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Manuscripts should be submitted on the journal's website www.cyprusreview.org. Should you encounter any difficulties, do not hesitate to contact the Editorial Team of *The Cyprus Review* at <cy_review@unic.ac.cy>.

FORMATTING REQUIREMENTS

- Articles should range between 8,000-10,000 words.
- Documents should be submitted in **A4 format, 1.5-spaced lines, in a 12-pt type-face, Times New Roman font.**
- Pages should be **numbered** consecutively.
- An abstract of no more than **150 words** should be included together with a **maximum of ten (10) keywords** to define the article's content. The abstract and keywords should be placed at the beginning of the first page just after the article's title and before the main text.
- **Policy Papers:** Policy Papers on subjects relating to Cyprus should range between 4,000 and 7,000 words in length.
- **Book Reviews** are normally 2,000 words maximum in length. The **reviewer's name** should appear at the end of the review. Guidance notes are available for book reviewers. Headings should appear as follows:

Title

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(Place, Date), number of pages [pp.]

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SEPARATE FILES

- As manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the **author's name should appear on a separate covering page.** The author's **full academic address and a short bio of no more than 50 words** detailing current affiliation, areas of research interest and publications should also be included in the said cover page.
 - **Images, Tables, Figures, and Photos**
- *The Cyprus Review* has adopted a **strict BnW/no-more-than-three policy** regarding images and/or photos accompanying submitted articles. More than three (3) items can be accepted at the editorial team's discretion, **if (and only if)** they are deemed absolutely necessary for the sake of scientific completeness.
- In any case, the images should be submitted in **high resolution and black & white format.** The editorial team **retains the right** to place the images, photos, tables etc. in

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- Images, tables, figures, graphs, and photographs should be **numbered consecutively** with **titles**, and submitted in **separate file(s)**. A **copyright credit should be added, if mandatory, under a permissions agreement**.

GENERAL STYLE AND FORMAT

- *The Cyprus Review* uses **British spelling**, '-ise'/'-our' endings (e.g. 'organise' and 'organisation', 'labour' and 'honour'), and strongly supports the **Oxford comma**.
- Possessives of words (nouns and proper names) ending in -s (such as Cyprus, politics, Descartes etc.) should be formed by the addition of an apostrophe (') at the end of the word, e.g. Cyprus', politics', Descartes'.
- We would ask authors to use the following **formula in the headings (full capitals, as in CAPITALS, in headings are to be absolutely avoided)**.
- **Headings and subheadings** should appear as follows:

1. Part One

A. First Subheading

1. Second Subheading

(a) Third subheading

(i) Fourth subheading

- All **nouns, verbs and adjectives** on the **first three levels** should **begin** with **capital letters**.
- The word '**state**' should begin with a **capital 'S'** when it denotes a polity, e.g. the international community of States; **but** the state of play.
- **Acronyms** should be **capitalised** in full.
- **Basic legal material** (e.g. the Treaty on the Functioning of the European Union, United Nations Charter) and their **short titles or abbreviations** should begin with **capital** letters (TFEU, UN Charter). The same rule applies to the **titles of books, chapters, articles** etc. cited in the footnotes and in the references section.
- Sources written **in languages other than English** (for instance French or German) follow their own rules regarding the **use of capital letters**. In such cases, it is preferable to follow the **rules** applicable in the **source's original language**. For instance:

Christopher Staker, 'Public International Law and the Lex Situs Rule in Proprietary Conflicts and Foreign Expropriations' (1987) 58(1) *British Yearbook of International Law* 151.

Antony Anghie, *Imperialism, Sovereignty and the Making of International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2004).

Maarten Bos, 'Public International Law and Private International Law: Two Well Distinct Identities' ('Droit international public et droit international privé: deux identités bien distincte') in Jerzy Makarczyk (ed.), *Theory of International Law at the Threshold of the 21st Century: Essays in Honour of Krzysztof Skubiszewski* (The Hague/Boston MA: Kluwer Law International 1996) 89 (in French).

Georg Jellinek, *The Legal Nature of State Conventions: A Contribution to the Legal Construction of International Law (Die rechtliche Natur der Staatenverträge: Ein Beitrag zur juristischen Construction des Völkerrechts)* (Wien: Hölder 1880) (in German).

- Use **italics** for the following:
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Attorney General of the Republic v. Mustafa Ibrahim & Ors
Military and Paramilitary Activities in and Against Nicaragua
Distomo case
 - The titles of published books, e.g. Professor Emilianides' *Constitutional Law in Cyprus*
 - The titles of periodicals, journals, and review e.g. *British Yearbook of International Law*, *American Journal of Legal History*, *The Cyprus Review*
 - **Short foreign phrases**, names or individual words, e.g. *Areios Pagos*, *Cour de Cassation*, *sui generis*.
 - However, **Latin abbreviations or words commonly used** should not be italicised: cf., e.g., ad hoc, i.e., per se.
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'[...] gender equality in *every* aspect of economic and social life is a *basic* obligation for *every* state which ensures equal treatment for *all* citizens irrespective of their gender'.¹
 - ¹ Konstantinos Dimarellis, Christina Ioannou, 'Equal Treatment of Women and Men in Employment: An Analysis of the Cypriot and the Greek Legal Frameworks' (2018) 30(1) *The Cyprus Review* 259, 273 (emphasis added).
 - In a likewise manner, when the author wishes to **omit an emphasis** in a quoted passage, this should be explained in the corresponding footnote adding (emphasis omitted).
 - Emphasising by use of **Bold** is to **be absolutely avoided**. Exceptions may apply strictly for quoted passages where the original text already contains certain

emphasised passages in italics and the author wishes to add more emphasis in another part. The corresponding footnote should then contain the explanation: (italic emphasis in the original, bold emphasis added).

PUNCTUATION, FOOTNOTE INDICATORS, NUMBERS, AND ABBREVIATIONS

- **Quotations** must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling, and punctuation.
- Any **alterations** to the original should be noted (e.g. use **brackets [...]** to indicate omitted information).
- **Single quotation marks (‘ ’)** are to be used to denote direct quotes and **double quotation marks (“ ”)** to denote a quote within a quotation.
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- **Footnotes** should be placed **after the closing quotation mark** (‘ _____’1), unless a specific reference to a term within the quoted passage is made.
- In general, **footnote numbers should be placed after the punctuation marks**. Footnote indicators should follow full stops, commas, semi-colons, quotations marks, and brackets or parentheses (_____1 _____,1 _____;1 etc.).
- **Footnotes** should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes, and should be numbered **consecutively** in the text.
- **Acknowledgements, references to grants etc.** should appear within the footnotes.
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- **Em-dashes [—]** should be used as punctuation devices, introducing parenthetical phrases, **without a space in either side**.
- It is preferable **not to use hyphens**, when such a choice is **grammatically** available (e.g. coordination, transnational, intergenerational etc.).
- **Single parentheses ()** should be used for all comments, remarks, and explanations either in the main text or in the footnotes.
- **Brackets []** should be used in the following cases:
 - For the **publication year of reports/reviews lacking a volume number**, e.g. *A. Christodoulides v. The Republic* [1967] 3 CLR 356; Paul Craig, ‘Theory, “Pure Theory” and Values in Public Law’ [2005] *Public Law* 440.
 - For **modifications and explanatory remarks** within quoted passages.

- **Other parenthetical indicators and quotation marks**, such as **braces { }** or **Guillemets « »**, are to be **absolutely avoided**, even if preferred in the original language of a given source (e.g. French, Greek, or German).
- **Numbers one to ten** should appear in their **written form**, whilst numbers **above ten** should appear in **Arabic numerals**, e.g. one, nine, 11, 20, 100, 10,000).
- The **period sign (.)** should be used as a **decimal separator/radix** (e.g. 2.02 cm), while **comma (,)** as a **groups of thousand's separator**, e.g. 100,000,000.
- **Dates** should follow the **day month year format**, as in 1 January 2000.
- **Months** should not be abbreviated in any case (e.g. February; not Febr.).
- **Decades** should be referred to as the 1930s, the 2000s etc.
- **Centuries** can be written in numerals, e.g. the 21st century.
- **Abbreviations** should be followed by a full stop, e.g. Doc., Cf., Appl., Suppl.
- The abbreviated form of the word **'number'**, i.e. **No.**, should not be followed by a period.
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- The word **'edition'** (i.e. 1st edition, 2nd edition etc.) should be abbreviated as **edn** (**without a fool stop**, while the word **'translator'** as **tr.** (followed by a full stop).
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- **Acronyms and law report abbreviations** should **not** be followed by **full stops**, e.g. UN, EU, NATO, CLR, EWCA Civ, WLR.
- It is preferable to **avoid abbreviating the title of journals, reviews, yearbooks, and other periodicals**. Titles should be written **in full and italicised** accordingly, e.g. *Journal of European Legal Studies* instead of JELS. However the word **'and'** can be **replaced** with the ampersand sign (**&**), if and if only the ampersand is used in the official name of the respective journal, e.g. *The Law & Practice of International Courts and Tribunals*, *Law & Contemporary Problems*, *International & Comparative Law Quarterly*, *Science & Education*.

- The same rules apply to **publishing houses and university presses** (avoidance of acronyms, use of ampersand when adopted by the publisher), e.g. Harvard University Press, Taylor & Francis.
- In judgments and secondary sources with **more than three parties or authors** the abbreviation ‘& Ors’ or ‘et al.’ can be used respectively.
- When **introducing an abbreviation or short title of an entity’s or a source’s name**, the abbreviation should be stated **after the first mention of the entity or the source**.
- **Abbreviations of entities’ names** can appear **either in the main text or in a footnote**.
- **Sources** should be **abbreviated in the first footnote** citing them. Afterwards, the short title or abbreviation can be used in both the main text and the footnotes.
- **Avoid forming the possessive of a noun, when it is followed by an abbreviated or short form in parentheses**, e.g. the Third Post-Program Monitoring Discussions Staff Report of the International Monetary Fund (henceforth IMF) on Cyprus.

REFERENCES IN FOOTNOTES

- As a general rule, if a secondary source is authored, edited etc. by **more than three scholars [in which case the formula Name, Name & Name is applicable]**, it is advisable to write **just the first name** of the author/editor etc., as it appears in the original source, and add **et al.**
- If the source’s **original language is not English**, both the **title** and possible **quotes** should be **translated** into English.
- When a book, book chapter, or article is written in a **language other than English**, its **original title** should be stated in **eclipses ()**, **following the translated version**, using the **alphabet** (Latin or other) utilised by its **original** language. At the end, the **name of the language should be indicated** within **eclipses, i.e. (in)**.

Christina Ioannou, Demetris P. Sotiropoulos, Achilles K. Emilianides, *Cyprus in a New Era: Geostrategic Parameters, Economy, Foreign Policy (Η Κύπρος στη Νέα Εποχή: Γεωστρατηγικές Παράμετροι, Οικονομία, Εξωτερική Πολιτική)* (Nicosia: Hippasus, 2014) (in Greek).

Achilles C. Emilianides, ‘State and Church in Cyprus’ (‘Staat und Kirche in Zypern’) in Gerhard Robbers (ed.), *Staat und Kirche in der Europäischen Union (State and Church in the European Union)* (2nd edn, Baden-Baden: Nomos Verlagsgesellschaft, 2005) 231 (in German).

Georges Ténékidès, ‘The International Condition of the Republic of Cyprus’ (‘La condition internationale de la République de Chypre’) (1960) 6 *Annuaire Français de Droit International* 133 (in French).

- When a book has **more than one edition**, the **number of the cited edition** should be mentioned, **before** the rest of the **publication details**. The **translator** of the book, if existing, should be **mentioned before** the said details too. If the book has **several editions and different publishers** etc. (especially older books or classic works), the **date of first publication** should be mentioned. For instance:

Thomas Hobbes, *Leviathan* (first published 1651, London: Penguin 1985).

Charles de Visscher, *Theory and Reality in Public International Law* (Percy Ellwood Corbett tr., 1st edn, Princeton NJ: Princeton University Press, 1957).

Achilles Emilianides, *Family and Succession Law in Cyprus* (2nd edn, The Hague: Kluwer Law International, 2019).

- **Books**

[Author], [Title], [Vol. if from a series] [Volume’s number] [if applicable: *Volume’s title*] ([edn/tr.], [Place of Publication]: [Publisher, if not applicable omit], [Date]) [exact page if a direct quote or paraphrase].

When the **place of publication** is in the **United States**, it is advisable to state **both the city and the abbreviated version of the respective State’s name**, e.g. Boston MA, Cambridge MA, Chicago IL. The abbreviated version of the State’s name should follow the **USPS rules**, available at <https://pe.usps.com/text/pub28/28apb.htm>.

Furthermore **places of publication** which are **not major cities** may be accompanied by a **country indication**, e.g. Basingstoke UK or Harmondsworth UK.

Antônio Augusto Cançado Trindade, *The Access of Individuals to International Justice* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2011).

Jean-Marie Henckaerts, Louise Doswald-Beck, *Customary International Humanitarian Law*, Vol. 1 *Rules* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2005).

Polyvios G. Polyviou, *The Case of Ibrahim, the Doctrine of Necessity and the Republic of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 2015).

- **Edited Books**

[Editor (ed./eds)], [Title], [Volume, if from a series] ([edition], [Place of Publication]: [Publisher], [Date]).

Achilles C. Emilianides (ed.), *Religious Freedom in the European Union* (Leuven: Peeters, 2011).

Emilios Solomou, Hubert Faustman (eds), *Colonial Cyprus 1878-1960: Selected Reading* (Nicosia: University of Nicosia Press, 2010).

- **Journal & Yearbook Articles**

[Author], [‘Article Title’], (date) [Volume number](issue number) [*Full Title*] [first page of article], [page number if a direct quote or paraphrase].

Christina Ioannou, ‘The Problem of Collective Action: A Critical Examination of Olson’s Solution of “Selective Benefits”’ (2012) 2(3) *International Journal of Business & Social Research* 151.

Alain Pellet, ‘The British Sovereign Areas’ [2012] *Cyprus Yearbook of International Law* 57.

Jacques Ballaloud, ‘The Operation of the United Nations in Cyprus’ (‘L’operation des Nations Unies à Chypre’) (1976) 80 *Revue Générale de Droit International Public* 130, 161 (in French).

- **Chapters in Books**

[Author], [‘Chapter Title’] in [Editor (ed./eds)], [*Book Title*] ([Date]) [first page of chapter in book], [page number if direct quote or paraphrase].

Angelos Syrigos, ‘Cyprus and the EU: Sovereign State, Negotiations and Objections from an International Law Point of View’ in Andreas Theophanous, Nicos Peristianis & Andreas Ioannou (eds), *Cyprus and the European Union* (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 1999) 91.

Nikos Skoutaris, ‘Legal Aspects of Membership’ in James Ker-Lindsay, Hubert Faustmann & Fiona Mullen (eds), *An Island in Europe: The EU and the Transformation of Cyprus* (London: I.B. Tauris, 2011) 42, 60.

- **Unpublished Theses**

[Author], [Thesis title] ([Date, if available]) (LLM/PhD Thesis, [Name of the University], [Date]) or

[Author], [Thesis title] ([Date, if available]) (LLM/PhD Thesis, [Name of the University, [Date]], available at [insert full URL] (last accessed day month year).

Javan Herberg, ‘Injunctive Relief for Wrongful Termination of Employment’ (DPhil thesis, University of Oxford, 1989).

- **Internet Sources**

[Author (individual author/s if named, organisation if authors unnamed)], [*Title*], [date of publication (in parenthesis if year only)], available at [insert full URL] (last accessed day month year), at [page number if a direct quote or paraphrase].

UN Global Compact, UN Environment Programme, *Business and Climate Change Adaptation: Toward Resilient Companies and Communities* (2012), available at http://www.unglobalcompact.org/docs/issues_doc/Environment/climate/Business_and_Climate_Change_Adaptation.pdf (last accessed 1 December 2019), at 3.

- **Blogs**

[Author], '[Title]' ([*Name of the Blog etc.*], [Date of Publication in day month year format or just year if further details are unavailable]), available at [insert full URL] (last accessed day month year)

Dimitrios Kourtis, 'The Rohingya Genocide Case: Who is Entitled to Claim Reparations?' (*OpinioJuris*, 21 November 2019), available at <https://opiniojuris.org/2019/11/21/the-rohingya-genocide-case-who-is-entitled-to-claim-reparations/> (last accessed 1 December 2019)

- **News Papers**

[Author], '[Title]' [*Name of the Paper*] ([Place of Publication], [Date of Publication]) [page number]

Jane Croft, 'Supreme Court Warns on Quality' *Financial Times* (London, 1 July 2010) 3.

- **Cross-references**

Cross-references within the same work should be made as follows:

[Author – only surname], [number of the footnote where the work was first cited in the form of (no)] [page number]

If two different works of the same author are cited in the same footnote, it is advisable to use a short title.

¹⁴ Manley O. Hudson, 'The Proposed International Criminal Court' (1938) 32 *American Journal of International Law* 549.

...

²⁸ Hudson (no 14) 550.

OR

¹⁴ Manley O. Hudson, 'The Proposed International Criminal Court' (1938) 32 *American Journal of International Law* 549; id., 'Membership in the League of Nations' (1918) 24 *American Journal of International Law* 436.

⁴⁰ Hudson, 'The Proposed ...' (no 14) 550.

....

⁴⁵ Hudson. 'Membership ...' (no 14) 438.

REFERENCES (BIBLIOGRAPHY) SECTION

- For the **references (bibliography) section**, the same rules apply, provided that the surname of the authors, editors etc., precedes the name and other particulars. Names of the authors, editors etc. should be initialised. Diphthongs (St, Ch etc.) should be

preserved. The total number of an article's or book chapter's pages should be mentioned too. For instance:

In the footnotes

Lefkios Neophytou, Stavroula Valiandes & Christina Hadjisoteriou, 'Interculturally Differentiated Instruction Reflections from Cyprus Classrooms' (2018) 30(1) *The Cyprus Review* 397.

In the References

Neophytou L., St. Valiandes & Ch. Hadjisoteriou, 'Interculturally Differentiated Instruction Reflections from Cyprus Classrooms' (2018) 30(1) *The Cyprus Review* 397-408.

For the **citation of legal authorities**, *The Cyprus Review* strongly endorses the use of the **OSCOLA Reference Guide** (4th edn, 2012), available at:

https://www.law.ox.ac.uk/sites/files/oxlaw/oscola_4th_edn_hart_2012.pdf.



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**LETTER
FROM THE
EDITOR-
IN-CHIEF**

Dear Readers,

This issue of *The Cyprus Review* is exclusively based on papers that were presented in our major International Academic Conference on ‘Colonial Cyprus (1878-1960)’, which took place between 7-8 February 2020. As things turned out, this ended up being the only Conference that took place by physical presence this year. The Conference was held at the University of Nicosia and was dedicated to the memory of notable historian and former President of the Cyprus Society of Historical Studies Aristides Koudounaris (1936-2018). It was co-organised by the Cyprus Society of Historical Studies, the School of Law of the University of Nicosia, the Department of History and Archaeology of the University of Cyprus and the post-graduate programme in modern history of Neapolis University Pafos.

The Conference was a monumental moment in the course of history of Cyprological studies. More than 75 academics and researchers presented papers (in Greek and English) as part of the 16 parallel sessions, as well as the plenary session. The latter was marked by the keynote speech delivered by noted historian Professor Emeritus Robert Holland (Centre for Hellenic Studies, King’s College London), on the topic of ‘Cyprus and Anglo-Turkish Relations in the 1950s’.

This current issue features seven papers that cover a wide thematic prism in the colonial era of Cyprus. It sets off with a paper authored by Gabriel Haritos on Israel’s entry to Colonial Cyprus. The author provides an account of events that describe the actions of the Israeli diplomatic service aimed at promoting political ties with Britain and the British authorities in Colonial Cyprus during the early 1950s. This is followed by Nikolaos Stelgias’ and Magdalini Antreou’s paper, which explores the emergence of the Cyprus Republic from the Turkish Cypriot point of view. Savvas Michael’s article in turn examines the British role in creating Greek-Turkish Divisions in Colonial Cyprus and analyses the subsequent breaches of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in Post-Colonial Cyprus. Nadia Kornioti revisits the early period of British rule on the island, as a means of obtaining an improved understanding of the constitutional framework for Cypriot independence and, by extension, of the complexity of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean to this day. This is followed by Andrea Manoli’s article on children’s rights during colonialism, which investigates the legal and socio-legal position of children during British

colonial rule in Cyprus. The paper by Noly Moyssi and Barbara Stivarou examines the British Colonial policy of fabric rationing in Limassol during the Second World War, through an archival research of primary sources. Finally, Stalo Constantinou's paper focuses on rural Cyprus in the period 1920-1940, and investigates/compares two agricultural factories operating during that period under different conditions.

The articles are followed by the usual Book Review section. Finally, our latest Call for Papers can be found, which is entitled *COVID-19 in Doctrinal Context: Analysing, Theorising, and Surpassing the Pandemic Crisis*. Through this call we intend to further the scientific debate about the foundational questions raised by the current pandemic, the threats, challenges, and possibly opportunities created, as well as the doctrinal assessment of the systemic responses provided vis-à-vis this latest predicament.

Christina Ioannou
Editor-in-Chief

ARTICLES

Israel's Entry to Colonial Cyprus

GABRIEL HARITOS¹

Abstract

The article provides an account of events describing the actions of the Israeli diplomatic service aiming to promote political ties with Britain and the British authorities in Colonial Cyprus, during the first years of the 1950s. Based upon Israeli diplomatic documents of that period, the article describes the tensions between Israel and Britain, the Israeli diplomatic initiatives leading to the opening of the Israeli General Consulate in Nicosia, the efforts for the revival of the local Jewish institutions and the role of Israeli entrepreneurs, enabling the consolidation of their country's presence on neighbouring British soil.

Keywords: Colonial Cyprus, Israel, foreign policy, international relations, Israeli foreign policy, British foreign policy, 1950s

Toward a British-Israeli Regional *Entente*

As a result of severe outcry on the Israeli Press and repeated protests by the Israeli administration,² the British Detention Camps in Cyprus, closed permanently on 9 February 1949³ and their last detainees, all of them Jewish Holocaust survivors, were permitted by the British Colonial Authorities of Cyprus to leave the island and settle permanently in the young State of Israel.⁴ This development was meant to conclude a sensitive aspect during a long period of rigid relations between Brit-

¹ Dr Gabriel Haritos, Postdoctoral Research Fellow, Azrieli Centre for Israel Studies at the Ben Gurion Research Institute, Ben Gurion University of the Negev.

² Cf. Helmuth Lowenberg, 'Israel' (1950) 51 *American Jewish Year Book* 399 available at http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1950_14_Israel.pdf (last accessed 2 September 2020).

³ 'Last Jewish DP's Leave Cyprus; British Soldiers Shout *'Shalom'* in Enthusiastic Farewell' *JTA-Daily News Bulletin* XVI(35) (New York NY: 11 February 1949) 1 available at http://pdfs.jta.org/1949/1949-02-11_035.pdf?_ga=2.38102243.1142929139.1599043423-1076808890.1598955470 (last accessed 2 September 2020).

⁴ British Colonial Authorities' decision came after Foreign Secretary's Ernst Bevin declaration at the House of Commons on 18 January 1949 according to which Jewish detainees interned to Cyprus were permitted to leave to Israel. Cf. 'Commons Postpones Palestine Debate; Bevin Announces Cyprus Detainees to Be Freed' *JTA-Daily News Bulletin* XVI(15) (New York NY: 19 January 1949) 1 available at http://pdfs.jta.org/1949/1949-01-19_015.pdf?_ga=2.7122930.1142929139.1599043423-1076808890.1598955470 (last accessed 2 September 2020).

ain and the Zionist movement, taking place in Mandate Palestine for years. With Israel declaring its independence on 14 May 1948 and the 1949 Rhodes Armistice Agreements coming into force, Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion had no desire to aggravate his government's relations with London, despite Britain's negative neutrality towards Israel, by abstaining from voting on both motions to allow Israel's full membership in the United Nations.⁵

Israel declared its independence in May 1948, with the end of the British Mandate in Palestine. However, this development did not immediately signal the start of full diplomatic bilateral ties between Israel and Britain. It was not until five months after the Jewish Detention Camps in Cyprus had closed that Israel appointed Mordechai Eliash, a jurist and academic, as its chargé d'affaires in London, who presented his credentials to King George VI of England on 10 June 1949,⁶ following Britain's official declaration regarding the *de facto* recognition of the new State, on 5 April 1949.⁷ Yet it took another twelve months for Britain to recognise Israel *de jure*, on 28 April 1950.⁸

Ben-Gurion knew very well that in order for Israel to earn the trust of the United States and the West, it would have to improve Israel's relations with Britain. This

⁵ On 29 November 1948 Israel submitted to United Nations Security Council its first application for admission in the UN. Although the United States and the Soviet Union voted in favour, Britain abstained, stating that this move might 'diminish the chances of an early settlement in Palestine. On 24 February 1949 Israel submitted its second application to the United Nations Security Council, and Britain abstained again. Cf. Louis Shub, 'Israel' (1950) 51 *American Jewish Year Book* 385 available at http://www.ajcarchives.org/AJC_DATA/Files/1950_14_Israel.pdf (last accessed 2 September 2020).

⁶ 'King of England to receive Israel's chargé d'affaires' (ל'ארשי ריצ תא לבקי ילגנאה ד'למיה), *Ha'Tzofeh* (Tel Aviv, 10 June 1949) 1 (in Hebrew) available at <http://jpress.nli.org.il/Olive/APA/NLI/SharedView.Article.aspx?parm=dXFORtWvLQf9Gqs/TL6nbwD6Ml5hZJSUFQ01C5rPs1JS3TvX7Ii00gOFsKCL5SxNY-w%3D%3D&mode=image&href=HZH/1949/06/10&page=1> (last accessed 2 September 2020).

⁷ Cf. 'Dr. Mordechai Eliash, Israel Envoy to Britain, Dies. Burial to Take Place in Jerusalem' *JTA-Daily News Bulletin* XXVII(49) (New York NY: 13 March 1950) 6 available at http://pdfs.jta.org/1950/1950-03-13_049.pdf?_ga=2.225593690.192170799.1598955470-1076808890.1598955470 (last accessed 2 September 2020).

⁸ Besides proceeding to *de jure* recognition of Israel, on 28.4.1949 Britain also acknowledged East Jerusalem's annexation by Jordan. The Foreign Office appointed an Ambassador to Tel Aviv and two Consuls to Jerusalem, one in the Israeli (western) sector of the city and one in the Jordanian (eastern) sector. Cf. 'Britain recognised *de jure* the State of Israel and the Annexation' (הריו-הד הריכה הינטירב) *Davar* (Tel Aviv, 28 April 1950) 1 (in Hebrew) available at <http://jpress.nli.org.il/Olive/APA/NLI/SharedView.Article.aspx?parm=o9Sbi1WIsHdoejWFtHsh3QUfr8tCAhiy8wZ8X-5uQda4Ov7mimzFHhMso66pt4gU%2BYw%3D%3D&mode=image&href=DAV/1950/04/28&page=1> (last accessed 2 September 2020).

fact was pointed out in several occasions, during Israel's initial contacts with Turkey – the only country in the Middle East and the East Mediterranean maintaining full diplomatic relations with Israel at that time.

Since both Israel and Turkey needed a powerful regional ally, in addressing the Israeli Ambassador in Ankara, Turkish Foreign Minister Mehmet Fuad Köprülü could not have been more specific, as he was quoted by Elyahu Sasson's report: 'You need to understand that military cooperation between Israel and Turkey is predicated on a military cooperation between Israel and Britain'.⁹ Fuad Köprülü repeated the same condition to the high-ranking officer of the Israeli Army, Moshe Dayan, when they met during the latter's official visit to Ankara in 1950. Similar incitations were expressed to Eliahu Elath, Israel's Ambassador to London, by his Turkish counterpart.¹⁰

The Israeli side was not indifferent to the Turkish suggestions. At the UN Headquarters, Israeli and British Delegations initiated contacts thanks to the intercession of the Head of the Turkish Permanent Delegation, Selim Sarper.¹¹ Meanwhile, intense consultations had been launched amongst Britain, the United States, Turkey and Israel on the possibility of establishing a Western joint defence mechanism in the Eastern Mediterranean, whilst Britain was already seriously considering the eventuality of shifting the focal point of its military presence in the region away from the Suez Canal and towards neighbouring Cyprus.¹²

Israeli diplomacy adopted the position that, in the event of a new war in the region, Britain would be called upon to take on the main bulk of defence in the Middle East, since the protection of the Suez Canal was not of interest only to Britain, but to all member-states of the Commonwealth. At the same time, London was bound by defence treaties entered into with the pro-Western regimes of Iraq and Jordan,

⁹ Israel State Archives /RG93/MFA/8692/3 Research Division (226/26 February 1951). Included in this report is an account by Eliahu Sasson, Israel's Ambassador to Ankara, on the working meeting he had in January 1951 with the Turkish Minister of Foreign Affairs, Mehmet Fuad Köprülü.

¹⁰ ISA/RG93/MFA/8692/3 Research Division (215/11 February 1951). Excerpt from Sasson's report from Ankara referring to Dayan's meetings with the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs.

¹¹ ISA/RG93/MFA/8692/3 Research Division (215/11 February 1951).

¹² ISA/RG93/MFA/8692/4 Research Division (380/16 October 1951). The report features an account of the progress made in the consultation between the US, Britain and Turkey in the matter of the establishment of the Supreme Allied Command Middle East (SACME) against the background of the possibility of Egypt also been taken into account as of that particular defence project. Egypt's ultimate refusal to be part thereto seems to have seriously impacted developments in that enterprise that was eventually doomed to fail.

while London was maintaining key strongholds in Cyprus, Basra, Aden and Alexandria.¹³ For its part, the Foreign Office saw an alliance between Israel and Turkey as ‘a reliable and effective support for British presence in the area in all possible aspects’.¹⁴ It also described Israel as a ‘Bastion of Democracy in the Middle East’ as well as ‘England’s Natural Ally’. At the same time, British diplomats believed that, in the event of a Soviet-backed attack in the Middle East, one could not say with certainty that the Arab states would fall on the side of the West. Moreover, their military forces – with the single exception of the Jordanian Arab Legion – were not considered battle-worthy, compared to the Turkish and Israeli armies.

In a retrospect, according to the Israeli point of view, when Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion, was addressing the Knesset on November 5, 1951 in order to give an account of his first official visit to the United States in May 1951, during which he met with the President of the United States, Harry Truman, along with other high-rank State Department officials, he considered it a given that Western countries were deluded into thinking they would ever find a reliable ally in the Middle East other than Israel. Specifically referring to Nasserist Egypt, Israel’s leading regional adversary at that time, Ben-Gurion precluded the failure of attempts by the US, Britain and Turkey to include Egypt in order to form a regional military alliance in the Eastern Mediterranean, an ambitious venture that never materialized.¹⁵

According to Ben-Gurion’s belief, it was only a matter of time before the West came to terms, not only with Israel’s importance, but also its dependability in the region. Despite the considerable size of their territories and their population, the Arab countries did not ideologically identify themselves with the value system of the West. Thus, sooner or later, any attempt by the West to collaborate with the Arab world would be destined to failure.

‘But how can the United States and England believe that Egypt will fight to defend Democracy and Freedom in the world, while at the same time, there is neither democracy nor freedom within Egypt itself? It was not Egypt’s army that saved

¹³ ISA/RG93/MFA/8692/3 Research Division (216/13 February 1951). Report by Eliahu Elath, Israel’s Ambassador to London, to the Western Europe Division.

¹⁴ Ibid. Particularly interesting was Elath’s assessment, according to which the financial and military assistance provided by the US to Greece, Turkey and Persia was not associated to any formal commitment to provide military protection to those countries in the event of a Soviet invasion. Elath concluded that Britain’s presence in the Middle East remains more important when compared to the US’s.

¹⁵ David Ben Gurion, *The Country’s Problems. Israel’s Foreign Policy* (‘הגידמה ליש תוייעב’) (Jerusalem: Sherutey ha’Modiin, 1951) 16 (in Hebrew).

Egypt from Rommel. It was the armies of the British, the Australians, the New Zealanders, the Indians and the Jewish Legions who fought on the side of the British army. If at some point Egypt were to take delivery of American or British arms, it would not use them for any other purpose other than to turn them against Israel. And that is exactly what we have already told the Americans and the English', said David Ben Gurion with particular emphasis in his speech before the Knesset on 5 November 1951.¹⁶

Israeli Diplomatic Presence in Colonial Cyprus; The Initial Steps

As diplomatic relations between Israel and Britain were normalised after Israel's *de jure* recognition on 28 April 1950, British Colonial Cyprus became the only administrative entity, several nautical miles off the Israeli Mediterranean coasts, with which Israel did not share any kind of dispute whatsoever. On the contrary, Cypriot harbours and airports could facilitate Israel's commercial contacts with the rest of the world, while an Arab economic boycott was about to be implemented. Cyprus might also serve as the closest transit point for the Jews from the Diaspora, on their way to permanently settle in Israel. However, this was predicated on the existence of good diplomatic relations between Israel and the British Colonial Authorities in the neighbouring island.

As early as the summer of 1949, immediately after the signing of the Armistice Agreements, which granted *de facto* borders to the young Jewish State, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs was already getting prepared to establish its presence in Cyprus by placing a Honorary Vice-Consul in Nicosia.

Initially, Gabriel Berdy, a British subject of Jewish descent and permanent resident of Larnaca, was selected to fill the position. Berdy and his family had settled in Cyprus in the early 20th century, in a small village named Marko at Nicosia Province, as part of the Jewish farming settlement project financed by the Jewish Colonisation Association (JCA) and Baron Maurice de Hirsch.¹⁷ In 1923, JCA decided to discontinue financing the programme and withdrew from Cyprus for good in

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Yair Seltenreich & Yossi Katz 'Between the Galilee and its Neighbouring Isle: Jules Rosenheck and the JCA Settlements in Cyprus, 1897-1928' (2009) 45(1) *Middle Eastern Studies*, 87 available at <https://www.tandfonline.com/doi/abs/10.1080/00263200802547693> (last accessed 2 September 2020) and Yossi Ben Artzi 'Historical Perspectives on Jewish Rural Settlement in Cyprus 1899-1939' in Giorgos Kazamias, Giorgos Antoniou (eds.) *Historical Perspectives on Cypriot-Jewish Relations* (Nicosia: University of Cyprus, 2015) 13-17.

1927, after selling off the large piece of farmland it had purchased at Marko. The Jewish families living in Marko and surrounding villages left, some of them for Israel, and others for Europe. The Berdy family were one of the few Jewish families to remain in Cyprus and settle in the village of Kouklia in Famagusta Province.¹⁸ No sooner had the British detention camps in Cyprus become operational during the period 1946-1949 than 30-year-old Gabriel Berdy offered his services to the detainees and, together with the rest of the few remaining members of the local Jewish community, saw to the maintenance of the Jewish cemetery in Marko.¹⁹ At the same time, Berdy himself worked closely with Prodromos Papavassiliou, then a member of the Municipal Council of Famagusta, and other Greek-Cypriots residing in Famagusta, assisting both the Jewish detainees in Karaolos and *Haganah* cells, that entered Cyprus secretly in a number of ways.²⁰

By way of a memo addressed to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on 19 September 1949, the Israeli Ministry of Jewish Immigration and Absorption (the 'Ministry of *Aliyah*') proposed that the duties of *Aliyah* Officer (Jewish Immigration Officer) be assigned to Gabriel Berdy along with the duties of Honorary Vice-Consul.²¹ The *Aliyah* Officer was responsible for decreeing whether Diaspora Jews applying for

¹⁸ Ata Atun, 'Initiative to colonise Cyprus with Jews in the 20th Century' (2011) 3(3) *International Journal of Academic Research* 790 available at <https://www.docdroid.net/YhTArF/initiatives-to-colonise-cyprus-with-jews-pdf> (last accessed 2 September 2020). According to civil registry sources, in September 1946 there were four Jewish families living in the village of Kouklia, Province of Famagusta. One of these was the family of Michael and Rosa Berdy. Their son, Gabriel Berdy, was 31 years old at the time. Since August 1974, Kouklia is controlled by Turkish military forces and it is renamed Köprülü.

¹⁹ About the preservation of the Jewish cemetery in Marko Cf. Yadin Rodan "The Forgotten Jews of Cyprus' (July-August 2001) *Eretz Magazine* 26 available at <http://www.erezt.com/NEW/article/Cyprus%20jews.pdf> (last accessed 2 September 2020) as well as Menachem Weinstein, *Religious Zionism in the Outskirts of the Land of Israel – 'Ha'Avodah' Movement at the Cyprus Detention Camps.* (צ'יסי'רפקב רצעמה רונחמב הדובעה תעומת. לארשי ירא ילושב תיתד תנויצ) (Nir Galim: Beit ha'Edot le-Moreshet ha'Tzionut ha'Datit ve ha'Shoa, 2001), 170 (in Hebrew).

²⁰ The Society for the Preservation of Israel's Historic Monuments (לארשי תשרומ ירתא רומישל הצעומה) maintains the website www.maapilim.org.il (last accessed 2 September 2020), which provides ample information on the Museum of Cyprus Detention Camps (Atlit, Northern Israel), including an alphabetical list of names of Greek-Cypriots who helped Jewish detainees, either during their detention in the Cypriot Camps of Karaolos, Dhekelia and Xylotymou or in their attempts to flee. Aside from Prodromos Papavassiliou, then Municipal Councillor at the Municipality of Famagusta, all other Greek-Cypriots are listed only by their first name or their code names. The database is accessible at <http://maapilim.org.il/search.asp?lang=HEB&dlang=HEB&module=notebook&page=criteria&rsrvr=1@1¶m=%3Cuppernav%3E-complex%3C/%3E¶m2=&site=maapilim> (last accessed 2 September 2020).

²¹ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Ministry for Immigration and Absorption (Ministry of *Aliya*) to the Ministry of Foreign Affairs. (027/142/462/7573 – 19 September 1949).

permission to enter and settle in Israel met the conditions for obtaining special travel documents in accordance with the Israeli Law of Return, and then issuing the relevant entry visas. This proposal was met favourably by the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs and on 21 September 1949 a letter was sent to Berdy, informing him in writing of his appointment as Honorary Vice-Consul of Israel in Cyprus and assigning him the additional duties of *Aliyah* Officer.²² The Israeli Foreign Ministry's Division for Consular Affairs then sent Berdy's credentials on to Israel's Diplomatic Mission in London to complete the necessary process at the Foreign Office in London, so they could then be forwarded to the Colonial Headquarters in Nicosia.²³

Though the Israeli credentials had already reached Gabriel Berdy in Cyprus,²⁴ the Foreign Office's International Treaty Division sent a document to the Israeli Diplomatic Mission in London on December 14, 1949 raising objections and invoking the opposition of the Governor of Cyprus, who purportedly found that Berdy 'may perhaps not be entirely suitable for appointment as Honorary Consul'. Moreover, Britain instructed Israel to appoint another person to the position and recommended David Slonim, a British subject of Jewish descent permanently residing in Cyprus. Slonim was the owner of the *Cyprus-Palestine Plantation Company Ltd.*, operating a plant nursery in Pisouri (Limassol Province), who it 'is believed, would be prepared to accept the appointment if it were offered to him'.²⁵ The Foreign Office letter unequivocally concluded: 'If your Government still desires to proceed with the appointment of Mr. Berdy, we should not wish to withhold recognition from him'.²⁶

The Secretary of the Israeli Diplomatic Mission in London, Mordechai Kidron, transmitted the British ultimatum to Israel, proposing that Berdy's appointment be cancelled, 'as the Government of Cyprus would only make life difficult for him', on

²² ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs to Gabriel Berdy (MH5990/21 September 1949).

²³ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Consular Affairs Division to Israel Diplomatic Mission in London (7125/20/1171/7/π – 28 November 1949).

²⁴ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Berdy to the Consular Affairs Division (1120/7/1-6 December 1949)

²⁵ The Cyprus-Palestine Plantation Company Ltd. had been registered with the relevant Cypriot corporate registry since January 1933. David Slonim, an agronomist of Russian-Jewish origin, ran the farming unit in Pissouri. Cf. Evangelia Mathopoulou 'Pioneers in a Stagnant Economy: The Jews in British Cyprus, 1899-1939' in Giorgos Kazamias, Giorgos Antoniou (eds.) *Historical Perspectives on Cypriot-Jewish Relations* (Nicosia: University of Cyprus, 2015) 39-41.

²⁶ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. British Foreign Office (SW1 Section) to the Israeli Embassy in London (T11876/31/385 – 14 December 1949).

the one hand; on the other, Kidron suggested that, for reasons of prestige, Israel should not conform with Britain's demand to choose whom it considered *most appropriate* to represent Israel's interests in Cyprus.²⁷

Despite repeated attempts by Gabriel Berdy to receive some kind of explanation from the local British Authorities,²⁸ the reason for which he had been rendered *inappropriate* for the duties of Israel's Honorary Vice-Consul was never officially specified,²⁹ nor did they ever explain to him why David Slonim was *more appropriate* than himself.³⁰ Nevertheless, their attitude was not groundless: In August 1948, Gabriel Berdy had been arrested by the British on suspicion of helping Jewish detainees escape from Karaolos Detention Camps.³¹ On the other hand, however, Israel was also reluctant to comply with London's orders, particularly after the increased strain on diplomatic relations preceding the definitive closure of the Cyprus Camps in February 1949.³² Thus, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs decided to tacitly reject the *appropriate* candidate, indicated by London.³³ In an effort to put the whole issue to rest, however, the Israelis were ultimately forced to revoke Gabriel Berdy's appointment as well.³⁴

That was not the end of the matter, however. The Israelis did want a diplomatic representation on the island in order to upgrade Israeli-British diplomatic relations

²⁷ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Michael Comay, Head of the British Commonwealth Division, to Mordechai Kidron, First Secretary of the Israeli Embassy in London (ZL/PK/3568 -19 December1949).

²⁸ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Berdy to Zvi Avnon, Head of the Consular Affairs Division (not officially logged) and Comay to Kidron (FO/D/1120/17468 – 31 January1950).

²⁹ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Comay to Walter Eytan, Director-General of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs (1561/20/1120/3/π – 5 January1950) and Kidron to Comay (ZL/RK/35055 –16 January1950).

³⁰ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Kidron to Comay (ZL/RK/35171-22 February1950). Following the clarifications requested by Berdy in Cyprus, the British side reacted yet more vehemently to the prospect of Berdy's appointment. More specifically, in the cable cited above, Kidron writes from London to Comay: 'Dunbar (from the FCO Treaty Division) phoned me and in a most apologetic and hesitant manner said that the Cyprus Government had replied to his second enquiry in even stronger terms than the first. They now said that Mr Berdy would be definitely unacceptable to them, whereas the first time they had merely expressed the hope that his candidature would not be pressed. They again proposed Slonim'.

³¹ 'Imprisonment of Jewish Illegal Immigrants' (Φυλακίσεις Εβραίων Λαθρομεταναστών) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 6 August 1948) 1 (in Greek).

³² ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Comay to Kidron (FO/D/1120/20/13283-2 January 1950). Comay, in responding to Kidron, wrote: 'We feel no obligation to appoint Slonim based solely on the fact that the Cypriot authorities threw that particular name into the hat'.

³³ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Avnon to the British Commonwealth Division (28536/20/1120/1/π -12 March1950) and Comay to Kidron (FO/D/1120/20/23161 – 6 March1950).

³⁴ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Avnon to Berdy (24001/20/1120/7/π-9 March1950).

and facilitate Jewish Immigration (mainly from Iraq) through Cypriot ports and airports. At the same time, it became a matter of honour to teach the Foreign Office a little lesson, which insisted on having a say as to who would be suitable or not to defend Israeli interests abroad - and particularly in Colonial Cyprus. Thus, despite the financial cost, the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs eventually decided to place a career diplomat in Nicosia, rather than an unpaid, Honorary Vice-Consul. By so doing, the British would not be able to raise objections as to the person selected to fill the post.³⁵

After a relatively brief period of training, Yerachmiel (Ram) Yaron (born Robert Lustig), a police officer until that time, joined the Israeli diplomatic corps on June 1, 1950 in order to serve as Israel's Consul in Cyprus. The selection of this particular person was by no means fortuitous: Yaron had served as Head of Police Interrogations when Palestine was under British Mandate. At the same time, he was a *Haganah* informer, a fact possibly already known to the British. After the declaration of Israel's independence, Yaron was appointed to the Israeli Police General Staff as Head of Interrogations.³⁶ The phrasing of a letter sent on 29 July 1950 by Zvi Avnon, Director of the Israeli Foreign Ministry's Consular Affairs Division, to the Israeli Ambassador in London, Avraham Kidron, explained why Yaron had been selected specifically to serve in Cyprus:³⁷ 'For reasons of order, may it be reminded that given the aforementioned is an Israeli citizen, commissioned to Cyprus as an ordinary Foreign Affairs Ministry officer, there can be no issue of his arrival being predicated on previous approval by the competent British Authorities'. When London learned of Yaron's placement, the Foreign Office remained absolutely silent for two weeks. Finally, on 14 August 1950, the *Agrément*³⁸ approving Yaron's appointment was issued, but not before a number of reminders by the Israeli Diplomatic Mission to the British Foreign Office.³⁹

The Israeli Consulate in Nicosia became operational on 28 August 1950, provisionally housed in a room of the Ledra Palace Hotel. The act of provisional recogni-

³⁵ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11 Memo from Avnon to Comay (26894/20/1120/1/π-6 March 1950).

³⁶ About Yaron's biography and diplomatic career see David Tidhar (ed.), *Encyclopaedia of the Yeshuv Pioneers and Builders* (יינובו בושייה יצולחל דיפולקיצינא) (5) 2288 (Tel Aviv: 1952) (in Hebrew) available at <http://www.tidhar.tourolib.org/tidhar/view/5/2288> (last accessed 2 September 2020).

³⁷ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11 Avnon to Kidron (67981/20/1120/7/π - 29 July 1950).

³⁸ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11 Kidron to Comay (20/1171/7 - 14 August 1950).

