# THE CYPRUS REVIEW

## A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

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(xii) **Book Reviews** are normally 2000 words maximum in length. Headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, ISBN registration, e.g. *Cyprus and International Politics,* Essays by Van Coufoudakis, Intercollege Press (Nicosia, 2007) 306 pp. ISBN: 978-9963-634-45-3. The reviewer's name should appear at the end of the review plus a brief biographical paragraph (60-100 words). Guidance notes are available for book reviewers. This section also hosts reviews of publications in Greek and Turkish to help facilitate cross-linguistic referencing and research awareness. Alongside attention to the specificities of the locality the journal deals with, there is also a geographical aspect to the section's broadening of scope. It strives to review publications of thematic relevance to Cyprus studies, even if the focus of the works is not necessarily Cyprus *per se*. The editors hope to enable the opening up of new avenues of intervention by Cyprus scholars in wider academic debates (as well as the awareness of such intervention amongst Cyprus-focused researchers). Suggestions are welcomed for publications that should be featured in the section and these can be sent to cy_review@unic.ac.cy.

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# TABLE OF CONTENTS

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We would like to take this opportunity to extend our sincere gratitude to the large number of anonymous reviewers who willingly give their time and expertise to referee articles for the journal.

Thank you for your support.


The Editorial Team

# ARTICLES

# A Photo in a Photo:
# The Optics, Politics and Powers of Hand-held Portraits in Claims for Justice and Solidarity

Elizabeth Hoak-Doering

## Abstract

*This paper is about a popular kind of photograph associated with demonstrations for the cause of missing persons. It focuses on Cyprus, where the demonstrators are often women who lost family members in the events before and during the Turkish Army invasion of 1974. In documenting these demonstrations, photojournalists capture a typical kind of image, here called 'the photographic Pietà'. Although the photographic Pietà first came to the author's attention in Cyprus it is not limited to that country, and this paper will establish some of the political, temporal and religious parameters in which it is prevalent. The paper establishes links with similar forms of representation in protests that appear in the context of other wars, and it isolates the uniqueness of the photographic Pietà among other kinds of photographs. One of the main attributes of the photographic Pietà is a kind of disappearance, which is related both to the basic rules of visual perspective and the mechanisms of photographic reproduction, and this is described here by way of example and experiment, then reviewed in the contexts of social science, political photography, gender and the media.*

**Keywords:** gender, media, photography, demonstration, human rights, politics, Cyprus

## Introduction

At the motorcycle rally of 1997,[1] one year after the killing of Tassos Isaac within the barbed wire no-mans' land of the Nicosia Buffer Zone, I witnessed a traditionally dressed widow drive a tractor into the same barbed wire. Mrs Panayiota Pavlou Solomi sat high up on the blue agricultural tractor that was decorated with a banner, which read, 'ΠΑΜΕ ΝΑ ΣΠΙΡΟΥΜΕ ΤΑ ΧΟΡΑΦΙΑ ΜΑΣ' (Let's go plant our fields). In addition to this banner, the tractor was pinned with flapping black and white photographs of the scores of missing persons from the village of Komi Kepir, many of whom are her relatives (see Fragko, 2002). In Mrs Pavlou Solomi's lap, she cradled the largest of her portrait photographs: her husband and her son who both are still, as of February 2016, officially

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[1]  See 'Motor Bike Rally to Kyrenia in Occupied Cyprus 1996'. Available at: [http://www.argyrou.eclipse.co.uk/Rally.htm].

Image 1: *Berlin–Nicosia Motorcycle Rally 1997, Mrs Panayiota Pavlou Solomi at Buffer Zone*
© photograph: Elizabeth Hoak-Doering

missing. She was acting alone, and handling the jolting tractor with the skill of a lady who had farmed her entire life. Behind, and on both sides of her there was a crowd of people with cameras. This isolated act, within the context of a charged political demonstration, projected symbolic meanings that related to Mrs Pavlou Solomi personally, as a Cypriot civilian, and as a Greek Cypriot woman. Her attention-getting performance was about Cypriot Missing Persons and the ongoing military occupation of the north part of Cyprus, but it also figuratively pushed at the heavily protected boundaries of Cypriot norms for women's self-expression.

The media-driven image of a bereaved or worried person holding the photograph of a missing relative has recently become fairly common, even though the disappearance of individuals is certainly not limited to modern warfare, or to warfare itself. Similarly, people have been posing for photographs holding older photos in their hands since the popularisation of photography as a medium. However, it was not until well into the twentieth century – and specifically in Cyprus and Argentina – when relatives of missing persons began to hold personal photographs up to the photojournalist's lens: a phenomenon that came about after the invention of the portable camera, the spread of global media and common understanding of individual human rights. For Ariella Azoulay (2012) this kind of photograph is a gesture that illustrates 'the event of photography par excellence'. But the gesture in this particular composition is only one aspect of the present analysis and, departing from Azoulay's work, the paper will look at events outside of the

Israel–Palestine binary, and also outside of Cyprus, presenting different paths for analysing embedded imagery in photographic theory.

This kind of photo within a photo is presented here as the 'photographic Pietà', and I work on several levels to describe, contextualise and explore it. To do so, I begin with a discussion of photography, showing how repetition modifies a prototype, both perceptually and actually. I distinguish the effect of this repetition from any perceptual and theoretical modifications to an original that take place during mass printing. I build these optical effects onto social science observations that Paul Sant Cassia makes in his work, *Bodies of Evidence* (2005), where he discusses the modalities and strategies of pictorial enunciation among displaced Cypriots in the context of Cypriot inter-communal strife and the war of 1974. Then, working through Azoulay and also Jalal Toufic (particularly 2004), this study broadens into an examination of how different modalities of photography can construct, or define a discourse between disempowered parts of society and the mainstream, and how it seems to amplify the cause of missing persons. This paper takes substance from, updates and revises the theoretical approach of a work previously published (Hoak-Doering, 2014).

## Temporal Dislocation and Historical Distance

Temporal dislocation is part of a photograph's charm: it says something about the past, while physically existing in the present. The current popularity of the 'selfie' demonstrates that even the passing of a few seconds describes an interesting gap in time. Temporal dislocation can awaken a momentary existential crisis about memory and human experience that reaches back to the origins of recording media in the late nineteenth century. With the invention of the Phonograph, for example, people questioned how real or experienced time could be 'kept', and 'used' later. Some wondered what, then, is the role of human memory? (see Daniels, 2011). Similar questions give photography, as a recording medium, its aura '… a strange tissue of space and time: the unique apparition of a distance, however near it may be …' (Benjamin, 2003 [1935], p. 23). In addition to the historical distance created in the gap between the exposure of the photograph and the viewer's gaze, old photographs also bear their age through physical decay. The dissipation of the chemical processes or substrates – of glass paper, board or metal plate – also demonstrate the existence of historical distance. Of course historical distance also appears in the contents of the photographic image, and these can also create bridges between past and present.[2]

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2   Barthes finds this historical dis-continuity in the Winter Garden photograph, in which his mother was a child. He says, 'no anamnesis could ever make me glimpse this time starting from myself …' (Barthes, 2000, p. 65).

Image 2: *Baker's Jubilee Philadelphia PA, USA (1898)*
Courtesy of the Library Company of Philadelphia (historical image)
© photograph: William Harvey Doering

Image 2 exemplifies historical distance. It is a street photograph of bakers carrying sticks of bread in a jubilee, marking the end of the Spanish American War. The original is a glass slide, and so historical distance is clear from the material, texture and format of the image. The content also shows historical distance; the bakers' uniforms, the style of the parade, and other cues assert that this was a long time ago (it was 1898). Still, the setting is recognisable to someone who knows the city. Often, the allure of historical distance hinges on a viewer's ability to make intellectual connections, and to engage with its content in a diachronic way. Historical distance may illustrate the viewer's distance from the past, while also making connections with it.[3]

## Embedded Distance in Photography

Embedded distance in photography occurs when photos appear in, or as the subject of photographs. A photograph is usually the subject of other photographs because it has historical content that relates to the person holding the original. The urge to do this is

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3  In contemporary documentary and films in Cyprus, E.A. Davis (2014) finds historical distance as a way to identify and assess archival material, which is embedded for effects that range from the evidentiary to reification of personal recollection, and stand-ins for evidence where none is available. In film, this shows through variations such as in cinematic quality, antiquated screen ratios and editing anomalies.

typical enough to have been featured on the cover of Anchor Books' paperback edition of Susan Sontag's *On Photography* (1989). These pictures usually show generations of a family; for example a younger person demonstrating her lineage by displaying the old photograph of relatives. As a result of this stylistic understanding, embedded distance does not readily attract attention – and so it could be interpreted or deployed in a political fashion, both intentionally and unintentionally.

Historical distance, as we have noted, is partly determined by the materiality of the image: the way the image looks faded, brown, or softened; and partly determined by the contents of the image. What, then, are the optical results of embedded distance? What happens to an image when it is re-photographed? And how does this relate to any meanings that could be conveyed in the newer image?

In the 1970s, artist Susan Hiller used the particular qualities of privacy and instantaneity in photo booths to create her Photomat series. One of the images from this series shows her looking directly at the camera, covering all but her eyes with a contact sheet of just-made self-portraits, and this work is used as a publicity image for her 2015 retrospective exhibition at the Lisson Gallery, London. Among other concerns, the Photomat series 'demonstrates the expressive peculiarities of machines' and 'disrupts conventions of representation' (Ward, 2015). What if, however, only the embedded image itself is examined as the mode and disseminator of disruption? How does the conventional understanding of portraiture change? For example: one photograph could be re-photographed and printed, and this process repeated until the original image seems to disappear. If the image fills the frame each time, the original disappears in about twenty generations; give or take a few depending on lens quality, lighting, and processing. The original disappears faster when the image includes someone holding the photograph.



Image 3: *Inter-generational pose (or the Photographic Pietà)*
© photograph: Radomir Cvetic/author

19

The pose in image 3 (previous page) is associated with the-younger-generation-holding-the-older-generation, and in this case the embedded original disappears in only four iterations of the process. Optically, the embedded photograph fades away; it has becomes smaller, less detailed, lower contrast, lighter and eventually disappears. These are the same qualities associated with spatial distance in the basic rules of atmospheric and linear perspective, where the subject actually is farther away. Metaphorically, one might interpret this as a younger generation showing the disappearance of an older generation, but it takes on other meanings in the politicised contexts to be addressed later.



Image 4: *Embedded digital portrait*
© photograph: Elizabeth Hoak-Doering

Digital photography leads to a different kind of distortion (image 4). When the experiment is conducted by photographing a screen image, the destruction of the original also takes place in about twenty steps, but with a very different visual result: the distorted original image becomes frontal, it is enlarged, the colours are high-contrast and saturated. Since the reproduction and embedment that are the subjects of this paper usually take place in print media, the discussion that follows deals with the original scenario of printed photographic imagery (see image 3) and addresses the operative effect of embedded images. In these, the original is gradually diminished, de-personalised and optically distanced; the distinct personality of the embedded picture dissipates as it is

simultaneously framed and re-contextualised in successive generations of photography. This framing and re-contextualisation exposes a power difference, both through pictorial quality and agency. That is, within the photograph the image of the 'holder' (usually a woman) is typically larger, and in higher contrast and better focus than the image held (usually a man). Importantly, the holder chooses to bring a portrait into a space for a reason. Her agendas and her agency will be discussed later. Inside the format of the photograph, the feminine holder is visually more powerful than the held image of a man. But there are also power dynamics that are external to the photograph, wherein the 'holder' and the 'held' are seen by the media and then by the media's audience.

### The Photographic Pietà

The Pietà is an icon of suffering; a motif where a mother holds the dead body of her son or husband. The classic use of this motif is religious, in paintings, and particularly sculptures of the Passion, where Mary holds the body of Jesus. Michelangelo's (1499) *Pietà* is the quintessential example of the motif, but the motif is not always religious. After the World Wars artists also used the mother-bearing-son composition in a secular (although referential) way to symbolise sacrifice and a nation in mourning, particularly in European monumental sculpture. In another form an angel, usually the Archangel Michael, can replace the mother figure.



Image 5:  *Roadblock at Ledra Palace Hotel (late 1970s)*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

The *photographic Pietà* is a contemporary and secular version of that religious motif. In this case a woman is photographed holding a photograph of her son, fiancé, husband, father or another male relative. Over time, the usual chronological realities do not always confer and so, as Sant Cassia notes (2005), sometimes a woman has aged in relation to the photograph she holds: a photo of her fiancée could look like her son. The present discussion is limited to the majority of such pictures in which women hold images of men, which Sant Cassia (2005) typifies as 'Penelopes and Vigils'. It leaves for further exploration the many variations that include children holding images of adults and vice-versa, men holding images, and women holding pictures of women (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999 and Sant Cassia, 2005; and the photo archive of Andreas Manolis).

The photographic Pietà functions in visual culture differently from the classic Pietà. In addition to its Christian modalities, the Pietà mobilises notions of national sacrifice. As such, the classic Pietà is usually mounted on behalf of a place or organisation, and any individual commemoration is often found on a cenotaph that accompanies the work. By contrast, the photographic Pietà is individually specific: a particular woman holds a portrait (or portraits) of a particular person (or people), usually but not always men. Occasionally the women are named and their stories are known, but their faces are always recognisable and intentionally exposed. Such iconic images of mothers holding pictures of relatives appear in media coverage of disappearances related to war and other catastrophic events, where there seems to be a common strategy (intentional or unintentional) for discourse with media, politicians, and the public. The political circumstances of vigils and protests where this photographic form appears vary from dissent to patriotism, and also in the ways that images substitute for, or recognise the existence of missing individuals.

In the 1970s three main groups emerged that began using photographs of their missing relatives to communicate through the media: Greek Cypriot relatives of missing persons, the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo (Argentina) and the National League of POW/MIA Families (USA). Since then, the use of a personal photograph within a media-publicised vigil can now be found in many other parts of the world: Mexico, Thailand, Sri Lanka, Pakistan, Nepal, East Timor, Indonesia and Kashmir to name but a few (Thornhill, 2014; Mugiyanto *et al*., 2008). The common factor among all these groups is the use of the personal photograph to create political awareness of missing persons, and to communicate this injustice to a larger public. The photographic Pietà can be seen where it reinforces official government narratives as in Cyprus and the United States of America, but it can also be seen where official government narratives are denounced – as in Argentina (Sant Cassia, 2005) and Asia (Mugiyanto *et al*., 2008). In each of these groups the function of the embedded image in vigils and demonstrations is slightly different, possibly revealing perceptual differences among these cultures with regard to photography.

Vigils in Argentina by the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo explicitly aim to expose the government's complicity in, and to end official silence about the *disparecidos* – civilians who disappeared by force during the Dirty War of 1976 through 1983. There is no agreed-upon number of *disparecidos* from the Dirty War; estimates of missing range between 9,000 and 30,000. Mothers of the *disparecidos* gather on Thursday afternoons at the political hub of Buenos Aires, the Plaza del Mayo, in front of the presidential palace, wearing white scarves and carrying or wearing photographs of their missing relatives. Their scarves are embroidered with the names of missing persons, symbolising baby's blankets, and these notorious headscarves have become an emblem of the group. The Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo have received international accolades for their human rights activities and they have been the subjects of academic research (there are many: see Guzman Bouvard, 1994, and Fisher, 1989). They have also inspired pop artists, Sting and U2 among others. Their activism and the causes they stand for can only be summarised here, but Sant Cassia generously develops this topic in relation to Cypriot vigils in *Bodies of Evidence* (2005, pp. 267, 273). Here, these large-scale actions are acknowledged and referenced as vital points of comparison with Cypriot women's demonstrations on behalf of missing persons.

In the USA, the National League of POW/MIA (Prisoners of War/Missing in Action) Families are among many well-organised American support groups for relatives of American missing servicemen. More than 83,000 military personnel are currently listed as POW/MIA from modern American wars; this number excludes current and recent military engagements in Iraq, Afghanistan, Pakistan and elsewhere (United States Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office). Unlike the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo, mothers from this group maintain personal vigilance that demonstrates their patriotism. They do not protest or stage vigils, instead they perform in a way that reminds civilians about the sacrifices that military families make and this performance includes using the POW/MIA emblem in different ways on a daily basis. The emblem is a silhouette of a serviceman and a watchtower, framed in a barbed wire motif, and the portrait profile is based on a particular serviceman, graphically transformed. The emblem of the POW/MIA is most often seen as a black flag (Leepson, 2015; see also Sturken, 1997). Like the symbolic headscarves of the Mothers of the Plaza del Mayo, this distinctive black flag is also a logo; that is, the flag most often hangs below the American flag, but it also is transformed into automobile stickers, charms for bracelets and other paraphernalia (for the controversy about this flag see Perlstein, 2015). When the National League of POW/MIA Families participate in public acts of commemoration they tend to use this black and white symbol rather than photographs of their individual missing relative(s), so the photographic Pietà here is transformed in an interesting way

where a symbol, not a portrait, is held up to the camera.[4] As a result, these women seem more like the classical Pietà: a patriotic mother and a symbolic model of sacrifice for the nation. Nevertheless these are not idealised mothers, but rather named individuals who pose with a symbol of the cause more often than a personal photo. The National League of POW/MIA Families present themselves in compliance with the sacrifices and honours of military life, trusting their government and the aims of the military, which pledges to 'Keep the promise', 'Fulfill their Trust' and 'No one left behind' (US Department of Defense Prisoner of War/Missing Personnel Office). The difference in the way these people use symbols rather than photographs of their missing may be tied to cultural and perceptual differences about photography, as will be shown later. Importantly, however, the American missing are servicemen and women: They were lost while on military duty, and this is different from the Argentine missing who are civilians.

In contrast to the other examples, the Cypriot missing are both civilian and military. With few exceptions, the images used in researching this paper come from Andreas Manolis who has worked as a press photographer in Cyprus since 1975. He captured multiple types of embedded images from demonstrations, vigils and funerals on both sides of the UN Buffer Zone, among Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The phenomenon is more common in post-war Greek Cypriot media than in Turkish Cypriot media, and the subjects of the photographs here discussed are all Greek Cypriot. This is emphatically not to imply that there are no Turkish Cypriot missing from events before and during the war in 1974 and the intercommunal fighting that intensified around 1963 (see Sant Cassia, 2005, p. 149 and the archives of Andreas Manolis). Officially, 493 Turkish Cypriots disappeared during the period 1963–1974 (CMP, 2015). Nor is it to imply that there is a cultural difference in the Turkish Cypriot affective response to missing family members. Instead, the media coverage of Turkish Cypriot missing reflects an official narrative about the Turkish army invasion of 1974, and it demonstrates that Turkish Cypriots were expected to remember – and in a different way from Greek Cypriots – to forget aspects of their recent history (see Papadakis, 1993). The official Turkish Cypriot stance on their missing persons is that they are martyrs who died for the sake of establishing a separate, new Turkish Cypriot state (Sant Cassia, 2005). Greek Cypriots now claim 1,508 military and civilians who disappeared during intercommunal unrest around 1963, and during the invasion in 1974 (CMP, 2016). Since July of 2007, mortal remains are being recovered and returned through the efforts of the bicommunal

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4   Graphic symbols transforming into representation also happens with the girls kidnapped from their secondary school in Chibok, Nigeria (14 April 2014). In protests against government inaction and awareness campaigns for the 219 girls still missing, the logo 'Bring Back Our Girls' essentialises their disappearance. This is especially true with the hashtag, #bringbackourgirls. Both the phrase and the hashtag are held up to cameras more often than images of individuals.

Committee for Missing Persons (CMP). The 2016 CMP report states that 1,064 individuals have been exhumed, and through DNA testing the remains of 480 Greek Cypriots and 149 Turkish Cypriots have been identified (CMP, 2016). In contrast with the official Turkish Cypriot narrative of martyrdom, the official Greek Cypriot narrative is that the remaining persons missing are possibly alive. As will be discussed later, aspirations for the return of Greek Cypriot missing persons is sometimes officially conflated with aspirations for the return of the north part of the island and a future as a re-unified Cyprus (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999 and Sant Cassia, 2005).

The photographic Pietà is linked with a group of Greek Cypriots who self-identify as Cypriot relatives of missing persons. While not all of these people take part in public demonstrations and vigils, there are roughly two bodies of people who do; and they differ in the intensity and in the ways that they stage their vigils. The general body is known as the Pancyprian Committee for the Return of Missing Relatives and Undeclared/Missing Prisoners of War [Pankypria Epitropi Syngenon Adiliton kai Adhiloton Aichmaloton], and it is a mixed group of families and relatives – both men and women – of the Greek Cypriot missing, who are usually from working and middle class families (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999, p. 274). Of these, a contingent known colloquially as the Mothers of Cyprus – *Oi Manadhes tis Kyprou* – will be discussed later.

The Pancyprian Committee for the Return of Missing Relatives and Undeclared / Missing Prisoners of War uses as its emblem a stylized image of a woman holding a photograph – a direct link between the photographic Pietà and the motivation behind the cause. This graphic image functions as the group's symbol, but it is not manifest in an overarching way like the headscarf of the Argentinian mothers, or the POW/MIA flag. The Cyprus government, though, did use iconic examples of the photographic Pietà to support its own agenda and ideological aims. Sant Cassia (1998–1999) relates how the post-invasion government symbolically conflated the loss of territory in the north of the island with the cause of Greek Cypriot missing persons. Thus, people participating in vigils also – perhaps unintentionally – also participated in an official narrative of waiting for return of property, even though they were not necessarily internally displaced. While Sant Cassia rightly points out that public demonstration was one of only a few means to communication between marginalised people and the political elite, I will emphasise that the Cyprus government co-opted photographic Pietà images for its own agenda. Cypriot relatives of the missing may or may not trust that the government is acting in their interests, and they may or may not be concerned with the reunification of the island and return of land under Turkish military control. The motive behind demonstrations for the Missing was most often personal: individual pleas for justice and human rights.

In July of 2007 the bicommunal Committee on Missing People in Cyprus began exhumations, DNA identification, and return of mortal remains, and at that point the official discourse that symbolically linked missing property with missing people had to

change. As with the return of mortal remains, so the government introduced public discourse about compromises in the return of territory. This was during the time of the direct talks between the leaders of the two communities (beginning in 2002) and the Annan Plan referendum (2004). Along with this change in political climate vigils became less frequent, mortal remains are gradually being returned to families and absolute faith in the government's official narrative about the so-called Cyprus Problem (unresolved land and human rights disputes from 1974 and before, and the continued presence of United Nations Peacekeepers) seems to be softening. Demonstrations by the families of Cypriot Missing never reached the point of large-scale protests that crossed social and economic strata, nor were they able to directly confront the government's opacity on the plight of the missing as directly as the mothers of the Argentinian missing do. Instead, these vigils balanced patriotism with criticism by posing existential, subjective questions about human rights to institutions: to the Cyprus government, foreign powers, and the United Nations. Although strident, their demands were posed within frameworks of government and civil society that were acceptable at that time.



Image 6: *Roadblock #2, at Ledra Palace Hotel (late 1970s)*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

The photographic Pietà reflects a shift in focus from group to individual iconography, possibly related to a modern, popular understanding of individual rights. Crafted in the aftermath of World War II, the Universal Declaration of Human Rights (1948) came about as a result of the Holocaust, but popular understanding of these rights apparently did not happen immediately. Azoulay counts only three instances where

Palestinian 'plaintiffs' demonstrated their loss to Jewish photographers during the violent displacement of Palestinians and the establishment of the state of Israel (the *Nakba*, 1948; Azoulay, 2012 p. 229). Thus, the emergence of the photographic Pietà shows that there may have been a gradual change in the ways individuals learned to relate injustice through mass media via photography. Azoulay's narrow focus may not be a fair gauge on the latter observation, however; it begs further exploration especially into the profound archives of Jewish peoples as photographic subjects during and after the Holocaust. On another level, the photographic Pietà's emergence may also reflect changes in the camera itself. Sontag (2003) writes that before about 1940 cameras were not portable enough to take pictures of individuals in varied environments, and so the photographic Pietà would have evolved along with photojournalism, too: not only in terms of what can be photographed, but also in terms of a new critical relationship between subjects, their agency and role in picture-making. The photographic Pietà is a performative motif – that is most effective when the object of a demonstration – whether large or small. And it is in direct discourse with the media, whose coverage broadcasts both the cause and individual experiences.



Image 7:  *Ledra Palace roadblock, observation post by police barracks late 1970s*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

27

## The Distant Subject

A woman in the photographic Pietà is not holding the embedded photo as a *memento mori*, an image of the dead. In a departure from the classic Pietà, she is holding the portrait of a missing person whose fate is unknown, and whose partial-presence is emphasised by the optical effects of both embedded and historical distance. Sant Cassia describes the state of her unknowing as 'having an existential ambiguity' which is different from the classic 'liminality' that anthropologists use to describe the transitory state between life and death (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999). Jalal Toufic (2014) approaches liminality through the Tibetan concept of Bardo, but the uncertainty that his work proposes includes several kinds of partial states of human presence. It is through such theories as Quantum physics that he builds an existential uncertainty, which in turn becomes a theoretical escape from radical and state violence in Israel, Palestine and Lebanon. One such proposition (*ibid.*) is about witnessing an astronaut crossing the event horizon of a black hole. To the viewer, the astronaut leaves our space-time and is out of communication, even though they appear to be frozen, and two-dimensional, on our side of the black hole. Here, in Toufic's scientifically-rooted narrative, the universe acts as a kind of photographer, presenting time that has stopped, and he equates our nostalgia about old photographs with 'the irretrievable loss to the universe of one who has been thus photographed' (*ibid.*, p. 2). He says that nostalgia comes from 'an intuition of the resonance' of that crossing of the event horizon, and the freezing of time. The word 'resonance' figures heavily for Toufic, because the photographic act resonates through the universe, and its effects are implicit from the theoretical end of science through the mundane. It is in this sense of resonance that Toufic's highly speculative interpretation of physics can be incorporated here, with respect to actual loss and grief. The mother figure in the photographic Pietà personifies and inhabits the perceptual ambiguity just described of a witness, and her missing relative is resonating as a collected set of memories; seen as a two-dimensional image that cannot communicate (for acoustic resonance in this context see Hoak-Doering, 2014, pp. 168–170, 187–188). In Toufic's scenario, the mother-witness also takes up Barthes' assertion that a photograph actually contains and projects luminous elements reflected from the subject of the image: it '... belongs to that class of laminated objects whose two leaves cannot be separated without destroying them both: the windowpane and the landscape ...' (Barthes, p. 6). The photograph is an actual living memory:

> 'In the picture, the person's still alive, it's a memory. I hold the picture because he's still alive ... without a picture, the memory fades, it flows away after years ... Can you imagine if the picture wasn't discovered? The memory [would be] ... narrow, limited ...' (Andreas Manolis, conversation about his missing brother 10 September 2010).

For Barthes, portrait photographs are literally animated by and invested with a human presence, conveyed through light in the eyes. Anyone else who sees the portrait of a

missing person must become a partial witness: '… the *Spectrum* of the Photograph … retains … a relation to "spectacle" and adds to [the photograph] that rather terrible thing which there is in every photograph: the return of the dead' (Barthes, p. 9). Looking again to Toufic, at the edge of the universe where a body would cross the event horizon into a black hole 'the universe automatically takes the astronaut's photograph as he crosses its border, the event horizon, in a sort of paradigmatic farewell' (Toufic, 2014). The held picture, the portrait, is historically and visually distant and however important the picture is to the woman holding it, the viewer is not particularly able to gather much information about the individual in the portrait; nor would such details be likely to determine a character without memories that may be attached to them.



Image 8: *Ledra Palace Roadblock. Observation post by police barracks late 1970s*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

Embedded photos of missing men are often but not always black and white, formal like an official military or passport photo or wedding picture, or a school photo. Collars and close shaves, a modest smile – these are usual characteristics of the held pictures and, although not quite sombre, these portraits often conform to general practical and professional standards. Why are such photos chosen? Sometimes they are not chosen: sometimes they are the only photos that remain after the upheaval of a war (conversation with Andreas Manolis, 10 September 2010). Given a choice, a formal picture is often more desirable even though less indicative of the man as a particular character. Such formalities add to the effects of embedding that begin to erase the individual. These icons of men are provocative in the way that they stand in for a particular person; the way they seem to emanate, or encapsulate his ghost. The viewer gleans little about the individual, and is probably not expected to. By implication though, the viewer is expected to respond to the idea of losing someone whose portrait we would so tenderly hold ourselves.

Three examples of the photographic Pietà that will be discussed here – in Cyprus, Argentina, and the USA – are all Christian societies, although respectively Greek

Orthodox, Catholic and predominantly Protestant (The Pew Forum report, 2007). It is interesting to look at the faiths of these societies and reflect on the deployment of the photographic Pietà in relation to variations in Christian beliefs about iconography. Greek Orthodox people, for example, often compare the practice of kissing icons (veneration) to kissing a picture of a loved person.

> '... In using an icon in devotion, one could legitimately accord it honor, because of the one portrayed in it ... All such honor was directed to the one portrayed in the icon, and not to the painted materials themselves. In making this distinction ... they were recognizing a common human phenomenon. Whether ... in the way one responds to the picture of the emperor, or in the way a young man might treat the picture of his girlfriend back home, people distinguish between the picture itself and the one portrayed, and yet they do not hesitate to treat those pictures with special honor, as having a unique connection to the ones pictured in them' (Payton, pp. 189–190).

The Catholic practice of veneration changed slightly with regard to religious art and objects after Vatican II (1962–1965):

> '... The net result of ... evolutionary developments was that the church building housed a whole series of foci for people who visited the church outside the time of the liturgy or even during the liturgy. It was not uncommon in the past to see people at side altars or burning candles before an image even during mass. It is precisely because churches lost a certain sense of focus that the 2nd Vatican Council foresaw a return to the fundamental needs of the church ...' (Cunningham, 2009, p. 97).

Nevertheless, accepted understandings about the Incarnation make Catholic and Orthodox churches more similar than different in the ways believers interact with religious art and material, including the sacramental bread and wine. This is particularly so when they stand in comparison to Protestants. For Orthodox and Catholics, the bread and wine are believed to become, through consecration, actual elements of the body of Christ. Among Orthodox Christians, veneration of icons and religious artefacts reflects the idea that God can be manifest in human flesh (Jesus).

> '... since Christ became true man, it is legitimate to *depict his face* (sic) upon the holy ikons; and, since Christ is one person and not two, these ikons do not just show us his humanity in separation from his divinity, but they show us one person of the eternal Logos incarnate' (Ware, 1979, p. 72).

