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REVIEW

a Journal of social, economic and political issues

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THE CYPRUS REVIEW (TCR)

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GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

Van Coufoudakis

Abstract

This article analyses the American view of Turkey and her relations with Greece and Cyprus in the post-Cold War era and argues that the U.S. has pursued contradictory goals and has fallen victim to the attempts by Turkey to consolidate its claims against both Cyprus and Greece. It points the view that U.S. policy towards Turkey has enabled Turkey to follow a course of self-aggrandisement in the region and concludes with a series of propositions to enable Greece and Cyprus to combat Turkish claims.

Introduction

Rather than reviewing the known issues that currently make up the Greco-Turkish agenda, I propose to examine the implications of the American response to the issues affecting Greco-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era and on how these issues may be resolved. The analysis that follows is an affirmation that Cold War policies and assumptions played a pivotal role in the definition and conduct of Greek, Turkish and American policy, and that American policy has been the most significant external influence in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey.

Greco-Turkish relations have deteriorated since the end of the Cold War because Turkey has capitalized on the conditions of the new international environment. Washington, by encouraging Turkey's ambitious role in the Balkans, in Central Asia and in the Middle East has encouraged Turkey's revisionist objectives in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

The Cold War Legacy

Let me begin with two fundamental assumptions. One is that a realistic analysis

of post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations must be made not only in the context of the perceptions, assumptions, motives and policies of the two countries, but also those of the United States towards each of the countries and Turkey in particular. And, second, that post-Cold War American policies towards Greece and Turkey cannot be separated from the security considerations that guided American policy to this region during the Cold War.

Political reality is influenced by the images and perceptions of policy makers.¹ Such images and perceptions provide a simplified world view and comforting rationalizations for choices made by policy makers. Perceptions can also cause serious policy problems if there is a wide gap between image and reality. The reforms of Kemal Ataturk helped redefine the negative American perceptions of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal Ataturk emerged as modern Turkey's George Washington, as the leader who restored Turkey's sovereignty, curtailed external interference, and set his country on the road to secularization, westernization and reform.

Turkey was perceived as a "proud and independent country"² by American officials during the debate on the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This image of Turkey has not changed since then. The inevitable conclusion of this perception has been that the Turks would not tolerate external interference in their politics and policies,³ and that political conditions in that country limited the exercise of American influence.

Another American perception of Turkey was inherited from British imperial policy. Throughout the 19th century Britain considered the Ottoman Empire's control of the Straits as vital to the containment of Russia. During the Cold War, Washington defined in similar terms Turkey's geopolitical value. In turn, Ankara effectively exploited this strategic asset to promote and protect its interests in the United States. American officials acknowledged the interdependent strategic role of the "two sisters," Greece and Turkey. They attributed, however, far greater strategic significance to Turkey because of its control of the Straits, the size of the Turkish Army and Turkey's location which made it a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East and American stepping stone to the Middle East to the vital Persian Gulf region.

In contrast to Turkey, Greece, during the Cold War failed to assert its independence and/or its strategic importance.⁴ Ideological biases and the dependence of Greek political elites on American support for their political survival created conditions confirming the American perception that Greek politics could be externally manipulated. Thus, if a policy choice had to be made between Greece and Turkey, Washington believed, especially prior to 1974, that the negative Greek reactions could be managed.⁵

Manifestations of the Cold War Legacy

Cyprus became the first test of the relations between the United States, Greece

and Turkey. England and Turkey effectively exploited Washington's Cold War concerns and gained her support for their objectives on the island. Thus, the interests of the Cypriots were sacrificed on the altar of the Cold War as Washington sought the resolution of the problem in a way that met NATO's and Turkey's concerns. Solutions proposed through NATO and/or American mediation sought to avoid a Greco-Turkish conflict and promoted positions demanded by Turkey. Thus, Washington's assumptions about Turkey and Cyprus have remained relatively constant over the last four decades.

Another manifestation of American policy has been the attempt to appear even handed during Greco-Turkish crises. Characteristic was the American response to the Turkish government sponsored pogroms against the Greeks of Istanbul and Izmir in September 1955. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's cable placed on an equal footing the victim and the perpetrator of the crime. By placing the burden of responsibility equally on both governments Washington adopted a response pattern that was to be repeated over the next forty years. A final example of the greater strategic significance attached to Turkey by the United States has to do with the negotiations for the reintegration of Greece in NATO's military wing (1975-1980). Throughout these negotiations Washington backed Turkey's claims for revisions to NATO's operational and control areas in the Aegean because of changed circumstances since the founding of the alliance. However, Turkey's demands have direct implications on the resolution of other bilateral Greco-Turkish issues such as the Greek territorial waters and the Greek airspace. Washington pressed Greece negotiate with Turkey over these issues regardless of their legal merit or effect on Greek sovereignty.

The Deviations from the Rule

Despite the coincidence of American and Turkish objectives during the Cold War, there are at least three instances of policy disagreements that challenge these assumptions. These three instances were deviations from the rule required by circumstances that affected broader American interests. While Turkey exploited these disagreements to enhance its independent foreign policy and its bargaining power in the international system, Washington found itself apologizing to Turkey for upholding the rule of law and for offending Turkish sensitivities.

The first case of discord involved Lyndon B. Johnson's June 5, 1964, "*ultima-turri*"⁷ to Turkey that stopped the impending invasion of Cyprus. What motivated the American action however was not a disagreement with Turkey's objectives on Cyprus, but with its tactics which risked a confrontation with the Soviet Union less than two years after the Cuban missile crisis.

The second example involves the pressures exerted in 1971 on the government

of Nihat Erim by the Nixon administration to suspend the cultivation of opium. The decision by the Nixon administration was in response to public and Congressional pressures about the influx of drugs from Turkey in the United States. The ban was unilaterally revoked by the Ecevit government after the 1973 elections. Despite protests, Washington did not take any further steps to penalize Turkey.

The third and final example involves the imposition of a limited arms embargo on Turkey by the U.S. Congress in 1975. This limited arms embargo was the result of Congressional action in response to pressures from domestic constituencies.⁸ The embargo was imposed despite the opposition of the Executive branch which had traditionally been Turkey's proponent in the United States.

What these three examples suggest is that Washington confronted Turkey only when Turkey's actions risked broader American security interests, or when domestic pressures prevailed over the traditional political and security preferences of the Executive branch.

The Post-Cold War Experience

Greece entered the post-Cold War era with a sense of optimism. It anticipated that the "new world order" would restore balance of the rule of law. Moreover, the Gulf War displayed once more the strategic value of Greece and Cyprus.⁹

The Greek optimism proved short lived. The American rule of law rhetoric excluded Cyprus and the outstanding Greco-Turkish issues. Greece, however, faced additional problems that affected its international standing. In addition to the outstanding Greco-Turkish issues,¹⁰ Greece faced serious economic problems that affected her position in the European Union. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia directly impacted on Greece because of its ties to Serbia and its policy on the recognition and the denomination of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece was also concerned about the fate of the Greek minority in Albania, about Turkey's involvement in the Balkans, and the rise of nationalism and irredentism in the region. The combination of all these problems undermined the role of Greece as a source of stability in the region, and as a promoter of economic, social and political change among the former communist states in the Balkans.¹¹

Turkey underwent its own soul searching as the Cold War ended. Turkey's foreign policy elite feared that the end of the Cold War would diminish Turkey's strategic value and thus its leverage with the superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the charismatic presence and vision of the late president Turgut Ozal and the Gulf War, helped Turkey redefine its role in the post-Cold War era and project its new look in positive terms which were compatible with the objectives of the United States.

Ozal envisioned a Turkey whose influence and role extended from the Adriatic to the China Wall. The 21st century was to be the "century of the Turks." Turkey was the source of stability and regional leadership in a region of instability which encompassed the Balkans, the Middle East and the Turkic republics of Central Asia. It was a regional role model for others in the area in terms of its economic and political development, especially because Turkey was an Islamic country that was also secular and democratic. In view of its location and its cultural and political ties to the Balkans and to the Turkic republics of Central Asia, Turkey saw itself as a *conduit* for trade and investment to this developing region.

Turkey presented its foreign policy to the United States and Europe as one of moderation and responsibility, and of commitment to an international order based on commonly shared values and a common European "mind-set." Turkey's leadership, prior to the rise of Erbakan to power in 1996, while down playing the Islamic threat at home and in the region, promoted itself as both a bridge to that region and as a barrier to turmoil in the European fringe. Turkey also courted the United States reminding the U.S. of Turkey's important and continuing role in NATO an organization still serving security needs.¹²

Turkey's significance to the United States has another but less advertised dimension, access to Caspian Sea oil. The United States has consistently backed the transportation of this lucrative new source of oil only through Turkey.¹³

Turkey succeeded where Greece failed, i.e. in selling this glorified image to the United States. The compatibility of Turkey's new image to America's emerging objectives in the region, provided American policy makers with the appropriate rationalizations to continue their relationship with Ankara in even stronger terms than those seen during the Cold War.

Manifestations of the Post-Cold War Legacy

The post-Cold War trends in the attitudes of the United States towards Greco-Turkish relations have been manifested in at least four areas, i.e. the *Imia* crisis and the on-going Turkish military challenge in the Aegean; the Kurdish insurrection; Cyprus and Erbakan's rise to power.

The Imia Crisis and the Turkish Military Challenge in the Aegean

Starting late in 1973 Turkey undertook a coordinated campaign to revise the Aegean *status quo*.

The January 1996 *Imia* crisis was not the first "hot" incident in the Aegean that required American intervention to prevent the outbreak of Greco-Turkish hostilities. It had been preceded by the Summer 1976 *Chora* incident and the March 1987 *Sismik* incident.

During the January 1996 crisis over *Imia*, the intervention of the White House prevented a Greco-Turkish conflict. It is instructive to see the American response to this crisis and its policy implications.

a) Once the crisis was defused, the White House called for a resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or another form of international arbitration. The White House did not recognise Turkey's claims to sovereignty over *Imia*, and opposed the threat or use of force for the resolution of bilateral differences in the Aegean. However, President Clinton went on to question Greek sovereignty over *Imia* because of doubts expressed by his legal advisors as to interpretations of documents and agreements dating back several decades. Thus, the resort to the ICJ was recommended in order to "weigh impartially the legal arguments of both sides."¹⁴ This response was a classic example of the American policy of maintaining "equal distance" among the parties in the dispute. In reality, however, Washington's position agreed with the Turkish challenge of Greek sovereignty over *Imia*. This was a serious error because, in order to satisfy Turkey, Washington undermined a fundamental rule of American foreign policy, i.e. the respect for established boundaries and for the continuing validity of international agreements.

b) Because of the escalating incidents in the air and at sea in the Aegean, Washington urged the implementation of confidence building measures (CBM) to reduce the chances of accidental war.¹⁵ However, Washington continued arming Turkey with sophisticated weapons with the justification that such armaments were needed because of threats emanating from the region.¹⁶ In addition, Turkey has received technical assistance and investments from the United States to develop a sophisticated arms industry. Both of these developments threaten peace and stability in the region and undermine the military balance between the two countries.

c) Having challenged Greek sovereignty in the Dodecanese through the *Imia* case with Washington's indirect support, Turkey, in the Summer of 1996, presented new claims of contested sovereignty in the Aegean. These included the island of *Gavdos*, and some one hundred other islands in "grey areas" of the Aegean on the grounds that they were not specifically listed in the treaties ending World Wars I and II.

This latest set of the claims brought a measured American response during press briefings at the U.S. Department of State.¹⁷ The press spokesman, Nicholas Burns, confirmed the Greek sovereignty over *Gavdos*, but qualified his response by indicating that questions of sovereignty should be discussed between Greece and Turkey. Seeking campaign support from the Greek-American community, President Clinton criticized "frivolous territorial claims" such as those over *Gavdos*.

The ambivalence of American policy has encouraged Turkish claims. On October 22, 1996, the State Department press spokesman referred to the existence of islands in the Aegean that may not belong to either Greece or Turkey under inter-

national agreements. He went on to suggest that the Greco-Turkish boundaries should be respected and that any changes should come peacefully and by mutual consent. In the storm of protest that followed these comments, which contradicted those of the President to the Greek-American community, the Department of State spokesman on October 24, 1996, attributed his comments to an error and emphasized once more the traditional position about a resort to the ICJ.

d) Turkey has mastered the art of creating incidents and provocations which are systematically followed by calls for negotiations in a show of goodwill and peaceful international conduct. If Greece rejected these offers it was accused of intransigence. Since 1974, the policy of the United States has been to urge negotiations regardless of the motives and of the validity of Turkey's demands.

The Kurdish insurrection

Despite the massive evidence by international human rights organizations, and by the U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices about the gross violations of Kurdish human rights in Turkey, Washington developed a hypocritical and contradictory policy on this issue. Washington supported the Turkish army's repression of the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey as well as its cross border raids into Iraq and provided Turkey with intelligence, weapons and political support. This was done in the name of combating terrorism. On the other hand, Washington launched Operation Provide Comfort out of bases in Turkey for the protection of the Kurds in Iraq whose insurrection against Saddam Hussein gained them the designation of "freedom fighters."

Cyprus

The Cyprus issue has been and continues to be the issue that exemplifies the American assumptions about Turkey both before and after the end of the Cold War. I will only provide five examples of the manifestations of American policy since the end of the Cold War.

Without disputing the significance and the necessity of the American involvement in the search for a solution, the substance of American policy and its fundamental assumptions about Turkey's interests in the Cyprus dispute have not changed. The following are characteristic examples:

a) In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis and the American policy of implementing all the United Nations resolutions on Kuwait and Iraq, Cyprus failed to get the same consideration from Washington. The United States has consistently opposed the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, especially when they contained goals that differed from those of the United States and Turkey.

b) The American position did not substantially differ from that of the Turkey on the issues of the constitutional structure of the Republic and on the issue of the external guarantees. The United States accepted Turkey's views regarding a loose confederation and the continued presence of significant numbers of Turkish troops in the occupied part of the island. The disagreement with Turkey was over the territorial concessions to be made to the Greek Cypriots. To increase the pressure on the Greek Cypriots there were implied threats of more formal ties with the unrecognized regime of the occupied areas, and the linkage of the constitutional solution to the Cypriot application for membership in the European Union.

c) The United States and Turkey have opposed the unified defense dogma that has placed Cyprus within the Greek defense space and the activities associated with the implementation of this agreement on the grounds of their impact on the process of resolving the Cyprus problem. It is ironic, however, that Washington has not opposed the continued presence of 35,000 heavily armed Turkish troops in the occupied area. Recently, Madeleine Albright,¹⁸ as US Ambassador to the UN, spoke of the "illegality of the Turkish Army's occupation" of Cyprus. Welcome as this statement may have been, it is doubtful that it reflects the administration's policy. The Albright statement may have been motivated by electoral considerations and personal ambitions.¹⁹

d) During the fall of 1996, a number of incidents occurred in the neutral zone during which unarmed Greek Cypriots were murdered in cold blood. The lukewarm reaction of the United States to the first murder in *Dherynia* clearly encouraged the repetition of Turkey's violent conduct. When pressed for a reaction to these killings the Department of State spokesman called for "mutual restraint." His qualified response implied that Turkey's actions were in response to Greek Cypriot provocations. Washington also used these killings at a pressure tactic on the government of Cyprus to reopen a face to face dialogue at the highest level with the Turkish Cypriots, and to open talks for military disengagement along the dividing line.

The condemnation of these killings that was included in the statement of President Clinton to the Greek-American community has to be seen in the context of the President's re-election campaign. This statement was not reflected in American policy.

e) The Clinton administration supported the involvement of the European Union in the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem. It has also expressed its support for the membership of Cyprus in the E.U.

The Clinton policy would be welcome if it was intended to develop new options in the search for a solution of some of the intractable issues in the negotiations such as those of human rights (three freedoms), the issue of guarantees, borders, etc. Washington, working in cooperation with Britain, has clearly linked the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with that of the political solution of the Cyprus prob-

lem, even though Washington has no voice in the E.U.'s membership policy. Washington is using the incentive of E.U. membership to impose the kind of political settlement demanded by Turkey.

Washington's policy parallels and reinforces that of Turkey who objects to the entry of Cyprus in the E.U., not only prior to a political solution on the island, but also prior to the entry of Turkey in the E.U.

The Rise and Challenge of Erbakan

The rise of the Islamists to power in Turkey in the Spring of 1996, provides a classic example of the rationalizations in and the contradictions of American policy towards Turkey. The United States extended its full support to Tansu Giller for being the pro-Western barrier to the Islamic takeover of Turkey. To Washington's great surprise, the coalition between Giller and Erbakan brought to power the very nemesis of the United States.²⁰ Erbakan's anti-American, anti-western, anti-Israeli views, and his support of Islamic movements that threatened America's Middle Eastern allies distinguished him from all other Turkish politicians.

In an attempt to bolster ties with radical Islamic states Erbakan visited and closed new business deals with countries such as Libya, Iran and Nigeria, countries on Washington's black list and the object of new American sanctions imposed in the summer of 1996. In his visit to Iran, Erbakan struck a \$21 billion gas pipeline deal that violated American-sanctions. Erbakan described Libya as the "victim of terrorism" rather than the "sponsor" of terrorism. He also struck a \$2 billion deal that violated American sanctions. Erbakan also remained silent while Qaddafi criticized Turkey for its ties to the United States, NATO and Israel, and described Turkey as a country "under Western occupation."

Erbakan, along with Giller, had expanded their political and economic cooperation with Iraq on the basis of inadequate Western compensation for losses suffered by Turkey since the Gulf war. Moreover, Giller and Erbakan urged the Iraqi regime to end Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and obstructed the use of Turkish bases by *Operation Provide Comfort* and for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq by arbitrarily implementing ATC regulations.

Erbakan's exploits were criticized during press briefings at the Department of State.²¹ The press spokesman found Erbakan's statements and actions to be "objectionable," "off base," "unwarranted," and that they sent the "wrong message" to countries such as Iran. He apologetically indicated that it was "unusual to speak this way about a NATO ally" but "given the circumstances ... we had no choice." The United States did not wish to involve itself in the internal Turkish debate, and Mr. Burns expressed the "hope" that Erbakan's actions were not in violation of American sanctions. The press spokesman concluded that the United States stood

by Turkey, a country victimized by terrorism, and felt that Turkey should do the same for the United States.

Officially Washington rationalized the situation in Turkey²² along the following lines:

- 1) That the majority in Turkey remains secular and pro-Western.
- 2) That the Erbakan-Ciller coalition was temporary and the result of internal political manoeuvring rather than support for Erbakan.
- 3) That Turkey should be dealt with sensitivity. While keeping the Islamists at "arms length," avoid alienating and undermining America's "real allies" in Turkey.
- 4) That the Turkish Army was the ultimate guarantee of secularism.
- 5) That Erbakan would self destruct by his actions, and
- 6) That the United States needed Turkey's military facilities more than ever before and that it should not do anything to strain its relations with a "very important ally" located in a "tough neighborhood." Other apologists for Turkey²³ continued to describe Turkey as the "antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and Russian imperialism" and that it was in the Western interest to be frank with the Turks but keep them as friends and to help them practice a "comfortable form of Islam."

In the final analysis, wishful thinking and rationalizations of Turkey's behavior characterized Washington's post-Cold War assessments of Turkey. Decades of contradictions, ambivalence, conflicting priorities of American policy towards Turkey,²⁴ and the unqualified support extended to Turkey for its geopolitical importance have contributed to Ankara's self-importance and arrogance. Thus, the United States has been the most important contributor to Turkey's international misconduct.

Implications for Greece and Cyprus

Despite the frustration felt in Washington because of Erbakan's challenge to American policy, American officials appear prepared to ride the storm and wait for him to self-destruct or for the Turkish military to remove him from power by direct or indirect action. Washington is not likely to upset its long term relationship with Turkey by interfering in Turkish politics. Nor is it likely that Turkish political elites would welcome such interference.

With stable governments in Greece and Cyprus American pressures are likely to be exerted in the direction of Athens and Nicosia rather than in Ankara in the search for solutions to regional problems. Another reality check for Athens and Nicosia ought to be the fact that despite promises by American presidential candidates

and/or the president, in the absence of a crisis, Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus will remain bureaucratic problems. Generalized pronouncements affected by campaign needs should not be confused with the fundamental American assumptions as to how the Greco-Turkish problems and Cyprus might be resolved. These assumptions have not changed.

Greece and Cyprus have sought Washington's involvement in the region's problems but neither country should expect that Washington will abandon Turkey. In view of the experience with American policy in the Aegean and Cyprus during 1996, both countries ought to be prepared to face pressures for a settlement accommodating Turkey's demands in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

What can Greece and Cyprus do?

a) Avoid the temptation of package deal solutions. While positive movement on Cyprus may contribute to an improvement in the Greco-Turkish political climate, Cyprus cannot be held hostage to Turkey's revisionism in the Aegean. Greco-Turkish issues have their own dynamics.

b) Greece must not engage in another interminable dialogue with Turkey until Ankara renounces the threat or the use of force in its relations with Greece, and acknowledges in unequivocal terms the validity of the frontiers and of the *status quo* established in the region under relevant international agreements Turkey must renounce any claims as to "grey areas" in the Aegean.

c) Cyprus must not venture into another high level meeting with the Turkish Cypriots until a common ground has been established and the Turkish Cypriot side has renounced claims to sovereignty. Further, prior to entering into another round of high level talks, Cyprus must not repeat the tactical error of making concessions up front prior to the commencement of negotiations and without any reciprocal concessions by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot sides.

d) Neither Greece nor Cyprus should be drawn into "Camp David" or "Dayton" style negotiations. Their sovereignty and territorial integrity is likely to be affected in such talks.

e) Greece and Cyprus should not suspend or renounce their defense cooperation agreement until such a time as a definite timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces has been agreed upon, and appropriate international provisions have been agreed upon for demilitarization and for the presence of an expanded international peacekeeping force. However, the presence of such an international force cannot subvert the sovereignty of Cyprus or the standing of its government, as it was the case of the NATO plan of 1964, and is the case today with the Bosnian model.

f) Turkey has mastered the art of creating threats of conflict and later retreating to calls for peaceful negotiations in order to display to the international community

her peaceful intentions. There are issues over which negotiations are appropriate, as in the case of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. There is no room for negotiations or for resort to arbitration over Greece's established sovereign rights and/or its frontiers.

g) Cyprus will soon have to respond to American and European initiatives for a political solution of the problem. Cyprus must stand firm against a Bosnia style solution that will only confirm and legitimize the partition of the island. Instead, proposals ought to be presented capitalizing on new options available to resolve what have been major obstacles in earlier negotiations. For example, NATO and the E.U. can provide creative new alternatives on issues of human rights, borders and guarantees. Cyprus must engage in a pro-active rather than a reactive policy that only responds to American and British initiatives. The United States must not be viewed as the *deus-ex-machina* that will resolve the serious challenges facing Cyprus today.

h) Critics of the American initiatives call for a more active involvement by the U.N. Security Council in the search for a Cyprus settlement. Unless permanent members such as Russia and France rise to their responsibilities in the Council, the United States will retain the initiative and use the United Nations to legitimize its policies. This is the challenge for Mr. Primakov if he intends to re-establish Russia as a superpower with its own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

i) Even though the integration of Cyprus in the E.U. is a top Cypriot priority, Cyprus ought to be prepared to tell its European partners that it will not pay any price in return for membership. Cyprus cannot be victimized twice.

j) Greece and Cyprus can cooperate with the United States in the search of defining ways to reduce tensions in the Aegean and along the dividing line in Cyprus. *Moratoria* in active military exercises, cooling off periods, hot lines, arms limitations and deconfrontation arrangements are possible once Turkey acknowledges the Aegean *status quo* and renounces the use or the threat of force in its relations with Greece and Cyprus. Deconfrontation and demilitarization proposals in Cyprus and the Aegean are meaningless if they are not mutual and in depth. This includes the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Cyprus and arms limitations along Turkey's Mediterranean and Aegean coasts.

I have argued that American policies have contributed to the inflation of Turkey's ego and self-importance and, thus, to Turkey's revisionism in the Aegean and Cyprus. America's assumptions about Turkey have remained relatively constant since the end of World War II. This is why Athens and Nicosia ought to be realistic about forthcoming American initiatives in the region. Athens and Nicosia can protect their fundamental interests in the post-Cold War environment by pursuing realistic, consistent and credible policies. These policies ought to place their national interests above party and personal interests, and build on the strengths both coun-

tries bring to the post-Cold War international environment.