³⁹ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11 Avnon to Kidron (MH10322 - 21 July 1950) and Comay to Kidron (MH10501 - 6 August 1950).

tion of Yerachmiel Yaron as Consul General of Israel in Cyprus was published in the Cyprus Gazette two days later.⁴⁰

The inauguration of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia was greeted with by the Israeli Press, touting the fact that in Cyprus, a strong reminder of the years of hardship in Mandate Palestine, the Jewish state now enjoyed its own official diplomatic presence and could interact 'on equal terms with its former jailers'. Extensive coverage by the Israeli newspaper *Maariv* gave the impression that numerous Jewish families filed papers with the newly appointed Consul to be allowed to settle permanently in Israel and that local Cypriots were massively rushing to the Consulate to obtain their visas as soon as possible in order to seek care at Israeli hospitals. No other Israeli diplomatic mission abroad had created such a stir amongst Israeli journalists. Typically, *Maariv* even listed the name of the sole consulate employee – the personal secretary to the Consul, '*Mrs Shoshana Mizrahi from Jerusalem*'.⁴¹

In 1950, the diplomatic corps in Colonial Cyprus comprised a total of six career Consuls - representing the United States, Greece, Turkey, Egypt, Lebanon and Israel - as well as fifteen Honorary Consuls, all of Greek-Cypriot origin.⁴² Israel's Consulate General acquired permanent premises in October 1950,⁴³ at 2, Adonis str. in Nicosia.⁴⁴

The Role of the local Jewish Community

Yerachmiel Yaron's first concern, when he started his service as Israel's Consul General in Cyprus was to rally the local Jewish element and establish a legal status for

⁴⁰ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia, September 1950 (not officially logged).

⁴¹ T. Levita, '*The First Day of the Israeli Consulate in Cyprus – Family of Jewish immigrants requested entry visa to Israel, Patients Want to Be Cured by Our Doctors – Y. Yaron's Duties in Moddle East's Monitoring Centre*' (ישארה מוידה) 'ידיקפת – וניאפור לצא אפרתהל מיצור מילוח, תוויוו תשקבמ מילוע תחפשמ – יסירפקב לארשי תיילוסנוקב וישארה מוידה' *Maariv* (Tel Aviv, 17 September 1950) 3 (in Hebrew) available at <http://jpress.nli.org.il/Olive/APA/NLI/SharedView.Article.aspx?parm=E11RkzkwrzmJ/WOSX4nlvUdf/gRHTAVKP8DKc2dFcro8dHYloundoQp820qv2HYg5Y-w%3D%3D&mode=image&href=MAR/1950/09/17&page=3> (last accessed 2 September 2020).

⁴² ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate at Nicosia, September 1950 (not officially logged)

⁴³ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia, October 1950 (not officially logged).

⁴⁴ Israeli Consulates Directory (1953-1954) *Government Year-Book 5714* (Jerusalem: Government Printer, 1953) 160.

the local Jewish Community. According to his first monthly activity report for the month of September 1950,⁴⁵ there were a total of just 200 Jews living on Cyprus – people of ‘Jewish national conscience’, as he stated. Of these, 30% were British citizens permanently established on the island, 5% had Israeli citizenship and the rest were citizens of third countries or were stateless. Of Cyprus’ Jewish dwellers, 20% spoke Hebrew, while most lived in Larnaca. Yaron had contact with the local Jewish Welfare Committee, which was set up during the period 1946-1949, in order to provide humanitarian aid to inmates of the Detention Camps in Karaolos area.

On September 10, 1950 elections were held for the Board of Directors of the Jewish Community of Cyprus, though its members seemed less than willing to become more actively involved. Indicatively, only 32 people came to vote. Furthermore, it was not long before intense divisive trends were manifested between members of the newly elected four-member Board of Directors of the Jewish Community and a sizeable number of Jews who insisted that the Jewish Welfare Committee continue to remain active and represent them. In September 1950, acting on Yaron’s encouragement, the newly elected Board of Directors completed all legal formalities and obtained approval from the local authorities, establishing the legal status of the Jewish Community of Cyprus, based in Larnaca.⁴⁶ After numerous attempts, Yaron managed to rally the Jews of Cyprus around the Israeli Consulate. In December of that year, the few Jews living scattered through the island’s larger towns were convinced to attend the traditional religious ceremonies held at the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia in observation of *Hanukkah*.⁴⁷

As was the case in other countries where Israel maintained diplomatic missions, so too in Cyprus, the Israeli Consul’s first priority was to determine whether the local Jewish element was in a position to effectively exert any influence over the decision-making centres. This approach came in accordance with Prime Minister David Ben-Gurion’s conception of how local Jewish Communities living abroad might become an important and effective diplomatic tool, enabling Israel to promote its interests to foreign governments and decisionmakers. This fact was pointed out dur-

⁴⁵ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia, September 1950 (not officially logged).

⁴⁶ Ibid.

⁴⁷ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia, December 1950 (not officially logged).

ing his address to the Knesset in 5 November 1951 when he divided the countries of the world into three main distinct categories, depending on the possibilities of their associating with Israel's interests and policy. The first category included countries not wishing to establish relations with Israel, either because they were hostile towards it, or because of agendas of their own which were not directly linked to Israel. Ben-Gurion mentioned the Arab countries, Pakistan, Afghanistan and Ethiopia as the typical examples of this specific category. The second category involved states with whose governments Israel retained relations but not with their citizens, or with the Jewish communities living there. Such cases were the Soviet Union and the People's Republics in Eastern Europe. The third category included the States with which Israel maintained relations, both with their governments, their citizens and the local Jewish communities. The common characteristic of those countries was that they were all Western-type Parliamentary Democracies. Given all the above, and due to the crucial role Jewish Diaspora should play in shaping Israel's foreign policy and interconnection with foreign governments, it was essential that Israel should maintain constant contact with the Jewish Communities abroad, which might be in a position to exert influence on local authorities, decisionmakers and government officials. In Ben-Gurion's opinion, this could happen more easily and effectively in the countries belonging to his 'third category of state', benefiting from pluralism and a Western-type Parliamentary Democracy.⁴⁸

It is obvious that, according to Ben-Gurion's '*categorisation of countries*', Britain belonged to the third category, enabling the Jewish Community in Britain to communicate in an effective way with decisionmakers in London. Nevertheless, the 'Britishness' of Cyprus did not change the fact that the island was under colonial rule and the local administrative system did not match Ben-Gurion's conception of a Western-type Parliamentary Democracy. Despite this important fact, due to the extremely low numbers of Jews residing in Cyprus at the beginning of the 1950s', the local Jewish community was practically unable to become an effective mediator before the local British Colonial Authorities, in order to promote Israeli interests – a reality that the first Israeli Consul General in Nicosia, Yerachmiel Yaron, was facing during the very first period of his service in Nicosia. In fact, according to Yaron's monthly reports, the Jewish community in Cyprus practically had no influence over the local British authorities, nor over the leadership of either of the two major ethnic communities on the island – Greek and Turkish. In 1950, the Jews living on the

⁴⁸ Ben Gurion, *Beayot ha'Medina*, 5-8.

island were scattered around various Cypriot towns and were seemingly reluctant to cultivate any sense of cohesion amongst themselves. Despite concerted efforts by the Israeli Consuls who succeeded Yaron over the next few years, international Jewish organisations were not eager to financially support the local Jewish Community, mainly because of its limited number of members.⁴⁹ Specifically, Consul Avraham Kidron, Yerachmiel Yaron's successor, wrote to the Chief Rabbi of the British Armed Forces in November 1954 in an effort to convince him to provide practical support for the Jewish presence on Cyprus. Kidron's main argument cited the significant number of Jews living on the island who, he said, should not be neglected. According to Kidron, in late 1954, a total 59 Jewish families (126 people) lived in Cyprus: 25 Jewish families (52 persons) in Nicosia, 20 families (44 persons) in Larnaca, six families (12 persons) in Limassol, four families (seven persons) in Famagusta, two families (six persons) in Kyrenia, a family of two persons in Morphou and a family of three persons in Marko.⁵⁰ Ultimately, Kidron's endeavours were for naught and the number of Jews living in Cyprus diminished all through the 1950s'. Therefore, Israeli diplomacy was obliged to find alternative ways to establish an effective presence in Cyprus, in order to consolidate a framework of sustainable common interests with the local British Colonial Authorities. But still, this was not exactly easy – at least not during the initial period of the Israeli diplomatic presence on the island.

Unforgotten British-Israeli Tensions of the Past

Over the first months of the Israeli Consulate's operation in Nicosia, British Foreign Office's objections as to the person to be appointed Israel's Honorary Vice-Consul on the island still echoed in the air. Britain may have recognised Israel *de jure* in April 1950, but the chill in their bilateral relations persisted.

Typical of the unpleasant situation was the incident that occurred when the local Customs Authorities announced that diplomatic pouches addressed to the Israeli Consul would be subject to special controls. The announcement triggered a most

⁴⁹ ISA/RG93/MFA/2155/4 The persistent pleas by Avraham Kidron for financial and institutional assistance to the Jewish Community of Cyprus over the second half of 1954 and through to early 1955, directed at Israel's Embassy in London and other Jewish bodies based in Britain and in Israel, fell on deaf ears: Kidron to Rekhavam Amir, Israeli Consul in London (1254/4/7 – 22 September 1954), Kidron to Amir, (1311/4/7-8 October 1954), Kidron to the Jewish Agency/Department of Education and Culture of the Jewish Diaspora (1619/4/7 – 17 December 1954) and Kidron to London's Anglo-Jewish Association (CSS/PR-23 December 1954).

⁵⁰ ISA/RG93/MFA/2155/4 Kidron to Y. Levi, Chief Rabbi of the British Armed Forces (letter dated 22 November 1954, not officially logged).

vehement reaction – both verbal and written – by Consul Yaron to the Assistant Secretary on Consular Affairs at the British Foreign Office.⁵¹ In the end, all diplomatic pouches were delivered to the Israeli Consulate unopened and the Secretary of the Colony apologised in writing. Nevertheless, British authorities did not reassure that such an incident would not be repeated in future – a fact Yaron noted in his report.⁵² Such a treatment of the Israeli Consul reserved by the British authorities was probably related to Yaron's resistance actions as an undercover *Haganah* informer, when Palestine was then under the British Mandate.

In the public sphere, local British media were not friendly toward Israel either. A clear indication was felt when English-speaking Cypriot newspapers were espousing the positions of the local British Authorities, which were openly critical of the Israeli government. Characteristic was the approach of an article, published on January 12, 1951 by the local daily newspaper *Cyprus Mail* under the title *150 Jews turned back from Israel*, which had as follows:

‘150 Jewish men, women and children on board the s/s *Buntaş* when she called at Limassol last week were a sad party indeed.

Their plight recalled that of so many emigrants to Palestine during the period of the Mandate. More bitter, in fact, for they have been turned away from the «Promised Land» by their own Jewish State, and not by a foreign mandatory Power.

They had not been allowed to land and were returning whence they came on the steamer which brought them to Israel. The reason appears to be that the young State of Israel, unable to feed its rapidly growing population, has to refuse entry to unauthorised immigrants, just as did the British during the much-vilified Mandate.

To make this state of affairs more tragic, one hears of Jews wishing to leave Israel owing to lack of opportunity there and being prevented from doing so.

The ‘Wandering Jew’ of the Biblical legend does not seem as yet to have escaped his misfortunes’.⁵³

⁵¹ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division (2/2/7/7 – 8 November 1950).

⁵² ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division. Monthly Activities Report of the Israeli Consulate in Nicosia, November 1950 (not officially logged).

⁵³ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 ‘150 Jews turned back from Israel’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 12 January 1951).

This newspaper article drew strong reaction from the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, which rushed to refute it as a fabrication,⁵⁴ and Consul General Yaron responded to the newspaper's Chief Editor with the following strongly worded and lengthy letter, dated 17 January 1951:

'Dear Sir,

In the issue of your newspaper, dated the 12th January, 1951, there appeared an item under the heading '150 Jews Turned Back From Israel' which, I am authorised to state, is completely untrue. The *s/s Buntaş*, a Turkish ship of 350 tons gross weight, arrived in Haifa Port on the 27th December, 1950, carrying on board 202 immigrants, four returning residents and two tourists – all of whom were allowed to land without any difficulty or delay.

One of the fundamental laws of the State of Israel (the *Law of Return*, 5710) expressly confers on every Jew the privilege of returning to his Homeland – thus entitling every person who professes to be a Jew, to enter the State of Israel and to settle in it. Since the inception of the State not a single Jew has been refused entry into Israel and, it might be added, members of our Knesset, irrespective of party affiliation, are rigorously on their guard that this basic constitutional privilege should never be infringed.

It is true that the State of Israel has to strain its resources to the utmost to provide means for the absorption of immigrants (over 500.000 have migrated during the 31 months of the existence of the State, almost doubling its Jewish population) and a strict scheme of rationing is being enforced to ensure fair distribution of supplies to all. So far, Israel has managed to feed its population by abiding by the strict regime of rationing, willingly undertaking every sacrifice for the liquidation of the Diaspora. The comments contained in paragraph 3 of the above item seem, therefore, rather malevolent, tending to cast a slur on the people of Israel and its Government. They are certainly not based on true facts: Not a single person, Jew of Gentile, has ever been turned back from the shores of our country because of the, admittedly, difficult food situation.

As to the second last paragraph of the 'news item': Persons desirous of leaving Israel in order to return to their former countries of residence or with a view of settling elsewhere, are absolutely free to do so; nobody has ever been forced to live in Israel against his will. I also venture to suggest that the implication of a tendency to 'prevent Jews wishing to leave Israel from doing so' is somewhat

⁵⁴ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Comay to Yaron (3979/17 January 1951).

inconsistent with the imputation that Jews are being turned away. Certainly not a very logical strain of thought.

It is to be regretted that your Limassol correspondent acted rashly, upon misleading information obviously supplied to him by an ill-disposed source, and that you have found it practicable, without checking the veracity of the story, to print the item, which betrays a tendency to disparage the epic struggle of the Jewish nation for the redemption of its Diaspora.

I have the honour to be,

Sir,

Yours truly,

(Y. R. Yaron)

Consul of Israel'.⁵⁵

During the second half of 1950 and early 1951, underlying tensions were high between the Israeli Consulate and the British colonial establishment. However, a few months later, everything seemed to be forgotten.

Israeli Entrepreneurship in Colonial Cyprus: An Effective Apparatus

With the normalization of the diplomatic relations between Israel and Britain, Colonial Cyprus was gradually proving itself to be quite welcoming to Israeli investors. Given the circumstances of the time, the presence of Israeli entrepreneurs on the island throughout the 1950's was especially important, particularly in the public works sector. A report to the Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs' British Commonwealth Division, dated 7 May 1953 and signed by the Israeli Vice-Consul in Nicosia, Eliezer Merom, who was in charge of economic affairs of Israeli businesses and individuals abroad, is quite revealing as to Israeli entrepreneurship in Colonial Cyprus.⁵⁶

Already by mid-1950, British military and political analysts had been designating Cyprus as the most likely alternative to be opted for in the event of relocation of a sizeable volume of British military forces, in case of evacuation or partial withdrawal from the Suez Canal. In that same year there was the procurement proceed-

⁵⁵ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Yaron to *Cyprus Mail* Chief Editor, 17 January 1951.

⁵⁶ ISA/RG93/MFA/2155/10 Eliezer Merom, Vice-Consul in Nicosia to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division (031/101/7 – 7 May 1953). The report was prepared following a question from the Ministry of Finance regarding the taxable assets of Israeli entrepreneurs doing business in Cyprus.

ings launched towards the construction of an extended camp, featuring permanent military warehouses, in Dhekelia, a project of an estimated budget of £10 million. Works on the development of the first section of the Dhekelia camp construction project, worth £2 million, was launched in November 1952. *Solel Boneh*, Israel's most important construction company was party to the venture, together with *CY-BARCO* (Cyprus Building and Construction Co.), a Cypriot construction company funded by Israeli investors. *Solel Boneh* had Israeli foremen and logistical staff dispatched and permanently located in Cyprus through to the completion of the project. By mid-1953, *Solel Boneh* managed to make its presence felt in Cyprus even more, through maintenance works at the RAF hangars and by taking on other public works, while gradually, it began to expand its activities into the private sector as well.

In 1952, *Ha'Khevera ha'Merkazit le-Shikun u-Vinian*, another Israeli company, founded a Cypriot subsidiary under the name *Panta Selfter*, as well as establishing the *Cyprus Middle East Constructing Co. (CYMEACO)* in a joint venture with local Greek-Cypriot entrepreneurs. That same year, the Israeli *Cyprus Drilling and Engineering* was registered with the Cypriot company register and embarked on the construction of infrastructure to provide electricity to the island's British military camps. In light of strong reservations manifested by British officials, as to whether Cyprus was indeed sufficiently equipped with appropriate infrastructures, in the event of British forces having to relocate from their actual base in Suez, the launching of extensive public works was absolutely necessary, in order to ensure the possibility for Navy war crafts docking, the loading and unloading of military ammunitions, a more fluid movement of military forces throughout the island etc. Serious consideration was being given to building military warehouses and airports and to extending the existing road network.⁵⁷ The Israeli construction companies saw the extensive public works in Cyprus as a major business opportunity. Since they were unable to conduct business in the neighbouring Arab states, Cyprus was the only option open to them – with the exception of Turkey, where *Solel Boneh* had already succeeded in developing a sizeable presence. In mid-1953, as the British authorities started developing a major military base in Episkopi, Israeli construc-

⁵⁷ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3 Mordechai Gazit, First Secretary of Israel's Embassy in London to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, West Europe Division (65437/362/21 -25 March 1953) Comments on presentation at an event hosted by the Royal Central Asian Society in London entitled: 'Cyprus Since the War and to this Day'.

tion companies were eager to take part in the venture. At the same time, other Israeli investors had also begun taking an interest in the Cypriot market, notably in the area of farming.

Israeli business presence in Cyprus was to become even more visible on 9 November 1950 when, in cooperation with the *Louis* Greek-Cypriot travel agency, the Israeli national air carrier *El-Al* inaugurated regularly scheduled flights connecting Nicosia, Tel Aviv and Istanbul.⁵⁸ Within this encouraging environment for Israeli investors, the Israeli Coastguard in March 1951 acquired a second-hand boat from the British Coastguard in Cyprus,⁵⁹ whilst the island's airports and seaports were developing into crucial transit hubs for Jews fleeing Iraq and Eastern Europe to settle permanently in Israel.

By 1954, while Cyprus was becoming the most important British stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean, all signs pointed to the likelihood that this development would attract even more Israeli investors and entrepreneurs to the island. The Israeli Ministry of Foreign Affairs, therefore, considered it essential for the new Consul, who was about to succeed Yerachmiel Yaron in autumn 1954, to be able to handle efficiently trade-related issues.⁶⁰ At the same time, though, the new Consul General would also have to act as military attaché, since the regional cooperation between Israel and Britain was then in the fore.⁶¹ The culmination of this rapprochement was the joint Israeli-British-French military operation in Egypt, which was meant to happen two years later, during the Suez Crisis.

Conclusion

In the very first years of its independence, Israel considered Jewish Diaspora as one of its foreign policy main apparatus, in order to promote bilateral diplomatic relations with foreign governments. Colonial Cyprus, which was the nearest British soil, situated just a few miles off the Israeli Mediterranean northern coastline, was of great importance due to its strategic position, able to facilitate Jewish Immi-

⁵⁸ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3. Yaron to Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division, Activity Report for November 1950. Ceremony at the Nicosia Airport on 9 November 1950, date of EL-AL's inaugural flight from Nicosia to Tel Aviv.

⁵⁹ ISA/RG93/MFA/2156/3. Yaron to Ministry of Foreign Affairs, British Commonwealth Division, Activity Report for March 1951 (225/100/7 -16 April 1951).

⁶⁰ ISA/RG130/MFA/2584/11. Gideon Shomron of the British Commonwealth Division to Arthur Lourie, Deputy General Secretary of the Israel Ministry of Foreign Affairs (6 March 1954, not officially logged).

⁶¹ Ibid.

gration from Eastern Europe and the Arab world. Furthermore, Cypriot ports and airports were of crucial importance for Israeli imports and exports, given that the Arab economic embargo was in effect.

Israeli diplomatic presence was essential, not only for the completion of bureaucratic procedures but also for promoting bilateral political relations with Britain, the most influential international power in the Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean. Nevertheless, uneasy relations between Israel and Britain just after the Jewish armed struggle against the Mandate and the First Arab-Israeli War in 1948 on the one hand, and on the other hand the lack of an influential Jewish presence in Cyprus itself, were not facilitating Israel's willingness to improve its relations with Britain.

Gradually, the right answers were given by Israel's private sector. Israeli entrepreneurship in Colonial Cyprus created an effective background for both Israeli and British decisionmakers, enabling them to strengthen ties between Israel and Britain within the local Cypriot economic realities and to further consolidate their *Entente*.

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The Emergence of the Cyprus Republic from the Turkish Cypriot Point of View: *Halkın Sesi*'s stance towards the bicommunal endeavour and its clash with local Greek and English language newspapers (1959-1960)

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Abstract

This article attempts to add to the limited yet very informative knowledge regarding the period 1959-1960 and fill a gap in modern Cypriot historiography. It sheds light on the role played by Halkın Sesi in the establishment of the bicommunal republic. Besides, it focuses on the interaction of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper with the other local media of the period. The article discusses the positive aspects and the complications which emerged during the transitional period. Furthermore, it summarises the attitude of the local newspapers towards the power-sharing project, the role of the economic factors, the overshadowing the basic constitutional principles, and the emergence of segregate electoral democracies during the establishment of the short-lived bicommunal Cyprus Republic.

Keywords: Cyprus Problem, decolonisation, Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots, *Halkın Sesi*, press

Introduction: The emergence of bicommunal democracy through the eyes of *Halkın Sesi*

My request to all my friends (Turkish, Greek) is that they focus their energy on one point, which is to work hand in hand to sow the seeds of happiness in this land. We have countless things to do ahead. We all agree that our path is tough and difficult. However, there is no doubt that if we act in good faith we will be able to defeat all the difficulties early. We are the ones who will give Cyprus an honourable place among the nations of the world. The independence, freedom, and honour are Cyprus' rights. I would like to stress that the understanding and

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cooperation of Turkey, Greece and Britain resulted in an agreement granting rights and freedoms to both communities of the island. This is the best service that could be done to world peace and humanity. Our task is to follow the strategy of these three governments and work to build a permanent peace on the island.³

On 16 August 1960, the day of the proclamation of the new republic, the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community delivered this speech as the British colonial administration was handing over the baton of governance to the bicomunal Republic of Cyprus. The speech was published by *Halkın Sesi* which like the other newspapers in Cyprus informed its readers that the transitional period and the process of transferring power was completed. As the last Governor of Cyprus, Sir Hugh Foot, put it this was a transition from ‘colonial rule to Agreement rule’.⁴

The declaration of independence was a product of the decolonisation process which peaked between February 1959 and August 1960. Cyprus was governed by the British as a protectorate since 1878 and then as a colony since 1925. According to the census of 1960, Cyprus had a population of just over half a million divided mainly between the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot community and the most significant minority of Turkish Cypriots.⁵ The third-largest community on the island was comprised of British citizens, many of which belonged to the government and military personnel stationed in Cyprus. At the top of the administration was the British Governor, who since the widespread upheaval of October 1931, ruled in the absence of an advisory body. The Governor exercised his enhanced powers by often resorting to strict policing measures in the face of the politicisation of the urban and rural populations by the local nationalist elites.⁶

The island was a small underdeveloped country with a chiefly agricultural economy. As Argyriou mentions ‘Throughout colonial rule, Cyprus remained a country

³ ‘Dr. Fazıl Küçük’ün Dün Yaptığı Konuşmanın Metni.’ (The Text of Dr. Fazıl Küçük’s Yesterday Speech) *Halkın Sesi*, (Nicosia: 16 August 1960). All translations belong to the authors.

⁴ Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 2002) 331.

⁵ ‘Census of Population and Agriculture 1960’ (Republic of Cyprus 1960) [https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1240A557C7D9F399C2257F64003D0D54/\\$file/POP_CEN_1960-POP\(RELIG_GROUP\)_DIS_MUN_COM-EN-250216.pdf?OpenElement](https://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1240A557C7D9F399C2257F64003D0D54/$file/POP_CEN_1960-POP(RELIG_GROUP)_DIS_MUN_COM-EN-250216.pdf?OpenElement). (last accessed 27 January 2021)

⁶ For this period analytically see Heinz A Richter, *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus, 1878-2009* (Rutzen, 2010); Stavros Panteli, *A History of Cyprus: From Foreign Domination to Troubled Independence* (London: East-West Publications (U.K.) Limited, 2000); William Mallinson and Bill Mallinson, *Cyprus: A Modern History* (IB Tauris, 2005).

with backward economy'.⁷ Further, as Anderson states, there was a close relationship between economic poverty and hostility towards British rule. In this framework, the Greek Cypriot community's political demands as well as the claims for economic development intensified during and after the World War II period.⁸ According to Yiangou, Cyprus' contribution to the War forced the British to allow some degree of return to political life permitting the nationalist and leftist forces to re-surface.⁹ Overall, as Papadakis et al. underline:

'The British colonial period witnessed the rise of Greek and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus. Greek Cypriots strove for enosis, the union of Cyprus with Greece [Enosis], while Turkish Cypriots initially expressed a preference for the continuation of British rule and later demanded Taksim, the partition of the island. From 1955, the Greek Cypriot enosis struggle assumed the form of an armed insurrection led by EOKA (National Organization of Cypriot Fighters). In 1958, Turkish Cypriots set up their armed organisation, TMT (Turkish Resistance Organization).'¹⁰

From 1955 through 1959, the British used several strategies for restoring law and order without the expected results.¹¹ Thus, London steadily turned its attention to the aim of reconstructing its position in Cyprus.¹² At the end of 1958, all the parties involved in the civil conflict, meaning the British, Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, Athens, and Ankara began searching for a compromise. Succumbing to various external pressures dictated among other by the Cold War¹³ circumstances the Athens-Greek Cypriot front sacrificed the national aspiration of Enosis. Similarly, the Ankara-Turkish Cypriot front abandoned their demand for Taksim. The

⁷ Sophia Argyriou, 'The Imperialistic Foundations of British Colonial Rule in Cyprus' (2018) 30 (1) *The Cyprus Review* 297–316, 302

⁸ David M. Anderson, 'Policing and Communal Conflict: The Cyprus Emergency, 1954-1960' (2008) 21 (3) *The Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 177-207.

⁹ Anastasia Yiangou, 'The Political Impact of World War II on Cyprus and Malta' (2014) 23(1) *Journal of Mediterranean Studies* 101-112, 107

¹⁰ Yiannis Papadakis, Nicos Peristianis, and Gisela Welz, *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, and an Island in Conflict* (Indiana University Press, 2006), 2.

¹¹ Andreas Karyos, 'Britain and Cyprus: 1955-1959: Key Themes of the Counter-Insurgency Aspects of the Cyprus Revolt' in Mihalis Sozos-Theodoulou Contos, Christos Panayiotides, Nicos Alexandrou Haralambos (eds) *Great Power Politics in Cyprus: Foreign Interventions and Domestic Perceptions* (Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2014) 33-53.

¹² David French, *Fighting EOKA: The British Counter-Insurgency Campaign on Cyprus, 1955-1959* (Oxford University Press, 2015) 299.

¹³ Andreas Stergiou, 'Soviet Policy Towards Cyprus' (2007) 19(2) *The Cyprus Review* 83-106.

compromise was sealed in 1959 when all the interested parties signed the Zurich and London Agreements initiating the process of decolonisation in Cyprus.¹⁴ The transitional period which entailed the transfer of power from the colonial government to the independent bicomunal republic begun with the activation of three committees. First, the Transitional Committee and the Joint Council in charge of 'preparing for transferring authority' second, the London Joint Committee on Cyprus tasked with 'settling the question of the British military requirements' and third, the Joint Committee (also called Constitutional Committee) assigned with 'creating the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus'.¹⁵

The negotiations for the establishment of the independent Republic of Cyprus were part of a broader process of decolonisation which was progressing worldwide. During the brief period of approximately three decades which followed the Second World War, some intercontinental empires dissolved.¹⁶ In this decolonisation process, several factors played a crucial role. As Dülffer, Frey, McIntyre, Osterhammel and Jansen argue, the political and social changes occurring in the colonies led gradually to the emergence of national liberation movements. The economic and military strength of the empires declined while fresh challenges emerged. Under these circumstances, the empires searched for a formula which would appease the rebellious colonies and reinvent their role in the periphery. From the 1950s onwards, the initial policies dictating violence in dealing with the insurgencies gave way to the emergence of a strategy of compromise. Within this framework, the empires transferred power, meaning the legal and institutional sovereignty, to their former colonies through negotiation processes, avoiding great upheaval in the home front. Thus, new standardised political units aligned with the post-war international law standard emerged worldwide, and the old empires transformed their roles in various parts of the world.

¹⁴ Alan James, 'The Making of the Cyprus Settlement, 1958-1960' (1998) 10(2) *The Cyprus Review* 11-32.

¹⁵ Hubert Faustmann, *Divide and Quit? The History of British Colonial Rule in Cyprus 1878 - 1960 Including a Special Survey of the Transitional Period February 1959 - August 1960* (PhD Thesis, Universität Mannheim, 1999).

¹⁶ Jost Dülffer and Marc Frey, (eds) *Elites and Decolonization in the Twentieth Century* (Palgrave Macmillan 2011); David McIntyre, *British Decolonization, 1946-1997: When, Why and How Did the British Empire Fall?* (London and New York: Macmillan International Higher Education, 1998); Jürgen Osterhammel and Jan C Jansen, *Dekolonisation: Das Ende der Imperien* (Decolonisation: The End of Empires) (C.H. Beck, 2013).

Halkın Sesi and the two local newspapers studied in this article followed closely the developments of the period that led to the establishment of bicomunal democracy. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper, like its colleagues *Eleftheria* and *Cyprus Mail* have engaged in a vibrant dialogue which illuminates various aspects of the decolonisation process in Cyprus. To date, this archive has attracted limited interest from the scientific community. By failing to take into account all the parties involved, mainly the Turkish Cypriot actor, scholars have neglected the thorough evaluation of the decolonisation process in Cyprus. This paper attempts to fill this gap and add to the existing knowledge by shedding light on the complications which emerged during the transitional period. The study attempts to find answers to several important questions such as: What was the attitude of the local newspapers towards the power-sharing project? What was the role of economic factors? What kind of complications arose prior to the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus? What was the echo of the emerging segregate electoral democracies in the front pages of *Halkın Sesi* and other local newspapers? What was the role of the local newspapers during the last period of decolonisation?

The Turkish language *Halkın Sesi*, was first published in 1942 in Nicosia by Dr Fazıl Küçük. The newspaper aimed to protect the rights and interests of the Turkish Cypriot community and to resist both the Greek Cypriot aspirations for Union with Greece and the British colonisation. During the decolonisation period, *Halkın Sesi* mirrored the official positions of the Turkish Cypriot leadership.¹⁷ *Eleftheria* is a Greek language paper published first in 1906 in Nicosia by the brothers Demosthenes and Kyros Stavriniades.¹⁸ From 1954 onwards the paper passed to the daughter of Demosthenis, Militza Garuana.¹⁹ Since its establishment, *Eleftheria* was considered a conservative newspaper. During the period in question, it echoed the positions and opinions of Archbishop Makarios and his followers. The English language *Cyprus Mail*, first published in 1945 in Nicosia, was very popular amongst the British living in Cyprus. Throughout this period, the newspaper, which is described as politically conservative, reflects the views of the British colonising forces in Cyprus.²⁰

¹⁷ Nikolaos Stelgias, *Ο Αγώνας Της ΕΟΚΑ, 1955-1959, Στα Πρωτοσέλιδα Του Τουρκοκυπριακού Τύπου* (The EOKA Struggle, 1955-1959 in the Turkish Cypriot Press) (Nicosia: Mass Media Institute, 2014).

¹⁸ Andreas Sophocleous, *Συμβολή Στην Ιστορία Του Κυπριακού Τύπου* (Contribution to the History of Cyprus Press) (Nicosia: Intercollege Press, 2003), 131–37.

¹⁹ Aristides Koudounaris, *Βιογραφικό Λεξικό Κυπρίων* (Biographical Dictionary of Cypriots) (Nicosia: Pierides Foundation, 1995), 289–90.

²⁰ Andreas Sophocleous, *Η Λογοκρισία Του Τύπου Στην Κύπρο Κατά Την Αγγλοκρατία (1878-1960)*

The emergence of the bicomunal democracy through local newspapers, their role, hopes and quarrels

As it is known, the Zurich Agreement is the result of the United Nations' (recent) decision. The three (guarantor) states, knowing that the fulfilment of this decision is their duty, came to a conclusion and a new agreement emerged. As the people of Cyprus, we must be in line with the decision imposed on us. Leaving aside the arguments and criticisms, we must work tirelessly to bury the nightmare, which has been spreading fear and horror in the skies of Cyprus for years.²¹

This opinion article authored by the leader of the Turkish Cypriot community was published by *Halkın Sesi* a few days since the signing of the London Agreement. Dr Fazıl Küçük pointed out to the members of his community that under the circumstances, the task of all Cypriots was to complete the decolonisation process through the transfer of power from the island's colonial administration to the Republic of Cyprus. At the time of Dr Küçük's article, the widespread decolonisation process characterised the post-war scene. A similar procedure emerged on a global level leading local political elite to assume the control of the institutional sovereignty of the ex-colonies.²² On several cases, the new governments of the former colonies made an effort to keep the political and the national unit congruent. In extend, the notion that there is a unity of culture and territory was the basis of their legitimacy.²³

In Cyprus' case, the cultural composition of the island along with the political and geostrategic balances of the period forced the implementation of an original formula. The signatories of the final settlement aimed at the 'political and constitutional communal segregation' attempting to appease the nationalist aspirations of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.²⁴ The final settlement granted to the majority the sense of control under an independent state and at the same time offered constitutional equality to the minority. Also, the founding agreements furnished the

(The Censorship of the Press in Cyprus During the British Occupation (1878-1960)) (Nicosia: En Typois, 2014).

²¹ Fazıl Küçük, 'Zaman Gösterecektir' (Time Will Show) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 2 March 1959).

²² McIntyre, (no. 12) 8.

²³ Dane Keith Kennedy, *Decolonization: A Very Short Introduction* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016).

²⁴ Faustmann (no. 13)

three guarantor powers with significant rights for perpetuating the constitutional balance. During the first months following the signing of the Treaty of London, this compromise strengthened the hopes for the success of the new bicomunal democracy. *Halkın Sesi* appeared to be in harmony with the Greek and English language newspapers on two issues summarised below.

First, despite initial disagreements, the dialogue between the two community leaders in the Transitional Committee was fruitful. *Halkın Sesi* wrote that the Turkish Cypriot community was pleased to see Archbishop Makarios elected to the Presidency of the Republic of Cyprus.²⁵ *Eleftheria* for its part, reassured all citizens that the Greek Cypriot leadership was determined for the success of the republic.²⁶

Secondly, a similar climate of cooperation was also observed in the thorny issue of revising Great Britain's position in Cyprus. The former colonial power, which was also one of the guarantor powers, secured under the founding agreements the perpetuation of its presence in the island through its two military bases in Dhekelia and Akrotiri.²⁷ In the final phase of the complicated negotiations in the London Joint Committee²⁸, the two communities joined their forces and overcame transient disagreements regarding the British Bases. The Greek Cypriot side faithful to its anti-colonial agenda tried to limit both the territory and the effect the bases would have on the daily lives of the local population.²⁹ The British on the other hand insisted on a bases area of 120 square miles.³⁰ Despite several attempts to settle the issue, the impasse between the two lasted until the mid-1960s, causing a delay in the republic's establishment.³¹ During the deadlock, the Turkish Cypriot leadership

²⁵ Şafi Alper, 'Makarios Kazandı' (Makarios Won) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 16 December 1959).

²⁶ 'Η Συγκληθείσα Χθες υπό του Εθνάρχου και του κ. Κιουτσούκ Δημοσιογραφική Σύσκεψις' (Yesterday's Press Conference of the Ethnarch and Kutsuk) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 5 July 1959).

²⁷ Costas M Constantinou and Oliver P Richmond, 'The Long Mile of Empire: Power, Legitimation and the UK Bases in Cyprus' (2005) 10 (1) *Mediterranean Politics* 65–84; Faustmann (no. 13)

²⁸ 'Müşterek Komite İlk Toplantısını Yaptı' (Joint Committee Held Its First Meeting) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 24 March 1959).

²⁹ 'Ο Εθνάρχης εις Μακράν Συνομιλίαν του μετά του Σάντυς Υπεγράμμισε την Άποψιν του Λαού, Όπως Μη Περιληφθούν Κατωκημένα Περιοχά εις τας Βρετανικάς Βάσεις εις Κύπρον' (The Ethnarch after his long conversation with Sandys underlined the people's opinion that inhabited areas should not be included in the British Bases) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 25 April 1959); 'New Plan for Bases Put up in London' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 6 October 1959); 'Urgent Talks on the Bases- Pyla Camp to Be H.Q. of Permanent Brigade' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 22 April 1959).

³⁰ 'İngilizlerin Son Teklifleri de Kabul Şayan Bulunmadı' (The Last Proposals of the British Were Also Not Accepted) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 25 November 1959).

³¹ 'İngilizler Londra'da Yeni Teklif Yaptı' (British Made New Offer in London) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23

which supported the Greek Cypriot proposal for a British bases area of 36 square miles³² intensified its contacts with the two sides.³³ In this context, the Turkish Cypriot leadership submitted in April 1960 a compromising proposal of 100 square miles.³⁴ Despite the initial British veto, the proposal opened a window of opportunity for compromise.³⁵ In mid-June, Turkey's military command, which overthrew Turkey's government in a military coup a month earlier, announced that it was in favour of the compromise proposal.³⁶ Soon after the two communities which deployed a common front in the negotiations signed the 99-square-mile agreement approved by all parties on 2 July 1960.³⁷

It should be noted that during the transitional period, the national radios of Turkey and Greece also supported the dialogue and cooperation of the two communities. Local newspapers often reproduced these broadcasts which through their interventions helped set the political and diplomatic agenda on the Cyprus Issue. In general terms, the interventions of the two foreign radios were in favour of the bicomunal Republic of Cyprus. The foreign radios urged the two communities to remain focused on the aim of cooperation, suppress all the 'troublemakers (boz-guncular)', and be faithful to the agreements.³⁸

October 1959); Yavuz, 'Hala Mı Tarafsızlık' (Still Neutral?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23 October 1959); 'Οι Τούρκοι Συνετάχθησαν με τους Βρετανούς επί του Θέματος της Υπηκοότητας – Κρίσις εις την Μικτήν Επιτροπήν του Λονδίνου.' (The Turks sided with the British on the issue of citizenship – Crisis at the London Joint Committee) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 23 June 1959).

³² 'Üslerle İlgili Müzakerelere Cumartesi Günü Başlanacak' (Negotiations for the Bases Will Begin on Saturday) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 1 April 1960).

³³ 'Tabiiyet ve Üstler Mevzusunda Görüşme Yapıldı' (Discussions on Nationality and Superiors) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 17 November 1959).

³⁴ 'Dr. Fazıl Küçük Üsler Mevzuunda Yeni Bir Uzlaştırıcı Teklif Sundu' (Dr. Fazıl Küçük Submitted a New Conciliatory Proposal on Bases) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 3 April 1960).

³⁵ '100 Mil Kare Yerine 99 Mil Kare Mi?' (99 Square Miles Instead of 100?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 13 April 1960).

³⁶ 'Rum Siyasi Çevrelere Göre: Kıbrıs Cumhuriyeti Temmuz'da İlan Edilecek. Başbakan Orgeneral Gürsel Bir Formül Göndermiş' (According to Greek Cypriot Political Circles: The Republic of Cyprus Will Be Declared in July. Prime Minister Gen. Gursel Sent a Formula) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 13 June 1960.)

³⁷ 'Kıbrıs Meselesinde Halledilmemiş Bulunan Mevzularda Anlaşmaya Varıldığı İlan Edildi' (It Was Declared That an Agreement Has Been Reached on Unresolved Issues in the Cyprus Issue) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 2 July 1960).

³⁸ 'Ankara Radyosu Ne Diyor? Cumhuriyet Kurulacak ve Selamlanacaktır' (What Does Ankara Radio Say? The Republic Will Be Established and Greeted) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 5 November 1959); 'Ankara Radyosu Bozgunculara Ne Diyor?' (What is Ankara Radio Saying to the Defeatists?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 4 November 1959).

During the transfer of power from the colonial government to the republic, despite the positive attitude of Ankara and Athens and the agreement of the two leaderships on at least two issues, *Halkın Sesi* disagreed with the Greek and English language newspapers of Cyprus on a variety of topics. Furthermore, the existing problems in the bicomunal relations were affected by the local newspapers' standpoint which functioned as a 'magnifying glass'.

In this context, *Halkın Sesi* often republished brief quotes from the local Greek language newspapers which then used to criticise the Greek Cypriot positions on various issues. For instance, the newspaper claimed that due to the Greek Cypriot side's stance, the prospect of partition remained:

We have a cinema. It is called Taksim. We have a football field, and its name is the same. They are so annoyed by that name. If a third Taksim is born from the Enosis and Ohi, heard from their mouths, then they should not blame anyone.³⁹

From *Halkın Sesi's* point of view, *Eleftheria* was against the 'Turkish-Greek cooperation' in Cyprus.⁴⁰ Also, it cultivated the illusion that the Turkish Cypriots were aiming to seize the whole of Cyprus⁴¹ and it rejected the principle of political equality:

The 'Eleftheria' claims that concessions granted to Turks increase their appetite and that they have come up with new demands. The paper tells us that "Zurich has given you three deputies, which we have to accept, but we will make these deputies puppets". Although the Zurich Agreement eliminates the concept of the majority and states that the two communities should govern Cyprus jointly, the Greeks still talk about majority rights and respect of the minority.⁴²

For *Halkın Sesi*, the agreements established the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots, and this provision had to be applied at all levels of the bicomunal democracy stretching from the presidency to the lowest-level government posts.⁴³ As the newspaper mentioned, *Eleftheria* aimed instead to exclude Turkish Cypriots from important government posts.⁴⁴ *Halkın Sesi* also exchanged accusations with

³⁹ 'Hepsi de Aym Kafada' (All with the Same Mentality) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 5 April 1960).

⁴⁰ Şafi Alper, 'Rum Basımının Sakat Görüşleri' (The Crippled Views of the Greek Cypriot Press) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 18 May 1959).

⁴¹ Şafi Alper, 'Eleftheria Saçmalıyor' (Eleftheria's Nonsense) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 4 June 1959).

⁴² 'Artık Yeter' (It's Enough) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23 June 1959).

⁴³ 'Bir Açıklama' (An Explanation) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 22 September 1959).

⁴⁴ Yavuz, 'Yersiz Bir Müdahale Daha' (Another Pointless Intervention) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 21 October 1959).

other Greek and English language newspapers of Cyprus. In mid-1959, the Turkish Cypriot newspaper attacked *Fileletheros*, *Alitheia* and *Kypros* using particularly harsh language⁴⁵. Besides, *Halkın Sesi* accused *The Times of Cyprus* that it did not respect the Turkish Cypriots' cultural characteristics⁴⁶. The Turkish Cypriot newspaper was also opposing the restoration of the Cypriot communist movement to legal political action. The opinion was that Cypriot communists after strengthening their position were ready to cooperate with those political forces of the Greek Cypriot community that rejected the agreements.⁴⁷ The newspaper wrote that 'It should be a duty for every Cypriot to prevent on our island the significant damages the Communist scourge (brings) on the world'.⁴⁸

During the transitional period, *Eleftheria* used strong language to respond to the above positions of the Turkish Cypriot side. The language and style adopted by *Eleftheria* just weeks after the signing of the London Agreement are noteworthy:

It would be scandalous if the Greeks were to be asked to pay for the broken and blackmailed politics of others—no Greek region in the Turkish section, not a penny to the Turks. We opposed Turks as friends, even if they do not do the same to us. We always leave the door (for cooperation) open.⁴⁹

From *Eleftheria*'s point of view, the Turkish Cypriots should not ask for more than what a minority should claim. Moreover, the 'Turks' of Cyprus have no choice but to come to terms with this reality and use the 'door' opened by the Greek Cypriot side in favour of cooperation. It is worth noting that the archival material suggests that *Cyprus Mail*, unlike *Eleftheria*, used a more restrained language regarding the inter-communal relations. Also, the English language newspaper, as opposed to *Halkın Sesi*, supported the lifting the ban against the local communist party AKEL. According to *Cyprus Mail*, this decision of the transitional government was dictated by the values of democracy and political freedom.⁵⁰

⁴⁵ R. R. Denктаş, 'Fileletheros'a Ne Oluyor?' (What Happens to Fileletheros?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 24 May 1959); H. Bedevi, 'Ethnos'un Gülünç İddialarını Cevabımız' (Our Answer to Ethnos' Ridiculous Claims) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 27 June 1959); 'Anayasa Komisyonu Alitheia ve Kypros'a Cevap Verdi' (Constitutional Commission Replied to Alitheia and Kypros) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 2 June 1959).

⁴⁶ 'Times of Cyprus'a Ne Oluyor?' (What Is Happening to the Times of Cyprus?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 14 May 1959).

⁴⁷ Yavuz, 'Fırsattan İstifade' (Grab the Opportunity) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 25 November 1959).

⁴⁸ F. Çetin, 'Selametimiz Bakımından' (For Our Salvation) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 5 December 1959).

⁴⁹ 'Μια Ευκαιρία' (An Opportunity) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 29 March 1959).

⁵⁰ 'Comment' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 2 November 1959).

***Halkın Sesi*'s confrontation with local Greek and English language newspapers regarding the fundamental aspects of the bicomunal republic**

A few hours had passed since the proclamation of the Republic of Cyprus when *Halkın Sesi* made a resounding statement. According to the newspaper, the Turkish Cypriot community was ready and willing to work for the success of bicomunal democracy on the condition that it would safeguard its interests. However, if the Greek Cypriot side violated the rights of the Turkish Cypriots, then the 'republic would collapse immediately'.⁵¹ This statement is of particular importance for two reasons. First, the official mouthpiece of the Turkish Cypriot leadership reminded the Greek Cypriots that it continued to hold a distinct understanding of the bicomunal cooperation framework. Second, as in the transition period, after the establishment of democracy, the local press continued to be one of the leading platforms for exchanging political messages between communities.

According to the findings of our research, during the transitional period Cypriot newspapers approached various aspects of the new bicomunal republic with skepticism. In this framework, *Halkın Sesi* repeatedly expressed its concerns regarding the provisions of the Zurich and London Agreements. The main questions posed in this chapter are first, why did the Turkish Cypriot newspaper have these reservations? How did the Greek Cypriot stance affect the newspaper's position, and also, how did other local newspapers address *Halkın Sesi*'s concerns?