This departs from the positions of the iconoclasts (and thus all Protestants) who believe that the sacrament and religious imagery are only symbolic.

Differences in the way the photographic Pietà appears in Orthodox/Catholic populations compared to predominantly Protestant populations may speak to minor differences in the accepted understanding of a photographic portrait. That is, that

Orthodox and Catholic people may read into a photograph something closer to Barthes' proposition that photographs hold the light from the eyes of the deceased (Barthes, 2000). By contrast, Americans (and even post-Vatican II Catholics) are much more likely to show restraint toward religious imagery, and caution in expressing such an embodied understanding of a photograph; suggesting, perhaps, another reason for the POW/MIA mothers to be photographed with the symbol of the cause rather than a photograph of their relative(s).



Image 9: *By the roadblock at Ledras Street in 2001–2002,*
*Night demonstration by the Green Line military observation post* (contact sheet series)
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

## The Media and the Pietà

As opposed to the photographs that are held in hand, which are cherished personal possessions, the photographic Pietà is not personal. It is public and demonstrative, because photojournalists capture and format the image, and the media amplifies it, along with the cause. This, according to the photographer Andreas Manolis is perhaps not intentional. He remarks that '... [the women] are not looking at me. They are looking through me' (personal conversation, 30 September 2010). However, as is clear from the example above (image 9), the photojournalist can choose how to frame the embedded image, shaping meaning around the public act of showing a personal photograph. This embedded picture of the missing person describes the temporal, physical and metaphysical distance from a demonstration. A woman who is demonstrating may hope that her face will tell her story with human appeal; that the embedded image may add authenticity to the story, and she may also seek purpose in a more general search for justice.

The photographic Pietà suggests a truncated grieving process for missing persons that is highlighted by, even created by the media. As the embedded image of the missing person becomes optically distanced, the woman holding the portrait in a demonstration in a way enacts her relative's disappearance. This optical and performative repositioning of the person in the photograph (its content) mobilises new layers of meaning, new viewpoints: the effect of which is to 'meaningfully reorder everyday life' (Sturken and Cartwright, p. 89). The demonstrating woman also acts out the im/possibility of taking on the traditional feminine gender role of mourning over a body (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999, p. 272), and exhumations that have taken place since 2007 result in a transformation of the photographic Pietà. Burials re-prioritise the portrait photograph as ambiguity lessens along with the return of mortal remains (image 10).



Image 10: *27 August 2007 funeral of a man in the catalogue of Missing Persons whose mortal remains were returned*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

## A Citizenry of Photography?

Ariella Azoulay's notion of a 'civil contract of photography' provides the basis for a discussion of ownership and civic participation in the photographic Pietà. Her work is entertained with caution however, because while she deals precisely with the relationship between viewer, photographic moment and content, her writing style distances the reader in a way analogous to the photographic one with which she finds fault. Readers of *The Civil Contract of Photography* will find, for example, her observation that '[t]here has always been a regard for the visible. The world has a visible dimension; human beings are

equipped with eyes and conduct themselves, to a large extent, in and through the world in keeping with the ways they observe it' (2008, p. 94). This kind of padding, or patronising, functions as the literary equivalent of a weak state photographer's distance from the distasteful content of the picture he must record (this distance is illuminated in her 2012 work, especially pp. 227–228). Furthermore, her theoretical 'citizenship of photography' is difficult to grasp because its '… members are … anyone and everyone who bears any relationship whatsoever to photographs – as a photographer, a viewer of photographs, or a photographed person … the citizenry of photography is borderless and open' (2008, p. 97). Is the citizenry of photography really all-inclusive? How can it have meaning if it is indistinguishable? Foundational questions aside, looking at the photographic Pietà in the context of Azoulay's perspectives on ownership and civic duty exposes a space where photographic actors, agents and subjects do not fit in with her so-called citizenry. This space is outside of the Israel-Palestine binary, which is the stage for her work. Perhaps through these departures, her 'citizenship of photography' may find a comprehendible, even if less comprehensive constituency.

Azoulay's work functions in this discussion where she talks about framing the 'event of photography' (2012) and individuals using photography as part of anti-state petitioning (2008). She says, '[a]s long as photographs exist, I will contend, we can see in them and through them the way in which … a contract … enables the injured parties to present their grievances, in person or through others, now or in the future' (2008, p. 86), and while this makes sense in terms of exposing injustice, this is the context in which Azoulay declares that all photographs are public property by nature. She attempts to revise the traditional notion that the photograph '… was recognized as belonging to whomever possessed the instrument that created the photographic image and the support on which the original image was printed, rather than to the one who stood in front of the camera …' (2008, p. 99). The photographic Pietà contrasts with the notion of photographs as public property. In the environment where a woman holds a picture at a demonstration, and where the subject of that picture is missing, for an academic to say that woman's photograph could be public property is a misunderstanding of the situation. Speaking almost directly to this scenario she writes, 'At the same time that a photograph lies in someone's hands, someone else can always claim the deposited image for themselves, or at least demand to participate in its safekeeping … [which] stems from a duty toward the deposit as such …' (2008, p. 103). Safe-keeping of photos is, for Azoulay, a civic duty and this extends even to institutional or journalistic control and deployment of images where the identity of a person in the content is unknown. That said, the people in the photographic Pietà have other things at stake, especially if the embedded portrait is the only one left after the upheaval of war and internal displacement (as previously suggested here, p. 29), and especially where it could be locally understood as a physical,

and spiritual link to the missing person. Although Azoulay proclaims, 'the concepts of property and ownership are ontologically foreign to photography' (2008, p. 103), ownership of these particular hand-held portraits cannot be massaged into the property of an intellectualised citizenry. The essence of demonstrating a portrait to a camera is that a woman is showing physical, kin-ownership; and loss of kin, after all, is the message of the photographic Pietà. Portraits of the missing are definitely not something that 'someone else can always claim', even in the name of civic duty, without losing meaning. Until the image becomes the sub-content of a 'photographic event', these photographic portraits clearly belong to families. Civic duty comes into play depending on how the portraits are mobilised, and this discussion follows.

What does participation in the 'citizenry of photography' look like? Azoulay's civic duty is best shown in photographs where a person gestures at the circumstances of a catastrophe (2012, p. 229). This would naturally include the photographic Pietà, except that the latter begs for a deeper reading. In the scenario of the photographic Pietà, the catastrophe and victim are convoluted by the state of un-knowing, and the gesture is part of a performance that may only be personal interest, or it may come from a sense of civic or national duty. For sure, these pictures are deliberately made along with the media. The women 'give the photographer the right to turn them into a photographic image' but Azoulay's issue with them 'receiv[ing] no material reward' (2008, p. 106; see also p. 116) seems irrelevant compared with the other power transactions that are taking place. In fact, where she elaborates to say that 'the photographer ... may even become wealthy ...' her argument loses traction in the environment of these photographs. This is not to say that the people who become 'the content' (2008, p. 100) of photographs do not deserve better, or more recognition – rather it is to say that in the present case what is sought out is exactly this high-profile portrait photo. The subject of the photographic Pietà is not 'abandoned ... unable to determine [the photograph's] composition and the modes of distribution'. Quite the opposite: this kind of photograph, which Azoulay dismisses, (quoted later, p. 229) embodies the subject's empowerment, not her victimhood. Azoulay's fixation on the specific controversy with Florence Owens Thompson and Dorothy Lange, eclipses other possible discourses in which the photographic subject is not a victim but rather a participant and an agent. In the photographic Pietà a woman is taking control of the 'deposit' (2008, p. 103) of her private image by deliberately exposing it and re-framing it in yet a larger body of like-minded political activity. Although it could be seen as a concrete example of Azoulay's 'civic duty' it is also – importantly – a gendered civic duty accomplished in spite of paternalistic cultural norms, and while maintaining the privilege of image ownership on all levels. In the personal, performative context of the photographic Pietà, Azoulay's presumptive citizenry of photography has a subgroup of women non-conformists who participate in collective, often anti-state efforts as discreet individuals with private claims, and personal photographs.

Jalal Toufic's *Vampires* (2003) presents a welcome contrast to Azoulay's choreography of camera, photographer, image, victim and viewer. Toufic gets around such framing by pursuing multiple understandings of human presence. No more imaginary than Azoulay's 'citizenry', Toufic's references centre on film, where '[the] definite embodiment in cinema is undone' (2004, p. 41), and as mentioned earlier, on liminal states (Bardo) that are enacted by such figures as vampires and the undead (2004, p. 20). Elsewhere, Toufic outlines a 'disconnection of the sensory functions' that is both the result and the cause of experiencing extraordinary injustice (see Toufic, 2005, pp. 64–66). Being part of such threshold events presents challenges to perceptual certainties that are taken for granted in most everyday life, but for Toufic, to witness violence, or to commit it, opens up parallel realities such as described in Quantum physics (Schroedinger's cat). Following this, images may only be likenesses, and states of altered consciousness – madness, hypnosis, yoga trance or psychological experimentation – suggest alternative understandings of human presence. Threshold experiences of violence trigger multiple possibilities for existence that include liminal zones, vampires, and bodies-double and through these dynamics Toufic presents the reader with a way out of Azoulay's camera-victim-viewer circumstance. By talking about disembodiment, he unhitches a picture's human subject from individual presence (Toufic, 2003, pp. 36–37). That is, where Azoulay calls a person in a photograph the 'content', Toufic sees a spectrum of possibilities: it may be a likeness but not an actual individual; the individual may exist in this, or another universe. Moreover, the image may be a cinematic matte (*ibid*., pp. 46–47), created strategically over time: a likeness meaningfully installed in a semantic environment with other objects. Where Azoulay's voice corrals a fictional 'citizenry' in response to [official Israeli] photographers framing [Palestinian] victims, Toufic takes a Houdini-like position that comes from inside that frame – that escapes the frame – that might even declare the frames never existed. The tools he uses to stage the disembodiment necessary for escape appear in physics, writing, fiction, and cinema. This is most notable in his reference to the 1956 speech by Egyptian president Gamal Abdel Nasser, where Nasser's voice was 'broadcast on radio and reaching the Israeli-occupied territories in Palestine – not so much the body, its source, as a land, a country, without which even when incarnated in a body it remains a voice-over [an exiled voice]' (*ibid*., 2003, pp. 49–50). Toufic's writing comes from within the frame and escapes it, presenting endless ways to understand the energy behind the photographic Pietà and its dissemination.

### Framing and Dissemination: External and Internal Reproduction

Distribution of images from demonstrations about the missing is a central feature of the photographic Pietà, yet this functional complicity with the media may come at a cost.

Does reprinting a photo in the media diminish the sense that the missing person represented is a unique individual? In the context of ephemeral and popular consumption, Benjamin (1935) describes a scenario in which a reproduction passes as a satisfactory copy of an original, and multiplying this ersatz causes certain losses in the original's authenticity. Benjamin's concerns about mass production of images – and Sontag (2003) shares these – do apply to the photographic Pietà (see also Hoak-Doering, 2014, pp. 184–185). That is to say, the photographic Pietà may now be considered a hackneyed trope in the international news about missing people and even Azoulay's condescension is evident where she dismisses it as a 'tactic familiar from the 1980s (sic) onward where the photographed person shows his or her catastrophe to the camera' (2012, p. 229). The uniqueness that is arguably compromised is not in the image of the missing person, but rather in the uniqueness of the context; the demonstration, the sheer numbers of which, appearing in the press diminishes the originality of each demonstration, whether in Cyprus, Argentina or elsewhere in the world. Manufacture of many copies of an original is different from the mechanism of embedded distance. Embedded distance comes from multiple generations of an image, not multiple copies, and in the media, the embedded picture is always only second generation, no matter how many copies are printed. Thus, on one hand the embedded distance visually articulates the loss of a person: embedded reproduction actually authenticates the photographic Pietà image as a representation of a missing person. On the other hand, Benjamin's warning about the loss of authenticity through mass production does apply where the photographic Pietà is appropriated as propaganda.

Following the war in 1974, as previously noted, the Cyprus Government used versions of the photographic Pietà for its own purposes, and it became an icon of the Greek Cypriot agenda for resolving the Cyprus Problem. As such it was aimed at educating foreigners and students, and for instilling patriotism. In the year 2000, for example, the Press and Information Office (PIO) printed pamphlets titled 'Cyprus, Humanitarian Issues', which feature a vignette photo-montage including women demonstrating with images of their missing relatives. The pamphlet substantially links humanitarian issues with the unresolved political and military occupation of the north part of Cyprus, saying '… the consequences of Turkey's illegal aggression were devastating. Not least among these was the gross violation of human rights' (PIO 138/2000–30.000).

Government use of the photographic Pietà separated it from personal claims for justice and human rights. It appeared that the larger Greek Cypriot national agenda – which attempted to mobilise international outrage about the injustices of the Turkish Army invasion and occupation – co-opted the more personal, and specific demand for the return of missing relatives. According to sociologist Maria Hadjipavlou, 'institutions of the state, the church and the media played up the [role] of women to promote the nationalist project, which is partly to dehumanize the enemy and project its barbarity; and

to abstain from any responsibility in the creation of this human and political issue, especially in the long delay this entailed after 1974' (personal correspondence, 5 September 2011). One effect of the government's co-option of the matter was to problematise the way some Cypriots feel about the cause of the missing in Cyprus and about the cause promoted by the Relatives of Missing Persons in particular. Sant Cassia suggests, on a somewhat positive note, that a claim to having a missing relative sometimes acted as a way for marginalised classes to exercise connection to the political elite, since their own experiences embody and substantiate the Greek Cypriot official narrative of loss and imminent return (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999, p. 270). And yet those who did not agree with the government's approach to solving the Cyprus Problem could point to the Relatives of Missing Persons as having been made tools of propaganda. Sant Cassia describes this kind of cynicism and its origins in practice:

> '... With relatively few exceptions, the westernized middle classes do not demonstrate much, and having a missing son/father appears more as something to be concealed rather than displayed. They are also more resigned to their death. It is these people that the UN and other diplomats meet on the Nicosia cocktail circuit. It is easy for them to conclude that the issue is a cynical political ploy and divest it of its internal political dynamics and cultural resonances' (Sant Cassia, 1998–1999, p. 274).



Image 11: *Published by the Committee of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons*
(obtained by the author in 2001, document undated)

The perception that the Cyprus government instrumentalised the Relatives of Missing Persons for advancing its own agendas may be partially correct, but it is also true that the women involved with the cause have been politically vocal in ways that no others had been in modern Cypriot history until recently.

Often, the photographic Pietà appeared in local and international articles about the Missing as part of the Cyprus Problem. And in many examples, these images were used to advance the cause, where publicity was taken care of by hand, literally, by handing out flyers that deploy the photographic Pietà and by writing letters (image 11). This kind of photograph still cogently articulates the demands posed by Relatives of Missing Persons because of the existential reality that it depicts. It is visually accurate, the fruit of planning, and it is a record of actions that take place within a society that offers very few stages for women's voices. This is particularly the case with a smaller group within the Relatives of the Missing who took a slightly more stringent and proactive approach to demonstration: *Oi Manadhes tis Kyprou* (the Mothers of Cyprus).



Image 12: *Demonstration by relatives and supporters next to Ledra Palace – 12 July 2002*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

## Oi Manadhes tis Kyprou

A small, yet notorious group of mourning women (image 12) are known for their stubborn petitioning, regularly except on religious holidays, at the UN Buffer Zone checkpoints and other strategic places. Originally banding together by exchanging telephone numbers in a help-network of women searching for family members at hospitals and prisoner exchange points in 1974 and 1975, these women activists for the Cypriot Relatives of Missing Persons went on to demonstrate and deliver petitions for Human Rights at places like the United Nations in New York, Buckingham Palace, No. 10 Downing Street, the White House, and other local and international seats of power. They wrote letters to, and met with politicians (image 13) and world leaders.

Until about 2003 this group – known commonly as *Oi Manadhes tis Kyprou* – could often be seen in a small group at the Ledra Palace Hotel roadblock and handing out informational pamphlets about the events of 1974 to foreigners who would cross there, from the south to the north.[5] All the pamphlets featured photographic Pietà imagery, but the content varied from human rights to more Greek nationalist material, depending on which public action group published it. Some, published by the Committee of Relatives of Undeclared Prisoners and Missing Persons, enumerated human rights violations within both Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities, along with similar enumerations of UN resolutions about the unknown fate of civilians (see image 11). In addition to this kind of pamphlet, *oi Manadhes tis Kyprou* also used more nationalistic materials supported by the Pancyprian Anti-Occupation Movement (PAK), which were considerably different in



Image 13: *Demonstration at Ledra Checkpoint, undated with Demetris Christofias*
© photograph: Andreas Manolis

scope, and which seamlessly link the missing persons with illegal occupation of land (see also Psaltis *et al*., 2014; and Cyprus News Agency, 96-10-20). PAK's logo is a phrase from the *Iliad*, visible on the front of the tractor driven by Mrs Panayiota Pavlou Solomi (image 1). ʻΕις οἰωνος ἀριστός ἀμύνεσθαι περί πατρής' (The best omen [to hear] is [the exhortation] to defend your country). The logo is layered evidence of the pro-Greek conceptual origins of the PAK's goals. The *Manadhes tis Kyprou* were regularly at the Ledra Palace checkpoint, not always demonstrating, but a consistent presence before crossings were permitted to Greek Cypriots in 2003. In a way, their presentations gave inroads to cultural analysis that could bluntly summarise some of the complexities about the Cypriot missing already set forth in this paper (see Kirschenblatt-Gimblett, 1990, pp. 430–431). Their promotional material included stickers and pamphlets, directly

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5   See also the interview with Androulla Palma, one of the Mothers of the Missing, in *Birds of a Feather* (2012 film by Stephanos Evripidou and Stephen Nugent) cited in E.A. Davis (2014), p. 57.

engaging with visitors by asking them to examine their feelings about visiting places that were off-limits to natives.

> 'You are, perhaps, planning to visit the occupied, by Turkey, part of our island. We don't prevent you from doing so, but, nevertheless, we would like to inform you that since July 1974 we also yearn to visit our father's homes and light a candle at the graves of our parents ... We cannot, however, do so as this is FORBIDDEN by the Turkish Occupation Army' (PAK undated pamphlet collection of the author).

Since 2003, and especially after the exhumations began in 2006, these activists and the other Relatives of Missing Persons of Cyprus have become less visible in public and in print – partly because some of their concerns are being addressed, but more often because they are ageing.

### Conclusion

The Greek Cypriot photojournalistic image of a woman holding a photograph of her missing relative is a prototypical photographic Pietà, but it is not the only example of the motif. Other cultures also protest in similar ways although under very different political and ideological circumstances. Both embedded and historical distances result from this performative media interface, heightening the impact of images used in demonstrations, and projecting the existential absence of missing persons into an optical arena that is politically meaningful. This trope highlights how individuals can operate within, and defy ideological structures; not just patriarchal, economic or nationalist ideologies, but also optical, compositional structures in the media, both of which are complicit with power. Intentional self-exposure to the photojournalist's lens overturns the presumed victimhood of the photographic subject, and turns her into an activist. That is, the photographic Pietà exposes modalities that give disempowered people access to power through the media, and this is especially true for women. Although this discussion has focused on the photographic aspect of this performative trope, the symbolic ones mentioned are also operative in parallel ways that are becoming increasingly important with hashtags and other social media conventions that offer speed and widespread visibility. There is room for much more research on this, where symbols take the place of individuals. There is also scope for debate as to whether the photographic Pietà is perceived to be efficacious or over-used in the media. This paper is a beginning, a way to describe the photographic Pietà as a visual parsing of social science material already established on the subject, and an attempt to highlight one area in Cypriot politics where women have been vocal and visible. In that respect, the paper leaves much leeway for further work: into archival precedents for the photographic Pietà and in the many overlooked ways in which women have exerted power in Cyprus.

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# 'Reluctant' Muslims?
# Turkish Cypriots, Islam, and Sufism

## Mete Hatay

### Abstract

*Scholars and other observers have often remarked upon the minimal participation of Turkish Cypriots in Muslim religious rituals. Theories to explain this have included that Turkish Cypriots are actually crypto-Christians or that they are the descendants of Alevis, a heterodox branch of Islam. This paper argues, in contrast, that the decline of Muslim religious practice began in the island in the mid-nineteenth century, with Ottoman reforms that attempted to root out the Sufi folk practices that were common in the island, particularly in rural areas. The paper shows that this institutional suppression of Sufi Islam created a fertile ground for the rise of secularist Kemalism in the 1920s and 1930s.*

> 'European travellers in Asia Minor, mainly classical archaeologists and very seldom orientalists, are generally better acquainted with Christianity than with Islam. Consequently, the divisions of the Christians are more obvious to them than those of the Mahommedan populations. By most the latter are regarded as a single whole, and any divergence they may notice from orthodox Sunni practice suggests to them that the population in question has been affected by Christianity that is, it represents an originally Christian population half-converted to Islam' (Hasluck, 1921, p. 310).

## Introduction

One spring day, I guided a young documentary film director on a tour of former Turkish Cypriot villages in the Paphos district of the island. The director was considering making a film about such abandoned villages, and we toured as many as possible, trying to find a suitable spot for filming. One such village was in the rolling Paphos hills, with a steep slope into the valley below. As we pulled into the abandoned village and parked next to the mosque, we noticed a car coming towards us. It was a Turkish Cypriot family, originally from the village, visiting to look at their former homes. After the usual introductions and questions about the village, I asked when the minaret had been built, as I had been doing research on minaret and steeple building in the island. The man with whom I spoke was in his mid-fifties and so remembered the minaret's construction in the late 1960s. He had heard from his aunt that the mosque had been constructed in the 1920s, and I later confirmed this.

'But it was probably a *cemevi*, since it didn't have a minaret', he commented, referring to the place of worship of Alevism, an Islamic sect related to Shi'ism that is known for its more liberal views on drinking alcohol and gender relations, for instance.

'Why should it be a *cemevi*?' I asked. 'It was most likely a *mescit*.' The latter is the equivalent of a small chapel and would not have a minaret.

'Well, I read somewhere that mosques without minarets are most probably cemevis', he replied.

Starting in the 1990s, with the Alevi revival in Turkey, this became one of the favoured ways for Turkish Cypriots to explain their 'fundamental' secularism. While Turkish Cypriots are nominally Muslim, many researchers have commented on their lack of overt religiosity, including that they do not attend mosque or engage in religious education.[1] Turkish Cypriots, in turn, have sought to explain their own lack of religious practice, and when one book by a local historian, doctor and politician claimed that the reason was a historical Alevism,[2] for many people this was a convincing – if conveniently easy – explanation that stuck. Indeed, I would hear on many similar occasions that mosques without minarets 'demonstrated' that Turkish Cypriots were surely Alevi. Especially given the ways that the secularist state in Turkey has used the history of Alevism in Anatolia to point to a more fundamental Turkic secularism that had been corrupted by 'Arab' elements,[3] it should not be surprising that Turkish Cypriots would seek to explicate their radical adoption of Kemalist secularism in the mid-twentieth century in this way.

However, this is not the only explanation currently circulating for Turkish Cypriot society's secularism. On numerous other occasions it has been suggested to me that my blue eyes must surely indicate Latin roots, and that Turkish Cypriots are basically not Turkish but of Lusignan origin. An older explanation, and one primarily favoured by Greek Cypriots, is that Turkish Cypriots were really Greek Cypriots who had converted to Islam, so the latter religion never really took hold in the society. Moreover, the confusion regarding the roots of Turkish Cypriot secularism is not aided by the dearth of information. While there are several studies on the history and practice of the Orthodox Church in Cyprus, there has been very little on the structure of faith and practice in Turkish Cypriot society.

This article attempts to untangle Turkish Cypriots' *secular* and relaxed attitude to Islam from *secularism* based on the Westernising and modernising politics of Turkish nationalism.

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1   B. Yeşilada (2009) 'Islam and the Turkish Cypriots', *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 46–59; B. Yeşilada, P. Noordijk and C. Webster (2009) 'Religiosity and Social Values of the Cypriots', *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1, pp. 15–34.

2   N. Beratlı (1997) *Kıbrıs Türklerin Tarihi* [History of the Turkish Cypriot], Lefkoşa: Galeri Kültür Yayınları.

3   K. Tambar (2014) *The Reckoning of Pluralism: Political Belonging and the Demands of History in Turkey*, Stanford, CA: Stanford University Press.

I will claim that both of these are present at the same time, having different roots but often overlapping in Turkish Cypriots' current attitudes towards religion, particularly as it has been politicised during the Justice and Development Party [Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP)] rule in Turkey. As I remark above, several observers have noted Turkish Cypriots' reluctant approach to Islam. The mosques that in the past Turkish Cypriots at least attended on Fridays are today filled with immigrant workers and foreign university students. What is more, apart from funerals, Turkish Cypriots at present are not disposed to attend ceremonies at mosques, and the various rituals associated with Islam – such as circumcision, the *mevlits* that take place at various times after a death, or sacrifices – happen within the home or community but not in the institutions that are normally associated with religion.

In addition to this secular approach to Islam, there is also, amongst many Turkish Cypriots, a secularist approach inherited from Kemalist Turkish nationalism.[4] Today, for instance, Turkish Cypriots exhibit significant resistance to pressure coming from the Turkish government to reinstitute the religious classes that for many years had been erased from school curricula. As detailed below, this politicisation of the secular view has a historical background that dates to the nineteenth century, when the beginning of nationalism is perceived alongside the effects of the exiled Young Turks who filled the island during that period.[5] Conversely, this politicised secularism took root and spread in the community with the rising Kemalist tide that hit Cyprus' shores in the 1920s. But, one of the most striking facets of Kemalism's arrival in the island was the speed and ease with which religion disappeared from the public sphere, and the relative lack of controversy therein, especially compared to Anatolia. Below it is argued that the ease with which a Kemalist militant secularism took root in the community is directly related to an earlier period of secularisation that made Turkish Cypriots into reluctant Muslims.

It is advocated here that we can understand the emergence of Turkish Cypriot secularism only by understanding the historical practice of Islam in the island, and the changes in that practice that began with the Ottoman Empire's efforts at modernisation of the nineteenth century. Rather than resorting to Alevism or Crypto-Christianity as justifications, I demonstrate that we should instead begin with the variety of interpretations and practices within the Islamic tradition and culture.[6] İlber Ortaylı criticises the contemporary field of historiography for its erroneous portrayal of a single

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4   H.M. Ateşin (1996) *Kıbrıs'ta İslâmî Kimlik Dâvâsi* [The Issue of Islamic Identity in Cyprus], İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları.

5   A. Nevzat (2005) *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*. PhD Dissertation, University of Oulu, Finland.

6   M.H. Yavuz (2004) 'Is there a Turkish Islam? The Emergence of Convergence and Consensus', *Journal of Muslim Minority Affairs*, Vol. XXIV, No. 2, (October), pp. 213–232.

Islamic world and a monotypic *homo islamicus*.[7] Ortaylı also stresses that those who adopt this erroneous conception are generally intellectuals from the Middle East:

> 'Intellectual leaders of Arab nationalism were the ones that embraced and utilized the orientalist approaches of L. Massignon, T.E. Lawrence, and W.S. Blunt. Beyond the world of historiography and political thought, today's Islam is becoming more and more an ideological force' (Ortaylı, 2005, p. 21).

On the other hand, many writers point out that there are highly differentiated and at times contradictory interpretations of Islam.[8] For example, there is an immense difference between Islam in some Arab nations, or, to be more specific, Islamic belief in Saudi Arabia (Wahhabism) and Shia Islam in Iran. Hakan Yavuz lists the reasons for the emergence of such diverse interpretations as follows: the legacy of colonialism, the process of historical formation, different ways of adopting Islam, socio-cultural and political transformations, and different geographies.[9] Ocak claims that it is of utmost importance from the perspective of historical development to explore 'the Turk's' interpretation of Islam in the light of two main parallel processes, one of Sunni (orthodox) Islam and the other of non-Sunni (heterodox) Islam, developing simultaneously in a very large geographical space extending from Central Asia to the Balkans and over a long time in history'.[10] In this context, it is clear that it is more appropriate to investigate the Islamic character of Cyprus (at least during the Ottoman era) within the framework of Ottoman Islam.

A look at the relationship of the Ottoman Empire with Islam shows that while there are many different schools and sects of Islam, within the empire one may heuristically distinguish four forms of practice: 'State Islam, Literal Islam (Islam taught in the *madrasah*), Folk (popular) Islam, and Mystic Islam (Islam of the lodges, i.e. *tekke*)'.[11] According to Poulton, State Islam is controlled by the Islamic clergy (*ulema*) and has a legalistic structure practised in accordance with certain written rules.[12] It is argued that,

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7   İ. Ortaylı (2005) *İmparatorluğun En Uzun Yüzyılı* [The Long Century of the Ottoman Empire], İstanbul: Alkım Yayınları, p. 21.

8   Yavuz (2004) 'Is there a Turkish Islam?', *op. cit.*, pp. 213–214; A.Y. Ocak (1999) *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslâm: Yaklaşım, Yöntemler ve Yorum Denemeleri* [Turks, Turkey and Islam: Approaches, Methods, and Interpretative Efforts], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 79–80; T. Akpınar (1993) *Türk Tarihinde İslâmiyet* [Islam in Turkish History], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 33–35.

9   Yavuz (2004) 'Is there a Turkish Islam?', *op. cit.*, pp. 213–232.

10  Ocak (1999) *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslâm, op. cit.*, p. 35.

11  *Ibid.*, pp. 51–69.

12  H. Poulton (1997) *Top Hat Grey Wolf and Crescent: Turkish Nationalism and the Turkish Republic*, London: Hurst and Company, pp. 36–37.

'because it created a systematic theology and law throughout its history and institutionalized in the vicinity of other cultures', the State Islam with Sunni origins, 'became the official preference of the Turkish states, aside from a few exceptions, and therefore turned into a state policy'.[13] Literal Islam was the result of a tradition of theological activities (from a Sunni perspective) aimed at explaining the Qur'an and the Sunnah (the sayings and living habits of Muhammad) at the *madrasah* (Islamic schools) and generally contributed to State Islam through interpretation and education.[14] The third category, Folk Islam, is the one practised by the Muslim people.[15] Ocak describes this popular version of Islam as follows:

> 'The term Folk Islam represents a more unmethodical way of being a Muslim that is not only interpreted and lived as a faith and social lifestyle in accordance with the basic tenets of Islam, but also largely determined by the traditional way of life partially based on superstition' (Ocak, 1999, p. 52).

