knowledge, but can be comparative in perspective.
Submission Instructions

- Authors should consult the Review’s guidelines for submission, which can be found at: http://cyprusreview.org/index.php/cr/about/submissions#authorGuidelines.
- Papers should describe the research question, locate Cyprus in theoretical and empirical debates on their subject and outline the methodology of the study.
- For specific academic enquiries, please contact The Cyprus Review via cy_review@unic.ac.cy.
- Interested scholars should send their papers to the email address cy_review@unic.ac.cy or submit their articles through our online platform available at the Review’s web page, not later than 1 February 2022.

All email submissions should be identified in the subject line with the heading CR S-OSG.