As seen in the following articles from the period, the answer to the above questions lies in the analysis of the various aspects of the defunct bicomunal democracy initiated by the Zurich and London Agreements.⁵² During the transfer of power from the colonial government to the Cyprus Republic, *Halkın Sesi* focused on four problematic aspects of the young democracy. First, the reports of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper in conjunction with the thesis of other local newspapers argued that the Zurich and London Agreements failed to overcome Cyprus' ethnic problem which was at its peaked in the mid-1950s. In other words, the founding agreements

⁵¹ Cemil Turanlı, 'İşte Cumhuriyet!' (Here Is the Republic!) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 17 August 1960).

⁵² Furthermore, as Adamides and Constantinou mention 'the status quo after 1974 has brought about only a resemblance of liberal peace for it often displays of illiberal forms.'. Constantinos Adamides, Costas M. Constantinou 'Comfortable Conflict and (Il)liberal Peace in Cyprus', in Oliver Richmond and Mitchell Basingstoke (eds) *Hybrid Forms of Peace: From Everyday Agency to Post-Liberalism* (Palgrave Macmillan: 2012), 242-259, 247

did not provide a final solution to the ethnic division through the allocation of power. Second, the local economy did not undergo a radical transformation and the two communities continued to pursue the aim of strengthening their economic structures separately. Separate economic agendas deprived Cyprus of a united middle class, whose interests would be identical to those of the new republic. Third, the basic principles of the constitutional order were violated, resulting in the infringement of the rule of law. Fourth, two separate electoral democracies were created as an outcome among other of the inheritance of the ongoing ethnic divisions. As Stubbs and Taşeli put it, the terms of the agreements ‘served to cement divisions between the two communities, thus legitimising the ethnic segregation of the island and further marginalising the smaller Armenian, Maronite and Latin populations’.⁵³

The founding agreements aimed at managing the issue of nationalism and securing the congruency of the political and the national unit.⁵⁴ Thus, they allocated the power between the communities providing the Greek Cypriots with the former colonial power’s leading role in the island’s governance, and the Turkish Cypriots with constitutional equality. *Cyprus Mail* underlined that the Constitution was a formula which provided ‘Greeks a sense of untrammelled independence’ and the ‘Turk’s iron clad guarantees against any discrimination’.⁵⁵

However, the two communities interpreted the allocation of power based on their own interests. Severe disputes between the two communities’ understanding of their rights and obligations under the agreements emerged during the first days of the transitional period. *Halkın Sesi*’s articles shed light on the decisive stance taken by the Turkish Cypriot leadership towards the provision of political equality in the Zurich and London Treaties. The newspaper insisted that the island had two separate communities, the bicomunal republic was not a Greek Cypriot state and the young republic was based on the communal autonomy and cooperation of the ‘dominant elements (hakim unsur)’.⁵⁶ *Eleftheria* on the other hand, rejected *Halkın Sesi*’s view and put forth the argument Cyprus did not have two equal ethnic com-

⁵³ Jonathan Stubbs, Bahar Taşeli ‘Newspapers, Nationalism and Empire’, (2014) 20(3) *Media History* 284-301, 293

⁵⁴ Ernest Gellner, *Nations and Nationalism* (Cornell University Press, 1983).

⁵⁵ ‘Creating a Nation’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 24 February 1959).

⁵⁶ Gazioğlu, ‘Anayasa ve Türk Hakları’ (Constitution and Turkish Cypriot’s Right) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 10 April 1960); Cemil Turanlı, ‘Ortak İdare’ (Joint Administration) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 7 July 1960).

munities, the Turkish Cypriots were a minority, and the establishment of a system based on dualism was neither possible nor just.⁵⁷

The Turkish Cypriots evoked on the letter of the agreements to support that the Vice-President had indeed enhanced powers.⁵⁸ Also, in the Constitution Committee, Turkish Cypriots insisted on the consolidation of Turkish Cypriot Vice-President's veto right.⁵⁹ From the Turkish Cypriots' point of view, there were 'two Presidents' who would decide together on 'matters affecting Cyprus as a whole'.⁶⁰ The Greek Cypriots thought the highest political power belonged to the President, while the Vice-President would have 'some explicit forms of executive power'.⁶¹ Although a final compromise on the Vice-President's position was achieved in April 1960⁶², the Turkish Cypriots warned that a collapse of the agreements would cause the partition of Cyprus.⁶³

Besides the segregated justice system⁶⁴, the power-sharing disputes extended also to the staffing of the state mechanism and the local government of the bicomunal republic. In this context, the two communities disagreed on the distribution of public posts. Under the founding agreements, Greek Cypriots would compose the 70% of

⁵⁷ 'Προς Τούρκους' (To Turks) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 15 October 1959).

⁵⁸ According to the 5th article founding treaties, 'the Executive authority shall be vested in the President and the Vice-President. For this purpose, they shall have a Council of Ministers composed of seven Greek Ministers and three Turkish Ministers. Decisions so taken shall be promulgated immediately by the President and the Vice-President by publication in the official gazette. However, the President and the Vice-President shall have the right of final veto and the right to return the decision of the Council of Ministers.' in 'Cyprus History: Zürich Agreement' <http://www.cypnet.co.uk/ncyprus/history/republic/agmt-zurich.html> accessed 31 July 2020.

⁵⁹ 'Anayasa Heyetimiz Dün Geldi' (Our Constitutional Committee Arrived Yesterday) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 7 April 1959); 'Constitutional Commission First Meeting – Goodwill on All Sides: Delegates Optimistic Success' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 14 April 1959); 'Anayasa Komisyonu'nda İhtilaf Mı Var?' (Is There Any Dispute in the Constitutional Commission?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 13 August 1959); 'Taviz İstemiyoruz Hakkımızı İstiyoruz. Londra ve Zürih Anlaşmaları Değiştirilmeden Aynen Tatbik Edilmelidir' (We Don't Want Concessions, We Want Our Right. London and Zurich Agreements Must Be Applied Unchanged) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 20 August 1959).

⁶⁰ '120,000 Turks Would Fight to the Last Man – Dr. Kuchuk Hints of Partition – Not Even the Slightest of Concessions' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 21 August 1959).

⁶¹ 'Το Επίμαχον Θέμα των Εκτελεστικών Εξουσιών' (The disputed issue of executive powers) *Eleftheria*, (Nicosia: 15 October 1959).

⁶² 'Kıbrıs Anayasası Dün Tamamlandı' (Cyprus Constitution Was Completed Yesterday) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 5 April 1960).

⁶³ 'Hepsi de Aynı' (no. 37).

⁶⁴ 'Rum İtirazları' (Greek Cypriot Objections) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23 June 1959).

the civil service and Turkish Cypriots the 30%.⁶⁵ As *Halkın Sesi* argued, this provision should involve the entire public sector, including security forces, Electricity and Telecommunications Authority, Customs, Cyprus Airways, Radio and Television.⁶⁶ *Eleftheria* on the other hand, mentioned that ‘much of the EOKA fighters have already been “used for a fee” in various positions of the forthcoming Cyprus State and the rest will be absorbed soon’.⁶⁷ The two newspapers also disagreed on the issue of local authorities.⁶⁸ *Eleftheria* opposed the separate Turkish Cypriot municipalities arguing that there was no geographical separation of communities.⁶⁹ *Halkın Sesi* on her part continued to support the Turkish Cypriot’s rights to separate municipalities.⁷⁰

The archival material available to this study suggests that, apart from the discrepancy in the distribution of power, public posts, and local government, the two communities also had separate agendas on another issue which has been overlooked by modern scholars. According to *Halkın Sesi*’s articles the bicomunal republic was seen as a golden opportunity for the distinct economic development of the two communities of Cyprus. Instead of focusing on the creation of a united middle class and the improvement of the daily lives of all citizens of the young republic, the Turkish Cypriot leadership aimed at developing the financial status of its community separately.⁷¹ The archival material sheds light to the role of economic nationalism, as analysed by Nakano, in the Turkish Cypriot leadership’s political agenda during the tran-

⁶⁵ ‘Cyprus’ (no. 56).

⁶⁶ ‘Üç Dört Yıl Sadakane Hizmet Eden Türk Elektrikçilerinin Polemitya’daki Vazifelerini Bir Emirle Son Verildi’ The Duties of Turkish Cypriot Electricians in Polemitia, Who Had Served for Three or Four Years, Were Terminated with an Order *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 7 July 1959); ‘Türkler Aleyhine Tayin ve Terfiler Berdevam’ (Appointments and Promotions against the Turkish Cypriots Continue) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 21 August 1959); ‘Elektrik İdaresindeki Türk İşçiler Hemen Takviye Edilmelidir’ (Turkish Workers in the Electricity Administration Should Be Reinforced Immediately) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 22 August 1959); ‘Poliste Kilit Mevkiler Rumlara Veriliyor’ (Key Positions in the Police Are given to Greek Cypriots) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23 August 1959); ‘Ehliyet Meselesi’ (Qualifications Issue) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 11 April 1960); ‘Polis ve Gümrükler’ (Police and Customs) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 4 May 1960); Cemil Turanlı, ‘Televizyonda Çifte Ölçü Siyaseti’ (The Double Standard Policy in Television) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 21 July 1960); ‘CITA’da Haksızlıklar Hala Devam Mı Ediyor?’ (Are There Still Injustices at CITA?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 14 July 1960).

⁶⁷ ‘Ο Μακάριος Ομιλεί δια τον Γρίβαν’ (Makarios speaks about Grivas), *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 17 July 1959).

⁶⁸ According the founding agreements ‘separate municipalities shall be created in the five largest towns of Cyprus by the Turkish inhabitants of these towns.’ in ‘Cyprus’ (no. 56)

⁶⁹ ‘Μια Ευκαιρία’ (no. 47).

⁷⁰ ‘Yine Mi Suç Bizde?’ (Is It Our Fault Again?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 29 December 1959).

⁷¹ Fazıl Küçük, ‘İktisaden Yükselme’ (Economic Advancement) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 20 March 1959); R. R. Denктаş, ‘Türk Çarşısında Yenilikler’ (Innovations in the Turkish Market) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 17 April 1959); ‘Turkish Aims- Self-Sufficiency- Five Million, Four-Year Plan’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 27 June 1959).

sitional period. Turkish Cypriots approached the new state as a necessity for creating a national market and promote development.⁷² Aiming to ‘national unity, autonomy and the augmentation of national power’, Turkish Cypriot leadership saw the free trade and new economic opportunities, e.g. foreign financial assistance, as tools that increased distinctively its ‘national power’⁷³. As the Turkish Cypriot leader Dr. Küçük mentioned one month after the signing of the Treaty of London,

The island of Cyprus is getting a new form of administration. Both communities will have separate assemblies to defend and protect their national identities while on the other hand, they will deal with all matters of interest through their separate councils. Referring to the (communal) rights, (we should stress that) equality is essential in all respects. Until today, there has been no progress in many areas, as the Turkish community has been neglected for many years, and the (colonial) administration could not understand the Turkish community. The low economic status of the Turkish community within the government that will be formed in the future will cause disruptions in the administration.⁷⁴

According to Küçük, the Turkish Cypriots, as one of the ‘hakim unsur’ of the island, were determined to use all available means to balance or even overcome the Greek Cypriot’s economic dominance. Aiming at their economic development and the creation of an independent middle class, the Turkish Cypriot leaders urged their community to increase domestic production.⁷⁵ It is important to note that the separate economic agenda of the Turkish Cypriot leadership alarmed the Greek Cypriots. The Greek and English language newspapers understood this agenda to be an essential boycott.⁷⁶ The Greek Cypriot side’s belief that the Turkish Cypriots imposed an economic boycott on their products was a critical factor that hindered the economic cooperation between the two communities. Moreover, it prevented the emergence of a united middle class, whose interests could be linked to those of the bicomunal democracy.

⁷² Takeshi Nakano, ‘Theorising Economic Nationalism’, (July 2004) 10 (3) *Nations and Nationalism*, 211-229, 222

⁷³ Ibid. 224.

⁷⁴ Küçük (no. 69).

⁷⁵ Şafi Alper, ‘Rahat Günler Özlerken’ (Missing the Comfortable Days) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 22 May 1959); R. R. Denkaş, ‘Tutunmak ve Yükselmek’ (We Are Determined to Hold on and Rise) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 18 March 1959).

⁷⁶ ‘Kuchuk Denies Trade Boycott-In Favor of Trade Relations and Full Cooperation’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 25 June 1959).

During the transitional period, the climate of bicomunal distrust was already established.⁷⁷ Thus, the new constitutional order was further jeopardised by the fact that both communities chose to resolve political disagreements with guns. Throughout this period several outbreaks of violence, often among the supporters of left- and right-wing organisations, and an arms race transpired between the two communities.⁷⁸ For instance, as *Cyprus Mail* stated, a group of former EOKA fighters ‘were committed to undertaking a series of assassinations [including that of Makarios] and striving for the annulment of the London agreements’.⁷⁹ On their part, both *Eleftheria* and *Cyprus Mail* feared that Turkish Cypriots could impose their positions on fundamental constitutional articles by the use of arms. The two newspapers were particularly alarmed by the notorious ‘Deniz’ case, the attempt to smuggle ammunition from Turkey to Cyprus, obstructed by the Royal Navy.⁸⁰ Armed attacks and the mobilisation of army troops completed the puzzle of violence.⁸¹ On the other hand, the perpetuation of the climate of civil conflict within the Greek Cypriot community unsettled *Halkın Sesi*.⁸² Furthermore, the newspaper was worried by the slow process of disarmament and attacks made against them for which they blamed on the Greek Cypriots.⁸³

⁷⁷ Nicholas van der Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island 1955-1974* (Barnsley: Pen & Sword Books, 2014).

⁷⁸ ‘Right-Left Clash: One Killed – Flare-up at Livadhia Cinema Now’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 22 April 1959.)

⁷⁹ ‘Makarios Assassination Plot. Plan to Provoke Civil War Disclosed to Meeting of Edma Leaders’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 12 September 1959).

⁸⁰ ‘Ammunition Find on Vessel Sunk after Seizure’ (Nicosia: 19 October 1959); ‘73 Cases Full of Ammunition Still Missing – Police’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 20 October 1959); ‘Η Ελληνοκυπριακή Ηγεσία Ενδέχεται να Διακόψει Διαπραγματεύσεις μετά των Τούρκων προς Εφαρμογήν των Συμφωνιών Λονδίνου και Ζυρίχης Κατόπιν Τουρκικής Απόπειρας Λαθραίας Εισαγωγής Όπλων και Πυρομαχικών’ (The Greek Cypriot leadership may stop the negotiations with the Turks about the implementation of the London and Zurich agreements after the Turkish attempt to smuggle weapons and ammunitions) *Eleftheria* (Nicosia: 21 October 1959).

⁸¹ ‘Another Killing – So Dr. Kuchuk Will Visit Villages Today’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 27 September 1959); ‘Army Send Troops between Villages to Keep Peace’ *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia: 29 September 1959).

⁸² ‘Adadaki Sakin Havayı Rumlar Yine Bozdu’ (Greek Cypriots Spoiled the Calm Again) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 25 April 1959); ‘Vali İle Makarios Pratik Çare Arıyor’ (Governor and Makarios Seek Practical Remedy) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 31 March 1959).

⁸³ ‘Ömerge Cami Taşlandı’ (Ömerge Mosque Was Stoned) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 23 March 1959); ‘Vazifesini Yapan Türk Polis Tecavüze Uğradı’ (Turkish Cypriot Police Who Did His Duty, Was Assaulted) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 5 May 1959); ‘Böyle Dostluk Olmaz’ (There Is No Such Friendship) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 13 May 1959); ‘Lefke’nin Su Yolu Rumlar Tarafından Berhava Edildi’ (Lefke’s Waterway Was Destroyed by the Greek Cypriots) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 3 August 1959).

The violation of the basic principles of democracy, such as the protection of life and property, was on everyone's minds when both community leaders moved to build two separate electoral democracies. With the term 'separate electoral democracy' we refer to the establishment of distinct electoral processes for the two communities. In this framework, Greek and Turkish Cypriots were to elect the members their communities entrusted with the tasks of government and management of community affairs.⁸⁴ According to the agreements, the two communities were to elect the President, Vice-President, members of the House of Representatives and the Communal Chambers separately. As Stepan argues, in the presidential system introduced into the political life of Cyprus by the Treaty of London, the office of President 'is necessarily occupied by one person, from one nationality, for a fixed term'.⁸⁵ This system limited the political bargaining between the two communities and the possibility of other parties, composed of other nationalities, helping to constitute the ruling coalition. Under these circumstances, the two communities were politically distinctly developed.

Against this background, the Greek Cypriot leadership, in its separate political sphere, contended the nationalist forces challenging the founding agreements.⁸⁶ The Turkish Cypriot leadership on the other hand, clashed with opposition groups and moved on to cultivate its cooperation with Ankara.⁸⁷ In their separate confrontations with political rivals, the two leaderships did not join forces to create a common democratic front. In other words, the political-electoral segregation prevented the development of bicomunal cooperation.

⁸⁴ Michael. MacKuen and George. Rabinowitz (eds), *Electoral Democracy* (University of Michigan Press, 2003); Richard S. Katz, *Democracy and Elections* (Oxford University Press, 1997); J. J. A. Thomasen (ed.), *Elections and Democracy: Representation and Accountability*, (Oxford University Press, 2014)

⁸⁵ Alfred Stepan, 'Comparative Theory and Political Practice: Do We Need a 'State-Nation' Model as Well as a 'Nation-State' Model?', (28 March 2008) 43 (1) *Government and Opposition* 1-25, 9.

⁸⁶ 'EDMA National Group Formed' *Cyprus Mail* (Nicosia; 3 April 1959); 'Makarios Dervis ve Kleridis'e Cevap Verdi' (Makarios Replied to Dervis and Kleridis) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 17 November 1959); 'Aday İlk Günden Anlaşmalara Hücum Etti' (The Candidate Attacked the Agreements from Day One) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 27 November 1959).

⁸⁷ R. R. Denктаş, 'Seçim Faaliyetleri Mi?' (Election Activities?) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 14 May 1959); 'Liderimiz Dr. Küçük ve Rauf Denктаş'ın Gönderdikleri Telgraflar' (Telegrams Sent by Our Leader Dr. Küçük and Rauf Denктаş) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 29 May 1960); 'Rum Cemaat Meclisi İçin Bugün Seçim Yapılıyor. Türk Cemaati Milli Birlik ve Beraberliğini Bir Kere Daha Isbat Etti. Cemaat Meclisi İçin 'Milli Cephe' Adaylarına Muhalif Namzed Çıkmadı' (Elections Are Held Today for the Greek Cypriot Community Council) *Halkın Sesi* (Nicosia: 7 August 1960).

Conclusion: The four major weaknesses of the Republic of Cyprus through the eyes of *Halkın Sesi*

This article attempts to add to the limited yet very informative knowledge regarding the period in question and fill a gap in modern Cypriot historiography. The article has discussed the role of *Halkın Sesi* in the establishment of bicomunal republic and has focused on the interaction of the Turkish Cypriot newspaper with the other local media. From this process, the article puts forth five assumptions.

First, the role played by the local newspapers in the process of transferring power from colonial administration to the Cyprus Republic was significant. Local newspapers starred in the process of the emergence of the new democracy, by magnifying the problems that overshadowed the relations of the two communities. Within this framework, *Halkın Sesi* focused not only on the hopes for the bicomunal democracy but also on the four problematic aspects of the founding agreements.

Second in analysing *Halkın Sesi*'s news and opinion articles retrospectively, we arrive at the assumption that it had beforehand advised its readers to contemplate on the failure of the bicomunal Republic of Cyprus. The articles of *Halkın Sesi* and its disagreements with the Greek and English language newspapers adds to the argument that the Zurich and London Agreements failed to definitively close the chapter of the ethnic division in Cyprus.

Third, the articles published by *Halkın Sesi* promote the hypothesis that the Turkish Cypriot community lacked a middle class whose interests were intertwined with the new state at the time of the republic's establishment. In this context, the community did not develop bonds and affiliations with the young republic that would ensure the future prospects of both.

Fourth, the archival material indicates that during the transition of power from the colonial forces to the new democracy, the violation of the basic constitutional principles overshadowed the cooperation of the two communities.

Finally, articles from *Halkın Sesi* and other local newspapers of the transitional period (1959-1960) make mention of the emergence of two separate electoral democracies. This is a development that limited the radius of joint political action and cooperation between the two largest communities in Cyprus. Ergo, the two communities failed to safeguard their republic from the problems which were manifested throughout the transitional period.

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The British role in creating Greek-Turkish Divisions in Colonial Cyprus and an Analysis into the Subsequent Breaches of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee in Post-Colonial Cyprus – A Public International Law Perspective

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Abstract

The article firstly focuses on the British colonial era in Cyprus, predominantly from the 1950s to the implementation of the Treaty of Guarantee. It argues that Britain played an active role in Greek-Turkish divisions, shown in particular by events between 1954 and 1958. The article then takes a legal analysis, focussing on the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960. It discusses British (and American) involvement in post-colonial Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, notably their support for a Turkish invasion. Crucially, it examines potential breaches of Public International Law through British actions, addressing both Treaty Law and Customary International Law. It is accepted amongst the international community that Turkey breached the Treaty of Guarantee when they invaded Cyprus in 1974. This is uncontroversial and will be briefly discussed, but the main intention of this article is to provide an original perspective on how the British also breached the Treaty of Guarantee.

Keywords: Treaty of Guarantee, public international law, Greek-Turkish relations, British colonial rule, British foreign policy

Introduction

Cyprus' colonial era ended in 1960, when the Treaty of Guarantee was signed by the United Kingdom, Turkey and Greece, which of course granted Cyprus independence. However, just 14 years later, Cyprus was invaded by Turkey and the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) was formed, dividing the island into the Greek and Turkish parts. The aim of this article is to expose British involvement throughout this era, ultimately arguing that their interference and support for one side actually breached international law, and cannot simply be seen as a diplomatic policy, but

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rather contravention with the Treaty of Guarantee. For this to be proven, the article must explore the entire era, from the 1950s up to the Turkish invasion.

The article firstly focuses on the end of the British colonial era in Cyprus, predominantly from the 1950s to the implementation of the Treaty of Guarantee. It argues that the British played an active role in Greek-Turkish relations and divisions, shown in particular by events between 1954 and 1958, and through the use of diplomatic primary sources. This laid the platform for later conflicts between Greeks and Turks, but were not breaches of international law.

The article proceeds to take a legal analysis, focussing on the Treaty of Guarantee in 1960, and its precise drafting and wording in 1959. It progresses to discuss British (and American) involvement in post-colonial Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s, notably their support for a Turkish invasion. Crucially, it examines potential breaches of international law through British actions, most importantly the breach of the Treaty of Guarantee. It also examines other relevant treaties and conventions that the nations had signed and ratified at that time, as well as breaches of customary international law. It is widely accepted amongst the international community that Turkey breached the Treaty of Guarantee when they invaded Cyprus in 1974, and thus international law. This is relatively uncontroversial and will be briefly discussed, but the crux and main intention of this article is to provide an original perspective on how the British also breached the Treaty of Guarantee.

Cyprus under Colonial British Rule and Greek-Turkish Divisions

Colonial Cyprus in Context – Pre-1950s

Understanding British colonial rule helps our understanding of Cyprus' mindset as a nation in 1974 – one that was used to foreign rule and thus potentially susceptible to it. Its strategic position and thus attraction did not change either, and whilst the British prioritisation of retaining Cyprus may have fluctuated over the years, its perception as a crucial asset by them and others was still evident in 1974, just as it had been when Britain colonised it. However, the three decades prior to the invasion saw the start of Greek-Turkish divisions, and this is where the British responsibility must be examined further.

Britain did categorise inhabitants of Cyprus into Greek and Turkish Cypriots, leading to nationalist feelings, even during their early years of colonisation. Perhaps there was no malice involved in this approach initially, however nonetheless it encouraged a divide. Cypriots were divided unequally – in the Legislative Council, there

were the same amount of British officials and Muslim representatives as those that were Christian Orthodox, thus 18% of the population (Turkish) had virtually equal rights as the Greeks who were of course the majority. This enhanced the focus of being Greek or Turkish, and nationalism increased. Again, this was an inadvertent approach by the British, perhaps keen on positive discrimination and encouraging the notion of equality. At this point, it may be fair to state that Britain did not really consider the consequences of their acts – WW1 and WW2, plus other colonial conflicts, were of course prioritised. Inter-ethnic violence occurred in the form of rioting in 1897 and 1912, which only stirred up tensions. During the inter-war years, there was rioting in 1931 when Government House was burnt down and the Colonial Constitution was revoked.

Britain's role in the Second World War has relevance in Cyprus, not due to the obvious enemy at the time (Germany) but due to the development of Britain's anti-communist and thus anti-Soviet obsession, which of course became part of the Western mindset during the Cold War post-1945. However, whilst the Cold War made strategic assets, in the form of nations, even more importantly, the trend was in fact paradoxical to this – decolonisation. Britain let many countries leave the Empire amidst the pressures of self-determination. However, the British found Cyprus slightly harder to set free, or at least handing over to Greece, one of the reasons being that they feared that if Greece became communist then Cyprus could become pro-Soviet. This was a mindset which would turn into a policy to play a part throughout the 1950s. Minister Geoffrey Wallinger stated in 1947 that 'the early cession of Cyprus might well be a wise policy, justified by considerations not only of justice, but also of expediency. But present circumstances are not normal...control of the island by a foreign power would be a danger to us.'² The Greek civil war was sufficient justification for the British to not relinquish Cyprus, given the instability to a nation who could not be trusted to rule a strategically essential State.

Cyprus was thus still considered to be a strategic asset. In an interview, Lieutenant-commander Martin Packard stated that:

Cyprus is the only bit of ground in the Middle East left to our strategic planners. From the purely strategic point of view, to sacrifice this one remaining asset at a time when it is not even certain that we shall get any strategic rights or facilities

² Geoffrey Wallinger, 24 October 1947, memo on file jacket, FO371/67084, file R 13462/9 in William Mallinson, *Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus: Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Newcastle; Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

in any part of Libya would seem inconsistent with the policy of the firm hold on the Middle East which has been endorsed by the Prime Minister and Secretary of State, as well as by the Chiefs of Staff...with Cyprus ceded to a Greece gone communist, we should not only have created a vacuum in the Middle East, we should have gone halfway towards letting the Russians fill it.³

Therefore, in the immediate post WW2 era, it seems that Cyprus remained key to Britain's Middle Eastern policy and desire to keep Soviet influence away.

Despite the post WW2 trend of decolonisation, Britain ultimately had the power to ignore any pressures with regards to Cyprus, given its proximity to the Middle East and importance as a link to a part of the world which was vulnerable to succumb to Soviet ideological influences. This is the logic behind geopolitics. However, why did Cyprus then gain independence just over a decade later in 1960, during the height of the Cold War? Surprisingly, the answer to this question lies in the very nation whose covert role in the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 (which will later be explored) and a country whose Cold War aims seemingly took prominence over all other policies at this time – the United States.

Britain were keen on American support and intervention in the Balkans, and despite initial reluctance, they provided massive exportation of arms to Greece during the civil war. However, with regards to Cyprus, the US opposed Britain's refusal to give it up. In the mid-1950s, American lip-service to self-determination took priority and Cyprus' perception as a key strategic asset was perhaps not as strong as a decade later. The US already had power in the Middle East following the Suez Crises. Furthermore, and importantly, the potential damage to NATO was too risky if Cyprus remained a British colony. Thus, Britain's stringent approach on Cyprus contradicted this.

The US thus exerted pressure on Britain to be flexible with regards to decolonisation. After Britain declared a state of emergency and deported Archbishop Makarios to the Seychelles in a bid to discard potential threats to British rule, the US and President Eisenhower forced Britain to free him. In his diary, Eisenhower stated:

I had certain important messages, particularly from the Greeks, asking me to urge upon Macmillan the importance of freeing Archbishop Makarios. I told

³ Lieutenant-commander Martin Packard, in Mallinson (no 1).

them that in my opinion I didn't believe they were gaining much by keeping him prisoner, so I would just turn him loose on the world.⁴

This was not only a statement of the US intention to make Cyprus independent, but an indication of the balance of power shifting to the US in the US-British 'special relationship'. This was the first sign of US influence on Britain in Cyprus, which was the backdrop behind the decolonisation of Cyprus and essentially led to its independence in 1960.

1954-1958 British Actions

For as long as Britain could, i.e. for as long as they could claim their status as a world power despite their economic weakness and hold off American pressures, they refused to give up Cyprus despite the growth of Greek requests for them to do so. The Americans were not happy, but in 1954 were convinced by the British that the Cyprus question should not be placed on the UN General Assembly agenda. It is important to consider the part Britain played during this time and the impact it had on Cyprus in the long term.

In fact, Britain were covertly and quietly creating a Greek-Turkish divide in Cyprus from the late 1940s. In 1947, John Peck from the Foreign Office stated that 'although the Turkish Government has never raised with us any questions affecting the Turkish minority in Cyprus, this minority should be protected'.⁵ The British were thus creating nationalistic feelings amongst the Greeks and Turks at this point, when there were no such strong sentiments. By 1950, the divide was apparent amongst the Greeks too, when a plebiscite revealed that 96% of Greeks voted for enosis.

By September 1954, the British were publicly encouraging these divisions at the UN General Assembly, where Selwyn Lloyd stated that 'the Turkish speaking Cypriots...are bitterly opposed to Enosis...there has up to now been no communal strife. Does the assembly really want to stir it up by keeping this matter on the agenda.'⁶ By stating this, Lloyd was essentially advising the UN to forget the divisions and let them flourish.

⁴ Foreign Relations of the United States 1955-1957, Vol. 24 (Washington: United States Government Printing Office).

⁵ John Peck, Internal Foreign Office Paper on Cyprus, 22 December 1947, BNA FO 371/67084, file R-1683/8/G in Mallinson (no 1).

⁶ Report on Cyprus, Agenda, Ninth Session of the General Assembly of the United Nations, New York, 23-24 September 1954, BNA FO 953/1964, file G-11926/20 in Mallinson (no 1).

In 1955, Britain's actions were even more vicious, overt and would arguably have a long-standing impact on Greek-Turkish relations. They convened a tri-partite conference between Britain, Greece and Turkey on Cyprus. Art 16 of the Treaty of Lausanne⁷ forbade Turkey from having any rights regarding Cyprus but the conference clearly ignored this. Permanent Under Secretary of the Foreign Office Kirkpatrick stated that he had 'always been attracted by the idea of a 3 Power Conference, simply because I believe it would seriously embarrass the Greek Government...I shall not produce any British plan until a Greek-Turkish difference has been exposed'.⁸ Furthermore, British Foreign Secretary stated that 'throughout the negotiations, our aim would be to bring the Greeks up against the Turkish refusal to accept enosis and so condition them to accept a solution, which would leave sovereignty in our hands'.⁹ As a result, the conference inevitably failed and Greek-Turkish relations were damaged – in Istanbul, 29 Greek Christian Orthodox churches were destroyed. These were not conflicts that would simply be forgotten by 1974.¹⁰

There is thus clear evidence that Britain not only encouraged these divisions in the 1950s, but created and defined them. The US did not encourage this, yet both Britain and the US had the same Cold War aims at this time. Thus, British actions must be attributed to the vested interest of needing a reason and justification to retain Cyprus as part of its Empire. Simply, Britain did not intend to decolonise Cyprus and weaken their power, thus the creation of Greek-Turkish divisions was their route to remain – justifying their colonial presence as a stable, controlling super power who could control two volatile, conflicting ethnic groups.

Historian Mallinson states it perfectly when he argues that:

The seeds of dismemberment in 1974 were sown by Britain in the early fifties. It was the cynically conceived tripartite conference in September 1955 that only bedevilled Greek-Turkish relations until today, but which set the tone for the dismemberment of Cyprus, so subtly engineered by Henry Kissinger in 1974.

⁷ Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne, July 24, 1923, The British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, Roumania and The Serb-Croat-Slovene State, of the one part, and Turkey, of the other part.

⁸ Kirkpatrick to Nutting, 26 June 1955, memo, BNA FO-37117640, file RG 1081/535 in Mallinson (no 1).

⁹ P. 21, Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy: America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London: I.B. Tauris; 2001).

¹⁰ British Consul General, Istanbul, to Foreign Office, 7 September 1955, telegram, BNA FO 371/117721, RG 10110/1 in Mallinson (no 1).

Historically speaking, Kissinger was merely dealing with, rather than causing, a problem that Britain had itself initiated twenty years previously.¹¹

One would possibly not go quite as far as Mallinson as it somewhat downplays Kissinger's role in the invasion in 1974. In fact, given Mallinson's book focusses on Kissinger's role too, this extract may not be a fair reflection of his views or at least are not intended to diminish Kissinger's responsibility. However, the essence of his point is that Kissinger acted on divisions created by Britain, thus the latter's role should not be forgotten, an argument which seems very strong given the archival evidence.

Britain did not only create and define the Greek-Turkish divisions. As the 1950s progressed, it is evident that Britain actively took the Turkish side, collaborating with them, arguably as they knew the Greeks were far stronger in terms of population size, thus mobilization for an independent State. In 1956 they admitted this in commenting on Turkish weaknesses, stating that a report 'shows a decline of the Turkish population from about one quarter to about one fifth – which does not really help the Turkish case very much'.¹² In July 1954, the Cabinet stated that 'we must...act on the assumption that deterioration in our relations with Greece is the price we must pay to keep Cyprus, A point may even come at we should have to decide whether Cyprus is strategically more important to us than Greece'.¹³ This shows Britain knew divisions meant they could keep Cyprus but if they were to encourage these divisions, they had to ally with the Turks to prevent them being overran. In doing so, Britain banned Greek Cypriot political parties but not the Turkish ones for example.

The anti-Greek rioting of the summer of 1958 provides a clear example of a pro-Turkish policy by the British. They were aware of the possibility of Turkish acts of violence from 1957, when a British Intelligence Report stated that 'a fairly reliable source has said that they Turkish house at OMORFITA where the explosion took place on 31st August has used as a bomb making factory for some time. Twelve persons worked there in shifts and 'thousands of bombs' have been made and distributed to various parts of the islands.'¹⁴ Just a few days before the riots, the Governor wrote to the Secretary of State that the 'Turks are prepared for further violence and

¹¹ P. 43, William Mallinson, *Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus: Diplomacy in the Eastern Mediterranean* (Newcastle; Cambridge Scholars Publishing, 2016).

¹² Glass to Fletcher-Cooke, letter, 9 August 1956, BNA FO 953/1695, file PG-11926-50 in Mallinson (no 10).

¹³ Secretary of State for the Colonies, paper, July 1954, BNA CAB 129/69 in Mallinson (no 10).

¹⁴ Phantom Secret Report by Security Intelligence on 'Volkan' activities, 9 September 1957, FCO 141/3840 in Mallinson (no 10).

this may occur before the statement of policy is made in Parliament'.¹⁵ On 8 June, anti-Greek riots broke out following a bomb at the Turkish press counsellor's residence.

In a telegram between the Governor and Secretary of State on 10 June 1958, not released until 2014, Britain showed they knew this was not the Greeks, stating:

It seems unlikely that Greek Cypriot terrorists would have attacked Turkish Government property at this time and in this way...expert examination of the explosive charge and fragments indicates that they were of a different kind from any known to have been used in the past by Greek Cypriot terrorists, but were of a kind known to have been used recently in bombs of Turkish Cypriot manufacture.¹⁶

Even Rauf Denktash, founding member of the Turkish Resistance Organisation (TMT) and who represented Turkish Cypriots at the UN Assembly admitted to the British that it was not the Greeks, stating 'of course it was a Turkish bomb...the Greeks would not dare do it',¹⁷ according to the same telegram.

Turkish Cypriots had planted a bomb in the house of one of their own representatives, in order to stir riots, and the British had no intention of disclosing this as it would have strengthened the view internationally, and more importantly domestically amongst the Greek Cypriots, that Makarios, rather than Britain, was the leader that should take Cyprus forward amidst the turmoil that Turkish Cypriots were causing. It would also strengthen the notion on enosis – union with Greece, which would be a pressure that Britain could not withstand to prevent decolonisation. British encouragement of Turkish nationalism had led to Turkish extremism and an act which Britain had to hide if they wanted to remain in Cyprus. The intention to create divisions which would justify British rule had backfired.

In a Cabinet meeting in July 1958, the British stated:

It was right that Greek and Turkish terrorists should receive impartial treatment; but it might be unwise, in view of the present situation in the Middle East, to take action which might alienate Turkish and Moslem sentiment or

¹⁵ BNA-FCO 141/3848, Governor to Secretary of State, 4 June 1958, telegram no. 724 in Mallinson (no 10).

¹⁶ Situation Report, 8 June 1958, 02.30 hours in in Mallinson (no 10).

¹⁷ Ibid.

provoke further Turkish disorders in Cyprus at a time when the number of British troops available for internal security might have to be reduced.¹⁸

In light of this, the British arrested Greek Cypriot terrorist group members for an act which they knew full well they were not guilty of. This meeting occurred just six months before it was agreed in February 1959 that Cyprus would become independent. Thus, by July 1958, Britain must have accepted defeat in losing its colony, mainly due to US pressure, and was thus a turning point in British ideology in Cyprus.

However, rather than attempting to diffuse divisions and be objective, Britain still remained clearly pro-Turkish for the very geopolitical reasons stated in the meeting – retaining Turkish support in Cyprus even beyond decolonisation, as it could have an impact on support for Britain across the Muslim areas of Middle East. Decolonisation was now inevitable by the late 1950s, and thus British priorities switched to maintaining the balance of power in the Middle East against the Soviets – the Cold War aims shared by the US.

The US were content that independence portrayed NATO in a positive light, supportive of self-determination, the precise provisions of the treaty lacked importance to them. Britain refused Cyprus' entry into NATO, which may have prevented an invasion later as they would have gained protection, on grounds of Cyprus having access to NATO plans and documents as a 'serious security risk'¹⁹ according to the Ministry of Defence.

However, despite allowing independence, one should appreciate the turmoil Britain left behind in Cyprus before 1960. Indeed, it was America who decided their fate but at least their preferred fate was independence in the 1950s, even if it was for their own vested interests of promoting self-determination, protect NATO and the desire to not appear hypocritical with respect to a tiny island. However, Britain showed no regard for a nation they saw as merely a part of their Empire, a base for their military and a Cold War pawn.

It would possibly not even be fair to say that the British simply highlighted and worsened the Greek-Turkish divisions in Cyprus during the period. It would be fairer and more accurate to conclude that divisions were created by the British, and it was of course these divisions which were the basis for 1960s conflicts and the invasion

¹⁸ Conclusions of Cabinet Meeting, 16 July 1958, CAB 128/32 in Mallinson (no 10).

¹⁹ Ministry of Defence Paper, JP 59/163, 1 January 1960, BNA-DEFE 13/99/MO/5/1/5 in Mallinson (no 10).

in 1974. Furthermore, they showed clear, biased support for Turkey, which incited violence from both sides – the incensed Greeks and overconfident Turks, and set up conditions in Cyprus ideal for conflict in the 1960s.

British acts in the 1950s thus provided the perfect platform for independence to fail and partition to occur. Cyprus' weakness in 1974 and thus vulnerability to invasion also has to be linked back to the 1950s. Thus, Britain must bear serious responsibility for this and this is important to note historically.

Treaty of Guarantee 1959-1960 and Cypriot Independence

Having explored the period directly leading up to the Treaty of Guarantee which determined Cypriot independence, the next part of this article will explore the precise terms of the Treaty of Guarantee 1960, which forms the basis of the argument that Britain may in fact have breached international law, specifically treaty law.

Treaties are of course a major source of international law, effectively a contract between States, which has more of a binding nature but is difficult to enforce. The Treaty of Guarantee consists of just five articles. Article 1 states:

The Republic of Cyprus undertakes to ensure the maintenance of its independence, territorial integrity and security, as well as respect for its Constitution. It undertakes not to participate, in whole or in part, in any political or economic union with any State whatsoever. It accordingly declares prohibited any activity likely to promote, directly or indirectly, either union with any other State or partition of the Island.²⁰

Article 2 then states:

Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, taking note of the undertakings of the Republic of Cyprus set out in Article I of the present Treaty, recognise and guarantee the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, and also the state of affairs established by the Basic Articles of its Constitution. Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom likewise undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island.²¹

²⁰ Treaty of Guarantee between United Kingdom of Great Britain And Northern Ireland, Greece And Turkey And Cyprus, Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

²¹ Ibid.

It is worth focusing on the wording in Article 2 – it effectively states that any activity which promotes the partition Turkey is prohibited, crucially including both direct and indirect activity. The discussion of ‘direct activity’ is quite uncontroversial and will be addressed initially.

Direct Activity

Turkey quite clearly directly breached article 2 by invading Cyprus in 1974, partitioning it and uniting the North with Turkey. Turkey argued that their invasion was lawful in light of Article 4, which states:

In the event of a breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom undertake to consult together with respect to the representations or measures necessary to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty.²²

The Article thus allegedly authorised Turkey to ‘take action’ in Cyprus if joint consultations between Greece and Turkey failed, and the action aimed to retain Cypriot independence. There is doubt over whether ‘take action’ could be defined as military action (as Turkey took in 1974) and whether their actions could possibly be depicted as retaining Cypriot independence, particularly as the end result was to partition Cyprus, a complete contradiction to Cypriot independence. Turkey argued that the Greek coup of Makarios and aim of ‘enosis’ with Cyprus triggered a threat to Cypriot independence, thus making their action lawful. This ambiguity and thus the Turkish justification that lives on today could be blamed on a lack of diligence in the construction of the treaty by Britain. However, it is accepted in the international community and amongst scholars that Turkey did in fact breach the treaty with their military action and thus acted unlawfully, reflected by the fact that the TRNC remains an unrecognised State today.²³ But this also illustrates the inability to enforce and thus weaknesses of international law (to be discussed later). There are also signs that the West could be starting to accept the TRNC, for example in recognising TRNC law (in

²² Treaty of Guarantee between United Kingdom of Great Britain And Northern Ireland, Greece And Turkey And Cyprus, Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

²³ Iakovos Kareklas, ‘International Law & Diplomacy on the Turkish Military Intervention of Cyprus’, *Hellenic Foundation for European & Foreign Policy, Working Paper No 18* (April 2011).

family, property law cases), such as *Hesperides Hotels v Aegean Turkish Holidays*;²⁴ and *Emin V Yeldag*,²⁵ thus consolidating the partition.

Indirect Activity

The notion of ‘indirect activities’ aimed at partitioning Cyprus and role of other State actors, notably the British, has not however been explored in academic literature. Of course, in order to see if an international treaty law has been breached, the precise wording of this treaty must be examined, as one would if one was dissecting a contract for breach in private law. Before doing this, looking at Article 3 of the treaty shows slightly more about the British intentions behind its construction. Article 3 states:

The Republic of Cyprus, Greece and Turkey undertake to respect the integrity of the areas retained under United Kingdom sovereignty at the time of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus, and guarantee the use and enjoyment by the United Kingdom of the rights to be secured to it by the Republic of Cyprus in accordance with the Treaty concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus signed at Nicosia on to-day's date.²⁶

Importantly therefore, as part of the treaty, the British retained military bases in Cyprus and this shows that Britain still viewed Cyprus as a country of great geopolitical significance, implying that the sentiments that they had during the 1940s and 1950s already explored in this article, were still existent during the drafting and consultation of this Treaty.

During the negotiations, Britain’s permanent retention of two substantial parts of Cyprus dominated the Treaty, most of which was made up of clauses relating to British territories and connected rights which detracted from true sovereignty. The Cypriots were barely involved, but Britain ensured Turkish involvement in the agreement, to the anger of the Greeks, with British Ambassador to Greece stating that the ‘Greeks are angry at the UK plan to involve the Turks...on the grounds that it introduced an element of Turkish governmental intervention...and since it must lead

²⁴ *Hesperides Hotels v Aegean Turkish Holidays* [1978] 1 QB 205.

²⁵ *Emin V Yeldag* (Attorney-General and Secretary of State For Foreign and Commonwealth Affairs Intervening) Family Division [2002] 1 Flr 956, 5 October 2001.

²⁶ Treaty of Guarantee between United Kingdom of Great Britain And Northern Ireland, Greece And Turkey And Cyprus, Signed at Nicosia on 16 August 1960.

to further antagonism and eventually to partition'.²⁷ The Turks were awarded disproportionate representation in the Civil Service, House of Representatives, and police and armed forces – as high as 40% for the latter two,²⁸ when the population was not even half that.

However, more specifically, it must also be considered whether Britain breached the Treaty of Guarantee through 'indirect activities.' The Treaty does not define what an 'indirect activity' may consist of. Revisiting Article 2, it states the Treaty 'undertake to prohibit, so far as concerns them, any activity aimed at promoting, directly or indirectly, either union of Cyprus with any other State or partition of the Island'. Thus, British support for a Turkish invasion must be interpreted as an indirect activity aimed at promoting the partition of Cyprus. British support for the Turks has already been explored in the colonial era but of course this has no relevance here, as Britain cannot be held accountable for breaching a Treaty by actions they took before the Treaty existed. Therefore, British support for the Turkish invasion in the 1960s and 1970s, after the Treaty of Guarantee and Cypriot independence but prior to the invasion and partition, must be examined to determine if the British could be accused of breaching the Treaty of Guarantee. For this, there must be some examination of the primary and secondary literature on this topic.

1960s – 1970s: British (and American) Support for Turkish Invasion

There is much evidence, which one has been collating and scholars such as Mallinson and Burke²⁹ agree with, that the British (and West) did indeed provide both diplomatic and financial support for Turkey in 1974, which contributed to and encouraged the Turkish invasion. As stated above, the Treaty of Guarantee makes specific reference to prohibiting such indirect action by parties to the agreement in Article 2, thus one would argue this potentially makes the British in breach of the treaty and international law. It is important to outline the British (and American) actions in Cyprus during their 14 year period of independence, which indicate Turkish support.

In 1967 to 1974, a military junta ruled Greece, who promoted the concept of 'Enosis' as one its many nationalist policies – the proposed union of Greece and the Greek communities in Cyprus. Leader of Cyprus at the time, Archbishop Makarios, opposed

²⁷ British Ambassador, Athens, to Secretary of State, 16 January 1959, BNA-FO 371/144516, file RG-1011/1 in Mallinson (no 10).

²⁸ P. 51, Mallinson (no 10).