Notes

1. There is a large body of work on this subject. See the pioneering work by Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, June 1959, pp. 120-131.

2. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, Hearings held in Executive Session on S938, First Session, 80th Congress, Historical Series. Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1973, pp. 78-80.

3. Van Coufoudakis, "Turkey and the United States: The Problems and Prospects of a Post-War Alliance," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1981, pp. 179-196. Harry. J. Psomiades, "American Images of Greece and Turkey Since 1945," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (eds.), *Greek American Relations: A Critical Review* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 91-106.

4. Despite the small size of Greece its strategic significance during the Cold war was even more important than that of Turkey, especially in relationship to Turkey's control of the Straits and the presence of the 5th Eskadra in the Mediterranean. Van Coufoudakis, "The Eastern Mediterranean in the Defense of the West-The Case of Greece," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, October 1986, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 34-39. Also: "The Essential Link: Greece in NATO," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, July-August 1988, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 35-44. Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., "The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean." Washington, DC: *The American Enterprise Institute*, 1976.

5. Theodore A. Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966.

6. Theodore A Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction*, pp.95-97.

7. For the text of this unusually strongly worded letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu see Republic of Cyprus, Public Information Office, *Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective*. Nicosia: PIO, 1969, pp. 36-37.

8. Clifford P. Hackett, "The Role of Congress and Greek-American Relations," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 131-148. Lawrence Stern, *The Wrong Horse-The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: Times Books-Quadrangle, 1977.

9. Nearly 90% of the logistical support of the allied operations in the Gulf moved through the Mediterranean. Greek and Cypriot facilities played a major supporting role in these operations.

10. These issues included: the Muslim minority in Western Thrace; the Greek minority of Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarchate; the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf; the width of the Greek airspace; the extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles; NATO command and control areas; search and rescue areas in the Aegean; and the militarization of certain Aegean islands. The Cyprus issue is also part of the Greco-Turkish agenda, even though it is not a Greco-Turkish issue *per se*.

11. Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issue and Challenges," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 28-29.

12. Among the many recent studies and statements promoting Turkey's "new role" see Dr. Tansu Giller, "Turkey and NATO: Stability in the Vortex of Change," *NATO Review*, no. 2, April 1994, pp. 3-6; Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics-From the Balkans to Western China*. Boulder: Westview/RAND, 1993; and Andrew Mango, *Turkey-The Challenge of a New Role*. Westport: Praeger, 1994.

13. Fiona Hill, "Pipeline Politics, Russo-Turkish Competition and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean," *Cyprus Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1996), pp. 83-100.

14. See the letter of President Clinton, dated February 26, 1996, to Angelo Tsakopoulos and other leaders of the Greek-American community.

15. See the letter of President Clinton to Greek Prime Minister Simitis dated July 1, 1996.

16. See the Clinton letter of February 26, 1996 to the Greek-American leadership. In addition to weapons acquired by Turkey under NATO's cascading policy, Turkey received from the United States air tankers for the refueling of its F-16's in flight, the new short range ATACM missiles and attack helicopters. All these systems pose a clear and present danger to the Greek islands in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

17. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, June 17, 1996.

18. In a speech to the Annual Awards Gala of the Cyprus Federation of American in New York, September 28, 1996.

19. At the time, Washington political observers considered Albright as a contender for the position of Secretary of State *in* a new Clinton cabinet.

20. Jim Hoagland, "Political Con Game in Turkey," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1996. By this unholy alliance Giller may have escaped prosecution for various financial scandals from her previous administration.

21. Especially in those of October 7 and October 8, 1996.

22. An excellent example of this rationalization is the op-ed by Alan Makvsky, a Turkish expert who held various official positions in Washington. See his "Responding to Turkey's Eastward Drift," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1996.

23. Amos Perlmutter, "Turkey's Strategic Mideast Position," *The Washington Times*, September 23, 1996, and Andrew Mango, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 and 133.

24. For example the subordination of human rights to security considerations.

* This paper was presented at the Symposium, "Contemporary Greece, Turkey and Cyprus - Greco - Turkish Relations and the International Environment," organized by the Research and Development Center-Intercollege(9-12/1996).

RUSSIAN POLICY IN THE CASPIAN, BLACK SEA AND THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Fiona Hill

Abstract

This article analyses the potential resurgence of Russia's influence in international politics and its attempts to restore its "great power, status," both in the territories occupied by the former Soviet Union, and beyond. The major issues of Russian foreign policy in the Caspian, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean regions are examined, with main emphasis on Russia's complicated relations with Turkey and the implications for Greece and Cyprus.

Introduction

On the surface, current Russian foreign policy is contradictory. On the one hand, the Russian Atomic Energy Ministry sells nuclear technology to Iran, on the other, Russian parliamentary deputies and the Foreign Ministry debate the threat posed by the rise of Iranian-style Islamic fundamentalism on the southern fringe of the former Soviet Union, while *Rosvooruzhenie*, the state armaments agency, concludes arms deals with China and Russian analysts mark their giant neighbor as a potential adversary in the 21st century. In sum, Moscow is no longer the unitary political actor of the Soviet era, and no single agenda is pursued. New sub-state and non-state actors, including individual government ministries and agencies, Russian companies, business and financial elites, and *mafia* groups have emerged to influence the policymaking process, and to pursue agendas that are frequently out of step with the propounded policy of the Russian Foreign Ministry. This fact necessarily complicates any interpretation of Russian activity abroad.

In the seeming confusion, however, four trends in the totality of Russian activity, and thus in foreign policy, are discernible:

1) A general trend toward attempting to restore and maintain Russian prestige through the reintegration of the former Soviet Union;

- 2) A shift in Russian foreign policy emphasis from West to East;
- 3) An effort to pursue as independent a foreign policy as possible from Washington, and to position Russia as a counterweight to the US in traditional areas of former Soviet influence;
- 4) A premium on advancing Russian commercial and economic interests.

Reintegration

Since 1992, there has been a consensus among the Russian political elite in Moscow that one means for restoring and maintaining Russia's "Great Power" status is through the reintegration of the former Soviet space into a common economic, political and security structure with Russia at its head. Members of the elite - both inside and outside government - differ, however, over what form reintegration should take and how it should be achieved. In September 1995, President Yeltsin signed a decree on the integration of the Commonwealth of Independent States (CIS), which outlined Russia's policy in the former Soviet space and set ambitious goals for enhancing ties. The decree declared the CIS a "priority area" for Russia and stated that Russia's "principal vital interests" were concentrated in this region.¹

Both before and since the publication of the decree, there has been a flurry of inter-state summits and agreements. In January 1995, for example, Moscow concluded a payments and customs union with Belarus and Kazakhstan, and later with Kyrgyzstan. This was followed in November 1995 and January 1996 with an agreement on the creation of a Russian-sponsored joint air-defense system with Georgia, Kyrgyzstan, Tajikistan, Armenia, Kazakhstan and Uzbekistan; and in April 1996 with the conclusion of a treaty of economic and political union between Russia and Belarus. Although there has, as yet, been little concrete activity beyond meetings and protocols, the sheer volume of paper and ink expended on this venture implies that Moscow means business, and the attempts to strengthen the Commonwealth of Independent States will be a major element in Russian Foreign policy for the foreseeable future.

Shift in emphasis from West to East

In tandem with this focus on the consolidation of Russia's position in the former Soviet Union, over the last two years there has been a gradual shift in the orientation of Russian foreign policy from an almost exclusive concentration on relations with the West to strengthening Russia's position in the East. Relations with the West are still an important factor, as the expansion of bilateral ties with Germany and the securing of \$10 billion in IMF loans attest, but negative issues have dominated these relations since 1993: the escalation of the war in Bosnia and punitive actions against Serbia by the EU, US and later NATO; and, most importantly for

Moscow, the decision to expand the NATO alliance to the countries of Central-Eastern Europe and therefore to Russia's Western borders. Although Russia is now participating in NATO operations in Bosnia through the cooperative deployment of Russian troops in IFOR, and in NATO's Partnership for Peace, Russia's position in the Euro-Atlantic region is still very much determined by the actions of others. As a result, Russian foreign policymakers have increasingly turned to other former Soviet spheres of influence in the East, where the reach of the EU, US and NATO is not so long.

This decision to turn to the East was underscored in January 1996 with the replacement of pro-Western Foreign Minister, Andrei Kozyrev, by the former head of Russian foreign intelligence, Evgeny Primakov. Primakov is a Middle East specialist, fluent in Arabic, who grew up in Tbilisi Georgia, and went on to become director of the prestigious Institute of Oriental Studies in Moscow. He is Russia's most influential expert on Asia and the Middle East, and his whole life and career is thus caught up in the geopolitical area bounded by the Caspian, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean.

Shortly after Primakov's appointment, in March 1996, Mikhail Titarenko, the director of the Institute of Far Eastern Studies in Moscow, noted, in a clear reference to the Kozyrev era and Primakov's attempts to reorient Russian foreign policy, that "the traditional crest of Russia is a two-headed eagle, but for the past few years both heads have been turned toward the West."² Titarenko went on to suggest that Russia would now be the preeminent power in the Eastern Hemisphere, and that this would be part of a "long-overdue balancing that should not be interpreted as any kind of demotion of the importance of ties with the West." A key adviser to Russian President Viktor Chernomyrdin also proposed in an interview in April 1996, that instead of facing West, Russia now wants "to stand, one leg in Asia, and one leg in Europe."³ The question for Moscow is where to plant Russia's Asian leg.

As yet that question has not found a definitive answer, but relations with the CIS and Primakov's region of interest have certainly been pushed to the forefront since January 1996. Primakov's first state visits as Foreign Minister, for example, were to Ukraine, Belarus, and the Transcaucasus. Primakov has also made it clear that he intends to chart an independent policy for Russia in the East that builds on his expertise and experience, and includes re-establishing Russian influence and ties with radical revolutionary allies such as Iran, Libya and Iraq.

Counterweight to the United States

The new Russian Foreign Minister is part of the consensus in the Russian political elite about the importance of restoring Russia's international position. In 1994, while still the head of Foreign Intelligence, Primakov chided Western powers for trying to impede the reintegration of the former Soviet Union, and in his first major foreign policy address on January 12, 1996, he noted that "Russia was and remains a

Great Power ... [and] ... her foreign policy should correspond to that status."⁴

In a March 6 interview with *Izvestiya*, Primakov suggested that Russia's post-Cold War "Great Power" role would involve providing a "Counterbalance" to the United States and the West in the global arena.⁵ Russia's steps to rebuild links with China, the Middle East and support for Boutros Boutros Ghali, the UN Secretary General, in the face of the United States insistence on blocking his re-election,⁶ indicate that this end is being pursued.

Russian President Yeltsin's trip to China in April 1996 at the height of his re-election campaign and shortly after a state visit to Moscow by President Clinton, was certainly designed to mark Russia's reemergence as an Asian power. The signature of a Russo-Chinese non-aggression pact in Shanghai, and agreements on economic issues, borders, and military exchanges in Beijing were intended to set the tone for bilateral Russian-Chinese relations for the 21st century.⁷ Observers in the region, however, were more inclined to see the trip as arranged by both Russia and China with a US audience in mind rather than a domestic one. Russian and Chinese leaders were anxious to demonstrate to the United States that they had alternatives to relations with the West.⁸

In a commentary in *The Washington Post* on the implications of the visit for the United States, former US Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger, noted that the *communiqué* from President Yeltsin's visit was "nothing less than a declaration of independence by both Moscow and Beijing from the strategic triangle that had evolved in the two decades since Richard Nixon's opening to China and a deliberate effort ... to reduce America's options in Asia"⁹ by bringing the two powers closer to each other. He further suggested that the selection of Shanghai for the signing of the non-aggression pact was the clearest signal of this effort, as it was "where Nixon and Zhou En-Lai completed the first Sino-American *communiqué*, committing the signatories to opposing hegemony in Asia-which meant the Soviet Union." For President Yeltsin, Kissinger continued, "the second Shanghai *communiqué* symbolizes Russia's reemergence as an equal player" with the United States in Asia.

Within a month of the Shanghai declaration, the game that Russia intended to play in Asia took a more ominous turn with rumors of an impending sale of inter-continental ballistic missile technology by Russia to China, which merited a strong protest to Moscow from US Secretary of Defense, William Perry.¹⁰ Since then, the Russian Foreign Ministry has announced that Primakov is slated to visit China at the end of November – a visit which will overlap with the scheduled arrival of outgoing US Secretary of State, Warren Christopher to Beijing – and that Moscow will be establishing a new representative office in Taipei to promote the expansion of ties with Taiwan. All of which suggests that Russia is attempting to insert itself into the existing United States relationships in China and Taiwan!¹¹

The deliberate overlapping of US visits to China with Russian initiatives has been

mirrored in the Middle East. In late October, Russian Foreign Minister, Evgeny Primakov, visited the region, against a backdrop of the faltering US-led peace process which had resulted in the US chief negotiator, Dennis Ross, returning to Washington empty-handed after a three-week stint of negotiations. Primakov visited Syria, Lebanon, Egypt, Israel, Jordan and the Palestinian self-rule territories. At each juncture, the Foreign Minister noted that Russia was an integral player in the Middle East peace process; that Russia would not be displaced from the process by the United States; and that Russia would not support Israel's attempts to renegotiate key provisions of the peace accords; and implied that Russia would support the Arabs over the Israelis if the peace process collapsed.¹²

Prior to his visit, Primakov also published a major article on Russian Foreign Policy and the new post-Cold War world order in which, after criticizing NATO expansion and urging the formation of a multi-polar world he stressed the importance of the Middle East Peace Process for global stability. In the article, he paid particular attention to the Palestinian, Syrian and Lebanese aspects of the process and insisted on a full partnership in the negotiations between the US, EU, France, Egypt and Russia as the only formula for success. Underscoring the shift in focus in Russian foreign policy from West to East, the Middle East was given priority in the discussion over Bosnia. Throughout the presentation, Foreign Minister Primakov also down-played the significance of unilateral US initiatives, focusing instead on the creation of a multi-polar world and international institutions and further underscoring Moscow's intention to constrain Washington as far as possible.¹³

Advancing commercial and economic interests

In spite, however, of the stress on "Great Power" national interests, and these attempts to undercut the United States, Russia is not pursuing a particularly aggressive foreign policy at present. As Evgeny Primakov noted at his first press conference, the rebirth of the old Soviet Union is not on the agenda, and outside the circles of the political and foreign policy élite, the majority of the Russian population is not interested either in the reintegration of the former USSR or in foreign entanglements. In part, the tragedy of Chechnya has done a great deal to rein in post-Soviet Russian ambitions. It has revealed the weakness of the Russian state.

The Russian assault on Chechnya has led to the largest and most destructive military operation on Russian soil since World War II. In September 1996, Russian Security Council Secretary and would-be Presidential candidate, Alexander Lebed announced that in less than 2 years, the war in Chechnya had resulted in the deaths of 80,000-100,000 civilians, 10,000 Russian troops, and an estimated cost of \$12-25 billion to the beleaguered Russian economy. Lebed's Russian combatant figures for the 2 year period are almost as high as the approximately 13,000 Soviet deaths in 10 years of fighting in Afghanistan.

Chechnya has dealt a serious blow to the Russian military and thus to Russian

prestige. Since December 1994, in spite of official reports to the contrary, the anti-Moscow Chechen forces have remained in effective control of the bulk of Chechnya's territory. Their repeated seizures of Grozny, culminating in the spectacular takeover and rout of Russian Interior Ministry forces in early August 1996, have underscored this point. As in the Crimean war, the Russo-Japanese War, World War I, and most recently in Afghanistan, the myth of the invincible Russian army has been vanquished. An article in *Nezavisimaya Gazeta* in January 1996, summed up the situation in the following way: "our former army, at one time unbeatable and legendary, is little by little falling to pieces."¹⁴

As British commentator Anatol Lieven notes in a recent piece on the Russian Military and Chechnya,¹⁵ as a result of Chechnya, "The great majority of Russians are "cheap hawks"; and whatever may be possible in ... the areas that matter most to the West is not possible on the cheap." Aggressive statements between 1992-1994 made by members of the Russian political elite, including President Yeltsin, about the need to protect Russians in the near abroad and attempts to bolster Russia's position by meddling in regional conflicts,¹⁶ have been tempered by the debacle in the Caucasus. In the recent Russian Presidential elections, against the backdrop of the Chechen War, Communist Party leader, Gennady Zyuganov, lost many votes because of his Party's seeming intention of involving the country in a potentially costly struggle to reintegrate the former USSR.¹⁷

Thanks to Chechnya, the revelations about Russian military collapse, nationalists and radicals denied power, and public opinion opposed, Moscow has neither the inclination nor the ability to pursue an aggressive Russian foreign policy. Indeed, according to Western military *attaches* in Moscow, Russia's ability to project its power militarily (in conventional terms, as it still has a considerable nuclear capacity), is not likely to return for at least 10 years and only then under favorable economic conditions.¹⁸ A strong economy has thus been identified both by the elite and the general population as the key to Russia's future.

Although the economy seems to be improving, there is still a sense of crisis. In 1996, for example, GDP and industrial production began to rise slightly in the summer and inflation hit 0% in August for the first time since 1991, but the ruble continued to lose value *vis-a-vis* the dollar, the budget deficit reached 4.3% of GDP, and by November wage arrears had reached 2.7 trillion rubles against a backdrop of miners strikes, suicides in the scientific sector and military leaders threatening mutiny if soldiers were not paid.

In spite of this sense of economic crisis, however, the last couple of years in Russia since 1993, have seen the generation of considerable wealth. Banks and independent entrepreneurs have become major political players, as have huge financial industrial groups. Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) are perhaps one of the most interesting recent developments in the Russian economy. They are

alliances between industries, financial institutions, and the state to share capital and technology and compete in the market. As of May 1996, there were 32 officially registered FIGs in Russia, employing 2.2 million workers and generating 6% of Russian GDP. FIGs have now become extremely successful as they obtain special state investment credits and loan guarantees, tax privileges, and protection from international competition, among other benefits. They also match available capital with investment starved companies.

Russian business leaders see the FIGs as the solution to Russian economic crisis – a solution where a handful of powerful banks own shares in and help finance and manage companies. Russian FIGs follow the Japanese and Korean models where key industries are protected and nurtured so they can capture a greater foreign market share and avoid being taken over by large foreign companies while the country is in transition. As Mikhail Khodorovsky, the President of *Menatep*, one of Russia's largest financial groups, puts it "the state is forming large companies which will be able to cooperate as equals on the world market ... if *Mitsubishi* has say, \$200bn in sales, then a company that wants to compete with *Mitsubishi* will need a level of sales a roughly the same level." Khodorovsky has stated that he would like to see 30% of Russia's industrial workforce concentrated into industrial giants protected by the state and oriented toward foreign markets. Some analysts see FIGs as a useful mechanism for providing a reliable source of capital for the development of the Russian economy in the absence of large-scale foreign investment; but others, such as Andrei Illarionov, Director of Moscow's Institute for Economic Analysis, fear that FIGs will give the government an overly large role in the economy, concentrate wealth in a few hands, and prevent the creation of an open and transparent economy.¹⁹

As yet, FIGs are still developing in Russia and it is not clear what role they are playing or will eventually play both in the domestic economy and in foreign policy. Most groups still have a domestic profile, although *Iterros-Mikrofin*, financed by *Uneximbank*, holds 24 companies, including enterprises in Kazakhstan, which gives Russian business a multi-national profile for the first time. Aside from FIGs, huge Russian companies with state backing are already playing an international role, most notably, the oil and gas giants *LUKoil* and *Gazprom*.

A Scandinavian foreign policy expert recently noted that "NATO may or may not expand eastward, but Russia's *Gazprom* has already moved West."²⁰ *Gazprom*, which owns 30% of the world's known gas reserves, has acquired infrastructure in East-Central Europe, has expanded its sales in this region and is the first Russian company preparing to develop an international equity market with up to 9% of its shares to be traded in Europe's leading financial centers. *LUKoil*, which has the second largest oil reserves of any private oil company in the world, is participating in huge international projects in Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, has begun exploratory drilling in Egypt, and is interested in projects in Algeria and Iraq. According to its

Vice-President, Vitaly Schmidt, *LUKoil* aims on becoming "a world-class company" that can compete with the likes of *EXXON* and *Royal Dutch Shell*,²¹ and has already embarked on ambitious joint ventures with the US oil company *ARCO*, and the Italian firm *Agip* to increase its international profile.

Oil and gas reserves have become Russia's most important source of revenue and thus its most vital economic issue. As a result of oil, gas and other raw material exports, Russia had a more than \$20 billion trade surplus at the end of 1995. Oil and gas barons, including the heads of *LUKoil* and *Gazprom* dominate the league table of Russia's most powerful business leaders.²² This power and influence at home and performance abroad are inextricably linked. Prominent Russian government officials, and the government itself, have a considerable stake in oil and gas. Russian Prime Minister, Viktor Chernomyrdin, is the former head of *Gazprom*, Yuri Shafrannik, the Russian Fuel and Energy Minister owns shares in *LUKoil*, leading Russian financiers, such as Vladimir Potanin, who is now a Deputy Prime Minister, and Mikhail Khodorovsky, the head of *Menatep*, have all acquired Russian oil companies, and the Russian government still holds a 40% stake in *Gazprom*.

Oil and gas are not, however, the only sources of international revenue, arms exports and technology sales from military industrial complex, which were formerly a major moneymaker for the USSR remain important. According to Alexander Kotelkin, the director of *Rosvooruzhenie*, the state arms export firm, Russia had more than \$7 billion in arms export orders for 1996, more than twice the total for 1995 when it brought in \$2.7 billion.²³ Russia now sells arms to 51 countries with India, China, Syria and Malaysia among its biggest clients and is trying to break into lucrative Latin American and Asian markets.²⁴

As a result of the size of the potential revenues from these sectors and the need to boost the economy, oil and gas, and arms sales issues have begun to dominate Russian foreign policy, and have increasingly brought it into direct competition with United States policy in Latin America, Asia and the Middle East. This is particularly evident in Russia's dealings in the arena that has become a focus of foreign policy with the advent of Primakov: the Caspian, Black Sea and the Eastern Mediterranean.

Major Issues for Russian Foreign Policy in the Caspian, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean Region

The Caspian, Black Sea and Eastern Mediterranean need to be seen as an organic whole – an interconnected system of trade and communication routes from the landlocked Caspian, across the Caucasus to the Black Sea and to the world's seaways through the Mediterranean. Oil and gas are the region's key resources, with estimates of up to as much as 200 billion barrels of oil in the Caspian basin, for

example, making it the location of the world's second largest reserves after the Persian Gulf.²⁵ Prior to the collapse of the USSR, Moscow monopolized oil production in the region, and dominated the northern and eastern approaches to the Caspian and Black Seas – and thus the principle communication routes along this axis. Since the dissolution of the Soviet Union and the outbreak of serious conflicts on Russia's southern borders, Moscow's strategic position has deteriorated, in particular where its control of production and Caspian-Black Sea oil and gas pipelines routes is concerned. Russian policy in the region has, therefore, sought to restore Russian influence and protect its state and commercial interests in oil and gas.

In 1993-1994, it seemed as if other regional players were trying to cut Russia out of the so-called "Deal of the Century" between Western oil companies and the government of Azerbaijan to develop offshore Caspian oilfields and transport the oil to world petroleum markets. This deal hinged on the utilization of an existing former Soviet pipeline system running from the Azerbaijan capital, Baku, through Grozny, the capital of Chechnya, to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk, or the construction of alternative routes through neighboring states to the Black Sea. In November 1994, Turkey proposed to Georgia that the pipeline for exporting Caspian oil from Baku should be routed West through Georgia and into Turkey and away from the Russian Federation and its existing pipeline and ports. The subsequent war in Chechnya in December 1994 and the inevitable disruptions in transportation along the Russian pipeline system, also raised concerns in Moscow that Western oil companies, operating in both Central Asia and Azerbaijan, would avoid Russia in oil transportation issues and that Chechnya would prove to be the death knell of Russia's monopoly over Caspian oil.