Ocak emphasises as well that Folk Islam has 'two dimensions, one orthodox and the other heterodox' and opposes the view that Folk Islam can solely be based on heterodoxy.[16]

> 'For example, among both the Sunnis and Alevi-Bektashis, and even among Sufi circles, beliefs and practices associated with a common cult of saints closely resemble each other (with certain exceptions). The "ulama" sector, however, eventually excluded and condemned such beliefs and practices, emphasizing insistently that these were to be considered causes of infidelity and heresy' (Ocak, 2001–2002).[17]

The final category of Mystic Islam (Islam belonging to the lodge or *tekke*), which is also the main theme of this article, represents what is known in Turkish as *tasavvuf* (sufism).[18] According to Turgut Akpınar, mystics or *sufis* 'seek and try to reach God not in a collective and formal manner as practised by organized religion, but in an individuated way and on their own'.[19] Furthermore, it is often argued that Islam entered

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13  Ocak (1999) *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslâm, op. cit.*, p. 60.

14  *Ibid.*, pp. 53–54.

15  *Ibid.*, pp. 52–53.

16  *Ibid.*, p. 52.

17  A.Y. Ocak (2001–2002) 'The Ottoman Empire and Islam, Framework for a New Interpretation', at *The 2001–2002 Sawyer Seminar*, the University of Chicago.

18  Akpınar (1993) *Türk Tarihinde İslâmiyet, op. cit.*, pp. 84–86.

19  *Ibid.*, p. 85.

the Turkish world of faith through Sufism. This, it is believed, is why Mystic Islam is the oldest mode of practice used by the Turks.[20] The Turkish tradition of Sufism 'can be described as a moral and scientific philosophy that reevaluated the pre-Islamic notion of providence in the light of Islamic contemplation'.[21]

For centuries, many different Sufi orders spread the tradition of Sufism to every corner of the Ottoman Empire. Hundreds of lodges served as centres where the Sufis practiced and discussed their mystic doctrines. Şerif Mardin says that Sufism became institutionalised in time and depicts its relationship with the Sunni State Islam as follows:

'The years after the establishment of the Empire represent a period of truce between these two versions of Islam; the Sunni Islam, on the one hand, and the institutionalized Sufism, on the other. While those who disseminated the word of the official religion gave a more cultivated shape to the Sunni sect of Islam, organizations at the various levels of society established official relationships with religious orders. The Janissaries [an elite corps of soldier-slaves] and the guilds were all affiliated with certain orders' (Mardin, 1983, pp. 92–93).[22]

The relationship between Mystic Islam and Folk Islam is worthy of analysis, too. One of the most important reasons behind the popularity of the Sufis among the people was their ability to offer the love of God to the masses in variegated forms. Poetry and music were among the most significant means to achieve this. Historical Sufi bards and dervishes such as Yunus Emre or Pir Sultan Abdal, quite popular even today, are important examples in this regard. Because they used the Turkish language when spreading their message, this helped the Turkish-speaking people to understand their philosophies much more easily. Many sects and orders had syncretic structures and quotidian rituals which made them preferable compared to the Islamic interpretation based on the strict rules of Sunni Islam. In lieu of the State Islam opposed to the heterodox and esoteric beliefs, these types of sects and Sufis that internalised a wide variety of traditional local cultures were more successful in building a strong bridge between the popular culture and the official ruling culture of the time. Although the State was at times in conflict with them, it tried to utilise the influence that the Sufis had over the people. Many powerful figures from the ruling circles were members of some orders, as well (especially the Mevlevi order). Such relationships not only provided the people with the

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20  Ocak (1999) *Türkler, Türkiye ve İslâm, op. cit.*, p. 56.
21  M.N. Bardakçı (2005) 'Bir Tasavvuf Mektebi Olarak Bektaşilik' [Bektashism as a School of Mysticism], *Uluslararası Bektaşilik ve Alevilik Sempozyumu* [International Symposium of Bektashism and Shiism], Süleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Theology, Isparta, 28–30 September, p. 51.
22  Ş. Mardin (1983) *Din ve İdeoloji* [Religion and Ideology], İstanbul: İletişim Yayınları, pp. 92–93.

opportunity of social mobility, but similarly served as channels through which the State could increase its influence and power over the society.

The Ottoman Cyprus of the same period reflected all of the above-mentioned Islamic attitudes and practices. One of the most important elements of this diversity in Cyprus under Ottoman rule was the Sufi alternative, which, as is demonstrated below, had a large share of religious practice in the island, especially in rural areas. It should be emphasised, however, that my argument is not that Sufi heteropraxy made Muslim Cypriots less ardent practitioners of an orthodox Islam. Indeed, what constitutes orthodoxy and what constitutes heterodoxy may be argued to shift over time and location. Rather, I argue that it was the Ottoman state's attempt, starting in the early nineteenth century, to impose a particular interpretation of orthodoxy and suppression of what its rulers perceived to be heterodoxy that gradually tore Muslim Cypriots from the sources of their religious devotion.

## The Emergence of Mystic Islam in Cyprus

The conversion of certain churches (mostly Catholic churches) into mosques and the establishment of an Islamic court by the Ottomans immediately after the conquest of the island in 1571 were the first symbolic signs of the new Islamic rule in Cyprus. In order to reinforce and strengthen the sovereignty of Islam on the island, the Ottoman Empire transferred some of the population from its other regions (mainly, from Anatolia) to Cyprus, as they had done previously in other newly conquered lands, and thus created the conditions for the formation of a Muslim community on the island. Many Muslims from Anatolia or sometimes from other regions came or were transferred to Cyprus up to the end of the nineteenth century. In addition to the transferred populations, the conversion of some non-Muslims to Islam also contributed to a rise in the number of Muslims on the island.[23] According to the first official census carried out in 1831, Muslims constituted 35% of the island's population.[24] This shows that over time the population transfers created a stable Muslim community on the island. If we analyse the structure of the Muslim settler population of Cyprus, the evidence for the above-mentioned religious/cultural diversity can easily be detected.

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23  R.C. Jennings (1993) *Christians and Muslims in Ottoman Cyprus and the Mediterranean World, 1571–1640*, New York/London: New York University Press, pp. 137–139.

24  M.A. Erdoğru (1997) 'Kıbrıs Adası'nın 1831 Tarihli Bir Osmanlı Nüfus Sayımı' [The 1831 Ottoman Census of the Island of Cyprus], *Ege Üniversitesi Edebiyat Fakültesi Tarih İncelemeleri Dergisi* [Ege University, Faculty of Literature, Journal of Historical Studies], İzmir Proceedings Seventh Cultural Studies Symposium, No. 12, p. 82.

The first signs of Sufism or Mystic Islam – the main focus of this article – were observed during the Ottoman conquest of the island. In each war that was waged by the Ottomans there were quite a few Sufis who provided spiritual guidance for the soldiers as well as participated in battles with them.[25] It is known that Sufis were buried as martyrs at the places where they fell. Many of them died alongside the soldiers while trying to seize a fortress during the conquest of Cyprus, and in particular of Nicosia, and their graves are still preserved. It is worth noting that the burial places of these entombed saints have been and continue to be sites of veneration as an essential part of Folk Islamic tradition. Bağışkan writes that a great number of the sites of spiritual offerings in Cyprus include locations where entombed saints or rather shrines are situated. He notes too that such sites are considered to have the power of healing:

> '[T]hese places (in the light of a superstitious belief) were seen as hospitals and the entombed Sufis were regarded as doctors. It was widely believed that visiting these sites, making offerings there, and tying pieces of clothing belonging to the sick persons on the graves, or on the windows of the shrines, or on the trees near the holy sites will heal the sick by binding the sickness there and/or that those who made offerings in these places will see their wishes come true. Therefore, when the believers who made offerings were healed or saw their wishes come true, this was seen as the proof of the spiritual power that these graves held' (Bağışkan, 2005, p. 285).[26]

On the other hand, it is believed that the first Sufi lodge to be established in Cyprus is Mevlevi Lodge (*mevlevihane*) near Kyrenia Gate. Harid Fedai and Mustafa Haşim Altan claim that the Mevlevi Lodge was constructed soon after the conquest. Historical records show that it was built with endowments provided by Arap Ahmet Pasha, one of the first governors of Cyprus.[27] Yusuf Agha, the master of Janissaries, and other leading figures of the period were among the donors who made contributions toward the maintenance of the lodge.[28] Besides support from military elites, some non-Muslims were also known to provide the lodge with funds from their properties. For instance, Rafael Lazari, a Jew, donated the income from his house in Lefkoşa/Nicosia to this lodge.[29]

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25  Ö.L. Barkan (1942) 'İstila Devirlerinin Kolonizatör Türk Dervişleri ve Zaviyeler' [The Coloniser Turkish Sufis and Hermitages of the Conquest Periods], *Vakıflar Dergisi* [Endowments Journal], No. 2, pp. 281–285.

26  T. Bağışkan (2005) *Kıbrıs'ta Osmanlı-Türk Eserleri* [The Ottoman-Turkish Monuments in Cyprus], Lefkoşa: Kuzey Kıbrıs Müze Dostları Derneği Yayını [Published by the North Cyprus Association of Museum Friends], p. 285.

27  H. Fedai and M.H. Altan (1997) *Lefkoşa Mevlevihanesi* [Lefkosa Mevlevi Lodge], Ankara: TRNC Ministry of National Education, Culture, Youth Affairs and Sports Publications, pp. 6–8.

28  *Ibid.*, p. 9.

29  Jennings (1993) *Christians and Muslims*, *op. cit.*, pp. 57–58.

After the conquest of Cyprus the establishment of the Mevlevi Lodge was followed by the formation of lodges and convents by several other religious orders. It has been documented that there were six orders that were active in the above-mentioned period: They were Bektashi, Mevlevi, Naqshbandi, Kadiri, Rufai, Melami and Halveti. Some foreign visitors were also interested in the above Sufi orders in Cyprus, and it is estimated that the activities surrounding the Bektashi order – one of the most important heterodox orders of the day – began with the deployment of a 1,000-man Janissary garrison. Many historians dwelt upon the subject of the Bektashi–Janissary relationship[30] and the focus of their research is discussed below. Until the beginning of the sixteenth century, the garrison soldiers were generally *devshirmes* (boys taken from Christian families to be conscripted and converted to Islam by force) and their patron saint was Hacı Bektaş Veli.[31] Reşat Ekrem Koçu (2004) claims that the historical sources of the time call the Janissaries 'Zumrei Bektashiyan' [*Bektashi clan*] or 'Dudmanı Bektaşiyan' [*Bektashi tribe*]. Other sources from the same period indicate that the headwear [*börk*] worn by the Janissaries was authorised by a *dervish* (Sufi practitioner).[32] Although some argue that the *börk* was authorised by Hacı Bektaş Veli himself, there are many documents proving this claim to be anachronistic, because Hacı Bektaş Veli died long before the establishment of the infantry units known as the Janissaries.[33]

J.A.B. Palmer (2000) focuses on the possibility that this dervish was a Bektaşi dervish from Amasya[34] but İsmail Hakkı Uzunçarşılı relates the Janissary–Bektashi link to the Ahi order or community, a craftsmen lodge system in which each occupation, with its own lodge, also had its own spiritual Sufi leader. Uzunçarşılı (1988) claims that in light of this tradition the Janissaries chose Hacı Bektaş Veli as their master or patron saint and thereby became the members of his order.[35] The words of the following Janissary march or prayer (*gülbank*) attest to this possibility:

> 'O God Almighty
> Head is naked, heart is burning, sword is in blood
> Many are beheaded here, but no one cares
> O God Almighty

30 İ. Ortaylı (2000) *Osmanlı İmparatorluğu'nda İktisadi ve Sosyal Değişim: Makaleler I* [Economic and Social Change in the Ottoman Empire: Essays I], Ankara: Turhan Publications, pp. 345–351.

31 R.E. Koçu (2004) *Yeniçeriler* [Janissaries], İstanbul: Doğan Books, pp. 11–13.

32 *Ibid.*, pp. 11–17.

33 J.A.B. Palmer (2000) 'Yeniçerilerin Kökeni' [The Origins of the Janissaries], in O. Özel and M. Öz (eds), *Söğüt'ten İstanbul'a* [From Söğüt to Istanbul], İstanbul: İmge Publications, pp. 484–485.

34 *Ibid.*, pp. 484–485.

35 İ.H. Uzunçarşılı (1988) *Osmanlı Devleti Teşkilatından Kapıkulu Ocakları* [Household Troops in the Ottoman State System], Ankara: Turkish Historical Society Publications, pp. 148–149.

> Our sword aims at harming the enemy
> Our allegiance is to the Crown
> Threes, sevens, forties
> Prayers for Muhammed and Ali
> And for our master Hacı Bektaş Veli
> Let's say "hu" for time immemorial!
> Huuuuuuuuuuu!' (Koçu, 2004, p. 11).

Şevki Koca's list of the Bektashi lodges in Cyprus includes the Bayraktar (Alemdar) Baba (Bayraktar Mosque) Lodge, not far from the Ömeriye district.[36] This lodge was constructed on the city walls of what is known as the Kostanza Tower. Koca argues that the lodge 'was constructed in memory of the Janissary Bektashi saint who fell during the conquest in 1570 just as he was about to plant a flag'. It is also believed that the shrine of Bayraktar Baba is here.[37] The Bektashi order, which has made an important impact on Ottoman social and cultural life, quickly grew in size after the sixteenth century. The order spread to the farthest corners of the Balkans and Greece and aimed to expand the influence of Islam by maintaining most of the pre-Islamic faith motifs and continuing many of the Christian-based traditions. The Bektashi faith was predominantly popular in the newly Islamicising societies. The spiritual leaders of many craftsmen lodges were Bektashis, too. It is not a coincidence that the patron saint of tanners and butchers in Cyprus was Ahi Revan.[38] Berkes argues that the Bektashi order, which became ever more powerful throughout the eighteenth century, also encouraged several rebellions against the Ottoman Sultan in which the Janissaries were involved.[39]

It is widely held that the heterodox nature of faith within the order became more potent as time moved on. For instance, in the fifteenth century, the heterodox Hurufi dervishes, perceived as a threat to the state in Iran, sought refuge in Anatolia, where they influenced the Bektashi order.[40] Bardakçı describes this process as follows:

> 'When Balım Sultan, who was educated in Dimetoka Seyid Ali Sultan lodge, the largest Bektashi lodge in the Balkans, became the sheikh of the Hacı Bektaş order, he

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36 Ş. Koca (2003) *Kıbrıs'ta Bektaşi Dergahları* [The Bektashi Lodges in Cyprus], 7 September 2001. Available at: [http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr/makale-deneyimler/kibris-bektasi-dergahlari/], last accessed on 6 March 2016.

37 *Ibid*.

38 R. Katsiaounis (1996) *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus: During the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, p. 45.

39 N. Berkes (2002) *Türkiye'de Çağdaşlaşma* [Modernisation in Turkey], İstanbul: Yapı Kredi Publications, pp. 157–160.

40 Bardakçı (2005) 'Bir Tasavvuf Mektebi', *op. cit*., pp. 58–59.

transformed certain widespread practices into principles, which enabled the consolidation of a mix of Christian, Shiite, and Hurufi beliefs within the Bektashi faith. In this way, traditions like twelve Imams, *mücerretlik* (living an unmarried life), *demlenme* (drinking wine), *ibahilik* (based on refuting Sunni bans and perception of sins), wearing earring, trinity (Allah-Muhammed-Ali), *hulül* (the entry of God into the realm of appearances), and twelve posts gained legitimacy' (Bardakçı, 2005, pp. 58–60).

## Sufi Lodges and Rituals in Cyprus

Giovanni Maritti visited the island in 1760 and observed that there were many Sufi dervishes attached to different orders in Cyprus. Maritti provides a detailed description of a lodge located in Larnaca which the Christians named 'Ayios Arab' and the Muslims simply 'Arab'.[41] This is probably the Turabi Lodge, which was administered by Bektashis in the eighteenth century.[42] Turkish Cypriots believe that the shrine in the lodge belongs to 'Umm Haram's black servant Türabi Dede', whereas Greek Cypriots and Catholics believe that it is the shrine of 'the black skinned Saint Therapon who is known as "Ayios Arab" in the Middle Ages and called Tarabo or Harabo by the common people'.[43] Maritti claims that their founder was a Molla Khunkiar, 'under whose rule they are formed into sundry convents and mosques'. He notes, moreover, that their practices are unusual in that they include the participation of women:

> 'They preach in these [the convents and lodges] twice a week, and admit to their sermons men and women, a thing not usually allowed in other mosques. One of them begins his discourse with a passage from the Qur'an, generally in condemnation of the very vices from which they themselves never abstain. The other Dervishes stand listening, separated from the people by a grating. When the sermon is over some of them begin to sing a hymn, accompanied by the music of reed-flutes, and by a dance which their chief begins and the others join in. They begin to turn very gently round the mosque, one after another, gradually increasing the pace until they circle round close together, with such speed that the eye can scarcely follow them. The dance over they squat down on their heels, and wait very demurely until their chief begins the dance anew, when all follow him' (Maritti, 1971, p. 34).

Bağışkan claims that this ritual is the Mevlevi *Sama* ceremony. However, if one reads Maritti's description more carefully, it can be detected that the ritual also bears the mark

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41  G. Maritti (1971) *Travels in the Island of Cyprus*, translated by C. Cobham, London: Zeno, pp. 33–35.
42  Bağışkan (2005) *Kıbrıs'ta Osmanlı-Türk Eserleri*, *op. cit*., pp. 52–53.
43  *Ibid*., p. 53.

of Bektashi *semah*.[44] Maritti distinguishes between three kinds of dervishes in that period: Dervishes, '*santons*' and '*abdalis*'.[45] Maritti, who besides giving a detailed description of the clothes worn by the dervishes, writes that although their manners are courteous, they nevertheless practice 'unnatural' vices, while 'their feigned devoutness helps them to indulge their unhallowed tastes'.[46] He continues that dervishes differ from santons in both their clothing and their behaviour. Santons, whom Maritti finds 'uncivil' and 'repulsive', 'are always filthy and wander around half-naked like the poor from India'. Their rituals are as follows:

> 'Their religious exercises take place three hours after sunset, and consist in whirlings and contortions and howls which become bestial bellowings, terrible to hear. One of them meanwhile clashes cymbals or beats a drum, shouting continually Allah (God): at last they fall faint from fatigue, and foam fearfully at the mouth: it is now that Mohammadans believe that the Santons are conversing with God and Mohammad. Recovered from their swoon they feast and consort with youths and women after a most unseemly fashion. These monks however enjoy no great credit with their fellow Mohammadans' (Maritti, 1971, p. 35).

Finally, Maritti notes that there was another group called 'abdali' (abdal) in Cyprus who did not have their own place of worship. He maintains that abdals were those dervishes who constantly wandered and were reminiscent of santons because of their lifestyle. He particularly notes that women were extremely attracted to abdals.[47] Moreover, the abdals who were respected were the Alevite/Bektashi Sufis, who were known for their unconventionality. Although they lacked lodges, abdals were able to perform religious rites by coming together with the people wherever they went. Most of them were folk poets as well, and they generally followed Sufism. The well-known Sufi poet Yunus Emre was an abdal, and his verses paradigmatically represent their beliefs:

> 'Dear Friend, let me plunge in the sea of love,
> Let me sink in that sea and walk on.
> Let both worlds become my sphere where I can
> Delight in the mystic glee and walk on.'[48]

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44  Bağışkan (2005) *Kıbrıs'ta Osmanlı-Türk Eserleri*, *op. cit*., p. 55.

45  Maritti (1971) *Travels in the Island of Cyprus*, *op. cit*., pp. 34–35.

46  *Ibid*., p. 34.

47  *Ibid*., p. 35.

48  'Dear Friend, let me plunge in the sea of love' by Y. Emre, published in T.S. Halman and J.L. Warner (eds) (2005) *Nightingales and Pleasure Gardens: Turkish Love Poems*. Translated by T.S. Halman. New York: Syracuse University Press, p. 25.

It can easily be observed from the foregoing that there were many heterodox devout dervishes in Cyprus in the period under consideration here. The alleged 'immorality', including the claim that rituals ended with sex, was probably slander spread by other orthodox Sunni Muslims with the aim of humiliating the heterodox dervishes. Even today such ideas are used to degrade those who hold Alevite beliefs. For instance, because in Alevism men and women worship together, it is widely believed that rituals end with a practice called *mum söndü* 'The candle went out', in which believers engage in indiscriminate sex in the dark. This myth bears no relation to Alevi practice and is one example of the popular degradation of Alevi belief. In contrast to these more orthodox attempts at degradation, we know that dervishes, contrary to the legalistic State Islam with strict rules, were widely revered by persons with little knowledge of formal Islam and who remained within the remit of the religion through forms of worship such as invocation (*zikir*) and whirling (*sama*). According to Sir Harry Luke:

> 'The purpose of the Sufi doctrine is to help the soul which was once one with God but got separated from him by entering the world return to God and achieve reunion with him. The journey of returning to God takes place on a "path" (*tarik*) taken by one of the dervish "orders" (*tarikatlar*). The stages of this "path" are represented by *zikir*, that is, rituals which differ in each order and which are performed so as to reach a state of transcendence that enables the mind to withdraw from worldly things and get closer to the Divine Power' (Luke, 2006, pp. 19–20).[49]

In the Mevlevi order, *zikir* involves dancing and whirling until one does not have the power to stand up. On the other hand, in the Nakshibendi and Rufai orders, *zikir* involves a rhythmic repetition of certain religious statements. This repetition continues until one has entered a trance, which ultimately results in exhaustion. This state of exhaustion is known as *hâl*.[50] Some dervishes are also known to hurt themselves with a skewer or sword after they reach the state of *hâl*. It is believed that they become immune to pain in this state of exaltation.[51] Luke himself witnessed this kind of *zikir* in the first quarter of the twentieth century in the *Kırklar Tekkesi*, an old Bektashi lodge under Nakshibendi control located 10 kilometres outside Lefkoşa/Nicosia, and gave a detailed description of this ritual in his book:

> 'Dervishes crouched on the floor in the shape of a circle in the mosque [lodge] call out to God with one voice in a beautiful and distinct rhythm. They swing from side to side and

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49  H.C. Luke (2006) *Dans Eden Dervişler: Seyahatname* [The City of the Dancing Dervishes], İstanbul: Gri Press, pp. 19–20.
50  *Ibid.*, pp. 60–61.
51  *Ibid.*

repeat "God help us, God help us" (*Ya medet, ya Allah, ya medet ya Allah*). After a short while, the rhythm and the prayer change. At the end of each statement, they bow down and shout out "There is no god but Allah, there is no god but Allah" (*La ilahe illallah, la ilahe ilallah!*), faster and louder each time, putting a special stress on the last two syllables. After a while, they move on to mystic words and shout "*Ya Hu!*" with a sound from the throat similar to howling. Now their swinging is much faster, so fast that even though they are still crouched on the floor they begin to shake. ... Suddenly, the old Sheikh jumps to his feet with a strange look in his eyes ... and takes off his clothes. He pulls off the sword waiting for him and runs forward with the sword's sharp end pushing towards his body. ... Although he is left breathless, he shouts "*Ya hu*" ... Now he has a long skewer in his hand ... He pulls the skin on his chest as far as he could and, after turning the skewer a few times in his hand, pushes it through his skin without shedding blood ...' (Luke, 2006, pp. 61–63).

This spectacle, which is a standard trick in any circus nowadays, understandably had the potential to make a huge impact on ordinary villagers of the time. Performances like these were actions that reinforced the belief among the people regarding the supernatural powers possessed by dervishes. For instance, Sheikh Ali Rıfkı Efendi, the last sheikh of the Turabi Lodge between 1911 and 1950, was considered a 'miracle-making' dervish. Bağışkan describes the folk belief in this sheikh's extraordinary healing powers:

It is still remembered that he had numberless Turkish and Greek patients who visited him because of their belief in his potent breath. He was especially considered a master in healing mental patients. After saying prayers for and blowing holy breath towards (*okuyup üflemek*) his patients inside a building next to the lodge, he made amulets for them. ... [O]nce, a mentally ill Greek girl who assaulted everyone around her and was chained because even six people could not hold her down was brought to the sheikh. He made the girl sit on the chair in front of him and began to blow his breath on her face. After half an hour, when he finished saying his prayers, the girl was transformed into a normal person. After becoming a healthy person, the girl often visited the sheikh, begging him to convert her to Islam ...' (Bağışkan, 2005, p. 53).

## Reforms of the Nineteenth Century and the Decline of Mystic Islam

In the nineteenth century, Sultan Mahmut II initiated a comprehensive reform movement in order to respond to the general decline of the Ottoman Empire. In addition to the modernisation of the army and the establishment of a central bureaucracy, it was decided in 1826 that the Janissary units which resisted modernisation should be dissolved. This was achieved in a relatively short time. Mahmut II likewise initiated the prohibition of the Bektashi faith due to its close relationship with the Janissaries. He sent into exile and even

ordered the execution of many Bektashi fathers.[52] This decision was equally supported by the Sunni *ulema*, who argued that the Bektashi faith should be banned not because of its connection with the Janissaries, but on account of its heterodox nature. The *ulema* accused Bektashis of *Rafizilik* (Shia Islam) and argued that they were *mülhit* (heretics)[53] using the pages of the Qur'an as corks in wine bottles, abusing the names of three of the four caliphs, and abandoning the rituals of daily prayers (*namaz*) and fasting (*oruç*).[54] With Mahmut II's decision, many of the Bektashi lodges that had been constructed less than sixty years earlier were demolished. Mahmut II then transferred the remaining Bektashi lodges to those orders which were loyal to him. Nakshibendis viewed this as an opportunity to seize the property of what they regarded to be a rival order and thereby became a significant force within the Empire.[55]

The effects of the reforms were quickly felt in Cyprus, too. A lot of Bektashi lodges found on the island were transferred to Nakshibendis and Kadiris. It is known that the Bektashis had several lodges, including the *Bayraktar Dergahı* (Flagbearer Lodge), before the implementation of the reforms. Among the important Bektashi lodges in Cyprus were *Zuhurât (Zuhûri) Baba Dergâhı, Kırklar (Can Baba) Dergâhı, Katip Osman (Kutup Osman) Baba Dergâhı* and *Hasan Baba Dergâhı*.[56] The Bektashi lodge known as the *Zuhûrî Baba Tekkesi* was in Larnaca. It is depicted in Evliya Çelebi's *Seyahatname* (*Book of Travels*) as an important site of the craftsmen lodge, Zuhuri, which comprises Ottoman masters of traditional shadow play. Koca states that lodges were taken away from the Bektashis in 1826 and transferred to orthodox Sufi orders loyal to the Sultan. One of the most obvious examples of such a transfer is the Zuhuri lodge (*tekke/dergah*):

'This lodge [*dergâh*] was partially destroyed after 1826, following the abolition of the Janissary units and the Bektashi order. Although the lodge was renovated during the reign of Sultan Abdülaziz (1860), a minaret with a balcony [*şerefe*] and two arches [*çifte kemerli*] was also added to the original plan. The lodge was transferred to the

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52  B. Lewis (1961) *The Emergence of Modern Turkey*, London: Oxford University Press, pp. 78–80.

53  According to Lewis, the term *mülhid* or *mülhit* accounted for all kinds of sceptical beliefs that fell beyond the confines of Sunni Islam, including materialism, atheism, agnosticism, that is, all sorts of religious tendencies that were considered a threat to the State. See B. Lewis (1953) 'Some Observations on the Significance of Heresy in the History of Islâm', *Studia Islamica*, No. 1, pp. 54–56.

54  A.Y. Soyyer (2005) 'Bektaşi Tekkelerinin 1826'da Kapatılışını Anlamak' [Understanding Why the Bektashi Lodges Were Closed Down in 1826], *Uluslararası Bektaşilik Ve Alevilik Sempozyumu* [International Symposium on the Bektashi and Alevite Faiths], Süleyman Demirel University, Faculty of Theology (September), pp. 28–30.

55  Soyyer (2005) 'Bektaşi Tekkelerinin 1826'da Kapatılışını Anlamak', *op. cit*., pp. 28–30.

56  Koca (2003) *Kıbrıs'ta Bektaşi Dergahları*, *op. cit*., at: [http://www.cemvakfi.org.tr/makale-deneyimler/kibris-bektasi-dergahlari/].

Nakshibendi order from this year onwards and in 1869 it was given to Hafız Huseyin Efendi, a Sunni from the Nakshibendi order. In the years that followed, this lodge also served as a Mevlevi *dergâh'* (Koca, 2003).[57]

In this same period, the other lodges mentioned above were either turned into mosques or set up to be administered by Nakshibendi or Kadiri dervishes. This was a time when the Bektashi order was forced underground in every corner of the Ottoman Empire. Many Bektashis began to disguise their identities as Nakshibendis, and in time this brought about the emergence of a Nakshibendi/Bektashi mix. Soyyer explains this as follows:

'Despite this reality, a Nakshi–Bektashi conception also developed. At times this was caused by the adoption of the Bektashi esoteric mentality by the Nakshibendi sheikhs appointed to the Bektashi lodges. At other times, these sheikhs were influenced by a semi-Bektashi and semi-Nakshibendi attitude. Indeed some Nakshibendi groups were completely transformed into Bektashis in terms of their perceptions and methods, although their names remained unchanged' (Soyyer, 2005, p. 70).

The Tânzimat (*reorganisation*) era which began in 1839 and constituted a continuation of the reforms initiated by Sultan Mahmut II had different consequences insofar as it shook the foundations of not only Bektashi lodges, but of all the Islamic institutions of the Empire. The most significant new reforms were those concerning the Islamic *waqf*; that is to say, those relating to donated or bequeathed assets as religious endowments or foundations. The new reforms ushered in the exemption from taxation of Islamic endowments under a central authority and resulted in the transfer of the administration of many autonomous endowments to provincial directorates under the authority of the Ministry of Endowments in İstanbul. It is widely acknowledged that during the Ottoman period, a major share of endowment revenues was used to maintain religious sites. Countless endowed resources comprising farm revenues and shop rents constituted a vital portion of the revenues received by many religious institutions including Sufi lodges.[58] Furthermore, many sheikhs affiliated with Sufi lodges maintained their own family endowments. All revenues endowed to the lodge were usually controlled by the sheikh of that particular lodge and his family. The incomes were used to provide for the poor, uphold the lodges and meet the daily needs of the dervishes.[59]

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57  *Ibid.*

58  J.R. Barens (1987) *An Introduction to Religious Foundations in the Ottoman Empire*, New York: E.J. Brill, pp. 87–97.