²⁹ John Burke, *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: conflict, colonialism and the politics of remembrance in Greek Cypriot society* (London: Routledge; 2017).

Enosis and the threat it posed to Cypriot independence. Therefore, on 15 July 1974, the Greek military junta, led by Dimitrios Ioannidis, conducted a coup and overthrew Makarios. This triggered a response from Turkey five days later on 20 July 1974, allegedly acting in self-defence to protect the Turkish community of Cyprus. Turkey continued to invade Cyprus in August 1974, fighting with the Cypriot and Greek armies, which led to the Turkish occupation of Northern Cyprus. Over 40 years later, the Turkish occupation of Cyprus still exists, with the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus remaining as an unrecognised State in the eyes of the United Nations, and Cyprus remaining a split nation, with the Greek community in the recognised south.

At the time of the invasion of Cyprus, Britain were in a weaker position than they had been in previous decades. As stated earlier, from the 1950s, Britain were no longer a super power and their decision-making and foreign policies were effectively determined by the United States foreign policy, given the nature of their 'special relationship' in the Cold War era. It is beyond the scope of this article to discuss US-British relations in detail; however, it is fair to argue that Britain generally followed US actions. Thus, in determining the degree of British support for a Turkish invasion, it is firstly important to analyse the US stance on this.

American Support

The United States was led by Richard Nixon, who resigned in August 1974 to be replaced by Gerald Ford. Henry Kissinger was Secretary of State, and it was Kissinger who arguably played a pivotal role in US foreign policy in Cyprus. The early to mid-1970s was an important time in US Cold War politics. The US promoted 'détente' – an attempted relaxation of Soviet conflict – in the late 1960s, before commencing a period of Sino-American rapprochement in the early 1970s. 1973 signalled the end of the Vietnam War and Kissinger's much reported involvement in the overthrow of communist Salvador Allende in Chile. Kissinger and the US were thus certainly active in global Cold War politics at this time and Cyprus was no exception. However, the precise extent of the US and Kissinger's role in the invasion of Cyprus, as well as the intentions behind their foreign policy, is subject to much scholarly debate. There have arguably been three waves of historiographical debate since 1974, which shall be explored.

In the years following the invasion, however prior to the release of any primary documents, the first wave of scholarly opinion broke through, which focussed on a criticism towards Kissinger's role in the invasion and an assertion that both the Greek

and Turkish invasions of Cyprus were a deliberate and supported US foreign policy, promoted by Kissinger. The late and renowned Christopher Hitchens, perhaps unsurprisingly, was one of the first to release a critique of Kissinger's role in Cyprus, in his book 'Hostage to History' in 1997.³⁰ Hitchens argues that the intervention of four major foreign powers, Turkey, Greece, Britain and the United States, turned a local dispute into a major disaster. Hitchens' incisive journalistic approach certainly cannot be ignored however he has released many publications which surround anti-US, and anti-Kissinger in particular, sentiments, especially in South East Asia (Vietnam and Cambodia). Thus, naturally, Hitchens' predictable conclusions fall into the bracket of anti-US journalism during the Cold War. Furthermore, Hitchens relies on the fact that Kissinger kept many documents classified after leaving, implying, but not confirming that he had something to hide.

In 1999, Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig released a book which argued the bold view that the US and Kissinger were involved in a 'calculated conspiracy' in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974.³¹ These authors have less of an anti-US reputation as Hitchens, however again they write with little source evidence to back up their views, given that primary sources were still yet to be released at this time. In fact, it could be argued that the book was actually ahead of its time and uncovered some credible conclusions about Kissinger's intentions in 1974. However, the book suffers from the odd slip and as a result these conclusions are undermined. Furthermore, its publication prior to the release of primary documents led many to, probably unfairly, simply categorise the work as one of that of a 'conspiracy theorist', and led the book to be overlooked and disregarded.

Somewhat surprisingly, in 2014, Eugene Rossides released a book³² which shared the views of Hitchens, O'Malley and Craig, yet fail to draw on the primary sources which were now available. The decision to ignore these documents meant his viewpoint had little significance, if anything undermining the first wave of historiography by implying that it could not be backed up by the released sources which were available at the time of writing his book.

³⁰ Christopher Hitchens, *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger* (London: Farrar Straus & Giroux; 1989).

³¹ O'Malley and Craig (no 8).

³² Eugene Rossides, *Kissinger and Cyprus: a study in Lawlessness* (Washington D.C.: American Hellenic Institute Foundation; 2014).

In the mid-2000s, following the release of many US foreign policy documents, the second wave of historiography began to prevail. They follow Kissinger's claims that he was not properly focused on Cyprus during the crisis that led to its illegal dismemberment. In Kissinger's book, 'Years of Renewal', he wrote:

If success is measured by 'solving' every problem, America's Cyprus policy failed in restoring a unitary Cypriot State...However, preserving the general peace and the structure of the Western Alliance on which peace depended were important objectives in their own right. And those objectives the Ford Administration did achieve in the Cyprus crisis of 1974.³³

In fact, Kissinger here, by admitting some deliberate policy in Cyprus, goes further than his apologists are prepared to go, who represent the second wave of historiography.

In 2008, Dan Lindley and Caroline Wenzke³⁴ took the view that Kissinger did not see Cyprus as a priority. In the same year, Jan Asmussen asserted that there was no British-American involvement in the coup that overthrew Archbishop Makarios in July 1974, stretching only to state that some members of British and American intelligence knew about Athens' plans for a coup would occur at some point in the autumn of 1974 but were surprised by the earlier timetable. Asmussen also explores why both the British and the Americans decided not to inform the Cyprus government as well as the reasons behind Britain's surprising reluctance to exercise her right of intervention on the island. He states that there was no communication between Kissinger and British Foreign Minister, Callaghan, on 20 July 1974 – the day of the Turkish invasion.³⁵ The book received plaudits for its intricate review of the newly released primary sources and in turn its interpretation of these, to essentially discard any intentional or extensive US or British involvement.

In 2012, Andreas Constandinos argued in his book on the Cyprus Crisis, that Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was so pre-occupied with other issues (mostly domestic) that he did not have the knowledge on or time to deal with the possible invasion of Cyprus.³⁶ Constandinos relies on many recently released documents where Kissinger

³³ Henry Kissinger, *Years of Renewal* (London: Simon and Schuster UK Ltd; 2012)

³⁴ Dan Lindley and Caroline Wenzke, *Dismantling the Cyprus Conspiracy: The US Role in the Cyprus Crises of 1963, 1967 and 1974* (Indiana: University of Notre Dame; 2008)

³⁵ Jan Asmussen, *Cyprus at War: Diplomacy and Conflict During the 1974 Crisis* (London: I.B. Tauris; 2008)

³⁶ Andreas Constandinos, *Examining the Role of the British and American Government's During 1974*

appears oblivious to the situation in Cyprus, as well as Kissinger's later admission and apology on his foreign policy failure in Cyprus.

This school of thought and second wave of historiography, which essentially promotes the concept of US non-involvement in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus, became favoured and prevalent after the release of the US documents, with an influx of literature taking variations of this same approach, released throughout the 2000s and still today. However, rather than simply latching on to these sources as proving that neither the US nor Kissinger had any calculated involvement in the invasion of Cyprus as Kissinger's above apologists have, one saw an opportunity to interpret the foreign policy documents in an original manner and tap into the vast amount of evidence, such as memorandums and documentation, to prove US and Kissinger collusion in this. For example, there is evidence of Kissinger stating in a meeting that there was 'no US reason' why the Turks should not gain a third of Cyprus.³⁷

In 2016, William Mallinson, writing his fourth book on Cypriot history, made a breakthrough in his book 'Kissinger and the Invasion of Cyprus', which may represent a welcome third wave of historiography, proving that Kissinger's actions, or inaction, was not so innocent and passive as Kissinger's apologists seem to claim. Mallinson wrote:

'Conspiracy theorists' is a label often applied unfairly by sloppy academics and government information departments...The Cyprus Conspiracy (O'Malley & Craig) has in fact been proven to have been fairly accurate in some of its evaluation...since then, he has documents which show not only how important Kissinger considered the bases (British base in Cyprus), but how he pressurised Britain into keeping them. The documents suggest that far from being a conspiracy, there was simply a secret high-level idea to allow Turkey to invade and keep over one third of Cyprus, a plan which initially only Kissinger (and perhaps a small coterie) and his former student, the Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit, were really focussed on.' Mallinson went to argue that 'this passion with Cyprus' position as a Cold War asset will crop up as we proceed, reaching a climax in the mid-Seventies. Kissinger is a prime example of those who consider Cyprus as a cat's paw of great power diplomacy'.³⁸

(Plymouth UK: Plymouth University Press; 2012)

³⁷ *Foreign Relations of the United States 1973-1976, Vol. 30: Greece; Cyprus; Turkey* (Washington: United States Government Printing Office, 2007).

³⁸ Mallinson (no 10).

Mallinson's well written book, backed up by the sources, is arguably the most reliable, innovative and ground-breaking view on the US and Kissinger's role in Cyprus, arguing that Kissinger and the US did have a pre-meditated plan in Cyprus and that Turkey's invasion was indeed a calculated part of that plan.

One book of this nature is not however enough to change the tide of literature. This third wave must at least match the second wave, and there is still more to be expanded on from Mallinson's work. As Mallinson states 'we still do not know whether the invasion was agreed well in advance or whether it was agreed on the hoof. We need more documents, and in particular all of the above-mentioned telephone transcripts, unexpurgated.'³⁹ Thus, much of this topic is yet to be explored in extensive detail. There are still many classified documents that specifically relate to Kissinger and may only be released upon Kissinger's death in the upcoming years. These may reveal further information on Kissinger's actions in Cyprus.

British Support

Most of the historiography on the British involvement in Cyprus surrounds the period of colonialism⁴⁰ and independence, thus there is not as much focus on Britain in the 1960s to 1974. However, it is fair to argue that the interpretation and historiography behind Britain's involvement in the invasion is very similar to the American 'waves', predominantly due to Foreign Minister Callaghan's obedience and submissive attitude towards the US, as stated earlier with regards to the 'special relationship'. This is why it was so important to analyse the US's support for the Turkish invasion in the previous section – this would generally be illustrative of the British stance. However, there has been some literature on the British support for a Turkish invasion.

Van der Bijl's 2010 book takes a pretty sympathetic view towards British non-involvement, stating that the British faced two serious problems - the Greek Cypriots' desire for Enosis and, the intense rivalry and antipathy between the Greek and Turkish communities, thus it was a difficult scenario to be faced with.⁴¹ This view fits within the second wave described above with regards to the US.

However, scholar Burke takes crucial strides towards the third wave of historiography on Britain's involvement in his 2017 book, to fall in line with Mallinson's views

³⁹ Mallinson (no 10).

⁴⁰ Philip Newman, *A Short History of Cyprus* (London: Longmans; 1953).

⁴¹ Nick Van Der Bijl, *The Cyprus Emergency: The Divided Island 1955 – 1974* (Barnsley UK: Pen & Sword; 2010).

on Kissinger and the US involvement in Cyprus. The book shows that a suspicion born out of Britain's long (neo-) colonial connection to Cyprus frame an understanding of British actions associated with the events, and lasting consequences, of 1974. Burke recognises that no study has yet sought to systematically analyse and understand the influences shaping the history and memory of British actions on Cyprus in 1974. However, Burke argues that there is an existence of 'partitionist' conspiracies, collusive accusations and a series of memory distortions which continue to resonate strongly irrespective of the evidence that is now available.⁴²

The scope of this article is not to regurgitate Burke's findings in detail – it is to importantly make the point that this third wave of historiography on the US's involvement in Cyprus is also apparent with regards to British diplomatic and financial support for the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974, through their actions in the 1960s up to 1974. This essentially backs up the views of the first wave in 1990s, but with the use of the important recently released foreign policy documents. Burke's analysis is thus built on primary evidence and is certainly convincing. However, Burke is a historian, and whilst the analysis is immensely significant, he does not make the legal link in identifying how important this evidence of British support for the Turkish invasion actually is. In combination with the examination of Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee discussed earlier, this actually shows that Britain breached international treaty law.

The Legal Link: British Support for the Turkish invasion – Does this Equate to 'Indirect Activity' that was Prohibited in the Treaty of Guarantee?

The point of exploring the literature that has recently prevailed on British (and American) support for the Turkish invasion in a historical context in the previous section, is relevant in a legal context, but has not yet been highlighted by any scholars and is thus the main and original aim of this article. To provide insight of this in a legal context, one must link the literature that is becoming prevalent that the British (and Americans) did in fact provide support for the Turkish invasion and thus promoted division of Cyprus, with Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibits any 'indirect activity' by the parties of the treaty to promote partition of Cyprus. If this third wave of literature is accurate, and in particular Burke's view of British collaboration with the US in the Turkish invasion, then Britain did indeed breach the Treaty of

⁴² Burke (no 28).

Guarantee with their support for an invasion – ie ‘indirect activity’. Before exploring this, it is worth considering if any other areas of international law were breached too.

Customary international law

It should be mentioned that international law is also composed of ‘customary international law’ (as well as treaty law) – a set of uncodified customs and general international law that governs UN States, which is however difficult to enforce and certainly not applied consistently, particularly when it comes to acts of intervention by the West. However, can the West’s actions in Cyprus be interpreted as a clear breach of customary international law, which has gone unpunished? This is dependent on two main questions - whether the West did in fact play a major role in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus (which has already been argued above) but also whether a covert and non-military intervention, e.g. US and British diplomatic and financial support for an unlawful Turkish invasion, is enough to hold the US and Britain culpable of breaching a customary international law.

Nicholas Tsagourias states that intervention which breaches international law refers to interference in the affairs of a State and can take many different forms: political or military, direct or indirect, but that international law is mainly concerned with dictatorial or coercive interference in a State’s affairs, which is, crucially, in principle prohibited. He however goes on to state that the scope of the prohibition is affected by the political, legal, or normative changes taking place in the international society at different stages of its development.⁴³ Thus, Tsagourias seems to imply that interference by way of diplomatic or financial support may not in fact be classed as an interference which is a breach of international law, but rather a form of coercive action is needed. Thus, the British and Western discrete role in Cyprus perhaps is not a breach, according to current customary international legal principles. This is certainly consistent with a lack of vindication for similar acts of covert support (mainly by the US) for other military coercive acts of interference into a State’s affairs.

However, there are counter arguments to this – firstly, to what extent is this lack of vindication for such acts of support due to the fact that, as Tsagourias argues, they do not breach customary international law, or perhaps controversially is this due to the fact that those nations who have the financial strength to interfere in this covert manner are likely the same world powers that control the climate of international law

⁴³ Nicholas Tsagourias and Alasdair Morrison, *International Humanitarian Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2018).

and the way in which it is enforced, particularly given the undefinable nature of customary international law, as discussed earlier? When exploring actual US acts of military interference, best evidenced by US military action across Latin America and Asia perhaps, and the lack of condemnation of these by international law, it is perhaps fair to imply that the latter is correct – i.e. that the US are exempt from breaching international law, due to their world status and power. However, in the case of Nicaragua, the US were found guilty of being in breach of its obligations under Article XIX of the Treaty of Friendship, Commerce and Navigation between the Parties signed at Managua on 21 January 1956.⁴⁴

The scope of this article is not to explore this immensely broad point of US breach of customary international law, which if proven in Cyprus, would be applicable to many examples of US intervention. In fact, this also includes a debate on which theory on international law one takes. Whether the US are punished for their arguably unlawful actions according to customary international law, depends on how one defines international law and thus the theory one adopts or form international law takes. Indeed, there has been a lack of prosecution or even publication or knowledge of US actions in Cyprus in 1974, which have undoubtedly been branded as ‘lawful’ by default according to international law today. Thus, this implies that international law could still be interpreted as a form of US hegemonic power rather than defence against imperialism, which is controlled and formulated by the US (via using the flexible nature of customary international law for example). It would draw upon theoretical debates, whereby for example Kitisiotis argues international law has become institutionalised and less voluntarist⁴⁵ whereas B.S. Chimni states international law provides more efficient support to Western-dominated global order.⁴⁶ This would require an analysis which certainly goes beyond the scope of this article and journal, on Britain’s role in colonial Cyprus. Thus, one appreciates that this counter-argument is perhaps quite far-fetched or at least one that requires far more extensive analysis given that it would have much wider implications, that cannot be discussed in this article.

Regardless of the above and whether the US and Britain can be considered to have interfered coercively in a State’s affairs and thus breached customary international

⁴⁴ *Nicaragua v United States of America - Military and Paramilitary Activities in and against Nicaragua - Judgment of 27 June 1986 - Merits - Judgments* [1986] ICJ 1; ICJ Reports 1986, p 14; [1986] ICJ Rep 14 (27 June 1986).

⁴⁵ Dino Kritsiotis, ‘International law and the relativities of enforcement’, in James Crawford, *The Cambridge Companion to International Law* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 2015)

⁴⁶ B.S Chimni, ‘Legitimizing the international rule of law’, in Crawford (no 44).

law through their covert diplomatic and financial support for the Turkish invasion, there is another angle by which the US and Britain may have breached customary international law – by threatening Cyprus’ self-determination. A people can be said to have realised its right to self-determination when they have either (1) established a sovereign and independent State; (2) freely associated with another State or (3) integrated with another State after freely having expressed their will to do so.⁴⁷ In 1960, following their independence from Britain, Cyprus can be clearly argued to have satisfied the first of these, thus should be seen to have realised their right to self-determination.

The principle of self-determination outlines not just the duty of States to respect and promote the right, but also the obligation to refrain from any forcible action which deprives peoples of the enjoyment of such a right. In particular, the use of force to prevent a people from exercising their right of self-determination is regarded as illegal and has been consistently condemned by the international community.⁴⁸ Thus, the US and Britain could be seen to have acted forcibly through their support of a Turkish invasion (including financial thus tangible) to deprive the Cypriot people of their right to self-determination, and which in turn threatened the independence of the State. This is again a point that needs to be fleshed out and is not within the scope of this article, given that the notion of self-determination is perhaps slightly more complex than in other States, as the Turkish people now use this same principle of self-determination to claim that Northern Cyprus is a recognised State and entitled to de facto independence, which has however not been accepted by the UN and international community.

Finally, on this point of breaching customary international law, relating to crimes against humanity, Sotiris Rizas argues that whenever a choice had to be made between realpolitik and human rights, the former was the main consideration of American policy-makers in Cyprus and Greece.⁴⁹ Although committed to the recalibration of US foreign policy toward human rights, the Carter administration did not depart from these premises in the formulation of its policy in the Eastern Mediterranean.⁵⁰ Of course, this potential breach of human rights could be argued to have also

⁴⁷ James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (Oxford: OUP, 2007)

⁴⁸ Crawford (no 46).

⁴⁹ Sotiris Rizas, *Realism and Human Rights in US Policy Toward Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus* (UK: Lexington, Oct 2018).

⁵⁰ *Ibid.*

breached the UN's Universal Declaration of Human Rights or the ECHR as discussed in the next section. However, more specifically, it is more relevant to discuss whether Britain breached the Treaty of Guarantee 1960, and this is the main point of International Law that must be examined, from a breach of treaty perspective.

Treaty law

The second counter argument to Tsagourias' point is crucial and more specific to the case of Cyprus, where the issues do not just relate to support and interference breaching customary international law. Rather, this British support breaches the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee, which prohibits indirect activity by any members of the treaty which may partition Cyprus. The British support, whilst led by the Americans, for the Turkish invasion, in the 1960s but also during the immediate years prior to the invasion in 1974, outlined in the previous section and highlighted by scholars such as Burke, should be classed as 'indirect activity', therefore an example of a breach of international treaty law.

Scholars such as Constandinos argue that Western actions in Cyprus in the 1960s should be examined independently from the 1970s due to the differing administrations and foreign policy approaches. Whilst he is correct that the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 cannot be politically blamed on the approach of a British or US administration in the 1960s, the construction and repercussions of this Treaty had direct legal connections with the Turkish invasion in 1974. Any British plans or support for a Turkish invasion in the 1960s, even if distinctly separate to the invasion in 1974, would also be seen as prohibited in contravention of Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee. Thus, some responsibility must lie with the British and Western actions in the 1960s.⁵¹

Have any other treaties in international law been breached by the British via their support for the Turkish invasion? Perhaps the first broader international treaty that one may consider is the European Convention of Human Rights.⁵² The UK, Turkey, Greece and Cyprus have all signed and ratified this treaty, thus are all subject to its terms. However, whilst the British may have provided diplomatic and financial support for the Turkish invasion, it was arguably not engaged in the invasion itself from a military perspective, and thus cannot be accused of breaching human rights. Con-

⁵¹ Constandinos (no 35).

⁵² Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Fundamental Freedoms (signed 4 November 1950, entered into force 3 September 1953), CETS No. 5, 213 UNTS 221 (henceforth ECHR).

versely, the Turks may in fact be more likely to have breached human rights, with reports of torture against civilians for example (prohibited under Article 3) needing to be addressed by the European Court of Human Rights. However, this is also beyond the scope of this article. The most relevant treaty to consider that has been breached is undoubtedly the Treaty of Guarantee and Article 2 - this is sufficient to claim that Britain have breached international law in Cyprus.

Enforcement of breach of Treaty of Guarantee

This article has thus far aimed to prove that Britain breached Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee, by covertly supporting a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974. However, even if this is the case, what next? There are two important problems in any instance of the breach of international law – who has the jurisdiction to make a decision on the case and how is this decision enforced?

As stated earlier, any individual or State claiming that the European Convention of Human Rights has been breached can take their case against a State who is party to the Convention to the European Court of Human Rights. But there is difficulty in claiming that Britain breached this Convention. Another option is to take the case to the International Criminal Court (ICC). However, the ICC only has the jurisdiction to deal with cases relating to Genocide (art 6), Crimes against Humanity (art 7), War Crimes (art 8) or Crime of Aggression (art 8 bis).⁵³ Again, whilst a case may be viable against Turkey in any of these areas, the notion of British support cannot be categorised as any of these. Thus, the only remaining option appears to be the International Court of Justice (ICJ), where the US were tried for their actions in Nicaragua, as stated above.

Assuming that a case of this nature could be taken to the ICJ in The Hague, and the judiciary found that Britain had indeed breached the Treaty of Guarantee, there are inherent flaws in the enforcement of international law in general, which means that it would be hard to enforce this decision. Whilst Treaties and Judgments are intended to be binding, States can opt to ignore these and face little consequences. For example, President Trump has recently stated that he does not even acknowledge the jurisdiction of the ICC. Furthermore, Turkey have been held to have breached international law by invading Cyprus, but nothing has changed on the island. The TRNC is not a recognised State in law but in reality it has not ceased to exist. Attempted

⁵³ Rome Statute of the International Criminal Court, Done at Rome on 17 July 1998, in force on 1 July 2002, United Nations, Treaty Series, vol. 2187, No. 38544.

sanctions against Turkey has not impacted this and there are even indications that the West are starting to recognise the TRNC. Perhaps if Britain were held to have breached international law, they would face financial penalties and sanctions, but it would make no difference to the lives of Greek Cypriots and there would be no way of enforcing any judgment on Britain. Again, the issue of enforceability of international law is beyond the scope of an article of this size, but is worth noting.

Conclusion

This article has aimed to prove two points. Firstly, through focussing on an original historical analysis of primary material at the UN General Assembly in 1954; the tri-partite conference between Britain, Greece and Turkey in 1955; and diplomatic correspondence on Cyprus during the anti-Greek rioting in 1958 for example, it has shown the development in British ideology on Cyprus during this short but crucial period in the 1950s, whereby they switched from aims to keep colonial control over Cyprus by creating divisions which 'justified' their presence, to accepting the loss of its colony, but maintaining a covert pro-Turkish policy for geopolitical reasons. Importantly, Britain created and encouraged Greek-Turkish divisions during this period.

Secondly and more importantly, this article has proven that international law issues are engrained in Cyprus, partly due to the fact that the Turkish invasion in 1974 was unlawful as it breached the Treaty of Guarantee, as is universally accepted. However, the most innovative and original aspect of this article is that it argued that British actions also breached international law, particularly in relation to codified international law, in particular Article 2 of the Treaty of Guarantee. British support of a Turkish should be seen as an 'indirect activity' aimed at promoting the partition of Cyprus, which was prohibited by the Treaty. This has been previously unexplored and further adds to the long-standing breaches of international law that remain part of the Cyprus problem today.

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The Island of Cyprus, Sovereignty, and International Law in the Early Decades of British Rule (1878-1923)

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Abstract

By drawing attention to a number of points from current debates in critical international legal scholarship, the present article discusses aspects at the intersection of Cypriot, Balkan and Middle Eastern history, through an innovative angle enriched with insights from a legal perspective. With the 1878 Congress of Berlin and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 at the epicentre, the article builds an argument in favour of revisiting the early period of British rule on the island, as a means to obtain an improved understanding of the constitutional framework for Cypriot independence and by extension, the complexity of international relations in the Eastern Mediterranean to this day.²

Keywords: Cyprus, public international law, legal history, sovereignty, Ottoman Empire, British Empire, Balkans, Middle East

‘The amnesiac quality of modern law’s origins avoids a momentous paradox. An advanced Occidental law, wedded in its apotheosis to freedom and a certain equality, becomes thoroughly despotic when shipped to the rest of the world in the formal colonizations from the late eighteenth to the early twentieth centuries.’³

Prologue

The Island of Cyprus belongs to those regions of the world that are difficult to locate and define within a singular geography. Lying just a few miles off the shores of western Asia, Cyprus also falls within the periphery of the European continent. Consequently, its history is a continuous alteration of influences from all major civilisations, empires and peoples that have periodically dominated the Eastern Mediter-

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² The present article is an elaborate version of a paper entitled ‘The Island of Cyprus and the Eastern Question in the Early Decades of British Colonialism: An International Law Perspective’, presented at the Colonial Cyprus (1878-1960) International Conference, at the University of Nicosia in February 2020.

³ Peter Fitzpatrick, *The Mythology of Modern Law* (London: Routledge, 1992) 107.

anean. This makes the island a permanent feature of the history of the region, albeit often only through broader regional geopolitical debates. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that even though Cyprus is a textbook example in numerous ongoing doctrinal debates in public international law, neither the island has surfaced prominently in the ‘historical turn’ observed in international legal scholarship,⁴ nor have Cypriological Studies benefited from the innovative questions and approaches deriving as a result of said historical turn.

This is potentially also due to the traditionally rigid stance towards and engagement with public international law among in Cyprus, caused by the subtle and fragile political and diplomatic balances formed in the two decades following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, in the shadow of a persistent, unresolved conflict. Despite the fact that this reluctance to engage with public international law is gradually being reversed at present, with rising expertise in various areas of public international law among the younger generation of Cypriot lawyers, the difficulty to engage with the most controversial historical, legal and political aspects of the island’s history remains. Such efforts are often met with scepticism by a portion of legal professionals and the general public. Hence, Cyprus remains outside the scope of current critical debates in international law, unlike some of its nearest middle eastern neighbours, failing to benefit from innovations committed to uncover the historical shortcomings and prejudices of international law.

With the above in mind, the present article is a brief, law-oriented, historical overview of the earlier period of British rule on the island, in an attempt to draw attention to the added benefits of opening up an inquiry into the colonial and pre-colonial *legal history* of Cyprus. The chosen angle for the present paper is that of the principle of sovereignty,⁵ since the principle lies at the core of both classical international law and international relations, despite differences in understanding what exactly the principle entails. Even though the legal meaning of Sovereignty is narrower than that in political discourse, understood as an attribute of a State as opposed to a criterion for statehood,⁶ in both disciplines Sovereignty is closely intertwined with a State’s estab-

⁴ Martti Koskenniemi, *The Gentle Civilizer of Nations: The Rise and Fall of International Law 1870-1960* (Cambridge University Press, 2001) 9.

⁵ Samantha Besson, ‘Sovereignty’ *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2011) <<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1472?prd=MPIL>> (last accessed 6 February 2020) para 1.

⁶ James Crawford, *The Creation of States in International Law* (2nd ed., Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2007) 32-33, 89.

lishment and subsequently, history. Thus, this angle gives the opportunity to touch upon a broad spectrum of international legal rules, that are central to the history of the Island of Cyprus, during the period 1878-1923.

The transition of Cyprus from an Ottoman Province in 1878 to a Crown Colony in 1925 is one of the less-discussed periods of Cypriot history, compared to other periods of colonial rule. This however, is a period of rapid development for international law, in the face of an expanding colonialism, and shrinking power within Europe's century-long empires. In this regard, I isolate in the present paper two events which are formative for South Eastern Europe, but whose relevance to Cyprus has been considerably toned down in existing literature. The 1878 Congress of Berlin, which was decisive in the process of state-building in the Balkan region, and the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which formally sealed the end of the Ottoman Empire. There are of course previous analyses of Greco-Turkish relationships regarding this period.⁷ The present article however, aims to illustrate how elements of *legal* significance surrounding those two legal instruments offer help explain the impact of the law on later developments in Cyprus.

The article starts with an overview of the colonial origins of international law, as illustrated primarily by critical international legal scholars, so as to introduce the reader to the ongoing debates on the subject. It then turns to the 1878 Congress of Berlin, during which the Ottoman Empire agreed to hand over the administration of Cyprus to the United Kingdom (UK), and the legal complications this agreement led to, up to the island's formal annexation by the UK in 1914. Lastly, it proceeds with a brief overview of the relevance of the 1923 Treaty of Lausanne for Cyprus, bridging developments surrounding that event to Cypriot independence in 1960.

As discussed below, throughout this period the European Powers, in pursuit of their own interests, raised concerns regarding the fate of the predominantly Christian, underdeveloped regions of the western territories of the Ottoman Empire. This led to a number of innovative, yet in the long-term highly detrimental approaches regarding the handling of minorities in the newly-established States in the region. Consequently, the mindset that dominated the field of international law and international relations at the time, it is hereby suggested, has had a direct impact on the constitutional settlement agreed for the independence of Cyprus, including the prominent

⁷ See e.g. Andreas Theophanous, 'The Cyprus Problem in the Broader Greco-Turkish Rivalry: Implications for Stability in the Eastern Mediterranean' (1997) *The Cyprus Review* 9 (1) 44.

role of the principle of bi-communality enshrined in the 1960 Cyprus Constitution, and the issue of Guarantees.

The Colonial Origin of International Law

Even though it is recognised that the development of inter-state relations goes far back to antiquity, the seminal moment in the development of classic international law is considered the signing of the Peace of Westphalia in 1648, which concluded the Thirty Years' War among the sovereigns of Western Europe. This is the first instrument that recognised separate rights for sovereign territorial entities, namely States, and in particular the principles of territorial delimitation and non-intervention in the internal affairs of the State.⁸ By the end of the 19th century, public international law had grown in a systematised legal order of positive legal rules, employed in principle by all major European Powers, most prominent among them Austria, Prussia, Russia, Great Britain and France, which together established in 1818 the Concert of Europe.⁹

Contrary to the modern conception of the global order today however, expressed primarily in the form of international organisations like the United Nations, the World Trade Organisation and others, no 'real international society'¹⁰ existed at that time, beyond the limited circle of States recognised as sovereign in western Europe, plus Russia. In the same spirit, international law was not considered a self-standing discipline during the 19th century. Instead, it was rather an 'amateur science' holding primarily the interest of lawyers and philosophers in France, Germany and less so Britain, engaging with elements of philosophy, diplomacy, public and civil law.¹¹

From the late 18th century through the better part of the 19th century, it was common for written works on the subject of international law to refer to a 'European International Law', even though the independence of the United States of America in the late 18th century suggested that international law had started to expand beyond the boundaries of the European continent.¹² At the same time, in the colonies the Eu-

⁸ Besson (no 3) para 13.

⁹ Sina Van den Bogaert, 'Berlin Congress (1878)' *Max Planck Encyclopedia of Public International Law* (2011) < <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e687> > (last accessed 24 August 2020) para 3.

¹⁰ Koskenniemi (no 2) 98.

¹¹ *Ibid.* 28-35.

¹² Hugh McKinnon Wood, 'The Treaty of Paris and Turkey's Status in International Law' (1943) 37(2) *American Journal of International Law* 262.

ropean States would exercise their power and pursue their interests from a ‘position of superiority’ through a system of capitulations, consular jurisdiction and a series of colonial wars; all of which ‘had become banal aspects of the international every day’.¹³

The late 19th century was the height of the period of colonisation in Africa. European penetration deeper into previously unknown to them territories, brought them in contact with societal and cultural forms which they could not understand, leading to the marginalisation of those non-European societies, which failed to comply with the common understanding of a perceived European identity.¹⁴ As a result, the arbitrary division of the world between an exotic Orient and an advanced Occident, led to a rigid racial—and by all standards racist—categorisation of the world’s peoples into the ‘civilized’ on the one side, and the ‘uncivilized’ on the other. Or the rational and philosophical Aryans, as opposed to the emotional and religious Semitics.¹⁵

The civilised/uncivilised categorisation was not a satisfactory one however, considering that while some “Orientals” were “pirates and even cannibals”,¹⁶ others had long-lasting established relations with the West¹⁷ forming an intermediate “semi-civilised” category of “barbarians” (including primarily the Ottoman Empire, China, Japan, Siam and Persia) positioned between the “civilised” and the “savages”; the latter term reserved usually for the peoples of the African continent.¹⁸ This had a direct impact on how European powers would treat the rulers of the non-European States, who ‘could never really become European’.¹⁹ Regardless of how much the non-Europeans tried, decisions about their position within the global order would depend on what and whom the Europeans would approve of.²⁰ Effectively therefore, though sovereign States are the traditional subjects of international law, in the late 19th century the status and participation of non-European States in the international legal system was dependent upon those who held the keys from the inside.

¹³ Koskenniemi (no 2) 98.

¹⁴ Ibid. 101-105.

¹⁵ Johann C Bluntschli, ‘Arische Völker und arische Rechte’ *Gesammelte kleine Schriften* [Aryan People and Aryan Rights] (2 Vols, Nördlingen: Beck Buchhandlung, 1879) 66 (in German) cited in Koskenniemi (no 2) 103.

¹⁶ Travers Twiss, ‘Rapport (1879-1880)’ *Annuaire Institut du Droit International*, 301 [Annual Report 1879-1880 Institute of International Law (in French) cited in Koskenniemi (no 2) 133.

¹⁷ Koskenniemi (no 2) 133.

¹⁸ Ibid. 132-136; Umut Özsü, ‘Ottoman Empire’ in Bardo Fassbender and Anne Peters (eds) *Oxford Handbook of the History of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2012) 429, 433.

¹⁹ Koskenniemi (no 2) 135.

²⁰ Ibid.

Even though the above categorisations survive in one form or another, it is less likely for this aspect of the genealogy of modern international law to have a strong impact over international legal discourse in States like Cyprus.²¹ Relatively newly-established states, which perceive themselves as members of an enlarged European community, which gradually expanded over the course of the 20th century. The above aspect of international law's development should not be underestimated and unproblematised, however, as it forms an integral part of the legal history of the island as a geographical region, and of the Republic of Cyprus as such. Even more so with due regard to the original constitutional framework of 1960.

With the above considerations in mind, the year 1856 is widely accepted as the moment the Ottoman Empire became the first non-European State to formally obtain the status of a subject of international law through the signing of the 1856 Treaty of Paris, which signalled the end of the Crimean War. Evidence for this endorsement of the Ottoman Empire in the inner circle of the members of the international community was provided under article 7 of the Treaty of Paris, where the parties to the Treaty expressly admitted the Sublime Porte to 'the advantages of public law' within the Concert of Europe.²² However, according to some commentators this formal recognition by then had no practical consequences and it was therefore a purely formalistic procedure, since the Ottoman Empire had already been maintaining diplomatic relations and signing treaties with European powers.²³ Indicatively, slightly more than a month earlier, Sultan Abdulmejid I had issued the *Hatt-ı Hümayûn* Reform Edict, in the middle of the *Tanzimat* period, during which a series of significant internal reforms, strongly influenced by the French and British legal systems, took place from 1836 to 1871. The need to align to the European legal standards of the time, is thus evident. The *Tanzimat* constitutes a highly significant part of the history of Cypriot domestic law as well,²⁴ as it led to the most significant legal reform on the island,

²¹ A member of the European Union since 2004, the Republic of Cyprus falls within the Asia -Pacific Group of United Nations members, which it joined in 1960. An indication of the peculiarity of geographical areas that do not fit comfortably within a single category.

²² The original wording of Article 7 in French reads: 'déclarent la Sublime Porte admise à participer aux avantages du droit public et du concert Européens.' [declare the Sublime Porte admissible for participation in the advantages of public law and the Concert of Europe]; McKinnon Wood (no 10) 263.

²³ McKinnon Wood (no 10) 262.

²⁴ Andreas Neocleous, *Neocleous's Introduction to Cyprus Law* (Limassol: Andreas Neocleous & Co LLC, 2010) 14-15.

half a century before the completion of the harmonisation of the Cyprus legal order with the English Common Law and the Principles of Equity in 1935.²⁵

The civilising mission of the European Powers of the late 19th century was at the heart of the development of international law and had a profound effect on the empires and the territories that lay beyond Europe. It is possible, however, that the effect of this process was reinforced for the Ottoman Empire, by virtue of its geographical expansion from the Balkan peninsula to the Levant and the Middle East, bridging the West with the East. There were also other factors that contributed to this development, including the Empire's century-long commercial ties with leading Powers in the Mediterranean, such as the Venetians, and the Christian faith of a significant proportion of its subjects.

Until recently, there has been a reluctance on behalf of many international law scholars to examine the discipline's development in the 'extra-European world', despite the fact that the latest period of the Ottoman Empire led to a number of doctrinal and conceptual innovations in international law.²⁶ In the period from 1878 onwards to the Interwar years, the Balkans are being increasingly referred to as a site of experimentation for a number of new legal mechanisms, including the earliest forms of fact-finding, peacekeeping and the administration of population exchanges, under the coordination of the League of Nations. Legal mechanisms that developed further thereafter, in the period of decolonisation.²⁷ As it is frequently the case with the study of history in general, it took considerable time also for international lawyers to fully appreciate the benefit of analysing and assessing the history of their own discipline, especially at the present moment in time, with many of the ongoing intractable conflicts around the world reaching new levels of increased tension.

²⁵ Article 49, A Law to Make Better Provision for the Administration of Justice and to Reconstitute the Courts of the Colony (Law No 38/1935), *The Cyprus Gazette 1935*; Its provisions confined the application of the common law and the principles of equity to those which applied in England in 1914; George M Pikis, *An analysis of the English Common Law, Principles of Equity and their application in a former British Colony, Cyprus* (Leiden: Brill, 2017).

²⁶ Umut Özsü and Thomas Skouteris, 'International Legal Histories of the Ottoman Empire: An Introduction to the Symposium' (2016) *Journal of the History of International Law* 18(1) 1.

²⁷ Ntina Tzouvala, "'These Ancient Arenas of Racial Struggles": International Law and the Balkans, 1878-1949' (2019) *European Journal of International Law* 29(4) 1149; Jean d'Aspremont, 'The League of Nations and the Power of 'Experiment Narratives' in International Institutional Law' (2020) *International Community Law Review* 22, 275; Nicholas Tsagourias, 'The League of Nations and Visions of World Order' (2020) *International Community Law Review* 22, 291.

On a separate note, even though the Island of Cyprus does not belong to the Balkans in geographical terms, its modern history is closely intertwined with that of Greece and Turkey, especially from the establishment of the modern Greek State in 1830. One could argue therefore, that history has made the island a Balkan territory “by proxy”. Hence, starting from the 1878 Congress of Berlin, when the Porte leased the island to Britain, we will see how events leading up to the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923 impacted Cyprus from that time onwards, with an emphasis on developments concerning international law.

The Congress of Berlin 1878

We elaborated in the previous section how States would become or not recognised members of the international community in the 19th century based on a Eurocentric understanding of civilisation. We also looked at the peculiar position of the Ottoman Empire during that time in its relation with the European Powers, by way of introduction to the events which took place on the Balkans and Cyprus from 1878 to 1923. In order to proceed with the developments which took place at the Congress of Berlin however, it is important to have a clear understanding on the general atmosphere in South East Europe and the Eastern Mediterranean at the time.

The rise of the idea of the nation-state, as a result of the Enlightenment, and the American and French Revolutions at the end of the 18th century, did not leave unaffected the various ethnic peoples within individual empires, with the Ottoman and the Austro-Hungarian Empires being most central to the developments in Eastern Europe. The non-ruling subjects of the empires, knew all too well that autonomy or the establishment of their own sovereign nation-state, would give them power for self-rule. In this context, the end of the Napoleonic Wars led the European powers to prioritise their internal problems. However, the Eastern Question, which concerned the fate of the predominantly Christian territories under Ottoman rule in eastern Europe, was an exception to this trend.²⁸

The Congress of Berlin took place from 13 June to 13 July 1878, following a series of uprisings on the Balkans in the 1870s and the Russo-Turkish war of 1877, during which the Russian Empire aspired to recover territories lost during the Crimean War (1853-1856). The violent repression of the uprisings and the fact that Russian troops had almost reached Constantinople alarmed the other powers, and in particular the UK, who had become wary of potential Russian domination over the Suez Canal, the

²⁸ Koskenniemi (no 2) 110.

Dardanelles and Bosphorus Straits, and the Persian Gulf.²⁹ It was becoming evident that there was an urgent need for the Great Powers to find a compromise regarding the fate of the Balkan territories of the Ottoman Empire, satisfying everyone's competing interests in the region.

For the British Empire, following increasing naval movement in the eastern Mediterranean after the opening of the Suez Canal in 1869, the Eastern Question had become an issue of imperial defence.³⁰ As a result, despite the fact that the Congress was seen primarily as one concerning the Ottoman Empire and the Balkan peoples, control over Cyprus was highly relevant.³¹ The broad geographical scope of these concerns is obvious in the words of Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli, Earl of Beaconsfield, who stated "In taking Cyprus, the movement is not Mediterranean; it is Indian," in an attempt to convince his peers at the House of Lords on 18 July 1878 that taking over the administration of Cyprus was essential for the welfare of the British Empire and the preservation of peace within it.³²

It was these defence considerations on behalf of the UK that led to secret negotiations with the Sultan, parallel to the formal negotiations of the Congress, which led to the secret Cyprus Convention (of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and the Ottoman Empire) of the 4th of July 1878. Under the Convention, the UK bound itself to assist the Ottoman Empire in the event of a Russian attack against Ottoman territories in the Caucasus and Eastern Anatolia. In exchange, the Ottoman Empire was to transfer the *occupation* and *administration* of the island to the British, while the Sublime Porte would retain its *Sovereignty* over the island. Both parties benefited from the agreement, since the UK ensured the possession of a military stronghold in the Eastern Mediterranean, while the Ottomans acquired protection from Russian expansionism in the Black Sea and its remaining north-eastern territories from the Caucasus towards Persia. Hence, in this subtle manner, through the mechanics of international law and diplomacy, Cypriot modern history obtained a double regional relevance. The developments on the Balkans on the one side—in particular, but not only, the relationship of Greece and Turkey—and the colonial developments in the Levant and beyond towards the East, on the other. Even though this has been

²⁹ Van den Bogaert (no 7) paras 8-9.

³⁰ Dwight E. Lee, *Great Britain and the Cyprus Convention Policy of 1878* (Cambridge, MA: Harvard University Press, 1934) 11.

³¹ *Ibid.* vii.

³² *Ibid.* 113.

prevalent throughout the island's history, existing literature does not always take into account the full spectrum of events and relevant factors, frequently obscuring the significance of one region over the other.

Administering a given territory without de facto annexing it strikes one as unusual today. Nevertheless, it was a phenomenon that had occurred on a number of occasions around the world within a decade from Britain's assumption of the administration of Cyprus. Given the centrality of the Principle of Sovereignty in international law however, this phenomenon raised serious concerns among international lawyers at the time. Whereas deciding on paper that the Sovereignty of a territory was going to lie with one State, but its administration was going to be exercised by another seemed straight forward, a series of practical problems occurred, since Sovereignty allocated rights as well as duties, obligations and responsibility under international law.

In the literature, parallelisms are frequently drawn between Cyprus and Austria-Hungary's lease of Bosnia-Herzegovina, which was also agreed upon at the Congress of Berlin. Even though it lasted only until 1908, the Austria-Hungarian lease of Bosnia-Herzegovina was very similar in form.³³ Another example with regard to the UK specifically, includes the case of Egypt, also formerly an Ottoman province, de facto ruled by the UK as of 1882 and declared a British protectorate in 1914.³⁴ Similarly, in 1898 the UK leased Kowloon from China for 99 years, which eventually became the colony of Hong Kong, and from which the British withdrew in 1997.³⁵ In all these cases since the territory did not formally belong to the UK, British law would not apply. Thus, the administering State could avoid compliance with international legal rules, essentially subjecting the respective territories to multiple legal vacuums, as illustrated below.

In his 1928 *Treatise on International Law*,³⁶ prominent international lawyer Lassa Oppenheim referred to both Cyprus and Bosnia-Herzegovina in this period as a 'cession of pieces of territory'.³⁷ A consensual agreement between two States to trans-

³³ Lee (no 28) 106.

³⁴ Koskeniemi (no 2) 152.

³⁵ Oliver Döit, 'Cession' *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2006) <<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1377?rskey=dqFULN&result=1&prd=MPIL>> (Last accessed 25 August 2020) para 4.

³⁶ Lassa Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise Vols 1 and 2* (London: Longmans, Green and Company, 1928).

³⁷ Oppenheim, *International Law: A Treatise Vol. 2* 363 cited in George Hill, *A History of Cyprus, Vol.*

fer territory from one to another.³⁸ This, according to Oppenheim had taken place for practical purposes. Even though he recognised that legally speaking the territories in question still belonged to the former owner-State, which in both of these instances was the Ottoman Empire, he concluded that only the Sovereignty of the State exercising administration was being exercised in practice.³⁹ The UK and Austria-Hungary respectively, in the present example.

More recently, Crawford admitted that the variety of different types of dependent status and the accompanying terminology tend to be confusing, arguing that ‘the legal incidents of a given relationship are to be determined [...] from an examination of the constituent documents’, as opposed to the label attached to it.⁴⁰ He clearly states however, that the Ottoman Empire did have a ‘residual Sovereignty’ over Cyprus, which involved the retention of extensive rights over the island.⁴¹ In practice, the persisting lack of clarity on the issue of Sovereignty deriving from such ‘administrative cessions’⁴² led to gaps between ‘appearance and reality’, with different types of de facto annexations leading to varying consequences in practice.⁴³ The issue of the status of Cyprus in the aftermath of the 1878 Treaty of Defensive Alliance did arise in the case of *Parounak v Turkish Government*⁴⁴ before the Anglo-Turkish Mixed Arbitral Tribunal in 1929, indicating how the direct impact of the arrangement between the Ottoman Empire and the UK was both substantial and a long-term one.