As a result, the Russian Foreign Ministry has had a tendency to see oil and competition for it in the broader Caspian region as a "zero-sum game" and not one where there is opportunity for mutual benefit. In Summer 1994, Russian President Yeltsin and then Foreign Minister Andrei Kozyrev signed a directive "On Protecting the Interests of the Russian Federation in the Caspian Sea"²⁶ which marked a Foreign Ministry policy of pushing for a resolution on the status of the Caspian that would turn the sea into a lake, prevent its division into national sectors and ensure a Russian veto over all oil deals.

In spite of this stance by the Russian Foreign Ministry, however, the Russian oil industry and energy ministry has fully participated in the international negotiations and projects for developing Caspian oil. *LUKoil* won a stake in the "Deal of the Century" in April 1994 with the backing of the Fuel and Energy Ministry and Russian Prime Minister Viktor Chernomyrdin. Since then it has secured inclusion in international consortia developing oilfields and pipelines in Kazakhstan and additional offshore fields in Azerbaijan. All of which implies an acknowledgement of the *de facto* division of the Caspian Sea into national sectors on the part of *LUKoil* and, therefore, on the part of certain players in the Russian government. In fact, under the

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influence of those in favor of the development of Caspian oil and the infusion of Western capital and advanced technology, Moscow and the Foreign Ministry now seem to be backing away from the hardline stance on the Caspian Sea regime.

In October 1996, for example, *Interfax* and other publications reported that Moscow may be prepared to reach a compromise on the status of the Caspian Sea. According to Ambassador Feliks Kovalev, the head of the Russian Foreign Ministry's working group on the Caspian Sea, "to unblock the current deadlock and achieve mutual understanding with Azerbaijan and Kazakhstan, Russia is ready to drop its tough opposition to dividing the Caspian Sea into national sectors" and is moving in the direction of agreeing to the creation of 35-40 mile national sector along the coastline of each Caspian state with the area outside these sectors "recognized as a common asset of all the five states, open for their joint use."²⁷

This emphasis on oil, gas, communications routes, and the influence of commercial interests on Russian policy can be seen in Russia's bilateral relationships in the Caspian-Black Sea-Mediterranean region-and especially in its relations with its former Soviet neighbors in the Caucasus and Central Asia.

*Russian policy in the Caucasus and Central Asia*²⁸

Russia sees the Caucasus (its own North Caucasus republics and the three newly independent states of Armenia, Azerbaijan and Georgia) as the key strategic region in the post-Soviet space. The Caucasus link the Caspian and Black Seas and form Russia's border zone with Turkey and Iran. The three Caucasian states are too weak individually to completely control their own destiny, but since 1994, Russia has become increasingly concerned that the states will unite to construct new East-West communications corridors-for crucial roads, railways and pipelines – from Central Asia and the Caspian to the Black Sea, avoiding Russia's North-South axes. The reorientation of communication routes, cooperation between the three Caucasus states, the expansion of ties between the Caucasus and Central Asia, and the potential alignment of these two regions with Iran, Turkey or both would pose a formidable geopolitical challenge to Russia.

This is no idle concern. Since the outbreak of conflicts in the Caucasus in the late 1980s, and especially since the wars in Abkhazia and Chechnya, Russian communication routes with the Caucasus have been cut off. Russia's rail route along the Black Sea coast from Sochi to Sukhumi was severed by the war in Abkhazia; its major road route along the old Georgian Military highway was blocked by the war between Georgia and South Ossetia-although this has now been partially restored – and its rail route from Southern Russia through Chechnya and then through Dagestan along the Caspian coast to Baku was cut off by the war in Chechnya. Furthermore, Russia's border with Azerbaijan has been closed since 1994, because of the war in Chechnya and Russian accusations of Azerbaijani material support for the Chechens. As a direct result, Russia's economic influence in the Caucasus has

faded. Russia still remains the region's primary creditor, and its political and military importance persists as a result of military basing rights in Armenia and Georgia and mediation efforts in regional conflicts, including Nagorno-Karabakh, but Russian-Caucasian trade has fallen precipitously, and the Caucasus states are beginning to look elsewhere to sustain themselves.

Prior to 1994, 70% of all Azerbaijan's trade – exports and imports – passed through Russia. Trade now passes through Iran and Turkey, and Russia has fallen to third place among Azerbaijan's trading partners – after Iran and Turkey. For Georgia, Russia has dropped to 7th in its major trading routes, after Turkey, Turkmenistan, Azerbaijan, Iran, Rumania and Bulgaria. Turkey's volume of trade with Georgia now exceeds Russia's by 6%, largely as a result of the existence of an extensive Turkish-Georgian border and a major crossing point at Sarp, just south of the Georgian port of Batumi, which was opened back in August 1988. Although Russia is still the main source of support for Armenia, as a result of the Azerbaijani blockade Iran has now become Armenia's main trading partner after Russia and Turkmenistan. Georgia is also building a major 130 km railway from the southern Georgian city of Akhalkalaka to Turkish city of Kars. The railway is entirely financed by Turkey with some support from the European Union and will gradually be extended to link Tbilisi and Istanbul. Significantly for Moscow, this project was announced shortly after the declared construction of a major rail link between Iran and Turkmenistan with the prospect of an extension into Armenia. In addition, in Spring 1996, Levon Ter-Petrossian, the President of Armenia, publicly announced for the first time that after the resolution of the conflict in Nagorno-Karabakh, Armenia would be prepared to embark on a strategic partnership with Azerbaijan and coordinate the construction of new road, rail and pipeline links between them.

Ukraine, Russia's most important Western neighbor and an emerging power on the Black Sea, has also been implicated in these developments. Since independence in 1991, Ukraine has increasingly looked for ways to counterbalance its relations with Russia. Shortly after independence, for example, Ukrainian Vice-Premier, Anatoly Kinakh traveled to Iran to conclude a packet of documents on economic cooperation, including an exchange of grain for oil to offset its dependence on Russia for oil and gas. Kinakh also initiated a discussion with Iran about the possible creation of an Iranian-Azerbaijani, Georgian-Ukrainian energy company, that would involve the eventual creation of a communication route from Iran stretching across the Caucasus and the Black Sea to Ukraine and thus to Western Europe completely bypassing Russia.

Although these more ambitious plans were put on hold due to the conflicts in the Caucasus, Ukraine has continued to pursue the creation of a major terminal at its principle Black Sea port of Odessa which would have the capacity to receive large volumes of oil from the Caspian basin and the Middle East.²⁹ In November 1996, Ukrainian Prime Minister, Pavlo Lazarenko, also held discussions with Georgian

President, Eduard Shevardnadze, in Tbilisi regarding Kiev's participation in Georgian trade and transit projects, specifically in projects related to the transport of oil from Kazakhstan's Tengiz field and crude oil and liquefied gas from Azerbaijan. The discussions centered on the transport of fuel supplies across Georgia by rail and then across the Black Sea to Odessa and Ukraine's second port, Nikolaev, beginning as early as 1997, with plans to approach the European Bank for Reconstruction and Development (EBRD) for credits to fund the venture. The Ukrainian Prime Minister also expressed an interest in joining a Georgia-Azerbaijan-Turkmenistan-Uzbekistan agreement on transit facilities and preferential tariffs along a route from Central Asia to the Black Sea.³⁰

These new communication routes are also not simply projected lines on the map. They have already begun to function. The corridor – running from Central Asia and Uzbekistan across the Caspian Sea to Azerbaijan and then to the Black Sea ports of Georgia, across the Black Sea and up through Ukraine, and then to Lithuania and its Baltic Sea ports – is being used by Uzbekistan for the export of cotton rather than its traditional export route through Russia. In October 1996, Russian analysts also noted that the US oil company *Chevron* is transporting oil from its Tengiz fields in Kazakhstan by tanker across the Caspian and then by train across the Caucasus to Georgian Black Sea ports, rather than using the existing Russian pipeline to Novorossiisk.³¹

Russia's reaction to all this has been to try to prevent the further decline in its regional position by maintaining its the upper hand in the resolution of Caucasus conflicts in Georgia and Azerbaijan, retaining its basing rights and border patrols in Armenia and Georgia, and attempting to extend its military control to Azerbaijan. Russian analysts, however, also recognize that economic issues in the region are paramount, given the high stakes in Caspian oil and inter-state trade, and an aggressive Russian foreign policy is counterproductive – there has to be more to Russian relations with the Caucasus than conflicts and military bases. In May 1996, for example, in a major article on the Caucasus in the Russian newspaper, *Segodnya*, Vladislav Shorokhov a senior analyst from the Institute of Europe of the Russian Academy of Sciences, urged Moscow to counteract its political and military influence in the region with improved economic ties. Shorokhov noted that Moscow would only succeed in its goal of influencing the choice of transportation routes for Caspian oil by forging alliances with local elites, improving bilateral relations with the governments of Georgia and Azerbaijan, and improving its transportation infrastructure.³²

Since Summer 1996, Russia has tried a more constructive approach in its relations with the Caucasus, primarily through its endorsement of Georgian President Eduard Shevardnadze's initiative for an all-Caucasus Summit in June 1996. This Summit emphasized Russia's leading role in the region with its site on Russian territory in the North Caucasian spa town of Kislovodsk, but did so in a positive man-

ner with the stress during the meetings laid on shared responsibility for regional problems, cooperation, mutual problem-solving and the defense of all states territorial integrity. Given Russia's preoccupations in the region, the major issue at the Summit was, notably, a discussion about restoring and upgrading Russian communication links with the area.ss

Moscow has also taken steps to improve its bilateral relations with Ukraine. Although there are still considerable problems between the two states over Ukraine's seeming intention to join NATO, and continued claims from the Russian political elite on the Crimean port city of Sevastopol, Moscow is no longer playing the Crimean card in the same manner as it was in 1992-1993,³⁴ and a settlement of the persistent Black Sea fleet dispute seems to be in the offing after a late October meeting between President Yeltsin and President Kuchma in Moscow. In addition, Moscow has also promised to seek the rapid conclusion of a bilateral Friendship Treaty which has been on hold since 1992.

*Russia's relations with Turkey*³⁵

Beyond the Caucasus, Central Asia and Ukraine, Russia's most complicated relations in the Caspian-Black Sea-Eastern Mediterranean region are with Turkey. Although relations are pragmatic with a great deal of bilateral trade, and high-level visits, Russia and Turkey are rivals of longstanding and have fought thirteen wars with each other over the past five centuries. Turkey guards all Russia's approaches to the Eastern Mediterranean and thus the world's seaways and has similar long-term ambitions to Russia for political and economic penetration of Central Asia, the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. Turkey is also seen by Russia as proxy of the United States in the Caucasus and Central Asia, and Russia and Turkey have fallen into diametrically opposed camps on the crucial issues of Bosnia and Chechnya, due to Turkey's close involvement with the Turkic Muslim peoples of the region and the presence of significant Balkan and Caucasus Muslim diasporas on Turkish territory. NATO expansion and Turkey's position in NATO have further rankled Russia, along with Turkey's insistence that Caspian oil flows should be routed long-term through a pipeline running from Baku to its Mediterranean terminal of Ceyhan.

Turkey and Russia ended up on a collision course soon after the collapse of the USSR with Turkey's overly enthusiastic support for an independent Azerbaijan, which resulted in a Russian-backed coup to overthrow the pro-Turkish Azerbaijani President, Albufez Elchibey, and the alienation of Armenia.³⁶ Turkey, has since modified its approach to treat the Caucasus as a single strategic unit, as suggested above. As well as signing a ten year treaty on friendship and cooperation and extensive commercial and cultural agreements with Azerbaijan in 1994, Turkey is courting both Armenia and Georgia, having recognized their importance for regional communications and oil transportation issues.

For Turkey, like Russia, Caspian oil is a crucial issue. The oil terminal at Ceyhan was initially constructed to handle exports from Iraqi oilfields to the West, and was then largely closed in 1990 after Iraq's invasion of Kuwait – a fact which has resulted in a serious loss of revenue in the realm of several billion dollars of transit and storage fees. After an agreement by the Azerbaijan international oil consortium in October 1995 that early oil from the Caspian would be transported through two pipelines from Baku – north through Russia to Novorossiisk and West through Georgia to its port of Supsa – Turkey pushed for a major new pipeline to be constructed from Supsa through Eastern Anatolia to link in with the existing pipeline from Iraq to Ceyhan. Turkey also called for restrictions on Russian tanker traffic from Novorossiisk through its Bosphorus straits, which would make the overland route even more attractive.

As befits this era of high technology, foreign policy is now conducted through the *Internet* and the Turkish government sponsors a site on the Caspian oil issue on the *World Wide Web* with a section on 'The Bosphorus: A Waterway at Risk.'³⁷ This site outlines the risks to shipping, safety, the environment and the well being of the local community posed by the potential increase in Russian tanker traffic through the Straits. The site's text reads, for example, "over half of Russia's total oil exports – between 30 and 35 million tons annually – travel through the Bosphorus. By the year 2010, the projected ... output from the Caspian Sea is estimated to be more than 36 million tons of oil annually ... [which] would more than double the current shipments of oil from Russia through the Bosphorus Even greater amounts are expected to be transported from Kazakhstan's oil fields to the Russian Black Sea port of Novorossiisk for shipment to the West. The combined additional volume would put immense pressure on the Bosphorus Straits." The text concludes by outlining the comparative advantages of the pipeline route from Baku through Supsa to Ceyhan and the benefits to the West if this route is chosen of having the final terminal for Caspian Sea oil located in a NATO country and secure from shipping accidents in the Bosphorus.

Russia has not yet begun to wage war on the *Internet*, but in response to Turkey's actions it has put political pressure on the Caucasus and Central Asian states to limit their relations with Turkey. This pressure has been fairly successful as Turkey does not have the economic wherewithal to establish itself as the dominant power in the region. In spite of the increasing volumes of bilateral trade, Ankara has mostly engaged in barter deals and extensive cultural and technical assistance programs rather than offering itself as a real alternative to continued regional dependence on Moscow, both economically and militarily. There is still a discrepancy, given Turkey's unstable domestic economic and political situation, between what it aspires to do and what it can actually achieve.

Turkish overtures to both Armenia and Azerbaijan to mediate in Nagorno-Karabakh, or to provide troops for a prospective OSCE peacekeeping force, have

also been consistently rejected by the parties under Russian pressure – most forcibly in May 1994, when Russia succeeded in unilaterally brokering a ceasefire between the three warring sides (Armenia, Karabakh and Azerbaijan) which has held ever since. Russia has also taken steps to ensure its domination of Armenia and Georgia's borders with Turkey, including the conclusion, in February 1994 in the wake of Georgia's military defeat in the war with Abkhazia, of a major Russian-Georgian friendship and cooperation treaty which provides for Russian military base rights in Georgia in return for the restoration of Georgian control across all of its territory.

In addition, Russia has used the war in Chechnya to justify a revision of the Conventional Forces in Europe Treaty (CFE), which will now enable it to station more forces and equipment in the Caucasus on Turkey's borders. This move and the establishment of Russian bases in Georgia and Armenia are intended as a signal to Turkey that Russia fully intends to remain active in the Caucasus. Turkey's support for the Chechens during the war has also led to indirect expressions of Russian sympathy for the PKK and the Kurdish insurgency in southeastern Turkey. A *Kurdish House* has been opened in Moscow which sends the additional signal that Moscow will not tolerate any exploitation by Ankara of its Caucasian diasporas.

Russia is, furthermore, trying to head off the construction of the Supsa-Ceyhan oil pipeline - unless there is some significant stake for it in the project. So far the *Azerbaijan International Operating Company* (AIOC) which is spearheading the development of the oilfields and has the final decision over transportation routes has not taken up Turkey's offer to fully finance the construction of the pipeline if there is a definite commitment from the AIOC. Russia has also succeeded in increasing its share in *Kazakhstan's Caspian Pipeline Consortium* deal to 44% which will bring oil through pipelines from the Tengiz field across Russian territory to Novorossiisk, and result in the upgrading of Russia's existing infrastructure. Moscow clearly hopes that this will encourage the AIOC to consolidate regional oil flows and route them through Novorossiisk.

One recent development does, however, also suggest that in addition to putting political pressure on Ankara, as in the Caucasus, Russia is not averse to a different, more pragmatic and conciliatory approach on specific issues. In early November, 1996, it was reported that *Gazprom* is planning to construct an underwater pipeline from Russia's Black Sea coast to Trabazon in northeastern Turkey to transport Russian natural gas to the Balkans. This venture would replace an earlier Russian-Bulgarian initiative begun in 1995 but stalled by Bulgarian feet-dragging. Energy analysts in assessing the *Gazprom* announcement noted that in addition to attempts to prompt a response from Sofia, Moscow – or at least certain key actors in Moscow – is beginning to put money above geopolitics. *Gazprom* already has deals with Ankara to supply Turkey with natural gas into the next century which also puts the Russian-Turkish relationship on a solid business footing.³⁸ In this case,

however, it is important to note that the natural gas is originating in Russia, not in one of the Caucasus states, and Russia already has control over both the supply and the transportation routes.

Russia's relations with Greece and Cyprus

In spite of the growing premium on economic and commercial interests in the region, geopolitics are still important for Moscow. As a further counterweight to Turkey in the Caspian-Black Sea-Eastern Mediterranean, Russia has pursued relations with Greece and the Republic of Cyprus. Greece is seen as a key regional ally, especially given historic cultural and religious ties between Russia and Greece, Greek fears of Turkish dominance in the Aegean and the Eastern Mediterranean, and the continued Greek-Turkish conflict over the division of Cyprus. Russia, therefore, has many potential issues to exploit. Greece and Russia also share an interest in breaking the Turkish monopoly on the Bosphorus straits, and since June 1995, the two countries have jointly pursued a project with Bulgaria to construct a pipeline across the Balkans for the transportation of oil brought by tanker from Novorossiisk to the Greek port of Alexandroupolis on the Aegean.³⁹ If this project succeeds it will greatly enhance Russia's case for routing Caspian oil through Novorossiisk and thus strengthen Russia's position *vis-a-vis* Turkey in the region.

As far as Cyprus is concerned, the outbreak of violence on the island in August 1996, and Turkey's heavy-handed response in conjunction with the rise of the pro-Islamic *Welfare Party* have enabled Russia to paint Turkey as a potential rogue state. This Summer, having previously paid little attention to events on the island, Russia raised the Cyprus question in the UN Security Council, and several related articles were published in the Russian press. Mikhail Demurin, a representative of the Russian Foreign Ministry, announced in August that Russia was opposed to the present *status quo* on Cyprus and would push for the eventual demilitarization of the island.⁴⁰ The Russian press also noted that the August events on Cyprus justified Russia's concerns with Turkey's regional ambitions. In one article, a Russian diplomat was cited as stressing that the Cyprus incidents demonstrated the potential threat posed by Turkish military might from the Caucasus and Central Asia to the Middle East – a threat which justified both Russia's demands for the reevaluation and renegotiation of the CFE Treaty, and Russia's interest in the Black Sea fleet to balance Turkish military and naval presence in the region. The significance of the Black Sea Fleet to offset the Turkish threat was also stressed by Russian Foreign Minister Evgeny Primakov in a press interview on August 3, 1996 in the midst of negotiations with Ukraine on the resolution of Black Sea fleet issues.⁴¹

Russian policy in the Middle East

While looking to counterbalance its major regional rival Turkey in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Eastern Mediterranean, Russia is attempting to head off its global rival, the United States, in the Middle East – in particular in relations with

Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya. In January 1995, for example, Russian Minister for Atomic Energy, Viktor Mikhailov, concluded a \$1 billion deal with Tehran to construct light-water nuclear reactors. In September 1996, Russia also unanimously opposed the United States missile attacks against air defense installations in southern Iraq in retaliation for Saddam Hussein's offensive against the Kurds in Northern Iraq in late August. Foreign Minister Primakov was particularly outspoken in his criticism of the US decision, putting it down to electioneering on the part of the Clinton administration. In March 1996, Alexander Kotelkin, the head of *Rosvooruzhenie*, was reported by *Interfax* to have discussed arms sales with Syrian President, Hafez al- Assad, and Deputy Russian Prime Minister, Oleg Davydov, announced that Russian and Libya were pursuing \$10-11 billion worth of joint ventures.⁴²

Russian analysts are quite clear about Moscow's motives in the Middle East. As Alexei Malashenko, a Central Asian analyst with the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace* in Moscow has suggested: "the main point of maintaining the relationship with [these countries] is to demonstrate to the United States and Western Europe that Russia is capable of conducting an independent foreign policy."⁴³ Andrei Poniatowsky of the *Moscow Center of Strategic Studies*, has also noted that "Developing relations with Iran and Iraq is not based on any principle of friendship, but instead on increasing anti-Americanism, which seems to be a growing part of Russian foreign policy."⁴⁴

In addition to the challenge to the United States, however, as elsewhere in the region economic issues are key. Financial pressures were a major factor in determining Russia's nuclear technology sales to Iran, and even though many in the Russian Foreign Ministry were opposed to the deal they were unable to constrain the activities of the relatively powerful Ministry of Atomic Energy. Prior to Evgeny Primakov's visit to the region in October 1996, articles in the Russian press also discussed the decline in Russian trade with the Middle East since the collapse of the Soviet Union and chided the Russian government for failing to capitalize on its long-standing economic ties with the Arab countries. Syria in particular and the Soviet-era volume of trade between the two was singled out as the potential "economic gate" for Russia in the Middle East.⁴⁵

There is also a great deal of money at stake for Russia in Iraq, which owes Russia an estimated \$5-10 billion in Soviet-era loans. Since 1992, Russia has pushed to have the UN sanctions against Iraq dropped. In Summer 1996 prior to the US missile strikes against Saddam Hussein, Deputy Russian Foreign Minister, Viktor Posuvalyuk headed an economic mission to Iraq. During an interview with Russian TV following the visit, Posuvalyuk underscored the fact that Iraq "is a country in which [Russia has] some very serious plans, and we need to prepare now for the time when the race, the rivalry and the competition begin for Iraqi business." Posuvalyuk claimed to have received assurances during his trip that Russia would have priority in economic relations with Baghdad.⁴⁶

Oil is a key factor in the Iraqi-Russian relationship and in the Soviet-era, Iraq was heavily dependent on Russian technology for the extraction and refinement of oil. In February 1996, Russia and Iraq signed a \$10 billion cooperation accord to revitalize Iraq's oil industry and boost its production by one million barrels a day, once UN sanctions have been lifted. This was the first bilateral accord of its kind signed since the UN Security Council imposed sanctions on Iraq in 1990 for its invasion of Kuwait. *LUKoil* was a major player in this accord and confirmed its readiness to begin the implementation of projects as soon as the UN embargo was lifted. In 1995, *LUKoil* secured a 70% share in Iraq's *Western Kurna* oilfield production-sharing consortium.⁴⁷

Economic issues aside, Russia also needs to counter its seemingly anti-Muslim positions at home by bolstering its ties with Islamic countries abroad. The war against Chechnya and the related persecution of Muslims from the North Caucasus have severely damaged Moscow's relations with the Russian Federation's large Muslim population in the Upper Volga and the Caucasus, and diminished Russia previously high-standing in the Muslim world as a counterweight to the United States. In the most recent incident in early October, for example, Moscow police stormed one of only two mosques in Moscow, arrested two-dozen members of the congregation in the middle of prayers, and accused them of being criminals from the Caucasus, meriting a stream of protests from Islamic groups. Russia's relations with Iran, Iraq, Syria and Libya, are therefore an antidote to abuses at home as well as a snub to the United States. Sherman Garnett, a Senior Analyst at the *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace*, has described Russian policy toward Iraq and Iran as "a dual embrace" as opposed to the United States "dual containment."⁴⁸

Conclusions

In sum, although many actions may seem contradictory, such as concluding deals to transport natural gas across Turkey on the one hand and trying to prevent the transport of oil across Turkey on the other, Russian activity in the Caspian-Black Sea-Eastern Mediterranean region is in keeping with the four major trends in Russian foreign policy. Russia is trying to maintain its prestige by pursuing reintegration with the republics of the former Soviet Union - attempting to bolster its somewhat unfavorable position in the Caucasus and Central Asia by limiting Turkish influence, building up its military presence, and improving bilateral ties and communication links. Moscow has also begun to concentrate its attentions on this region to plant one leg firmly in Asia and to counterbalance the United States - capitalizing on the Soviet legacy of regional relations to chart a policy that is independent, and even in direct opposition to Washington in the courting of pariah states such as Libya, Syria and Iraq. Finally, Russia is simultaneously pursuing the pragmatic goal of protecting its commercial interests and strategic sources of re-

venue to boost the economy and the revenues of key actors with ties to the government. As a consequence, oil and gas export issues and arms sales tend to dominate bilateral relations and thus Russian foreign policy.