59  *Ibid.*, pp. 87–90.

Following the phase of centralisation, many lodges and their sheikhs lost control of their economic resources. Moreover, many of the local endowment directors appointed by İstanbul in an attempt to establish a central, 'modern' administration were known to utilise the advantage of being away from the centre. They brought their own men to the vacant positions of previous members of the board of trustees. They even took possession of certain endowment properties by claiming ownership either in their own name or in the name of third persons (usually their relatives).[60] At the time of the British arrival on the island, many of the lodges (and other religious institutions) were dilapidated owing to the lack of material resources, and most dervishes sought their survival as beggars.[61] The only order to survive the destruction triggered by such reforms was the Mevlevi order, which had always managed to sustain good relations with the state. In 1860, the Mevlevis succeeded in receiving a warrant from the Sultan, which allowed them to retain control of their endowments. Over and above this they gained the opportunity to take control of lodges that belonged to some orders that lacked the material means to survive.[62] Mevlevis were able to preserve their privileged status until the end of the Ottoman Empire.

With the establishment of the Republic of Turkey, all Sufi orders were banned. Mevlevis, too, whose administrative centre was Konya, moved to Halep (Aleppo) and continued their activities there in response to the ban. The Cyprus Mevlevi lodge (*Mevlevihane*) was first affiliated with Halep; however, their activities had to end in the 1950s as a consequence of the persistent resistance of the Kemalist Turkish Cypriot leadership.

In Cyprus, the existence of such orders was important in terms of making Islam available to those living in rural regions where Sunni Islam could not penetrate due to its legal and formal structure. Most lodges were able to meet the spiritual needs of the people with their music, dance, and poems and nurture them within the remit of Islam. Dervishes wandering from village to village were the only carriers of Islam in those places where no mosques or *imams* existed. The lodges in towns were also used as shelters by the poor and acted as sites of social care where orphans were looked after and the hungry were fed. The Ottoman modernisation and reforms followed by the socio-cultural and political transformations under British sovereignty all resulted in the demise of lodges. Up until the nineteenth century, Sufis were akin to missionaries spreading the word of Islam in Cyprus, the spiritual leaders of the villagers, and fathers to the many orphaned and poor. Their demise was a major blow to Folk Islam. From the end of the nineteenth century onwards, some rural Cypriot Muslims who were left without spiritual guidance

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60 M.B. Seager (1883) *Reports on the Evkaf Properties*, London: Cyprus Colonial Office, pp. 11–12.

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 43–44 and 58.

62 *Ibid.*, p. 29.

from visiting Sufis were obliged to meet their religious needs by either converting to other religions or by finding new spiritual guides. In most cases the new spiritual guides were the Orthodox bishops who were gradually becoming more powerful. Hafız Lokman Hekim describes the 'danger' of that period in the following words:

> 'Turks were less in number than Greeks in the villages, they were speaking in Greek and with no schools, *imam*s, and mosques, Turkish villages were in a pathetic state to the extent that some Turks were even becoming Greeks under the influence of crafty bishops' (Nesim, 1987, p. 65).[63]

Of course, there were various other reasons behind conversions, including economic, social and political aspirations. Still, the disappearance of traditional religious guides from most of the villages in the nineteenth century deserves to be counted among the main reasons, particularly following a period when folk and heterodox religious beliefs were widespread in certain locations and when such beliefs were generally nurtured by Sufi orders. As the wide Sufi networks in the villages became less and less influential, the religious needs of villagers were met through practices based on folk Islamic rituals (such as rain prayers and healing through prayers) which were increasingly being met by the 'miracle-making' bishops of the Orthodox Church. Conversions occurred under such circumstances.

## Conclusion

Sufi orders had been active since the time the Turks first accepted Islam as their religion. In the newly conquered lands Sufi orders brought different interpretations to Islam by syncretically blending them with the old Turkish faiths and local religions. As Sufis became more institutionalised over a period of time and began to act as a bridge between State Islam and Folk Islam, they started to assume the role of social welfare functionaries. Along with their lodge-based social care activities supported by their endowments, they guided and directed the people's metaphysical needs, as well. Although Sufis were sometimes used by the state to pacify resistance movements against the sovereign, they occasionally acted as mediators and even at times leaders of popular reactions against the administration. Moreover, they were involved in several rebellions and subjected to prosecutions and oppression as a result.

As in other regions of the Ottoman Empire, the Sufis in Cyprus were instrumental in enabling the people to keep faith with Islam through their syncretic interpretations that

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63  A. Nesim (1987) *Batmayan Eğitim Güneşlerimiz* [Our Education Suns That Never Set], Lefkoşa: TRNC Ministry of National Education and Culture Publications, p. 65.

were open to folk rituals. Their eventual demise had a huge negative effect on the state of Islam in the island. With the arrival of British rule, following a period in which lodges were closed down or repressed, many Muslim villagers opted to change their religion. Nevertheless, it would not be wrong to argue that the beliefs and practices of the times when heterodox lodges were influential, highly determined the secular attitude acquired by the Cypriot Muslims in subsequent years. One of the reasons why Kemalist and secular ideas were so readily accepted after reaching the island near the end of the 1920s should be sought in the fact that Cypriot Muslims had, for centuries, been practicing a 'soft' version of Islam informed by heterodox orders. Additionally, many Islamic institutions (including Sufi lodges) were both materially and spiritually shaken by the reforms of the nineteenth century, and in consequence, their ability to influence Muslim villages in rural regions was considerably reduced.

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# Unemployment in Greek Cypriot Families: Psychosocial Impact, Coping Strategies, and Grassroots-level Solutions

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## Abstract

*The recession of the Cyprus economy began in 2009 and culminated in the island experiencing the third highest unemployment rate in the European Union in the years 2013, 2014, and 2015 (Statista, 2015). To sketch out the profile of the Greek Cypriot unemployed, determine the psychosocial impact of unemployment, and identify risk and protective factors germane to this context, a telephone survey was conducted with 120 Greek Cypriot unemployed adults (a response rate of 72%). It was further hypothesised that long-term unemployment has more pervasive destructive psychosocial effects on both the unemployed and their families and that the latter effects are exacerbated by poverty and mitigated by social support and religiosity. A last focus of the study was to generate grassroots-level solutions to the problem of unemployment with implications for social policy development. Findings partially support the research hypotheses and provide insight into various government, legal, church, and society-level interventions that may help deflate the problem. Implications for knowledge development, future research, and social policy are discussed.*

**Keywords:** unemployment, Cyprus, psychosocial impact, risk and protective factors, coping mechanisms, solutions, social policy

Following the 2012–2013 banking crisis and subsequent financial collapse of Cyprus, unemployment recently peaked at an unprecedented rate of 13.9% to 17.5%, the highest recent increase for a European member state (*Eurostat*, 2014). Unemployment engenders calamitous psychosocial effects on the unemployed including severe mental health challenges (McKee *et al*., 2005), substance abuse (Backhans *et al*., 2012), risky sexual behaviours (Madianos *et al*., 2014), interpersonal violence (van Dolen *et al*., 2013), crime (Saridakis and Spengler, 2012), physical health complications (Helgesson *et al*., 2013),

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decreased life expectancy (Sullivan and Wachter, 2009) and suicide (Madianos *et al.*, 2014; Page *et al.*, 2013). Furthermore, unemployment reverberates through the entire family system sometimes leaving indelible marks (Appelbaum, 2012). Consequently, it has been associated with couple conflict (Duke *et al.*, 2013), spousal abuse (Vahid *et al.*, 2011), elder victimisation (Maxwell and Maxwell, 1992), child maltreatment (Liu *et al.*, 2013) and for the children of the unemployed school failures and bullying (Magklara *et al.*, 2012) and other emotional and behavioural problems (Harland *et al.*, 2002). Nonetheless, a note of caution is warranted in that the magnitude and nature of these unemployment effects may be culture-specific in some cases.

The evidence on the relationship between unemployment and divorce appears equivocal. In a multinational time series study examining the period 1950–1985, Lester (1996) found a strong positive correlation between unemployment and divorce. Notwithstanding, in a US study examining data for the period 1960–2005, Amato and Beattie (2011) cautioned that the unemployment–divorce correlation is both period- and state-specific. The latter authors concluded that unemployment is negatively associated with divorce after 1980. This observation may relate to sociocultural changes such as the wider entrance of women into the workforce (Colley, 2013) and the associated progressive transformation of gender roles (Eisikovits and Bailey, 2011).

Interestingly, Sherman (2009) points out that those unemployed parents with more flexible gender roles could experience less strife and tension in the home. Gough and Killewald (2011) also note that unemployment relates to greater involvement with household chores especially for unemployed wives. As expected, the longer the unemployment lasts, the more pervasive its destructive consequences (Aaronson *et al.*, 2010; Nichols *et al.*, 2013) with educational level having a moderating effect on psychological maladjustment (Galic, 2007).

A noteworthy covariant with unemployment is social stigma. The latter, impregnated by myths and stereotypes, tends to ravage the unemployed and their families (Belcher and DeFrorge, 2012) particularly when unemployment is longer in duration (Daly and Delaney, 2013), making it much harder for the unemployed to regain employment (Karren and Sherman, 2012). Regrettably, research has consistently shown that society often espouses *blaming the victim* dispositions (Ryan, 1976) when it comes to the unemployed (Letkemann, 2002; Liem and Liem, 1996) much to the latter's dissatisfaction and despair.

## Theories on the Psychosocial Effects of Unemployment

Several theories speak to the potentially severe psychosocial aftermaths of unemployment. For example, *stages theory* (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld, 1938) advances that there are certain stages that unemployed people typically undergo as they tackle their situation. Specifically,

'First there is shock, which is followed by an active hunt for a job, during which the individual is still optimistic and unresigned; he still maintains an unbroken attitude. Second, when all efforts fail, the individual becomes pessimistic, anxious, and suffers active distress; this is the most crucial stage of all. And third, the individual becomes fatalistic and adapts himself to his new state but with a narrower scope. He now has a broken attitude' (p. 378).

Fryer (1985) criticised *stages theory* for assuming that all unemployed go through the same stages in a similar fashion thus undermining the uniqueness of each individual's personal circumstances and traits. Heavily influenced by the Great Depression, *frustration theory* (Dollard *et al*., 1939) suggests that frustration resulting from unemployment tends to predict aggression and anti-social behaviours. Moreover, according to *lifespan developmental theory* (Erikson, 1959), humans go through eight stages of development each with associated conflicts that need resolution for healthy psychosocial development. During adolescence, the individual is striving to develop identity and make a decision about a future career. Therefore, unemployment may repress one's occupational identity and yield severe psychosocial crisis.

Freud suggested that work represents our strongest connection to reality. Jahoda (1981) took it a step further and proposed *deprivation theory*, which claims that unemployed people are not only deprived of the manifest benefits of employment (e.g. earning a living) but also latent benefits such as time structure, social contact, external goals, status and identity, and enforced activity. On the other hand, *agency restriction theory* (Fryer, 1986; Fryer and Payne, 1984) purports that the negative effects of unemployment occur because resulting economic deprivation disallows people to plan and organise personally satisfying lifestyles.

*Role theory* (Parsons, 1951) suggests that individuals are assigned certain roles in society and their happiness depends on how well they are able to fulfil their roles. For instance, in this regard an unemployed father may become depressed because he is not able to provide for his family. *Life chances theory* (Max Weber) has also relevance here. This theory suggests that the unemployed may become pessimistic about his/her life when experiencing prolonged unemployment which in turn could lead to self-destructive behaviours. Contrastingly, *self-efficacy theory* (Bandura, 1989) reminds us that the unemployed may manage their situation differently based on the level of confidence that they have in themselves. Finally, *income inequality theory* (Wilkinson, 1996) maintains that increased income inequality such as the one caused by unemployment has destructive social consequences including crime, decreased productivity, poor health, and so forth.

## The Socio-Economic Context of Cyprus and Unemployment

Following its independence from British Colonisation in 1960, and despite the devastating effects of the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus in 1974 which has continued to this day, the Cyprus economy had grown impressively to the extent that many have described it as a 'financial miracle' (Pashardes and Hajispyrou, 2003) up until 2009 when its deep recession began (Pashardes, 2014). In 2013 it became the fifth EU nation to be rescued from the European creditors who imposed not just, 'austerity and reforms but an unfamiliar demand for a banking "bail-in" – getting debt holders and uninsured depositors to absorb bank losses and to stump up new capital' (*The Economist*, 2014). Austerity measures enacted for fiscal consolidation target high incomes primarily in the public sector while salaries in the private sector are reduced due to the recession (Pashardes, 2014).

Most Greek Cypriots are Greek Orthodox. The Christian Orthodox Church in Cyprus retains considerable economic power and political influence. Following the 2013 banking crisis, the Cyprus Government created a solidarity fund which the church pledged to support. The church even promised to take out mortgages on its properties and loan money to the Government to save the economy from bankruptcy (DW, 2013). Nevertheless, throughout the years the Church of Cyprus has been criticised for corruption (Drake, 1998) with about half the population losing trust in the Cyprus Church (Kambas, 2014). Family is regarded paramount in Cypriot society. It is considered by many as the bedrock for the nurture and support of children (European Youth Centre – Council of Europe, 2007). Authoritarian relationships tend to be seen both in the home as well as at work (Epaminonda, 2014) with parents exercising significant influence even in the selection of a spouse (Apostolou, 2014). Economic, social, and political power is held primarily by men, and only men are permitted to become religious functionaries. Women are rarely seen in political offices, although they are joining the labour in increasing numbers. Even so, women tend to hold less prestigious positions and earn less money than men (Countries and their Cultures, 2015).

Cyprus entertains a strong and effective presence of trade unions, which have successfully defended and promoted workers' rights (*ibid.*). The working class has kept pace with the elevation of living standards resulting in a large middle class with very few exceptions of destitution and homelessness primarily due to the full-employment status of most Greek Cypriots prior to the recession (*ibid*). The strong growth of the economy over the period 2000–2009 gave rise to a booming labour market associated with high wages and high employment. Today, however, poverty is on the increase as unemployment has skyrocketed in the last four years presenting the biggest social challenge in the country (Pashardes, 2014). The unemployment benefit scheme in Cyprus is presently administrated by the Social Insurance Service Department of the Ministry of Labour and

Social Insurance in cooperation with the advisory Social Insurance Board and the Director of Social Insurance Services. The beneficiaries can be persons who have lost jobs and who belong to one of the following categories: (a) persons aged between 16 to 63 who have been legally employed in the Republic of Cyprus; (b) persons aged between 64 to 65 who have been legally employed in the Republic of Cyprus and do not qualify for old-age pension; (c) voluntary contributors who have worked abroad for a Cypriot employer. Self-employed persons are not entitled to unemployment (Info Cyprus, 2015). To be eligible for unemployment benefit the applicant must: (a) have been insured for at least 26 consecutive weeks up to the date of unemployment; have paid social insurance contributions during the employment period of not less than 26 times the weekly amount of basic insurable earnings; and (c) have paid and/or collected social insurance contributions of at least 20 times the weekly amount of basic insurable earnings (*ibid*).

The Minimum Wage Order of 2012 is applicable only to certain jobs (shop assistants, clerks, child-care workers (assistant baby and child minders), personal care workers (nursing assistants). Furthermore, the Order provides for a minimum hourly rate of pay for security guards, and cleaners of business/corporate premises. The normal working hours of shop assistants, according to the relevant Law, must not exceed 38 hours weekly and 8 hours daily, whilst for clerks the working hours should not exceed 44 hours in total per week (including any overtime) or 8 hours daily (Cyprus Ministry of Labour, Welfare, and Social Insurance, 2015). Despite this Order, the financial exploitation of foreign workers who are paid far less than employed Greek Cypriots is widespread on the island according to a report by the European Union Agency for Fundamental Rights (Christou, 2015).

## Research Aims

There is a dearth of unemployment studies in Cyprus. Thus, it is unclear what the socio-demographic sketch of the Greek Cypriot unemployed is, how Greek Cypriots withstand unemployment, and what risk factors and resiliencies lie in the Cyprus socio-cultural context exacerbating or buffering the mortifying repercussions of unemployment. It is also ambiguous as to what the exact psychosocial side effects of unemployment are in this terrain and how these are contoured by the time span of unemployment. Another flawed area in the literature pertains to the type of solutions and interventions that are witnessed by the unemployed as imperative to deflate the problem. Further, it is not entirely clear to what extent the theories mentioned previously are bolstered by current empirical evidence and in different geographic contexts.

Addressing the aforementioned gaps in knowledge, this study ventured out to investigate the following seven research hypotheses:

(1) In line with stages theory and life chances theory, the long-term unemployed experience more pessimism, shame, suicidal ideation, immigration intent, and alcohol abuse than those unemployed for shorter periods.

(2) In accordance with frustration theory, unemployed individuals are prone to aggression and intra-familial tension and conflict.

(3) In compliance with life span development theory, unemployment spurs an identity crisis resulting in increased psychological stress and depression.

(4) In agreement with deprivation and agency restriction theory, the psychological and economic stressors of unemployment are conducive to social isolation and lessened outdoor social activity.

(5) In conformity with income inequality theory, the unemployed and their families are stigmatised in their social milieus as they fare worse in emotional health and material possessions than their mainstream counterparts.

(6) In parallel with prior empirical evidence, the destructive effects of unemployment are exacerbated by low socio-economic status but mitigated by social support systems, religious faith, and/or spirituality;

(7) In conformity with role theory, the toxicity of the negative effects of unemployment is higher for males and older individuals barring individuals nearing retirement.

The study also scanned the socio-demographic profile of the unemployed, primary coping mechanisms used to tackle its ill-effects, and grassroots-level solutions to this social malice. The rationale for these latter analyses relays to their inherent implications for other geographical contexts and further knowledge development in this field.

## Method

### Sampling Procedure

All respondents were Greek Cypriot adults who have been unemployed for at least one month. The study included a combination of a random and a snowball sample. Specifically, the District of Nicosia telephone directory was initially used to identify respondents. The pages of the phone directory were numbered and a page was randomly selected using the random number generating engine[2] with the total number of pages in the directory being used as the requested range. Then the listings on the selected page were numbered and again a random number was generated to identify the home called. This procedure proved to be a cumbersome exercise as several homes called claimed to have no unemployed individuals. Nonetheless, 104 unemployed individuals were

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2   The random number generating engine is available at [www.random.org].

identified this way, of which 76 agreed to partake in the phone survey. These individuals together with those who were called and reported no unemployed individuals in the household as well as other contacts the researcher located in the community helped to identify a further 63 unemployed individuals with their phone numbers. When these individuals were called, 19 refused participation.

Overall, 167 unemployed individuals were called and 120 individuals agreed to complete the phone survey. The final response rate of this study was therefore 72%. Caution is nonetheless warranted here as it is unclear if during the screening process some individuals disguised their unemployment status. If this is true, then the response rate of this study may have been lower.

## Data Collection Procedure

This study was pre-approved by the Institutional Review Board (IRB) at the author's affiliated institution prior to implementation. Data were collected via a structured phone interview created by the researcher after reviewing germane literature on unemployment (see Appendix, p. 88). The interview protocol initially entailed twenty questions but when it was pilot tested with three respondents it was realised that another question should have been included to enquire about age and this was done. All respondents were called between 10 a.m. and 12 p.m. and also between 5 p.m. and 8 p.m. everyday apart from Sundays in summer 2014.

All structured phone interviews were conducted in Greek. On average, it took respondents somewhere between 5 and 12 minutes to answer the questions. Some gave more lengthy answers than others with the longest interview lasting about 22 minutes. An introductory statement was read to all respondents to inform them: that participation in the study was voluntary and to explain how they were identified; that their data would be kept confidential and maintained in a locked cabinet and a password protected computer file (with all data destroyed after analyses); that they could skip any question they did not want to answer and/or discontinue participation at any point in the interview if they wished to do so. They were likewise notified that the researcher could make referrals to local psychological support services if at any point during the study or later they felt the need for them. Respondents were also informed that the intent of the study was to generate a research report for publication that could possibly inform public policy on the issue. In addition, anonymity was guaranteed and respondents were given the option to email the researcher in about a year's time if they wished to know the results of the study. All responses were typed verbatim in a word file by the researcher.

## Data Analysis Procedure

Quantitative data were entered into a Statistical Package for the Social Sciences (SPSS) file and various descriptive and correlation analyses were subsequently executed. Qualitative data

were content analysed. Specifically, the researcher reviewed all the data and noted the most prominent emerging themes. Frequencies and percentages were then computed for each emerging theme. A volunteer reviewed the data as well to ensure that the researcher did not miss any emerging theme and that all frequency computations were accurately completed.

## Results

### Sample

As can be seen from table 1 (below), the final sample comprised of 120 individuals of whom 67 (56%) were female and 53 (44%) were male. The mean age of respondents was 42 years (SD = 11.27, range = 21–63 years). About half of the respondents were married, engaged or in a serious relationship (52%) and the remaining (48%) were either single, divorced/separated, or widowed and had on average 2 children (SD = 1.44). Six in every ten respondents had at least tertiary education with only one respondent in every ten not completing high school and about half reporting living in dire straits.

### Table 1: Basic Socio-demographics

| Age | N | % | Mean = 42 years;  SD = 11.27, Range = 21–63 years |
|---|---|---|---|
| 21–35 yrs. | 40 | 33 | |
| 36–50 | 43 | 36 | |
| 51–63 | 37 | 31 | |
| **Gender** | | | |
| Males | 53 | 44 | |
| Females | 67 | 56 | |
| **Education** | | | |
| Less than high school | 9 | 8 | |
| High school | 46 | 37 | |
| Tertiary Education Plus | 65 | 55 | |
| **Socioeconomic Status** | | | |
| Low | 54 | 45 | |
| Mediocre | 55 | 46 | |
| High | 11 | 9 | |
| **Marital Status** | | | |
| Married * | 62 | 52 | |
| Single** | 58 | 48 | |
| **Number of Children** | | | Mean = 2; SD = 1.44; Range = 0–5 children |

*Also, engaged or in serious relationship; **Also, divorced, separated, or widowed

Table 2 (below) indicates unemployment length and some of the consequences of unemployment as experienced by respondents. On average, respondents were without work for 22 months (SD = 14.3, range = 2–62 months). Even though none of the respondents reported thinking about committing suicide at the time of the study, one in every five respondents shared the fact that at some point after becoming unemployed they had thought about harming themselves. When asked if they needed a referral to a psychological support centre all respondents stated that they did not desire such help. Eight out of every ten respondents reported feeling shame about their unemployment; two-thirds were pessimistic about their future, and about half seriously thought about migrating to another country. One-quarter of male respondents and none of the female respondents had abused alcohol to get by.

**Table 2: Unemployment Length and Some Consequences**

| Unemployment Length | | *Mean = 22 months; Range = 2–62 months |
|---|---|---|
| | N | % |
| *Optimism about Future* | | |
| Yes | 39 | 33 |
| No | 81 | 67 |
| ***Feeling Shame about Unemployment* | | |
| Yes | 91 | 76 |
| No | 26 | 22 |
| *Past Suicidal Ideation* | | |
| Yes | 25 | 21 |
| No | 95 | 79 |
| *Thoughts about Migrating to another Country* | | |
| Yes | 58 | 48 |
| No | 62 | 52 |

*(1 outlier removed = 120 months);  ** Missing data 3 respondents

Table 3 (p. 74) highlights the main strategies used by respondents to cope. Their main support came from family and friends, the government (for only the first 6 months of their unemployment), their relentless job search, involvement with personal hobbies, prayer, humour and volunteerism. Sadly, some respondents resorted to alcohol to self-medicate their depression.

Table 3: Coping Mechanisms

| Coping Mechanism Type | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Family and Friends' Support | 76 | 63 |
| Government Support (Only for Six Months) | 62 | 52 |
| Applying for Jobs (Never Give Up) | 44 | 37 |
| Involvement with Hobbies | 38 | 32 |
| (Drawing, Gardening, Sports, Cooking, Watching Movies, Listening to Music) | | |
| Prayer | 32 | 27 |
| Humour | 17 | 14 |
| Volunteerism | 15 | 13 |
| Drinking Alcohol     * | 13 | 11 |
| Acquiring New Skills to Increase Employability | 8 | 7 |
| Borrowing Money | 5 | 4 |
| Receiving Assistance from Various Charities/Organisations | 4 | 3 |
| Exercising | 3 | 3 |
| Anti-Depressant Medication | 3 | 3 |

*all males, no females

Table 4 (p. 75) exhibits the impact of unemployment on 'self' and the family as reported by the respondents. As can be seen, the most frequently cited negative consequences of unemployment were in order of importance: humiliation and social embarrassment, self-isolation, depression, aggression, relationship challenges, intense/neurotic budgeting (austerity), and sleeping difficulties. Less frequent consequences but still major causes for concern were: drinking and smoking, weight gain, suicidal ideation, and physical health problems.

Table 5 (p. 76) cites significant correlations of unemployment duration with various variables of interest. As can be seen, unemployment length correlated positively with age, intent to migrate, suicidal ideation, shame, and alcohol abuse. Unemployment duration correlated negatively with socioeconomic status, optimism, education, and Christian faith strength.

Finally, table 6 (p. 77) delineates the solutions professed by respondents for ameliorating and/or eradicating the social evil of unemployment. These solutions are classified as government, legal, church, and society solutions.

## Discussion

The first question set out by this study touched upon the socio-demographic portrait of the Greek Cypriot unemployed. According to the Central Intelligence Agency – The World Factbook (2014), the Cyprus population is completely evenly distributed based on gender (males = 49.5%; females 50.5%). However, in this study 56% of the respondents

were female. This may appear to suggest that females may have a slightly higher proclivity for unemployment but caution is warranted with this conclusion because female Cypriots tend to respond at a higher frequency to phone surveys [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process] and/or are more likely to stay home due to gender socialisation in Greek culture (Pateraki and Roussi, 2013). However, *Eurostat* (2015) reports that male unemployment in Cyprus was at 17.1% in 2014 compared to 15.1% for females, namely 2% higher for males compared to females.

### Table 4: Impact of Unemployment on 'Self' and Family

| *Impact on Self* | *N* | *%* |
|---|---|---|
| Humiliation/Social Embarrassment | 91 | 76 |
| Self-Isolation | 43 | 36 |
| Depression | 41 | 34 |
| Suicidal Ideation | 25 | 21 |
| Aggression | 21 | 18 |
| Relationship Difficulties | 19 | 16 |
| Intense/Neurotic Budgeting (austerity) | 16 | 13 |
| Sleeping Difficulties | 14 | 12 |
| Drinking | 13 | 11 |
| Smoking | 11 | 9 |
| Weight Gain | 9 | 8 |
| Physical Health Challenges | 6 | 5 |
| Intense Worrying about Future | 4 | 3 |
| Agoraphobia | 3 | 3 |
| *Impact on Family* | | |
| Children Feeling Depressed | 33 | 28 |
| Children not having all Necessities & Entertainment Opportunities | 29 | 24 |
| Elders Feeling Depressed about Unemployed Child/Grandchildren | 26 | 22 |
| Intergenerational Unemployment Deeply Devastating | 17 | 14 |
| Intra-familial Tension/Conflict & Chronic Stress | 15 | 13 |
| Children Feeling Stigmatised at School/Neighbourhood | 13 | 11 |
| Decreased Quality of Food (high protein food often unaffordable) | 11 | 9 |
| Children Having School Problems | 9 | 8 |
| Necessary House Repairs Postponed | 7 | 6 |
| Temperature Problems in Home (Unaffordable Electricity) | 5 | 4 |
| Children Experiencing Sleeping Problems | 2 | 2 |

Respondents represented equally all age groups below retirement age but when the data of middle and pre-retirement middle adulthood groups are aggregated it can be determined that two-thirds of the respondents were middle age adults compared to only one-third being young adults. There are many different interpretations of this observation. For example, it could be that unemployed young adults are more likely to migrate to other countries as they are not raising families in Cyprus and are more resilient to risk and unpredictability. Another possibility is that young adults may be more likely to answer cell phones as opposed to home lines (most of the numbers called in this study were home lines).

**Table 5: Correlations with Unemployment Length**

|  | *Unemployment Length* |
|---|---|
| *Age* | r (Pearson)   =  .70* |
| *Migration Intent* | r (Spearman) =  .69* |
| *Suicidal Ideation* | r (Spearman) =  .64* |
| *Socioeconomic Status* | r (Spearman) = -.57* |
| *Optimism* | r (Spearman) = -.55* |
| *Shame* | r (Spearman) =  .52* |
| *Alcohol Abuse* | r (Spearman) =  .45* |
| *Education* | r (Spearman) = -.28* |
| *Christian Faith Strength* | r (Spearman) = -.27* |

* $p < .01$

The fact that nine out of ten respondents had high school education and almost six of every ten respondents had college education suggests that education is not necessarily a protective factor for unemployment in Cyprus. One explanation of this finding could be the absence of meritocracy in employment practices in Cyprus [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process] and/or the fact that more educated individuals may have higher salary expectations. Moreover, in accordance with expectation, only about one in ten respondents was of high socioeconomic status. It is possible that high socioeconomic status individuals have private businesses or strong social connections that afford them highly privileged positions in society. Furthermore, the fact that half of the respondents were single and not in a serious relationship could suggest that these people did not afford the financial costs associated with being in a serious relationship (such as paying for outings, buying gifts or raising children) or that shame may have led them to social isolation and/or depression thus reducing their drive to seek out partners and/or

future spouses. Moreover, the finding that on average respondents had at least two children is quite disturbing as it suggests that many children are plagued by the negative effects of unemployment.