Moreover, the agreement had an immediate impact on the island’s population. For instance, Hill mentions that even though Cypriots were entitled to British protection *beyond the Ottoman borders*, they were not regarded as British subjects at all, since the UK never disputed the legal Sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire over the island.⁴⁵ Conversely, when travelling across territories *under direct Ottoman control*, Cypriots were legally considered Ottoman subjects, but not necessarily treated as such.⁴⁶ The author estimates that an accurate legal analysis on this point may require additional detailed research on Ottoman Law and practices under the *millet* system.

IV (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1952) 285.

³⁸ Döit (no 33) para 1.

³⁹ Hill (no 35) 285.

⁴⁰ Crawford (no 4) 284.

⁴¹ Ibid. 327.

⁴² Döit (no 33) paras 3-5.

⁴³ Koskenniemi (no 2) 151-152.

⁴⁴ *Parounak v Turkish Government* (1929) 9 Rec MAT 748; 5 ILR 25 cited in Crawford (no 4) 288.

⁴⁵ Hill (no 35) 285.

⁴⁶ Hill (no 35) 408.

Nevertheless, Hill correctly points out, albeit in very broad terms, that the local population⁴⁷ fell within an obvious legal vacuum, that put them in a precarious position in terms of any protection that could have been afforded to them by either the UK or the Ottoman Empire.

Correspondingly, this situation put foreign Consuls serving in Cyprus in an awkward position as well, and affected the century-long practice of Capitulations. These ‘pledges’ (*ahdnameler*), which were unilaterally granted to or revoked from non-Muslim sovereigns by the Sultan, extended to them and their subjects privileges regarding residence, safe passage, tax and custom duty exemptions through the territories ruled by the Ottoman Empire.⁴⁸ They further secured the immunity of Western citizens from the jurisdiction of Ottoman courts, preventing them from being subjected to the provisions of Ottoman Law.⁴⁹ As a result, Europeans would be tried under their country’s law, through extraterritorial consular jurisdiction.⁵⁰ Hence, despite their well-established presence, Consuls on Cyprus were the first ‘shock absorbers’,⁵¹ who found themselves in a position where they had to seek recognition from the British government to exercise their duties, while technically still serving on the territory of a different State. This led to further uncertainty on whether or not they would enjoy the privileges and protection which had been afforded to them for centuries.⁵²

These brief examples illustrate the level of ambiguity persisting in international law in the late 19th century as well as the practical problems that derived because of it. Furthermore, they show how Cyprus was remotely implicated and affected by the international developments and the power dynamics of the late 19th century. Upon the arrival of the British, many Ottoman officials returned to Constantinople, with the majority Muslim population opting to stay on the island instead, despite arrange-

⁴⁷ The reference to ‘locals’ here is made without due regard to any categories of persons which may have enjoyed special privileges, such as Ottoman or foreign officials, or individuals of Cypriot origin covered by consular or other protections. The literature consulted for the present paper does not offer detailed information on the matter.

⁴⁸ Özsu, *Ottoman Empire* (no 16) 430-431.

⁴⁹ *Ibid.* 431.

⁵⁰ *Ibid.* 434; Umut Özsu, ‘The Ottoman Empire, the Origins of Extraterritoriality, and International Legal Theory’ in Anne Orford and Florian Hoffmann (eds) *Oxford Handbook of the Theory of International Law* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2016) 123, 130-132.

⁵¹ Robert Holland, ‘Why the Levant?’ in Anastasia Yiangou, George Kazamias and Robert Holland (eds) *The Greeks and the British in the Levant* (London: Routledge, 2019) 25, 28.

⁵² Hill (no 35) 404.

ments to facilitate their voluntary relocation.⁵³ An early instance, one can say, of the mass transfer of populations initiated on the Balkans after the end of the First World War (WWI), and the establishment of the Turkish Republic.

At the same time, the abuse of the Capitulations by European and local protégé merchants across the Empire, was one of the factors fuelling Turkish nationalism, which regarded the system as a ‘humiliating sign of decline’,⁵⁴ and ‘evidence of exclusion from the “family of nations”’.⁵⁵ The issue of the Capitulations was not to be resolved completely until 1923 and the Lausanne Peace Treaty.⁵⁶ Thus, we start to observe already in the period following the Congress of Berlin the very early, remote seeds of the phenomena that led to the widespread violence in the Balkan region and Asia Minor in the first two decades of the 20th century.

From the 1914 British Annexation of Cyprus to the 1923 Peace Treaty of Lausanne

The unclear status of Cyprus under international law changed at the beginning of WWI in 1914, when the Ottoman Empire joined the war on the side of Germany and Astro-Hungary, against the UK and its allies. Due to WWI, the Cyprus Convention of 1878—an alliance—was no longer effective. Thus, King George V issued the *Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council*,⁵⁷ which formally brought the island under full British control.

Strictly speaking in legal terms however, this still did not amount to the island coming under British Sovereignty, as such. Given the belligerent status between the UK and Turkey, the Order could qualify as an act of *belligerent annexation*,⁵⁸ which subsequently, in legal terms turned the status of the British administration of the is-

⁵³ Hill (no 35) 293.

⁵⁴ Özsu, *Ottoman Empire* (no 16) 432.

⁵⁵ *Ibid.* 438.

⁵⁶ Article 28, *Treaty of Peace between the British Empire, France, Italy, Japan, Greece, others and Turkey* (Lausanne Peace Treaty), 24 July 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. XXVIII, No 701, p. 11; A total of 14 Treaties were signed on 24 July 1923 in Lausanne, regulating a broad range of territorial and other arrangements in the region, including the regime governing passage through the Bosphorus and Dardanelles Straits and the Sea of Marmara.

⁵⁷ *Cyprus (Annexation) Order in Council*, 5 November 1914 available at United Kingdom, Hydrographic Office Archive (Ref no HD 1914/638).

⁵⁸ Frank Hoffmeister, ‘Cyprus’ *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2019) < <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1273?rskey=ZcU4oy&result=1&prd=MPIL> > (last accessed 24 August 2020) para 2.

land into that of belligerent (i.e. military) *occupation*.⁵⁹ The situation where one State exercises effective control over the territory of another State, without the latter State's consent.⁶⁰ As a result of these developments, and considering that the UK already had had administrative control over Cyprus for more than three decades, the status of Cyprus remained uncertain until the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923.

The exact determination of the status of Cyprus during WWI is of little practical importance, since there are no known incidents implicating the island directly in the hostilities between the belligerent parties. Had any issues arisen between the UK on the one side and Turkey, Germany or the Austro-Hungarian Empire on the other implicating the island, then this question would obtain high importance.

Cyprus was spared the violence on its territory in both World Wars. But the horrors experienced by troops and civilian populations on the Balkans, Asia Minor and the Caucasus—from the Balkan Wars in 1912-13, to the Armenian Genocide during WWI and the Fire of Smyrna in September 1922, as the last chapter of the Greco-Turkish War of 1920-1922—are well-known and deeply embedded in the collective consciousness of the next generations in all these regions. Naturally therefore, these events had an impact on the Cypriots, among whom there are ethnic Greeks, Turks and Armenians to this day, with the earliest inter-ethnic clashes between the Greek and the Turkish communities of the island being traced back to this period.⁶¹ Thus, it comes as little surprise that this period eventually had a broader, albeit rarely discussed, *legal* effect on later developments on the island, beyond the historical and emotional baggage still burdening each ethnic group; often exploited for political gains in the construction of narratives of victimhood or national pride, depending on the speaker, the audience and the surrounding circumstances.

⁵⁹ Eyal Benvenisti, 'Occupation, Belligerent', *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2009) < <https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e359?rskey=rSAFwb&result=1&prd=MPIL> > (last accessed 24 August 2020); Adam Roberts 'What is a military occupation?' (1984) *British Yearbook of International Law* 55(1) 249, 261-262.

⁶⁰ Benvenisti (no 62) para 1.

⁶¹ Asmussen has written on the Limassol Riots of 1912, occurring after the Ottoman defeat from Italy and two shooting incidents in Dali and Pyla in October 1922 in Jan Asmussen, 'Early Conflicts between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities in Cyprus' (2004) *The Cyprus Review* 16(1) 87; Peter Loizos discusses the burning of the Turkish Cypriot coffee shop in the village of Argaki in Peter Loizos, 'Correcting the record: Memory, Minority Insecurity and Admissible Evidence' in Rebecca Bryant and Yiannis Papadakis (eds), *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory* (London: I.B Tauris, 2012) 195.

The 1919 *Treaty of Neuilly*⁶² and the 1923 *Treaty of Lausanne Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations*⁶³ contained mechanisms for the exchange of populations across the Greco-Bulgarian⁶⁴ and the Greco-Turkish⁶⁵ borders, respectively. These led to a ‘formalisation of displacement’,⁶⁶ as a means to homogenise the populations of the new States established on the Balkans, throughout the gradual process of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Eastwards across the Mediterranean, the formerly Ottoman Middle Eastern territories were deemed unable to govern themselves,⁶⁷ and were thus awarded a new status under international law as Mandates, regulated under article 22 of the Covenant of the League of Nations. Their administration, which was colonial in all but name,⁶⁸ was to be supervised by the victors of WWI, who allocated the former, non-European Ottoman and German territories among themselves. Under this new post-WWI world order, the rights of minorities would be *guaranteed* by the newly-established League of Nations,⁶⁹ which was also tasked with directly supervising the administration of the Mandates.

A significant detail for consideration here is that under paragraph 3 of Article 22, the Mandate System recognised that ‘Certain communities formerly belonging to the Turkish Empire’ had ‘reached a stage of development’, roughly along the lines of civilised, barbarian, and savage categorisation mentioned in the beginning of this article, ‘where their existence as independent nations can be provisionally recognized subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a Mandatory until such time as they are able to stand alone’. To these territories, usually referred to as Category A Mandates, belonged all of the immediate Eastern neighbours of Cyprus; Syria,

⁶² *Convention between Greece and Bulgaria Respecting Reciprocal Migration* (Treaty of Neuilly), 27 November 1919, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. 1, No 9, p. 67.

⁶³ *Convention between Greece and Turkey Concerning the Exchange of Greek and Turkish Populations and Protocol* (Treaty of Lausanne, Exchange of Populations), 30 January 1923, League of Nations Treaty Series, Vol. XXXII, No 807, p. 75.

⁶⁴ Tzouvala (no 25).

⁶⁵ Umut Özsü, ‘A thoroughly bad and vicious solution’: humanitarianism, the World Court, and the modern origins of population transfer’ (2013) *London Review of International Law* 1(1) 99.

⁶⁶ Umut Özsü, *Formalizing Displacement: International Law and Population Transfers* (Oxford: Oxford University Press, 2014).

⁶⁷ Ruth Gordon, ‘Mandates’ *Max Planck Encyclopedia of International Law* (2013) <<https://opil.ouplaw.com/view/10.1093/law:epil/9780199231690/law-9780199231690-e1066?rskey=nlzhPq&result=1&prd=MPIL>> (Last accessed 24 August 2020).

⁶⁸ *Ibid.* para 1; Koskeniemi (no 2) 170-172.

⁶⁹ Helmer Rosting, ‘Protection of Minorities by the League of Nations’ (1923) *American Journal of International Law* 17(4) 641.

Lebanon, and Palestine. It is hereby unknown whether Cyprus was ever mentioned even in passing in the discussions pertaining to the allocation of the Mandates, or whether the fact that the island was already under British control completely excluded such a scenario. Besides, the majority Greek Cypriot population had already made clear since 1878 that their aspiration was to be unified with Greece. What can be said with some certainty though is that following WWI, contrary to other areas in the region, independence was definitively not on the table as far as Cyprus was concerned.

The direct impact of the above post-WWI arrangements to Cyprus is thus, seemingly limited in scope and rather remote, since neither the Great War, nor the Greco-Turkish War immediately afterwards brought any major changes for the island, which continued to be administered by the UK. Nevertheless, out of a total of 143 articles contained in the Lausanne Peace Treaty, two of them did refer to Cyprus. Article 20 recognised the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British in November 1914, resolving the uncertainty over the island's Sovereignty by formally passing it over to the UK, and Article 21 regulated the nationality of Turkish nationals ordinarily resident in Cyprus in the context of other post-war arrangements.⁷⁰ Since Mandates had already been allocated to the Mandatories in 1919,⁷¹ and given the fact that retention of the island by the British derived out of a direct recognition of the UK's annexation in 1914, the way was clear for the establishment of the Crown Colony of Cyprus on 10 March 1925.⁷²

Contemporary relevance of 1878-1923

Between the signing of the Treaty of Lausanne in 1923, and the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, the Second World War (WWII) and the establishment of the United Nations in 1945 had led to a new era in international affairs. A period characterised by the process of decolonisation and the Cold War. However, according to some commentators, this common emphasis on WWII as a threshold period in international law and international relations, fails to fully appreciate the continuities observed from the 19th century, to the Interwar period, and then the international legal order following WWII, in terms of ethos, tools and ideological com-

⁷⁰ Lausanne Peace Treaty (no 54).

⁷¹ Crawford (no 4) 533.

⁷² Letters Patent passed under the Great Seal of the United Kingdom constituting the Office of the Governor and Commander-in-Chief of the Colony of Cyprus and providing for the Government thereof, 10 March 1925, *The Cyprus Gazette* (No 1691, 1925).

mitments.⁷³ Indeed, there is considerable scope to argue that this is also illustrated in the case for Cyprus, where historiographical, political and other assessments of key events, frequently underestimate or fail to grasp completely the importance of earlier aspects of its history, including the period on which the present article focuses on. Therefore, before concluding, I hereby attempt to bridge the period 1878 to 1923, with important aspects of the island's later history.

Firstly, already shortly after the Lausanne Peace Treaty was signed, commentators had recognised Cyprus as the remaining outstanding issue in Greco-Turkish relations.⁷⁴ Reference is made in particular to the issue of the security of the 'non-Greek minority', emphasising how the Near East is 'notorious' for the need to protect minorities against the 'dominant nationality' in a given region.⁷⁵ In the 1930 *Greco-Bulgarian Communities*⁷⁶ Advisory Opinion of the Permanent Court of International Justice (PCIJ) in The Hague, which dealt with the exchange of populations on the Greco-Bulgarian border, one of the questions raised before the Court was the meaning of the term 'community' for the purposes of the Treaty of Neuilly.⁷⁷ The PCIJ gave the following definition:

"community" is a group of persons living in a given country or locality, having a race, religion, language and traditions of their own and united by this identity of *race, religion, language and traditions* in a sentiment of solidarity, with a view to preserving their traditions, maintaining their form of worship, ensuring the instruction and upbringing of their children in accordance with the spirit and traditions of their race and rendering mutual assistance to each other.⁷⁸

One can easily observe how this was closely reflected 30 years later, in the 1960 bi-communal Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus, still in force today albeit heavily amended in practice, which under Article 2, paragraphs 1 and 2, read:

(1) the Greek Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of *Greek origin* and whose *mother tongue* is Greek or who share the *Greek cultural traditions* or who are members of the *Greek-Orthodox Church*;

⁷³ Tzouvala (no 25) 1151.

⁷⁴ Arnold J Toynbee, 'The East after Lausanne' (1923) *Foreign Affairs* 2(1) 84, 89-93.

⁷⁵ *Ibid.* 91.

⁷⁶ *Greco-Bulgarian 'Communities' Advisory Opinion*, 1930 PCIJ Series B, No. 17, p. 4.

⁷⁷ *Ibid.* 5.

⁷⁸ *Ibid.* 21 (emphasis added).

(2) the Turkish Community comprises all citizens of the Republic who are of *Turkish origin* and whose *mother tongue* is Turkish or who share the *Turkish cultural traditions* or who are *Moslems*.⁷⁹

Thus, the bi-communal arrangement of 1960 was potentially a reaction to those early concerns, offering a solution which reflected more closely the spirit enshrined in the Advisory Opinion of 1930, instead of the legal order which started developing after WWII. Another example of how the vast literature engaging with Cyprus' history of the 20th century, rarely considers the relevance of the events, the legal and political discourse surrounding the period of the Lausanne Treaty. One major exception has been the argument raised by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on various occasions that the end of British rule should have led to the restoration of Turkish rule. Considering the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire, the provision under Article 20 of the Lausanne Peace Treaty, and the major changes that followed in the region of the Eastern Mediterranean until the 1960s, also through the process of decolonisation, from a legal perspective this is a weak argument. From a historical perspective however, it is a lead towards obtaining clearer understanding of the processes that eventually defined Cypriot independence in 1960.

Second, I would like to now turn to the issue of guarantees, as one of the cornerstones of Cypriot independence. To date the issue remains one of the most difficult aspects for a future resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The existing literature, while extensive in discussing the problems deriving out of the Treaty of Guarantee, a valid and necessary discussion, fails to give a satisfactory explanation on the rationale, the context and the legal practice behind the use of this particular legal tool. Guarantees had already been used in different forms for centuries, including in the form of Capitulations as described in section 2 above, from the time of Charlemagne and the Byzantine Emperors, in the relationship between European, or European and non-European rulers.⁸⁰ We have also seen in section 3 above how the League of Nations assumed the role of a guarantor for the protection of the minorities in the new States and the Mandates that were established with the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Hence, it would not be far-fetched to argue that in 1959, when the London-Zurich Agreements for the independence of Cyprus were negotiated, pre-1945

⁷⁹ Art 2, Republic of Cyprus Constitution 1960 (emphasis added).

⁸⁰ Rosting (no 67) 641-645; Davide Rodogno, 'European Legal Doctrines on Intervention and the Status of the Ottoman Empire within the 'Family of Nations' Throughout the Nineteenth Century' (2016) *Journal of the History of International Law* 18(1) 5, 21-25.

practices resurfaced, albeit adapted to the realities of the post-WWII world order, with Greece, Turkey and the UK eventually guaranteeing the ‘independence, territorial integrity and security’⁸¹ of the newly-established Republic of Cyprus.

Of relevance here is also Crawford’s reference to the concept of ‘internationalised territories’ as a form of organisation for territories which are ‘disputed between States on strategic, ethnic or other grounds’ and as a result became autonomous under a form of ‘international protection, supervision or guarantee’.⁸² He gives a plethora of examples, with an emphasis on the Free City of Danzig, which was established in 1919⁸³ at the end of WWI, further arguing that the limitations imposed on Cypriot Sovereignty, by way of the three treaties constituting the Republic’s independence,⁸⁴ Cyprus is essentially a case of an ‘internationalised territory’ ‘by the back door’, adapted to the post-1945 needs and global order.⁸⁵ Hence, through the concept of ‘internationalised territories’ we can once again see a WWI phenomenon, surviving in the case of Cyprus well into the second half of the 20th century.

Lastly, in the face of all the post-WWI developments in terms of concepts and mechanisms relating to Sovereignty, the PCIJ had ruled in 1923 that a sovereign State could waive part of its sovereign rights, adding that what constituted Sovereignty was not fixed, and it was a matter of international relations, as opposed to a matter of international law.⁸⁶ The ability of a State to bind itself under international law, was characteristic of its sovereign character in itself.⁸⁷ Thus, regardless of the status of the Republic of Cyprus in terms of the form of territorial organisation it assumed in 1960, it was a sovereign State under international law, albeit admittedly one of limited capacity. This however, was not the result of an ambiguous conspiracy by the great powers of the post-colonial world to divide and rule as the usual narra-

⁸¹ Art II, *Treaty of Guarantee*, Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol 382, No 5475, p. 3 available from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20382/v382.pdf>.

⁸² Crawford (no 4) 233.

⁸³ *Ibid.* 236.

⁸⁴ One of the three is the Treaty of Guarantee mentioned above. The other two are the *Treaty Concerning the Establishment of the Republic of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series* vol. 382, No 5476, p.8 available from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20382/v382.pdf> and the *Treaty of Alliance between the Kingdom of Greece, the Republic of Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 16 August 1960, *United Nations Treaty Series*, vol 397, No 5712, p. 287 available from <https://treaties.un.org/doc/Publication/UNTS/Volume%20397/v397.pdf>).

⁸⁵ Crawford (no 4) 241-244.

⁸⁶ Koskenniemi (no 2) 173; *SS ‘Wimbledon’* 1923 PCIJ Series A, No. 1.

⁸⁷ Koskenniemi (no 2) 173.

tive suggests. It was rather the result of an international legal order which in its very nature contained unfavourable prejudices and practices as well as normative rules which allowed to be bended just enough so as to adapt to the needs and interests at stake. As one of the major tools employed in international politics, international law and its history can inform our understanding of current international problems. For them to be effectively used however, the acknowledgment of and practical engagement with the inherent prejudices deriving from the darkest periods of its development is a prerequisite.

Conclusion

As I have attempted to illustrate above, elements of critical legal scholarship can contribute to our broader understanding of historical, political and international legal considerations at the intersection of Cypriot, Balkan and Middle Eastern history. The need for such an analysis derives from a long-term reluctance to engage with controversial and highly contested aspects of international law. In a volatile political environment such as the one experienced in Cyprus from the very establishment of the Republic such an approach may be justified, to a certain extent, due to the role traditionally expected of the law. Law's assumption of the position of a neutral arbiter that will determine who is right or wrong, guilty or innocent. Such an approach however, fails to acknowledge that the law is also one of the main tools in the design and implementation of international policies. As seen above, there are continuously growing criticisms today, from international lawyers and historians alike, of the legal arrangements that took place in the early 20th century.

Whereas the Congress of Berlin can be seen as the ultimate event of European state-making in the Balkan region at the end of the 19th century, the population transfers in the aftermath of WWI had a lasting effect deep into the 20th century also affecting Cyprus.⁸⁸ Since 1923 the Treaty of Lausanne keeps resurfacing in the broader Eastern Mediterranean region. As early as December 1922, Lord Curzon had stated with regard to the exchange of populations during the negotiations for the Treaty of Lausanne, that this was 'a thoroughly bad and vicious solution, for which the world would pay a heavy penalty for a hundred years to come'.⁸⁹ The closer we approach the centenary of the Treaty of Lausanne in 2023, the more some political circles entertain the idea of a need to rectify the injustices the Treaty of Lausanne and other develop-

⁸⁸ Özsu, *Bad and vicious solution* (no 63) 126.

⁸⁹ *Ibid.* 126-127.

ments from that time led to. Lord Curzon's dark prediction is not therefore out of place. International developments at the turn of the 20th century have led to numerous political problems in the region, and extensive human suffering. However, the solution does not lie in throwing the blame on 'the other' depending on one's standing point. The solution lies in a critical engagement with the deeper implications of the legal and other relevant factors that led to those developments from the first place.

One question to reflect on in that direction is whether the independence of Cyprus in 1960 was one of the many acts of granting independence in a rapidly decolonising world, or whether it was the last act in the disintegration of the Ottoman Empire. To look for a black and white answer would be insufficient, as arguing in favour of either side of the balance would fail to appreciate the complexity of the full picture. As the legal-historical survey above suggests, there is a need to jointly assess different aspects of Cypriot history, under the broader umbrella of the dissolution of the Ottoman Empire. Expanding from the Eastern Mediterranean to the Balkan region, over a broader chronology, which looks for answers beyond the narrow scope of the 1950s.

The law does carry an 'amnesiac quality', as mentioned by Fitzpatrick in the opening lines of this article. Like any other discipline, international law too has its parallel history, ontological challenges, and epistemological inadequacies. To overlook them however, would mean to reject a broader scope of factors that have contributed extensively to the formation of today's realities.

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Children's Rights during Colonialism: The Case Study of the Crown Colony of Cyprus

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Abstract:

The Commonwealth countries retain an unceasing connection to the United Kingdom. Ranging from the values of the Victorian England on human rights, to the oversea territories, the puritanical colonial power stigmatised in an emphatic way the lives of millions. The Republic of Cyprus constitutes a case on point of such influence. That said, this paper unearths a long-standing culture of disrespect for basic human rights generally and the rights of the child in particular amid the normalization of deviant behaviour towards children since 1878. The paper intends on investigating the legal and socio-legal position of children during the British colonialism in the Island of Cyprus. In analysing the factual and legal status of the cases in question, a brief historical overview is of the essence. Thus, the current paper is legally-based yet, rather interdisciplinary as history and diplomacy 'flirts' with the law. The originality of the paper focuses on the conspicuous gap in the academic literature relating to children's rights in the Island of Cyprus.

Keywords: Children rights, colonialism, legal history, neglect, best interest of the child, sexual offences

Introduction

There is no doubt that the Commonwealth countries, nearly all former British colonies, retain an unceasing connection to the United Kingdom. Ranging from Victorian England's values on human rights to overseas territories, the puritanical colonial power stigmatized millions' lives emphatically. The Republic of Cyprus constitutes a case on the point of such influence. The history of the 'acquisition' of the Island of Cyprus by the British Empire and what became a *place d'armes* until acquiring a greater degree of strategic importance have been extensively analyzed by academics. Nevertheless, in recent years there is an evidence emergence on the bibliography that

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focuses on the social and economic aspects of Colonial Cyprus. In turn, the current paper will portray children's rights during colonialism. However, what are children's rights? To put it simply, children's rights constitute a subset of human rights. Nevertheless, children are entitled to specific attention, special protection, and care following the cherished human rights of modern ages as those are included in the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child 1989 (UNCRC). The aim is to build a human rights culture in societies and secure human rights for the current and future generations.² In today's terms, a child is a person below the age of 18. Nevertheless, this was not always the case, as the definition of a 'child' and of 'childhood' varied over time, overstate prioritization, morality, and other social peculiarities.

Bearing in mind the above, the current article aims to unearth a long-standing culture of disrespect for fundamental human rights generally and the child's rights in particular amid the normalization of deviant behaviour towards children during the British reign in the island i.e., 1878 - 1959. By engaging in a legally flavoured yet historical retrospection, the paper offers a proper understanding of colonialism's impact on children's rights and possibly food for thought behind the leading causes and legal consequences of the legal and socio-legal deficiencies on children's rights that exist until today. By retaining some of the Ottoman legal and socio-legal aspects, the British Empire managed to create a unique mosaic system inherited during independence. As radical reforms were not introduced in Cyprus regarding children-related legal frameworks, the writer of the current paper argues that the normalization of children rights violations during colonialism impacted the developments of children rights approach, or lack thereof, throughout the years, and created what sociologists define as a culture of deviance.

As history and the Cyprus Law Reports suggest, primitive education, infanticide, child marriage, child labour, inequalities amongst genders, corruption, and vast criminality constituted some of the paradigms of historical legal deviant behaviour. So many behaviours had become expected and accepted until the black box of legal deficiencies opened. In other words, during colonialism, there was a deep-rooted pattern of legal deficiencies and a lack of children's rights within the island of Cyprus. Thus, this is the story of a deep-rooted banality of complicated historical, cultural life facili-

² Amnesty International USA: Action for Human Rights. Hope for Humanity, Children Rights (Amnesty International USA, New York) <https://web.archive.org/web/20080921082323/http://www.amnestyusa.org/Our_Issues/Children/page.do?id=1011016&n1=3&n2=78> last accessed on 02/09/2020.

tated by an environment of scarcity and competition, elite bargaining, clientelism, incrementalism, patterns of information, routinization, governmental structures, and societal structures. Hence, the Island of Cyprus transformed and embraced the lack of protection (and thus, violations of their fundamental human rights) of vulnerable groups, particularly children, into acceptable behaviour. The research will further exemplify the limited, to next to no, legal framework or application of such framework thereof, protecting children. On the contrary, a culture of exploitation of children and women prevailed and became the foundations of legal practices.

That said, this paper intends to investigate children's legal and socio-legal position during British colonialism on the Island of Cyprus. A brief historical overview is essential in analyzing the legal and socio-legal status of the cases in question. Thus, the current paper is legally-based yet interdisciplinary as history and diplomacy 'flirts' with the law. The originality of the article is threefold. Firstly, there is a conspicuous gap in the academic literature relating to children's rights in general, specifically on Cyprus's Island. This conspicuous gap is more evident when analyzing British colonialism in Cyprus. Secondly, the originality flows from the inter-disciplinary approach engaged by the writer. The writer uses a historico-socio-legal to identify and critically analyze children's rights during colonialism in a holistic manner. Thirdly, the lack of digitalized resources and legal research on the subject matter pushed the author of the current paper to use primary sources and archival materials.

A brief historical background

On the 4th of June 1878, following the defeat of the Ottoman Empire from Russia, 'Her Majesty the Queen of the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Ireland, Empress of India, and his Imperial Majesty the Sultan, being mutually animated with the sincere desire of extending and strengthening the relations of friendship happily existing between their two Empires, have resolved upon the conclusion of a Convention of Defensive Alliance with the object of securing for the future the territories in Asia of His Imperial Majesty the Sultan.'³ Following the Convention, the Island of Cyprus was occupied and administered by England.⁴ Since then, the island was administered by the United Kingdom in the shadow of a systemic legal, socio-legal and cultural deviance that survived after the 300 years of the Ottoman reign in Cyprus. By 1914 the island

³ The Cyprus Convention: Convention of Defensive Alliance between Great Britain and Turkey with Respect of the Asiatic Provinces of Turkey (Constantinople, 4th June 1878) <http://www.lygeros.org/section_caratheodory/CyprusConvention_18780604.pdf> last accessed on 15/01/2019.

⁴ Ibid.

had been formally annexed to the British government⁵, and approximately ten years later, on the 10th of March 1925, the island was proclaimed a British Crown Colony.⁶

The British came face to face with the mosaic and somewhat hybrid-like character of the island. Thus, it was unsurprising that the Ottoman Empire's legal and socio-legal aspects remained enforced and visible for a substantial period after transferring the island to the United Kingdom. Nonetheless, since then, the Empire's administration introduced laws as they felt numerous detriments within the justice domain, which inevitably made an urgent appeal for reform.⁷ Nevertheless, if one considers the island's hybrid character, legal proceedings were due in different Courts under the Ottoman and English Law, respectively, subject to timely alterations or modifications by Cyprus Statute Law.⁸ Robert Hamilton Lang, a former consul of the island, describes how 'very few of the judges have ever received an education suitable for the proper discharge of their duties, and as few have the inclination to study the new principles and ordinances of justice.' He explains how cadis (judges) overwhelmingly belonged to a religious school and were thus affected with all the prejudice of a Pharisaical sect and lived in a state which indisposes to assiduous application and prolonged attention.⁹

Nevertheless, as stated above, many years passed before the visible connection with the Ottoman legal administration was removed.¹⁰ An illustrative example can be found in the Criminal Code of the island. The British Empire initially retained and used the Ottoman Penal Code up until 1928. Nevertheless, the British colonial administration's general purpose was 'to maintain law and order and keep things quiet'¹¹ as simple and as complicated as that might be. Consequently, Christodoulou

⁵ Erginel, Erdem. 'Traditionalists vs. Reformists: The Struggle for Leadership Within the Turkish Community of Cyprus Between the World Wars' (Third International Congress on Cyprus Studies November 13-17) 2000.

⁶ Ibid.

⁷ Epaminondas Epaminonda, 'A hybrid model of Mediterranean capitalism with British influences: The case of Cyprus' (Management & Organizational History 2016 11:3) 325.

⁸ Great Britain, Colonial Office, 'The Cyprus Blue Book 1887-1888,' (Ψηφιακή Πλατφόρμα Κυπριακής Βιβλιοθήκης) 19 <<http://www.cyprusdigitalibrary.org.cy/files/original/eb5f418ab164675131f062af47097a26.pdf>> accessed on 08/10/2018.

⁹ Robert Hamilton Lang, *Cyprus: Its History, Its Present Resources, and Future Prospects* (Publisher Macmillan 1878) 20-350 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusitshistor00langgoog/page/n8>> accessed on 10/12/2018.

¹⁰ Andreas Kapardis, *Society, Crime and Criminal Justice in Cyprus 1878-2000*, (1st ed. Sakkoulas publishers' European studies in Law 2001) 90.

¹¹ Ibid, 42.

explains that, while the United Kingdom has always been very keen on their democratic values governing their institutions, during their long reign in the island of Cyprus, they never allowed locals to develop, enjoy representative political or social institutions.¹² For the first fifteen years of British colonialism, the population through Archbishop Sophronios expressed their concerns as they were financially drained and 'in a state of great misery.'¹³ The participation of the Empire's subjects in the island's administration was lacking, so was the participation of children of that said administration. Hence, the voice of children was silenced and neglected. Due to the great state of misery, the islanders developed infanticide for the simple reason that they were too poor to have many children.¹⁴ Others were giving birth to children merely because children came with a salary in the sense that children were engaged in work very early in their lives, as will be seen later.

Legal Reorganisation and international children protection

On the 17th of January of 1879, the colonial power established the High Court of Justice of the Queen, which under Hill was awaiting the island's whole judicial system's reorganisation.¹⁵ The Court was given full powers and competencies in all civil or penal character cases over all persons except where the Ottoman Sheri courts had exclusive competence, i.e., mostly in family law cases.¹⁶ The Sheri or Sharia law is a religious law forming part of the Islamic tradition. It draws primarily from the religious precepts of Quaran.¹⁷ The first major revision of the legal system in Cyprus was in 1882, then the British restructured the judicial system, including the courts, and introduced the unique feature of common law as we know it today. While the British were preoccupied with the reorganisation of the island's legal sphere, other Western cultures slowly began to acknowledge the risks of children's physical and psychological maltreatment by the 1900s.¹⁸ According to Susan Benet, during the 1900s,

¹² Ibid, 50.

¹³ Ibid, 80.

¹⁴ Robert Hamilton Lang, *Cyprus: Its History, Its Present Resources, and Future Prospects* (Publisher Macmillan 1878) 20-350 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusitshistor00langgoog/page/n8>> accessed on 10/12/2018.

¹⁵ Andreas Kapardis, *Society, Crime and Criminal Justice in Cyprus 1878-2000*, (1st ed. Sakkoulas publishers' European studies in Law 2001) 54.

¹⁶ Ibid.

¹⁷ Oxford Lexico, Sharia (Oxford: Oxford University Press) <<https://www.lexico.com/definition/sharia>> last accessed on 03/09/2020.

¹⁸ Andreas Kapardis, *Society, Crime and Criminal Justice in Cyprus 1878-2000*, (1st ed. Sakkoulas publishers' European studies in Law 2001) 54.

non-governmental organisations and societies protecting children were increasingly funded across different nations.¹⁹ Although children commenced being visible and understood as a vulnerable group in need of assistance, they were still not seen as right holders themselves but as mere charity beneficiaries.²⁰ Weisberg explains that European children remained legally under their fathers' possession or guardians while being virtually unprotected by their State.²¹ The developments in child protection across Western cultures flourished until it triggered the professionalisation of child protection and care service disciplines such as social work, paediatric and clinical psychology. Moreover, the legal historiography firstly placed the creation of a universal instrument on children's rights through international law in 1924. In 1924 the League of Nations adopted what became known as the Geneva Declaration of 1924.²² The 1924 Declaration was essentially an aspiring rather than a practical document. This was because it was merely a short list consisting of only 5 Articles.²³ Although the 1924 Declaration spoke in elegant tones of nations' responsibilities towards children, it was practically unfocused and virtually a mere aspirational document. Nevertheless, the 1924 Declaration provided that a child must be given a mean requisite for its normal development and protected against every form of exploitation. As children formed a substantial part of the workforce worldwide, though, child exploitation by any means was essentially societally and legally enforced on children, so was child marriage and bearing at an early age.

Since common law was introduced early in the island, a close analysis of the wording used in judicial cases can reveal that a child was seen as a mere object and was virtually unprotected and unconsidered by the State, contrary to the prevailing human rights principles of the time. On an appeal regarding the child's abandonment, which resulted in his death, the child is repeatedly referred to as 'it,' whereby other individuals by gender.²⁴ More specifically, in *R v Nash* the Court states that 'she left with the child in perfect health and when she returned she said she had left it with Mrs Hillier

¹⁹ Ibid.

²⁰ Richard C. Mitchell, 'Reflections on the UNCRC's Future from a Transdisciplinary Bricoleur' (International Journal of Children's Rights 21 2013) 510-522.

²¹ Weisberg, 'The Concept of the Rights of the Child' (21 Revue of the INT'L Comm'n Jurists 43) 1978.

²² Zoe Moody, 'Transnational treaties on children's rights: Norm building and circulation in the twentieth century' (Paedagogica Historica 2014 50:1-2) 151-164.

²³ Geneva Declaration of the Rights of the Child 1924, <https://www.unicef.org/vietnam/01_-_Declaration_of_Geneva_1924.PDF> accessed on 21.06.2018.

²⁴ *R v Nash* (1911) 6 C.A.R., 225 per Lord Alverstone L.C.J; Official Gazette of Cyprus, The Cyprus Gazette, Issue No.2625 of 31st December 1937: Cyprus Law Reports, Authority of the Supreme Court

and later she said the child was well.'²⁵ The subjectivation of a child is not rare within the legal historiography of the island of Cyprus. On the contrary, children, women, and even low-income families were seen as inferior to men or wealthy families.

Disturbingly, the cases concerning private family life, including domestic violence cases, neglect on considering children, the effects of the proceedings, and the effects of the facts of the case on children. Thus, it follows that the legal maxim of the child's best interest, which should have been the paramount consideration of a competent court, was also intentionally or unintentionally neglected. As a matter of fact, children were not mentioned at all in divorce proceedings. The principle of the welfare of the child or the best interest of the child was indeed recognised in common law as the case of *Despinou v Theophilo v. Haralambo Abraam* suggests.²⁶ Nevertheless, it seems that the principle was applied rather ineffectively and only theoretically.²⁷ Even though the Court found evidence of repeated assaults upon the wife, the latter was held to be the party responsible for the divorce.²⁸ The direct and/or indirect effects of the above assaults on children were not addressed within the judgment. On the contrary, the husband was held to be the innocent party because the wife left the matrimonial house after the repeated abusive incidents. Following the Court's *ratio decidendi*, it was held that the father, despite abusive, was entitled to the child's custody. What is also of particular interest, in this case, is the fact that despite the repeated assaults, the Church often reconciled the couple while adjourning the application of divorce filed by the wife in the hope of reconciliation.²⁹ As such, domestic violence, disrespect and degrading treatment of a mother, and the direct and indirect consequences of the incident on the child and the welfare of the child were repeatedly neglected.

The inadequate consideration of children during colonialism can also be revealed through the case of *Rex v. Christophoro Ianni*.³⁰ In this particular case, a boy of 15

Supplement No.4, p.12 <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1937/index.html> accessed on 8/10/2018.

²⁵ Ibid.

²⁶ The Cyprus Law Reports Vol. IV, *Cases Determined by the Supreme Court of Cyprus: on appeal from the District Courts from the years 1896, 1897 and 1898*, published by the authority of the judges of the Supreme Court, *Despinou Theophilo v. Haralambo Abraam* 1897, pp. 43-47.

²⁷ Ibid, 43-47.

²⁸ Ibid.

²⁹ Ibid.

³⁰ The Cyprus Law Reports Vol. VIII, *Cases Decided by the Supreme Court of Cyprus: On appeal from the district and magisterial courts and by the assize courts*, Government Printing Office, Nicosia 1919, *Rex v. Christophoro Ianni* 1909, pp.106-107.

years of age was charged with committing sodomy upon another little boy.³¹ The accused boy was sentenced to castigation and to 'be of good behaviour for six months.'³² Even though the judgment expressly acknowledged the seriousness of the crime, the judiciary, while exercising its discretionary powers, remained lenient on the basis that the perpetrator was of young age.³³ Throughout the judgment, the judiciary seems to consider a child of 15 years of age as too young but simultaneously mature enough to marry and work under the extreme weather conditions of the Mediterranean. While it is understandable to consider the punishment twice since there are two children involved, inadequate sentencing and reform often promote a culture of deviance while promoting a sense of impunity, inhumanity, and silence. The judgment, as it was also the case in *R v Nash*, did not specifically address the needs of the victim. The limited address of the victim's needs through inadequate sentencing is a particularly rampant phenomenon throughout colonial Cyprus' legal historiography. This phenomenon, which, as stated above, can promote the destructive culture of silence, led victims to feel unsafe while promoting despair, which leads to insufficient reporting of crimes. The preventive nature of punishment in such severe cases and the offender's reform and rehabilitation, which was of particular importance, as the accused was only 15 years old, were equally inadequately considered. Consequently, the child's best interest, or in this specific case of children, was again neglected.

Sentencing during colonialism

The Blue Books can exemplify the overall culture and cruelty of British officers towards the Islanders. During the British colonial reign of the island, the Blue Books contained statistics and financial activities each year. The Blue Book of 1880 reveals that the judiciary's sanctions imposed on criminal defendants involved whipping, being bound over with or without surety, fines, peremptory imprisonment, and imprisonment.³⁴ Overall, researchers suggest that court statistics are limited, and they cannot provide an accurate index of the state of crime as a substantial number of offences, especially offences against the person, were not reported.³⁵ Nevertheless, dark figures in crime reporting are by no means unexpected. The phenomenon of dark

³¹ Ibid.

³² Ibid.

³³ Ibid.

³⁴ Andreas Kapardis, *Society, Crime and Criminal Justice in Cyprus 1878-2000*, (1st ed. Sakkoulas publishers' European studies in Law 2001) 66, 68.

³⁵ Ibid, 84.

figures concerning that specific period might be attributed to the fact that the victim's family preferred to punish the culprit or culprits themselves during the Ottoman and British eras.³⁶ Williams also stipulates that the dark figures were also the result of 'arranged' recording, as the corrupt police personnel often accepted bribes to alter or refrain from reporting specific criminal activities.³⁷

Sexual Exploitation and Slavery of children and women

As soon as the island came under British rule in 1878, slavery legally ended.³⁸ Essentially, the social status, and inevitably the legal status, of hundreds of people initially brought as slaves during the Ottoman ruling began to be transformed rapidly but steadily. Yet, in his book, Kappler explains that slavery survived through the socially-enforced institutions of *besleme* or 'voluntary servitude' in practice.³⁹ After the Second World War, many individuals found themselves in a great state of misery. The financial drain led many families to desperation and separation. More specifically, many low-income families on the island gave their children away to wealthy families as household servants.⁴⁰ Despite been freed, many individuals never left their former masters, thus spent the rest of their lives with them, rebranded as household servants instead of slaves.⁴¹

Esme Scott-Stevenson, an English Lady residing in Cyprus, describes common instances of illegalities and sexual exploitation incidence against children by their masters. More specifically, Lady Esme describes an example when the wife of a *zaptiehs* (police officer) visited her village doctor in great grief. She entrusted the doctor that her only daughter, who lived in Nicosia as a servant, returned home in bad health. The doctor began to make rude remarks. The remarks described as rude in her book relate to the young girl's pregnancy.⁴² The mother begged the village doctor to 'save her child from disgrace' and offered her services in the field for all her life.⁴³ When the doctor declined her offer, she changed her tone and declared that 'herself

³⁶ Ibid, 84.

³⁷ Ibid, 84.

³⁸ Michalis N. Michael, Matthias Kappler and Eftihios Gavriel, *Ottoman Cyprus: A collection of Studies on History and Culture*, (Near and Middle East Monographs 4, Harrassowitz Verlag 2009) 162.

³⁹ Ibid.

⁴⁰ Ibid.

⁴¹ Ibid.

⁴² Esmé Scott-Stevenson, *Our Home in Cyprus* (Publisher Chapman and Hall 1880) 15-300 <<https://archive.org/details/ourhomeincyprus00stegoog/page/n8>> accessed on 10/12/2018.

⁴³ Ibid.

and her family would become a byword in the village; that her daughter would be as ruined socially as though she were the highest lady in the land; and she passionately threatened that she would go to Nicosia where the Turkish doctors would rapidly help to save her child.⁴⁴ The English doctor explained her threat's unlawfulness and warned her of the consequences as abortion was prohibited by law and punished by imprisonment.⁴⁵ Abortion in Cyprus constituted a criminal offence, subject to exception, up until March 2018. Since then, abortions can be performed on request until the 12th week of pregnancies, which is extended to 19 weeks in rape cases. Back to Lady Esme's testimony, her book explains that sexual-related practices had been only too common within the island, so were 'underground' abortions as parents rushed to 'save' their children's lives from 'disgrace' and societal stigmatisation after their masters have abused and impregnated them.⁴⁶ Three months later, the mother admitted that her daughter gave birth to a child but declared it had been born dead. Nevertheless, no traces of a body could be found where the parents indicated; thus, the parents were arrested.⁴⁷ Ultimately, the prisoners were released as without the body; the offence of murder was hard to be proved.⁴⁸ Nevertheless, the impact of the trial of the said parents was twofold. On the one hand, the prosecution had a salutary effect as it clarified the English law's position relating to abortion. On the other hand, though, Lady's Esme husband (official from England) never had another such case brought before him.⁴⁹ Accordingly, it emphasises that locals went 'underground' in a sense, keeping their family lives as distant as possible from the English officials and, as such, from the law. Locals knew that they could find revenues and solutions outside the legal sphere and either with illegal underground practices that went largely unpunished or religious methods considered illegal yet 'moral'.⁵⁰ The case further unearths the vulnerability of children working as servants as they were faced with sexual exploitation, amongst other things, while the law remained largely unable to protect children in domestic service and did not provide adequate and effective legal revenues in a case of pregnancy after an abuse. In terms of upholding abortions rath-

⁴⁴ Ibid.

⁴⁵ Ibid.

⁴⁶ Esmé Scott-Stevenson, *Our Home in Cyprus* (Publisher Chapman and Hall 1880) 15-300 <<https://archive.org/details/ourhomeincyprus00stegoog/page/n8>> accessed on 10/12/2018.

⁴⁷ Ibid.

⁴⁸ Ibid.

⁴⁹ Ibid.

⁵⁰ Esmé Scott-Stevenson, *Our Home in Cyprus* (Publisher Chapman and Hall 1880) 15-300 <<https://archive.org/details/ourhomeincyprus00stegoog/page/n8>> accessed on 10/12/2018.

er than protecting the child's best interest, the strict approach of the law pushed the subjects of the Empire away from the legal sphere. Moreover, the wording used by Lady Esme in her book emphasises a puritanical culture and the tendency to stigmatising and define children and women in terms of sexual maturity or stigmatising anything which the society considered 'different' or abnormal. The wording also proves the culture of impunity beleaguering the communities since then. What is particularly concerning is the burden that falls on young girls and women, a somewhat form of victim-blaming and shaming, which is largely evident today, while lawyers blame women and young victims of sexual abuse. Simultaneously, the Court remains mostly uneducated on the psychological impacts of sexual-related abuses and diminishes the likelihood of victimisation of said victims.