In all these trends, the ultimate goal is the same: to restore Russia's status as a "Great Power" and thus as a major international player - now economically as well as politically and geopolitically.

Notes

1. "RF-SNG: Strategicheskii kurs. Ukaz Prezidenta Rossiiskoi Federatsii ob utverzhdenii strategicheskogo kurca Rossiiskoi Federatsii s gosudarstvami-uchastnikami Sodruzhestva Nezavisimyykh Gosudarstv, N. 940, 14 sentyabrya, 1995 g." *Dipkur'er*, No. 16/18, August 1995.
2. Cited in Carol Williams, "Russia Redirects Foreign Policy Sights Eastwards," *Los Angeles Times*, March 25, 1996.
3. Cited in John Helmer, "Shift in Russia's Strategy on Asia," *The Straits Times* (Singapore), April 18, 1996.
4. See Alessandra Stanley, "Russia's New Foreign Minister Sets a More Assertive Tone," *New York Times*, January 13, 1996.
5. Cited in "Russia and the World," Editorial, *The Christian Science Monitor*, March 8, 1996.
6. See Bruce Clark, "UN Lifted by Payments from Russia, US," *Financial Times*, October 7, 1996.
7. See Lev Delyushin, "New Day Dawns in Russia-China Ties," *The Daily Yomiuri*, April 30, 1996.
8. See Lu Ning, "A Partnership from Positions of Weakness," *Business Times* (Taiwan), May 2, 1996.
9. Henry Kissinger, "Moscow and Beijing: A Declaration of Independence," *The Washington Post*, May 14, 1996.
10. "Russia Reckless to Sell ICBM Technology to China," *Newsday*, May 23, 1996.
11. See Paul Goble, "Russia Playing Two China Cards," *RFEIRL*, November 8, 1996.
12. See, Paul Goble, "Back in the Middle East," *RFEIRL*, October 31, 1996.
13. Evgeny Primakov, "Na gorizonte - Mnogopolyusnyi mir," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 22, 1996.

14. *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, no. 2 (6) January 1996.
15. Anatol Lieven, "Russia's Military Nadir: The Meaning of the Chechen Debacle," *The National Interest*, Summer 1996.
16. See Fiona Hill and Pamela Jewett, "Back in the USSR: Russia's Intervention in the Internal Affairs of the Former Soviet Republics and the Implications for United States Policy Toward Russia" (John F. Kennedy School of Government: Strengthening Democratic Institutions Project, January 1994).
17. See Vladimir Shlapentokh, "Bonjour, Stagnation: An Outcome of Yeltsin's Victory," NATO Special Adviser for Central and Eastern European Affairs, Working Paper CND(96)432, September 13, 1996.
18. Lieven.
19. Information from Matthew Lantz, "Financial Industrial Groups (FIGs) in Russia," *Internal SOI Memorandum*, September 16, 1996.
20. Cited in Paul Goble, "Private Firms and Moscow's Foreign Policy," RFE/RL, Washington, October 25, 1996. The same remark was also relayed to me directly from a Gazprom official by Russian analyst, Andrei Kortunov, in a private interview in September 1996.
21. Cited in "Russia's LUKoil to Compete with Oil Majors," (*Reuters*) *The Moscow Tribune*, March 30, 1996.
22. See, Chrystia Freeland, "Oil Barons and Bankers Top Russian Business List," *Financial Times*, February 8, 1996.
23. Cited in "Did White House Make Arms Control Concessions to Russia in Exchange for Lifting Chicken Ban?" *Russian Reform Monitor*, no. 117., March 31, 1996.
24. See Alexander Ignatov, Alexander Volkov, "Russia Competes for Arms Trade Again," *Moscow News*, March 28-April 3, 1996.
25. See Rosemarie Forsythe, "The Politics of Oil in the Caucasus and Central Asia: Prospects for Oil Exploitation and Export in the Caspian Basin," *Adelphi Paper* 300 (*International Institute for Strategic Studies*, 1996).
26. See Robert V. Barylski, "Russia, the West and the Caspian Energy Hub," *Middle East Journal*, vol. 49, no. 2, Spring 1995.
27. "Moscow Ready to Compromise on Caspian Status, Government Source Says," *Interfax*, no. 2, October 22, 1996, and "Russian Government Seems to be Changing View of Caspian," *Pipeline News*, no. 35, October 22-November 1, 1996.
28. For an excellent discussion of Russia's policy in the Caucasus, see Vladislav

Shorokhov, "*Rossiiskaya politika na Kavkaze: shto dal'she?*" *Segodnya*, May 24, 1996.

29. See, for example, Azer Mursaliev, "*Ekonomicheskii patsifizm*," *Ezhenedel'nik Kommersanf*," May 28, 1996.

30. See "Georgia Will Act as Conduit for Azeri Crude Oil, Liquefied Gas Going to Ukraine," *Pipeline News*, no. 36, November 2-8, 1996.

31. See, for example, Rustam Narzikulov, "*Rossiia proigryvaet zapadu kaspiskuyu neft*," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 22, 1996.

32. Vladislav Shorokhov, "*Rossiiskaya politika na Kavkaze: shto dal'she?*" *Segodnya*, May 24, 1996.

33. See Nodar Broladze, "*Eduard Shevardnadze: Poseem mir, pozhnem blagopoluchie*," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, June 15, 1996.

34. See Hill and Jewett.

35. See Lowell Bezanis, "Turkey: Rethinking Peace at Home, Peace Abroad," and Elizabeth Fuller, "Turkey: The Tussle for Influence in Central Asia and the Transcaucasus," in *Transition*, June 14, 1996, pp. 6-15.

36. See Hill and Jewett.

37. See <http://www.access.ch/tuerkei/GRUPF/caspian.html>

38. See "Does an Underwater Gas Pipeline to Turkey Signal a Sea Change in Russian Policy?" *Pipeline News*, no. 36, November 2-8, 1996.

39. See Beth Heinsohn and Michael Gulyayev, "Experts: Pipeline no Lock on Profits," *Moscow Times*, July 2, 1995, and "Moscow, Sofia, Athens Reiterate Interest in Pipeline," *Pipeline News*, no. 35, October 22-November 1, 1996.

40. See, Vladimir Abarinov, "*Ozabochennost' turetskoi ugrozoi vstrechaet ponimanie v Moskve: Sobytiya na Kipre napominili sosedyam o voennoi moshchi Ankary*," *Segodnya*, August 17, 1996.

41. See, for example, Eduard Aslanian interview with Alekos Mikhailidis, "*Nam blizka Rossiia*," *Segodnya*, June 7, 1996.

42. See Interfax, March 26, 1996.

43. Cited in Mike Trickey, "Rise of Islam Sets off Alarms in the Kremlin," *The Ottawa Citizen*, October 4, 1996.

44. *Ibid.*

45. See, for example, Vladimir Grande, "*Nevostrebovannyi potentsial*," *Nezavisimaya Gazeta*, October 16, 1996.

46. Cited in Mark Matthews and Ann LoLordo, "Iraqi Money Appeals to Russia: Leaders Eager for the Day UN Drops Sanctions," *The Sun* (Baltimore), September 8, 1996. See also interview by Yelena Kalydina with Viktor Posavalyuk, "US, Russia Fall Out Over Iraq," *Moscow News*, September 12-18, 1996.

47. "Russia, Iraq Sign Cooperative Oil Agreement," news bulletin, *The Dallas Morning News*, February 9, 1996; Yelena Suponina, "Oil Games Around Baghdad," and Sergei Strokan, "Russia Betting on Iraqi Oil," *Moscow News*, February 29-March 6, 1996; Michael Gulyayev, "From Russia to Saddam," *Russia Review*, March 11, 1996.

48. Cited in Mark Matthews and Ann LoLordo, "Iraqi Money Appeals to Russia: Leaders Eager for the Day UN Drops Sanctions," *The Sun* (Baltimore), September 8, 1996.

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THE CYPRUS PROBLEM IN THE BROADER GRECO-TURKISH RIVALRY: IMPLICATIONS FOR STABILITY IN THE EASTERN MEDITERRANEAN

Andreas Theophanous

Abstract

This article provides ample confirmation that focusing on the intercommunal aspect of the Cyprus problem, as is often the case, is inadequate in understanding and addressing the issue. The author places the Cyprus problem within the context of the post-Cold War regional and international environment and also deals with the historical background of the issue, tracing the policies of Greece and Turkey over Cyprus in the post-1974 period. Furthermore, he addresses recent events and developments and suggests that the content of the solution of the Cyprus problem will critically affect security and cooperation in the island, the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond.

Introduction

The objective of this paper is to assess the implications of the Cyprus problem in the context of the broader Greco-Turkish rivalry and to examine particular developments that seem to be emerging. The Cyprus problem has serious implications for stability and security in the Eastern Mediterranean and the broader area. Given that "with the end of the Cold War, the Mediterranean, which had often been considered Europe's strategic backwater, is now a region where the [N.A.T.O.] Alliance may be most likely to face new challenges,"¹ as some analysts have agreed, addressing the Cyprus question in a conclusive manner and in a way that contributes to wider stability and security is essential.

The Cyprus problem, which is basically an international issue, constitutes perhaps the most important current focus of Greco-Turkish antagonism. But more than Cyprus is at stake. Greco-Turkish rivalry has deep historical roots and over time has gone through several stages. Currently, Turkey seeks to revise the status quo in the Aegean Sea, while Greek policy focuses on preserving the *status quo*. In this

respect, Greek foreign policy during the past few years has been clearly expressed by the statement "we do not claim anything-but we are not prepared to give up anything."

Adopting a historical perspective in connection with the Cyprus problem and the Turkish claims in the Aegean, S. Victor Papacosma notes that "when one also takes into consideration the Turkish maneuverings among the Moslem minority in Western Thrace and Turkey's general success in reducing the number of Greeks in Istanbul, Imbros and Tenedos, the multi-pronged threat to Greek and Greek Cypriot interests is broadened. Accordingly, Turkey's long-term, patiently executed, revisionist policy should be evaluated as the sum of several critical parts."²

In the next section an attempt is made to outline the context within which the Cyprus problem and Greco-Turkish relations should be placed. This is followed by a brief historical background on the policies of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus since 1974. This is very instructive as it may be indicative of the policies pursued by the two countries in their broader relations. In section IV some developments affecting the Cyprus problem and the relations between Greece and Turkey are assessed. Finally in section V some conclusions are put forward.

The Context

A critical development is that the end of the Cold War also marked the end of bipolarity. In the new multipolar world in which the U.S.A. is the dominant power, the possibility of regional conflicts is much higher. Furthermore, in the new emerging international environment, the new meaning of security has not been adequately addressed so far.

Three senior analysts of the Rand Corporation, Ian Lesser, F. Stephen Larrabee and Ronald P. Asmus argue that in post-Cold War Europe it is of critical importance that western strategy be reassessed and that particular attention should be paid to the broader Mediterranean region. More specifically they stress that "... the Mediterranean could emerge as Europe's new front line as the West confronts the strategic challenges of the post-Cold War era. It is here that many of the most likely candidates for future European security crises may be located. At the same time, traditional distinctions and barriers across the Mediterranean are breaking down and being reshaped by a wide and diverse set of demographic, political and economic forces. European, North African and Middle Eastern security are intersecting in new ways, blurring old strategic distinctions that have guided past policy and creating new challenges for Western policy"³

Oil and pipeline economic and political interests involved in Central Asia constitute another major factor influencing developments in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed, as Fiona Hill has pointed out, "since 1991 the most important strategic issue in the triangle (formed by the Caspian, the Black Sea and the Eastern

Mediterranean,) has been oil in the Caspian and the competition between the littoral states of these three seas over its exploitation and transportation to markets in Europe."⁴

Both American and European analysts increasingly underline potential sources of conflict and factors that may undermine stability and security in this strategic region. Nationalism, the search for a new identity and a new direction, the economic gap existing between the rich and poor countries of the Mediterranean, unfulfilled expectations and frustration could indeed lead to undesirable developments.

The broader Mediterranean area is perceived to extend from Gibraltar to the Black Sea. It has been noted that "when senior US policy-makers think of the Mediterranean, they think first and foremost of the Eastern Mediterranean, above all Greece and Turkey as well as the Black Sea region. They also see the Mediterranean as the stepping stone to both the Middle East and the Persian Gulf."⁵ Consequently, according to Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser "the emerging geopolitics of energy supply illustrate how the Middle Eastern and European environments are increasingly interwoven"⁶ Indeed, "[e]nergy security gives Europe, especially Southern Europe, a tangible economic stake in stability across the Mediterranean...".⁷ They also underline that "[p]erhaps the most difficult political problem that must be addressed, however, is the Greek-Turkish dispute. Thus a new effort to resolve Greek-Turkish tensions is essential. This should begin with a new initiative to try to resolve the Cyprus issue. Progress on this issue is a key to a broader settlement of Greek-Turkish differences over the Aegean. The two problems are, in fact, closely linked: without progress on Cyprus there is likely to be little movement on the Aegean. At the same time, movement on Cyprus could create a better psychological climate for the resolution of outstanding bilateral differences over the Aegean."⁸

Historical Background

It is essential for the purposes of this analysis to assess briefly the policies of Greece and Turkey on Cyprus in the post-1974 period. In this way, it will be possible to grasp the current state of affairs in Cyprus as well as overall Greco-Turkish relations and perspectives.

On July 20, 1974, following a *coup d'état* instigated by the then military regime of Athens against President Makarios, Turkey found the pretext it had been seeking to invade Cyprus. Turkey invoked two reasons for its action:

- (1) To re-establish the constitutional order in Cyprus and to uphold the independence of this island-state in accordance with the 1960 agreements establishing the Republic of Cyprus.
- (2) To protect the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Retrospectively, it is obvious that Turkey has *de facto* partitioned Cyprus and has ever since been consistently pursuing its maximum objective, which is the strategic control of the island. By the term strategic control we imply an unchallenged ability to use Cyprus as a lever to advance its interests regionally and internationally. We should also keep in mind that the minimum objective of Ankara in Cyprus has traditionally been to thwart the strategic control of Cyprus or part of it by Greece and/or the creation of a second Greek state in the island.

Turkey invaded Cyprus not only to prevent *enosis* but moreover because it saw a window of opportunity. In the immediate aftermath Turkey had the opportunity to impose a solution favorable to the Turkish-Cypriots and its own interests. What has prevented a solution since 1974 is basically the pursuit by Turkey of its maximum objectives. Indeed, Turkey's victory in the war of 1974 led to a shift in Turkish objectives: from the minimum objective of trying to prevent *enosis* or the creation of a second Greek state in Cyprus to the maximum position which aims at the strategic control of Cyprus.

From 1974 to 1993 there was relative calm in Cyprus since the Turkish strategic control of the island was not challenged. At the same time, Turkey claimed that it had brought peace to Cyprus. Nevertheless, what Turkey describes as "peace" has proved very fragile. Indeed, the assassination of four Greek-Cypriots in the latter part of 1996 and the resultant heightened tensions have shown that peace and security on the island and in the broader region are at stake.

Prior to 1993, the Turkish occupation troops "tolerated" crossings of the cease-fire line by Greek-Cypriots while in recent months they have been ruthless, exercising "disproportionately greater violence" as the U.S. State Department has stated and indeed brutally killing Greek-Cypriots. A major factor is that the policies of both Greece and the Republic of Cyprus have changed. More specifically, following 1974 Cyprus has virtually been held hostage to Turkey; the Greek side has taken the decision to put an end to this situation. This has led to new developments.

More specifically it should be remembered that the prevailing policy of Greece and Cyprus in the immediate aftermath of the war in 1974 was expressed in the two following statements: (1) Cyprus decides and Greece provides its support.

(2) Cyprus is too far away from Greece.

These two statements summarize what has been known as the Karamanlis dogma. They reflected the inability of Greece to support Cyprus militarily. Consequently, the *casus belli* pronouncements put forward by successive Greek governments in case of a new Turkish advance in Cyprus lacked credibility.

Furthermore, the dogma "*Cyprus decides and Greece provides its support*" was a policy essentially lacking realism. Nicosia could not decide on its own about poli-

cies that would sooner or later entangle Athens. It was also a statement which aimed at overcoming tensions in the relations between Cyprus and Greece; one should not forget that prior to the invasion, relations between Athens and Nicosia were governed by the supremacy of "the national center", that is Athens. Yet when the actions of Athens provided the opportunity to Turkey to invade the island, Greece stood aside and watched Turkey occupy almost half of the island.

According to Arvanitopoulos "Greece has experienced a serious deficit in the credibility of its deterrence strategy due to its inaction in the face of the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and its subsequent behavior in the Aegean where it let Turkish violations of Greek airspace become an ordinary phenomenon."⁹

Papandreou's visit to Cyprus in 1982-the first visit ever by a Greek Prime Minister-marked a turning point in the relations between the two states. It rekindled the hopes and the faith of Greek-Cypriots in Hellas and its perceived readiness to help Cyprus. Indeed, Papandreou proclaimed a new policy, a policy labelled "*symparataxi*"-which means lining up together in a common front. This was indeed a new approach. "The sun of Greece has risen over Cyprus again" was the headline of a major Greek-Cypriot daily, *Phileleftheros*, at the time. This new approach proved to have been the forerunner of even closer relations between Athens and Nicosia.

The stalemate in Cyprus which existed from 1974 eventually provoked (in 1993) an upgraded commitment by Greece to the defense of Cyprus, something Turkey did not want. The new policy, promoted by President Clerides and the late Prime Minister Papandreou and sustained by his successor, Prime Minister Simitis, has been described as the new defense dogma.

Arvanitopoulos suggests that this new defense arrangement "breaks new ground, in the sense that it departs from ... outdated modes of thought and action, and attempts to introduce the analytical tools of deterrence strategy into Greek defense realities."¹⁰ This change highlights a departure from the old practices of Greek foreign policy-which may be summed up as follows: "traditional in its conception and execution, reactive at its best and conciliatory in attitude at its worst."¹¹

Moreover, the March 6, 1995 decision of the European Union to embark on accession talks with Cyprus six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference constitutes one of the most important developments since 1974. Certainly, the European Union would prefer a solution to the Cyprus problem before membership. Nevertheless, even in the absence of a solution, Cyprus could still become a member.

Turkey has been experiencing changes as well. They account in part, for the hardening of its position. One can certainly detect a growing nationalism, as well as a drift away from Europe. Turkey has certainly embarked on a path for a new

Turkey. According to Steinbach, Turkey may be moving towards Neo-Ottomanism.¹²

Current Developments and Their Implications

Much less effort would have been spent on the Cyprus problem if it had not entailed dimensions which could seriously upset peace, stability and security in the broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean. In the context of the post-Cold War period the strategic position of Cyprus seems to have become more important. Besides being located at the juncture of three continents, the Eastern Mediterranean in which Cyprus is located, is at the apex of two geostrategic triangles the importance of which is immense and growing:

- (a) in the north with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea
- (b) and in the south with the Middle East and the Persian Gulf.

The American and western diplomacy of complacency with the status quo in Cyprus since 1974 seems to have been shaken for several reasons. A major factor is that in the post-Cold War era the likelihood of regional conflicts is higher. Added to this, while in the past the status quo in Cyprus did not generate any threats to peace given the prevalence of the strategic control of Cyprus by Turkey, the new defense policy of Athens and Nicosia has altered this framework or is at least moving in that direction.¹³ This has wider strategic implications. According to Evriviades, the new defense policy has de facto brought Greece further into the Eastern Mediterranean and toward the underbelly of Turkey.¹⁴ Consequently, Turkey will sooner or later be faced with two options:

- (a) To alter its maximum approach in Cyprus and accept a compromise solution by which Cyprus should not be under the strategic control of either Turkey or Greece

or

- (b) consider the possibility of undertaking a preventive strike to eliminate any Greek military presence in Cyprus or a potentially viable Greek defense system.

Moreover, the March 6, 1995 decision of the European Union for accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus (six months after the end of the Intergovernmental Conference) has also provided a strong incentive to the member countries to work towards the resolution of the Cyprus problem. The European Union would not like to inherit the Cyprus problem by accepting Cyprus prior to a solution. On the other hand, it would be embarrassing for the Europeans if a non-member country, Turkey, determined the policy of the European Union.

Certainly, the new strategic realities around Cyprus and Greco-Turkish relations

require new approaches. Several analysts suggest that Greece is a *status quo* power while, on the contrary, Turkey is a revisionist power. If Turkey does not alter its revisionist policies and if Greece remains adamant in not giving in to Turkish demands, then inevitably these two countries will embark on a collision course. Indeed, the dangerous arms race between Greece and Turkey is indicative of the atmosphere of tension in the relations between the two countries. A similar state of affairs prevails in Cyprus.

Undoubtedly, from the perspective of the U.S.A. and the European Union there is an interest in a peaceful resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey and of the Cyprus question. In relation to this, it should be noted that while the priority of the west is to see a peaceful resolution of Greco-Turkish differences and of the Cyprus problem, the contents of the package leading to a resolution are of secondary importance to it. This is hardly surprising. After all, traditionally, American and western policy in general towards Greco-Turkish relations was dominated by the primary objective of Soviet containment. The particular interests or objectives of Greece, Turkey and Cyprus were of secondary importance-and were therefore essentially ignored.¹⁵ In the post-Cold War period this practice has so far persisted out of inertia. But it can be changed.

The solution of the Cyprus problem and the improvement of Greco-Turkish relations would certainly be a positive development. Such an outcome though may presuppose the modernization and the further democratization of Turkey. Although not impossible, this seems to be a distant likelihood. On the contrary, according to several analysts-such as Professor Steinbach-Turkey has embarked on a path for a new Turkey. Professor Steinbach underlines that while in the past Turkey was considered as a stable power contributing to stability and security in the area, in the current context it may become a power which augments instability in the entire region.¹⁶

The Cyprus problem and the overall Greco-Turkish rivalry are further complicated by other developments currently taking place. It is important to focus on some of the challenges faced by Turkey. To begin with, the Kemalist establishment in Turkey faces severe problems, such as the search for a new identity, that challenge its existence. Furthermore, the Kurdish problem cannot be contained by the Kemalist regime. Had Turkey offered the Kurds a limited form of cultural autonomy in the past, there could have been expectations for a peaceful resolution. That has not happened. The continuing violence deepens the gap, thus increasing instability. Added to this, Turkey faces a serious socio-economic crisis as well as a democratic deficit. Given this state of affairs, it is hardly surprising that nationalism is growing while the Islamic movement has become a sizable force in Turkey. Several analysts indicate that Erbakan is not a passing phenomenon.

In addition to these domestic problems, Turkey has differences with most of its

neighbors. While for Greece and Cyprus Turkey constitutes the greatest threat to their national security, the reverse is not true: Greece and Cyprus are not at the top of the list of Turkish preoccupations. In spite of a great degree of economic interrelationship between Russia and Turkey, there is currently an antagonism between these two countries. Russians perceive Turkey to be playing an important role in efforts to destabilize or weaken post-Soviet Russia. If this is true, then we have a new dimension of the old Eastern Question. Turkey also has differences with Syria over water supply, the city of Hatay (that was annexed by Turkey in 1939), and the alleged support of the Kurds by Damascus. Furthermore, there is a debate in Turkey about whether or not Turkey should interfere in Northern Iraq and capture the area of Mosul. In this regard it is important to note that sometimes the population of 200.000 Turkmans in northern Iraq is inflated to 2.000.000 in the Turkish press.

Some Conclusions

Undoubtedly, the broader area of the Eastern Mediterranean – with its natural connections and interrelationships with the Black Sea and the Caspian Sea on the one hand and the Middle East and the Persian Gulf on the other – is quite volatile. A peaceful resolution of the Cyprus problem would remove a serious source of potential conflict. The basic question is what type of solution. Efforts aiming at marginally improving the current *status quo* amount to a process of legalizing the *status quo*, thus indirectly rewarding aggression. Such a scenario would not only undermine the interests of Cypriots but would also generate more instability. The real dilemma is whether Cyprus should be turned into the Switzerland or the Bosnia of the Eastern Mediterranean. This outcome will be largely determined by the active involvement or the lack of it by the U.S.A. and the European Union.