### Table 6: Proposed Solutions

| Government Solutions | N | % |
|---|---|---|
| Increase the Unemployment Assistance Period to European Levels | 37 | 31 |
| Open New Positions related to recent Humongous Natural Gas Discoveries | 26 | 22 |
| Reinforce Transition Programs to Employment/ Training in in Non-Saturated Fields | 18 | 15 |
| Provide Tax Incentives for Businesses to Hire Unemployed People | 12 | 10 |
| Reduce Taxes on Unemployed Families | 8 | 7 |
| Lessen Salaries of High Earning Public Employees/ Invest Savings in New Jobs | 7 | 6 |
| Create Support Programs for the Children of Unemployed at School | 4 | 3 |
| Initiate Public Education Campaigns to Mitigate Social Stigma | 3 | 3 |
| *Legal Solutions* | | |
| Law Criminalising the Hiring of Foreigners at Below Greek Cypriot Salaries | 48 | 40 |
| Strengthen Employment Laws to Reduce Employee Terminations | 19 | 16 |
| Promote Anti-Discrimination Legislation in the Hiring of the Unemployed | 8 | 7 |
| Enforce Legal quotas that Prevent Over-Hiring of Foreigners | 6 | 5 |
| Provide Free public Legal Services to All Employees Terminated/ Laid Off | 4 | 3 |
| *Church Solutions* | | |
| Investment of Part of its Vast Available Wealth to Support the Unemployed and their Families | 24 | 20 |
| Spiritually Strengthen/Reach out to the Unemployed | 18 | 15 |
| Advocate for More Humanistic Governmental Policies for the Unemployed | 17 | 14 |
| Create New Jobs for the Unemployed | 15 | 13 |
| Promote Public Education Campaign to Dispel Myths/ Stereotypes | 6 | 5 |
| *Society Solutions* | | |
| Exert Pressure on Government and the Legislative Branch to Provide Support | 17 | 14 |
| Realise Anyone Could Become Unemployed/Reduce Social Stigma | 14 | 12 |
| Reach out to the Unemployed / Support them/ Volunteer Time and Resources | 11 | 9 |
| Promote Support Groups for the Unemployed | 3 | 3 |

The average length of unemployment experienced by respondents was twenty-two months. Given that governmental unemployment assistance lasts only for the first six months of unemployment, it can be concluded that, on average, respondents were left without any income for at least sixteen months. This is a particularly long period especially for those who had to support families and/or had very mediocre means to get by. Two-thirds of respondents were not optimistic about their future and over three-quarters of them felt shame about their situation. It could be that respondents internalised the social stigma associated with unemployment (Daly and Delaney, 2013) or that they were overwhelmed by the negative perceptions of others once they heard of their status. Shame may increase one's social isolation (Reneflot and Evensen, 2014) and should therefore be taken seriously into account by intervention in this context.

One in five respondents had thought about suicide in the past and about half seriously contemplated migrating to another country. Madianos, Alexiou, Patelakis and Economou (2014) reported much more acute suicidal tendencies for their sample in Greece. This may suggest that there could be particular socio-cultural factors in Cyprus that protect against suicide and/or that the respondents were disinclined to disclose their authentic suicidal impulses. The fact that half of respondents were ready to migrate to another country for survival is consistent historically with previous research showing migration to be a progressive reaction to adversity for a significant number of Greeks (Georgas *et al.*, 1996).

In reference to coping mechanisms mobilised by respondents to fend off the intrinsic ills of unemployment, six in every ten respondents relied heavily on support from family and friends to make ends meet. Government support was helpful but very short-lived. One in three respondents spent time exercising his/her hobbies which seemed to have protective benefits on social isolation and despair. Some of the cultural strengths (as emerged from the data) mitigating adversity in this context should be noted here such as music and gardening (due to all year round good weather). Music and gardening have been found in other contexts to be sources of empowerment in calamity too (Myers, 1998; Travis, 2013).

Half of the respondents continued to seek out employment opportunities despite bleak prospects which may at least partly verify the initial phase of *stages theory* (Eisenberg and Lazarsfeld, 1938). More research is needed to explain why certain unemployed individuals show higher motivation to seek out new employment opportunities than others. It is possible that the more active job seekers are those with a higher sense of self-efficacy (Bandura, 1989). Another evident cultural strength emerging from the data is the protective nature of the Greek Orthodox faith. One in every four respondents turned to their faith to find paramount support and encouragement. This observation corroborates previous research not only in the Greek cultural context (Fouka *et al.*, 2012) but also in other contexts (Patton and Donohue, 1998).

Concerning the impact of unemployment on the respondents, three-quarters of respondents felt humiliation and embarrassment, one-third experienced social isolation and depression, and one-fifth suffered suicidal ideation. It appears that in the small society of Cyprus, shame and humiliation are high risk factors which may be conducive to social isolation and suicidal ideation. Similar impact on unemployed people has been found in other studies (Pelzer *et al.*, 2014). Moreover, males had a higher chance of resorting to alcohol abuse which may confirm *role theory* with males in the Cyprus context expected to be the family providers; being unable to successfully perform such roles may have led some of these respondents to self-medicating and/or to self-destructive tendencies such as alcohol abuse.

Additionally, the data show that unemployment may devastate emotionally the children and elders in the family. Furthermore, children's access to school necessities and mainstream entertainment opportunities may be restricted. Malnutrition and sleeping problems in children can result and may make the children more vulnerable to discrimination by peers; it may fertilise intra-familial tension and conflict too in some cases. As this study illustrates, the adverse side effects of unemployment tend to be fortified when intergenerational unemployment is evident in the family. Many of these troubling ramifications of unemployment on the entire family system have been witnessed by other studies as well (Broman *et al.*, 1990).

A very significant positive correlation was found between unemployment duration and age in this study. Past research has shown that unemployment is particularly debilitating for older groups (Wight *et al.*, 2013). Young people are more likely to migrate to other countries in search of employment. Longer unemployment predicted stronger immigration intent and suicidal ideation and was negatively correlated with socioeconomic status perhaps suggesting that more affluent individuals may have more mighty connections in the community that lead to further employment opportunities [name deleted to maintain the integrity of the review process] and of course higher capability to launch new businesses. As hypothesised, longer unemployment was also associated with more shame and less optimism (a finding perhaps supporting the *stages theory* of unemployment), more alcohol abuse (a finding perhaps supporting the *life chances theory*), plus it was negatively associated with educational level. The latter finding may be explained by *self-efficacy theory* (Bandura, 1989) with more educated people having greater self-confidence to either regain employment or migrate to another country offering more generous job opportunities.

Reflecting on the solutions envisioned by respondents, the foregoing circled around four primary pillars: *Government*, *Legal*, *Church*, and *Society*. The fact that no solutions targeted the self-level may suggest that the respondents did not blame themselves for their unemployment and instead regarded it as a product of sociocultural dynamics and

injustice. At the government level, the respondents expounded that the time span of public unemployment insurance was too short. It did not match general European standards and had to therefore be amplified. They too declared that the government should take full advantage of the vast natural gas fields recently found trapped below the ocean floor of Cyprus plus open new positions in this terrain together with sponsoring employment training in these and supplementary non-saturated occupational fields, and not least to furnish employers with alluring tax incentives to enlist the unemployed.

At the legal level, they held out for new legislation to criminalise the engagement of foreigners at salaries subordinate to those offered to Greek Cypriots and to enforce tougher restrictions on uncalled for employee terminations. What is more, they also affirmed that the church should have a more explicit role in strengthening the morale of the unemployed; bringing them closer to Faith, meeting their primary needs, and using its clout to sway the government to introduce more humanistic social policies to relieve the unemployed. In conclusion, the respondents asserted that society needs to be more actively involved in social campaigns to support the unemployed, apply influence on the government and politicians to kick-start effectual interventions that will reduce unemployment and stop it from distancing itself and blaming the victims for their plight.

## Research Hypotheses

In response to the research hypotheses theorised by the study, the following observations are concluded:

*Hypothesis 1: In line with stages theory and life chances theory, the long term unemployed experience more pessimism, shame, suicidal ideation, immigration intent, and alcohol abuse than those unemployed for shorter periods*
Clearly the present data support this hypothesis.

*Hypothesis 2: In accordance with frustration theory, unemployed individuals are prone to aggression and intra-familial tension and conflict*
Qualitative analysis indicated that the long-term unemployed as a group experienced more intra-familial conflict but individuals with stronger faith and those involved more in social activities were not at risk for aggression. This finding underscores the importance of churches in supporting the unemployed as well as the need to create opportunities for unemployed populations for social interaction and exchange. These may take the form of support groups, volunteer opportunities, free of charge self and professional development seminars, and so on.

*Hypothesis 3: In compliance with life span development theory, unemployment gives genesis to an identity crisis resulting in increased psychological stress and depression*

This hypothesis is partially supported by the current data. Even though over one-third of respondents suffered deep depression as a result of their unemployment status, individual and socio-cultural strengths and resiliencies tended to counterbalance such negative mental health effects. More research is needed in this area to discern the particular socio-cultural dynamics that serve as protective factors in unemployment. In the present study, these related mostly to social support systems, spirituality and/or church involvement, higher socio-economic status, and being older yet unemployed for a shorter period.

*Hypothesis 4: In agreement with deprivation and agency restriction theory, the psychological and economic stressors associated with unemployment are conducive to social isolation and lessened outdoor social activity*

This hypothesis is at least partially supported by the present data. Over one-third of respondents felt extreme social isolation and confinement to their homes. The primary reasons for their social isolation were unaffordability of social outings and depression. More research needs to be conducted into other causes for the social isolation of the unemployed including social discrimination, pity displayed by certain social strata, self-esteem complications, and so on.

*Hypothesis 5: In conformity with income inequality theory, the unemployed and their families are stigmatised in their social milieus as they fare worse in emotional health and material possessions than their mainstream counterparts*

This hypothesis is fairly supported by the present data too. Three-quarters of the respondents experienced social stigma and associated social embarrassment *vis-à-vis* their unemployment status. Stigmatisation even though to a much lesser degree was also evident in the lives of one-tenth of the children of the unemployed population at school.

*Hypothesis 6: In parallel with prior empirical evidence, the destructive effects of unemployment are exacerbated by low socio-economic status but mitigated by social support systems, religious faith, and/or spirituality*

This hypothesis is very strongly supported by the current data. Low socio-economic status was a high risk factor for pessimism, depression, suicidal ideation, and alcohol abuse thereby confirming life chances theory as well: Protective factors for these ill effects included short-term unemployment, social and church support and spirituality.

*Hypothesis 7: In conformity with role theory, the toxicity of the negative effects of unemployment is higher for males and older individuals barring individuals nearing retirement*

Clearly, the data confirm this hypothesis. Males viewed unemployment as a more disastrous event than females and they found the time harder to fill in their empty hours. They felt more destitute and pitiable about themselves too, especially when they were

older and suffering from unemployment for longer periods. Some sensed that they were an embarrassment to their families and bad role models for their own children. They also worried excessively about the future of their own children and were not able to see any light at the end of the tunnel.

## Study Limitations

The sample of this study was relatively small and did not include individuals that did not have phone numbers. As a result, the most under-privileged unemployed did not have an equal opportunity to participate in this study. The additional snowball method employed to increase the sample size introduced sampling bias in that select individuals had a higher chance to be represented. Another limitation of the study is that it entailed only Nicosia residents and did not include foreign citizens of Cyprus who are unemployed and may have differing needs and experiences compared to the mainstream Greek Cypriot population. Last of all, the self-report nature of the data in this study opens it up to the criticism that respondents may have been dispensing disingenuous responses in an effort to protect their facade.

## Conclusion

This study represents the first research undertaking to look into the complex dynamics typifying unemployment in Cyprus together with risk factors, resiliency factors and the destructive consequences of unemployment in this context. The study concludes that unemployment affects all strata of society and places a heavy burden not only on the unemployed person but on entire family systems too. As such, it highlights the need for clinical services provided by systemically trained helping professionals such as marriage and family therapists and social workers. Even though certain cultural strengths such as strong kinship and friendship networks, a community orientation, spirituality, laid back attitudes (as seen in a passionate love of music) and good climatic conditions may serve as protective factors for the deleterious effects of unemployment, other cultural aspects such as shame and traditional gender roles may compound the problem. Importantly, the study also finds strong support for stages theory, deprivation theory, life chances theory, life span development theory, agency restriction theory, and role theory and partial support for income inequality theory in the context of unemployment. Future research can further illuminate the specific social processes and thinking patterns that associate with both positive and negative socio-emotional outcomes in unemployment and protective parameters for these.

   This study expands knowledge on grassroots-level governmental, legal, religious and social solutions to unemployment that may be transferable in a diversity of geographic

contexts as promising venues to mitigate the perplexities of unemployment. Future research with a larger representative sample should provide more insight into the experiences of the unemployed based on various socio-demographic attributes such as gender, age, ethnic origin, education, physical location, and so on. Among other aspects, public opinions about unemployment should likewise be investigated to determine the nature of extant social stigma as well as contracting/appointment attitudes and intentions of prospective employers. School interventions with the children of the unemployed should similarly be pursued and evaluated to determine best practices for supporting these multi-stressed populations.

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# Appendix

## The Questionnaire used for the Phone Interview

Hello, I am a social work professor at an American University and I'm conducting a study to evaluate the psychosocial impact of unemployment in Cyprus. Are you or any other adult above age 18 in your household currently unemployed and been out of work for at least a month? (If yes): (As I stated earlier) I am conducting a study on unemployment and I am hoping to generate findings that may be useful to the Cyprus Government in clarifying the psychosocial impact of unemployment so that hopefully more supportive services can be put in place for the unemployed. The phone interview takes about 10 minutes to complete and all information you share will be maintained strictly confidential. Even though parts of your answers may be published, there will be no identifying information that will personally relate you to the information published. You have the right to avoid answering any question by asking me to move on to the next one. All data will be kept locked in a cabinet and will be destroyed as soon as they are analysed. If at any point during the interview you wish a referral to a psychological support centre, please advise me accordingly and I will give you a couple of local numbers. Moreover, if you wish to know the results of this study you can contact me in about a year at an email that I can provide to you at the end of the interview. Would you like to participate in this study?

1. How long have you been unemployed?
2. How do you cope with your unemployment?
3. Have you received any government assistance? If yes, what help did you receive? How good was the quality of the help you received? Please explain.
4. Have you received any other assistance, other than from the government? If so, what type of help and by whom? How good was the quality of the help you received? Please explain.
5. How does your unemployment impact you and the rest of your family? Please explain.
6. Do you feel shame to be unemployed? Please explain.
7. What do you think the government needs to do to help the unemployed in Cyprus? Please explain.
8. What do you think society in general needs to do to help the unemployed? Please explain.
9. Any other suggestions that you have for lessening and/or eradicating the problem of unemployment in Cyprus?
10. How optimistic are you about life in general? Please explain.
11. Have you thought about immigrating to another country? Please explain.
12. Do you use alcohol or drugs? If yes, when did you start using alcohol and drugs?
13. Have you ever thought about harming yourself or anyone else because of your unemployment? If yes, how serious were these thoughts? Please explain.
14. Are you Greek Orthodox? If yes (go to question 15, if no go to question 16)
15. How strong is your Christian Faith?
    Weak        Average        Strong
16. Gender?
17. Age?
18. What is your marital status?
19. Do you have children? If yes, how many?
20. What is the highest level of formal education that you have achieved?
21. How would you describe yourself?
    Poor        Middle Class        Rich

# Inclusiveness and the Perceived Legitimacy of Peace Treaties: Findings from a Survey Experiment in Northern Cyprus

Dİrenç Kanol[1]

## Abstract

*Participation at the negotiation table for finding peace agreements can be conceptualised as a peacebuilding function of civil society but studies which measure the impact of civil society's participation at the negotiation table are distinctly scarce. Do people perceive inclusive peace treaties to be more legitimate? The study focuses on this question by gathering and analysing data from 400 Turkish Cypriots. The survey experiment suggests that inclusiveness does not influence the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. The implications of this finding for conflict resolution are discussed.*

**Keywords:** civil society, Cyprus, legitimacy beliefs, peace-making, peacebuilding, peace negotiations, peace treaties

## Introduction

Decades ago, Johan Galtung differentiated between negative peace and positive peace: 'Negative peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war – and positive peace which is the integration of human society' (Galtung, 1964, p. 2). Peace research has evolved extensively since Galtung made this distinction. Peacebuilding, a term that takes social and psychological aspects of conflict into the core of its definition, has become a buzzword in peace studies. Simply put, peacebuilding refers to any kind of intervention that leads to sustainable peace (Bush and Duggan, 2014; Fast and Neufeldt, 2005). Sustainable is a keyword that may differentiate peacebuilding from other concepts such as peacekeeping and peace-making. Peacekeeping is used only to define activities that enable a state to transform from an environment of war to one of negative peace. It is usually conducted by foreign soldiers, for instance, the United Nations (UN) troops. These

troops endeavour to deter the recurrence of violence and supply local people with their immediate needs such as food, water and shelter. On the other hand, peace-making goes a step further than peacekeeping. Peace-making deals with diplomatic activities, which involve negotiations that are aimed at finding a peaceful settlement between enemies.

It should be stressed that peacebuilding covers interventions that can be classified under peacekeeping and peace-making, but advances it further. It also includes interventions aimed at reshaping a society towards the goal of achieving positive peace. Peacebuilding interventions specifically focus on tackling the root causes of conflicts. If a conflict is caused by environmental degradation, then environmental protection can be classified as peacebuilding. Similarly, if negative rhetoric in history books is one of the root causes of conflict, interventions aimed at changing the content of these books can be classified as peacebuilding. Therefore, peacebuilding interventions denote a set of activities that try to transform a conflict-torn society into a peaceful society by addressing the sources of it.

It should be noted that peacebuilding is used in post-conflict contexts more than in civil war settings. The reason for this is because in civil war settings, peacekeeping and peace-making precedes in urgency when juxtaposed with peacebuilding. Focusing on the root causes of conflict becomes much more relevant once major violence stops. However, it should be noted that peacebuilding, by using the definition above, also covers activities that are classified under peacekeeping or peace-making. For that reason, peacebuilding emerges as a wider concept which includes both peacekeeping and peace-making activities but with the addition of other activities which centre on the derivatives of conflict in post-conflict settings.

By using the term 'post-conflict country', it may not always be clear what is exactly meant (Call, 2008). It may refer to a setting where major violence comes to an end. Likewise, it may also refer to a setting where a peace agreement has been signed after the end of a civil war. As a final point, it may refer to a setting with an apparent military defeat of one side to the conflict (*ibid*.). The first definition is more appropriate than the second or third because the ending of major political violence has certain consequences which can be appreciated in all of these settings (Call, 2008; Diehl and Druckman, 2010).

According to the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) report (2007), the interest in the evaluation of peacebuilding increased with the growth in the number of peace negotiations and recognition of the inadequacies of the existing approaches. The United States Institute of Peace counts 40 peace agreements between 1989 and 2005 world-wide. The problem in most of these cases is that these agreements did not result in positive peace but rather intermittent violence, crime, economic hardships, suspicion toward former enemies and public dissatisfaction with life and politics. This suggests that a comprehensive peacebuilding approach which focuses on the root causes of conflicts can better address problems in countries which experience violent

conflict. Unlike peacekeeping and peace-making interventions in which civil society actors have either limited or no contribution, civil society emerges as one of the main actors in peacebuilding interventions. Recently, peace researchers moved beyond describing only what civil society has done in single-case studies and defined and differentiated between different peacebuilding functions of civil society (Marchetti and Tocci, 2009; Barnes, 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). Nevertheless, peacebuilding literature is clearly short of studies that measure the effectiveness of civil society's peacebuilding roles. Evaluation of the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions is absolutely necessary (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak *et al.*, 2009).

There is a misconception in the literature that civil society refers to 'civil' actors as actors that are inherently and functionally 'good' (Kumar, 1993, p. 377). But this is far from the truth. Klu Klux Klan, Al Qaida and the like, are also civil society actors. Almost no one would argue that killing people simply because of their ethnicity or faith can count as peacebuilding. Therefore, it would be erroneous to understand civil society as inherently 'good'. This type of actor actually 'spoils' peace rather than builds it (Stedman, 1997). What makes any organisation or any actor a part of civil society is their distinctiveness from family, business and the state. As soon as an individual acts collectively with other people outside their family, business and the state, this person becomes a part of civil society (Spurk, 2010). This does not mean that civil society cannot be related to family, business and the state. A civil society organisation (CSO) may have connections with the state, but in order to be defined as a civil society organisation, it should not be organised under the state apparatus (*ibid.*). That said; since political parties compete to become governmental actors, they cannot be defined as civil society organisations.

One study which took important strides toward measuring civil society's peacebuilding functions is Paffenholz (2010). Based on eleven case studies conducted by country-expert researchers, Paffenholz (*ibid.*) presented the results of the first extensive study on the effectiveness of civil society's peacebuilding roles along with enabling and disabling factors for their effectiveness. This study is, arguably, the single comprehensive academic study which has tried to measure effectiveness and discover which factors influence effectiveness. Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) define seven different peacebuilding functions: One of these being advocacy. Advocacy, whether it is public advocacy (outside lobbying) that involves demonstrations, press releases and petitions or non-public advocacy (inside lobbying), which is one-on-one communication with the policy-makers, can be used to influence governmental authorities (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010).

Additionally, Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) include the civil society's efforts at the negotiation table during peace-treaty negotiations as part of advocacy. This study will assess the possible effects of this inclusion on the durability of peace. Yet, it should be

noted that the role of civil society at the negotiation table cannot be classified as advocacy because the aim is not necessarily to influence the governmental authorities. The literature shows that the main effect of having civil society at the negotiation table is the increased legitimacy of peace treaties, which in turn, contributes to durable peace (Nilsson, 2012). Conversely, Kanol (2015) tested this causal mechanism behind the positive correlation between civil society being at the negotiation table and durability of peace with a survey experiment in the southern part of Cyprus. Unexpectedly, the author's data suggested that having civil society at the negotiation table does not have a meaningful effect on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties.

This study extends Kanol's (2015) study to the northern part of Cyprus by conducting a survey experiment with 400 Turkish Cypriot subjects. In the next sections, studies published on inclusion and its possible effects on legitimacy beliefs are reviewed, the methodology is discussed, the results of the survey experiment conducted in the northern part of Cyprus are presented and the implications of the findings are debated in the concluding section.

### Inclusive Decision-Making Processes and Perceived Legitimacy:
### A Literature Review

Most scholars perceive civil society participation at the negotiation table as a positive action (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Zanker, 2013; Chigas, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014). Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) look at the correlations between the level of civil society participation during the making of 25 peace treaties and the durability of peace. The authors suggest that 'we see that high or moderate civil society involvement in peace negotiations appears to be strongly correlated with sustained peace in the peacebuilding phase. These findings suggest that a strong relationship exists between direct and indirect civil society participation in peace negotiations and successful peacebuilding' (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008, p. 30). Nilsson (2012) conducts an empirically stronger analysis and comes to the same conclusion. The author looks at 83 peace agreements in 40 different conflicts. Using duration analysis with control variables, she finds that inclusive peace treaties are more likely to create sustainable peace.

Paffenholz (2014) suggests that scholars should now accept that inclusion is beneficial and focus more readily on different ways to include civil society at the negotiation table. Nevertheless, recent findings suggest that it might be hasty to move away from looking at the impact of inclusion. Zanker (2014) asserts that in order to speak about legitimate peace agreements, civil society, which is present at the negotiation table, should represent the real interests of the people. People should identify their selves with those representing them at the negotiation table, and there should be awareness of what civil society is actually doing while participating in the arbitration process. Kanol (2015)

conducts a survey experiment with 337 Greek Cypriot participants and finds that when subjects read about inclusion of civil society at the negotiation table during the dialogue process of a hypothetical peace agreement in Cyprus, their perceived legitimacy of the peace agreement does not significantly vary. Looking at other research which explores the relationship between decision-making types and perceived legitimacy, caution is also recommended against moving away from inclusion / exclusion discussion just yet.

Procedural fairness theory suggests that fair decision-making procedures determine how people are to react to authoritative decisions (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler *et al*., 1997). In spite of the confidence of political philosophers who argue that participation and deliberation are fairer procedures (Manin, 1987; Barber, 1984; Cohen, 1997) and create better epistemic results than representative procedures (Estlund, 2008; Bohman, 2009; Goodin, 2008; Habermas, 1996), empirical findings are mixed.

Morrell (1999) found that there was no significant difference in legitimacy beliefs between two groups differing in the level of participation. Similarly, Gangl (2000) found that after providing the subjects with different definitions of fair and unfair procedures, the 'people have voice' procedure was not conceived to have more legitimacy but in fact, statistically it had insignificant less legitimacy. De Fine Licht (2011) found that direct decision-making compared to representative and expert decision-making did not have a significant positive effect on the perceived legitimacy of health care policies and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002a; 2002b) discovered that giving an opportunity to voice opinions did not make a positive difference to the subjects' legitimacy beliefs about the outcome and satisfaction. On the contrary, the subjects were actually frustrated when they were allowed to have a voice but this voice was not taken into consideration, thus reducing satisfaction with the outcome. However, when the subjects had the opportunity to influence the outcome after being given a chance to voice their opinions, their legitimacy beliefs increased (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002b). A similar conclusion was also reached by the non-experimental statistical analysis of Ulbig (2008). This author found that 'voice' alone did not make any difference. Only when the citizens' voice could actually make a difference did legitimacy beliefs significantly increase (Ulbig, 2008). Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson (2012) found that subjects did not bestow more legitimacy upon the decision-making arrangements they chose in comparison to arrangements that were chosen exogenously by the experimenters.

Other studies have produced more optimistic results. Persson, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2013) argued that both direct voting and deliberation have separate positive effects on legitimacy beliefs. But, when direct voting is present, deliberation had no meaningful impact on legitimacy beliefs. The results of Cavalcanti, Schläpfer and Schmid's (2010) field experiment suggested that participation had a positive effect on the implementation of common decisions. Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010) found that when people were

given a choice to decide on the institutions endogenously, they were more likely to cooperate. Grönlund, Setälä and Herne (2010) also detected that subjects were more willing to engage in collective action after deliberating on energy policy. Using vignettes, De Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2014) compared reactions to different forms of decision-making and pinpointed that students attributed most legitimacy to deliberative types of procedures. Comparing legitimacy beliefs between direct voting, electing representatives and expert decision-making, Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson (2012) found that direct decision-making created the highest legitimacy beliefs. Such a result is supported by other studies such as Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2007), Gash and Murakami (2009), Esaiasson (2010) and Olken (2010).

In some of these studies the discovery of positive impact of participatory types of decision-making procedures on legitimacy beliefs is encouraging but overall we see that results are at best, mixed. Moreover, it is not certain whether generic findings about decision-making processes and legitimacy beliefs can be generalised in relationships between inclusive/exclusive peace treaties and legitimacy beliefs. The only study which specifically tests this relationship is Kanol (2015) and this author found evidence in favour of the null hypothesis.

## Method

Unlike observational studies, experiments enable researchers to randomly assign subjects into treatment and control group(s) in order to make sure that the statistical findings are not contaminated by well-known problems like specification error and endogeneity. If subjects can be randomly assigned into treatment and control groups, researchers can be certain that they do not have an unexpected finding due to confounding variables or reverse causality. Therefore, this study uses Kanol's (2015) survey experimental design to capture the effect of inclusiveness on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. Unlike lab experiments, survey experiments rely on vignettes where subjects are randomly assigned into different groups reading different texts or questions. If the texts are designed properly and the randomisation process is successful, the researcher can be sure that the differences in means found between the treatment and control group(s) are *really* due to the psychological effect of reading the diverse texts presented to them.

The experimental study was conducted in the northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus was divided as a consequence of intercommunal strife which broke out in the second half of the 1950s and continued until the island was partitioned in 1974. Turkish Cypriots seceded and promulgated their own state in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983. To date, the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – TRNC' is an unrecognised state, acknowledged only by Turkey. Like every causal relationship tested with experimental studies, the external validity based on a single case study is questionable. It is, nonetheless,

possible to generalise findings by running meta-analyses of the results derived from a significant number of studies in different contexts. This study contributes to this endeavour by using a study in a context other than the southern part of Cyprus where the only experimental study on this topic was conducted (see Kanol, 2015).

Due to funding issues, the researcher was unable to gather data from a representative sample. The sample is non-probabilistic; however, it includes all kinds of people as shown in table 1. The researcher enlisted the help of a research assistant to gather data in the Köşklüçiftlik region of northern Nicosia, which is the most crowded region of the city. The research assistant randomly distributed the questionnaires to the subjects and asked each one to carefully read the texts presented to them before answering a short questionnaire.

After reading a paragraph which invited the treatment group – comprising of 200 Turkish Cypriots – to consider that a hypothetical agreement had been found, the group was asked to complete a survey. The subjects were notified that this hypothetical agreement had been found as a result of negotiations between the presidents of the two sides along with the active participation of 50 representative civil society organisations. A further 200 Turkish Cypriots were assigned to a control group where the participants were given the same text but with no information on the active involvement of civil society organisations. Perceived legitimacy was measured for all respondents following the readings of texts about a hypothetical agreement. The short texts presented to the subjects were as follows:

*Treatment Group*

'Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.'

*Control Group*

'Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.'

The respondents in the treatment group were coded as 1 and the respondents in the control group were coded as 0. Using the means of such vignettes enabled the use of a simulation to measure the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society depending on the participation of civil society organisations in peace-treaty negotiations.

Kanol (2015) relies on previous questionnaires used by Stromer-Galley and Muhlberger (2009), De Fine Licht (2011), De Fine Licht *et al.* (2014), Esaiasson *et al.* (2012), Persson *et al.* (2013) and Zhang (2015) in order to operationalise perceived

legitimacy. Kanol (2015) used three questions in order to measure perceived legitimacy. The average of the same three measures was used in this study to construct a perceived legitimacy index. The first statement used for calculating the perceived legitimacy index is: 'the decision was taken in a fair way' – 'strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 strongly agree'. The second statement used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: 'please indicate what you thought of the outcome' – 'not satisfied at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely satisfied', and the third question used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: 'how willing are you to accept the decision?' – 'not willing at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely willing'. Cronbach's alpha (0.99) shows that the perceived legitimacy index is perfectly reliable.

The questionnaire also asked the participants to give information about their age, gender, level of education, region of residence, religiosity, ideology, trust in CSOs, trust in Greek Cypriots, and vote intention in a future referendum following the reading of the short texts provided. Age is an interval variable. Gender is a dichotomous variable. Females are coded as 0 and males are coded as 1. Education is measured by asking the participants about their last degree obtained. The 6-point scale begins with no schooling and ends with a postgraduate degree. Ideology is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented left and 6 represented right. Regions of residence are coded as 5 dummy variables – Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and Trikomo/Iskele. Religiosity is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number from 0 to 6 where 0 is used to code the respondents who are not religious at all and 6 is used to code the respondents who are very religious.

Trust in CSOs is measured with the following question: 'on a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust do you have for civil society organizations in your country?' Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented no trust at all and 6 represented complete trust. Trust towards Greek Cypriots is measured on a 7-point scale. Asked if Greek Cypriots can be trusted, the respondents were asked to put a circle around a number on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 that implies that they cannot be trusted to 6 which implies that they can be trusted. Moreover, voting intention in a future referendum is measured on a 7-point scale. The respondents who were intending to definitely vote 'no' are coded as 0 and the respondents who were intending to definitely vote 'yes' are coded as 6. The full questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. The sample size is large (N=400) and there are 7 categories in the scale used to measure the dependent variable. Therefore, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is acceptable.