Similarly, children in the institution of *basleme* remained vulnerable to sexual exploitation while the working conditions were cruel as subjects of the Empire, and their children were discriminated against based on their social status. *Basleme* was the common practice of adopting or fostering a child into relatively wealthy households and brought up that child as servants during the island's Ottoman reign.⁵¹ Although there is no evidence of *basleme* being legally incorporated initially, since the island retained the Ottoman laws for a substantial time, it constituted a widespread phenomenon in every region of the Ottoman Empire and thus of the countries which moved from the Ottoman era to another colonial power, as it is with the current case. Theoretically, *basleme* was neither permitted nor allowed, but practically it constituted a repetition of child circulation and abuse. Young children, more usually female children, undertook household chores and baby-sitting with no payment whatsoever while enduring sexual harassment. The employers or foster parents did not pay any wages based on the assumption that taking custody of such a child was a charity, whereby abuse, neglect, and exploitation of children under the institution of *basleme* was not an issue neither for the society nor the law.⁵² In her book, Nazan Maksudyan explains that since the Ottoman society tended to define foster children in terms of sexual instauration, unchastity, promiscuity, and intendency,⁵³ no social force was strong enough to regulate the criminal actions of the masters. Additionally, the book moves on to identify a case of pregnant children in *baslemes* who were forced to return to their villages

⁵¹ Nazan Maksudyan, *Orphans and Destitute Children in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Syracuse University Press, 1st ed. 2014) 54.

⁵² *Ibid.*

⁵³ *Ibid.*

to give birth and essentially abandon their babies.⁵⁴ According to Nazan Maksudyan, court records contain a substantial number of legally enforced contracts between poor parents and persons of high status, such as government officials, artisans, and merchants, in exchange for their daughters.⁵⁵ Thus, it seems that *basleme* remained as an institution for a substantial period until the island's independence, creating a fertile environment for child sexual abuse. At the same time, other under-age servants, such as domestic servants, apprentices, and so on, were regularly sexually subjected and abused while the law failed to acknowledge the effects of such abuses on children and their families. Overall, through this *de facto* form of regulated but equally unregulated concubinage, children became even more vulnerable, and offences such as incest, sexual harassment, and slavery were inevitably promoted.

The discrimination and the systemic failure of initially the Ottoman Empire and then of the British Empire to regulate the institutions of *basleme* virtually permitted the promotion of criminal acts and impunity, diminishing the judicial institutions of the Empire and the trust of the community towards the rule of law. Archives reveal that in instances where children fought against their fates, they managed to escape or suicide, leaving their stigma in the legal history of criminal activities alongside social taboos and between the then blurred lines of charity and abuse. Another read on the law of the time unearths that in the absence of adequate legal regulation for adoption and child abuse, the subjects of the island moved on to foster children disregarding the state law *per se*. Hence, emphasising the two-tier unfair understanding of equity, equality, and humanity, or the lack thereof, of the legally pluralistic discursive in the Island of Cyprus.

With the passing of years and the legal reform that was undergone, a more Westernised criminal code was introduced in the Island of Cyprus. More specifically, up until 1928, the Ottoman Penal Law applied for offences against under-age persons in sections 197-200. Nevertheless, the new Griffith influenced Criminal Code, Cap.13, which was introduced in 1928, had some common features, including the wording which projected cultural stigmatisation and stereotypes of impureness and unnaturalness. Sections 152, 158-160 regulated the sexual abuse of children. All the crimes described therein were considered a felony, and the punishment was 5-14 years of imprisonment with corporal punishment dependent on the violence involved.

⁵⁴ Nazan Maksudyan, *Orphans and Destitute Children in the Late Ottoman Empire* (Syracuse University Press, 1st ed. 2014) 54-59.

⁵⁵ *Ibid*, 28.

Nevertheless, neither the term 'abuse' nor the term 'child' was considered the same as it is nowadays. Abusing a girl under the age of sixteen was termed 'defilement,' and a boy was termed 'unnatural offence,' as if the sexualisation of an under-age female is defined by pollution, impure ceremonial use, and debase but still somehow natural. A flower that has been crumbled and thus lost its beauty and pureness. Whereby abusing an under-age boy was unnatural and should be contempt as such. Similarly, dividing them into genders is also a socio-legal harmful practice that promotes stereotypes that are even projected by the judiciary, which was supposed to promote justice, fairness, and equality. Simultaneously, the social labels projected within the law are particularly harmful, especially in such a close religious community that stigmatises the victims more than perpetrators. Such instances are widely described by Lady Esme Scott-Stevenson as described above and through the common law in several cases analysed herein. Analysing *baslemes* and other sexual abuses of children during colonialism based on today's human rights perspectives constitutes discrimination toward children based on their family and social status. A cycle of neglect of the child's best interest and gross disregard of children's voices and especially of under-age victims of sexual exploitation and abuse.

Slowly but steadily, the Criminal Code of the Crown Colony of Cyprus became what we know today, subject to amendments, Cap. 154. Nevertheless, the then-new Criminal Code is similar to Cap. 13 as it describes unnatural offences and defilement of underage boys and girls, respectively. The 1959 Criminal Code also defined rape, as such, the law is beginning to acknowledge the harmful practices of sexual exploitation. Yet, offences against the person were and still are, under the title 'Offences against Morality,' providing a degree of impureness on the victim and the perpetrator. The offences were considered felonies, and the law provided for 5-14 years of imprisonment, except in the case of rape, which was punishable by life imprisonments with or without corporal punishment.

The Island's Westernisation process: International developments after World War II

Nevertheless, by the end of the Second World War, disregard and contempt for human rights have resulted in atrocities outraging humankind's conscience and the advent of an era based on freedoms. Human rights are the basic standards without which people cannot survive and develop in dignity. They are inherent to the human person, inalienable and universal. Thus, the international community set those common standards

with the adoption of the Universal Declaration of Human Rights in 1948, which gives great moral weight to the fundamental principle that all human beings, irrespective of race, religion, social status, and other physical physiognomies, are to be treated equally and respectfully. Hence, the 1948 Declaration is considered the first international agreement on the basic principles of human rights; thus, possesses historical importance.⁵⁶ The Universal Declaration of Human Rights contains two articles that refer to children, articles 25 and 26. Firstly, article 25(2) provides that ‘motherhood and childhood are entitled to special care and assistance. All children, whether born in or out of wedlock, shall enjoy the same social protection.’⁵⁷ Hence, the world began to understand children as a vulnerable group in need of assistance for the first time. Secondly, article 26 of the Declaration offers the right to education, access to education and sets the aims of such education.⁵⁸ Nevertheless, the 1948 Declaration specifies that ‘parents have a prior right to choose the kind of education that shall be given to their children.’⁵⁹ Consequently, a child is still seen as a beneficiary of rights rather than a right holder. A presumption that is enforced within the international and the national communities of that time equally. Nevertheless, as seen throughout the current research, human rights’ foundational doctrines were generally disregarded in the Crown Colony of Cyprus as the enlightenment movement never arrived on the island.

Children in Labour

The subjectivation of children on the island can also be demonstrated through the rampant phenomenon of child labour. As the then-Attorney-General Stelios Pavlides reasoned, a boy usually completed elementary education by 12 years of age. The prohibition of employment of children under 14 years of age in private or public industrial undertakings was considered a gap in inactivity.⁶⁰ Thus, by 1944 a child could be

⁵⁶ Equality and Human Rights Commission, What is the Universal Declaration of Human Rights?, <<https://www.equalityhumanrights.com/en/what-are-human-rights/what-universal-declaration-human-rights>> last accessed on 07/12/2018.

⁵⁷ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 25 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf> last accessed on 07/12/2018.

⁵⁸ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 26 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf> last accessed on 07/12/2018.

⁵⁹ Universal Declaration of Human Rights 1948, Article 26 <https://www.ohchr.org/EN/UDHR/Documents/UDHR_Translations/eng.pdf> last accessed on 07/12/2018.

⁶⁰ Official Gazette of Cyprus, The Cyprus Gazette 1944, Authority Issue No. 3149 16th November 1944, p.262 <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1944/index.html> accessed on 08/10/2018.

employed as an apprentice to learn a trade.⁶¹ The reasoning of the Attorney-General of the Island of Cyprus signifies the limited pursuance of education, as the primary purpose of a male child was to bring income to the household, and the purpose of a female child was to undertake the household. The subject of child labour was also emphasised by other Attorneys-General of the British Crown Colony. More specifically, Q.C., Criton Tornaritis explained that Cyprus has always been difficult to control wages, nature of the workplace, condition of services, and hours of work regarding under-age 'domestic servants.'⁶² Thus, it follows that domestic servants and child-labour as an institution were retained as it was since the Ottoman empire, jeopardising children's development. What differentiated the Ottoman from the British era is that the latter introduced legal frameworks regulating child-labour. Children under the age of thirteen could be employed in 'light work of an agricultural or other character.'⁶³ Considering the burdens of agricultural trade combined with the extreme weather conditions of the Mediterranean, it shall be argued that it is anything but light. Hereafter, the law could only be interpreted as having the following purpose: to create a window for regulated child-labour of any kind as it served the societal purpose of such a child during that time. Thus, it is arguable that overall the institution of child-labour and domestic servants was retained from the Ottoman Empire, contrary to the new legislation introduced by Her Majesty. It could be easily argued that this was expectable as the new legal order remained unknown by the British Empire's local subjects as they remained uneducated and the laws were published mainly in the English language.

Evidence suggests that children invariably hastened to their mother with earnings close in the afternoon, and then the mother in her turn gave the earning to the man of the household.⁶⁴ Sir Samuel White Baker explained that women and girls were working hard with 'strong grubbing-axes, digging out the roots of brushwood from among the rocks and making them into faggots, as fuel for burning the grey limestone,' other women and girls 'were engaged with baskets collecting wild artichokes.'⁶⁵ The former consul in Cyprus, Sir Hamilton Lang, explains that the women and children chiefly

⁶¹ Ibid.

⁶² The Official Gazette of Cyprus, The Cyprus Gazette, Issue No.3629 18th June 1952, p. 219-222 <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1952-1953/index.html> accessed on 08/10/2018.

⁶³ Ibid.

⁶⁴ Sir Samuel White Baker, *Cyprus as I saw it in 1879* (MacMillan & Co 1879) 13- 457 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusiasawitin00bakeuoft>> last accessed on 3/12/2018.

⁶⁵ Ibid.

performed the labour required.⁶⁶ Furthermore, children often worked in water mills. They found themselves turning the wheel either by night or day by mules or oxen.⁶⁷ Women and girls arguably wore cloth upon which the eggs are laid around their waists and cause them to hatch by the heat of their body.⁶⁸ Thus, exemplifying the primitive labour environment. Nevertheless, when a child's right is violated, it should be remembered that it brings a domino effect as rights are so inter-dependent and inter-connected. For example, in the case of child-labour the right of non-discrimination is violated too. Consequently, despite the international progress of human rights and, more specifically, children's rights, children on the island were deprived of their fundamental rights and needs. The notion that every child should be protected against every form of exploitation was not unknown to Western culture. On the contrary, the League of Nations introduced it in 1924. Nevertheless, in practice, children of the world were faced with a vicious and continuing cycle of violence and exploitation as disrespect of legal norms and socio-legal practices prevented the rule of law's functioning.

Child-marriage

The age spectrum specified by law signified that a child could be married as soon as she or he reached fourteenth years of age, 'legalising' and retaining as such child-marriage. Like the laws regulating the family life of Christian, the Turkish Family (Marriage and Divorce) Law 1951 permitted the marriage of a woman once she completed her sixteenth year.⁶⁹ A close analysis suggests that the rights were of the parents and, more specifically of the father, whereby children seemed to be mere beneficiaries of such rights. It appears that the institution of child-marriage was retained from the Ottomans while both communities married their children at an early age.

⁶⁶ R. Hamilton Lang, *Cyprus: Its History, Its Present Resources, and Future Prospects* (MacMillan and Co. 1878) <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusitshistor00langgoog/page/n8>> last accessed on 15/01/2019.

⁶⁷ Sir Samuel White Baker, *Cyprus as I saw it in 1879* (MacMillan & Co 1879) 13- 457 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusasisawitin00bakeuoft>> last accessed on 3/12/2018.

⁶⁸ R. Hamilton Lang, *Cyprus: Its History, Its Present Resources, and Future Prospects* (MacMillan and Co. 1878) 237 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusitshistor00langgoog/page/n8>> last accessed on 15/01/2019.

⁶⁹ Turkish Family Law 1959 CAP. 339, Article 6.

Children rights developments through the 1950s

Gradually, a 'child' was determined as a person under the age of eighteen years.⁷⁰ Yet, the Children Act 1956 constitutes somewhat ambiguous legislation as it moves on to explain that children in need is a person under the age of sixteen.⁷¹ The Act was introduced in Cyprus in 1956, and it is still applicable subject to amendments. Nevertheless, the fact that the age spectrum of a 'child' gradually expanded constituted a positive step towards realising the needs of a person under the age of eighteen. Maybe it was due to the international influences, as by 1950, governmental and non-governmental organisations worldwide were assembled assisting children. Nonetheless, the Children Act 1956 saw children again as beneficiaries of the rights rather than right holders. On the international sphere, on the other hand, devastating major armed conflicts in Europe constituted the trigger of the immediate adoption of the United Nations Declaration of the Rights of the Child in 1959.⁷² Bennett Jr has found that the increased interest in human rights after the Second World War moved the international community in recognising child-centric human rights. The 1959 Declaration is the first document to date that purports to contain a comprehensive statement of children's rights.⁷³ Nevertheless, previous studies identified that even though the 1959 Declaration represents a historical centrepiece regarding international children's rights and is much more comprehensive and directed than its predecessor, the Geneva Declaration cannot be termed a 'comprehensive document' on children's rights.⁷⁴ Yet, the children on the island were deprived of their rights as the enlightenment movement that flourished in Europe never arrived in Cyprus.

Education

Following the spirit and the humanitarian evolutions during the 1900s, the British Colonial power enacted legislation specifying that a 'child' is a person between the ages of four and fourteen in 1933.⁷⁵ The 1933 legislation also regulated that children

⁷⁰ The Official Gazette of Cyprus Gazette, The Cyprus Gazette, Issue No.3953 14th June 1956, p.337-345 <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1956-1957/index.html> accessed on 08/10/2018.

⁷¹ Ibid.

⁷² Zoe Moody, 'Transnational treaties on children's rights: Norm building and circulation in the twentieth century' (Paedagogica Historica, 2014 50:1-2) 151-164.

⁷³ Walter H. Bennet Jr., 'A Critique of the Emerging Convention on the Rights of the Child') Cornell International Law Journal, vol.20 Issue 1 Winter 1987, Article 1) 3-29.

⁷⁴ Ibid.

⁷⁵ The Official Gazette of Cyprus, The Cyprus Gazette For The Year 1933, Issue No. 2291 6 of January

not being less than four or more than fourteen shall be entitled to attend elementary school, whereby children not less than four or more than twelve shall attend school in a compulsory attendance area.⁷⁶ Governors customarily declared some areas as 'compulsory attendance areas,' normally school areas located in cities.⁷⁷ Otherwise, attendance was not compulsory, and the figures presented herein support this argument. It was the duty of the parent residing within a compulsory school attendance area to send such child regularly to a school. Nonetheless, it should be reminded that school areas were specific and thus limited, excluding some groups of children who were not living within two miles of such areas.⁷⁸ Consequently, while children's rights to education and thus on the development began to develop, specific groups of children residing in non-rural areas were deprived of these rights. Similarly, the educational system seems to have created inevitable segregation based on ethnicity and religion, which was retained in the Constitution in 1960, differentiating as such children contrary to the cherished human rights principles and the values expressed in *Brown*.⁷⁹ At the same time, children belonging to other minorities were discriminated against as either the Quaran or Bible was taught respectively in each segregated school.

Nevertheless, still with the developments in education, Roger Heacock explains that education, amongst other things, was 'primitive,' with intellectual attainment barely surpassing a faint knowledge of the basics.⁸⁰ Figures show that in 1932, there were 32,441 boys and 24,236 girls enrolled in primary education throughout Cyprus in one of the 1,023 elementary schools.⁸¹ Throughout this chapter, the patriarchal structure of the society is demonstrated through the children enrolled in schools, as boys were much more than girls. After all, the position of girls in a rather androcentric community was considered to be the household. Regarding secondary education, there were two 'Moslem' schools, one for boys and one for girls, and for the 'Orthodox-Christians,' there were five gymnasiums with a combined attendance of 1,066, seven village high schools with 469 pupils, three girls' high schools with 252 pupils

1933, p.325, <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1933/index.html> accessed 8 October 2018.

⁷⁶ Ibid.

⁷⁷ Ibid.

⁷⁸ Ibid.

⁷⁹ *Brown v. Board of Education of Topeka*, (1954) 347 U.S. 483.

⁸⁰ Roger Heacock Roger, 'The Framing of Empire: Cyprus and Cypriots through British Eyes, 1878-1960' (The Cyprus Review 1 23:2 2011) 26.

⁸¹ Alexis Rappas, *Cyprus in the 1930s: British Colonial Rule and the Roots of the Cyprus Conflict* (I.B. Tauris & Co Ltd 2014) 44.

and the Commercial Lyceum in Larnaca with 213 pupils.⁸² The considerable number of 60,000 children who attended schools is shadowed by the fact that 'up to 50 per cent of the children enrolled in the first class of village schools leave within two years, during which they may not even reach the second class'.⁸³ This is a result of society's structure, which valued physical and economic survival more than education. It can also be argued that it establishes a strong case of neglect of children's cognitive attainment and prosperous future, irrespective of his or her parent's background, as that is accorded through the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child today. Thus, the theoretical development of children's rights to education and development was tackled by society's social structure and the law's systemic inability to regulate these phenomena effectively.

Since religion and religious education were of high importance for the two communities, Moslem family affairs were regulated by Chapter 339, which introduced the Turkish Family Law of 1951.⁸⁴ More specifically, the parents shall bear such costs when it came to children's maintenance and education.⁸⁵ At the same time, the 1951 Law specified that the husband 'is the head of the conjugal union; he determines the place of residence and... Is generally charged with the care and support of the family'.⁸⁶ The woman shall 'adopt the family name of the husband; she shall assist the husband and support him with all her ability in the maintenance of the home and shall have the management of the household affairs'.⁸⁷ Consequently, Article 37 automatically shows women's subjectivation and thus determining that such a subjectivation was regulated in both communities equally, which was also evidenced during the Ottoman era. The relatively 'ornamental legalised' role of women somehow managed to survive, and it can be found today in the official publication on the website of the United Kingdom's government. More specifically, the website specifies that Turkish Family Law 'applies' where the parties are either of a Turkish nationality; professes the Moslem faith; and resides in Cyprus.⁸⁸ At this point, it should be emphasised that the official governmental site uses present simple terms, as in 'applies,' in a law going

⁸² Ibid.

⁸³ Ibid.

⁸⁴ Turkish Family Law 1959, CAP. 339.

⁸⁵ Ibid.

⁸⁶ Turkish Family Law 1959, CAP. 339, Article 37.

⁸⁷ Ibid.

⁸⁸ Publishing Service of UK Government, Marriage: Marriage in the United Kingdom, para.15.3 <https://assets.publishing.service.gov.uk/government/uploads/system/uploads/attachment_data/file/258233/marriage.pdf> accessed on 08/11/18.

as far back as colonialism. All other marriages are regulated by the British Subjects' Marriage Laws 1889 and 1921.⁸⁹ Furthermore, the child's religious education is of paramount importance as the 1951 Law specifies that such education shall be determined by the father or, in his absence, by the mother provided that the mother is moslem.⁹⁰ If the mother is non-moslem, the Court shall entrust the religious education to the child's nearest relative on the father's side.⁹¹

According to one of the Blue Books of the Island of Cyprus, the expenditures for education during the first year of the British administration were £3,000 compared to law and justice, which was only £571.⁹² Thus, signifying, on the one hand, the determination of the colonial reign to develop the rather primitive education, but on the other hand, the limited pursue of justice through law-abiding institutions. Blue Books constitute an essential research tool in all state departments' historical administrative practices and activities during the period 1886-1946.⁹³ Hence, despite the focus of the colonial administration on enhancing education, children's future was determined long before their existence, as there was no higher education within the island, and poorer groups of the society did not have the resources to send their children abroad to pursue a prosperous educated future. The strict androcentric patriarchal structure beleaguering the Island of Cyprus can be demonstrated through the law of that time as it is excluding children of their fundamental rights for a successful development through education.

It should be emphasised that, as in any patriarchal society, the law determined the domicile of origin of a child by the domicile of his father at the time of the child's birth, except in the case of an illegitimate child.⁹⁴ The latter is still largely applicable within the Republic even though under the current legal framework, the 'care for the minor child ('parental care') is the duty and right of the parents who exercise it

⁸⁹ Ibid.

⁹⁰ Turkish Family Law 1959 CAP. 339, Article 48.

⁹¹ Ibid.

⁹² Great Britain, Colonial Office, *The Cyprus Blue Book 1889-1890*, Ψηφιακή Πλατφόρμα Κυπριακής Βιβλιοθήκης, 47 <<http://www.cyprusdigitallibrary.org.cy/files/original/eb5f418ab164675131f062af47097a26.pdf>> accessed on 08/10/2018.

⁹³ Ψηφιακή Πλατφόρμα της Κυπριακής Βιβλιοθήκης, *Blue Book/Κυανή Βίβλος*, <<http://www.cyprus-digitallibrary.org.cy/collections/show/3>> accessed on 20/11/2018.

⁹⁴ Official Gazette of of Cyprus, *The Cyprus Gazette (Extraordinary) 1939*, Authority Issue No. 2708 28th February 1939, p.169 <http://cypruslibrary.moec.gov.cy/ebooks/The_Cyprus_Gazette_1939/index.html> accessed on 08/10/2018; Turkish Family Law 1959 CAP. 339 Article 37.

jointly.⁹⁵ Parental responsibility includes the determination of name, the care of the person, the administration of the property, and the child's representation in every case or legal transaction relating to his or her property.⁹⁶ Yet, children in the Republic of Cyprus tend to adopt the father's family name irrespective of the equality between parents provided by law. Consequently, the social reality of the law emphasises the rather lyrical existence of equality. Additionally, in my professional expertise, to some extent, the judiciary tends to favour mothers in the applications of parental care, as it is rare for a father to win such an application.

Children in internment camps

On top of the already distressing and inhuman culture within the island, in 1939, the colonial regime accepted Jewish immigrants who sought visas to British-controlled Palestine. At the end of World War II, the United Kingdom barred the Holocaust survivors who sought visas for Palestine, thus, embarking on clandestine passages, with thousands of Jewish, including children, being crammed on small, unseaworthy means of transportation.⁹⁷ In dealing with the refugee wave, the British government established internment camps on the Island of Cyprus in August of 1946. In the inhuman and culturally innate island, more than 2,000 children were born, and 500 orphans were brought from abroad.⁹⁸ Nevertheless, the conditions in the camps were somewhat challenging, resembling the overall distressing image of the island. Jewish refugees were treated like inmates, detained behind barbed wire with limited food and water. Dr Hadjisavvas correctly argues that camps caused further discontent while watchtowers' erection, coupled with armed British officers resembled the Nazi camps.⁹⁹ She moves on to identify the disturbing similarities between the refugees of the 1940s and today's refugees from Syria and Iraq.¹⁰⁰ Nonetheless, it could be easily argued that they resemble the 1974 situation in Cyprus as well.

⁹⁵ Ο περί Σχέσεων Γονέων και Τέκνων Νόμος του 1990 (216/1990), Άρθρο 5.

⁹⁶ Ibid.

⁹⁷ Eliana Hadjisavvas, 'Migrant Movement in the Mediterranean; The Holocaust and the British Empire 1940-1950 (University of Birmingham 2017).

⁹⁸ Ibid.

⁹⁹ Jason Steinhauer, 'EU Month of Culture Spotlight: Cyprus' (The Library of Congress May 3, 2016) <<https://blogs.loc.gov/kluge/2016/05/cyprus-eliana-hadjisavvas/>> last accessed on 30/01/2019.

¹⁰⁰ Ibid.

Conclusion:

Overall, this paper's work is the work of conceptualising 'the child' during British colonialism and the result of conceptualising 'the self' of the child. A 'self' that was determined long before its existence was an enhancement to the family's economic and social status. From the outset, children's existence was intertwined with the parent or guardian context. They were the object of an individual or individuals who determine themselves as masters or parents. Therefore, the origins of the colonial child are as much about the child as they are about the societal constructs of the child at that time. How childhood is conceptualised and understood throughout the island's socio-legal history had a detrimental effect on children and the legal maxim of the child's best interest per se. Unable to express their voice, children in colonial Cyprus remained silent as pervasive historico-socio-legal norms determined their future. The colonial history of the Island of Cyprus signifies the limited pursuance of education, as the primary purpose of a male child was to bring income to the household and the purpose of a female child was to undertake the household. British officials on the island were stunned by the innate nature of locals who were curious and keen to learn, touch, and stare at the new element, which, compared to them, seemed pleasant and prosperous.¹⁰¹ Nevertheless, the British Empire's neglect to pursue children's rights, coupled with the social peculiarities of that time silenced the voices of children across the island. From in between the then blurred lines of sexual exploitation, neglect, abuse, and charity, to inadequate education and hard labour, children remain the victims of social peculiarities and other legal and socio-legal deficiencies.

As core principles and the responsibility to respect children's rights remained underdeveloped locally for a substantial period, undoubtedly, the United Nations Convention on the Rights of the Child came to spread hope. But that was not until much later in history, in 1989. By then, the Island of Cyprus gained its independence. Nevertheless, the vast influences of colonial power are still visible. As the paper suggests, social peculiarities dictated, and to some extent still do, the lives of children within the Island of Cyprus, disregarding, neglecting, and disrespecting core principles such as the best interest of the child and the voice of the child. Of course, whenever a new law is introduced, especially laws regulating communities' social lives, that said community rarely accepts it without condemning it.

¹⁰¹ Sir Samuel White Baker, *Cyprus as I saw it in 1879* (MacMillan & Co 1879) 13- 457 <<https://archive.org/details/cyprusasisawitin00bakeuoft>> last accessed on 3/12/2018.

A modern example is that of the civil partnership of same-sex couples. While it recently became legal in the Republic of Cyprus, it is largely condemned by the constitutional dogma of the Church, politicians in social media with the society projecting homophobic hate speech. As is the case today, so was during colonialism as well.

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Ψηφιακή Πλατφόρμα της Κυπριακής Βιβλιοθήκης, Blue Book/Κυανή Βίβλος

Fabric rationing in Limassol during the Second World War, as part of British Colonial policy: A look from the Municipal Archive of Limassol

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Abstract

Rationing and price fixing was implemented by many countries during the course of the Second World War, that affected the distribution of supplies such as food, fuel and textiles. This was done in order to avoid price gouging and the creation of black markets, even though the measures were implemented black markets still arose from the start of the war. Cyprus was a colony of the British Empire at the time, and imperial legislation that implemented rationing was enacted on the island. This article focuses on the rationing policy of the British in Limassol through the use of archival material dating to 1943 from the Municipal Archive of Limassol in order to demonstrate the implementation of this policy to the city. Additionally, a glimpse of the problems of the policy can be observed through the press of the time, where textile merchants, tailors and civilians expressed their opinions on the rationing system.

Keywords: rationing, Second World War, British Empire, British Colonies, textile rationing, black market, Limassol, Cyprus

Introduction

The Second World War has been extensively studied but mostly through the lens of military action, economic studies are not dominant in the field and they have focused on austerity measures in western European nations such as the United Kingdom and Ireland. Furthermore, textile rationing during wartime has also seen a limited amount of study, especially outside of the large European powers and within the colonial context. Cyprus offers a unique perspective of the implementation of British policy on rationing during war time since Cyprus was a British colony and Cypriots who participated as volunteers in the war at the same time sought self-determination from the Empire and a union with Greece. The present article will use primary source-

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es, that includes correspondence between government officials, from the Municipal Archive of Limassol for the year 1943, laws enacted by the Colonial Government and economic information published in the Cyprus Gazette and the Cyprus Blue Books and newspapers published in the Cypriot press at the same time that detailed the way rationing was implemented, price fixing of certain commodities, such as cashmere, the creation of black markets and the effects the measures had on the local people.

Historic Context

Second World War

The Second World War started on the 1 of September 1939 and ended on 2 September 1945, with different end dates for the Eastern and Western front and the Pacific theater. The war was fought between the Axis Powers, made up of Nazi Germany, Fascist Italy, Imperial Japan and their satellite states and the Allies, the Soviet Union, the United Kingdom, France and the United States, their allies as well as their imperial possessions, such as Cyprus. The location of Cyprus kept it away from any serious fighting during the war, the German Airforce bombed some strategic British bases on the island with a few British casualties. Still Cyprus was heavily involved in the war through the Cyprus Regiment and the Cypriot Voluntary Force, that were made up of all Cypriots, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots, Armenians, Maronites and Latins that fought in many important battles such as the Battle of Monte Cassino, the Battle of El Alamein etc. The participation of Cypriots was mostly due to economic reasons, since the British provided a decent pay at the time, the fight against fascism on the part of members of AKEL and the aspirations of the Greek-Cypriots for independence from Britain and union with Greece.³ At the height of the war the Greek-Cypriot side tried through various ways to petition the British government, in one instance in 1943 most of the Greek-Cypriot Municipal Council members, from almost all the Municipalities and headed by the Archbishop of Cyprus Leontios, sent a telegram to the PM Churchill in order to petition for the union of Cyprus with Greece, stressing that since Greece and Cyprus had a significant participation in the war effort, on the

³ Georgios Kazamias, Military Recruitment and Selection in a British Colony: The Cyprus Regiment 1939-1944 in Elizabeth A. Close, George Couvalis, Michalēs Tsianikas (eds), *Greek Research in Australia: Proceedings of the Sixth Biennial International Conference of Greek Studies, Flinders University June 2005* (Flinders University Department of Languages - Modern Greek: Adelaide, 2007) 333-342; Panagiotis Dimitrakis, The Special 'Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War' (2009) 45(2) *Middle Eastern Studies* 316; Alexios Alecou. *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955 Politics and Ideologies Under British Rule* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 26.

side of the allies that espoused democracy. Therefore, after the war Cyprus should be granted self-determination and the option to unite with Greece.⁴

The economic situation during the war, rationing and black markets

During the course of the war there was a widespread scarcity of clothes and other commodities, this was created in part by the diversion of manpower and materials to war production, the allied blockades of Germany and Italy that restricted trade routes and ports in order to deprive them of supplies such as minerals, metals, food and textiles. More specifically the supply of textiles was affected by the vast amount of clothing used for the soldiers and the confiscation of fabric reserves of countries occupied by Germany.⁵ Germany controlled the economy in all the countries it occupied in order to minimize their consumption and outsource their production towards the German war effort, for example in the Netherlands, Germany appropriated the scant coal production that led to a fuel shortage and consequently even harsher conditions during the winter with wide scale famine.⁶

The restriction of free trade and the diversion of material for the war effort led to shortages, disturbances in production and distribution and inevitably steep jumps in prices, that forced the governments to impose price control and rationing in order to stop profiteering and the creation of black markets. These measures were implemented in all countries of the world, since large parts of the world remained under European colonial administration and were therefore affected by the situation even if they were geographically distant to the major theaters of war. Rationing was implemented throughout the duration of the Second World War and continued for some years after its conclusion since the production capabilities could not cover the expected demand.⁷ For example in Northern Ireland rationing lasted between 1941 and 1949 while in the Republic of Ireland from 1942 to 1948,⁸ in the United King-

⁴ Anonymous, 'Η μόνη μας αξίωσις' *Εσπερινή* [Evening], 10 April 1943, 2.

⁵ Ralf Futselaar, *Lard, lice and longevity: the standard of living in occupied Denmark and the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (Vol. 1). (Amsterdam University Press 2008) 96; Faith M. Williams, 'Price control and rationing in foreign countries during the War' (1945) 61 *Monthly Labor Review* 882.

⁶ Ralf Futselaar, *Lard, lice and longevity: the standard of living in occupied Denmark and the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (Vol. 1). (Amsterdam University Press 2008) 90.

⁷ Faith M. Williams, 'Price control and rationing in foreign countries during the War' (1945) 61 *Monthly Labor Review* 882.

⁸ Orla Fitzpatrick, 'Coupons, Clothing and Class: The Rationing of Dress in Ireland, 1942-1948' (2014) 48(2) *Costume*, 236.

dom food rationing began in 1940 and continued until 1954.⁹ In the United Kingdom people were given ration books and limits were imposed on various products such as bacon, butter, sugar and meat.¹⁰ Rationing began on the supply of food but was later extended to all necessities such as fuel and textiles.

Although the intended target was to avoid the creation of black markets, they still sprung up just as quick as rationing was implemented.¹¹ In general prices for textiles saw a dramatic increase due to shortages, for example, in Britain the price of clothing rose an average of 175% from pre-war levels in May 1941.¹² In Denmark and the Netherlands there was a clothing shortage, by the end of the German occupation most children owned only one set of underwear.¹³ In Cyprus the price of textiles also saw an increase and the creation of black markets helped to quickly steer the prices higher than ever before.¹⁴

Clothing rationing was introduced in Britain with the Civilian Clothing Order of 1942 that regulated the manufacture and distribution of clothing.¹⁵ While in Ireland on the 9th of June 1942 with the Emergency Powers Order.¹⁶ In Denmark textile rationing came late in the war, in 1944, and until then the poorer members of society were affected by textile shortages. The Netherlands implemented textile rationing very early in the war, starting from 5 August 1940.¹⁷ In Iraq, which was under British occupation, textile rationing was implemented in 1944.¹⁸

⁹ Christina Savvas, Panikos Panayiotou, *Queens of Amathus* (LGK in the Community, 2019) 33.

¹⁰ Christina Savvas, Panikos Panayiotou, *Queens of Amathus* (LGK in the Community, 2019) 33.

¹¹ Christina Savvas, Panikos Panayiotou, *Queens of Amathus* (LGK in the Community, 2019) 33.

¹² Peter McNeil, "Put Your Best Face Forward': The Impact of the Second World War on British Dress" (1993) 6(4) *Journal of Design History*, 284.

¹³ Ralf Futselaar, *Lard, lice and longevity: the standard of living in occupied Denmark and the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (Vol. 1). (Amsterdam University Press 2008) 89.

¹⁴ Central Economic Office of AKEL, 'Η διανομή κασμηριών' [The distribution of woolen textiles] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 16 October 1943, 2.

¹⁵ Peter McNeil, "Put Your Best Face Forward': The Impact of the Second World War on British Dress" (1993) 6(4) *Journal of Design History*, 283.

¹⁶ Peter McNeil, "Put Your Best Face Forward': The Impact of the Second World War on British Dress" (1993) 6(4) *Journal of Design History*, 236.

¹⁷ Ralf Futselaar, *Lard, lice and longevity: the standard of living in occupied Denmark and the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (Vol. 1). (Amsterdam University Press 2008) 96.

¹⁸ Simon Eliot, Marc Wiggam (eds) *Allied Communication to the Public During the Second World War: National and Transnational Networks* (Bloomsbury Academic, 2019) 191.

The situation in Cyprus

The Cypriot economy and the textile industry

The textile industry was already globalized due to the industrial revolution and European imperialism, when the war broke out the trade and import of fibers, such as cotton was already common within the European market¹⁹ and Cyprus' position within the British Empire had created close trade links with India and other textile manufacturing nations.²⁰ In 1938 Cyprus imported cotton mainly from Britain and India as well as other parts of the British Empire such as Palestine and European countries like Germany and Poland.²¹ Additionally, large amounts of artificial silk were imported from the United Kingdom, France, Italy, Japan and Syria.²² For example, the import of woolen goods was doubled from 1934 to 1938, in a similar fashion, the import of cotton and silk was expanded during this time. Natural fibers as well as artificial fibers such as artificial silk were imported.²³ Locally Cyprus produced wool, cotton, flax fiber, hemp fiber and silk,²⁴ these items were also exported from the island.²⁵ Cyprus continued to export goods during the course of the war, in 1941, it exported farm animals, agricultural produce, tobacco, spirits, timber, wool and various minerals such as asbestos, gold ore and terra umbra.²⁶

The economic conditions in Cyprus were partly worsened during this time, but at the same time the war created new industries related to the army that employed many locals. The 1940's were also a period of intense labour organizing and striking on the part of the Cypriot workers,²⁷ the strikes were due to the dissatisfaction of the people for the high price index and the policies enacted by the Government for the prices of clothing, food, fuel and shoes. Added to that, were the aspirations of the Cypriots for more political freedoms and calls for self-determination and union with Greece. The Colonial Government didn't take well with the calls for strikes by the labor unions,

¹⁹ Ralf Futselaar, *Lard, lice and longevity: the standard of living in occupied Denmark and the Netherlands, 1940-1945* (Vol. 1). (Amsterdam University Press 2008) 96.

²⁰ *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 234.

²¹ *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 288.

²² *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 291.

²³ *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 242.

²⁴ *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 412-415.

²⁵ *The Cyprus Blue Book*, 1938, 426-427.

²⁶ *The Cyprus Gazette*, 1941, 122.

²⁷ Alexis Rappas, *The Labor Question in Colonial Cyprus, 1936-1941: Political Stakes in a Battle of Denominations* (2009) 76 *International Labor and Working-Class History*, 194.

replying that, they would hinder the war effort and that anyone who participated in the strikes would be prosecuted, they were also satisfied that the measures enacted by the government were enough to provide for the people.²⁸ While on the issue of Enosis, the British considered it to be the strongest ‘trump card’ to control the will of Greece and anticipated strong reactions from the part of the Greek government, but in the end the Greek side did not exert any pressure on the issue of Cyprus.²⁹

Legal Framework

Cyprus became a British possession ruled by a High Commissioner in 1878, and in 1925 the island became a Crown Colony and was ruled by a Governor.³⁰ At the start of the Second World War, the Governor of Cyprus was William Denis Battershill (4 July 1939 – 3 October 1941) and then for most of the war Charles Campbell Woolley (3 October 1941 – 24 October 1946).³¹ The British Empire implemented new emergency legislation starting from 1939 that was also extended into its colonial possessions, such legislation enacted in Cyprus was the Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) Order in Council, 1939, the Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1940, and the Emergency Powers (Colonial Defence) (Amendment) Order in Council, 1942. These laws were published in the Cyprus Gazette.³² Parts of the aforementioned laws dealt with the regulation of the prices of various commodities such as barley, kerosene, carobs as well as fabrics. Laws regulating the sale of textiles remained in force even after the war, in a similar fashion to many other countries, such an example is the Defence (Sale of Government Clothing and other Textiles) Order, 1946 that specified laws governing approved retail prices for textiles, the issuing of clothing booklets and approved retailers.³³

²⁸ Anonymous, ‘Η κυβέρνηση εισηγήθη εις τας εργατ. συντεχνίας αναθεώρισιν της αποφάσεως των δια απεργίαν’ [The government has suggested to the labor unions to recall their decision on striking] *Ελευθερία* [*Eleftheria*], 26 August 1943, 1; Anonymous, ‘Συνέντευξις του Δημάρχου Λεμεσού μετά του Αποικιακού Γραμματέως’ [Interview of the Mayor of Limassol with the Colonial Secretary], *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 30 December 1943, 1.

²⁹ Procopis Papastratis, *British Policy Towards Greece During the Second World War 1941-1944* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1984) 11.

³⁰ *Cyprus. Handbook prepared under the direction of the historical section of the Foreign Office. No. 65* (London: H.M. Stationery Office, 1920) 13.

³¹ Clement Dodd, *The History and Politics of the Cyprus Conflict* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2010) 7; *The Cyprus Gazette*, 1 January 1943, 1.

³² Supplement No. 3 to *The Cyprus Gazette* No. 2806 of the 3rd January, 1940. Subsidiary legislation, 899, no. 95.

³³ Supplement No. 3 to *The Cyprus Gazette* No. 3220 of the 3rd January, 1946. Subsidiary legislation, 114 no.95.

The government created various offices such as the Office of the Controller of Supplies in Nicosia that were tasked with the implementation of the economic policy and rationing and approved any importations into Cyprus.³⁴ The Municipalities had frequent correspondence with the Controller of Supplies for various matters including the distribution of textiles, some letters are currently held at the Municipal Archive of Limassol and will be detailed later on. Furthermore, the colonial government created the Office of Complaints for the Black Market existed in Cyprus, where consumers could file complaints, but it run parallel to the actual black market³⁵

After the British Colonial government, power rested on the shoulders of Municipal Committees and Mayors, the Mayor of Limassol was Ploutis Servas who served from 1943 to 1949, a notable communist politician who also acted as the General Secretary of the CPC in the years 1936-1944 and later of AKEL between 1941-1945.³⁶ Generally, the implementation of new laws and higher taxes was not taken well by the people, labor unions organized strikes and Ploutis Servas, met with the Colonial Secretary sir Hugh Foot, who later became the last Governor of Cyprus, where 'he stressed the need to lift all the freedom-limiting laws and to provide political freedoms to the people'.³⁷

Rationing in Cyprus

The British Empire in order to combat the lack of resources and by consequence the creation of a black market that would inflate prices, created a system of rations to sell at a fixed price various needed items, including textiles. Since Cyprus was part of the British Empire, these policies were also implemented on the island. Even though rationing of food was implemented the prices of bread and spirits kept rising due to scarcity. A black market quickly formed for both food and clothing.³⁸ Illegal activities were not committed only by the citizens but also from the side of the muhtar and the grocers in both the villagers and the towns, who allocated rations at their

³⁴ The Cyprus Blue Book, 1946, 21.

³⁵ Anonymous, 'Η διανομή κασμηριών' [The distribution of cashmere], *Ανεξάρτητος [Independent]*, 16 October 1943, 2.

³⁶ Panagiotis Dimitrakis, The Special 'Operations Executive and Cyprus in the Second World War' (2009) 45(2) Middle Eastern Studies 322; Alexios Alecou. *Communism and Nationalism in Postwar Cyprus, 1945-1955 Politics and Ideologies Under British Rule* (Palgrave Macmillan, 2016) 16, 26.

³⁷ Anonymous, 'Συνέντευξις του Δημάρχου Λεμεσού μετά του Αποικιακού Γραμματέως' [Interview of the Mayor of Limassol with the Colonial Secretary], *Ανεξάρτητος [Independent]*, 30 December 1943, 1.

³⁸ Anonymous, 'Νέα Λεμεσού' [Limassol News] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ [New Cypriot Guardian]*, 5 May 1943, 1.

whims giving more to some and less to others, leaving people with less than enough to survive. This corruption led to pleas in the newspapers of the time for stricter and frequent checks from the authorities in order to have a just allocation of rations.³⁹ In response the British Colonial Government created the Office of Complaints for the Black Market in late 1942, where citizens could go and give any information they had on black market activities such as price gouging and illegal selling of rationed items at higher prices. By January 1943, just two months after its establishment, the office had examined over 100 cases, 60 of them led to convictions, the payment of a sum of £620 and prison sentences of three or more years.⁴⁰

The Governor of Cyprus announced through the press that committees would be set up in each district, city and village to regulate the distribution of textiles. More specifically the head of each household would receive a form, where they would record their needs for clothing and footwear. There was an order of priority: a) those who needed the fabrics immediately (B) those that needed the fabrics before the end of 1943 and (c) those that could receive them in 1944. This list was also sent to the Controller of Supplies.⁴¹ Each municipality of the island was responsible to supply its own citizens with the rationed supplies, citizens were registered in the municipality and were separated into different categories, such as students and pregnant women, in order to better cover the people who were most in needed. They were additionally separated by neighborhood. For example, the Head of Education announced on the 10th of April 1943 that 50,000 primary school students would be provided with fabrics at cost price, additionally, he secured ca. 350,000 cubits of aladja and other fabrics and that they would also make shoes for the students.⁴² Moreover, the government announced through different newspapers that women in the seventh month of pregnancy should visit a government doctor to acquire a certificate with which they could buy 10 yards of capot from the closest government distribution center.⁴³ In Limassol

³⁹ Anonymous, *Ανεξέλεγκτος η εις τας πόλεις και χωριά διανομή διαφόρων χρειώδων του βίου* [The distribution of various necessities of life in the cities and villages is uncontrollable] *Φωνή της Κύπρου* [Voice of Cyprus], 15 May 1943, 2.

⁴⁰ Ch. G. 'Το γραφείο παραπόνων προς καταπολέμησιν της μαύρης αγοράς' [Office of complaints for the combat of the black market] *Ανεξάρτητος* [Independent], 14 January 1943, 2.

⁴¹ Anonymous, 'Ποιον το σχέδιον διανομης ειδών ιματισμού και υποδήσεως' [What is the distribution plan of clothing and footwear] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ* [New Cypriot Guardian], 30 May 1943, 1.

⁴² Anonymous, 'Η χθεσινή συνεδρία του Ελλην. Εκπαιδευτ. Συμβουλίου' [Yesterday's meeting of the Greek Education Council] *Ελευθερία* [Eleftheria], 10 April 1943, 1.

⁴³ Anonymous, 'Κάμποτ δια τας εγκύους γυναίκας' [Capot for pregnant women] *Κυπριακός Τύπος* [Cypriot Press], 18 April 1943, 2; Anonymous, 'Κάμποτ δι' εγγύους μητέρας' [Capot for pregnant women],

the distribution of capot to pregnant women and black tippet to priests started on the 20th of April 1943 at the office of the Cooperative Bank.⁴⁴

The Distribution of Fabrics in Limassol

As mentioned before the chief authority for the distribution of textiles was the Municipalities, in the case of Limassol, the Municipality under the Mayor Ploutis Servas. While the Office of the Controller of Supplies regulated how much fabric was entitled to each person. At the same time the fabric was sold by the meter and could not exceed the quantity for the sewing of one suit or as it is called in the letter of the Controller mr Joanides 'one full costume/μιας πλήρους φορεσιάς'. Because the measurements varied, the Office had decided on 19½ - 20 pics per piece as an average price. The Controller sent a letter to inform all the District commissioners.⁴⁵

THE OFFICE OF THE CONTROLLER OF SUPPLIES.

Nicosia 26th August 1943

No. 12414.