A united Cyprus could be a factor of stability, which would be to the interest of the European Union, the U.S.A. and the international community in general. It could also play a positive role in bringing about a rapprochement between Greece and Turkey. On the contrary, if the West makes the mistake of pressuring the Greek side into a solution that amounts to the legalization of the *status quo*, there will be adverse effects not only for Cyprus but also for Greece, Turkey, and the west. The first outcome of such a "solution" would be the official extension of the Greco-Turkish borders to Cyprus. This would dramatically increase instability in the area. The defense dogma, although in its infancy, has already demonstrated that. This realization should not tempt the west to suggest a return to the pre-dogma period: Cyprus cannot be held hostage to Turkey. Instead, a united Cyprus member of the European Union and of a broader western collective security organization would be a stabilizing factor in the relations between Greece and Turkey. Moreover, it would serve the objective of stability and cooperation in the Mediterranean and beyond.

Given the current circumstances in the island and the regional strategic bal-

ances, a truly federal arrangement may perhaps be the only available formula which would render Cyprus a unified state and thereafter pave the way for further integration. Such a solution, although not a precondition, would also facilitate Cyprus' membership of the European Union and lead into another period of economic growth and development, into a new economic miracle, the fruits of which would be shared by both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Indeed, the challenges lying ahead are great. While paying particular attention to its defense within the framework of military cooperation with Greece, the Republic of Cyprus must convey the message convincingly both to the Turkish Cypriots and to the international community that this policy aims at deterring further Turkish aggression while also contributing to a peaceful resolution of the problem. Moreover, it has to undertake several initiatives which would promote fundamental Cypriot objectives abroad. For example, it is of the utmost importance that Cyprus seeks membership in a collective security organization. Likewise it is essential to promote itself as a model state projecting ideas and values such as democracy, pluralism, human rights and a market economy in the Eastern Mediterranean and beyond. A series of measures and innovations also have to be undertaken domestically in order to achieve these objectives. Among other things, it is about time that policy making should be preceded by policy analysis and a careful examination of the effects of several options. Particular attention should also be paid to the promotion of policies leading to the most efficient utilization of its most important asset, its human capital.

Notes

1. See Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser (1996).
2. See Papacosmas (1996, p.6).
3. See Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser (1996, p.25).
4. See Hill (1997, p.179).
5. See Asmus, Larrabee and Lesser (1996, pp.28-29).
6. *Ibid.*, p.26.
7. *Ibid.*, p.26.
8. *Ibid.*, p.30.
9. See Arvanitopoulos (1997, p.156).
10. *Ibid.*, p.153.
11. *Ibid.*, p.153.
12. Udo Steinbach made this point while presenting the theme "The Islamic

Reorientation of Turkey and its International Implications" in Nicosia, within the framework of a seminar entitled *Contemporary Turkey*, organized by the Department of Turkish Studies of the University of Cyprus, and the Bureau for the Study of the Cyprus Problem of the Ministry of Foreign Affairs on November 16, 1996.

13. An important development since this paper was presented has been the decision of the Government of the Republic of Cyprus to purchase S-300 anti-aircraft missiles from Russia. The deployment of such sophisticated weaponry on Cyprus would decrease the disadvantages of the Greek side on the island. This decision provoked Turkey's anger but, apart from that, it provided greater impetus and urgency for efforts on the part of the US and other western countries to resolve the Cyprus problem. This is because the S-300 missiles would not only increase tension and the possibility of conflict on the island (which would almost certainly escalate into a Greco-Turkish war) but would also give Russia a greater stake in developments over Cyprus.

14. See Marios L. Evriviades "Turkey's Role in American Strategy During the Cold War and Post-Cold War Period," a paper presented on October 29, 1996, within the framework of the symposium *"Contemporary Greece, Turkey and Cyprus - Greco-Turkish Relations and the International Environment,"* organized by the Research and Development Center - Intercollege.

15. See Stearns (1992).

16. See note 12.

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THE GENESIS OF THE GREEK AND TURKISH NATIONALISM IN CYPRUS, 1878-1914: A COMMON MARCH AT A DIFFERENT PACE

Stefanos P. Papageorgiou

Abstract

Greek national ideas ruptured the Ottoman millet system in Cyprus, with the onslaught of the Greek Revolution and the creation of the modern Greek State. Henceforth, Greek nationalism made its appearance, with the beginning of the British rule; as a result the dominant Muslim community was forced to live under legal equality with the Greek Cypriot majority. Initially, the Muslims maintained a policy of political obedience towards the British administration, until the creation of the national Turkish State, a fact that prompted them to a nationalistic attitude, similar to the one already adopted by the Greek Cypriots. The emergence of nationalism resulted in the deterioration of relations between the Greeks and the Turks of Cyprus. Peaceful co-existence during the Ottoman period, was gradually replaced by a state of conflict.

The Millet Period

In order to understand the emergence and the development of nationalist ideas in Cyprus, it is, I believe, necessary to examine the social structure of the Ottoman period. The Ottoman rulers had divided the subjects of the Empire into self-governed religious communities (*millets*) under the guidance of the clergy. This particular system allowed a relatively high degree of religious and cultural freedom and at the same time tolerated the presence and the distinction between nationalities. The arrangement was completed by the compulsory acceptance on the part of the subjects and adherence to a common political, administrative and financial system (*Ottomanism*).¹

The principal element of cohesion, but also of distinction between the *millets* was religion, while the national element was limited to a minor role with no significant influence. The idea of national identity based on a common language, religion and

shared customs did not acquire political meaning but was adopted by the Ottoman State in order to achieve communal cohesion and a regular administrative function.²

This general framework of social and administrative policy was imposed in Cyprus as well with the consolidation of the Ottoman domination. The island which throughout its long history was colonised by numerous ethnic and religious groups, was divided into two religious communities (*millet*s): the Muslim and the Christian-Orthodox.³ During this period, the traditionally structured Cypriot society, was based on the enlarged family and the village. Beyond these limits the elements of identity and blood relations were perceived exclusively in religious terms.⁴ This is confirmed, among others, by numerous official and private inventories which discriminate population exclusively on the basis of religious faith, without the slightest reference to national distinction.⁵ The two communities, in their common evolution, went through stages of peace and conflict;⁶ the latter, however, never made use of national elements in order to overthrow or even question the Ottoman legal framework. On the contrary, the conflicts aimed at the reintegration in the existing legal framework under improved conditions.

The absence of internal class homogeneity and the political, administrative and social division of the island regardless of religion, created differences and tension, which, however, were expressed in terms of class rather than religion.⁷ The proportionately, almost equivalent, presence of Muslims and Christians in the rural class-the overwhelming majority of the population-but also in the higher social *strata* (civil servants, land-owners, tax-farmers, the clergy), resulted in giving priority to defending and pursuing mutual class interests. Class interest was therefore more important than religious differences. They were not a principal reason of conflict in the Ottoman system which was tolerant towards the religions of the Bible. During this period, class interest was definitely the main cause of most of the conflicts that took place in the island.⁸

The *millet* system functioned rather smoothly until the late 18th century, when religious and ethnic differences in the Empire began to acquire a dynamic national character. They were, therefore, used to supporting and promoting movements with an implicit national orientation. Members of the Greek-speaking elite of the Orthodox *millet*, having exploited in an exemplary way the social, financial and cultural changes that took place in the Ottoman Empire during the previous period, acquired a significant financial weight, thus becoming the most powerful part of the Ottoman merchant class. The financial strength of this group could not be translated into equivalent political prerogatives. Therefore, it put forward the linguistic, religious and cultural particularities of its co-religionists, aiming at the creation and the development of a national movement, and, furthermore, the formation of a nation-state.⁹ Thus, in this direction, the intellectual movement of *Neo-Hellenic Enlightenment*,¹⁰ played a major role in the expansion and the expression of the Greek national ideology.

The national-liberating struggle of 1821, a spiritual child of the panhellenic nationalism which was largely based on the European model, managed to liberate only a small part of Greek historical territories. Greek nationalism has subsequently tried to complete the unfinished liberation struggle. This was effected on the basis of a territorially non-limited, all-powerful ideology, the *Megali Idea (Great Idea)*, which aimed at the reconstruction of a new Byzantine Empire, conceived in exclusively Greek-Orthodox terms. It would extend from the Anatolia to Corfu and from Cyprus to the furthest north borders of the geographical Macedonia.¹¹

In Cyprus the Greek national idea made a modest impression for the first time in 1821, when the island's Christian population managed to pierce at the national revolution of their co-religionists in continental Greek Land. The rapid and violent repression of the revolutionary movement in Cyprus, and the atmosphere of terror that followed, did not succeed in repairing the first breach. Moreover, the presence of the small Greek State in the southern ends of the Balkan peninsula, from 1828, served as a bastion and diffusion point for nationalist ideas.¹²

The Period of British Rule (*Anglocratia*): From Passive Community to Agressive Nationalism

The Greek-Cypriot aspirations for joining their national centre, were manifested with the outbreak of the struggle in 1821 and the subsequent formation of the Greek State. These aspirations remained at a peak during the last fifty years of Ottoman occupation (1828-1878) and became the predominant political issue during the entire colonial period.¹³

From the very beginning the British had to face a solid community imbued with national conscience and free from the former Ottoman bondage which the *millet* system had imposed. The new rulers, casting aside the pre-existing Ottoman system, facilitated the development of objective conditions which favoured the expansion of Greek nationalist ideas. National division, that spread to all aspects of public and private life, resulted in the gradual collapse of the religious communities and, at the same time, in the rise of all those elements that undermined the traditional communal cohesion. The new political institutions put into force, led to the predominance of a political life based on nationalist terms, using a nationalist vocabulary.¹⁴

The most important vehicles of nationalist ideas in Cyprus were the Orthodox Church, the financially and socially powerful merchant class in the cities and the group of scientists and intellectuals that sprang out of it. The Church, a hegemonic institution in social and financial terms, had acted as the sole political representative of the Orthodox during the Ottoman period. Endowed by the Ottoman regime with a series of exceptional privileges, the Church regarded the new administration

as a major danger, as it refused to reconfirm the Church's official political role, and while depriving it of its financial privileges as well as of the state's support in collecting taxes from the Christian flock.¹⁵ This is why the Church having got over its initial embarrassment caused by the imposition of the British rule in an exemplary and rapid way, took on a leading role in the fight for *enosis* supporting the diffusion of nationalist ideas.

The same path was followed by the merchant elite, for similar reasons. This class, while demanding in an active way political liberalisation, refused to contribute to any social reform, since this would weaken its ability to control rural classes. So adopting the slogan of *enosis*, the merchant elite tried to increase their internal political power and to participate in a more active way in state apparatuses so as to ensure their financial prosperity. On the other hand, they conveyed nationalist ideas to the rural masses, deflecting them from a socially oriented struggle.

The new situation did not bring about the slightest change in the political and social pyramid of the Greek-Cypriot community. The traditional ruling classes fought hard to preserve the old social relations of the Ottoman period, since this was the source of all their privileges. The nationalist anticolonial movement in Cyprus, *never* seemed to gather all those progressive elements of social content, present in other similar movements, and was led by groups with conservative models and interests. This is why the movement's development was not followed by a corresponding improvement in social and economical situation of the majority. The island's rural population, about 70%, lived under abject conditions, politically a prisoner and financially a victim of politicians and usurers.¹⁶

There is, however, another aspect which goes beyond the real causes of the development of Greek nationalist ideas in Cyprus. The *enosis* movement was both the receiver and transmitter of a fascinating ideology which functioned parallel to and independent of political ambitions and social-economic class interests, gaining the support of the whole of the population. The intensity and persistence of the nationalist ideology in Cyprus can be found in no other unredeemed Greek territory. Cypriots took the best advantage of the favourable conditions, compared to other Greek-populated Ottoman districts created by the new British occupation. They put forward *enosis* as the main weapon of their ideology and as a major political issue.

Greek-Cypriots clearly declared from the first days of *Anglocratia* their political goals, either directly or through their representatives, by means of successive proclamations and other similar manifestations: "... *the only desire and the only hope for the future is the union with the Mother-Greece.*"¹⁷ The memoranda and other similar steps that followed in 1895, 1902, 1907, 1911, 1912, were more or less of the same content.

The development of nationalist ideas and the rise of the *enosis* movement was

facilitated by the creation of a double educational system which helped Greek and Turkish cultures to develop separately.¹⁸ This educational system generally accelerated the dissolution of community cohesion and influenced at least in an indirect manner the decrease of mixed villages.¹⁹

In this favourable context the Greek-Cypriot engagement in the *enosis* affair, seemed as a logical consequence. The Christians in Cyprus, trying to acquire legitimacy in the present, had recourse to the past and became organically linked to it. Enslaved and living under regimes which imposed absolute submission and humiliation for centuries, Christian Cypriots let themselves be seduced on a vague but glorious past. They joined a "pure" and ancient race and adopted the theory of their uninterrupted historical continuity, impatiently and gratefully. Outcasts and "bastards" for centuries, they found for themselves "pure" and famous ancestors: the Hellenes. For as Professor Issacs emphasises: "... *concerning racial apotheosis, mythology, identity, psychological security and magical deceit nothing can be compared to Panhellenism.*"²⁰

The Formation of Turkish Nationalism

The establishment of British administration brought about, among other things, a dramatic overturn in the pyramid of political power. Muslims, who until that time were the dominant community both administratively and politically, were now forced to coexist with Christians in a new legal framework of institutional equality. This created for the Muslims a situation of historic embarrassment, since institutional equality between the two communities worked to their disadvantage: the Greek-Cypriots were both the overwhelming numerical majority and the most financially powerful part of the population.

For the Muslims the choice was objectively limited. A small percentage, mainly among the old ruling class, refusing to negotiate with the new regime, emigrated to the Ottoman territories in Syria and Asia Minor during the first years of the British rule. On the other hand, most of the Muslims remaining on the island, chose or were forced to choose, an attitude of obedience and loyalty to the new administration: "... *We Muslims according to our religious faith[. . .] consider as corrupted and subversive any community which using means of a revolutionary character, by unfounded justifications and false inventions and by constantly complaining, creates problems for the Government which it ought to obey.*"²¹

The choice of a policy of loyalty to the local British government was dictated as a result by a series of factors: nationalist ideas that were predominant in the area of the Greek-Cypriot community did not meet with the same response in the Muslim one. The Ottoman Empire was the womb that gave birth to all the national states in the wider Balkan area and the Near East. Nevertheless, the ruling Muslim class

remained prisoner of an imperial logic with a main point of reference and cohesion, the supranational Islamic faith. The development of a Turkish national conscience among Cypriot-Muslims was therefore retarded in the absence of a national centre, and a homeland. This is, as well, one of the reasons for the lack of strong national orientation in their educational system which remained limited and focused on religious education and the Arab language.

Muslims were conscious of Greek nationalist views and desires who had anyway never tried to hide them: "... *the fact that Greeks around the world, through the creation of associations, subversive meetings and other common activities, try to revive Greece in the future[. . .], needs no further proof and is well-known to all governments and even to each individual[. . .]. We believe that her Majesty's government knows that Greeks are so imbued with the idea of Panhellenist idea that they want to see nothing but Hellenism on earth, and will be satisfied with no government but the Greek one.*"²²

To the Muslim dilemma "*British sovereignty or subordination to the Greek state*", the answer was easy and predictable. Muslim Cypriots, members of a sovereign community for centuries, had developed the matching, proud and even arrogant temperament which rendered the thought of cohabitation with Greeks in a state governed by their old *Rayas*, odious and contrary to their dignity. Moreover, they believed that "... *no community can enjoy security, life, property and honour under a Greek administration, since Greeks were arrogant because of their glorious past and ancestors[. . .]. This is true especially for Muslims who are naturally subject to their vengeance.*"²³

Those fears were not excessive. Following 1878, the Greek-Cypriots refused to accept equality of rights with the Muslim community concerning political participation and administrative management. Their goal was the Muslims' political isolation: they regarded Turkish-Cypriots as a *necessary evil* and their presence on the island as an *historical misfortune* which should be rendered powerless since it could not be abolished:⁴ "... *Recognition and justification of our national historical rights may be disapproved by the small Muslim minority, moved by religious rather than national motives. However, their number is too small to allow them to go against the national destiny of this eminently Greek island, nor can they claim that their participation to cultural and economical progress is of any significance. Trade, Sciences, Arts, Letters, Industry and any other activity which can bring economical progress is exercised almost exclusively by the Greeks of Cyprus.*"²⁴

This aggressive and intolerant nationalism did not leave much of a choice to the Muslims. So, during the first period of the British dominion, when the relations between the two communities were tense, the Muslims, being in no position to put forward a nationalism similar to that of the Greek-Cypriots, were forced to align themselves with the British administration policy. Later, from 1923 onward, when

Mustafa Kemal's Turkish national State was formed, a Turkish nationalism began to take shape in Cyprus and the Turkish-Cypriots started to use a reference point their national centre, the national Turkish State.

The British Position and Policy

The British, on the other hand, showed no official acknowledgment of national communities dividing the population into *Muslims* and *non-Muslims*. This created discontent on the part of the Greek-Cypriots who reacted strongly regarding this *negative surname* as devious and an obstacle to their nationalist goals. This appellation could be found in British official documents but never acquired any substantial meaning. Both British officials and civilians, in their documents appear to unreservedly accept the Greek nationality for the Christians on the island: "... *no man with a common sense could deny that Cypriots are Greeks who speak, think and feel in Greek.*"²⁵

The attitude of the colonial administration towards the Greek-Cypriot expectations for *enosis* was shaped by final decision of the British to maintain their dominion on the island. Nevertheless, during the period between 1878-1914, the Greek-Cypriots' demands were not totally rejected by the British who had adopted a subtle political line: "... *I think that it's only natural for the Cypriots of Greek origin to consider their integration with what they call mother-land as an ideal that needs to be nursed willingly, with warmth and devotion. Such a feeling is an example of the patriotic devotion that so gracefully characterises the Greek nation. And I have trust in those who feel so solemnly about themselves not to forget that they must show the same respect for other people's similar feelings. I must say that these aspects [. . .] are views that Her Majesty's Government will not refuse to regard with respect. On the other hand, the view of the Muslim's population on the island that British occupation in Cyprus should not lead to the dismemberment of the Ottoman Empire, and that Great Britain's mission in the Levant should not have as a consequence the diminution of the Sultan's dominion, is also a view that Her Majesty's Government is equally obliged to regard with respect.*"²⁶

This quotation is reflecting, in general, the chosen British policy on the Cyprus problem during the period 1878-1914, and represents the manner in which they intended to handle the problem of *enosis*. The Under-Secretary for the Colonies, after flattering the Greek-Cypriot sensitivities in his elegant manner by acknowledging them as part of a noble nation with noble ideals, in fact demanded that equal respect be shown towards the Muslims' similar feelings. In other words, he declares that Great Britain regards both aspects, though diametrically opposed, equally respectable. But what bears the greatest importance is the passage in the text which underlines England's firm decision not to proceed to any kind of action that would diminish the Sultan's dominion over the Near East. In other words, that

no attempt at diminishing the Sultan's dominion should be made by any country including Greece, but excluding Britain.

The main arguments aiming at restraining Greek-Cypriot nationalist pursuits were based on:

- Their formal inability to cede to a foreign country (i.e, Greece) territory that did not belong to them. This argument was made even stronger by the *Cyprus Convention* (1878) articles, according to which Cyprus was ceded to the British by the Sultan for a certain purpose and amount of time, during which it is still to be considered as Ottoman territory.

- The Greek-Cypriots' extremely negative attitude towards the prospect of a return under the immediate dominion of the Sultan after the withdrawal of the British. The reaction of the Greek-Cypriots to the withdrawal of the British military forces in 1894, which were mistaken for withdrawal from the island, was typical of the discontent and panic that such an action would provoke. The rumours were denied by the British government "... and people felt reassured, though they made England realise their grave fear at the thought of returning Cyprus to Turkey."²⁷

Following 1914, the scene changed, and even more so after 1923, when, according to the *Treaty of Lausanne*, Cyprus was ceded to Great Britain as a *Crown Colony*. From that time on beliefs and arguments of all three sides (British, Greek-Cypriots, Turkish-Cypriots), regarding this particular issue were formulated by the new facts on the ground, and assumed different dimensions. Further, relations constantly deteriorated and during the last period of the British rule they went through the stage of *Tension* and to the stage of *Rupture*.

Notes

1. Kemal Karpat, 'Millet and Nationality: The Roots of the Incongruity of Nation and State in the Post - Ottoman Era,' in B. Braude - B. Lewis (ed.), *Christians and Jews in the Ottoman Empire*, vol. 1 (*The Central Lands*), (New York - London, 1982), pp.141-142. K. Karpat "Ethnicity and Community and the Rise of Modern Nations in the Ottoman State", in *Actes du II Congres International des Etudes du Sud-East Europeen*, Tome III (*Histoire*), pp.113-115.

2. Karpat, "*Ethnicity and Nationality..*", *op. cit.*, p. 115.

3. Kyprianos (Archimandrite), *Istoria Chronogogiki tis Nisou Kyprou*, (Nicosia, 1902), pp. 446-461. Daros Alastos, *Cyprus in History. A Survey of 5.000 Years*, (London, 1976), p. 262. Stavros Pantelis, *Nea Istoria tis Kyprou* (Athens, 1986), p.43.

4. Adamantia Pollis, 'Colonialism and Neocolonialism: Determinants of Ethnic

Conflict in Cyprus," in P. Worsley-P. Kitromilides (ed.), *Small States in the Modern World. The Condition of Survival* (Nicosia, 1979), p.48.

5. See, among others, the statistical results of Louis de Barrie in Comte de Mass Latrie, *Histoire de l' ile de Chypre ...* (Paris, 1852-1861), vol. III, pp. 580-586, Richard Pockocke, *A Discriptional of the East ...*, (London 1754), p. 148 and the inventories of Maritti, Light, Turner, de Vezin, MacDonald and the official ottoman Census of 1777, in Theodoros Papadopoulos, *Social and Historical Data on Population*, Cyprus Research Centre (Nicosia, 1965).

6. H. Luke, *Cyprus: A Portrait and an Appreciation* (London, 1965), p. 79. Kostas Graikos, *Kipriaki Istoría*, vol. 8, p. 179-180; M. Attalides, *The Turkish Cypriots: Their Relation to the Greek Cypriots in Perspective* (Nicosia), p. 56.

7. Pollis, *op. cit.*, p. 48; Karpat, *op. cit.*, p. 121.

8. H. D. Purcell, *Cyprus* (New York, 1969), p. 189-192.

9. See more in Richard Clogg, "the Greek Millet in the Ottoman Empire" in *Small States in the Modern World*, *op. cit.*, pp. 185-207.

10. See more in P. Kitromilides, "The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict", *op. cit.*, pp. 144-187.

11. Tom Nairn, 'Cyprus and the Theory of Nationalism', *op. cit.*, p. 32.

12. Kitromilides, *op. cit.*, p. 158.

13. See among others Alastos, *op. cit.*, p. 330; C. W. J. Orr, *Cyprus under British Rule* (London, 1972), (1st edition, 1916), pp. 160-161; *To Kypriako Provlíma ...*, (Athens, 1975), p. 26.

14. Wendell Barham, *Enosis: From the Ethnic Commutation to the Greek Nationalism, 1878-1955* (Columbia University), 1982, p. 99.

15. Parliamentary Papers, no. 2324 (*Cyprus 1879*).

16. Ploutis Servas, *Kypriako: Eftines* (Athens, 1980), p. 68-69. See more in Ronald Storrs, *Orientalisms* (London, 1945).

17. Filios Zannetos, *Istoria tis Nisou Kyprou apo tis anglikis katoxis mehri simeron*, vol. 8. (Larnaca, 1991), p. 45.

18. Pollis, *op. cit.*, p. 53; Barham, *op. cit.*, p. 93-98, Nairn, *op. cit.*, p. 35; R. Patrick, *Minority Group Rights*, no. 29 (1979), (Cyprus).

19. Nairn, *op. cit.*, p. 34.

20. See Memorandum of Muslim Representative to the Secretary for the Colonies Lord Kimberley (5/4/1881), in Zannetos, *op. cit.*, p. 322.