## Results

Table 1 presents the number of observations, means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for the independent, dependent and control variables. The number of observations is completely the same for both the treatment and control groups. The average

perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty is high. Most respondents have strong trust in CSOs. Age variance is large and there is absolute equality in the sample with regard to gender. The sample is comprised of slightly left-wing people who are predominantly secular, slightly distrustful toward Greek Cypriots and slightly more likely to vote 'no' in a future referendum. The mean value for level of education is 3.36 and the median respondent has an undergraduate degree. A vast majority of the respondents reside in Nicosia (66%). The remainder are from Famagusta (10%), Kyrenia (15%), Morphou (5%) and from Trikomo/Iskele (5%).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

| Variable | N | Mean | SD | Min | Max |
|---|---|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment/Control | 400 | 0.5 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Legitimacy | 400 | 4.72 | 2.15 | 0 | 6 |
| Trust CSOs | 400 | 4.7 | 2.17 | 0 | 6 |
| Age | 400 | 37.9 | 13.7 | 18 | 80 |
| Gender | 400 | 0.45 | 0.5 | 0 | 1 |
| Education | 400 | 3.36 | 1.12 | 0 | 5 |
| Nicosia | 400 | 0.66 | 0.48 | 0 | 1 |
| Famagusta | 400 | 0.1 | 0.3 | 0 | 1 |
| Kyrenia | 400 | 0.15 | 0.36 | 0 | 1 |
| Morphou | 400 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Iskele/Trikomo | 400 | 0.05 | 0.21 | 0 | 1 |
| Ideology | 400 | 2.3 | 2.36 | 0 | 6 |
| Religiosity | 399 | 1.03 | 1.2 | 0 | 6 |
| Trust GCs | 400 | 2.44 | 1.97 | 0 | 6 |
| Vote intention | 400 | 2.51 | 2 | 0 | 6 |

Table 2 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis. Trust in CSOs could not be introduced in the statistical model since it has a perfect correlation with perceived legitimacy. Pearson's correlation between trust in CSOs and perceived legitimacy is 0.99. Furthermore, the author had to choose between including either trust in Greek Cypriots or vote intention in a referendum in the model since these also had a perfect relationship, thus triggering a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, only trust in Greek Cypriots was

included in the model. It should be emphasised that the analysis was run with both variables and these variables have a very similar effect on the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty (not only p-values but Beta values as well). Excluding these variables do not pose any problems to the validity of the statistical model because the randomisation process was successful. The randomisation process was tested by looking at the correlations between the independent variable and the control variables. None of the correlations are significant at the 90% confidence level. Since a region is a nominal variable, dummy variables are created and Nicosia was kept as the base in the regression analysis.

The statistical model in table 2 explains up to 46% of the variation; hence, the explanatory power of this model is quite successful. Taking 95% confidence level as the threshold, we see that older, more educated and secular Turkish Cypriots who tend to trust Greek Cypriots are more likely to perceive the hypothetical peace treaty as more legitimate. Turkish Cypriots from Iskele/Trikomo region are less likely to perceive the hypothetical peace treaty as more legitimate. As regards the independent variable of interest, we find no meaningful effect of being in the treatment group on the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty. The p-value is only 0.93 and the Beta value is only 0.01.

Table 2:  OLS Regression Analysis

|  | Beta | P-Values | Standard Errors |
|---|---|---|---|
| Treatment/Control | 0.01 | 0.93 | 0.16 |
| Age | 0.02 | 0.01*** | 0.01 |
| Gender | -0.27 | 0.11 | 0.17 |
| Education | 0.43 | 0.01*** | 0.09 |
| Famagusta | 0.52 | 0.06 | 0.28 |
| Kyrenia | 0.25 | 0.28 | 0.23 |
| Morphou | 0.46 | 0.24 | 0.39 |
| Iskele/Trikomo | -1.44 | 0.01*** | 0.48 |
| Ideology | -0.01 | 0.71 | 0.04 |
| Religiosity | -0.37 | 0.01*** | 0.06 |
| Trust GCs | 0.24 | 0.01*** | 0.05 |
| Intercept | 2.33 | 0.01*** | 0.54 |
| Model Fit | | | |
| N | 399 | | |
| R-squared | 0.46 | | |

**Note:** *** significant at 99% confidence level

## Conclusion

Evaluating civil society's peacebuilding functions has gained prominence recently not only among practitioners but academics too. Being at the negotiation table can be understood as a peacebuilding function of civil society as some suggest that its participation will make peace negotiations more representative and peace treaties more legitimate. Similar to Kanol (2015), this study used a survey experiment with the aim of exploring the relationship between civil society's participation at the negotiation table and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. This research complements Kanol's earlier study by gathering data in the northern part of Cyprus. It improves upon the former work by surveying a more representative sample. Although the sample is non-probabilistic, it does include various types of people, and not simply students. Therefore, the sample is more representative of the wider population. Regardless, the results did not change. There seems to be no relationship between inclusiveness and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties.

These findings have important implications for negotiation strategies in countries which have suffered from civil war. In Cyprus, for instance, the UN Secretary General's Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, mentioned the critical nature of civil society in finding a peace agreement and attaining a 'yes' in the referendum (*Cyprus Mail*, 2015). Yet, it is not clear what exactly the role of civil society at the negotiation table is. With respect to *being at the negotiation table*, if civil society's participation does not affect the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties, does this mean that its participation would not affect positive peace? Not necessarily.

This study does not explore the perceived legitimacy beliefs of civil society actors participating at the negotiation table. If their participation at the negotiation table positively affects their legitimacy beliefs, it is again an empirical matter to explore how this effect influences positive peace. Neither does this study examine the possible positive impact of inclusiveness on the epistemic quality of peace treaties. On the other hand, Cunningham (2013) states that the inclusion of many actors at the negotiation table may actually slow down and even block the negotiation process. One can argue, therefore, that more research is needed to examine the multiple potential effects of inclusiveness on peacebuilding, taking into account the complexity of the causal processes.

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# Appendix

Control Group

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

Treatment Group

Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

If there was such a situation, what would be your reaction to the following statements/questions?

1)   The decision was taken in a fair way.
     Strongly disagree  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  Strongly agree

2)   Please indicate what you thought of the outcome.
     Not satisfied at all  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  Completely satisfied

3)   How willing are you to accept the decision?
     Not willing at all  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  Completely willing

     Now I will ask you some general questions.

4)   On a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust would you say you have in Civil Society Organizations in your country?

     No trust at all  0  1  2  3  4  5  6  Complete trust

5)   Age:
     .......

6)   Gender:
     Female  0  Male  1

7) What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
   - 0   No schooling
   - 1   Primary school
   - 2   Secondary school
   - 3   High school
   - 4   Undergraduate
   - 5   Postgraduate

8) In which region are you residing?
   Nicosia
   Famagusta
   Kyrenia
   Morphou
   Trikomo/Iskele

9) In political matters people talk of 'the left' and 'the right'. How would you place your views on this scale?
   Left   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   Right

10) How religious do you consider yourself as?
    Not religious at all   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   Very religious

11) Overall, would you say that Greek Cypriots can be trusted?
    No, they cannot be trusted   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   Yes, they can be trusted

12) If there was a referendum tomorrow, how would you vote?
    I would definitely vote no   0   1   2   3   4   5   6   I would definitely vote yes

# A Hung Parliament in the North:
# Outside Options after the 2003 Election
# en Route to the Annan Plan Referendum of 2004

BURAK ERKUT[1]

## Abstract

*The Turkish Cypriot elections in December 2003 ended with no single political party attaining an absolute majority of seats, whereupon both supporters and opponents of the Annan Plan were each represented with 25 Members of Parliament (MPs), leading to a hung parliament. The aim of this study is to understand the outside options of parties in this hung parliament setup, and identify who were the winners and losers of the formed coalition and the alternative possible coalitions. The methods chosen to evaluate the possibilities are the Shapley–Shubik Power Index and the Casajus Value, which enable a quantification of negotiation power of parties by means of outside options. The results show that the Democratic Party (DP) is the real winner of the coalition. Outside options explains why the National Unity Party (UBP) preferred not to join a coalition with the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and how the Peace and Democracy Movement's (BDH's) unwillingness to join a coalition with the DP and the CTP seemed to be a wrong decision. Moreover, outside options illuminates on how the CTP's power would be reduced in a grand coalition suggested by President Denktash. This study forms a new and original contribution to the literature on the Annan Plan and the Cyprus dispute, providing a better understanding of the political conditions prior to the referendum by using cooperative game theory.*

**Keywords:** outside options, hung parliament, Cyprus dispute, Annan Plan, Turkish Cypriot politics, cooperative game theory, coalitions analysis

## Introduction

A serious attempt for settling the Cyprus dispute was made by the former Secretary General of the United Nations, Kofi Annan, whereby he submitted a plan to Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities in November 2002 based on the outcome of the

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intercommunal negotiations under the mediation of the United Nations (Yakinthou, 2009). With the so called Annan Plan I, he suggested a federation of the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities with a bizonal structure (Taki, 2009). In the Turkish Cypriot community, the opposition together with the vast majority of trade unions supported intercommunal negotiations based on the Annan Plan, whereas the government, the president and some NGOs were against it (Kaymak, 2009). Elections held in the northern part of the island on 14 December 2003 led to an indefinite result: Those in favour of the Plan and those against it had an equal number of seats in the parliament, leading to what political science describes as a hung parliament. After a long process of talks between the parties, the leading party supporting the Plan formed a coalition government with a smaller party against the Plan and intercommunal talks restarted with the presence of a new negotiation team. The intercommunal talks resulted in referenda – held separately on both sides of the island – on 24 April 2004.

This paper is interested in the nature of coalition formation and power sharing during the process of coalition formation. These aspects are even more thought-provoking when there is a hung parliament. The process of coalition formation involves sharing ministries between coalition partners, which provides the ground for a junior coalition partner to demand more ministries than its share in the parliament. In order to analyse the structure of government construction and the power of parties, the use of concepts of cooperative game theory are adopted.

This paper makes use of a formula to predict the number of ministries a party may acquire, based on the probability of being a key party to a coalition (i.e. turning a losing coalition without a parliamentary majority to a winning coalition with a parliamentary majority). This is one aspect of power sharing. A second aspect is how the outside options of the parties are utilised, since options to join other coalitions influence the negotiation power of parties as well. Based on the case study, this paper examines these two aspects with regard to the Democratic Party's (henceforth DP) self-defined role as a key party to coalitions.

The following hypotheses will be tested:

1. It was better for the Republican Turkish Party (henceforth CTP) to form a coalition with the DP than with the National Unity Party (henceforth UBP), since it would have to sacrifice more ministries for the latter case.

2. Based on its number of ministries and its role in intercommunal negotiations, the DP was the real winner of the coalition government formed after the elections.

3. It was better for the UBP to remain as the opposition rather than align with the CTP, because the UBP's outside options would imply that this party shall gain only 1/4 of the ministries in a coalition with the CTP, although it had only 1 MP less than the CTP.

4. Leaving only the Peace and Democracy Movement (henceforth BDH) in the opposition reduced the CTP's outside options more than it did for the two right-wing parties combined, although the CTP was the party with the highest number of MPs.

5. In line with Sözen (2005), it was a wrong decision for the BDH not to join a three party coalition with the CTP and the DP, because its outside options gave this party a strategic role which could be used to claim for ministries.

6. A grand coalition of all parties would have reduced the CTP's power.

The remainder of the paper is structured along these lines: the section below discusses the concept of hung parliaments in the literature followed by a section on coalition building and outside options in which the power of the parties and their outside options are analysed before the article ends with a conclusion.

## Hung Parliaments in the Literature

The term 'hung parliament' can be defined formally as follows: A hung parliament occurs when no party or no political alliance of parties has enough seats in a parliament to form a non-minority government based on the majority of the votes, or when the two parties or the two political alliances have an equal number of seats in a parliament without a third party or a third group of political alliance. In the main, hung parliaments are generally observed in the UK, Australia, Germany's federal parliament, most recently between 2005 and 2009, and in some of its Bundesländer. The latter is known as the case of Hessische Verhältnisse (Hessian Situation), after the state parliament elections of 1982, 1983 and 2008 in Hessia.[2] A hung parliament is followed by an early election or a minority government or in some cases a coalition based on the majority of the votes. A review of the literature indicates that hung parliaments are mainly analysed in the framework of the UK and in Australian elections.

In fact, the term 'hung parliament' appeared initially in UK political culture. Blick and Wilks-Heeg (2010) write that in British politics, the parliament was always 'hung' prior to the existence of parties in the modern sense, for example, at the end of the nineteenth century and at the beginning of the twentieth century. Until the 1970s, the term 'balanced parliament' was used to describe the situation of a hung parliament but after the UK general elections of February 1974, the term 'hung parliament' replaced the

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2 For further information see 'Schon Wieder Hessische Verhältnisse' [Hessian Situation Again]. Available at: [http://www.faz.net/aktuell/politik/wahl-in-hessen/landtagswahl-schon-wieder-hessische-verhaeltni sse-12586024.html], last accessed on 22 February 2016.

term 'balanced parliament'. Blick and Wilks-Heeg clarify the emergence of the term as an adaptation from the US legal system's 'hung jury', which explains a situation in which the jurors disagree on a decision and need to call a second round of meetings to reach a unified decision. The metaphor was used to indicate that the UK parliament had to be dissolved as the government in control was a minority government (Blick and Wilks-Heeg, 2010).

The dissolution of parliament is not the only possible implication of a hung parliament. Based on historical events from the election history of the UK, Kalitowski (2008) lists four possibilities:

1. A single-party minority government supported by other parties in exchange to an agreed programme.
2. A single-party minority government without the properties described above.
3. A government based on the majority of the votes.
4. Dissolving the parliament.

It should not be forgotten that the outcome of a hung parliament is also dependent on the constitutional and legal framework within which a parliament operates. A well-functioning, stable government is important for the political stability of a country; however, it is not clear whether or not a hung parliament will lead to an instable political system or an increased participation of citizens in the processes of democracy. Controversial opinions on the issue of hung parliaments are also captured by Kalitowski (2008). The author distinguishes between two clusters of opinions: One cluster considers that a hung parliament may create an effect of instability on an otherwise stable system, whereas another cluster argues that a hung parliament can increase the political interest of the public and may result in an increased participation in the processes of democracy.

Political compromises can also be seen in step with the second cluster of opinions. Based on the case of the UK 1974 general election, Rogers (2010) argues that a hung parliament is suitable for developing political compromises along with taking responsibility for the economy as both equate to two sides of the same coin. The author claims that a hung parliament is even better than a parliament with a single party majority because it can represent the voters more equitably, and provide a boost of confidence to the markets.

The latter point is subject to economic theory. For instance, in the economic theory, the concept of bargaining observes situations in which parties negotiate the share of power. A basic example is the problem of how to divide a dollar between two players when the outside option is described as 'the best option available elsewhere' (Cunyat, 1998, p. 2) – which can be taken by one of the two parties as a result of discontinuing the negotiations. The outside option principle declares that a player's bargaining power can

increase his or her bargaining power if and only if the outside option is attractive enough (Mutoo, 2000).

Cooperative game theory offers different solution concepts by focusing on the issue of outside options. As mentioned above, an outside option is the best option available for any negotiating party elsewhere (Cunyat, 1998). Furthermore (in terms of opportunity costs) a negotiating party with a high outside option is expected to make his/her conditions more easily acceptable than a negotiating party with a low outside option. This is because his/her opponent may recognise that if the conditions are rejected, the opponent could, for example, go elsewhere to create a coalition and power share. These are alternative options that negotiating parties can adopt to enhance their mediation authority. Outside options are important in cases where two political parties, negotiating for a coalition government, are not restricted to form alliances only with each other as there may be other parties willing to form coalitions with them.

In the literature there are different concepts of outside options, which are driven by cooperative game theory. By way of illustration in the classification of coalition values, two distinguished concepts are attributable to Aumann and Dreze (1974) and Owen (1977). Whereas the Aumann–Dreze value considers only a player's own coalitions while determining the payoff, the Owen value considers associations outside of a player's own coalitions. As Casajus (2009) formulates, both values are insensitive to outside options. A recent contribution by Casajus (*ibid.*) is based on the following main idea: 'Splitting a structural coalition affects players who remain together in the same structural coalition in the same way' (*ibid.*, p. 50). The solution concept proposed by Casajus is based on the Shapley value and can be seen as a balance between outside options and contributing to one's own coalition (Casajus, 2009).

To be more precise, the point of departure is the Shapley value which is a mathematical solution concept from cooperative game theory. It 'tells us how market power is reflected by payoffs' (Wiese, 2010, p. 6) by asking how to distribute the value generated by the grand coalition among the members. The members may differ in their contributions to the grand coalition; therefore, the expected payoffs they receive are expected to differ as well. The Shapley value distributes the worth generated by the grand coalition among the members, where players with similar marginal contributions obtain the same payoff and a player with zero marginal contribution does not obtain anything from the worth of the coalition (Wiese, *ibid.*). Codenotti gives the following interpretation to the Shapley value (Codenotti, 2011): 'Given any "ordering" of the players, where each order is equally likely, the Shapley value $\varphi_i$ measures the expected marginal contribution of player $i$ over all orders to the set of players who precede her'.

The contribution of Casajus (*ibid.*) is based on the Shapley value but it considers the outside options of the players. The players obtain their Shapley payoffs, which needs to be

component efficient – meaning that summing up the payoffs of parties within a component (i.e. a coalitional structure) corresponds to the worth generated by that component. Splitting a coalitional structure affects the remaining players in that coalitional structure in the same way (Casajus, *ibid.*). Belau (2011) describes the Casajus value as 'the Shapley value made component efficient' by considering the coalitional structures rather than the grand coalition of all players – which makes it suitable for analysing coalition formation in a hung parliament.

## Coalition Building and Outside Options

A specific use of the Shapley value is the voting systems. The Shapley value applied to the voting systems is called the Shapley–Shubik Index or sometimes known as the Shapley–Shubik Power Index (Shapley and Shubik, 1954). In the coalition formation process in a parliament, a coalition is either winning (and is assigned the worth 1) or losing (and assigned the worth 0); that is to say, the game is a $0 – 1$ normed game.

Consider the election results of northern Cyprus on 14 December 2003. The only agenda of the election was the political plan for the resettlement of the Cyprus issue suggested by Kofi Annan based on the outcomes of the intercommunal negotiations. In consequence the election can be seen as a 'virtual referendum' (Kaymak, 2009, p. 156). As described earlier, the election results suggested a hung parliament with pro-Annan Plan MPs numbering 25 and anti-Annan Plan MPs also totalling 25. The referendum, therefore, needed to be decided in the parliament; President Denktash – being a lawyer – considered that 'the entire referendum exercise violated the TRNC Constitution in calling for its dissolution' (Kaymak, 2009, p. 157) – later on, the Turkish Cypriot Supreme Court disagreed with the opinion of Denktash. Hence, the aim of parties that were pro-Annan Plan was to restart negotiations and ensure a referendum on the settlement of the Cyprus dispute as suggested in the Annan Plan.

The pro-Annan Plan parties represented in the parliament were the CTP (19 seats) and the BDH (6 seats). The two anti-Annan Plan parties represented in the parliament were the UBP (18 seats) and the DP (7 seats). The Solution and EU Party (CABP–liberal), the Nationalist Peace Party (MBP–nationalist) and the Cyprus Justice Party (KAP–nationalist) did not obtain enough votes to be represented in the parliament, and the Patriotic Unity Movement (YBH) boycotted the elections.[3] A government requires a simple majority of 26 seats in the parliament.

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3   For the official election results see 'Yüksek Seçim Kurulundan İlan' [Notice of the Supreme Election Board]. Available at: [http://ysk.mahkemeler.net/16/20140109115630980.pdf], last accessed on 4 February 2016.

Based on the four parties (CTP, BDH, UBP and DP), there are 4! = 1·2·3·4 = 24 possible permutations, in which a coalition government can be established. Permutations are often associated with the metaphor of four players entering a room one after the other. For one player, there is only one rank order. For two players, there are two rank orders – either player 1 enters first or player 2. Based on these considerations, there are 24 different permutations for four players.

Reaching a simple majority is an important point for coalition building. Within all possible rank orders, there is always a party which 'completes' a coalition to secure a simple majority; namely, adding that party to a losing coalition would make it a winning coalition. In cooperative game theory, the player which turns a coalition from a losing coalition to a winning coalition is known as the pivotal player (or pivotal party). The pivotal player will be assigned a worth of 1 whereas the remaining players will be allocated a 0.

The consideration of all possible orderings is counterfactual. The importance of counterfactual scenarios is reflected in the calculation of Shapley–Shubik index value for this simple voting game. It is calculated by means of summing up the values (either 0 or 1) that a party adds to all possible coalitions (known as the marginal contribution of that party) and dividing this number by the sum of all possible coalitions (in this case, it is 24). To be more precise, in a simple voting game ('simple' meaning 'non-weighted') the Shapley–Shubik index value of a party is the probability of that party being a pivotal player in a coalition (Mann and Shapley, 1964).

The CTP with 19 MPs had the Shapley–Shubik index value of 10/24, having secured the largest share among the four parties. The DP, with only 7 MPs, had the Shapley–Shubik index value of 6/24, which is also the Shapley–Shubik index value for the UBP with 18 MPs. Although the press considered the 6 MPs of the BDH to be a victory, this party was measured as a pivotal party for only two coalitions: 2/24. It was no surprise that the chairman of the DP, Serdar Denktash, was criticised by the nationalist front[4] immediately after the elections for stating that his party 'will be the key to the formation of any coalition'.

The DP was formed by prominent members of the UBP in 1992 after disagreements between the UBP's board and Rauf Denktash (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). Due to the fact that it was the UBP's largest opponent, the DP implicitly tried to become the bigger party of the centre-right in the general elections of 1993 (UBP: 29.9%, DP: 29.2%) and 1998 (UBP: 40.4%, DP: 22.6%) (Sözen, 2005). After failing to reach this target, the party went to the 2003 parliamentary elections under the leadership of Serdar Denktash with a strong opposition to the Annan Plan. He changed the party's post-election strategy to be

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4    *Yenidüzen*, 16 December 2003, Iss. No. 6883.

the key to the formation of any coalition.[5] It can be argued that the DP did not fulfil this target, but compared to the great difference between the number of MPs of the UBP and DP, 18 and 7 respectively, the DP still had the same Shapley–Shubik value as the UBP, its bigger opponent, so it could claim the same number of ministers as the larger party.

_Thesis 1:_ Although the DP and UBP have the same Shapley value, the number of MPs of the UBP is almost three times more than that of the DP. Also, it should be noted that the CTP could not form a government with the BDH to enjoy a majority in the parliament. In a coalition government with the UBP, the CTP would have to sacrifice more ministries because the UBP would be able to claim more ministries on account of its number of MPs. Thus, a coalition with the DP may be considered a clever move from the CTP's perspective as well as the best possible option.

Although the Shapley–Shubik power index is important in order to understand coalitions and the power of political parties, it does not consider outside options. So far we know the probabilities for each party to become a pivotal player. However, parties also have outside options – besides a certain coalition government, a party may be a pivotal player in another coalition government. Outside options will be deliberated by using the Casajus value.

To proceed with the calculation of outside options by means of Casajus, some assumptions should be made. Initially, the three parties supporting the Annan Plan (CTP, BDH and CABP) made an agreement prior to the elections to the effect that coalition governments would not be formed with any parties that were against the Annan Plan.[6] That said, prior to the election a similar arrangement was not observed between the coalitions of that time – the UBP and DP. Nonetheless, immediately after the election, Serdar Denktash (DP) indicated to Dr Dervish Eroglu (chairman of the UBP and later president) that he ought to act as though he had 25 MPs:[7] 25 MPs correspond to the combination of the MPs of UBP (18) and DP (7). This point was made a short time before Serdar Denktash commented that his party would be the key to any coalition. In consequence, the parties could not attach themselves to the initial deals and promises made, simply because neither a coalition between the UBP and DP, nor a coalition between the CTP and BDH could form a winning coalition due to the extraordinary seat distribution. Furthermore, as these parties governed together for many episodes in their

5   See S. Denktash: 'Sandiktan Koalisyon Çikacak' [A Coalition will come out of the Election Box]. Available at: [http://www.habervitrini.com/gundem/serdar-denktas-sandiktan-koalisyon-cikacak-110555/], last accessed on 4 February 2016.

6   _Yenidüzen_, 28 November 2003, Iss. No. 6866.

7   _Yenidüzen_, 18 December 2003, Iss. No. 6885.

history (UBP–TKP: 1985–1986 and 1999–2001, DP–CTP: 1993–1996), it was not hard to imagine a left-right coalition.

Sözen (2005) describes the outcome of the CTP–DP coalition as 'a very unstable coalition government' (p. 466) since the two parties had only 26 out of 50 MPs. Mehmet Ali Talat and Serdar Denktash were appointed as main Turkish Cypriot mediators for the Annan Plan negotiations – this altered the position of the Turkish side,[8] leaving behind the self-determination policies of Rauf Denktash (Faustmann, 2009). Indeed, there were signs of change in Turkish foreign policy even before the Turkish Cypriot elections of 2003. The newly elected Turkish government of Justice and Development Party declared the plan as negotiable, and supported a policy change towards a federal solution (Bahceli and Noel, 2009).

Following the referendum a wave of resignations meant that the government would lose its majority in the parliament and call for an early election in February 2005: the upshot leading to the victory of the CTP (see Sözen, 2005).

During the course of the analysis of outside options, the situation, whereby some MPs switch from one party to the other or remain independent, is not reflected upon. This may seem unrealistic but can only be understood if the high tension of the era is considered; even though there is anecdotal evidence that an MP from the UBP thought of resigning after the election but then chose not to.

The following assumptions will be made:

*Assumption 1*: A coalition government between the CTP and the UBP or the CTP and the DP.

*Assumption 2*: Any coalition government with three parties.

*Assumption 3*: The grand coalition suggested by Rauf Denktash.

Considering the first assumption, the following coalition function can be defined:

$$v(S) = \begin{cases} 1, CTP \in S, DP \in S \\ 1, CTP \in S, UBP \in S \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$

The coalition function above can be interpreted as follows: A coalition formed by any two parties is observed. If this coalition has a majority in the parliament, it is assigned the worth '1' – it is a winning coalition and can pass laws, for instance, the referendum law which was necessary for the Annan Plan referendum. Any other coalition is assigned the

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8    The term 'Turkish side' refers to both Turkish Cypriots and Turkey.

worth '0' because it does not have a majority in the parliament – hence, any other coalition is a losing coalition. The CTP could form a two party coalition with the UBP or the DP to reach a majority in the parliament.

The game 'S' can be considered as the 'gloves' game with the CTP having the only 'left' glove and the UBP and DP having a 'right' glove each. This is similar to a market situation, where only a pair of gloves (i.e. a left and a right glove) is meaningful for the market – and the left glove is the scarcer of the two sides. This observation can be justified for a number of reasons: To begin with, according to the constitutional arrangements, the party with the highest number of MPs is appointed first to form the government; in this case it is the CTP. Second, after the election the UBP's chairman, Dr Dervish Eroglu, said that his party would not be involved in any coalition where the UBP does not hold the position of prime minister.[9] Conversely, the DP's chairman, Serdar Denktash, announced his priority list of coalition governments:[10] The list of the grand coalition proclaimed the following: a coalition between the CTP and UBP and a coalition between the CTP, BDH and the DP. But later this list is extended by a coalition with the CTP[11] which is subject to a condition stipulating that the BDH is not involved.

None of the cases involve a coalition in which the DP claims the position of the prime minister – therefore, the CTP is viewed as the only player with the 'left' glove, namely the position of the party forming the government under a prime minister from its own parliamentary group. A two party coalition with the BDH would fail to secure the necessary majority in the parliament, and so it is not considered. A minority government with the BDH was subsequently rejected by the CTP's chairman, Mehmet Ali Talat.[12] The right-wing parties did not consider at any point the BDH as a possible two party coalition partner. Further justification comes in Talat's interview with *Yenidüzen*[13] when he states that no other party but the CTP would form the government. His message seems to validate the CTP as the only player holding a 'left' glove in a 'gloves' type of game.

It is known that the Shapley values in this coalitional structure would be the following:

$$Sh_{CTP}(v) = \frac{4}{6}, Sh_{UBP}(v) = \frac{1}{6}, Sh_{DP}(v) = \frac{1}{6}$$

The Casajus value on $V^{part}$ is the solution function *Ca* given by

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9   *Yenidüzen*, 27 December 2003, Iss. No. 6892.
10   *Yenidüzen*, 20 December 2003, Iss. No. 6886.
11   *Yenidüzen*, 6 January 2004, Iss. No. 6899.
12   *Yenidüzen*, 27 December 2003, Iss. No. 6892.
13   *Yenidüzen*, 24 December 2003, Iss. No. 6889.

$$Ca_i(v) := Sh_i + \frac{v(\wp(i)) - \sum_{j \in \wp(i)} Sh_j(v)}{|\wp(i)|}$$

Wiese interprets this formula in the following manner:

'According to this value, the players obtain the Shapley value which then has to be made component-efficient. If the sum of the Shapley values in a component happens to equal the component's worth, the Casajus value equals the Shapley value. If the sum of a component's Shapley values exceed the component's worth, the difference, averaged over all the players in the component, has to be "paid" by every player' (Wiese, 2010, p. 112).

The Casajus payoffs yield for the CTP–DP coalition:

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{4}{6} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{4}{6} + \frac{1}{6}\right)}{2} = \frac{3}{4}$$

$$Ca_{DP}(v) = \frac{1}{6} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{4}{6} + \frac{1}{6}\right)}{2} = \frac{1}{4}$$

$$Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{4}{6} + \frac{0 - \frac{4}{6}}{1} = 0$$

*Thesis 2:* In reality, the government was formed as a coalition between the CTP and the DP, whereupon the CTP had 6 ministries plus the prime ministry and the DP had 4 ministries.[14] According to the Casajus values, the CTP should have 8.25 (rounded to 8) ministries and the DP should have 2.75 (rounded to 3) ministries. Thus, the DP had a bigger share than its Casajus value. Although the CTP could not improve its position as explained in *Thesis 1*, the DP is the real winner of this coalition – it had the same outside option value as the UBP, its largest opponent, and made use of it to claim one more ministry.