To all Commissioners,

Further to my letter No. BJS/490/B of the 21st August 1943, I have to inform you that the average length of the local cloth mentioned therein is 19½ - 20 pics per piece, as contracted with weavers.

In order to avoid any complaints on shortages from Committees and the public, and as the actual measuring and cutting will be carried out mostly by amateurs, it has been decided that this local cloth should be issued on the basis of 19½ pics per piece, thus allowing a margin of up to half a pic per piece.

I consider that this information should be made available to Committees when issuing out the cloth.

(Sgd) Joanides

For Controller of Supplies.

The tailors were some of the small manufacturers especially affected by textile shortages and steep prices, since there was a shortage of lining and capot. In 1943

Πάφος [Paphos], 22 April 1943, 1; Anonymous, *Κάποτ δια τας εγκόους γυναίκακς* [Capot for pregnant women], *Χρόνος [Time]*, 24 April 1943, 2.

⁴⁴ Anonymous, *Νέα Λεμεσού* [Limassol News] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ* [*New Cypriot Guardian*], 20 April 1943, 1.

⁴⁵ MAL 572/225/41/1.

the Controller of Supplies gave one fabric roll of capot to each licensed tailor that was soon exhausted, and the Central Committee of Tailors, that represented 500 tailors, asked for an audience with the Controller of Supplies in order to petition for another distribution of capot, their call was not answered by the government.⁴⁶ Additionally, from the press, we learn that the Central Committee of Tailors declined an offer of 2000 jackets of capot since the government offered 2 shillings per item, that corresponded to 18 piastres, which was considered excessive by the Board. Instead they offered 13.5 piastres per piece which was turned down by the department.⁴⁷

The distribution of textiles within the city of Limassol was divided by parish, such as Agia Triada, Arnaoudia, Tzami Tzetit/Agίου Antoniou, Tsiflikkoudia, Agios Nikolaos, Agios Antonis, Agia Zoni, Agia Katholiki, Agia Napa etc. Furthermore, each parish was subdivided into groups, for Arnaoudia the first group was 1-100, the second 101-200 and the third 201-315. Each group was given rations on a specific date and the rations were collected by the authorities 3-4 days later. In Arnaoudia the first group was issued rations on the 23 of September 1943 and the rations were collected by the people on the 25th. The next group got rations the next day and so on.⁴⁸

The Municipal Archive of Limassol as a historical source

The Patticheion Municipal Museum, Historical Archives, Research Center of Limassol houses the Municipal Archive of Limassol from the time of the British occupation to the early years of the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus and offers a unique view into the inner workings of the Municipality of the city during the colonial period.

The file with number 225/41 titled 'Fabrics' (Υφάσματα) dated from January to December 1943 includes 59 pieces of paper, within them are various letters of correspondence between the Mayor of Limassol, various Associations of textile sellers and tailors, the Commissioner of Limassol and the Controller of Supplies as well as announcements from the mayor and other authorities, some of them are in Greek while others are in English.

Parties involved in the distribution of textiles in Limassol

In the distribution of textiles a range of different authorities were involved, starting from the top, which was part of the colonial administration of the island, there

⁴⁶ Anonymous, '500 ράπται ζητούν προστασία' [500 tailors ask for protection] *Κυπριακός Τύπος* [Cypriot Press], 1 December 1943, 2.

⁴⁷ Anonymous, 'Μικρά νέα' [Small News] *Ανεξάρτητος* [Independent], 10 June 1943, 1.

⁴⁸ MAL 572/225/41/28.

was the Office of the Controller of Supplies, with the Controller Mr. Joanides, the office was responsible for the supply system, including requisitioning, receipt, storage, stock control, shipment, identification, and accounting of the supplies. Another authority was the Commissioner of Limassol who was appointed by the British Government and acted as the head administrator of the city. Following that the Municipal Council of Limassol with the Mayor Ploutis Servas, who was elected by popular vote.⁴⁹ And finally, the various local professional associations such as the Limassol Textiles Merchants' Association and the Association of Textile Sellers of Limassol that represented the interests of the tailors and textile merchants. Each party had its own stake in the scheme, and the local merchants and tailors tried to petition the Municipal Government and the District Commissioner for greater involvement in the distribution of textiles.

For instance, the Limassol Textiles Merchants' Association, on the 6th September 1942 sent a letter addressed to the Commissioner Limassol and the President of the Municipal Committee, that tried to persuade them in collaborating for the distribution scheme:⁵⁰

The Limassol Textiles Merchants' Association.
 Limassol the 6th September, 1943.
 The Commissioner Limassol,
 President of Municipal Committee,
 Limassol.

Honourable Sir,

The Limassol Textiles Merchants' Association by their point to the Commissioner Limassol dated the 24th ult., asked that the distribution of 'aladja' and 'pantalonikia' as well as other textiles, be entrusted on the basis of certain proposal which have been made some time ago by the brother Association of Nicosia to the Controller of Supplies and which is included in different petitions and memorandums of our Association, copied of which have been enclosed in our said petition of 24th ult.

The Commissioner of Limassol by his letter of the 31st ult. informed us that the distribution scheme has been entrusted to the Limassol Mu-

⁴⁹ The Cyprus Blue Book, 1946, 21, 115.

⁵⁰ MAL 572/225/41/6.

nicipality. For this reason we apply to your Honour as president of the Municipal Committee.

We know that the Municipality with its usual stull cannot do the distribution itself of so great a quantity of textiles to so many people and will have to make agreements with third persons to undertake the distribution of textiles, paying to them the small percentage of commission which has been approved by the Government to cover the distribution expenses.

Our shops are all nearly empty on account of the scaring merchandise which renders our business problematic and for many of us the support of our families difficult.

It is obvious that we dispose in our shops sufficient effort and time, as well as qualified personnel for the successful application of the scheme as far as the distribution part is concerned since we are sustaining the expenses of their maintenance.

Since for various reasons, very few of us have been granted import Licenses during the war and the small quantity of our imported goods are requisitioned by the Government, now that goods of our lines are to be distributed to the public, it is just and reasonable this should be done through the recognized retail textiles merchants, as same was done with grocers.

In the present case especially it is more practical the distribution to be done through approximately 30 shops than through one, in this way the distribution which would have taken 4 or 6 months to be completed, will now take only 4 or 6 days. This will both satisfy the public who will meet its needs in a short time; because every one with his card which will be given to him by the Municipality and in which will be stated the quantity and kind of goods which is entitled to receive (value of which will be probably paid to the Municipality when taking his card) will go to the pre-arranged shop and take delivery of his goods.

The above arrangement will be under the responsibility of our Association in general and of the respective retailers separately, who will act as trustees of the Municipality. A few details that may still remain unsettled as regards the working of this scheme can be arranged between the Committee under your chairmanship and ours.

Trusting that our application will receive your favourable consideration and thanking you in anticipation.

We have the honour to be
Sir,
your obedient servants
(Sgd) Loukaides

Another labour organization the Association of Textile Sellers of Limassol, that represented all the textile sellers of the city, had requested the Controller of Supplies and the Governor of Limassol to be appointed responsible for the distribution of textiles in the city. The Governor responded by saying that this was already under the authority of the Municipality of Limassol. In turn the Association sent a letter on the 3rd of September 1943 to the Municipality to request a meeting with the officials to discuss the possible involvement of the Association in the distribution in cooperation with the municipal authorities.⁵¹ The Association followed its petition with another letter on the 9th of September 1943, that was replied to by the President of the Municipal Committee with a letter on the 10th of September 1943. In this letter he informs the Association that the Municipal Committee has decided to decline the offer to distribute the textiles together with the Association and under the conditions they petitioned. Additionally, he stressed that the Municipality would go forward with the distribution as soon as possible on its own terms.⁵² In the end, with the letter titled 'Urgent' send on the 5th October 43, Ploutis Servas addresses the Commissioner of Limassol informing him that the Municipality had entered into an agreement with Mr. Agathoclis Loukaides of the Association of Textile Sellers of Limassol for the distribution of clothing in the city.⁵³

Urgent.

Limassol, 5th October, 43

225/41.

The Commissioner,

Limassol.

subject: Distribution of Clothing.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the contract dated 14.9.1943, entered into between the Limassol Municipality and Mr. Agathoclis Loukaides

⁵¹ MAL 572/225/41/5.

⁵² MAL 572/225/41/9A.

⁵³ MAL 572/225/41/17.

of Limassol, whereby the municipality has undertaken to deliver Mr. Loukaides the quantities of cloths referred to in the said Contract, for distribution to the public by the said Mr. Loukaides under the conditions of the Contract and in accordance with the arrangement is made by the Municipality. A copy of the said Contract is in your hands.

2. The Municipality is distributing at present, though the above Contractor, the following kinds of clothing, viz: (a) aladja Moni; (b) aladja Dimiti; (c) Kapot; and (d) Pantaloniki, on the basis of the allocation prepared at your Office and in accordance with the instructions given to us by the District Inspector,

3. The distribution of the clothing referred to in para 2 above started some days ago and will be completed within the next ten days or so.

4. In order that the Municipality may be enabled to go on with the distribution of all the other clothing referred to in the said Contract and with a view to avoid any delay in the carrying out of the distribution and eventual loss of time and money, I have the honour to request you to kindly supply us, early as possible the other clothing referred to in the said contract.

5. Suggesting that you will deal with this matter as early as possible/
I have the honour to be your obedient servant,

(sgd)

Mayor

After the Associations, local merchants also wanted to be involved in the process of textile distribution in the city of Limassol, for example Mr. Loukaides, in a letter to George Shizas, the Vice-president of the Municipal Committee, dated to the 2nd of September 1943, expressed his interest in emptying his shop that was located on Agiou Antreou street from his own merchandise and rending it to the Municipality for £40 per month and that he would be responsible for the distribution of the textiles to the public.⁵⁴

Through the duration of the distribution scheme there was frequent correspondence between the Mayor and the Commissioner of Limassol:⁵⁵

⁵⁴ MAL 572/225/41/4.

⁵⁵ MAL 572/225/41/22A.

THE OFFICE OF THE COMMISSIONER, LIMASSOL

15th October, 1943

His Worship the Mayor,

Your Worship,

I have the honour to inform you that certain quantity of knitting wool has been allotted to Limassol town and to enquire whether the Municipality would be prepared to undertake its distribution.

(sgd) St. Evagelides

Commissioner.

Problems arose with the distribution and the fixing of prices that did not correspond to the actual quality of clothes but instead was a fixed price for all qualities, in a letter to the Commissioner dated to the 18th of October 1943 the Mayor of Limassol wrote:⁵⁶

Limassol 18th October, 43

225/41.

The Commissioner,

Limassol.

Sir,

I have the honour to refer to the distribution of clothing to the Public, under the Government Scheme; and to protest, on behalf of the Council of the Municipal Corporation of Limassol, for the revision made at your office of the quantities of clothing allotted to each applicant by the committees appointed.

I am to state also that each revision is in most cases unjust and results in an inevitable friction between the Public and Municipality, which latter is always considered by the Public to be responsible for any unjust action in the present and similar cases.

2. The Municipal Council decided also that the Municipality is not prepared to undertake in future the distribution of any clothing, foodstuff and other commodities, unless the Municipality is entrusted with the preparation of the distribution lists drawn up in accordance with deci-

⁵⁶ MAL 572/225/41/22ΣΤ.

sions taken by the Council or any Committee appointed by the Council for the purpose.

3. In regard to the distribution of Men's suitings and ladies woolens, the Municipal Council decided that they are not prepared to undertake the distribution of this clothing unless and until different prices are fixed for each kind of such clothing, according to quality, instead of an average price per pic for the whole lot, as fixed by the Controller of Supplier.

4. I shall be pleased if you will kindly let me have an early reply to the above.

I have the honour, to be,
sir,
your obedient Servant,
(sgd)
Mayor.

The Municipality of Limassol decided to resolve the issue internally after receiving the entire supply of fabrics from the Government and to re-price and readjust the price internally with the help of the members of the Committee of the Limassol Tailors Association and the members of the Limassol Textiles Merchants' Association. In a letter to the Committee of the Limassol Tailors Association the Mayor of Limassol wrote:⁵⁷

Limassol 23 of October, 43
225/41
To
the Committee of the Limassol
Tailors Association of Limassol
Limassol.

Sirs,

As you know, the Municipality of Limassol has undertaken to distribute to the public, along with other fabrics, a certain amount of cashmere and woolen women's fabrics. We want to divide these fabrics into qualities in order to set a separate price for each quality, because unfortunately the Office of the Controller of Supplies set a single price for everything.

⁵⁷ MAL 572/225/41/27. Translated from the Greek original by Barbara Stivarou.

The Municipal Council instructed me to warmly ask you to appoint two representatives from your Association, who together with the representatives of the Textile Association, will voluntarily undertake to distinguish the different qualities of the above fabrics and to classify them in different categories with basis for determining the selling price for the first quality eg 100, e.g.

Quality	'A' – 100	
	'B' – 80	
	'C' – 60	etc.

With the belief that you will want to offer your services for an issue that is in the interest of the Citizens, and that we will have your answer soon.

With honor,
the
Mayor

At the same time the fabric was sold in moderation but could not exceed the quantity for sewing a suit or as it is called in the letters of a full costume. As mentioned before, because the measures varied, the British decided at 19½ - 20 pics per piece as an average.⁵⁸

The city of Limassol called for its citizens to be registered in the catalogues for clothing distribution, that was organized by the city's Office of Market Regulation. The Mayor of the city, Ploutis Servas, issued a notice on the 1st of November of 1943 to extend the deadline for registration in the catalogues to the 6th of November 1943 since many citizens of the city were not registered⁵⁹ The Office of Market Regulation of the Municipality of Limassol was the authority for issuing ration books for the sale of cashmere (woolen fabrics), socks and other clothing. On the 12th of November 1943 it published a notice that it would issue ration books for clothing every workday from 8:00 in the morning to 11:30 and from 02:00 until 04:00 in the afternoon. For Saturday the issuing was done until midday.⁶⁰

The shortage of clothes during the war is evident through various records from the Municipal Archive and from articles in the press. In a letter to the Mayor of Limassol

⁵⁸ MAL 572/225/41/1.

⁵⁹ MAL 572/225/41/35A; Photo 1 'Announcement' Annex.

⁶⁰ MAL 572/225/41/49.

dated to the 17th of November 1943, the Municipal Doctor, complains that during his inspection of various shops and restaurants he noticed that towels and aprons were either completely absent or in a miserable state and petitioned the Mayor to ask from the Government capot to be distributed among 60 barbershops, 95 barbers, 32 restaurants, 45 bakeries, 100 bakers, 25 butchers, 15 animal slaughterers and 40 green-grocers. Each establishment would be allotted more fabric than individual laborers. In total the Doctor asked for 3655 cubits of capot.⁶¹

The distribution of textiles was publicized through the press, on the 25th of December 1943 the Governor of Limassol announced that the distribution of locally made woolen textiles would be distributed to the villages of the Province of Limassol. The rate for the villagers was 6 shillings per cubit. Additionally, he informed the public that more locally made fabrics would be distributed in the future, aladja single 5 piastres per cubit, aladja dimiti 10 piastres per cubit, kapot 6 piastres per cubit and pantaloniki for 17 piastres per cubit.⁶² The receivers would be issued a receipt that certified that they received their allotted amount and prevent anyone from getting more than one item on their name.⁶³

The formation of a black market for textiles

A problem that emerged after the implementation of rationing was the creation of a parallel black market, references from the press as well as the announcements of court cases show us a glimpse of the conditions. In an article in the newspaper *Eleftheria* dating to the 5th of April 1943 we are informed of instances in the countryside where some people were able to get fabric for one or more costumes with the aim of reselling it later and pleading calls for the implementation of some sort of control by the authorities.⁶⁴ Press releases from court cases in Nicosia show a case where Michael Aspris from Palaemetochi, an ex-soldier of the Cyprus Regiment, tricked three women, Eleni Kiriakou from Kaimakli, Genovefa Joumali from Enkomi and Christallou Kiriakou, into giving him various clothing articles including shirts, socks, capot and money with the promise of delivering them to their husbands that were fighting on the front, for this he was sentenced to one year in jail. Additionally, Ali

⁶¹ MAL 572/225/41/54.

⁶² Anonymous, 'Διανομή ειδών ματισμού εν Λεμεσώ' [Distribution of clothing items in Limassol] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 25 December 1943, 1.

⁶³ Photo 3 'Empty Receipt Annex.

⁶⁴ Anonymous, 'Βάσανα Υπαιθρου' [Rural Suffering] *Ελευθερία* [*Eleftheria*], 5 April 1943, 2.

Reza from Peristerona was sentenced to a £10 fine for selling aladja over the tariff.⁶⁵ Also in Nicosia, Loizos Theofanous was sentenced to 1 month in jail, a £7 fine and £3 in damages for selling three fabric rolls over the tariff. Furthermore, two men Fatma Mehmet and Enver Houtaverti were sentenced to lighter sentences for selling woven textiles above the tariff.⁶⁶ In Limassol Eva Kokkinou was sentenced to a fine of £3.10 and £1 in court fees for being in possession of fabrics without a license and for selling a corset for £4.50 instead of 10 shillings.⁶⁷ The police conducted searches in the cities and the villages for stolen goods including food and clothing, in the village of Kolossi a man was arrested for hoarding a number of men's and women's clothing.⁶⁸

Cataloguing textile types

From the correspondence between the Controller of Supplies and the Commissioner we have a detailed list of both fabric categories and quantities corresponding to their values. What is not specified is the origin of the fabrics, i.e. whether they are imported, or products made locally. From the copy of a report prepared by a Committee appointed by the Government to investigate the textiles industry in Cyprus entitled 'Report on the Textiles Industry in Cyprus issued by the Supplies Transport & Marketing Department'. It was finished after the war on May 1947 and circulated internally without being published officially. From it we gather that the cotton industry was the largest industry within the textile trade. According to the report 'We have in the island already 3.300 spindles in the Government Factory. The 10.000 spindles would produce enough yarn for all the island's requirements, including hand loom weaving as carried pre-war.'⁶⁹ Similar circumstances are in the areas of spinning ('Producing a good regular yarn in the Government Mill'), weaving and dyeing cotton.⁷⁰ In terms of the import and export of wool we learn that 'The 1938 imports of Woolen Piece Goods was 457.000 yards. Approximately 150 tons of washed wool is required for this amount of Cloth. Cyprus is producing one hundred tons of Clipped

⁶⁵ Anonymous, 'Δικαστηριακά Λευκωσίας' [Nicosia Court Cases] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ* [New Cypriot Guardian], 12 June 1943, 1.

⁶⁶ Anonymous, 'Δικαστηριακά' [Court Cases] *Ανεξάρτητος* [Independent], 11 March 1943, 1.

⁶⁷ Anonymous, 'Νέα Λεμεσού' [News Limassol] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ* [New Cypriot Guardian], 13 May 1943, 1.

⁶⁸ Anonymous, 'Νέα Λεμεσού' [Limassol News] *Νέος Κυπριακός Φύλαξ* [New Cypriot Guardian], 5 May 1943, 1.

⁶⁹ *Report on the Textiles Industry in Cyprus issued by the Supplies Transport & Marketing Department*, (Unpublished report, 1947), 1.

⁷⁰ *Ibid.* 2.

wool annually... Up to the present time all the wool clip, except a small amount used by the hand loom weavers'.⁷¹ On hosiery, wool, cotton underwear, socks and stockings we are informed that: 'No figures are available to show the pre-war imports. But some small factories imported machinery during the war to cover the island's needs locally'.⁷² For the silk industry we know of a local factory that continued to operate during the war: 'There is a very good Filature Factory near Paphos producing a Grade 1 silk, during the war has been manufactured into service requirements'.⁷³ From this report we can gather that Cyprus with much austerity and control in the consumption of fabrics could have been almost self-sufficient in order to cover the local demand, without including the need for synthetic fabrics and luxury items.

The Controller of Supplies notified the Commissioner of Limassol on the textiles that were debited to the Municipality of Limassol.⁷⁴ The government was mostly interested in supplying the Municipalities with the textiles and charging the appropriate fees, then the Municipalities were tasked to mostly operate themselves in regard to the distribution. From the letter we can see that there is no reference to synthetic fabrics such as asvestos or rayon piece goods that were mostly the product of import or were not used on a large scale in Cyprus, while hemp and linen were not produced in large quantities on the island. Thus, we can assume that the control was focused on the local production only.⁷⁵

THE OFFICE OF THE
CONTROLLER OF SUPPLIES

Nicosia, 28th of August, 1943

No. 12435

Commissioner,
Limassol.

Further to my letter No.BJS/190/B/19402 of the 26th August 1943, the following is an account showing the amounts with which the Municipality has been debited:

1080	pics	Haircloth	3 /-	a pic	162.0.0
1962		Linings	3/-		294.6.0

⁷¹ Ibid. 2.

⁷² Ibid. 4.

⁷³ Ibid. 5.

⁷⁴ Photo 2 'Receipt' Annex.

⁷⁵ MAL 572/225/41/2.

142		Overcoating	15/-		106.10.0
3624		Men's Suitings	15/-		2718.0.0
23624		Ladies Woolens	8/-		915.0.0
2016		Grey Drill	3/44		352.16.0
1863		Flannelettes	1/5		162.18.0
180 doz.	pairs	Ladies Silk			
		Stockings	2/4 ½	each pair	270.0.0
500		Ladies Cotton			
		Stockings	2/4½		750.0.0
346		Men's socks	1/-		207.12.0
5040	pics	White Drill	2/2	a pic.	560.0.0
11025		Khakki Drill	2/2		1225.0.0
69519		Aladja Single	-/5		1931.15.0
5678		Aladja Dimiti	1/1		315.6.0
21225 ½		Pantaloniki	1/8		2001.12.6
29488		Capot	-/6		982.18.6
					£12988.15.0

This amount includes the 3623 pics asked for in your letter No. 286/42 of the 24th August, 1943.

(Sgd) Joanides

For Controller of Supplies

The clothes referenced in the list are the following, the haircloth was made up of stiff woolen fabric. The linings are placed in specific places on clothing, hats etc. to prevent wearing and tearing and they also add warmth to winter clothes. Overcoating refers to a type of long coats made of wool that are usually worn in the winter. The term Men's Suiting's refers to a suit set made of wool comprising of a jacket or coat and trousers. Ladies Silk (dress) Ladies Cotton (dress) and Ladies Woolens (dress) are dresses consisting of a skirt with an attached bodice that created the appearance of a dress. White, Khakki and Grey Drill, drill is a durable cotton fabric used in clothing items such as shirts, safari jackets, blouses, and some types of sports clothing. The heavier weights were often used in corsets and are commonly used in work clothing and uniforms. Flannelettes were soft woven fabrics. Stockings (cotton) and Stockings (silk) these were usually created through machine knitting and could be made of cotton, linen, wool or silk. Aladja Single and Aladja Dimiti were characteristic Cypriot

fabrics made of cotton with blue and red stripes. Decoration at the openings and edges is very simple, consisting of braided strips or coloured threads.⁷⁶ *Pantaloniki* was a cotton coat and similar fabrics that were dyed before weaving and were suitable for bags and work trousers. Finally, *Capot* is a woolen fabric that was used to make a *capote*, a long coat or cloak with a hood.

Problems arising from the fabric sizes and cashmere qualities

Initially, woolen fabric was separated into local and imported, with the local being cheaper. An important aspect to determining the price was the thickness of the fabric, that is, the thickness of the yarn during knitting. Because of this it was commonplace in the past to weight the woolen fabric to determine its price. The fact that the British offered a common price for both types created a large number of negative reactions. In an article in the newspaper *Anexartetos* dated to the 16th of October 1943, the Central Economic Office of AKEL lampoons the Office of the Controller of Supplies, for rationing woolen fabrics at a fixed price of 15 shillings per cubit instead of according to their quality, since previously they were sold at 5 shillings per cubit, others for 6, 7, 10, 15 while others were more expensive at 18 and 20. This was done by the Office in order to lower the price index, which was successful, and the index dropped from 278 to 231. This in turn increased the purchasing power of the Cypriot pound by 4 shillings. The article criticized the fact that poor workers bought woolen fabrics worth 5 shillings for 15, 200% more than their worth, and that the sellers made a profit on the backs of the poorer members of society. Additionally, the article criticizes the lack of control by the Office of the Controller of Supplies towards the merchant-tailors, who were able to uncontrollably increase the prices, for example a costume could be sold for £25, of which the textile itself was just £4 and the added £21 was for the 'labour costs'. This led to costumes being sold in the black market for £15 usually and for £20-25 to the upper classes.⁷⁷ The Office responded to the accusations by claiming that the woolen textiles were worth 12 shillings. To refute this the Central Economic Office of AKEL provided testimony and detailed information on prices from traders in Nicosia who sold woolen fabrics at the aforementioned low prices to the government. The price fixing led to cheap fabrics worth 5, 6, 7 shillings to be sold for 15 shillings to lower class citizens, while the upper class through connections was able to

⁷⁶ Euphrosyne Rizopoulou-Egoumenidou, 'Cypriot Costumes as Seen by Women Travellers During the First Decades of British Rule: Impressions and Reality' (2005) 44(1) *Folk Life*, 51.

⁷⁷ Central Economic Office of AKEL, 'Η διανομή κασμηριών' [The distribution of woolen textiles] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 16 October 1943, 2.

buy woolen fabric worth much more for just 15 shillings. AKEL called for the creation of a popular and democratic audit board for the distribution of supplies.⁷⁸

Conclusion

The British Colonial policy can be summarized as to controlling the production and the importation of textiles in Cyprus and the fair distribution of the material to each province. Nevertheless, the colonial government was distant and did not really care about the supply of textiles to the general population. Their main concern was to charge the Municipal governments with the price of textiles they provided them and to then collect the relevant amounts.

From the analysis of the correspondence and the government and municipal announcements available at the Municipal Archive of Limassol we are able to piece together the creation and organization of the supply chain for the rationing of textiles to the Cypriot society by the British Colonial Government and the Municipal Councils of each city. It is evident that the Municipalities did not take a passive role during the distribution, but they were in fact the ones responsible for the registration of their citizens in the catalogues,⁷⁹ for the distribution of the textiles themselves,⁸⁰ and for the coordination between various tailors' associations that wanted to participate in the scheme.⁸¹

Although the image painted from the official documents is one of apt coordination and good management, albeit with the usual disagreements between the associations, local and state government.⁸² The press of the time paints a completely different picture, that comes mainly from two different sides, the first are the various tailors associations that existed through the island and continuously complained to the local and state government for the lack of involvement of their associations in the distribution schemes,⁸³ while at the same time expressed publicly their dissatisfaction with the state government, that did not provide them with enough textiles and they were running out of resources that led to increased unemployment to tailors they also wished for a bigger stake in the distribution scheme with a cooperation between

⁷⁸ Central Economic Office of AKEL, 'Οι τιμές των διανεμηθέντων κασμηριών' [The prices of the distributed of woolen textiles] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 11 November 1943, 2.

⁷⁹ MAL 572/225/41/35A.

⁸⁰ MAL 572/225/41/28.

⁸¹ MAL 572/225/41/17.

⁸² MAL 572/225/41/6.

⁸³ MAL 572/225/41/17.

the tailors associations, the Municipalities and the Government for the distribution of textiles.⁸⁴

On the other hand, the locals and especially the villagers as well as the workers associations and AKEL, often took to the press to express their dissatisfaction with the injustices of the rationing system and of the ever-reaching hand of the black market. An especially troubling problem was that the government sold at a fixed price of 15 shillings, all types of woolen fabrics, even the lower quality ones that were worth 5, 6 or 7 shillings. This in turn led to the poorer members of society buying for more money low quality fabrics and at the same time the richer members who had connections were able to buy woolen fabrics that were worth 20 or 30 shillings with less money.⁸⁵ The black market was especially harsh on the common people since it led to an ever bigger increase of the price index, traffickers would sell products at much higher prices, making them available to the upper class but virtually unattainable to the people.

The British Government set up the Office of Complaints for the Black Market where people could fill in their grievances, this led to arrests, trials and the infliction of prison sentences and fines to the traffickers,⁸⁶ without the black market ever disappearing.


The file with number 225/41, titled 'Fabrics' (Υφάσματα) in archive of the Pat-ticheion Municipal Museum, Historical Archives, Research Center of Limassol helps us to understand the special importance fabric held as an essential item during the Second World War, due to this importance it was rationed together with other necessities such as foodstuff and fuel. This is further highlighted by the role it played in the policies enacted by the central and local governments, which is evident by both the internal correspondence that exists in the archive, the official reports such as the Blue Books as well as articles published in the press of the time.

⁸⁴ Anonymous, Σύσκεψις ραπτών και ραπτεργατών Κύπρου [Meeting of tailors and textile workers of Cyprus] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 21 April 1943, 2; Anonymous, 'Το ζήτημα της επενδύσεως' [The investment issue] *Εσπερινή* [*Evening*], 10 April 1943, 2.

⁸⁵ Central Economic Office of AKEL, 'Οι τιμές των διανεμηθέντων κασμηριών' [The prices of the distributed of woolen textiles] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 11 November 1943, 2.

⁸⁶ Ch. G. 'Το γραφείο παραπόνων προς καταπολέμησιν της μαύρης αγοράς' [Office of complaints for the combat of the black market] *Ανεξάρτητος* [*Independent*], 14 January 1943, 2.

Annex



Photograph. 1. Announcement by the Mayor Ploutis Servas on behalf of the Municipality of Limassol. A last call to anyone who has not yet registered on the catalogue of the city in order to receive textiles. The final registration date is the 6th of September of 1943. (Patticheion Municipal Museum, Historical Archives, Research Center of Limassol MAL, 572/225/41/35A).

COOPERATIVE CENTRAL BANK LTD.
LIMASSOL DISTRIBUTION CENTRE

DATE 17/4/43 12 B

STOCK CLERK No 400452

Please deliver to Municipality

No.	PARTICULARS
	<u>8 bags 3623 pins</u>
	<u>particulars</u>
	<u>delivered on 17/4/43</u>

Received the above Goods

[Signature] STOREKEEPER [Signature]

Photograph. 2. Receipt issued by the government that certifies that the Municipality of Limassol received a specified number of textiles (Patticheion Municipal Museum, Historical Archives, Research Center of Limassol MAL, 572/225/41/12B).

ΔΗΜΟΣ ΛΕΜΕΣΟΥ
ΔΙΑΝΟΜΗ ΥΦΑΣΜΑΤΩΝ
ΚΑΠΟΤ

№ 1052

Πηχεις:

.....

Αριθ. έγγραφης:

Ημερομ.

.....

ΔΗΜΟΣ ΛΕΜΕΣΟΥ
ΔΙΑΝΟΜΗ ΥΦΑΣΜΑΤΩΝ
ΠΑΝΤΑΛΟΝΙΚΙ

№ 1052

Πηχεις:

.....

Αριθ. έγγραφης:

Ημερομ.

.....

Photograph 3. Empty receipt that was going to be issued by the Municipality of Limassol to the people who were registered to receive capot and pantaloniki (Patticheion Municipal Museum, Historical Archives, Research Center of Limassol MAL, 572/225/41, not numbered).

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Rural Cyprus, 1920-1940: Two factories, Two stories to tell

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Abstract

During the first three decades of the 20th century, the British made a substantial effort to upgrade Cyprus agriculture for export purposes. In the above context, silk and flax were of great value to Cypriots and were blooming during the period under study, yet only in the form of home industry. The present paper investigates two agricultural factories operating during the same period of time but very different in every aspect. The Flax Factory in Zodia was the creation of the Department of Agriculture and the present paper gives an overview of the course of the establishment through time and actions from 1923 to 1945. The second factory, the Cyprus Silk Filature in Yeroskipou, Paphos, was a factory established by a British company with the full support of the Cyprus colonial government. Two important aspects of the filature are under study, the working conditions and the company's – cocoon merchant's dispute.

Keywords: flax, silk, factory, Yeroskipos Filature, Zodia mill, scutching machine

Introduction

During the descent of the British to Cyprus towards the end of the 19th century, they were confronted with the fact that Cyprus agriculture was in a primitive stage and that Cypriot producers were very poor, suspicious and extremely difficult to changes.

Furthermore, the economic status of the rural Cyprus at the dawn of the 20th century was wretched. Heavy taxation, poverty and the inability of producers to secure money through financial institutions, led them directly to usurers. Hence, the need to find an immediate solution for a sustainable rural Cyprus was indeed imperative. During the same period the prospect of an Agricultural Bank, on the island of Cyprus, did not seem as an option,² making the situation even more difficult.

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² For more information on the establishment and operation of the Agricultural Bank, Christos K. Kyriakides 'The establishment of the Agricultural Bank in Cyprus in 1906: A long term request that failed' («Η ίδρυση Αγροτικής Τράπεζας στην Κύπρο το 1906: ένα μακροχρόνιο αίτημα που απέτυχε»), Proceedings of the 4th International Conference "Κυπρολογικό", Nicosia 29 April- 2 May 2008, volume C1 (Nicosia 2012) (in Greek) and Kyriakos Iakovides 'The request for the establishment of the Agricultural

Agriculture and Agriculture –Based Factories at the Dawn of the 20th Century

During the first three decades of the 20th century, the British made a substantial effort to upgrade the Cyprus agriculture aiming at the improvement of production methods and processing of agricultural products for export purposes.

In the context of the above mentioned effort, the British provided the Cypriot producers with all the necessary means to improve their growing techniques, their cultivation methods, the varieties used and their harvesting methods in order to maximise the quality of the final product. Examples of such agricultural products were flax and silk. These two products were of great value to Cypriots and were blooming during the period under study, yet in the form of home industry. Due to the efforts of the British government these two products achieved the factory level within a decade reaching notable export numbers.

Towards the upgrade of the Cyprus agriculture and the local agriculture based factories, a crucial step forward consisted the development of the Agricultural Bank in 1925 (Agreement of the 17th of June 1925) under the auspices of the Government, with initial capital (£50.000).³

Two Factories, Two Different Approaches

The present paper investigates two factories operating during the same period of time yet very different in every aspect. The Flax Processing Factory in Zodia was basically a creation of the Department of Agriculture, a vision of William Bevan the Director of Agriculture. The present paper gives an overview of the course of the establishment through time and actions from 1923 to 1945. The second factory, the Cyprus Silk Filature in Yeroskipou, Paphos, was a factory established by a British company with the full support of the colonial government from 1926 to 1945. The present paper discusses the two main reasons of the filatures failure. The first was the working condition issue and the second was the dispute of the company with the local cocoon merchants, a situation, which at the end, lead to the closure of the establishment.

Bank, 1878-1900' («Το αίτημα ίδρυσης Αγροτικής τράπεζας, 1878-1900», The History of the Cyprus Cooperative Movement vol. A (Nicosia 2015) 145 (in Greek).

³ Brewster J. Surridge, 'A survey of rural life in Cyprus: based on reports of investigators who visited villages throughout the colony during 1927 and 1928 and amplified by statistical and other information from the records of the government' (Nicosia: Government Printing Office 1930) 42.

Flax Processing Factory – Zodia Scutching Mill

Zodia Scutching Mill –Phase One, Production of Linen Thread, 1923-1929

On April 30th 1923, the law for the Co-operative Societies (other than Co-operative credit societies) was published in the Cyprus Gazette.⁴ The present law provided, among other, for acquisition and use in common of machinery and other implements of production, for the purchase and sale of commodities, for the purchase of raw materials for agricultural and industrial purpose. This was a very important upshot for the colonial government in terms of the development of the agricultural industry since about a month after the enactment of the co-operative law in 1923, the first Cyprus Flax Society was formed and a factory in Zodia was erected. In addition to the above, a filature was built in Yeroskipou. In the first case, it was the first society that was formed right after the enactment of the law and that is the reason behind the name the FIRST Cyprus Flax Society.⁵ The First Cyprus Flax Society filed an application at the Registry of the Co-operative societies with initial capital of £2000. The application was signed by seventeen people of different status and occupation including Abbot Kleopas Kykkos, Augustus Classen (an officer of the Agricultural Department, who was just recruited from the Ottoman Bank), the two important teachers of Zodia who were also notable farmers, two Agricultural Officers from the Department of Agriculture and some other producers from villages around Morphou.

At the same time, the Director of Agriculture initiated a discussion between Department of Agriculture and important flax producers and reached an agreement in March 1923. The agreement concerned the guaranty regarding the importation of a scutching machine for the Zodia factory. It stated that in the event of the importation of the scutching machine by the government, the flax producers were obliged to repay it in two years in equal installments per semester. The Commissioner requested from the Secretary of State for the Colonies the sum of £900 under 19 (B) Department of Agriculture, Other Changes 'Agricultural Tools and Improvements' for the purchase of the scutching machine. The argument of the Commissioner was that the flax production in Cyprus was very good yet the Cypriots were lagging behind in terms of processing techniques since the methods used were quite primitive. Thus, the purchase of the scutching machine was crucial for the development of flax in the Morphou area

⁴ Cyprus Gazette, 30 March 1923 No. 1569.

⁵ Charalambos Charalambous 'The law for the Co-operative Societies, 1923' («περί Συνεργατικών Εταιρειών Νόμος του 1923») Giorgos Georgis (ed), The History of the Cyprus Cooperative Movement vol. B (Nicosia 2017) 116 (in Greek).

which was the most important fibre flax producing area in Cyprus. The agreement was signed by the Director Agriculture, William Bevan and fourteen fibre flax producers mainly from Zodia (and other Morphou area villages). It is worth mentioning that the producers from Zodia who signed the agreement were financially ruined during the years that followed.⁶ It is not fully confirmed but their involvement in the repayment of the loan for the scutching machine most likely had something to do with their financial catastrophe.

The Factory in Zodia

The flax processing factory was built in Kato Zodia. Kato Zodia was considered to be the center of fiber flax production in Cyprus thus it was the most suitable place for the erection of such an establishment. Zodia is an agricultural village situated in the western plain of Mesaoria. According to Nearchos Cleredes, it is about two villages, Pano and Kato Zodia. The residents of Zodia believe that their village was named after ghosts that in the Cypriot dialect are called Zodka.⁷ The factory was erected based on the Department of Agriculture specifications. The tender for the construction was awarded to Nikoforos and Achilleas Constantinou for the amount of £281.00.⁸

According to the relevant description in Stavros Tantas's Book '....The factory was brick built, simple construction with tiles on the roof just outside Kato Zodia on the north side of the road connecting Zodia – Katokopia , from east to west. A long wall divided the building in two long wings. On the west side of the building, the engine room was situated, along with the director's office. Next, the scutching machine room, leading to the back wing entrance....'⁹

According to Zodia residents, the factory was situated on the east side of the village¹⁰, close to the boys' school. The factory hours were 'from dawn to dusk'¹¹ with a half an hour break during lunch time. According to a testimonial of the Oral Tradition

⁶ Personal Interview Chistodoulos Kattirtzies, March 2019.

⁷ Nearchos Clerides, 'Villages and Cities of Cyprus' («Χωριά και Πολιτείες της Κύπρου») (Nicosia 2005) 94 (in Greek).

⁸ 'Cyprus Flax Society' (« Συνεργατική Εταιρεία Λινού») *Eleftheria* (Nicosia, 15 August 1923) 3 (in Greek).

⁹ Stavros Tantas, 'Zodia during the old times' («Η Ζώδια τα παλιά χρόνια») (Nicosia 1995) 53 (in Greek).

¹⁰ Cyprus Research Center (henceforth CRC)/Oral Tradition Archive (henceforth OTA), Registration No. 4427, Nicosia (K. Zodia 48). Testimony Ch. Elenides (13.3.1995).

¹¹ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 840, Nicosia, (K. Zodia 2). Testimony M. Koudouna (16-17.6.1991).

Archive,¹² the sound of the sirens of the factory, morning, midday and afternoon was a way the residents could assume the time! The staff of the factory was mainly young women (12-15 years old) from Zodia mostly but also other villages.¹³ During the first phase of the factory's operation, the factory was engaged in the production of linen thread from June to November. The rest of the year, the workers were engaged with other agricultural chores of their own.¹⁴

Based on testimonies of the Oral Traditional Archive, the division of labour within the factory was as follows. On the scutching machine there were approximately 30 young women. Twenty on first station of the machine where the flax was cut in pieces (in the Cypriot dialect it is called Melitzia), three on the second station, the brushes station, four on the pound station (in Cypriot, Koupani) and four on the loom station (rokkouda). Furthermore, some young women (usually the beginners) carried the flax to the machine. The first station was the most difficult due to the large amount of dust involved during the process. For this reason, the workers were paid more, 6 piastres a day as beginners and then 1 shilling (9 piastres) as experienced workers.¹⁵ According to the testimony of the only worker still alive (Mr. Christodoulou), further to the young women staff, who was the majority of the staff, there was a man superintendent and a factory manager. Mr. Christodoulou was about 10 years old at the time and was responsible for feeding the scutching steamed machine with debris of flax.

The Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture¹⁶ in 1923 stated that the Zodia scutching mill commenced working full time and the scutching machine has arrived. Furthermore, the report stated that Augustus Classen was a full time employee of the Department of Agriculture as the Flax instructor. A year later, in the 1924 Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture¹⁷ it was recorded that all necessary construction tasks, at the scutching mill were completed and most of the Cyprus fibre flax was being processed at the Zodia factory (also mentioned as Zodia scutching mill). In the same report, it is noted that the erection and operation of the Zodia scutching mill along with the two private mills that commenced operation right after the Zodia mill, increased the production of flax in Cyprus since in 1924, more area was cultivated for

¹² CRC/ATA, Registration No. 4427, Nicosia (K. Zodia 48). Testimony Ch. Elenides (13.3.1995).

¹³ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 840, Nicosia, (K. Zodia 2). Testimony M. Koudouna (16-17.6.1991).

¹⁴ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 2821, Nicosia (K. Zodia 13), Testimony E. Hatzizianni (26.2.92).

¹⁵ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 840, Nicosia, (K. Zodia 2). Testimony M. Koudouna (16-17.6.1991).

¹⁶ Annual Report for the Year 1923, (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1924) 6.

¹⁷ Annual Report for the Year 1924, (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1925) 6.

fibre flax. This mainly resulted due to the increasing demand for Cyprus linen in the European market (UK and Belgium).

It should be noted that the president of the First Cyprus Flax Society was Abbot of Kykko Kleopas and the Secretary was Augustus Classen who was also the flax instructor in the Department of Agriculture as previously mentioned.

Financial Difficulties of the Cyprus Flax Society

Despite the good omens of the beginning of the First Cyprus Flax Society, the company could not meet its obligation to repay the government the installments as agreed in 1923 for the purchase of the scutching machine. In January 1925, Abbot of Kykko Kleopas (being the president of the Society) sent a letter to the Director of Agriculture in an attempt to prevent the government from taking legal action against the Society for the scutching machine debt.¹⁸ During 1925 and 1926 the factory was forced to close¹⁹, since despite all the actions taken by Abbot of Kykko and Augustus Classen, the referral of the debt to the court could not be prevented. Thus, on the 18th of August 1926 the court decided that the society should pay the amount of £480, Decision no. 455, 1926.

Strangely enough, in the 1925 Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture, there was not even a hint about the financial problems that the Society was facing²⁰. On the contrary, the only reference made on the Zodia factory was the fact that despite the poor quality of the product harvested due to adverse weather conditions, the factory was able to process the product which would otherwise be useless. During the same year, during the Commissioner's opening statement at the Annual Legislative Council Meeting²¹ he expressed his satisfaction for the progress made in the flax processing sector. He mentioned the fact that the First Cyprus Flax Society was using the scutching machine and that other private initiatives followed the Zodia factory's example. The Commissioner concluded that the above mentioned actions along with the importation and introduction to the producers of new fibre flax varieties aided tremendously the increase of the produced processed flax.

¹⁸ Cyprus State Archives (henceforth CSA) :SA1: 1254/1922/1, Letter of the First Cyprus Flax Society to the Director of Agriculture Cyprus, 20 January 1925.

¹⁹ CSA: SA1:1113/1921, Letter of the Director of Agriculture to the Secretary of State, Cyprus, 6 July 1926.

²⁰ Annual Report for the Year 1925, (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1926) 7. Also states that processed product from the Zodia Factory was exported to the UK for £85/ ton c.i.f. at the company Malcolm of Belfast.

²¹ Cyprus Gazette, 13 November 1925, No. 673, 1731.

The course of the factory after the court's decision was very clearly seen through the correspondence between Augustus Classen, the secretary of the Society and the Director of Agriculture. Classen's suggestions for the future of the factory consisted of two choices.²² Either the government should ceded the management of the factory to Abbot of Kykkos who has greatly invested in the factory, with an additional subsidy of £500, or alternatively, the government should fully undertake the management of the factory. The Director of Agriculture²³ strongly disagreed with Classen's suggestion for the government to fully undertake the management of the factory stating that due to the financial chaos that the society was into, the above mentioned suggestion was not in the best interest of the government. His suggestion was the privatization of the factory, citing as an example the fact that two private flax processing factories were operating smoothly (Baldassare's in Limassol and Matsoukis in Paphos). The Secretary of State's instructions²⁴ were to immediately sell the factory in order to collect the debt, based on the Court decision. The confiscation order was an issue vividly discussed in the press at the time²⁵ stating that the government issued an interim decree for the scutching machine of the Zodia factory.

The financial chaos and the insecurity that prevailed in the First Cyprus Flax Society were clearly stated in the correspondence of Abbot of Kykko and the colonial government. Abbot of Kykkos²⁶ informed the government that he has already sent all the applications for shareholder applications which he could collect, and that many flax producers were very cautious in applying due to the pressure exercised by lawyers. Through the letter of the Abbot of Kykko, the mentality of the Cypriot flax producers as well as insecurity feelings were vividly exposed. According the Abbot of Kykko all irregularities '...were a caprice of a group of shareholder peasants who want to be erased from the society either due to ignorance or due to false accusations that were spread.' Furthermore the Abbot of Kykko, blamed (indirectly) the Department of Agriculture for not properly implementing the member registration of the Society. In addition to the Abbot of Kykko, the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, also described the chaotic situation that occurred in the society²⁷ He reported that from

²² CSA: SA1: 1254/1922/1, Letter of Classen to Director t of Agriculture , Cyprus 7 September 1926.

²³ ²² Ibid. Letter of the Director of Agriculture to the Secretary of State, Cyprus, 22 September 1926.

²⁴ Ibid. Letter of Secretary of State to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus, 23 September 1926.

²⁵ 'Confiscation Order against the Flax Company' («Διάταγμα κατασχέσεως κατά της εταιρείας Λι-νού») *Neos Kypriakos Phylax* (Limassol, 18 August 1926) 4 (in Greek).