21. *Ibid.*

22. *Op. cit.*, p. 322.

23. *Op. cit.*, p. 126.

24. See Memorandum of Greek-Cypriots to the Under-Secretary for the Colonies, Winston Churchill (1907), in C. W. J. Orr, *op. cit.*, p. 164.

25. Storrs, *op. cit.*

26. *Parliamentary Papers; "Correspondence relating to the Affairs of Cyprus"* (1908), (Cyprus, 3365).

27. Zannetos, *op. cit.*, p. 818.

BEHAVIOURAL HOME ENVIRONMENT AND ITS RELATION TO MOTIVATION AND ACHIEVEMENT: GENDER, SETTING OF RESIDENTIAL AREA AND SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS DIFFERENCES

Michalis K. Koutsoulis and James Campbell

Abstract

The present study examines the influence of the home environment on high school students' motivation and achievement and how it differs among genders, setting of the residential area and socioeconomic status (SES). Home environment was considered the combination of SES and parental behaviour factors. A stratified random sample of thirty five classrooms (745 students and their parents) from eight schools in all cities was selected as a representative sample for the high school students in Cyprus. The data were analyzed by LISREL.8 (Joreskog and Sorbom, 1993) and by t-test within SPSS (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner, and Bernt, 1990). Their indications, as well as the relevant suggestions of the results are thoroughly discussed, in view of the existing social conditions in Cyprus.


Introduction

The purpose of this research was to study home environment variables (socioeconomic and behavioural) and how those variables influence students' motivation (self-concept, attitude toward school, attributions, and aspirations) and achievement. Emphasis was also given to gender, setting of residential area, and socioeconomic status (SES) differences. More specifically, the present research studied home behavioural environment with respect to five parental processes: pressure, psychological support, help, monitoring, and press for intellectual development (Campbell, 1994). Furthermore, the study investigated the effect of the motivational factors on achievement and their relationship among them.

The theoretical frame of the present study was based on Walberg's productivity model (Figure 1). According to Walberg (1984) and Wang, Heartel, and Walberg

(1993), home environment is one of the major causal influences on student learning. The findings from home environment research give a clear picture of the magnitude of the influence that the home has on students' motivation and school performance. Home environment encompasses the physical, social, psychological, and educational environments that exist in the home. Walberg (1984) believes that the effect of this environment on a child's development is what determines the degree of one's educational success, and the positive attitudes toward oneself, the school, and an ambitious career. From ancient times educators like Aristotle believed that the family should be the base for children's education (Stafford and Bayer, 1993). Home environment theorists, believe that some of the difficulties young people face at school can be due to problems caused by parents (e.g., Beane and Lipka, 1986). The family is the place that provides the primary setting for personality development for children, because the family provides the individual with the earliest contacts with society, and influences children by the kind of relationship the members of the family have among themselves.

Figure 1. Walberg Productivity Model: Causal Influences on Student Learning



Parental behaviour to children concerning their intellectual growth is another very important variable in the literature of home environment. Johnson (1992) concluded that: the family produces the climate that supports the development of cognitive abilities and satisfaction in doing cognitive work, as well as the development of healthy personality characteristics that facilitate academic development.

The socioeconomic status (SES) of the family is a factor that has a major effect on the students. For the present study SES was the combination of the education, occupation and income of parents. Flouris (1989), Campbell and Wu (1994), and Campbell and Koutsoulis (1995) in their study of Greek American high school students, using PLSPath analysis, found a strong indirect effect of socioeconomic status on high school students GPA and mathematics achievement. Furthermore, Flouris (1989) found that low SES parents exert more pressure on their children, to succeed they exert more pressure on intellectual development, and they monitor their children's time more than parents from high SES. However, parents from high SES provide more psychological support to their children than low SES parents. The education of parents, as a socioeconomic variable, took the attention of many researchers. Stone (1988) found higher achievement scores being significantly associated with the education of mothers. Similarly, Thompson *et al.* (1988) found the educational level of mothers as the most important socioeconomic predictor of school achievement. McCracken, Barcinas, and Wims (1991) found that fathers of high achieving students had a higher level of education than the other students. The early years of a child's life is a very important period for the development of a child's self (Purkey, 1970). The self-images, feelings, and beliefs of children, according to Beane and Lipka, (1986) are well formed before they enter school. The development of clear and positive self images in children depend on the kind of home environment or climate provided by parents (Purkey, 1970). Several researchers found a clear connection between a healthy home and high self-esteem (Stafford and Bayer, 1993). Additionally, psychologists perceive a tendency of self-stability once a given personality has been established in the home, and a resistance to any changes of that (Purkey, 1970). That stability makes the influence of the home even more important.

Other researchers studied the causal relationship between self-concept and achievement. Some found that self-concept affects academic achievement and, therefore, supports the self-enhancement theory (Pitiyanuwat and Campbell, 1994; Song and Hattie, 1984), and some found that achievement affects self-concept and supports the skill development theory (Calsyn and Kenny, 1977; Shaw, 1983). Some other researchers failed to report any causal effect or relationship between general self concept and achievement (Keith *et al.*, 1985; Maruyama *et al.*, 1981; Pottebaum *et al.*, 1986).

The studies of gender differences in self-concept research have been numerous. Several researchers found that males have a higher self-concept than females,

even though females had higher grades (Calsyn and Kenny, 1977; Kelly and Jordan, 1990). Another interesting finding on self-concept research is the interaction of gender differences and basic subject matter. Byrne and Shavelson (1987), Marsh, Byrne, and Shavelson (1992), found that the general and academic self-concept of males correlated higher with mathematics self-concept than with English, and the general and academic self-concept of females correlated higher with English self-concept than with mathematics. Further, they demonstrated that even though females had higher mathematics grades, males still maintained a higher level of self-perceived success in that subject area than females. A similar finding by Flouris (1989), was that females had higher levels of reading self-concept and males higher levels of mathematics self-concept, even though females had higher levels of academic achievement. Similarly, Flouris *et al.* (1994) and Pitiyanuwat and Campbell (1994) showed that males had higher levels of math self-concept, even though females had higher mathematics achievement. Feldhusen and Willard-Holt (1993) demonstrated that males had greater preference for mathematics and science related tasks. A similar finding by Harty, Samuel, and Beall (1986) found males to exhibit a significantly greater interest in science than females.

A positive attitude toward school and teachers can also be considered as an important school outcome (Haladyna, Shaughnessy, and Shaughnessy, 1983). The way a student accepts the school and its role in society determines the effort and the psychological power that the student is willing to put into the school work. Attitude plays an important role in the motivation of the students for learning by influencing their behaviour (Ajzen and Fishbein, 1977). A positive attitude toward school and education is a necessary component for high educational aspirations. Students with a positive attitude toward a subject are likely to want to continue their education in that area or expand their learning to college or graduate school and beyond (Haladyna *et al.*, 1983; Shaughnessy and Haladyna, 1985).

It can be concluded from the literature that females tend to have a more positive attitude toward school than males (Campbell and Koutsoulis, 1995). Haslett (1976) found significant sex differences in the judgments of students of a teacher's instructional style; high school females judge teachers as being better than did males.

The family also exerts a significant influence in shaping the vocational interest, occupational choice, and career development of children (Smith, 1982). Koutsoulis (1996) found that parents influence their children with their own expectations, as children tend to adopt them, and finally those expectations may affect the occupation they eventually choose. McDermott, Conn, and Owen (1987) indicated that as one moves to a population that is more educated, the expectations of the parents, and thus the students, become more demanding and comprehensive.

Marjoribanks (1979) found home environment strongly related to the aspirations

of children. In his later study (1986) he found the aspirations of parents to have strong associations with the educational aspirations of adolescents and moderate to strong relations to occupational aspirations. Mims (1985), similarly, found parental aspirations and expectations having an important and significant impact on the future orientations of the students.

Students' educational aspirations, as a component of their motivation, play an important role in their educational achievement and are necessary conditions for higher educational attainment (Frese, Mohan and Sollie, 1979). Late adolescence is a time for major decisions where students become more mature and they start to give serious thought to their occupational choice. According to Crites (1969), an adolescent takes an increasing account of reality as a basis for his/her choice as he/she grows older, and at the age of 16-18 the person is able to choose a specific occupation.

A variable that has been examined thoroughly on the study of students' aspirations is gender. Several researchers found that males possessed higher educational and occupational aspirations than females (Ayalon and Yuchtman-Yaar, 1989; Calsyn and Kenny, 1977; Frese *et al.*, 1979). Smith (1989), furthermore, found that females had lower aspirations even though females had higher grades. Some other researchers found that females possessed higher educational and occupational aspirations (Mims, 1985; Stone, 1988). Kysel *et al.* (1992) found that more female than male students were planning to stay on in education, while Solorzano (1992) found that females had slightly higher educational aspirations. Finally, some researchers found no gender differences on students' aspirations. (Apostal Bilden, 1991; Feldhusen and Willard-Holt, 1993).

Several researchers that studied students' aspirations support the concept that socioeconomic status contributes to the occupations that students aspire, and to how long will they stay in school. According to Cohen (1987), this is happening because of the successful image and the prestige the parents of a higher social class provide to their children. Haas (1992), Idowu and Dere (1983), and Solorzano (1992) supported that concept by indicating that students who come from low socioeconomic status have lower educational and occupational aspirations than high SES students.

A more specific parental socioeconomic factor that seems to influence childrens' educational expectations is the education of parents. Fleming (1982), found that children with lower educational expectations have parents who are less educated, and that highly educated parents tend to have higher expectations for their children's education and career plans.

Another demographic characteristic that was of interest to this study and is related with the aspirations of students is the setting of the residential area. Crites (1969) indicated that there are differences between rural and urban areas in the vocation-

al choice of youth. Frese *et al.* (1979), and McCracken and Barcinas (1989) indicated that rural youth had lower educational aspirations than city youth. Haas' (1992) explanation for that was that the low educational level of rural parents tends to influence the educational aspirations of their children. He further found that rural children felt that their parents were more supportive of their taking full-time jobs, attending trade schools, or entering the military, rather than attending college. Other differences between the two settings were reported by Flouris (1989). He found that parents from urban areas had a higher educational level than parents from rural areas, which had a positive effect on a child's achievement. He further indicated that parents in rural areas exert more pressure on their children on school work, hoping that their children can change their socioeconomic status through education. According to Mylonas (1982) such differences exist because of the distance from the urban centre and on the educational policy of each government. That policy purpose is to exclude the children of peasants and generally the students from lower social classes from getting higher educational opportunities and giving advantage to the children from upper social classes that usually reside in cities.

As was noted above, another major focus of the study was to analyze the home behavioural and motivational factors in respect to gender differences. Gender as a socialization pattern makes society expect different functions from men and women (Rosenberg and Simmons, 1982). Home as a socialization factor generates differentiated gender characteristics (e.g., Campbell and Mandel, 1990; Jacobs, 1991). Campbell and Mandel (1990) demonstrated that the large gender disparities are more the products of socialization than any difference in innate abilities between the genders. They found that females receive low levels of pressure and monitoring but higher levels of psychological support and help. Moreover, Campbell and Wu (1994) who studied gifted Chinese children, Flouris, Calogiannakis-Hourdakis, Spiridakis, and Campbell (1994) who studied Greek children, Pitiyanuwat and Campbell (1994) who studied Thai elementary students, all concluded that males perceived more levels of parental pressure, help, and monitoring than females. Jacobs (1991) found stronger gender stereotypes related to higher specific beliefs for parents of sons relative to the ability beliefs of parents of daughters. Leung (1993) also concluded that males and females are subject to differential parental pressures for achievement. He further indicated that both mothers and fathers tended to emphasize achievement and competition more for their sons than for their daughters.

Methodology

Because of the complicated nature of the research problem - like every educational problem - and the inclusion of many variables, it was necessary to use statistical analysis of data methods appropriate for the study (Keeves, 1988). Structural Equation Modeling, that is based on correlation along with the support of factor analysis, are powerful methods that helped to explain the interrelations among the variables of the study. According to Keeves (1988), it is very important

to establish the causal order of the variables within the model.

Subjects: The study was conducted within the public high schools (*Lyceums*) in Cyprus. The target population of the study was all students that attended the public *Lyceums* of the Republic of Cyprus during the 1994-95 school year. The sum of those students was about 15,000 (*Republic of Cyprus*, 1994). The age range of the *Lyceum* students is between 15 and 18. Selection of the sample: (for the purpose of this study) was a random selection of 35 classrooms of 745 students and their parents within eight high schools (*Republic of Cyprus*, 1994). A stratified random sampling was performed to ensure representative samples of subjects according to the composition of their residential area (urban, rural) and their specialization in the *Lyceum* (Classical Studies, Science/Mathematics, Economics, and Business).

Instrumentation and Materials: All the instruments were initially developed in the English language. For the purpose of this study, the instruments were translated into the Greek language (forward translations) – then translated from Greek back to English (back translations) – to ensure the validity of the translations. Furthermore, a pilot study was conducted among Greek American high school students that attended Greek parochial high schools in New York City (Campbell and Koutsoulis, 1995).

The Inventory of Parental Influence (IPI) (Campbell, 1994) is a series of instruments designed to isolate family members' perceptions of the following family processes: (a) parental pressure, the level of pressure parents exert on their children to succeed in school (b) parental psychological support, the level that parents support their children in relation to school performance (c) parental help, (d) parental press for intellectual development that measures the level that parents provide intellectual resources to their children, and (e) parental monitoring of the students' home life by their parents (Campbell, 1994). The second version of the IPI measures the perceptions of parents of the same family processes. The first two family processes (Part I) are factor scales that have been developed from Likert statements. The respondent agrees or disagrees with each statement (1. strongly disagree; 2. disagree; 3. uncertain; 4. agree; 5. strongly agree). Part II of IPI contains three factor scales made up of items relating to family practices that require the respondent to specify how often each practice occurred (1. never; 2. rarely; 3. sometimes; 4. usually; 5. always). The following were some of the types of questions included in this instrument: "*I am afraid to go home with a fail grade;*" "*my parents want me to go to a good college;*" "*I was never satisfied with my child's grades in school;*" "*I supervised the homework of my child.*"

The Self-Confidence Attitude Attribute Scale (SaaS) (Campbell, 1994) consists of Likert-scale items and was used for measuring a student's self perception as a general factor (general self-concept), and a student's level of academic confidence in four basic areas (Mathematics, Science, Modern Greek and History). Some of the

types of questions included in this instrument were: *"I have always found mathematics difficult; Science is boring"*.

The Attitude Toward School Questionnaire (AtsQ) was designed to study the students' perceptions toward school. The following were some of the types of questions included in this instrument: *'Education is the key to success in the future;'* *'it is difficult for me to see my education as a stepping stone for future success.'*

The Educational Aspirations Questionnaire (EaQ) was designed to study the students' educational aspirations. The EaQ consists of Likert-scale items. The following were some of the types of questions included in this instrument: *"Considering your abilities, grades, and available money, etc., how far do you actually expect to go in school?"* The Completion Items Form (CiF) consists of five demographic characteristics, the grade point average (GPA) for the academic years 1992-93 and 1993-94, the grades in eight subjects and the grades that the students got on the tests for the same subject areas.

Procedures: After the selection of the schools and the classrooms the researcher met the Principal of each school that was participating in the study. He explained to him the purpose of the study and the procedures that had to be used by the researcher and the students. An Assistant Principal introduced the researcher to each classroom. The researcher explained to the students the purpose and the procedures of the study and answered possible questions. The administration of the questionnaires took two 45-minute periods on different days. In all classrooms that questionnaires were answered, the researcher was present. Each questionnaire was accompanied with a data scan sheet, where most of the responses were entered on it. The respondents began with the CiF, then with the AtsQ and they proceeded with the EoaQ. The researcher collected all the instruments and answer sheets at the end of the session.

At the end of the period the students were instructed about the parents' IPI - one for the father and one for the mother where applicable. The researcher asked the participants to give the questionnaire to their parents, in order for them to complete it. The students were asked to return the questionnaire enclosed in an envelope at the second scheduled meeting with the researcher. The students were given the option of anonymity to ensure more reliable results. At the second and final meeting with the participants, the students completed two more questionnaires. They responded on the IPI for students and on the Saas. At the end of the session the researcher collected all the questionnaires from the participants and the questionnaires from their parents. The same procedure was used for every school. About 80% of the parents responded to the questionnaires.

Statistical Analyses: Factor analysis was employed in order to study the constitutive meaning of the constructs, using the SPSS Principal Components Factor Analysis (Nie, Hull, Jenkins, Steinbrenner and Bernt, 1990). Varimax rotation was

employed to create a set of interpretable scales which were used as a guide in forming ten synthetic predictor factor scales. For the five parental behavioural constructs students' and parents' responses were combined. These ten sets of interpretable scales were named: socioeconomic status (SES), parental pressure (PRS), parental psychological support (SUP), parental help (HLP), parental press for intellectual development (PID), parental time monitoring (MON), general self-concept (GSC), academic self-concept (ASC), attitude toward school (ATS), and aspirations (ASP). Coefficient alpha reliabilities were calculated for each factor and ranged from .64 to .94 (*Table 1*).

Table 1

COEFFICIENT ALPHA RELIABILITIES OF THE LATENT VARIABLES

Variable	Items	Means	SD	a
Socioeconomic status	5	48.352	20.982	.882
Parental pressure	36	2.641	.559	.902
Parental psychological	34	3.895	.398	.799
Parental help	16	2.862	.757	.909
Parental press for intellectual	16	2.946	.668	.812
Parental monitoring	24	2.654	.635	.850
General self-concept	6	3.531	.630	.641
Academic self-concept	32	3.161	.490	.922
Attitude towards school	9	2.912	.532	.656
Educational aspirations	11	3.846	.685	.778
Academic achievement	10	15.792	2.489	.937

For the final analysis of data and in order to study the different patterns of home environment, motivation, and achievement, several Structural Equation Modeling analyses were used by utilizing LISREL.8 (Jöreskog and Sorbom, 1993). The first and most important step in the analysis of data with Structural Equation Modeling, according to Keith (1988) and Stage (1989), is the development of a general path model which includes the important influences derived from theory along with any other important variables to be controlled. The direction of the influence between two or more variables is not a question to be answered from the statistics, but from the theoretical insights about the problem at hand (Asher, 1983). The ordering of

the variables in the path model, according to Keith (1988), is based on a mixture of theory, research, and logic. According to Braxton, Duster and Pascarella (1988), relationships exist in models not because they are improving regression coefficients but because theories posit them. LISREL is a maximum likelihood method and requires stringent distributional assumptions, such as normality and independence of residuals (Noonan and Word, 1988). The gender, setting of residential area, and SES differences were analyzed by calculating effect sizes and t-tests.

Parental Influence on Motivation and Achievement

Statistical analyses: As soon as the Principal Components Factor Analysis isolated the constructs, the standard deviations, the means (Table 1) and the correlation matrix were obtained (Table 2).

The correlation matrix, the standard deviation and the means were used from LISREL in order to measure the predicting variance on the dependent variable (academic achievement).

After an initial run of the LISREL and in an effort to obtain a fitted model SES, general self-concept and parental press for intellectual development and career

Table 2

PEARSON CORRELATION COEFFICIENTS FOR PREDICTOR
VARIABLES AND DEPENDENT VARIABLE

	SES	PRS	SUP	HLP	PIO	MON	GSC	ASC	ATS	ASP	ACH
SES	1.00										
PRS	-.128	1.000									
SUP	.147	-.061	1.000								
HLP	.197*	.012	.356*	1.000							
PIO	.219*	.032	.282*	.522*	1.000						
MON	-.033	.269*	.205*	.463*	.273*	1.000					
GSC	.121	-.258*	.212*	.092	.088	-.025	1.000				
ASC	.217*	-.266*	.237*	.000	.129	-.050	.396*	1.000			
ATS	.050	-.308*	.208*	.090	.110	.044	.210*	.417*	1.000		
ASP	.382*	-.324*	.316*	.075	.145	-.029	.165	.394*	.377*	1.000	
ACH	.242*	-.485*	.191*	-.004	.099	-.043	.197*	.451*	.349*	.503*	1.000

*p<.01

expectations were eliminated from the final analysis due to non-significant contribution for the explanation of the variance. The order the predicting constructs entered the equation was as follows: step 1: parental pressure, psychological support, help, and monitoring; step 2: attitude toward school; step 3: academic self-concept; step 4: educational aspirations; and step 5: academic achievement.

Results: For high school students, LISREL estimates revealed that the best positive predictors of high school students academic achievement are academic self-concept (1.22) and educational aspirations (1.07), while parental pressure was a strong negative predictor (-1.54). Within the family processes, time monitoring had a moderate positive effect on achievement (.36) while parental help had a small and a negative effect (-.26). Parental pressure also influences negatively students' academic self-concept (-.12) and educational aspirations (-.24). Contrary to pressure, parental psychological support was found to have a positive effect on students' academic self-concept (.24), aspirations (.38) and on attitude toward school (.23). Parental help that studied the level (not the quality) of help that parents provide to their children was also found to have a significant negative effect on academic self-concept (-.06). Time monitoring of students' out of school activities was also found to have positive effect on attitude toward school (.09).

From the factors that are considered as part of the students' motivation academic self-concept — that focused on the combined level of confidence of the stu-




Figure 2: LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood), standard deviation, and residuals. N=740. Dependent variable: Academic achievement. R²=42 PRS: Parental pressure: SUP: Psychological support: MON: Time monitoring: HLP: Help: ATS: Attitude toward school; ASC: Academic self-concept: ASP: Educational aspirations: ACH: Academic achievement.

dents on four basic areas (Mathematics, Science, Modern Greek and History) – was found to have a strong effect on high school students' achievement (1.22) and on educational aspirations (.30). LISREL estimates also revealed that attitude toward school influence academic self-concept (.32) and aspirations (.24) (Figure 2).

Discussion: The purpose of this study was to identify some of the factors that explain students' academic achievement. The factors included in this model are the home behavioural (pressure, psychological support, time monitoring and help), and motivational (academic self-concept, attitude toward school and aspirations). Educators in their effort to provide students with the necessary supplies that they need to face the challenges of this changing society need to know the ways that home environment can help the students to devote more effort to school work. Also, educators need to know how home influence students' motivation and consequently their achievement.

Within the home behavioural environment pressure was found to negatively effect the achievement of students, academic self-concepts (results that agree with the conclusions of Flouris, (1989) who conducted a similar study in Greece), attitude toward school, and aspirations. Parental psychological support, on the contrary, produces positive results on students' emotional elements. Time monitoring was found to have a moderate effect on their achievement and a small effect on their attitude toward school. A very surprising finding is that parental help with students' work produces negative results by lowering students' achievement and self-concept.

These findings are very important for the parents. It is necessary for them to know that pressure harms students' motivation and achievement and that psychological support strengthen those factors. Parents must consider these findings and change their use of pressure and try to replace pressure with psychological support. The fact that monitoring had a moderate effect on students' school performance can tell the parents that it is important to monitor their children time but is not a critical factor for their school performance. The negative effect of parental help is something that parents and educators have to take into account. Since the present study measured only the amount of help and not the quality of that measure it is not possible to find the real reason for that effect. It is possible that parents with their help replace childrens' responsibility towards school work and the students do not try hard, or parents help their children in a harmful way. It is possible that low and moderate achievers get more help from their parents because they need it, but the reverse can be true that over protective and helping parents produce low achievers.

Another major finding extracted from the statistical analyses was that academic self-concept had a major effect on students' achievement. This finding is in accord with numerous other researchers who focussed on self-concept (Byrne and

Shavelson, 1987; Hansford and Hattie, 1982; Lynch, 1991; Stone, 1988; Taylor and Michael, 1991). This finding is very important for educators in general and teachers in particular because teachers can help their students build a strong self-perception on academic areas. Teachers should consider finding ways to effectively raise their students' self-concept in their area of teaching. The fact that academic self-concept has so much importance for high school students and that the mean score of that construct is exactly in the middle of the 5-point scale (3.16), makes us to conclude that students do not have high academic self-concept and they need help to raise it. Academic success can help the students to raise their self-concept on academic areas as a reciprocal effect, but also they might need regular feedback for their school work from their teachers (Brophy, 1987) and also from their parents.