The active role of the DP during the intercommunal negotiations was a further gain for this party. This was a strategy which the CTP did not use as a junior partner in the government with the DP back in 1993 to shape the negotiation process. According to

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14  *Yenidüzen*, 12 January 2004, Iss. No. 6898.

Özgür (2000), the CTP's passive role in the foreign policy of the 1993 government led to the joint declaration of the DP and the UBP stating that federal solution is not the only possible solution for the Cyprus dispute.

Since the UBP and the DP have the same Shapley value, the calculation is similar for a coalition of the CTP–UBP coalition – only the roles of the UBP and the DP would change:

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{3}{4}, Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{1}{4}, Ca_{DP}(v) = 0$$

*Thesis 3*: Although the CTP and the UBP had almost the same number of MPs, the CTP would claim 3/4 of the ministries in the government, thereby reducing the share of the UBP by sharing ministries corresponding to their outside options. This may explain why the UBP began coalition talks with the CTP via a letter containing 18 questions on the Annan Plan,[15] to which the CTP replied: 'You should have asked Mr. Annan', and ended the talks.[16] The recent coalition experience of the CTP and UBP also indicated that some prominent members of the UBP were not satisfied with being the minor party in the coalition government with CTP. This was especially the case regarding foreign policies of the government, where they felt that UBP's opinions were not reflected well.[17]

Considering the second assumption, specifically, the formation of any coalition government with three parties, the following coalition function can be defined:

$$v(L) = \begin{cases} 1, CTP \in L, DP \in L, UBP \in L \\ 1, CTP \in L, BDH \in L, UBP \in L \\ 1, BDH \in L, DP \in L, UBP \in L \\ 1, CTP \in L, DP \in L, BDH \in L \\ 0, otherwise \end{cases}$$

This coalition function can be interpreted as follows: In the game 'L' only three party coalitions are considered. From the parties represented in the parliament, any coalition with three parties which reaches a parliamentary majority is assigned the worth '1' since these coalitions are winning coalitions in the sense that they can pass the necessary laws. Any other coalition will be assigned the worth '0' since it cannot reach a parliamentary majority.

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15  *Yenidüzen*, 3 January 2004, Iss. No. 6896.

16  *Yenidüzen*, 4 January 2004, Iss. No. 6897.

17  See, for example, the speech of the UBP MP, Zorlu Töre, criticising the UBP's chairman, Hüseyin Özgürgün, for giving up the UBP's ideals on the Cyprus dispute. Available at: [http://www.kibris sondakika.com/tore-akinci-ve-mehmetali-talati-elestirdi], last accessed on 18 February 2016.

The Shapley payoffs are known:

$$Sh_{CTP}(v) = \frac{10}{24}, Sh_{UBP}(v) = \frac{6}{24}, Sh_{DP}(v) = \frac{6}{24}, Sh_{BDH}(v) = \frac{2}{24}$$

The Casajus payoffs yield for the CTP–UBP–DP coalition:

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{10}{24} + \frac{1 - (\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{6}{24})}{3} = \frac{32}{72}$$

$$Ca_{DP}(v) = Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{1 - (\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{6}{24})}{3} = \frac{20}{72}$$

$$Ca_{BDH}(v) = \frac{2}{24} + \frac{0 - \frac{2}{24}}{1} = 0$$

_Thesis 4_: In a counterfactual three party coalition with the UBP and DP, the CTP would have a lower outside option than the combined outside options of the UBP and DP. Even though the latter two would not form a government with a parliamentary majority, they would need a third coalition partner. And even supposing the CTP would leave them on their own, it would not form a coalition with the BDH either. The outside option of the CTP in this case would reflect this phenomenon – the calculations above reflect the CTP's position as the party with the largest number of MPs still remaining in the minority in this government regarding the allocation of the ministries (the CTP's Casajus value corresponding to 5 out of 11 ministers).

The Casajus payoffs yield for the CTP–UBP–BDH coalition:

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{10}{24} + \frac{1 - (\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24})}{3} = \frac{36}{72}$$

$$Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{1 - (\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24})}{3} = \frac{24}{72}$$

$$Ca_{BDH}(v) = \frac{2}{24} + \frac{1 - (\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24})}{3} = \frac{12}{72}$$

$$Ca_{DP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{0 - \frac{6}{24}}{1} = 0$$

The Casajus payoffs yield for the UBP–BDH–DP coalition:

$$Ca_{DP}(v) = Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{6}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24}\right)}{3} = \frac{28}{72}$$

$$Ca_{BDH}(v) = \frac{2}{24} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{6}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24}\right)}{3} = \frac{16}{72}$$

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{10}{24} + \frac{1 - \frac{10}{24}}{1} = 0$$

The Casajus payoffs yield for the CTP–BDH–DP coalition:

$$Ca_{CTP}(v) = \frac{10}{24} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24}\right)}{3} = \frac{36}{72}$$

$$Ca_{DP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24}\right)}{3} = \frac{24}{72}$$

$$Ca_{BDH}(v) = \frac{2}{24} + \frac{1 - \left(\frac{10}{24} + \frac{6}{24} + \frac{2}{24}\right)}{3} = \frac{12}{72}$$

$$Ca_{UBP}(v) = \frac{6}{24} + \frac{1 - \frac{6}{24}}{1} = 0$$

*Thesis 5*: Considering the three party coalitions, the CTP would have the largest outside option in a coalition with either the BDH and the UBP or the BDH and the DP; however, this would be lower than its outside option in a two party coalition with either the DP or the UBP (the cost of having one more party in the government is paid by a reduction in the number of ministries assigned to the CTP, which is reflected in the calculations above). The real winners in the three party coalitions would be the minor parties – the BDH and the DP – by increasing the majority vote of the government in the parliament and in the parliamentary committees where the decisions are taken. The most realistic three party coalition would be the CTP–BDH–DP coalition, which was

initially supported by the CTP and opposed by both the DP[18] and the BDH.[19] But while the opposition of the DP can be justified by its outside option and claim for ministries being higher in a two party coalition, the BDH's opposition can be considered as a wrong movement. Without considering outside options, the BDH has a Shapley–Shubik power index of 0.083, whereas the outside options in three party coalitions would yield the BDH an outside option of at least 0.167 if it is involved in that coalition – an improvement rejected by the party, which also caused the party to lose its votes in the 2005 elections (Sözen, 2005). Based on the calculations above, the BDH's outside option value would have corresponded to 1 out of 11 ministries, the rest shared by the CTP (6) and DP (4) in a three party coalition.

Considering the third assumption, the Casajus payoffs are equal to that of the Shapley value by definition since the coalitional structure or partition coincides with the set of all players (i.e. Casajus value for the grand coalition is the Shapley value).

*Thesis 6*: Considering the three party coalitions and their Casajus payoffs, the CTP was free to choose between the DP and the UBP without reducing its Casajus payoff; that is to say, without its outside option being reduced. Also, the CTP's Casajus payoff (being equal to its Shapley payoff) in the case of a coalition of four parties, would be lower than its Casajus payoffs in any coalition in which it participates. The suggestion of President Denktash to build a coalition government based on all four parties would eventually reduce the CTP's power in a coalition.

To sum up, the outside options play an important role in analysing the political conditions which led to the Annan Plan referendum in the Turkish Cypriot political scene – due to the indefinite outcome of the hung parliament. The commitments of political blocks could not hold, and even though the government of the Republic of Turkey was in favour of the Annan Plan (Bahceli and Noel, 2009), there was huge uncertainty – which accounted for the reason why the minor parties gained importance: The flexibility of both the BDH and the DP could influence the government formation one way or the other. The importance of the CTP–DP government can therefore be viewed as an attempt to reduce the uncertainty and the tension of bipolarisation in society, though paradoxically, the final version of the Annan Plan was more of a disagreement between the communities than an agreement.

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18   *Yenidüzen*, 6 January 2004, Iss. No. 6899.
19   *Yenidüzen*, 10 January 2004, Iss. No. 6903.

## Conclusion and Future Research

In this paper, the outside options in a hung parliament have been analysed. The case study was based on the outcome of Turkish Cypriot elections in 2003, which was an important milestone en route to the Annan Plan referendum in 2004. The distribution of seats was interesting from the perspective of cooperative game theory because the election ended in a hung parliament where both supporters and opponents of the Annan Plan each had 25 MPs. The Shapley–Shubik power index was used together with the Casajus outside option value to calculate the power and outside options of parties.

A hung parliament may have different outcomes (Kalitowski, 2008) and among the possible outcomes, a political consensus between parties of different views is possible. The concept of outside options allows minor parties to make demands for more ministries. Therefore, if used properly as a strategic tool, it may result in a minor party becoming the real winner of a government. In effect, being the real winner does not merely consist of the number of ministries but also comprises of yet more strategic positions – in the case study, this was the role of Serdar Denktash in the intercommunal negotiations for the Annan Plan. Clearly, even within a political bipolarisation such as the Annan Plan era in Turkish Cypriot society, the role of flexible minor parties is very decisive in the pursuance of reaching a consensus. Outside options gain importance in a hung parliament because they may influence the dissolution of political commitments and blocks.

At this point, we can question what generic rules govern the dynamics in a hung parliament. Since changing aspects are expected to embrace different dynamics across cultures, the political culture of the Cypriot communities shall remain as the research context. In a complementary paper, the effect of Turkish foreign policy on the referendum, post 2002, will be measured for causality. Counterfactual considerations regarding the possibilities of a pro-Annan Plan majority versus a contra-Annan Plan majority will be modelled to deliberate on how this might have altered the political situation. A further point to be emphasised is the structural similarities in the political culture of Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities.

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*Yenidüzen*, 6 January 2004, Iss. No. 6899.
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*Yenidüzen*, 12 January 2004, Iss. No. 6898.

# Memories of a 64th Generation Cypriot

For the most part, *Memories of a 64th Generation Cypriot* is a book focusing on one of the most important, critical and fascinating historical periods in the history of Cyprus. It recounts the life, personal memories and experiences of its author, Rüstem Köken. Köken, the seventh child of a farming family, was born in a Turkish Cypriot village. He finished school in Pergama (Pergamos/Beyarmudu) in Larnaca before moving to Famagusta to attend Namık Kemal Lycée [Secondary School]. Following his graduation he moved to Istanbul in 1961 to attend Istanbul Technical University where he studied electrical engineering. But in December 1963 the crisis which flared up in Cyprus between Greek and Turkish Cypriots led Köken and other Turkish Cypriots to abandon their studies and move back covertly to the island in order to participate in the clashes. After spending two years fighting in the area of Erenköy [Kokkina] he returned to Istanbul where he faced many difficulties due to the agonising effects of the war. Moreover, although brief as it may be, the author does refer to, and provide, an interesting account of the tense political situation in Istanbul and the radicalisation of the student movement and politics during the closing years of the 1960s. The author later describes how he met his wife and goes on to chronicle the conditions which he and his wife withstood when their children were born. He recounts how they raised them and details the professional decisions he had to take in order to work and provide the necessary means to support his family, such as moving to Libya on two occasions owing to the difficult economic situations he was facing in both Turkey and Cyprus.

Yet, the most significant and interesting section in the book is the Erenköy warfare, which later lent its name to a whole generation of people. Following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus in 1960, constitutional guarantees and rights were provided to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots but it was not long afterwards that the newly established state was to be tested. Through the thirteen points set forth by President Makarios, the Greek Cypriots proposed an amendment to the constitution 'to resolve constitutional deadlocks', which would relegate the Turkish Cypriot community to minority status as a prelude to bringing about *enosis*. After failing to convince the Turkish Cypriots to accept changes to the bicommunal constitutional order, heavy clashes and killings broke out between the two communities of the island. The part of the title *64th Generation Cypriot* denotes those Turkish Cypriot scholars who were studying in Turkey

in 1964, and took the decision to abandon their studies in order to go back to Cyprus and fight in Erenköy.

This most thought-provoking part of the book reveals the mentality of the Turkish Cypriot generation that participated in the violent clashes between the two communities, along with the ideas and perceptions of these people toward the Greek Cypriots as well as the political environment of that time. Nonetheless, the author could have devoted a few more pages to elaborate on this aspect in greater detail. We read that the 'Dreams of the Greeks about [the] annexation of Cyprus to Greece were obvious, but we didn't think that they would repeat the massacres they [had] previously enacted in Morea, Crete and the Balkans, in Cyprus in this century' (p. 72). It is worthy of note that when Köken refers to 'we' in the above passage, he equates Turkish Cypriots with Turks, considering them to be one and the same. In doing so he neglects or demotes the Turkish Cypriot identity, or even a Cypriot identity. He does not contemplate that Turkish Cypriots can have an identity of their own. On another point he mentions that 'As we Turks are so tolerant and so peaceful, the Greek Cypriots hated us, and they indoctrinated their children with hatred and hostility for Turks' (p. 77).

Rüstem Köken presents an account of the history of Cyprus that does not allow any space for reconciliation and collaboration between the two communities. He depicts the people of Cyprus as two entirely different communities that did not have, and still do not have, anything in common. In this respect his personal memories of being scared as a child until he departed the Greek village because Greek Cypriot children threw rocks at him, is quite revealing. What is more, he presents a scenario of the dominant Greek Cypriot community being one that holds the role of the victimiser, whereas the subordinate Turkish Cypriot community is depicted as being the victim. Although nobody can deny that the situation described was entirely wrong, it gives the reader the impression that the Turkish Cypriots were devoid of responsibility. The island of Cyprus is a place of two conflicting nationalisms that feed upon each other.

Furthermore, Köken seems to be trying to establish and perhaps promote a link to the 'motherland' of Turkey, in that he was a staunch admirer of Mustafa Kemal Atatürk. The Turkish Cypriots followed the radical reforms of Atatürk, and were therefore saved from the fundamentalist fanaticism of religion (p. 69). The author's Kemalism is apparent throughout the text, especially when he discusses Islam and the backward way of life, full of superstitions – a 'Bedouin culture', as he calls it (p. 206).

The author provides a vivid depiction of a bygone Cyprus full of picturesque scenery which brings back many memories to the people of Cyprus who actually lived through the period, and which also acquaints the younger generations with the past. Although the book is very strong in this respect, it lacks historical objectivity on more than one occasion. Whilst it reproduces the official historical narrative of the island and the conflict, it offers a rather confusing description at times. For example, Rüstem Koken

speaks of the lack of weaponry on the part of the Turkish Cypriots during the war. In contrast with the weaponry of the Greek Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots had only old, slow and untrustworthy rifles (p. 98). However, a few pages later there is a picture of him with a friend during an MP watch, holding Bren Guns (p. 115) that were light machine guns and totally different from the antiquated rifles he mentions earlier. On another occasion, he alludes to the death of the wife and children of a Turkish military doctor to evidence Greek Cypriot hostility. After the killings the dead were placed in a bathtub in the house. The author obviously refers to an incident which inspired an exhibit in the Museum of Barbarism – located in the Turkish part of Nicosia where the house of the doctor used to be. It should be noted that there are also Greek Cypriot versions of the killings that took place at that time, some of them perhaps absurd such as one that recalls the doctor killing his family and then he or the Turks/Turkish Cypriots placing them in the bathtub. Another account specifies that the individuals involved were indeed killed by Greek Cypriot grenades but they were then placed in the bathtub by Turkish Cypriots in order to stir the public's reaction. From the above, it is safe to argue that the evidence is inconclusive.

As a final point, the editing of this work is abysmal. There are extensive misspellings and proof-reading errors (*intersted* for interested, *mension* for mention). To illustrate this, the English letter *i* is substituted with the Turkish letter *ı* for some reason but it is written correctly at other times (studyıng for studying, İstanbul for Istanbul). Reading these memoirs and becoming familiarised with the author's viewpoint, one should not be surprised at the emergence of the Cyprus issue and why it still remains impossible to solve. Needless to say there are countless similar voices in the Greek part of the island which ally with Köken's standpoint but in reverse, promoting Greek/Greek Cypriot nationalism.

NIKOS CHRISTOFIS

# The History of the Communist Party in Cyprus: Colonialism, Class and the Cypriot Left

T*he History of the Communist Party in Cyprus* is the first attempt to offer a comprehensive account on the appearance, the activities and the evolution of a party that laid down the foundations of party life and influenced the political and social order in Cyprus. This book is one of the very rare publications that detail the history and evolution of a Cypriot party – the others being Adam's controversial account on AKEL (1972) and Stamatiou's book on pre-1974 EDEK, in Greek (2013). In this respect, this is a valuable contribution to the study of the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK) and as such, it fills a gap in research related to the history and evolution of parties and party politics in the island; it enriches the existing (limited) literature on the island's parties and politics. More importantly, it helps in tracing and understanding key factors and processes that shaped the left-right cleavage in the 1940s and are extended into our era despite significant social, political and economic changes that have taken place in the meantime. It also assists the reader to comprehend Cyprus society and politics provided that their course is seen in a continuum; social divisions prompted by the appearance of the KKK led to consolidation of the left-right cleavage in the mid-1940s and have persisted in daily life until today.

The author, Yiannos Katsourides, in conducting his work, draws on the theories of Stein Rokkan and Seymour Lipset on state formation and the social and other conditions that influenced party formation in Europe. Even though Cyprus forms a separate case than the continent, comparisons provide useful and sufficient explanations on the specific characteristics and the divergent paradigm of the KKK. The author also examines the party's creation, organisational and programmatic features in the light of the Marxist-Leninist theory on society and classes, and in particular Lenin's views on the relation between the party and the working class, processes of organisation and work, and other relevant matters. Katsourides shows that the Cypriot communists followed and employed theory in a conscious and scrupulous manner, and put into practice basic Marxist principles in the setting up and operation of the KKK.

In the absence of previous literature on the subject, the author searched primary relevant sources, in particular the Greek Cypriot press, the British Archives, the very valuable Archives of Contemporary Social History [Αρχείο Σύγχρονης Κοινωνικής

Ιστορίας – ASKI] in Athens and, of course, documents held by the Progressive Party of the Working People [Ανορθωτικό Κόμμα Εργαζόμενου Λαού – AKEL] and the Pancyprian Labour Federation [Παγκύπρια Εργατική Ομοσπονδία – PEO]. The KKK, AKEL and PEO have, during various periods of time, been the targets of monitoring and persecution by the authorities, resulting in the outlaw of the two parties – the KKK and AKEL – and valuable sections of their archives being lost. Copies of documents and reports found in ASKI, though not compensating for the lost archives, may fill somewhat the gaps. The author's access to AKEL and PEO archives, until now not open to researchers, is of significant value as it sheds new light on history such as the programmed and planned creation of AKEL by the outlawed KKK.

The book is divided into seven chapters, with four directly focusing on the KKK, including also an extensive introduction and conclusions.

The introduction presents the scope of the book and the main themes examined, the theoretical and methodological framework employed by the author, and the outline. Marxist theory and Rokkan-Lipset's theories on the people's mobilisation and the formation of class cleavages, the emergence of left parties and the way they connect with social class, as well as the link between the citizen, class consciousness and the collectivity are set as the study's guidelines. Their association with Cyprus shows the extent to which its case fits well with or diverges from the general paradigm.

In chapter 1, the focus is on the context and the peculiar conditions of Cyprus in the period that preceded the emergence of communist ideas and of a small working class. Its colonial status is a decisive factor affecting the path to development and nation formation. The constraints of colonial rule, taxes and the exploitation by local elites of an almost exclusively agrarian society constitute the main components that enforced upon it a belated course to modern life. They are combined with the politics of *enosis* – union with Greece that monopolises the interests of elites in their search for power. Even so, slow progress is noticed as well as the emergence of a working class.

Although some of the above concerns are presented over an extensive period of time, with leaps back and forth, sometimes extending to more than one century, other assertions remain undocumented. For example, the reader cannot be sure as to whether conditions described in connection with tax collection (p. 18) were also in force in the mid-nineteenth century and the late Ottoman rule. Furthermore, assertions such as the one that claims 'The majority of small owners lost their land ...' (p. 26) appear grossly exaggerated.

Chapter 2 deals with politics as well as the conditions and dynamics that had maintained political activity at very low levels, in both size and quality. It examines the limited role of the Legislative Council, the status and other features of the political elites and the exclusion of the large majority from franchise. These traits led to a deficient

system that served only to legitimate the regime, mainly through the inclusion of local elites in the administration of the island by Great Britain.

The political formations, social and other phenomena that preceded the communist party KKK and paved its path are studied in chapter 3. The attempts to organise parties – the Agrarian, the Popular, and the Cypriot Labour Party – failed as such because they were mostly person-centred, in the service of their founders. In this respect they were profoundly different from the communist party norm. However, some of their ideas along with other forms of organisation such as guilds and labour clubs, and ideas linked to social unrest and questioning the system had opened the road to a new party.

Chapter 4 narrates the slow progression from the emergence of the communist ideology in Cyprus to the founding congress of the KKK in August 1926 and its main attributes. It stresses the choice of a programmatic plan to challenging the existing order, defending and promoting the interests of the working class. This was sought through (failed) alliances for a united front, by following 'known' modes of communist activism, on the basis of a political programme that tackled social issues such as the question of *enosis,* the pursuance of civil rights and liberties, and the defiance of religious order. Opposition to *enosis* and to the Church are assessed as a mistake by the party not corresponding to the public's mainstream stance and beliefs and impeding KKK's expansion.

The party's organisational model and relational network, examined in chapter 5, demonstrate how its leadership promoted a different culture among its members and created a 'society within society'. These practices diverged radically from the elite model of the conservative forces and the Church, as were other topics examined in the chapter such as KKK's organisational structure and internal relations, the significant role of the party press to promote communist ideas, and attempts to approach and organise the Turkish Cypriot community and relations on an international level with other communist parties and organisations. A most significant ingredient that determined the future of the left in Cyprus was the KKK's role in setting up the bases and organising the trade union movement that to date constitutes the left's backbone.

Chapter 6 projects the aspects that led to the party's failure to integrate within the system and record a sizable electoral score. It was repression by the colonial regime but also the reaction of local elites and the Church, as well as the KKK's negative positions on *enosis* and the Church, at a time when society was not ready to endorse such radical choices linked to the national claims. Internal dissensions and tensions with the labour movement, and the exclusion of the larger section of the lower strata have also proved obstacles to electoral success.

The final chapter 7 shows that the party's years in illegality, following the popular unrest of October 1931, have not been able to hinder its development. After a period of

severe crisis due to the arrest and ban of its leadership from Cyprus, some of its cadres managed to re-assemble its forces and re-organise the KKK. Its underground activity combined with a shifting focus in the organisation and tutelage of the rapidly expanding working class gave a new impetus towards its expansion. In 1941, KKK's outlawed leadership inaugurated a new course for communism in Cyprus with the creation of AKEL. The new party's moderate ideological foundations, its support for *enosis* and reconciliation with the Church are proposed as the decisive factors of the left's broad influence that is maintained to the present day.

The latter argument, where the party focus is on more moderate positions appears the most significant or sole factor of the left's success. It ignores conjectural elements and social and other circumstances during the period 1939 to 1944; the years when AKEL laid down strong foundations and established itself as a major political force. It also holds fast to the argument that de-possessed peasants formed the working class. The influences upon which AKEL founded its expansion seem to be ignored; for instance the conditions of extensive social mobility and urbanisation created by WWII, such as widespread employment in military/defensive works in addition to deployment in large numbers to the side of the allies which created a need for defending the interests of and protecting new groups outside of their traditional environment. The ideal protector was AKEL, for both ideological but also for reasons connected to the reality: With the Church and the conservative camp remaining leaderless and largely unorganised after 1931, resistance to the rapid expansion of the left was initially very weak or non-existent.

There is a discrepancy in the book with regard to the nomenclature. The Communist Party of Cyprus (Κομμουνιστικό Κόμμα Κύπρου) and other organisations are labelled in accordance with their English name (CPC, LLC, AP, PP etc.), while AKEL, PEO and others are named following the abbreviation of their name in Greek, which is the literature standard. Noted also are some translation problems and/or typos (e.g. Panebianco's theory on *'a party's generic factors'* (p. 202) instead of 'a party's genetic traits/features'), missing or wrong references (e.g. endnotes 90 to 106 on pages 88 to 91). Copy-editing needed some more attention.

That said, Katsourides' book is a valuable contribution to the study of party politics, class and labour movements and politics under colonial rule. Academics, researchers, students, and political actors, those that study and want to understand party and politics in Cyprus, the Middle East as well as Europe and elsewhere, in a comparative perspective, will benefit from reading the book. It offers a detailed account of a party's history, processes of work and development under peculiar circumstances and colonial rule. It is richly documented and referenced. While reading it, new questions emerge and invite new research; for example, what exactly were the links, if any, between the underground/ outlawed KKK and the very active left-wing group of Cypriots in London, including the

future Secretary General of AKEL, Ezekias Papaioannou? Was the group's activity limited to the promotion of the 'national cause' in the UK or has it in any way influenced the work and course of the KKK in Cyprus? A further question relates to the creation by the KKK of the Peasant-Educational clubs (Αγροτο-μορφωτικοί Σύλλογοι) in the 1920s and 1930s and their role in AKEL's penetration in rural areas. Little is said in the book about the background to these clubs, but given that electoral mobilisation (1943) was limited to towns and townships, we gather that by the time AKEL was founded only a sizeable number of already existing clubs could explain the spreading of communist ideas among the peasantry. Without such an organised network of clubs and influences, AKEL's expansion in rural areas might have been slow and difficult, particularly given that peasantry is generally highly conservative. But what role exactly did the KKK play in creating these clubs, what was the size of this movement, and what other issues facilitated their expansion (e.g. mining sites and labour concentration)?

CHRISTOPHOROS CHRISTOPHOROU

## Resolving Cyprus:
## New Approaches to Conflict Resolution

Edited by JAMES KER-LINDSAY
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*Resolving Cyprus*: Such a bold title could evoke two sets of readers' reactions. For those who have not dealt with the Cyprus conflict in detail it could be interest coupled with relief that – finally – a new viable solution could be in the wings. For those who are privy to the Cyprus problem it is more likely to be annoyance or even indignation, as the title could suggest that yet another attempt is being made at seducing readers to finally recognise the injustice of the status quo and to find out how easy it could be to resolve the conflict if only the world recognised the 'facts' and distinguished the 'truth' from the 'lies'. Let there be no mistake: the book contains none of this. It offers neither a clear resolution to the conflict, nor the well-known propaganda of one-sided positions. Instead, it offers a compilation of 30 contributions that attempt to answer a simple question posed in a call for papers about resolving Cyprus: But the question is not '*how* can Cyprus be solved'. Instead, it is simply '*can* Cyprus be solved'. The results are interesting in most, refreshing in many, surprising in some cases. The output is a very diverse collection of approaches stemming from several disciplines. The potential audience is accordingly broad, including everybody interested in the Cyprus conflict as well as those dealing with any protracted social conflicts.

In order to find answers to the question 'can Cyprus be solved', academics, leading practitioners and policy makers as well as civil society activists have dealt with aspects of history, security, with political factors or dynamics within communities, legal dimensions, internal or external parties, gender perspective, and economic or civil society issues. They were asked to contribute with essays rather than scientific articles full of references, so they can present within a few pages their ideas and views on whether Cyprus can be solved. The concept seems to have encouraged some to strip themselves of their usual corset of ideological constraints and to free their mind with bold concessions, perspectives that in the not too distant past would have been decried as heretic or treacherous by any one side to the conflict.

The editor, James Ker-Lindsay, decided to set the contributions into alphabetical order rather than to attempt to group them into disciplinary or argument clusters. This decision makes reading enjoyable and rich in variety. Still, it may be no coincidence that

the first author, Adamides, sets the tone in conceding that finding a resolution to the Cyprus conflict might actually – *gasp!* – not be desired at all. In this regard, the popular double referendum in the wake of the Annan Plan, in 2004, has gone a long way in opening eyes to internationals and Cypriots alike on their attitude on the conflict. 'The conflict, in other words, has become rather comfortable and the stalemate is not particularly painful for either side', concludes Adamides (p. 7). This, according to Stavrinides, is mostly because '[e]ach community's combined assets, goals, political resources and diplomatic capabilities are more or less balanced by the other community's combined assets, resources and capabilities'. This, he claims, has led to a 'kind of static equilibrium [...] which the communities have come to accept on the quiet as the state of the non-violent non-solution of the Cyprus Problem' (p. 263). Of course this attitude has to do with continued mutual mistrust between the two main communities on the island, and therefore with the fear that the costs of a compromise for a solution may just be too high. And after all – for over 40 years there has been very little bicommunal violence in Cyprus. For Holland it remains clear that the missing ingredient for a Cyprus solution is goodwill. It was especially in the 2004 referendum that the Greek Cypriots demonstrated that '[a]t the popular level, there was not that *yearning* for an end to the status quo that characterised feelings in Ulster, for example, at the start of the new century' (p. 125). Christou agrees that 'the political costs of bringing the negotiations to a standstill is negligible' (p. 59). Or as Kaymak expresses it: 'Sadly, it is the members of the [UN] Good Offices mission who appear more affected by failure than Cypriots themselves' (p. 134). After these frank, bold and rather novel claims, Heraclides' fervent call that '[t]oday more than ever before since [...] 1974 [...] a solution is urgently needed and if the two parties do not arrive at an agreement soon, they will both be in dire straits' (p. 113), sounds hollow. He is supported by Skoutaris, however, who from a constitutional law perspective warns that '[w]hat is definitely not a solution is the current stalemate that has led the European Court of Human Rights to characterize Northern Cyprus as a vacuum in the European public order' (p. 229).

Of course, the admission that Cypriots may be giving up looking for a change to the political status quo is supported by recent research of the Cyprus 2015 Initiative, which has illustrated that the indefinite perpetuation of the status quo has been slowly gaining ground as the preferred 'solution' to the conflict within both communities. Not surprisingly, therefore, several essays promote 'soft' ideas for the political future of Cyprus, rather than repeat the respective sides' maximalist propositions. Appeals for emphasis on the common Cypriotness of the island's inhabitants are implored by Ahmet An instead of an ethnic, communal belonging. He is supported by Southcott's contribution that re-emphasises the well-known Friends of Cyprus positions that echo building intercommunal empathy and fostering cross-ethnic cooperation. Meanwhile, Akçali on

the basis of the proverb 'Good fences make good neighbours' urges for efforts at good neighbourliness of the two communities, rather than persisting with fixated efforts at reunification.