²⁶ CSA: SA1: 1254/1922/1, Letter of Abbot of Kykko to Stivadoros (lawyer), Cyprus, 10 August 1926.

²⁷ Moisis Zarifis according *Viografikon Lexikon Kypriou 1800-1920 Vol. A*, p.190 by Aristides Kou-

the £1748 registered shares, the £727 were pending, stating that most of the amount pending was coming from people who were in a position to pay their debts. He further informed that legal action was taken against 93 person for arrears of £153, but they were able to collect the debt from only sixteen person, totaling £28. Yet, even in those cases, the credit was not recorded in the society's accounts. Moreover, the registrar stated that the society's lawyer, also gave the president, Abbot of Kykko on 15/2/1925 the amount of £30 from debt collection, and again this amount was not credited to the account of the society. Closing this revealing correspondence, the Registrar urged the government to retreat the scutching machine and initiate an investigation for the unpleasant situation that occurred.

The above mentioned correspondence, revealed a very ugly yet realistic side of rural Cyprus. The producers were extremely poor yet very skeptic and tried to survive in any way. On the other hand, usurers and lawyers took advantage of the illiterate and poor producers.

The Director of Agriculture²⁸ stated that due to the lack of money the factory was unable to operate in 1926. The Governor²⁹ stated that the Zodia factory which operated under the Cooperative society regime, could not operate in 1926 due to financial difficulties and that in the near future the factory will resume operation under new management. According to the present report, most likely under new management the factory would be able to show its potential since flax has proven to be an economically viable product for Cyprus.

In October 1926, Abbot of Kykko Kleopas, presented another proposal to the government. He asked to buy the factory for the price of £480, fully repaid in three years plus interest. Augustus Classen was also in favour of the above mentioned proposal and also stressed that it was urgent to find a solution for the factory due to the large volume of flax (previous year's stock) that was in danger to be destroyed by the rain. Finally, the colonial government approved the temporary operation of the factory to the First Cyprus Flax Society under Classen's responsibility³⁰. It should be noted that a week before the approval of the Treasurer, the machinery was returned to the First Cyprus Flax Society under a temporary lending regime.

dounaris, was the first Registrar of the Cooperative Societies, CSA: SA1: 1254/1922/1, Letter of the Registrar of the Cooperative Societies to the Treasurer, Cyprus, 21 September 1926.

²⁸ Annual Report of the Year 1926 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1927) 6.

²⁹ Colonial Reports, No. 1366, Annual Report for 1926 (London 1928) 43.

³⁰ CSA: SA1: 1254/1922/1, Letter of Treasurer to Augustus Classen, Cyprus, 19 November 1926.

In 1927, the factory was sold to Kykko Monastery for the amount of £177 including buildings, machinery and land!³¹ Despite of the sale, the Department of Agriculture continued occasionally to sublet the factory in order to aid and encourage the flax producers. Furthermore, the involvement of the government in the factory's business is also revealed through Classen's letter to the Director of Agriculture³² in which he made a suggestion to expand the factory's business with the addition of a spinning and weaving establishment. This, according to Classen could be done with very little expense and could be profitable.

Zodia Scutching Mill –Phase Two, Production of Linen Thread Factory, Spinning and Weaving Establishment and School, 1929 -1934

An important milestone in the factory's history was the cancellation of the registration of the First Cyprus Flax Society in 1929.³³ The Director of Agriculture expressed his frustration over the fact that the flax producers refused to deliver their product to the factory. He noted that the issue with the producers/members of the First Cyprus Flax Society had many adverse effects on the colonial government. He further stated that a thorough and transparent investigation was needed in order to fully expose the reasons of the flax society's failure.

Despite the cancelation of the society from the register of Cooperative Societies, the government continued to promote the interests of the Zodia factory. This fact could be justified by the correspondence between the Director of Agriculture and the Imperial Institute³⁴ regarding a textile sample, promoting Cyprus linen in The United Kingdom. Moreover, a post in the press³⁵ confirmed the intention of the Department of Agriculture to lease 'the mill' once more for 1 piastres per oke for the flax producers and 1.5 piastres per oke for merchants. In the same post, it was noted that the intention of the government was to further expand the 'mill' to an educational center for weaving as well as thread production. Furthermore, the fields around the 'mill' would be used for experimental purposes.

³¹ Ibid. Letter of Director of Land Registry to the Secretary of State, Cyprus, 28 July 1927.

³² CSA:SA1671/1928, Letter of Augustus Classen to Director of Agriculture, Cyprus, 28 April 1928.

³³ CSA:SA1:890/1923, Letter of the Director Agriculture to the Cooperative Society Registrar, Cyprus, 17 August 1929.

³⁴ CSA:SA1:1113/1921, Letter of Director of Agriculture to the Imperial Institute, Cyprus, 5 December 1929.

³⁵ 'From the Cyprus Gazette' («Από την Επίσημη Εφημερίδα») *Paratiritis* (Limassol, 22 June 1929) 2 (in Greek).

The parallel operation of the Zodia factory as a school was confirmed by the correspondence of the Director of Agriculture with the Principal of the School of Blind (Lady Storrs) whom he invited to the factory,³⁶ in order to observe first-hand the educational programme. In the above mentioned letter, the use of looms and spinning wheels for educational purposes was noted along with the fact that young women from Zodia villages as well as other villages of the Morphou area attend the school in an attempt to upgrade this home industry of great importance to the Morphou area.

The looms as well as the spinning wheels expanded the factory from production of linen thread alone to a spinning and weaving establishment that produced not only linen threads but also linen goods. In the Oral Tradition Archive³⁷ there is a very vivid description of the spinning wheels and looms and the purpose of the upgrade which enabled the factory to enter a new industry³⁸. In the same testimony, it is mentioned that all the linen for the newly operated grand hotel in Prodromos village, Verengaria, were made by the Zodia factory.

According to the Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture³⁹ during 1929, the factory was leased by the colonial government and the Department of Agriculture bought 51000 okes of flax which after processing in the Zodia factory was sent to the Great Britain for sale. Furthermore, the report noted the successful securing of a grant from the Empire Marketing Board exclusively for the development of flax in Cyprus. During the same year, the Governor's Annual Report⁴⁰ stated that the quantity of processed flax in Cyprus doubled in 1929, yet due to the collapse of the prices in the international market, it was not possible to export any processed product and thus the product was stored both in Zodia factory and in Yeroskopou (the private flax processing factory).

The colonial government, mostly through the Department of Agriculture, continued the effort to keep the Zodia factory alive. This was well justified through the official correspondence⁴¹ that noted the unsuccessful attempt of the Department of

³⁶ CSA:SA1:1648/1930, Letter of the Director of Agriculture to the Principal of the School of the Blind, Cyprus, 18 December 1930.

³⁷ CSC/OTA, Registration No. 2821, Nicosia (K. Zodia 13). Testimony E. Hatzigianni (26.2.92).

³⁸ Vasos G. Appios, 'Memories from occupied Zodia' («Αναμνήσεις από την κατεχόμενη Ζώδια») (Nicosia, 1999) 45 (in Greek).

³⁹ Annual Report of the Year 1929 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1930) 10.

⁴⁰ Colonial Reports, No. 1514, Annual Report for 1929 (London, 1930) 8.

⁴¹ CSA: SA1:1398/1928/1, Letter of the Director of Agriculture to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 16 July 1929.

Agriculture to sell the produced product to P.Joannou and Co. It also revealed that because of the circumstances, the Department of Agriculture⁴² was granted permission to buy the factory's production for the sum of £3,600, about 600 tons of material. This gesture demonstrated the Department of Agriculture efforts to keep flax production and processing at equilibrium levels.

The current status continued during the next year, In the Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture for 1930⁴³ it stated that the Zodia Mill operated in 1930, under the management of the Department of Agriculture (under a leasing regime from the Kykko Monastery), 22,000 okes of flax were received and 4 tons of processed product were prepared for export.

In March 1931, Abbot of Kykko, Kleopas⁴⁴ announced to the Director of Agriculture his intention to sell the land, machinery and production to the colonial government for the sum of £528 which was immediately implemented.⁴⁵ The efforts of the Director of Agriculture to ensure the renewal of the grant from the Empire Marketing Board for another three year period along with the payment of some pending expenses continued during the next two years (1931 and 1932). Yet, the Empire Marketing Board was strongly against the renewal of the grant for flax production in Cyprus.⁴⁶ The situation deteriorated even further due to the severe drought in 1931 that affected greatly the flax production. The Director of Agriculture⁴⁷ was confronted, on one side with the bad financial situation of the Zodia factory and on the other side, with the severe problems that occurred due to the drought. He suggested the leasing the Zodia Mill for £5 per month, a suggestion which was immediately implemented.⁴⁸ Despite the drought problem, and the inferior quality of the flax produced, the Zodia factory continued processing and was able to export all the product. According to the Governor's Annual Report 1931, the processing of flax in both factories (Zodia and Yeroskipou) continued and the product was sold in the Great Britain market along with the previous year's stock.⁴⁹ The value of the Zodia Factory during the drought

⁴² Ibid., Letter of the Secretary of State to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 25 July 1929.

⁴³ Annual Report of the Year 1930 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1931) 10.

⁴⁴ CSA: SA1:1254/1922/1 Letter of Abbot of Kykko to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 29 March 1929.

⁴⁵ Ibid., Letter of the Secretary of State to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 30 July 1931.

⁴⁶ CSA: SA1:1254/1922/1, Letter from the Empire Marketing Board to the Minister of Colonies, London 10 September 1931.

⁴⁷ Ibid., Letter of the Director of Agriculture to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 28 June 1932.

⁴⁸ Ibid., Letter of the Secretary of State to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 30 June 1932.

⁴⁹ Colonial Reports, No. 1574, Annual Report for 1931, (London, 1932) 9.

regarding the rural Morphou area was well stressed in an Oral Tradition Archive testimony. According to this testimony, a young woman working at the factory and her family were able to survive during the drought due to her salary at the Zodia factory⁵⁰. In other words, the Zodia factory contributed the most during a very hard period of rural Cyprus despite its internal problems.

Privatization of the Factory

Towards to end of 1932, the colonial government of Cyprus decided to change the operating regime of the Zodia factory. The Director of Agriculture⁵¹ suggested that the factory should be granted to Augustus Classen on terms of a private enterprise with the precondition to continue the effort to keep the Zodia factory and the educational center running. The Department of Agriculture's proposal included the following terms: Augustus Classen would take over the management of the factory with an annual allowance of £100.

The 1932⁵² Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture noted the limited operation of the Zodia factory yet the full operation of the educational center. Furthermore, despite the problems of the factory, the spinning and weaving establishment continued its business. This was made obvious by the correspondence of the manager of the Verengaria hotel with Augustus Classen, who complained about the quality of the products (linen).⁵³ The range of products mentioned in the letter enabled for a full view of what the Zodia factory was producing and included rags, curtains, table cloths, napkins and towel.

In January 1933, the agreement between Augustus Classen and the Department of Agriculture was finally signed.⁵⁴ With the current agreement the effort of the Department of Agriculture to support Zodia factory was once again evident. The two year agreement (with the prospect of renewal for two more) set the following obligations for Classen. He had to undertake the scutching mill and the spinning and weaving establishment, at his own expense and on his own account to the satisfaction of the Governor and to employ no less than 15 young women per day. He had to

⁵⁰ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 2821, Nicosia, (K. Zodia 13). Testimony E. Hatziyianni (26.2.1993).

⁵¹ CSA: SA1:1254/1922/1, Director of Agriculture to Secretary of State, Cyprus, 30 December 1932.

⁵² Annual Report of the Year 1932 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1933) 8.

⁵³ CSA: SA1:1648/1930, Letter of Yiannis Kokkalos to the Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 21 December 1932.

⁵⁴ CSA: SA1:1254/1922/1, Agreement between the Director of Agriculture with Augustus Classen, Cyprus 25 January 1933.

scutch all flax brought to the mill by flax producers at a rate that had to be approved from time to time by the Director of Agriculture, to tender to the best of his known and ability to the Department of Agriculture advice on any matter touching upon flax or flax industry. On the other hand, the government should pay Classen the sum of £100 per annum as a subsidy and retaining fee for the services of the flax adviser and to provide him with all the machinery, accessories and furniture. All except from the scutching mill.

In the 1934 Annual Report of the Director of Agriculture⁵⁵ there was no reference regarding the Zodia factory. Yet an increase in production as well in the domestic demand was indeed reported. Although the Zodia factory was not mentioned in the report, there was a general comment regarding the high quality of processing in the Cyprus flax processing factories.

Zodia Scutching Mill –Phase Three, Production of Linen Thread Factory in Zodia and the Relocation of the Spinning and Weaving Establishment in Nicosia, 1935-1945

In 1935, Augustus Classen decided to relocate the spinning and weaving establishment to Nicosia and at the same time the linen thread factory (otherwise scutching mill or Zodia factory) carried on its business in Zodia. Testimonies (OTA and personal interviews) revealed that Classen continued to manage both premises. Some of the workers, including the factory's superintendent continued to serve both premises.⁵⁶ According to as revealed in his correspondence with the Treasurer,⁵⁷ in an attempt to ensure a loan, the reason behind the relocation was the distance from Zodia to Nicosia. It was necessary for the spinning and weaving establishment to be closer to the center in order to better manage the orders of the colonial government. In addition to the above, Classen noted that despite the fact that labor was much cheaper in the area of Zodia yet it was hard to find due to the mentality of the peasants. Another conjecture on the relocation of the spinning and weaving establishment was the decreasing fibre flax production in the area.⁵⁸ An argument that also coincides with Classen's stated reasoning was the fact that rural women got married at a very young age thus had to quit their jobs to stay home.⁵⁹

⁵⁵ Annual Report of the Year 1934 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1935) 10.

⁵⁶ CRS/OTA, Registration No. 4427, Nicosia, (K.Zodia 48). Testimony C.Elenides (13.3.1995).

⁵⁷ CSA:SA1:1254/1922/1, Letter of Augustus Classen to Treasurer, Cyprus 3 April 1936.

⁵⁸ CRS/OTA, Registration No. 4427, Nicosia,, (K.Zodia 48). Testimony C.Elenides (13.3.1995).

⁵⁹ CRS/OTA, Registration No 2821, Nicosia, (K. Zodia.13). Testimony E. Hatziyianni (26.2.1993).

Classen tried very hard to keep the Zodia factory running. In spring 1937, taking advantage of a post in the Sunday Times (28th March 1937) titled 'More British flax need', in a letter to the Director of Agriculture gave a brief overview of flax production and processing, especially in the Morphou area.⁶⁰ In Classen's overview, from the first step of the Zodia factory in 1923 to 1937, he stated that although the flax production in 1937 was in good quantity and quality, it could not be sold due to cash flow problems. Classen suggested that the colonial government should guarantee the sale of the product to the banks or alternatively, the Department of Agriculture should buy the production, which was done in the past. Classen also stressed that the production was already available along with the generation of people that have the expertise and the experience of producing and processing flax that could make the revival of flax production and processing possible.

The Zodia factory continued its business for the production of linen thread under the supervision of Augustus Classen. In addition to the above, the Kykko Monastery was also still involved. This could be justified by a post in a newspaper⁶¹ referring to a visit of an important Egyptian linen merchant who visited the Zodia factory along with Abbot of Kykko in order to examine the prospects of a cooperation with the factory. Classen's⁶² attempts to secure a loan from the colonial government as a guarantee for the spinning and weaving establishment and the Zodia factory, were once again unsuccessful.

Yet, Classen was not ready to give up on the Zodia factory. In the official correspondence of Classen with the Director of Agriculture⁶³ he initially warned the colonial government that due to the global crisis, the inception of the WWII, the lack of linen in the international market could be a great opportunity for the Cyprus fibre flax. Furthermore, Classen insisted once more on the revival of the production and processing of fibre flax. He considered the revival and reconstruction of the factory of great importance to the Cyprus agriculture. He reminded the Director of Agriculture, which the development of the factory in 1923 was done based on the great potential that the area of Morphou exhibited in fibre flax production and processing. In Classen's second letter it was obvious that he was no longer the owner of the factory and

⁶⁰ CSA:SA1:914/1937, Letter of Augustus Classen to Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 29 April 1937.

⁶¹ 'Specialist in Linen' (« Ειδικός εις το Λινάρι»), Proini, (Nicosia, 14 July 1936) 2 (in Greek).

⁶² CSA:SA1:914/1937, Letter of Treasurer to the Secretary of State, and Letter of Secretary of State to Treasury Cyprus 17 May 1937.

⁶³ CSA: SA1:1254/1922/2, Letters of Classen to Director of Agriculture, 21 September and 14 October 1939.

that it has been returned to the Kykko Monastery. The Director of Agriculture⁶⁴ then reported that from November 1939 on, the colonial government rented the Zodia factory from the Kykko Monastery for £10/annum for two years and in the future, in the case that the work load increased the rent would also be increased to £50/annum for another two years. During the same year, the Department of Agriculture issued a newsletter⁶⁵ for fibre flax producers with instructions on good quality fibre flax and also noted the government's intention to reopen the Zodia Factory during the following season.

Despite all the above mentioned efforts from the colonial government and Clasen, the factory gradually lost its initial glamour and in 1945 the doors closed permanently. During the same period⁶⁶, the scutching machine was transferred to the School for Deaf in Nicosia. Some of the younger workers continued to work in the spinning and weaving establishment in Nicosia and the rest continued weaving at home.

The doors of the Zodia factory remained closed until 1953,⁶⁷ when a Zodia resident bought the land at an auction and built three houses in the area that used to be the Zodia factory premises.

Discussion and Conclusions for the Case of the Zodia Factory

Based on the above findings it was obvious that fibre flax production and processing was very important during the colonial period. Yet it is also profound that the Zodia factory was never stable nor profitable during the period that operated from 1924 to 1945. The production of fibre flax decreased after the WWII when the production for linseed increased (like it used to be before 1910) and consequently the factory gradually lost its power. As stated by D. Christodoulou,⁶⁸ despite the fact Cyprus flax was suitable for fibre, after 1946 it was only used as linseed. The instability of the factory as well as the ongoing changes within it, could mainly be because of the fact that within the two decades of the Zodia factory operation, it was globally a very difficult period with political instability and large fluctuation of market prices.

⁶⁴ Ibid., Director of Agriculture report, Cyprus 23 February 1940.

⁶⁵ Ibid., Newsletter on flax production, Department of Agriculture, Cyprus 11 October 1940.

⁶⁶ CRC/OTA, Registration No. 2821, Nicosia, (K. Zodia 13). Testimony E. Hatzizianni (26.2.1993).

⁶⁷ Personal Interview Chistodoulos Kattirtzies, March 2019.

⁶⁸ Demetris Christodoulou, 'The evolution of the Rural Land Use Pattern in Cyprus' (London 1959)143.

Last but not least, the financial hardship of the producers along with the inability to trust was a large negative factor for the prosperity of the sector. Both W. Bevan in 1919 and D. Christodoulou later on, characterise the Cyprus producer as very poor and very distrustful and difficult in change. The above finding was once more justified by Augustus Classen in 1937: ... *lack of commercial enterprise and the peculiar character of the Cypriot, which precludes co-operation, deprive Great Britain of a source of supply, as well as Cyprus of a source of revenue which deserves developing more than any other branch of agriculture....*⁶⁹

The Cyprus Silk Filature in Yeroskipou

The Preparation

During the first two decades of the 20th century the government took an initiative to investigate the perspective of the silk industry in Cyprus. As in the case of flax, the silk industry was a domestic industry that thrived in rural Cyprus. The investigation included sample shipments in the Imperial Institute as well as consultations with different British companies in the field of silk. The government was in the search for an investor/company to develop a silk filature in Cyprus. In December 1922, Norton Breton, the director of Henckell du Buisson and Co forwarded to the Advisory Committee on Silk Production of the Imperial Institute in London⁷⁰, a memorandum with the possible terms of agreement of his company with the colonial government of Cyprus. The present terms were the aftereffect of a thorough investigation conducted by the company. In the text, it was pointed out that only one filature should be erected in Cyprus. The continues supply of cocoons should be ensured in order to cover the filature's and consequently the company's expenses. The company further suggested the introduction of export duties as a safety measure. Due to the inexperience of the staff during the first year of operation and the potential losses , the producers should settle for lower prices. Lastly, the community authorities should be responsible of the securing of the land of the potential filature.

At this point, it is worth mentioning the in August 1925⁷¹, the company Societe Francaise de Sericulture de Marseille through the French ambassador in Cyprus, ex-

⁶⁹ CSA: SA1:914/1937, Letter of Classen to Director of Agriculture, Cyprus 29 April 1937.

⁷⁰ CSA: SA1:1181/1922, Letter of Henckell du Buisson and Co to Imperial Institute, Advisory Committee on Silk Production, Cyprus Silk Filature, London 5 December 1922.

⁷¹ CSA : SA1: 724/1922, Report on Sericulture , September 1925.

pressed their interest to erect a filature in Cyprus yet the colonial government refused since it was obvious that the search was focused on British companies.

The Cyprus Silk Filature

Based on the above data collected and actions taken by the colonial government, the Department of Agriculture proceeded, in 1925, with the erection of the Yeroskipos Filature in Paphos, which, according to the Director of Agriculture, was expected to give a huge boost to the sericulture sector of the island.⁷² The Cyprus Silk Filature commenced its business on the 25 March 1926 with great potential. It could absorb all the cocoon production of the island along with the same amount of imported cocoons.⁷³ The opening ceremony took place on the 24 of May 1926 in the presence of the Governor and the Bishop of Paphos. According to the description given in the book of Christos and Ekaterini Aristidou,⁷⁴ 'the filature was stone built. The largest hall was the silk extraction room with two lines of basins (totaling 80) and the production machines'. The description also included drying halls and quality control area. In 1926, Norton Breton, who had the full responsibility (as the president and the manager) of the establishment noted that the filature had 80 looms and employed 180 workers. He further revealed that the filature absorbed 150,000 kilos of cocoons annually from which resulted 120-130 of 100 kilo parcels of silk thread.

Working Conditions in the Filature

In December 1926, Governor Ronald Storrs, visited the filature during a tour in rural Paphos⁷⁵. He observed irregularities in the working conditions in the filature and asked for explanations. He personally asked the Secretary of State⁷⁶ to relieve Dr. Millard (the medical officer of health) from all his duties and ask him to immediately investigate the establishment. He further justified his instructions based on some observation he made during his visit. He observed that some workers had to work standing for long hours and that the atmosphere was oppressive even though the windows were open.

⁷² Annual Report of the Year 1925 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1926) 7.

⁷³ J. De Leon, 'Sericulture in Cyprus' (Tel-Aviv, 1933) 8.

⁷⁴ Christos and Ekaterini Aristidou, 'Yeroskipou, The city of sacred garden' (« Η πόλη των ιερών κήπων») (Nicosia, 2010) 114 (in Greek).

⁷⁵ 'Erga ke imere tou neou kivernitou', («Έργα και ημέραι του νέου κυβερνήτου») *Neos Kypriakos Fylax*, (Limassol, 15 December 1926) 3 (in Greek).

⁷⁶ CSA: SA1:1614/1926, Letter of the Governor to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 14 December 1926.

Dr. Milland's report,⁷⁷ recorded many irregularities regarding the filature staff. He confirmed that the atmosphere where the silk was spumed was oppressive. He also confirmed that the workers had to stand at their work for nine hours a day. Moreover, the young girls that worked at the factory had to alternately dip their fingers into very hot water and then into cold water in doing a few simple mechanical actions. What seemed to bother Dr. Milland the most was the fact that most of the workers were young girls between the ages 12 and 15 and were treated very badly. During his interviews he even came across girls under twelve years of age (which was illegal). He was also troubled with the fact that many twelve year old girls had to travel two or sometimes three hours on foot to go to the filature. This alone was very stressful yet the fact that these young women had no place to rest during their lunch break made things even worse. He also reported extremely low wages. Millard's worries were the way that the young women, basically girls, were treated as he stated '...In considering the conditions of work at the filature, I am of the opinion that the conditions under which child servants are employed should also be enquired into. These children are occasionally burnt to death and their happiness or misery depends very largely upon the characters of those who employ them'. The company's respond on Dr. Millard's report directly to the Governor,⁷⁸ revealed the inhuman philosophy of the company and its representative, Norton Breton. To begin with, Breton noted that the oppressive atmosphere was normal since there were 120 basins full of hot water yet there was ample ventilation. For the alternation of hot and cold water, Breton explained that that was the procedure used and the cold water was for soothing the hands of the workers. He stated that this procedure was done for the convenience and comfort of the workers. He further stated that at the close of the day's work a bowl of very diluted sulphuric acid was provided for the workers to dip their hands in order to protect their hands from injury. Breton was very derisive in the letter when he tried to defend the company for the fact that women under the age of twelve were working in the filature stating that this was entirely outside the company's control. The same argument was used for the fact that women traveled a great distance to go to work and basically noted that it was their choice and not the company's. He did mention that an area for the workers to rest during lunch was under construction. The last part of the letter concerning the criticism regarding the wage paid, revealed the way

⁷⁷ Ibid., Letter of the Medical Officer of Health to the Chief Medical Officer, Cyprus 17 January 1927.

⁷⁸ CSA: SA1:1614/1926, Letter of the Director of the Filature to the Governor, Cyprus 10 February 1927.

the company thought and treated the work force in the filature. ‘...To English ears the amounts may sound extremely small without considering local conditions. A wage of 11/2d per day to an Aboriginal male in the Northern Territory of Australia, mentioned in Lord Apsely’s book, sound akin to slavery, but the conditions under which he lives leave him quite content with this wage..’

Norton Breton expressed his disdain regarding the ‘natives’ in many occasions. A very strong statement was made when pressure was put in the company to improve the infrastructure in order make working conditions better. ‘... As soon as the Company finds its feed i.e. begins to make a little money instead of losing it, we can do more, but my experience with the oriental has taught me to go slowly with him, if you give him benefit after benefit which he has never had before in very short time his attitude will be... “Thank you for nothing”’.

Despite the assurances given to the colonial government by Breton, the working conditions at the filature did not improve at all. During a visit of the Secretary of State in person, in September 1930, he observed that the workers were still working standing up for nine hours, and the wage was still extremely low. The Secretary of State⁷⁹ demanded a report on the working conditions in the filature and more details on the Bonus System mentioned by Breton during his visit. Once more, Breton’s reply was very disparagingly about the working force of the filature. ⁸⁰. To begin with, he noted that for similar work, workers in the US received 5 piastres, in England 3 piastres, in Italy and France 2 piastres, thus the wage of 1 piastres in Cyprus was more than satisfying !! He further informed the Secretary of State that due to the silk crisis the filature intended to further decrease the wages. For the Retirement Bonus Fund, he explained that it was a fund given to the workers at the end of the financial year and the company credited the workers with 10% of their total wages as a bonus fund. Yet, due to the financial problems that the company faced during the current period, the fund was used to pay the wages of the workers during time the filature remained closed due to the lack of cocoons. As for the extra hall , the resting area for the workers along with the stools for the comfort of the workers that had to work standing up for nine hours, Breton just stated that there was no budget to spare for this reason at the moment.

⁷⁹ CSA: SA1:887/1927, Letter of the Secretary of State to Norton Breton (Heckell du Buisson, The Cyprus Filature), Cyprus 27 September 1930.

⁸⁰ Ibid., Letter of Norton Breton to Secretary of State, Cyprus 9 October, 1930.

The Dispute of the Cocoon Merchant with the Filature's Administration

Further to the working conditions situation that occurred, the administration of the filature had another serious obstacle to overcome for the development of the establishment. It was the dispute between the local cocoon merchants and the filature that put a lot of pressure on the company.

From the very beginning, the local cocoon merchants strongly reacted to the low prices that the filature was buying cocoons. During spring 1927, Norton Breton, confidentially informed the Secretary of State⁸¹ that the local merchants bought cocoons from the producers and exported them in France and Italy where, at the same time, the filature did not have enough raw material to continue working. Breton further asked the colonial government to grant the filature an exemption permit in order to import cocoons. In addition to the above, Breton asked the government to impose export duties in order to prevent the exportation of cocoons by the merchants. In June 1928, Norton Breton informed the Secretary of State⁸² that the filature was able to survive and did not have to suspend the operations despite the persistence of the local merchants to keep the prices steady ½ piastres higher than the price of the filature. A few months later, a post in the *Eleftheria* newspaper⁸³ reported that the colonial government did not support the development of local industries, on the contrary, the government aided the development of British companies. The example given was the filature, explaining that since the beginning, the government prohibited by law the establishment of another filature and furthermore once the administration of the filature had problems with the local merchants that the government granted an exemption permit to the filature in order to import cocoons from Syria, to protect it.

Norton Breton then directly contacted Governor Storrs⁸⁴ and informed him about the many difficulties that the filature faced because of the reduced quantities of cocoons available in the filature. He further informed the Governor that the local merchants (and especially the ones in the Paphos District) were about to export cocoons in Greece and asked for an exemption permit in order to import cocoons like in 1927.

⁸¹ CSA: SA1:887/1927, Letter of Norton Breton (Heckell du Buisson, The Cyprus Filature) to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 24 May 1927.

⁸² *Ibid.*, Letter of Norton Breton (Heckell du Buisson, The Cyprus Filature) to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 7 June 1928.

⁸³ 'From other towns, From Larnaca' («Από τις άλλες πόλεις, Λάρνακα») *Eleftheria* (Limassol 14 November 1928) 3 (in Greek).

⁸⁴ CSA: SA1: 887/1927, Letter of Norton Breton to Storrs, Cyprus 1 August 1929.

Once more, the permit was granted. Yet, despite the government's assistance, in 1930 the filature was forced to temporarily close⁸⁵ since most of the cocoons in the market were exported to France. The filature, according to Breton, was not in a position to continue imports of cocoons because of the very high cost.

The dispute between the administration of the filature and the merchants carried on. During the following year the company tried repeatedly to consult with the merchant representatives all around Cyprus. In May 1931, the colonial government tried to help save the company once more: Wrongfully, tried to impose export duties for the cocoons yet the bill was not voted by the Greek Cypriot members of the Legislative Council in the absence of the ottoman members⁸⁶. The persistence of the colonial government was even more obvious in 1932, when the Secretary of State⁸⁷ informed Norton Breton about the government's intention to pass the export duty law for the cocoons seeking assurances than in that case the filature would reopen. In April 1932 the export duties for the cocoon law was passed for the impose of 1 shelling and 3 piastres export duty subject to change by the Governor at any time through the Cyprus Gazette⁸⁸. This provision in the above mentioned regulation demonstrated that the colonial government was fully aware of that the law was neither correct nor fair.

The annual report of the Director of Agriculture 1933⁸⁹ stated that the filature was able to continue operation for nine months having adequate amount of cocoons. During 1934 though, the situation got worse and Governor Palmer informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies⁹⁰ that he had already discussed the options of the fate of the filature with the President (Norton Breton) and the possibility of the final closure of the establishment. Norton Breton suggested the subsidy of the difference between the prices of the cocoons from the merchants to the ones the filature normally bought for a year or alternatively grants an o exception of export duties to the UK to the filature. Palmer further informed the Secretary of State for the Colonies that he already informed the president of the filature that the colonial government was not in

⁸⁵ Ibid., Letter of Norton Breton to the Secretary of State, Cyprus 19 February 1930.

⁸⁶ 'The cocoon issue. Do we benefit from the monopoly?' («το Ζήτημα των κουκουλιών»), *Paphos* (Paphos 29 May 1931) 2 (in Greek).

⁸⁷ CSA: SA1: 887/1927, Letter of Secretary of State to Norton Breton (Heckell du Buisson, The Cyprus Filature), Cyprus 10 March 1932.

⁸⁸ Ibid., A Law to amend the customs, Cyprus 5 April 1932.

⁸⁹ Annual Report of the Year 1933 (Nicosia: Department of Agriculture 1934) 16.

⁹⁰ CSA: SA1:887/1927, Letter of the Governor Palmer to the Secretary of State for the Colonies, Cyprus 15 May 1934.

a position to subsidize the difference in price and asked whether it was possible grant the exception to the filature. Two months later the British government replied to Governor Palmer⁹¹ that no exception was possible due to a special agreement with France (Protocol Cmd 4633 Silk duties recommendations of the import duties, Cmd 4632, Trade and Commerce Protocols, UK and French Republic). In August 1934 a notice in the press⁹² informed the public to settle any debts with the establishment since the filature was about to close for good. The filature (for the phase under investigation for the purpose of the current paper) closed down during the Summer of 1934. The 1934 report of the Director of Agriculture⁹³ stated that during 1934 the filature was able to continue its operation for a short period of time before closing down for good due to adverse marketing conditions in the silk industry.

Discussion and Conclusions for the Case of the Filature

During the first decades of the 20th century, sericulture was a promising home industry. The erection of the Cyprus Silk Filature was a move by the British Empire to promote Cyprus Silk yet the decision to appoint a British company to establish and operate the filature in Cyprus proved to be a mistake. The filature took advantage of the very poor peasants in rural Paphos and very serious abuse of the labour force was indeed reported repeatedly. Furthermore, the dispute of the British company with the local merchants (due again to the exploitation of rural Cyprus) was a serious issue that the company was not able to overcome and in the end, forced it to close.

To sum up, the two factories operating almost simultaneously in two different areas of Cyprus, failed to meet the colonial government's and the producer's expectations. The reasons behind the Flax Processing Factory in Zodia failure were the producer's attitude as well as the fact that committee managing the financial situation lost control despite the Department's of Agriculture efforts to keep the factory running for the sake of the producers. On the other hand, the filature was owned by a British company that tried to take advantage of every aspect of the operation of the filature. The working conditions were extremely bad and the payment of the producers meager. The filature failed at the end, despite the colonial government's extreme efforts because of the power that the local merchants exhibited.

⁹¹ Ibid., Letter of P. Cuhllife-Lister to Governor Palmer, London 27 September 1934.

⁹² 'Filature' («Μεταξοπυργείο») *Proini* (Nicosia, 17 August 1934) 3(in Greek).

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**BOOK
REVIEWS**

Protecting Human Rights and Building Peace in Post-Violence Societies

NADIA HADJIGEORGIOU

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The present monograph by Dr. Nasia Hadjigeorgiou, which is the end-result of a PhD thesis at King's College, tackles a particularly important topic, namely, the contribution of human rights to peacebuilding operations. While human rights protection is an important parameter for the successful construction of peace after a protracted conflict, its actual impact is not always well understood. As a result, the failure, in some instances, of human rights to ultimately promote peace has been almost always recast as a failure to implement enough human rights policies. Instead, as the author pertinently observes, this failure might be due to the lack of nuance in our understanding on how and when human rights policies can really help peacebuilding efforts.

On that basis, the author, an Assistant Professor in Transitional Justice and Human Rights at the University of Central Lancashire in Cyprus, embarks upon a detailed analysis of the ways human rights contribute to the embeddedness of peace in post-violence societies, while also elucidating the necessary conditions for increasing the effectiveness of human rights policies to that effect. Her study is based on an interdisciplinary methodology, as presented in the introduction and applied throughout the book, linking law to peace studies, political science, conflict resolution and social sciences, in general. Dr Hadjigeorgiou selects case studies from four post-violence societies (South Africa, Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus and Northern Ireland), that is, societies where hostility is directed to individuals because of their membership to a specific (ethnic, religious, racial etc) group, illustrating how similar human rights policies render different outcomes in those societies. In doing so, the author offers a rich and complex image concerning human rights and peacebuilding, providing a dense analysis and highlighting the multiple factors that should be taken into account for human rights to effectively advance peace.

The book can be separated into two parts, a first, more theoretical one that consists of Chapters 2 and 3, while the four subsequent chapters confirm the theoretical

conclusions with the help of examples drawn from the case studies. Chapter 2 attempts to formulate a multi-level definition of peace. The author starts from the assumption that current accounts of peace are insufficient. She argues that the understanding of what peace implicates is either too practice-oriented, focusing on easily measured indicators (violence reduction or free elections) and the presence of competent institutions, or too vague and idealistic in the mold of the abstract doctrine of “positive peace”. Instead, the book proposes a three-fold definition of peace that encompasses the elements of security, justice and reconciliation. The author then shifts her attention to the content of those terms. Security is narrowed down to the more tangible protection from physical threats. In contrast, the concept of justice is not restrained by the traditional “transitional justice” paradigm with its insistence on the institutionalized punishment of the most violent crimes or its anything-goes expansion. Instead, the author argues that different legal tools might remedy injustices. Finally, reconciliation is defined as meaningful cooperation (not absolute harmony or sheer co-existence) at the personal and political levels. Reconciliation encompasses the non-dehumanization of the opponent, as well as the willingness of all sides of the society to cooperate. In the end, Chapter 2 on the definition of peace is more conceptual than theoretical, though it ensures that more informed decisions about how to achieve the goal of peace will be reached by peacebuilders.

Chapter 3 turns to the crux of the matter, namely the relationship between human rights and peace. The author sheds light to the elliptical analysis of that relation in past studies concentrating exclusively to adjudication and legislation and pleads for a more comprehensive framework on the ways human rights can contribute to the building of peace. Dr Hadjigeorgiou, firstly, constricts her argument to legal human rights (excluding from the study’s remit moral human rights), which translates into an increased focus on legal institutions and remedies. Within such legal human rights, she prioritizes civil (and political) rights (right to property, right to vote etc) and leaves out group rights, putting instead emphasis on individual ones. The restriction of the study’s field, while based on pragmatic considerations related to the current focus of peacebuilding efforts, is to be regretted since socio-economic rights play a crucial role in the reconstruction of post-violence societies.

Next, the author highlights how current work on the way human rights contribute to the various facets of peace, namely security (police reform), justice (remedies) and reconciliation (truth commissions), is more intuitive than factually founded. This weakness is at the heart of the author’s endeavor to offer a new framework on the

relation of human rights and peace. Before doing that, however, the author clarifies the term conflict, not anymore as the factual context that preceded the peacebuilding effort, but as the disagreements arising throughout that process and where human rights intervene in order to consolidate peace (p. 56-61). The author defines conflict as an incompatibility of goals, as an empirical phenomenon and a psychological state of affairs. Thus, human rights must strive to resolve such conflicts in fact and according to people's perceptions.

The last part of this chapter unfolds the multi-faceted role of human rights in building peace. One relevant strategy is to influence legislation, since the latter is deemed a more transparent means for human rights implementation, ensuring a broader perspective and better timing in dealing with conflict, a more effective monitoring of measures taken and greater visibility. A second strategy is through the resolution of conflicts in the courtroom, especially when divisive conflicts have paralyzed a power-sharing post-conflict governance scheme. Human rights infuse legitimacy to court pronouncements and human rights adjudication enhances security, pays tribute to the equality of the opposing parties and contributes to a more effective communication of the change brought by courts. Finally, a third, complementary strategy is to pay attention to public perceptions in the framework of peacebuilding operations. There, human rights can give voice and a legitimate vocabulary to the victims, ease identity tensions and provide remedies that impact on socio-economic conditions.

Ultimately, this Chapter paints an extraordinarily complex image on human rights contribution to peace, one that – though not easy to systematize and deliver to the reader – better reflects reality. While some of the analysis is repeated in the subsequent chapters, Chapter 3 is an indispensable part in the author's reconstruction of the human rights-peace relation.

Chapters 4 to 6 lay out how the presented goals/strategies are applied with reference to the four aforementioned case-studies. Chapter 4 analyzes how human rights have been applied through means of adjudication. The author invokes example concerning political and property rights in post-conflict societies in Cyprus, BiH and South Africa; the prohibition of discrimination in the workplace in the case of BiH; and state obligations to investigate loss of life or enforced disappearances in Cyprus and Northern Ireland. Dr Hadjigeorgiou asserts that there are three main parameters that determine the successful contribution of human rights to peacebuilding through adjudication: (a) the nature of the conflict; (b) the type of court; (c) the passage of time.

With regard to the nature of the conflict, the author proceeds to a not always easily discernible distinction between minor and fundamental conflicts.¹ She persuasively establishes that minor conflicts are more easily resolved by courts, which should be strengthened and made more accessible to that effect. Instead, fundamental conflicts reflecting major disagreements on the basic traits of post-violence societies are not successfully resolved by courts, which are equally unwilling to do so, because they suffer institutional limitations and can neither confront the systemic aspects of such cases nor adopt remedies that require general reforms. The author focuses, subsequently, on the type of courts that should enforce human rights in a post-violence context, distinguishing between domestic and international courts on the basis of three features (legitimacy, enforcement capacity and interpreted document) and advocates for a combined use of both paths. Finally, she highlights the importance of timing for human rights adjudication, arguing that, when there is no agreement, judicial intervention should be sought sooner than later and vice versa. In the latter scenario of a concluded peace agreement, the delayed intervention of courts reduces the danger of politicization, allows to take stock of the agreement's implementation up to that point and encourages judicial activism towards the successful resolution of the conflict.

Chapter 5, on its part, examines how human rights protection can be legislated and enforced with a view to promoting objective peace. The author insists on three crucial parameters: political willingness to do so; the effective drafting of the relevant human rights law; and the extent of the competent bodies' enforcement powers. She reaches the conclusion that, firstly, some willingness by local political elites or partial compliance might foretell the eventual failure of the reform. Secondly, she asserts that any piece of legislation should clearly aim at promoting peace (and state so) and its content should reflect that objective. Thirdly, she stresses the importance of creating monitoring bodies that (a) are independent, (b) have the necessary powers to guide throughout the implementation stage and enforce the law, (c) have a clear strategy on how to fulfill the laws and (d) have been granted the resource and the expertise to do so. Equally crucial is the involvement of the international community -which should be light-touch to avoid accusations of foreign interference and the weakening of local ownership, as well as the participation of civic society to the legislative process, so as to pressure hesitant politicians, provide technocratic expertise and give voice to the

¹ For instance, a dispute over the interpretation of a statute is not necessarily a minor one, as the example of evictions on the basis of "racially discriminatory law and practices" in SA illustrates (p. 90).

private grievances of individuals. The author's analysis when applying those elements to the case-studies is at its finest, whether concerning electoral rights in Cyprus or BiH, or juxtaposing legislative drafting in BiH, South Africa and Northern Ireland, or, further, when comparing the traits and powers of monitoring organs in South Africa or Northern Ireland.

Last but not least, Chapter 6 examines whether human rights can promote and protect subjective perceptions of peace. The author insists that human rights constitute a vocabulary that allows the articulation of a plight, the official acknowledgment that a response is due, and the provision of a remedy as a strong message for the eradication of past injustices. The author's analysis goes, however, beyond the semiotics of the human rights vocabulary, emphasizing the need for human rights vocabulary to be accompanied by meaningful change and be perceived as bringing change by the people. She eloquently showcases how the right to return of the displaced population in BiH did not ensure integration and social justice or how the right to truth and return of those missing in Cyprus remained unfulfilled in the consciousness of Cypriots, because the perpetrators were not simultaneously held accountable. Furthermore, such public perceptions are, according to the author, inextricably linked (a) to the existence of a climate that supports reform, (b) to awareness about human rights institutions and their work, (c) to an understanding that a genuine attempt for reform is made and (d) to institutions that are trusted as legitimate. Additionally, changes towards a mixed (international-national) composition of the peacebuilding team and the adoption of a communication strategy that cuts both ways, informing the public but also allowing for the reception of the public's feedback by the peacebuilders, are important for embedding subjective feelings of peace.

Chapter 6 is undoubtedly the most challenging for the author as it deals with subjective perceptions and its line of argumentation is not always easy to grasp. The reference to the Historical Enquiries Team (HET) in Northern Ireland, for instance, is more appropriate as an example where the competent organ fails to deliver the sought policy, rather than an example where a human rights policy towards peacebuilding is fully there but specific contextual elements prevent the creation of the respective subjective feelings. In contrast, the Demopoulos case of the ECtHR is very pertinent for the author's line of reasoning as the Strasbourg Court clearly failed to reassure the applicants about the fairness of the procedure established by the Immovable Property Commission.

All in all, the book offers a multi-faceted and nuanced picture on the role of human rights in peacebuilding and the requirements for its successful contribution to it. The minutiae analysis and the interdisciplinary methodology employed by the author further enrich her work. The conceptual contemplations are well supplemented by multiple case-studies drawn from the four historical examples, showcasing her impressive research and her masterful grasping of the subtleties relating to each post-violence society analyzed in the book. Thus, this publication constitutes an important and original addition to the study of human rights in building peace and a welcome analysis of why BiH, South Africa, Northern Ireland and Cyprus succeeded in some aspects and failed in others in their long road towards reconstructing their post-violence societies and promoting peace.

VASSILIS PERGANTIS

CALL FOR PAPERS

The Cyprus Review (Special Issue 2020)

The Cyprus Review invites submissions
for its upcoming 2020 Special Issue on

COVID-19 in Doctrinal Context: Analysing, Theorising, and Surpassing the Pandemic Crisis

Responding to the ongoing planetary crisis due to the spread of the COVID-19, *The Cyprus Review* opens the present call to all interested academics, scholars, and practitioners who are willing to contribute to the ongoing scientific debate about the foundational questions raised by the pandemic, the threats, challenges, and possibly opportunities created, and the doctrinal assessment of the systemic responses provided vis-à-vis this latest predicament.

The *Review* invites all interested authors to consider submitting original contributions primarily in the fields of International Relations, Politics, Social Welfare, History, Public Administration, Law, Sociology, Anthropology, Social Sciences, Economic, and Life and Health Sciences, critically approaching the pandemic crisis in theoretic or practical milieu. It should be pointed out that the contributions must be, at the broadest possible sense, pertinent to Cyprus in order to be considered for publication.

Following below is a highly indicative list of topics:

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- Human rights in the COVID-19 era
- Legal, social, and political notions of the State of Exception
- Biopolitics, necropolitics and State regulation during the crisis
- International organisation and international crisis management
- Humanity, solidarity, and sociability in the times of COVID-19
- EU policies and the pandemic

- Economic, commercial, and financial aspects of the crisis
- Poverty, social exclusion, and the Welfare State during the pandemic
- COVID-19 and the environment
- Spatial and temporal aspects of the pandemic crisis
- Legal and political dimension of the preventive policies implemented
- Threats, challenges, and opportunities for scientific debate in the times of the pandemic

This is not an exclusive list. On the contrary, we urge prospective authors to think out of the box, endorse bold new ideas, and research the various aspects the current crisis. Articles should have a relevance to the case of Cyprus, thus enhancing Cyprological studies and research.

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- All submissions should be identified in the email subject with the heading **'TCR 2020, COVID-19 Special Issue'**