The importance of self-concept is a long process and its development begins long before the first ring of the school bell (Purkey, 1970). What is more important is that once the student enters the school with a positive self-concept and the parents continue that support, the student begins school life positively. Positive self-concept produces positive results and positive results produce high self-concept in a reciprocal way. As soon as the student, with the support of the family, gets into that cycle, the student would have more opportunities for success than the student that enters the school with low self-concept.

It was also derived from the analyses that attitude toward school is influenced positively from parental psychological support and monitoring, while parental pressure has greater negative impact. Attitude toward school does not affect academic achievement but it does affect academic self-concept and aspirations. It can be possible that with the parental support students are able to build a positive attitude toward school. As a consequence a positive attitude toward school can help students begin school positively, giving the student a high self-concept where that high self-concept will produce positive school performance.

It is evident from the research on attitude toward school that the students' attitudes to their education are not only important for their school performance but a priority for school outcome. It is helpful for a teacher to target students with positive attitudes because those students are open to new information as they believe that the new information will benefit them. On the other hand students with negative attitudes toward education will block any new information. These attitudes, as it is noted in the literature, and as an outcome of that study, are influenced by the parents' behaviour. The role of the teacher becomes more important to initiate positive attitudes when the home environment produces negative ones.

Another factor that had a major influence on students' academic achievement is the level of their educational aspirations. It is evident that high educational aspirations is a factor highly associated with academic self-concept. The targets students set for their future, especially for that age group, is something that defines the deter-

mination of the students. For the students to aspire a high educational level must be a basic school outcome and must be used as a means to increase students' motivation. We can conclude that high school achievement is a 'product' of high parental psychological support, low parental pressure, moderate amount of time monitoring, low amount of help, strong academic self-concept and high educational aspirations. School success begins at home as several educators noted throughout the centuries.

Gender Differences

Statistical analyses: The gender differences were studied by implementing two separate LISREL models, one for the males and one for the females. In addition t-test analyses were implemented to study the gender differences in all the variables of the study.

Results: For male students LISREL estimates revealed the same variables like in the holistic model, namely, academic self-concept (1.84), aspirations (1.30) and parental pressure (-1.04) as negative predictor. Pressure also affected males' aspirations (-.24) and attitude toward school (-.25) negatively. Again, psychological support was found to have small to moderate positive effects on attitude toward school (.20), academic self-concept (.24) and aspirations (.40). Within the parental behaviour variables monitoring was found to have moderate direct effect on achievement (.46), while help does not contribute to the males' model. From the motivational factors attitude toward school had small effects on academic self-concept (.25) and on aspirations (.28). Also academic self-concept had an effect on aspirations (.32) (*Figure 3*).

For female students, LISREL estimates revealed again the same predictors for female students' achievement but in a different weight. Parental pressure is a very strong negative predictor (-1.76) and much stronger than in the males' model. Academic self-concept (.96) and aspirations (.85) are also strong predictors but they have less effect on females' achievement than on males' achievement. Parental help had a significant negative effect on females' achievement (-.29), a path that was not significant in the males' model. Another path from the parental factors that differentiates between the males' and the females' model is the path from monitoring to achievement that is not significant for the males (.13). Psychological support had positive effect on academic self-concept (.24), attitude toward school (.26) and on aspirations (.37). Pressure had negative effect on attitude toward school (-.34), on aspirations (-.19) and on academic self-concept (.21). Attitude toward school had an effect on academic self-concept (.35) and on aspirations (.19), (*Figure 4*).




Figure 3: Male's LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood), standard deviation, and residuals. N=740. Dependent variable: Academic achievement. R²=45. PRS: Parental pressure; SUP: Psychological support; MON: Time monitoring; HLP: Help; ATS: Attitude toward school; ASC: Academic self-concept; ASP: Educational aspirations; ACH: Academic achievement.




Figure 4: Females' LISREL Estimates (Maximum Likelihood), standard deviation, and residuals. N=740. Dependent variable: Academic achievement. R=40 PRS: Parental pressure; SUP: Psychological support; MON: Time monitoring; HLP: Help; ATS: Attitude toward school; ASC: Academic self-concept; ASP: Educational aspirations; ACH: Academic achievement.

T-test analyses revealed that males receive more pressure from their parents than females ($g=-.59$), while female students were found to have higher attitude toward school ($g=-.22$), educational aspirations ($g=-.20$) and academic achievement ($g=-.31$). A very interesting finding is that parental expectations are not different for the two groups (*Table 3*).

Table 3

STUDENT T-TEST ANALYSES AND EFFECT SIZE FOR GENDER
DIFFERENCES POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE

Construct/ group	N	Mean	Standard deviation	t-value	Two tail probability	Effect Size (g)
<i>Parental pressure</i>						
Males	291	2.84	.52			
Females	444	2.51	.54	8.06	.000	.59
<i>Psychological support</i>						
Males	291	3.88	.41			
Females	444	3.91	.02	-.92	.358	-.08
<i>Help</i>						
Males	288	2.85	.78			
Females	444	2.87	.77	-.31	.760	-.02
<i>Press for intellectual development</i>						
Males	291	2.98	.61			
Females	444	2.93	.71	1.03	.304	.08
<i>Monitoring</i>						
Males	288	2.71	.62			
Females	443	2.61	.64	2.05	.040	.15
<i>Academic self concept</i>						
Males	295	3.23	.47			
Females	444	3.11	.50	3.00	.002	.23
<i>Attitude toward school</i>						
Males	287	3.30	.54			
Females	440	3.41	.49	-2.84	.005	-.22

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Educational aspirations

Males	287	3.76	.70			
Females	442	3.89	.64	-2.50	.014	-.20

Career expectations

Males	286	76.03	19.40			
Females	434	74.47	18.80	1.08	.283	.08

Parents' expectations

Males	196	3.59	.97			
Females	350	3.56	.83	.43	.67	.04

Academic achievement

Males	295	15.33	2.47			
Females	444	16.10	2.45	-4.13	.000	-.31

Discussion: Data analyses revealed a differential pattern between male and female students, supporting the study's theoretical suppositions of gender differences. T-test analyses revealed that males receive more pressure than the females. This finding is in accord with the studies of Campbell and Wu (1994), and Flouris *et al.* (1994). The difference in parental behaviour is a socialization pattern that pressure males to do better in their school work and to get into higher education. Even though females receive less pressure parental behaviour influences them more than males. Differences on the effect of parental behaviour were also found on time monitoring, where for males monitoring had a moderate effect on their achievement and no effect for the females' achievement. Also, parental help had no effect for males while for females it had a moderate negative effect on their achievement. These findings tell us that parental behaviour has a differential effect on the two groups possibly because those groups receive differential socialization.

Self-concept measures revealed differences between males and females. Even though females were found to have higher academic achievement, males have higher scores of academic self-concept than females - a pattern that agrees with several researchers (Byrne and Shavelson, 1987; Byrne, Shavelson, and Marsh, 1992; Calsyn and Kenny, 1977; Haslett, 1976; Kelly and Jordan, 1990; Marsh *et al.*, 1988; O'Malley and Bachman, 1982). Academic self-concept as LISREL estimates found is much more important for males than for females. It is possible that for the age of the respondents females are more mature than the males and self-concept plays a different role for them. As previous researchers found (Campbell and Koutsoulis, 1995; Haladyna and Thomas, 1979; Whaley-Klahn *et al.*, 1976) females had a more favourable attitude toward school than males.

Finally, gender differences were found in students' educational aspirations, with females having significantly higher scores. This finding is in accord with Stone (1988), Kysel *et al.* (1992), and Solorzano (1992) and it shows the transition of Cypriot society to the modern world. This can be explained as a change in society where women can no longer accept being housewives. Female high school students may see education as a way of attaining a better job. Another parallel finding that is interesting for the Cypriot society is that parents have equal expectations for both male and female children to continue their studies after high school.

Setting of Residential Area

Statistical Analyses: For the study of the differences between urban and rural students t-test analyses were employed.

Results: T-test analyses revealed few differences between the two groups. The differences were found on students' aspirations measures on their parents' SES and on their academic achievement. Rural area students had lower educational aspirations ($g=.20$), and career expectations ($g=.33$) where the gap between those groups was even greater for their parents' expectations ($g=.43$). Rural students SES was found to be much lower than their urban schoolmates ($g=.86$). Finally, rural students' had lower academic achievement ($g=.21$) (Table 4).

Table 4

STUDENT T-TEST ANALYSES AND EFFECT SIZE FOR SETIING
OF RESIDENTIAL AREA DIFFERENCES
POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE

Construct/ group	N	Mean	Standard deviation	t-value	Two-tail probability	Effect Size (g)
<i>Parental pressure</i>						
Urban	524	2.62	.58			
Rural	215	2.70	.50	1.89	.059	.07
<i>Psychological support</i>						
Urban	524	3.90	.38			
Rural	215	3.86	.44	.87	.384	.07
<i>Help</i>						
Urban	520	2.85	.76			
Rural	214	2.88	.76	-.56	.573	-.05

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Press for intellectual development

Urban	520	2.97	.65			
Rural	215	2.89	.70	1.45	.148	.12

Monitoring

Urban	519	2.6	.64			
Rural	216	2.73	.62	-2.07	.039	.17

Academic self concept

Urban	524	3.18	.49			
Rural	215	3.11	.49	1.73	.040	.14

Attitude toward school

Urban	520	2.88	.54			
Rural	214	2.98	.51	-2.13	.033	-.18

Educational aspirations

Urban	521	3.86	.68			
Rural	216	3.75	.68	2.44	.015	.20

Career expectations

Urban	515	75.22	15.78			
Rural	209	69.53	18.30	4.19	.000	.33

Parents' expectations

Urban	377	3.68	.86			
Rural	171	3.30	.88	4.71	.000	.43

Socioeconomic status

Urban	523	53.06	20.67			
Rural	216	36.96	17.01	10.12	.000	.86

Academic achievement

Urban	523	15.94	2.47			
Rural	216	15.42	2.51	2.59	.010	.21

Discussion: A result that agrees with the findings of Frese *et al.* (1979) and McCracken and Barcinas (1989), is that students that reside in urban areas of Cyprus have higher educational aspirations from the students that reside in the rural areas. The difference even factors positively. Time monitoring had a moderate positive effect on achievement and parental help had a moderate negative effect on achievement. It was found that males receive higher amounts of pressure than females, but pressure was more harmful for females' achievement than for males. Males also had a higher academic self-concept, even though females had higher grades, and academic self-concept was more important for males' achievement

than for females'. Females were found to have higher educational aspirations, bigger on students' occupational expectations and their parents' expectations. One can conclude from this that the students that reside in the rural areas do not have equal opportunities with the students that reside in the cities. Flouris (1989) found in his study in Greece that for rural people education was for their children, the only way out of the painful rural life and poverty. Today, though, this might not be the case because the economic situation is better than in the past. Rural people do not live under the economic insecurity of the past and is possible that rural youths face their occupational future in the rural areas more positively, due to the unemployment of university graduates. On the contrary that reality is in accord with Mylonas' (1982) position that the blockade of the rural area students from higher studies is due to the physical distance from the urban centre and as a consequence affects negatively their aspirations. As one can see from *Table 4* the differences found on students' aspirations can be due to the huge SES difference between urban and rural people or their parents' expectations.

Socioeconomic Status

Statistical Analyses: For the differences between low and high SES Student t-test analyses were used.

Results: In the study of the SES measures that is the average of parents' education, occupation and income, it was found that high SES students get a higher amount of parental psychological support ($g=.26$) and help ($g=.36$). Parental pressure and monitoring was not found to be different for the two groups. High SES students were also found to have higher academic self-concept ($g=.39$) and academic achievement (.44). High SES students were also found to be in a better position in all aspirations measures (educational aspirations $g=.76$, career expectations $g=.44$, and parents' expectation $g=.77$), (*Table 5*).

Discussion: T-test analyses revealed that parental behaviour differs referring to SES index. High SES parents provide more psychological support and help to their children. From previous analyses we see that psychological support was an important factor influencing students' motivation. One can conclude that high SES parents, because of their educational level, can provide more support to their children. The fact that high SES parents help their children more than the low SES is something that we cannot comment on because of the limitation of the study that measured only the amount of help and not the quality.

Table 5
 STUDENT T-TEST ANALYSES AND EFFECT SIZE FOR
 SOCIOECONOMIC STATUS DIFFERENCES
 POOLED VARIANCE ESTIMATE CONSTRUCT/ GROUP

Construc/ group	N	Mean	Standard deviation	t-value	Two-tail probability	Effect Size (g)
<i>Parental pressure</i>						
High SES	371	2.59	.56			
Low SES	367	2.69	.47	-2.26	.024	-.17
<i>Psychological support</i>						
High SES	371	3.95	.39			
Low SES	367	3.85	.41	3.45	.001	.26
<i>Help</i>						
High SES	369	3.00	.70			
Low SES	364	2.73	.79	4.90	.000	.36
<i>Press for intellectual development</i>						
High SES	369	3.08	.63			
Low SES	365	2.81	.68	5.49	.000	.41
<i>Monitoring</i>						
High SES	369	2.65	.65			
Low SES	365	2.66	.62	-.24	.810	-.02
<i>Academic self-concept</i>						
High SES	371	3.26	.50			
Low SES	367	3.07	.49	5.30	.000	.39
<i>Attitude toward school</i>						
High SES	370	2.93	.54			
Low SES	363	2.90	.52	.79	.431	.06
<i>Educational aspirations</i>						
High SES	369	4.09	.57			
Low SES	367	3.60	.70	10.31	.000	.76
<i>Career expectations</i>						
High SES	362	77.39	15.30			
Low SES	361	69.76	17.2	6.28	.000	.44
<i>Parents' expectations</i>						
High SES	274	3.88	.79			
Low SES	274	3.25	.85	9.02	.000	.77
<i>Academic achievement</i>						
High SES	370	16.29	2.37			
Low SES	368	15.29	2.50	5.53	.000	.41

Another important outcome that is derived from the present study, is that high SES children have higher educational aspirations than the children from low SES families. It is possible, as Pirgiotakis (1996) and Frangudaki (1985) noted, that the parents are those that determine the boundaries of their children's aspirations through their own expectations for them. Finally, high SES students were found to have higher academic self-concept and achievement than low SES students. Beyond the difference on SES, that is something stable within the home environment, those differences can be due to differential parental behaviour of high versus low SES parents.

Final Conclusions

The first major conclusion extracted from the statistical analyses is the influence of the home behavioural and physical environment on high school students' achievement. Parental behaviour seem to differentiate for males and females and also operates differently with respect to the family's SES. Those differences can be due to differential socialization (Campbell, 1994) or can be due to the educational level of the parents. Either way what is important for students' development and academic success is the positive part of parental behaviour, namely, psychological support. As was extracted from the statistical analyses pressure not only harms students' achievement but also the motivational factors that have being studied in the present research. Antithetically, psychological support had positive effects on the motivational measures of the students.

In the present age group, teenagers might react to pressure by not doing what parents tell them to do. It is also possible that parents have the will to help their children to do well in school and they simply believe that increasing pressure can force their children do well in school. It can also be true that parents exert pressure on their children because that was the way they had been *treated* from their parents. It is also possible that when parents press their children to excel in school at the same time they take the responsibility for school work away from their children. Because of the developmental sensitivity of that age group the effort of the parents to intervene and control their childrens' behaviour not only is unsuccessful but also produces negative results. The students need their parents' support and that means that parents must trust them and provide them anything they need for their school duties. It is possibly very useful for the children to know that their parents are there if they need them. Additionally, as it was derived from the analyses, parental help had a negative effect on females; academic self-concept and achievement. Within the same framework, parental help might replace students' responsibility, especially when that help replaces students' efforts too.

It is, therefore, important for the parents to provide a positive environment for their children, not only when they attend high school but from the early years of their lives. When the child begins the school positively, the self-concept is positive and

can continue through the school positively. A positive home environment also helps the students to have a positive attitude toward the school and academic self-concept. High academic self-concept helps the students to aspire to a high educational level. That whole circle of family and school related emotions improves students achievement and increases the chances of success in the future. It is also possible that academic success can give a positive feed-back to that family-school circle and strengthen it even more. We can conclude that everything begins at home, without of course removing the responsibility of the teachers. Teachers are equally responsible with the parents in order to work and nurture students' self-perceptions, improve their attitude toward school and aspire a more ambitious career, especially when home environment does not provide those motivational benefits. The major difference though, between parents and teachers is that parents can help their children individually but teachers usually have to deal with large groups of students with tremendous individual differences.

Another responsibility of the teachers, educators and school administrators is to find ways to persuade parents that excessive pressure always reduces students' achievement and motivation, and that students need high levels of psychological support in order to succeed in school. The findings of the study suggest that educators must consider the establishment of closer relationship with parents. Teachers can provide parents with information on which parental behaviour is the most effective regarding students' school performance and motivation.

It is evident that children that reside in the cities and come from families with high SES index have higher educational aspirations and academic achievement from the children that reside in rural areas and come from low SES families, a fact that tends to preserve the social classification in Cyprus society. That finding supports Mylonas' (1982) and Tzani's (1983) position that academic success is a subject of social class.

A major question arising from this research study is if parents from low SES and from rural areas, or all parents, can really help their children to succeed in school and who can help them on that issue. The answer we believe is very obvious: low SES and rural parents can be provided with such guidance. That responsibility belongs to the educational system. The problem is whether educators and those who are able to influence educational legislation are willing to contribute to this and abandon the advantage that their own children have over the low SES and the rural children.

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'HERSTORY': THE MISSING WOMAN OF CYPRUS

Myria Vassiliadou

Abstract

The following article is concerned with the contemporary issue of feminist history, a relatively neglected topic in women's studies, which has received increasing attention in the last few years. A scholarly paper has rarely been published on Cypriot women's history, which is the aim of this work. It is not this paper's objective to give a detailed theoretical analysis of the issue but rather a descriptive account of "hidden" lives.

Introduction

"In the end, it boils down to this: is one prepared to break with tradition, to be 'unhistorical' in order to make history, or not?"

Cyprus is said to be the island of Aphrodite, the ancient Goddess of love and beauty. It says so on postcards and tourist information leaflets given to millions of tourists from all over the world. The name is used in advertising campaigns for wine, for restaurants, and also as a brand name for shoes and clothing. Cyprus is female, and so is its Goddess. Its name is exploited commercially, as is the island.

A number of articles and books, of political, social or journalistic nature describe Cyprus as the *raped island*, the *oppressed beauty of the Mediterranean sea*, the *victimised beauty*, due to its continual invasion by foreign rulers – all explained by the island's size and strategic geographical location. Therefore, Cyprus has been invaded, raped, and oppressed, just as many women in the world argue they have been. It is relatively insignificant in world politics. It is financially and military dependent on bigger, more powerful states. It is always under threat due to its geographical location and the expansionist tendencies of its neighbours; fragile, hanging by the thread. Yes, Cyprus may be a woman. It is prohibited from having a voice and struggling to exist and be accounted for. This is not a personal claim. This is a constant complaint by its people and by the almost all-male government. Its leaders are men, its social system patriarchal and sexist, and yet, a parallel has never been drawn between the two – the country and the woman – by these authoritative

rulers. Ironically, the same rulers who voice these apparent inequalities over Cyprus' international position, are the same rulers who are still far from ensuring women's equality and safety through the legal system. They are the same rulers who hand out government application forms for posts in the civil service on which one's father's name and occupation must be stated along with other information, but nothing concerning the mother.

On my identity card there is the name and surname of my father and following that, the name and maiden surname of my mother. As a thirteen year old and naive young woman I concluded from the above, and thousands of other examples, that as a person, I belonged first to the state, then to my father and then to my mother who in turn belonged to her father – I assumed that he, in turn belonged to his father. It did not occur to me at the time that I could actually be a person in my own right. It did occur to me though that if I had ever had to go through childbirth, I would have expected such documents to be primarily concerned with me. Consequently, my identity card has always been a problem to me.

When I was at high school, all the female students had to take the home economics class. We were taught how to cook, make cakes and sew as well as embroider, in order to grow up 'and be proper women, able to look after our house, our husbands and our families.' These were the constant words of my high school home economics female teacher. The male students had to take carpentry and learn other practical skills necessary for a 'man.' So, when a young boy – aged 13 – asked to take home economics classes as he loved cooking, the school authorities refused to let him, despite the fact that carpentry and home economics classes took place – 'conveniently' – at the same time. In fact, the boy was laughed at and talked about by other students and teachers. I was one of those students although I recall feeling that I had to laugh but did not really know the reason why.

I am a Cypriot woman. I was born in Cyprus and I have spent most of my life here. I have also had the opportunity to live abroad, study abroad and experience different cultures and ideas. I am a Cypriot woman and because of that I feel the need to understand my society, and people's perception and attitudes. I feel the need to understand why I am always placed second, or I am non-existent in any given list.

Methodological Concerns

"If we continue to speak this sameness, if we speak to each other as men have spoken for centuries, as they have taught us to speak, we will fail each other. Again ... words will pass through our bodies, above our heads, disappear, make us disappear."²

In order to try and understand the Cypriot woman of today, her attitudes and perceptions, we have to go back in time and trace the complex antecedents of her

social historical background. Histories have always tended to be stylised and have concentrated on elites and the dominant groups in any particular society. The whole discourse of history is a site of power and resistance. Historians have been so concerned with recording the passage of power and authority throughout the centuries, that the outcome of their work has preserved the patriarchal structures of the societies they studied. Women have predominantly been excluded, ignored or simply mentioned in the background of any given period. In *Northanger Abbey* Jane Austen has her heroine complain about history books being full of "the quarrels of popes and kings, with wars and pestilence in every page; the men also good for nothing, and hardly any women at all." History is written by men (of the dominant class and race) and women have systematically been excluded as *agents of knowledge*.³ Writing in 1972, Anna Davin motivated women to study their own history "for by showing that the role and nature changes with each society we are helping to defeat the argument 'that's how it's always been.'"⁴ It is only through showing that a woman's role is socially constructed "and rooted in a specific historical context, rather than natural and universal, could feminism hope to argue that it was open to change."⁵

June Purvis explains how the publication of Sheila Rowbotham's book, in 1973, *Hidden from History: 300 Years of Women's Oppression and the Fight Against It*, has been followed by "an outpouring of publications making visible women's lives in the past, some of these accounts being more explicitly feminist than others."⁶ Women have been totally 'hidden' from Cypriot history and it is only through reading between the lines of textbooks by eminent male historians that even superficial information on their existence surfaces. Ironically, there has not yet been any single academic publication on the Cypriot woman from a historical perspective – least of all from a feminist perspective. It is therefore important to at least try and examine briefly the thousands of years of history of the Cypriot people in order to understand the "other," the woman. It is important to try and tell 'herstory' rather than 'history.' According to Natalie Davies the aim of telling this feminist story is to comprehend the "significance of the sexes, of gender groups in the historical past. Our goal is to discover the range in sex roles and in sexual symbolism in different societies and periods, to find out what meaning they had and how they functioned to maintain the social order or to promote its change."⁷ This is an extremely difficult task: "so long as a woman lives the life of the past she can never come into conflict with history. But no sooner does she begin to deviate, however slightly, from a cultural trend that has dominated the past than she encounters the full weight of historical inertia, and this unexpected shock may injure her"⁸

Due to the majority of Cypriots' identification with the Greek people and culture, and the lack of academic analysis until very recently, the literature and research covering Greece seems immediately to be applied to the island.⁹ Mavratsas, for example, gives a very interesting sociocultural perspective of the Greek and Greek

Cypriot economic ethos which he names the 'hellenic' ethos. This is well justified for the sake of his analysis but it is important to realise that the different historical experience of the two countries result in obvious differences in attitudes and perceptions of the people. This is especially so in the case of women who had no voice in the thousands of years of history. By looking at a number of historical textbooks and the first relevant article – published in booklet form in 1995 by Mary Pyrgos,¹⁰ I wish to give a brief picture both of Cyprus and of the Cypriot people, *with a particular emphasis on women*. It is not my intention to give an extensive theoretical framework of the history of women in Cyprus; thus, the following paper is a descriptive rather than theoretical/analytical account of what limited materials already exist, which aims at identifying important trends. The paper can indeed be criticised for not challenging the use of concepts developed to explore society from a masculinist perspective since it does not question as such existing methodology and the foundations of existing theoretical frameworks. Knowledge about women is basically added to the knowledge about men. Nevertheless, such research might be argued to be necessary in the context of Cyprus because up to the present day only men have been investigated and thus we need data about women too. In fact, feminist scholarship in Cyprus is such a new field that this is the only immediate way at the moment, for women to gain some access to men's academic world, just as second-wave feminists started off some time ago in Europe and the United States. I am therefore well aware of the limitations of this kind of work which does not strictly adhere to the whole philosophy and ethos of feminist principles. However, I see this piece of work as an encouragement, a starting point for the development of a *feminist* perspective within the academic life in Cyprus. My emphasis on the term 'feminist' (simply to point out the obvious) is necessary since not all work on women is feminist and thus "the claim that research on women is conducted with a feminist perspective can be made only when the methods applied do in fact reflect women's experiences which undoubtedly will vary"¹¹ Thus, the present paper could create a possible problem for some feminists as to whether it should be included in the definition of 'feminist work.' But I feel that in this particular context it is a start, and is a way of demonstrating how women are denied equal opportunities and are discriminated against and for this it should ideally be regarded as promoting positive change. It thus has political implications for the life of women in Cyprus and it is aimed at acknowledging and pointing out their oppression. For this reason, I consider this to be a feminist account.