Several contributors use the official negotiation basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation as the starting point for their analysis and further ideas or proposals. Few among them agree, however, that this sort of federation is viable at all. Sözen is one of them, recalling that according to the Cyprus 2015 Initiative a bizonal, bicommunal federation is at least the second-best solution for both, Greek and Turkish Cypriots, while the two communities could never reach nearly as much percentage of agreement with any other solution (the first choice for them being the unitary-state and two-state solutions respectively). On the other hand, Bahcheli and Noel compile arguments for a case against bizonal federation, which according to experience elsewhere (such as Bosnia) is not viable in Cyprus, nor is it desired by most Cypriots even though it has been the starting point for the official resolution concepts of the past decades. Papadakis reiterates the point that Cypriots do not really want federation but prefer the status quo instead. Ker-Lindsay does not go quite as far as excluding federalism. Rather, he adds the ingredient of subsidiarity into the scheme, which declares that political decisions should always be taken at the most appropriate – usually the lowest possible, competent – level. In this manner, Ker-Lindsay claims, Greek Cypriots could be convinced to live in their old villages within the northern part of the island, as they could be allowed to govern themselves, dealing with day-to-day issues on their own. On the other hand, Christou's compromise proposal for a *tri*zonal, bicommunal federation including a zone centred on the capital Nicosia for peaceful coexistence of the two communities does not convince.

Facing a lack of progress or will in solving Cyprus, the island is currently experiencing, according to Constantinou, 'the privatisation of its settlement – meaning *à la carte*, cross-ethnic settlements by Cypriots from all communities transgressing the divide, without authorisation by [...] their respective authorities [who are unable] to stop or control them' (p. 72). Moreover, as Loizides or Vogel and Richmond remind us, Cyprus has experienced a series of bicommunal projects in the past – ranging from an initiative by the two mayors of the divided Nicosia to various civil society organisations – on which new interethnic cooperation could be based.

To such political or social arguments, some authors add the economic dimension of the current state of Cyprus. Faustmann estimates the discovery a few years ago of hydrocarbon off the island possibly providing 'the most promising constellation for a settlement since 2004' (p. 81). But further on he admits that after initial enthusiasm upon the discovery the prospects for a settlement remain bleak and the continuation of the status quo clearly prevails as the most likely scenario. Gürel and Tzimitras agree that in a continued zero-sum game of principles about the Cyprus impasse the incentives for

economic profit coming out of cooperation are not strong enough. Both parties continue to prefer losing money to throwing conflict-related principles overboard. For Olgun the culprit is clear: the continued claim by the Greek Cypriots that the exploitation of hydrocarbons is the Republic's sovereign right is, in his view, 'a hegemonic posture' (p. 213).

Olgun is part of a small group of contributors who cannot refrain from heating up old claims, updating them, and adding blame to a specific side – the usual blame game that most of the contributors have avoided. Of course anything else in a book resulting from an international call for papers on the Cyprus problem would be surprising. Still, conclusions such as the one by Kitromilides ('Cyprus cannot be solved unless Turkey abandons the strategy of division' (p. 157)) leave the reader with impatience, especially considering the boundless volume of novel ideas and approaches throughout the book. And even if a few authors seem to be stuck in the past, at least the world around them has changed. This is where Holland hooks in with his main theory that only a regional crisis, which we are currently witnessing in the Middle East, may have a catalytic effect on the Cyprus impasse. He calculates that based on experience with crucial developments in Cyprus over the past 140 years, progress happens only when dramatic events in the region – in other words an external crisis – push Cyprus negotiators into action out of fear instead of goodwill. The present 'War of Arab Succession [...] defined mainly but not exclusively by Shia-Sunni divisions' could pose such a threat with catalytic effects (p. 125). Probably with a similar threat in mind, McDonald proposes to demilitarise Cyprus in exchange for external security to be guaranteed by an EU force.

Overall, *Resolving Cyprus* makes interesting reading, rich in variety. It demonstrates how the overall fixation on the Cyprus problem has shifted away from obsession with blaming one another and repeating maximalist positions to a much more diverse analysis with frequent insight that resolving Cyprus may have lost its urgency in recent years, as the population of Cyprus has grown tired of their own obsession with the lies and injustices that they are living with day by day.

CLAUDE NICOLET

*Photography and Cyprus:*
*Time, Place and Identity*

### Fictive Gazes and Interpretive Frames

*Photography and Cyprus* is a collection of ideological critiques of photographs in various public and private contexts of Cyprus by academics and photographers. This is an interesting and unique contribution to scholarship on Cyprus, as well as a useful case study in critically approaching ideologies revealed in images, in a country where distinctions between experienced and constructed realities are particularly blurry; it will be of considerable interest to readers in the fields of art, communication, history, politics, sociology and social anthropology.

The eleven essays are organised in four sections, each suggesting an ideological or aesthetic lens through which photographers, artists, governments or the general public have represented or viewed Cyprus, its peoples and its landscape: colonial and postcolonial, political, gendered, and artistic. The essays themselves, thoughtful, well written, and generally jargon-free, deal with the conditions of production and, more problematically, reception of images of Cyprus; and the editors' introduction suggests that since photography 'shapes how places are seen ... [and] influences subjectivity, understanding such processes can contribute to revealing how we came to be who we are' (p. 10). What is missing, although this level of self-reflectiveness is variously placed in brackets, masked, or staged as critical distance in some of the essays, is a metacritical look at what the essays do and do not say about the cryptic 'we' of the introduction that encompasses Cypriots, the essays' authors, and readers of the collection.

The first section ('The Colonial Gaze') opens with Hercules Papaioannou's reading of John Thomson's 1878 photographs and captions as romantic-mythological constructs of Cyprus viewed through a British/Western colonial and exploitative gaze, and as expressions of the photographer's personal commercial and artistic aspirations. This kind of analysis has its own merits, but the essay avoids a critical question: what reality was there in Cyprus that could be set against, as an alternative to Thomson's constructs, which might invalidate them? Nicos Philippou's piece broadens the argument through an

analysis of *National Geographic* travelogues on Cyprus from 1928 and 1952, arguing, for example, that the former 'spelled out what Thomson implied through his ambiguous gaze and parallel narratives: Cyprus is "Half-oriental"' (p. 28). The analysis focuses on the cultural ambivalence of the texts accompanying the photographs, their writers' constructions of 'types' rather than individual Cypriots, and their Rousseauistic production, often through artificially costumed and posed photographs, of images of a naive, beautiful and 'unspoiled' Cyprus. Yet paradoxically, as an alternative 'real' to these constructs, Philippou points to the island's urbanisation, the growth of transport technology, and the local population's view of infrastructure projects 'as signifiers of progress, modernization and Europeanization' (p. 36), as well as how Cypriots during this period enjoyed 'the adoption of modern identities, lifestyle and technology and never celebrations of tradition' (p. 36). Philippou does not register the irony, but it is implicit: on the one hand the postcolonial approach critiques and exposes a Western gaze that values 'tradition', however romanticised; on the other, the alternative, supposedly authentic Cypriot gaze is revealed as a rejection of the 'primitive' past in favour of celebrating 'modernity' and 'progress', understood as Europeanisation.

This exteriorisation of ideology is also characteristic in the section on 'The Political Gaze'. Taking its cue from Benedict Anderson's definition of nations as 'imagined communities', Iro Katsaridou's chapter on photography exhibitions during the 1950s–1980s argues that Greek reviewers interpreted images of Cyprus stereotypically as representing imagined aspects of Greekness shared with the 'motherland' that supported an ideology of a suffering, oppressed Greek Cypriot 'nation'. Katsaridou's analysis parallels Philippou's; however, here the purveyors of ideology are the Greek press and government, in the service of Greek political aspirations. Absent from Katsaridou's argument are the imagined communities themselves: Anderson does attribute the spread of national consciousness largely to the dissemination of print media, but *imagining* the nation is not limited to press and official discourses; it is something that happens 'in the minds of each [of the members of even the smallest nation]' (*Imagined Communities* [London: Verso, 1983], p. 49).

Yiannis Toumazis' essay on historical representations of Cyprus, in museums in Athens, Istanbul and Cyprus as well as local monuments, takes a step towards addressing this by looking at how the exhibits are designed to generate questions with emotional associations in the minds of viewers: 'Through focusing on the traumatic memory and the aestheticization of the notion of death, these spaces activate nationalist mechanisms' (p. 94). Toumazis' experiential approach to exhibits dedicated to 'national struggles' stops just short of taking the next turn, to the trope of transference which in trauma theory informs the viewer's response – in Dominick LaCapra's formulation, 'All history ... must more or less blindly encounter the problem of a transferential relation to the past whereby the

processes at work in the object of study acquire their displaced analogues in the historian's account' (*History and Criticism* [Cornell University Press, 1985], p. 11). What this means is that a critical essay, through its methodology, 'works through' the trauma associated with its subject matter; it enacts through its own gaze, however subtly, an allegory of the gaze it is critiquing – and this can be seen regardless of the 'distanced observer' stance adopted by several of the authors here, or Toumazis' studiedly neutral voice ('I paid another visit to the Istanbul Military Museum on 18 August 2010' [p. 87]; 'In the context of the research, I came across other reproductions ...' [p. 92]).

At this point, the book's structural categories ('political', 'gendered', and 'art' gazes) begin to overlap. Jennifer Way reads Tracey Emin's films, photographs and texts as indicative of a hybrid and ambivalent approach to Cypriot identity, but struggles with the paradox of trying to maintain a biographical conceit of 'authentic' as opposed to fictive, constructed identity: on the one hand, for example, she argues that 'features of [the 1996 short film] *Emin & Emin, Cyprus* correspond to ... mainstays of Cypriot tourism's promotional material' (p. 208) and 'Emin omits signs of modernity and contemporaneity. In this respect she shares company with ... John Thomson' (p. 209); but on the other hand, she concludes by contriving to salvage the artist's 'authentic' self and sense of place: '... in regard to Turkey and Cyprus, Emin accessed if not processed material *that may have felt extremely authentic to her* ' (p. 213; italics added).

Theopisti Stylianou-Lambert's study of representations of the 'Rock of Aphrodite' runs into a similar difficulty, and reconfigures the tenuous distinction between fictive and authentic identity as a separation between the public and the private: photographs 'produced *for* tourists ... have a public ... orientation' while those 'produced *by* tourists ... have a private orientation (p. 162) [... they] contain personal narratives and meanings and *are intended for private consumption, even if they appear to have global circulation* as in the case of online photographic albums [... they] *assume a life of their own which is independent of promotional imagery* when viewed, printed, shared, discussed and saved' (p. 163; italics added).

The issues of individual identity and authenticity follow a different trajectory in Stavros Karayanni's critique of 'constructed notions of gender embodiment and sexuality' in the works of Thomson and two Greek Cypriot photographers. Karayanni focuses on the system of 'auto-exoticism and ... self-possessed autoethnography' through which, in Mary Louise Pratt's terms, 'colonized subjects undertake to represent themselves in ways that engage with the colonizer's own terms' (p. 124). This 'gestural system' is re-enacted throughout the analysis, and particularly clearly in Karayanni's conclusion, where he speaks of 'the compelling need to reconcile the gap between the Cyprus of my childhood and of the present. [...] The Cyprus I remember is "oriental" while that of the present fiercely and defensively advocates its Western affiliation and Hellenic/European heritage'

(p. 139). Karayannni's personalised 'anxiety' is historiographical, and, in addition to critiquing gender issues, unravels two threads in the fabric of 'Cypriot' identity: first, it understands culture and identity – the Cypriot 'we' and 'Cypriotness' – as dynamic, unstable and evolving rather than static; and second, it recognises, without reducing, the textual nature of both memory and experience – the constantly shifting and 'complex transaction between art and truth' (p. 140).

These, I would suggest, are unacknowledged truisms of the movement of history: that *lived experiences* are transformed, through mental recording and distorting processes, into *memories* (stories and images that frame identity and perception), which in turn, when expressed verbally or visually, become *literature or art* – that is, texts open to ideological manipulation, to being imbued with or emptied of signification.

This overdetermination and voiding of significations in images is the focus of Elizabeth Hoak-Doering's essay, which, taking its cue from Paul Sant Cassia's work, examines versions of the 'photographic Pietà' – quasi-religious images of older women demonstrating with photographs of their historically distant, much younger, missing male relatives – in terms of their 'embedded distance': on the one hand, '[p]hotographs of such demonstrations transform the individual voice – the person – into an acoustic generalization and a visual icon (pp. 187–188) [...] the space of a political demonstration conflates personal losses into the cause of missing persons' (p. 189); on the other hand, in new contexts, such as exhumations and identifications of remains which reify the missing as the deceased, 'burials change the value of the portrait photograph: the iconic embodiment of life seems to fade as existential ambiguity diminishes' (pp. 183–184).

The three remaining essays locate their subjects within the framework of borders or thresholds. Haris Pellapaisiotis considers the symbolic implications of the physical space of the UN buffer zone in Cyprus and the curatorial logic of art projects during 2005–2013 focused on this area, which is characterised variously as 'porous', 'suspended' or 'liminal'. Pellapaisiotis offers only two rather conservative options for this threshold in the event of a solution in Cyprus – erasure or institutionalisation: '[s]hould parts of the buffer zone be preserved in the form of a museum of conflict [...] Or, should disagreeable signs be erased?' (p. 237). However, noting that Cyprus has 'no history in avant-garde art [...] the historical legacy of art in Cyprus stems from ... [an] incestuous relation with state institutions and the causes of state' (p. 229), he does pose the question: 'Is it not the task of the avant-garde in art to redefine tradition and to offer alternative tropes and paradigms for talking about place?' (p. 238).

Elena Stylianou's analysis of works by Haris Epaminonda and Christodoulos Panayiotou seems to offer one such trope, arguing that archives can enable a 'postmodern understanding of "cosmopolitanism" ... which blurs the traditional categories of the inside and the outside by accepting both as existing and valid' – yet in these artists' work, she

argues, 'it also fails to neutralize those narratives that are relevant to the artists' locale' (p. 241). Paradoxically, postmodern cosmopolitanism turns out to be, in the context of the 'contemporary art world', a 'Eurocentric and highly gendered project that … leaves little space for optimism' (p. 258), an 'illusive term' (p. 259); and art to contain 'the artists' own convictions, biases, tastes and desires that could never possibly stay immune to their *local-ness*'. Stylianou concludes by arguing that 'any sense of "cosmopolitanism" or "worldliness" has always been infused with a sense of individualism and locality, and any attempt to defy *localness* can be misleading if not dangerous' (pp. 261–262).

Finally, and in contrast, Alev Adil's 'autoethnography' begins by exploring 'the relationship between memory, photography and identity in the context of *my Turkish Cypriot cultural identity* and photographic practice' (p. 98; italics added), but this identity soon migrates to the threshold – 'Mine is a border identity' (p. 100) – where it effaces itself: 'My Cypriot heritage is an unreadable palimpsest written in the margins and blank spaces of colonial identity' (p. 101); '[t]he border is the terrain where mutually incompatible competing myths become an illegible palimpsest, a failed space of Cypriot identity' (p. 115). Adil's resolution of identity is self-mythologisation, expressed as self-recognition – of 'oneself as one's own cultural intermediary' (p. 115); that the sense of the local, of 'authentic' personal emotions and connections comes, in Sara Ahmed's phrase, 'from without, the thickness of sociality itself' (p. 116); and that from this perspective of the *stranger,* identity is based on 'a labyrinth of psychic and social borders' – on a mythopoietic *jouissance* of fragmentation: 'I am Ariadne, I am the maze, I am the Minotaur. The Dead Zone is the very heart of my homeland' (p. 117).

In short, together with some sharp analyses of photographic representation, this collection reveals the struggle of its writers to define authenticity; and also, given the phthisic nature of Cypriot identity, the Sisyphean problem of separating ideologies from perceived 'realities', of producing a sense of self and place that might be socially transformative in Cyprus. If one could conceive (of) an identity that merged the local and the cosmopolitan, accounted for and refused to succumb to the *I-will-not-forgets* of both sides of the border, resisted simultaneously the erasure and institutionalisation of the threshold and at the same time both contained and released its space of forgetting, that might, at some point, be Cypriot.

JOHANN PILLAI

# Sendall in Cyprus, 1892–1898:
## A Governor in Bondage

Diana Markides is one of the foremost historians of Cyprus under British rule and the author of numerous important studies characteristically based on very solid archival research. Carrying on this record of empirically sound scholarship, *Sendall in Cyprus* is a project the author has obviously taken to heart: this small book is printed on elegant glossy paper, contains numerous watercolour paintings, photographs and original documents (close to thirty illustrations in total) which offer a rich visual experience of late nineteenth century Cyprus, and draws on a wide range of sources, from official archives held both in London and Cyprus, to newspapers of the time, through private correspondence, diaries and official publications. Delivered in clear and elegant prose, the main purpose of this book is to throw light on a somewhat neglected early period of British rule uneasily poised as it is between 'the excitement of the initial (...) occupation of the island, and the more turbulent early twentieth century' (p. 9) and too often dismissed as being characterised by the unqualified indifference of colonial authorities for both the island and its inhabitants. Constantly reminding us of the difference of perspectives between the Colonial Office and the Cyprus government, Markides argues instead that at least during the six years of Sir Walter Sendall's term as high commissioner, several attempts were made to improve daily life in Cyprus within, of course, the limitations of a colonial form of rule by definition not always attentive to local demands. That not more could have been done to better, at least materially, the lives of Cypriots was due to the British government's – particularly the Treasury's – inflexibility which in effect kept Sendall and other, perhaps less inspired, high commissioners and governors 'in bondage'.

Although spanning the entire colonial period (1878–1960), Markides' work has for the most part focused on what may be called the late colonial period (1930s–1960s). Instead, *Sendall in Cyprus* takes us back to the very early days of British rule at the turn of the century. This is a well explored period, most notably in the works of George S. Georghallides, Rolandos Katsiaounis, Andrekos Varnava and Rebecca Bryant. Yet the novelty in Diana Markides' approach consists in revisiting these times through the eyes of a British governor in a series of six chapters, each devoted to the successive years in

Sendall's term, and an epilogue. Sendall is possibly not the most famous of the early British governors and is certainly less broadly known than Sir Garnet Wolseley, the island's first governor whose somewhat disparaging views on Cyprus can be found in his published diary, Sir Robert Biddulph, the governor who oversaw the establishment of the Legislative Council, Cyprus' colonial parliament, or Sir Charles King-Harman considered sensibly more sympathetic to the national feelings of the Greek Cypriots. And yet Markides paints the portrait of a very proactive official, whose work ethic broke with his predecessors' proverbial nonchalance and induced him to take a number of long-lasting initiatives such as the development of the island's infrastructure, roads and external communications which had considerable impact on Cyprus' economy facilitating the domestic and international circulation of its main crops (tobacco, fruit); his consistent and determined support to the development and rationalisation of the management of education primarily through the establishment in 1895 of two 'pancyprian boards of education – one Muslim and one Christian – whose task would be to supervise and regulate village school committees' (p. 117); the vigorous steps taken for the preservation of the island's antiquities, enabling a 'transition from looting to learning' in archaeological excavations; crucially, the reform of a draconian tax system (p. 148) which until then had stifled agriculturalists causing a significant number of them to be imprisoned unable as they were to pay their debts to usurious moneylenders (p. 69); and the restoration of law and order and the drastic reduction of the crime rate – which Markides argues is 'the most eloquent testimony to th[e] improved quality [of life] during Sendall's term' (p. 205) – illustrated by the arrest and execution of the notorious Hassanpouli brothers often depicted as Cypriot Robin Hoods (pp. 137–138).

All this helped improve the relations between Cypriots (Greek and Turkish) and British authorities. Indeed the able governor, argues Markides, seems to have taken the fate of the island's inhabitants to heart and demanded of his officials that they interact with them, most notably by making it a requirement for British officials to learn Greek and/or Turkish (p. 30) and by himself consulting 'Cypriots at all levels' (p. 57). This in turn contributed to establishing Sendall's long-lasting popularity. 'The Cypriots', writes Markides, 'found themselves with a governor, who not only worked, but who wanted to work *with them* for the island' (p. 121). Markides evokes numerous instances of popular effusion for the governor (e.g. p. 134), including an appeal to Queen Victoria by both Christian and Muslim notables that Sendall may stay in Cyprus at the end of his term (pp. 194–195) (in this regard, annexes and illustrations include a picture of a modern plaque dedicated to Sendall at the entrance of the Phaneromeni school and poems written for the governor by Vassilis Michaelides and Demetris Libertis). Yet as Markides notes in terms that could apply to some of Sendall's successors (Sir William Denis Battershill, 1939–1941, comes to mind) such displays of public favour were always entwined with

expectations that governors could not or would not always fulfil and dissonances of this kind could pave the way for bitter misunderstandings.

Not everything Sendall attempted to do was successful although Markides most often exonerates the governor citing unsurmountable external difficulties. One such failure was the registration of private property owing, according to the author, to the 'complexities of hereditary arrangements in the Ottoman system, the undefined boundaries of ecclesiastical properties, the vagaries of the *vakoufs*, together with the extent of land mortgaged and remortgaged' (p. 140). To the extent that tax reform would have been invaluable in an overwhelmingly agricultural island, this was a serious setback. From the point of view of British policy it may be argued that successful as it may have been, the exponential development of education backfired as it considerably facilitated the spread of – particularly Greek – nationalism which throughout the years would take an increasingly anticolonial turn. After following a school curriculum increasingly modelled on the Greek one, affluent graduates of Cypriot secondary schools could pursue their higher education in vibrant centres of Hellenism, such as Athens or Alexandria, before returning in Cyprus where they took the lead of their community's cultural and political life. National ideas cultivated in schools and universities could indeed be freely expressed and debated in the enhanced civic space created by the British through the free press and electoral institutions (the Legislative Council) (p. 165). Sendall's term in effect coincided with a period when Cyprus became fully incorporated into the intellectual Eastern Mediterranean network promoting Greek nationalism and Cypriots followed and sometimes participated in Greece's expansionist wars – such as the 1897 Greek-Turkish War (pp. 174–175). Relayed throughout the island by mushrooming literary and philanthropic societies, such nationalist ideas could occasionally poison intercommunal relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots as happened during the celebrations of Greek independence on 25 March 1895 when Greek Orthodox schoolchildren marched through the Muslim neighbourhood of Tahtakale in Nicosia 'singing songs about slaughtering the hated Turks' (p. 106).

Nothing however would pre-empt more Sendall's policy in Cyprus than the Tribute, namely the sum of money – deducted from the island's fiscal receipts minus the budgetary expenses – Britain committed to pay the Ottoman Empire in 1878 which was commuted in 1881 into a Cypriot contribution to the Ottoman debt to British bondholders. The governor's several appeals to alleviate the burden of the Tribute systematically collided with the British Treasury's obduracy to the point where Sendall would privately complain that the latter held him 'under bondage' and ask to be appointed elsewhere. In 1895, the newly appointed Secretary of State for the Colonies Joseph Chamberlain, an important reformer of the colonial service, receptive to Sendall's pleas, arranged an annual £40,000 grant-in-aid which relieved Cyprus' budget. Despite this however, and notwithstanding

Diana Markides' eloquent efforts to argue otherwise, Sir Walter Sendall remained for all purposes a manager of scarcity. This is perhaps the main criticism that can be levelled against this book: although adopting the perspective of an apparently good-willing colonial governor efficiently nuances the widely accepted assumption of British administrative neglect in Cyprus, one is still left to wonder if it constitutes an epistemological break. If the short-sightedness on the part of the British government was so exacting, how much difference could a hardworking governor actually make? Markides convincingly makes her case that Sendall stands out among Cyprus' British governors; yet the reader also gets the impression that the initiatives of officials – imaginative as they may have occasionally been – made little difference against the iron law of bureaucratic hierarchy. Paradoxically it could be that this is the reason why, aside from students of colonial Cyprus, this book will appeal to all those interested in the mechanics of turn-of-the-century British imperialism as it very clearly elucidates the differences in priorities and perspectives between Downing Street and the 'men on the spot'.

ALEXIS RAPPAS

# The 'Return' of British-born Cypriots to Cyprus: A Narrative Ethnography

Janine Teerling's book is a contemporary ethnography of the life experiences of British-born Cypriots who choose to return to Cyprus. It is unique in that it explores an aspect of British Cypriot migration that has not hitherto been examined – that of second generation British Cypriots and their re-entry back, to what in diaspora or migration studies, is commonly termed the 'home country'. The study is an empirical contribution to the field because not only does it thoroughly investigate the motives behind British-born Cypriots' decision to return to the island; it also explores their lived experience of settlement in Cyprus and how this has shaped their understanding of concepts such as home, belonging and identity more generally.

Teerling's journey into the lives of the British-born return migrants to Cyprus, explores many of the assumptions commonly held in popular discourse about British Cypriots. One of the assumptions repeatedly raised by her research participants (second generation British Cypriots), was the 'traditional' upbringing they received within the closed confines of the British Cypriot community compared to the more 'modern' lifestyle experienced by their respective 'cousins' who grew up at the same time in Cyprus. While her empirical findings serve to provide substance and depth of understanding to beliefs about the British Cypriot community as being traditional in terms of their values and practices; the collection of narratives also acts to challenge notions of 'tradition' and 'modernity', and turn them on their head. A case in point can be found in the childhood memories of second generation British Cypriots, who by their own admission, were brought up with traditional values compared to their brethren back in the parental home. In exploring childhood memories of family visits to Cyprus, Teerling narrates how many British Cypriots had fond memories of these trips, highlighting the greater liberties granted to them in the relative 'safety' of Cyprus, compared to the restrictions imposed on their freedoms by their anxious parents when they were back in the UK. Conscious of the sharp difference in up-bringing between themselves and their Cypriot cousins, many second generation British Cypriots related how ironic it was that their cousins looked down on their UK counterparts as 'villagers'. In reflecting on these memories after having settled in Cyprus as adults, a common view presented by British Cypriots was that despite

their sheltered upbringing in Britain, the metropolis enabled them to benefit by becoming more open-minded and independent. This compared to local Cypriots, many of whom in the view of British-Cypriot returnees have limited horizons or remain economically dependent on parents, even as young adults. In the light of these reflections, Teerling shows how even seemingly straight forward terms such as 'modernity' and 'tradition' can be highly charged, have contested meanings, and can be interpreted differently, depending on whether the beholder is a local Cypriot, a member of the diasporic community in Britain or a British-Cypriot returnee.

A key question Teerling grapples with at length is the British-Cypriot community's motives for relocating to Cyprus. According to her findings, decisions to abandon the UK were dictated mainly by practical or pragmatic reasons, for example, job opportunities and life style choices such as bringing up a family in a safe environment, or escaping the rat race of Britain's cities. In the main, decision-making had little to do with the sort of essentialist views that expressed a desire to 'rediscover roots' or the 'authentic' home present in research findings of other second generation returnees, such as the British Caribbean community. Although Teerling's findings were not entirely surprising, what was interesting to discover were the experiences of adjustment, as well as the accommodation techniques that second generation returnees employed once they had actually settled in Cyprus. Accounts of adjusting were of course diverse. They varied from those who openly expressed their initial loneliness or disappointment with their Cypriot family's lack of welcome and attention; to those who claimed 'oozing relaxation' once they set foot in Cyprus compared to their hectic work life in the UK. Alternatively, some claimed to have felt more Cypriot in the UK, while others went as far as to state they felt foreign in both places.

But beyond the differing experiences of adjustment, participants described how they adopted a 'strategic' approach to how they chose to settle in Cyprus and 'fit in'. Rejecting the 'essentialist' up-bringing afforded to them by their own first generation parents, second generation returnees have reportedly embraced a 'plural form of belonging', picking and choosing elements of contemporary Cypriot society that best suit them. By consciously capitalising on different sites, for example choosing international schools for their offspring, or proactively switching ways of living, namely, actively engaging with the fast growing international community living in the Cyprus of today as opposed to interacting just with local Cypriots; many second-generation returnees have managed to tailor-make a 'lifestyle package' suited to them. Teerling recognises that British-born returnees are similar to other migrants (e.g. Hong-Kong) in their ability to switch and capitalise on different sites and pick elements of the culture. Yet ultimately, the account describes the pride and empowerment of British-born Cypriots who have successfully traded in the discontent they felt with life in Britain and the tug for change, (the central

reasons many chose relocation to Cyprus in the first place); for the benefits gained. By choosing at will when to act or be 'British', 'Cypriot' or 'international', returnees have realised that they are better able to adapt and integrate in their new home. Teerling argues that the plurality of forms of belonging – adopted by British-born returnees – points to the development of what she chooses to term a 'Third Cultural Space of Belonging'.

Thus Teerling situates her writing in the literature that recognises that we live in a world of hybridised cultures. She describes her participants with the rather in-eloquent term 'halfies' (individuals who combine in themselves a mixture of features resulting from migration, overseas education or parentage). Certainly, this quality of 'in-between-ness'; of being neither one nor the other (yet somehow both), seems to be the defining characteristic of the participants in question. The question really is not whether this characterisation is correct, but whether this feature is really as unique as is projected? The burgeoning literature of transnational studies and diaspora is rich in accounts of individuals who have learnt to combine and negotiate their multiple identities in a way that allows for them to play out their plural roles, and not only to survive, but thrive as well.

But not all British-born returnees to Cyprus have met with success. Popular discourse also tells stories of return migrants who did not make it on their return to Cyprus. Evidently, these individuals were not able to find a way to fit in and create alternative third spaces of belonging. Instead they felt dis-empowered because they could not find ways to integrate socially and emotionally. Realising that returning 'home' was not what had been projected by their memories or upbringing, they felt, or were made to feel by native Cypriots, like foreigners or outsiders in their ancestral homes. These tales of uncompromising failure have not been included in Teerling's account.

It is possible, that the ability of returnees to make it or not may be influenced in part by the time period of return. As Cyprus has become in recent years more global and European, returnees have taken advantage of this new multicultural framework to search out the third cultural spaces of belonging, they need to be comfortable. The same supportive structures were not in place twenty or thirty years ago to the same degree and to the same level of development. Furthermore, the younger generation, seem to be more adept at taking advantage of and building on these systems of support and searching for and ultimately finding their 'spaces'. They also appear less inclined to feel the need to succumb to the pressure of fulfilling the traditional role that older females in particular felt obliged to do. (Teerling has a brief note on the different perspective of female returnees in their 50s).

The importance of age and generation, are of course, assumptions that need to be explored further, opening up avenues for new research. But they beg the question, is the successful integration of British-born returnees that Teerling celebrates, merely a

generational phenomenon or a product of the globalised, fluid age we live in? Despite these lingering questions, Teerling's book is an enjoyable, thought provoking read, valuable for its rich, contemporary narratives and an excellent source for scholars of migration, diaspora studies and Cypriot society more generally.

MADELEINE DEMETRIOU

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
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