Cyprus' unique position at a cross-roads between three continents, its size and greatly diverse history of peoples throughout the centuries have had an immense and irreversible impact on Cypriot life and social structure as it stands today. At the same time, Cyprus has been a very isolated place and it is only very recently that further access to the means of communication and transportation has began to change this situation. This uniqueness expresses itself in an extraordinary blend of the East with the West, an internalisation of opposing values, contradicting morali-

ties and a confused perception of the people's identity and culture. In fact, it seems that "the Greek culture has an essentially masculine character ... (that) exhibits certain peculiarities which can easily confuse the social scientist who approaches them with a western theoretical apparatus."¹² A different approach seems therefore to be necessary, not just in terms of Western/Middle-Eastern (thus cultural) point of view but most importantly, from the point of view of women. This point of view does not imply the generalisation of the universality of feminist ways of knowing which I see as inherently perspectival and culture-bound. Feminism is indeed a general theory of the oppression of women by men - a universal theory but a contradictory one at the same time. Although feminists disagree on the uniformity of women's oppression, "without some element of universality there can be no feminism."¹³

While reading the vast amount of literature on feminist concerns, I was confronted with extreme isolation because the 'different contexts' of women in 'my world' were not included since feminists are only now beginning to realise the implications and heterogeneity 'of the condition of being a woman.'¹⁴ Cypriot women do not appear to fit into the Euroamerican feminist writings. Neither are they a part of Third World feminism or Middle Eastern (mostly Islamic-concentrated) analyses of the situation of women. Since Cypriot women have been under the influence of various rulers and invaders,¹⁵ this has resulted in both insecurity and immense confusion concerning their identity, values and beliefs. In fact, it was not until 1960 that Cyprus achieved independence and even after that, a number of political problems which resulted in the Turkish invasion of 1974 created further imbalance in the workings of the society in terms of social structure and collective identity. Understanding the uniqueness and peculiarities of the Cypriot women's situation and attempting to explain it, is necessary for their self-development but also vital towards their struggle to acquire a voice.

The Historical Background

Early times

"But who, if it comes to that, has fully realised that history is not contained in thick books but lives in our very blood?"¹⁷

The first traces of life in Cyprus can be dated back to the 7th millennium BC, beginning with the Neolithic Age (7000-5300BC) and later the Chalcolithic Age(4000-2500 BC). A number of archaeological excavations have exposed a wealth of artefacts, which illustrate the various stages of the development of the Cypriot civilisation. Nevertheless, information of life in early Cyprus, while receiving a lot of attention, is extremely limited and even more so on the life of Cypriot women of the time and it is only certain anthropological studies that offer some light on the subject. Many details of women's lives have simply been lost with the passage of

time. According to Mary Pyrgos,

"The purpose of life of every woman at the time was to survive and propagate the species ... the figurines of pregnant women ... reinforce the view the sexuality and the rituals surrounding it played an important role in Neolithic Cyprus ... Children ... belonged to the mothers and until 8000BC are known by the name of the mother."¹s

During the Bronze Ages-early, middle and late (2500 -1050BC) when the people from Anatolia first arrived on the island, part of the population worked in copper mines and the majority in pottery making, animal breeding, agriculture, weaving. It seems that most of these tasks were done by women. Further on, evidence from the period suggests that:

'The island had a matriarchal system which flourished in the year 2000BC ... It is a fact that a number of findings, myths and information from texts support this view. We do however encounter some elements of a patriarchal system as well. We cannot therefore claim that in Cyprus existed a matriarchal system exactly opposite to the patriarchal. We can assume however, that women and men lived peacefully together and developed in parallel without oppressing each other in a society where the principle of equality of sexes still prevailed. We can also accept that women at the time were greatly respected and that their role in society and the economy was highly significant."¹s

Women of the time had a dominant presence in temples and gave their names to Cypriot cities. According to sources that seem to vary in terms of agreement, Kitium was named after the Princess Kition, the city of Paphos after the amazon Paphos, Amathus got its name from Queen Amathusia, and the current capital of Cyprus, Nicosia was named after the nymph Leucothea.

During the latter part of the Bronze Age, in the 12th century BC, the Achaeans began to emigrate to Cyprus. With their arrival, they established a patriarchal system or Patriarchy. There were now fewer female idols than male ones. According to information drawn especially from myths of the time, the new leadership condemned free sexual relations and imposed the importance of the virginity of a woman and her subservience to man. Monogamy was established and the tradition of succession of power which passed from mother priestess to daughter changed.

"In Cyprus, though the supremacy of Zeus [father of the Gods] was accepted, the Minoan tradition of mother-goddess was continued and found its supreme in Aphrodite - the goddess of fertility, of love both pure and carnal, and, of course -, beauty. Poetic fantasy wants Aphrodite born of the foam of the sea."²⁰

Sacrifices made at the Temple of Aphrodite in Paphos included only male animals. The initiates of these rituals, by paying a coin, were given a lump of salt and

aphallus.²¹

During the Cypro-Geometric period (1050-750BC), further numbers of Greek-speaking invaders, now armed with iron weapons, followed in the wake of the Myceneans. This period saw the rise of the first ancient kingdoms, which was followed by an obscure time, when there was a virtual blank in the history of the island, known as the *dark ages*. By the 9th century a Phoenician colony was established on the island. The Phoenicians brought with them the alphabet, which was being used by the Greek-speaking settlers in less than a century.

During the Cypro-Archaic Period (750-475BC), the Assyrians, the Egyptians and the Persians ruled Cyprus successively. In this period, the chastity of women was promoted and their overall position in society deteriorated even more. Any involvement in public life was unacceptable and women worked as weavers but also guest house owners, midwives, entertainers, paid mourners, companions, prostitutes and last but certainly not least, slaves. An extraordinary succession of Near Eastern Empires marked the island during this period. Assyrian rule was replaced by that of Egypt and then that of Persia, whose domination ended when Alexander the Great, under the support of the Cypriot kings conquered the Persian Empire.

This was soon to become also the end of the Cypro-Classical Period (475-325BC). Alexander gave a decisive impetus to the growth of civilisation.

"... by the planned cities built along his route, with market places, theatres, schools, etc. By the improvement of harbours and transport and the opening up of new roads and by creating monetary unity facilitated both the movements of trade and of people. The Greek language, developed into a great instrument of expression, ... became the vehicle for the movement of ideas which percolated throughout the conquered regions and stabbed beyond them into surrounding barbarism."²²

Information like this should nevertheless be treated with extreme caution.

"Ancient texts give more information about the life of Cypriot women in the classical era but contemporaries who write the history of women should examine this information very carefully and cautiously. The patriarchal authors wrote only the history of men, and they mention only what is important to them as men. The history of women and their role in society was either hushed up or distorted. That is why it is not strange that the information we have on women in ancient Cyprus is so sparse."²³

According to writings of the time, marriage continued to be regarded as the purpose of women of the period. Marriages were arranged by the father, who selected their daughters' husbands - especially within the upper classes - according to their tribe and social class. Similar to today's patriarchal double standards, women were then expected to remain faithful to their husbands but men were free to have

mistresses. The important King of Salamis Evagoras I and his son Onesillus or Evagoras II for example, were murdered on their way to visit their mistresses (374/373 BC). During that period, respect towards women was very low, so having children, and especially sons, protected women's position within society. " For this reason, all married women wanted to have children; but there is no way of knowing if the maternal instinct was highly developed."²⁴

During the Hellenistic Period (325-30BC), which started with the death of Alexander the Great, Cyprus became involved in struggles among his generals over the division of his empire. Throughout these conflicts, many of the cities were destroyed and their kings were imprisoned or executed. The Ptolemies were now in control of the island, which became part of the Hellenistic State of Egypt. As part of the Kingdom of Egypt, Cyprus became culturally and artistically oriented towards the Hellenistic world. Aphrodite remained the most important of the god(desse)s and the Great Mother Goddess continued also to be worshipped as Astarte (an earlier form is Isis-Aphrodite).²⁵ Nevertheless, the Ptolemies maintained "harems" with hundreds of concubines, and encouraged "dissolution in love ... and voluptuousness and exhibitionism among the women of the ruling class."²⁶ According to Pyrgos, the queens of this period were dynamic and determined. "They stood by their king husbands as equals, they were worshipped like goddesses, they fought like the men and if necessary they even defied death."²⁷ As an example of a prominent woman of the period she gives Queen Axiothea, wife of Nicocles, King of Paphos. She points out that these of course were the exception and that the majority of women had to struggle in order to survive in a world that belonged to men. However, Alastos explains that when Ptolemy decided to murder Nicocles, the latter demanded to be heard in his defence and as he was given no hearing, he killed himself.

" Queen Axiothea informed of her husband's death, killed her daughters to save them from falling into the hands of the enemy and persuaded the wives of the king's brothers to commit suicide with herself."²⁸

It seems, thus, that Pyrgos regards being helpless and powerless, unable to voice an opinion and having absolutely no other choice but to commit suicide as a sign of women being determined and dominant. Sensitivity to feminist principles and ideas is absent and stereotyping of the definition of power, determination and courage is obvious in this account of women's history which cannot be considered to be feminist. However, it is Alastos who seems to sum up the circumstances under which the Cypriot woman lived:

" The woman was very much the household slave as in all Greece."²⁹

The Romans and the Rest

In the year 30BC, Cyprus came under the Roman Empire as part of the Province

of Syria: this was the beginning of the Roman Period (30BC-AD330). Roman rule in Cyprus was established in its final form in 22BC, when Octavian, now the Emperor Augustus, transferred the island to the rule of the Senate. That was the beginning of a long period of uninterrupted peace. It was also a time when women walked freely in the streets (accompanied by servants the number of whom was determined by the law, depending on the women's social status), attended public spectacles and visited the public baths. However, they were treated as minors by the law, but gained a certain amount of social respect upon marriage. Consequently their parents hurried to marry them off at a very early age. The choice of a husband for the daughter depended on the former's social class and, as Pyrgos explains, Romans could not marry a Cypriot, but could live with her. As for the woman herself, again, she had no say. Pyrgos states that before the marriage ceremony, a woman had to visit the Temple of Priapus in order to symbolically offer her virginity. Furthermore, divorce was easy to obtain for men, who were actually encouraged in this way to abandon their wives and keep concubines. She also informs us that

"In 212 AD, the Emperor Caracalla, (with the *Constitutio Antoniniana*) under the guidance of his mother made all the citizens of the Empire equal. Romans and slaves now had the status of the roman citizen. This law was a decisive one for Cypriot women ... patrician women in Cyprus participated in decision making. Apollonia, who lived in the 2nd century AD and Cornelia Nike were well known for their philanthropy. The latter was also famous for her efforts to free slaves."

June Hannah explains how philanthropy has long been recognised as an arena which middle class women made their own. "As a voluntary activity, and one which required caring qualities, it was seen as a suitable outlet for women's desire to do something useful with their lives for the good of a wider community."³⁰

It was during the Roman Period, in the beginning of the third century that Paphos and other cities, particularly Salamis, suffered extensive damage from an earthquake. Cyprus, with its people stricken by poverty, war, earthquakes, drought but also the decline of morality, was already getting ready for the advent of the new religion which was to change the history of the island and the attitudes of its people irreversibly. The inauguration of Constantinople as capital of the Roman Empire in AD 330, marked the beginning of the Byzantine Period (AD330-1453). By that time, the majority of the inhabitants of the island had become Christians, so the transition to the new order was relatively smooth. Constantine brought with him a more moral and humanitarian world than his Roman predecessor. Based on Christian ideals, he restricted the absolute power that the father had over his children; furthermore, he abolished concubines, thus giving a new status to women. Pyrgos, nevertheless, suggests that this promotion of equality of the sexes was soon to disappear and was substituted by patriarchal thinking. She says that the Church in collaboration with the state promoted rules, which only humiliated women. It seems, thus, that

Byzantine rule was full of contradictions and double standards concerning women. With the complete regulation of social life,

"the son had to follow his father's profession ... the law forbade parents to sell their children...women's rights were advanced. A widow had the right to raise her own children and a wife the right of property equal to her dowry."³¹

It was nevertheless women who substituted donkeys and camels in mountainous areas as porters. Furthermore, the puritanical Byzantine society exorcised anything that the Goddess Aphrodite stood for and dancing, pleasure and enjoyment became sins.

From the middle of the seventh century until the second half of the tenth century, Cyprus was to undergo a series of invasions, beginning with the Arab invasion in AD 649 under Muawiya. In 688 Emperor Justinian II and Caliph Adbel Malik agreed to demilitarise the island and share the taxes extracted from the mixed communities of Muslims and Christians. A succession of *naval* battles and raids between the Byzantine Empire and the Caliphate bring Cyprus to AD 965 when the Byzantine Emperor Nicephoros Phocas was able to reoccupy Cyprus. This marked the Second Byzantine Period AD 965-1191 in Cyprus which was to witness a very rigid tax collection but also a firm government and numerous building programmes, mainly of Orthodox churches and monasteries. Their astonishing elegance alone assured that this was one of the greatest periods of Cypriot history. It was again during this period that two female role models came into existence. One was that of the Virgin Mary. She was interpreted to stand for motherhood, subservience, morality. The other was of the sinful Eve-the seducer, immoral, and valueless. However,

"... both central female figures in the Bible, Eve as well as Mary, are associated with myths concerning the potency of the male creative force. Since the sole creative principle of the universe in the Bible is male, it is not surprising that woman, man, and the son of God, central figures in the divine plan of the universe, are all created by male forces."³²

There were thus only two realistic roles for women to choose from. They had to follow one or the other and live with the implications of their 'choice.' Diversity and freedom of expression were totally denied and as Simone de Beauvoir explains in *the Second Sex*, it is not "reality that dictates to society or to individuals their choice between the two opposed basic categories; in every period, in each case, society and the individual decide in accordance with their needs. Very often they project into the myth adopted by the institutions and values to which they adhere."ss In this case, it was the Church that promoted these images, and misogyny was thus encouraged. Thus, it was only through marriage and children that women felt they could gain respect within a society that relegated them to the back of the house.

Women of the time found strength in Christianity but also in legends such as that

of Regina. Regina was the utopian third choice. The one to exist only in legends but never in reality. The ultimate dream. She was a legendary powerful woman capable of almost everything. She is described in myths of the time riding her horse, building castles and palaces, defending the powerless. According to the legend, she constantly and stubbornly refused to give into Digenis's - the legendary hero who represents men and masculinity - advances. She was a 'complete' woman but also had that times perceived masculine traits that allowed her to be anything she wanted. She represented the best of both worlds.

" Regina is wonderfully beautiful, kind, proud, hard and heartless, woman and goddess, the shadow that goes past our eyes, she glances at us for a moment and then she disappears in the wind or her underground palaces. She is a queen and a demon, an amazon and a woman, she is the Regina of Cyprus."³⁴

The triumph of the First Crusade at the end of the 11th century increased the prosperity of the island which benefited from the new markets for its produce on the coast of Palestine. Nevertheless, the military decline of the Byzantine Empire became obvious by the middle of the 12th century. Isaac Comnenus, one of the rulers of the Byzantine dynasty, took over the government of the island in 1184 and declared himself independent until 1191 when King Richard I (the Lionheart) of England defeated him and took possession of Cyprus. Richard married Berengaria of Navarre in Limassol, where she was crowned Queen of England. It was after this that Richard sold the island to the Knights Templars for 100000 dinars. A year later, in 1192 the Templars resold Cyprus to King Richard who transferred it at the same price to Guy of Lusignan.

This marked the beginning of the Lusignan Period (AD1192-1489) which was to last for three hundred years, impose the feudal system and maintain a regular succession of legitimate male heirs. There were occasional breaks in the dynastic succession, and queens became regents for minor heirs. Despite this, women played a prominent role throughout, which Hunt described as often domineering.³⁵ This period was crowded with historical events: numerous personalities appeared and many tragedies and conflicts took place. A complete new ecclesiastical establishment for Cyprus appeared whereby the Latin Church took over administration of the dioceses from the Greek Orthodox bishops. The Greek Orthodox Church was fanatically persecuted by the Latin Church, to which the Lusignans owed their allegiance. The Latin Church acquired great power and together with the state, they controlled society. Rules and laws were again characterised by double standards.³⁶ Adultery, for example was condemned, but numerous evidence from stories of the time, show how it was really accepted by society, a fact taken for granted, that only few women, such as Helena Palaeologina, confronted. Most of this information and stories of the period have been preserved by travellers. It was a traveller, for example, who explained that most women could play the spinet. Another explained how the

atmosphere of the country, due to its warm climate, encouraged hedonism and the majority of the people had extra-marital relationships. King John II for example had Marietta of Patras as a mistress and his wife, Helena Palaeologina was well aware of it. It was, in fact, Marietta de Patras who was the mother of James II (the Bastard), "loved and spoiled by his father when alive and his eventual successor."³⁷ Double standards and the Christian rulers, nevertheless, demanded that marriage and chastity remained the central concern of women's lives.

"Rapists were severely punished by the Assizes. If the rapist came from the same social class as the victim and her family accepted him, he was obliged to marry her. If he was not accepted by her family, the girl became a nun and the rapist had to pay the amount necessary for her to enter the convent."³⁸

Chastity and monogamy were indeed valued and respected. It is interesting here to mention Peter I, ruler of Cyprus as from 1358, who believed in the preaching of the Christian Church and who was the 'chosen instrument' to liberate the Holy Land. It was nevertheless the same man who, despite his marriage to Eleanor of Aragon, had numerous mistresses among whom, his favourite was Joanna l'Aleman.³⁹

Among the eminent women of the time was Queen Alice who became Regent of the Kingdom and guardian of her infant son. She held the regency with the assistance of her two brothers, Philip and John. There was also Queen Helena Palaeologina, mentioned above, who was Greek and became the second wife of King John II in 1441. According to Kleanthis Georgiades, "mostly serious developments of Cypriot history are connected with her."⁴⁰ Helena represented a symbol of national resurgence – her belonging to the Imperial family of Constantinople raised hopes for union with the Byzantium once more. She was devoutly Orthodox, well educated and spoke foreign languages fluently. She was an intellectual, famous for her energetic and ambitious nature, who went as far as to confront the Pope when she felt that she had to. Her daughter Charlotte, who also followed a pro-Greek policy, also showed the strength of character she had inherited from her mother and reigned Cyprus for six years. The next female ruler of Cyprus, and a greatly dominant figure in the political history of the island, was Caterina Cornaro. She was the daughter of the Venetian patrician Mark Cornaro and married James II. She remained Queen for fifteen years until 1489.

When James II and his son died in suspicious circumstances in 1474, they left the Lusignan line without a successor. This gave Venice, now at war with Turkey, the opportunity to intervene directly and seize the island for the defence of her eastern flank. This marked the beginning of the Venetian Period (1489-1571) which was characterised by the continual struggle of its rulers to prepare the island defences against the inevitable Ottoman invasion, which eventually took place in 1570 on the orders of Sultan Selim II. There appear to be no information about the life of women of that time apart from the fact that Caterina Cornaro died in Venice in 1510, still

bearing the title of Queen of Cyprus, Jerusalem and Armenia.⁴¹

Cyprus's entry into the Ottoman Period (AD 1571-1878) was a liberation for the bulk of the Greek Orthodox population who were relieved to get out of the oppressive feudal system and the authoritative administration. Serfdom was abolished and the rights of the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church gradually restored. However, there were serious and continual revolts against Ottoman rule later on, mainly as a result of harsh taxation.⁴² The most serious of these occurred in 1764 when Ghil Osman Agha was killed after more than doubling taxes. The rebellion, nevertheless, continued for another two years. Despite this, the Church acquired more and more political power⁴³ and had the authority to solve family differences amongst the Greek, Armenian, Maronite, and Latin citizens. The family problems of Ottomans married to Cypriot women were solved by the *Kadi*, in accordance with the Koran. Generally speaking, there was a very strong emphasis on religion by the people themselves who prayed, went on pilgrimages, made offerings and donated icons to the Church. The Orthodox Church was used by the Ottomans to control the Greek Cypriots. Thus, the Archbishop grew particularly influential and was the official representative of the Greek Cypriots and gradually gained the right to appoint the dragoman of the serai, who was the head of the civil service. Half a century after the murder of Ghil Osman, and after a series of revolts and hatred, in 1821, the High Porte brutally intervened to forestall support among Cypriots for the revolt against Ottoman rule in Greece. On the 9th of July – a historical landmark in Cypriot history, Archbishop Kyprianos was publicly hanged by the Turks, together with three other bishops. By the 14th of July, 470 citizens and mostly members of the clergy were killed.

According to Pyrgos, despite the wealth of texts written at the time, women were nowhere mentioned during the first two centuries of Ottoman rule. She finds that their position of the somewhat freer disappeared and women now felt totally oppressed in every sphere of their existence. "Society had crushed their spirit and their activities"⁴⁴ especially due to the Islamic Law – which was directly related to the Koran - and the Byzantine Ecclesiastical Law. It was only in rural areas where no Ottomans lived, that the Cypriot women initially continued to behave as before, but gradually their lives changed as well.

"Ottoman women, most of whom were Latin women who became Moslems, behaved like other Cypriot women. They appeared bareheaded and participated in social events. In time, however, urban Ottoman women withdrew into harems and were seldom seen out."⁴⁵

Cypriot society was influenced immensely by the three hundred years of Ottoman rule and the effects are still visible in 20th century attitudes and lifestyle. "Of all the periods of which there is historical record this is without doubt the unhappiest and least prosperous."⁴⁶ Similar to other circumstances of social

oppression or unrest, it was women who were victimised more than anyone. They were not allowed to say their opinion concerning their future partners and marriages were arranged by matchmakers. A precondition for marriage was the dowry provided by the bride, but also a brideprice from the groom which included the building of the house. The dowry issue often caused disputes which resulted in marriages or engagements being dissolved.⁴⁸ Christian or Muslim, they suffered and struggled their way though the whole of the Ottoman period, hiding away⁴⁷ unable to have a voice, living a life of misery where no self-expression apart from praying was allowed.

"Modern" Times

It was during this period, the latest part of the 19th century, that Russian encroachments on the Ottoman Empire began to alarm Britain as well as Turkey. Eventually, this resulted to the signing in 1878 of a defensive alliance between Britain and Turkey. Under the Cyprus Convention, Britain assumed administration of the island, which remained formally part of the Ottoman Empire. This marked the beginning of the British Period (1878-1960) – a crucial time for both the political but also the social history of the island. From this time onward, the hope of the Greek Cypriots for unification with Greece never dimmed and this is quite important to note for the further developments on the history of Cyprus.

The effects are strongly visible in the current social structure of the island in general, and in the position of women in particular. Pyrgos suggests that with the British rule came a new era for Cyprus. "The liberalism that blew from the West lifted Eastern despotism from the Cypriot people... The once locked doors of the houses now opened and women, timidly at first, and later more courageously, greeted the outside world with curiosity ... they were no longer as isolated as before".⁴⁹ She points out, however, that this new way of life influenced in the first three decades of the British rule only the women of the upper classes.⁵⁰ On the other hand, life for the vast majority of lower class women who lived predominately in rural areas had not changed especially due to major difficulties in the means of communication and transportation.

It was not until the outbreak of the First World War that Cyprus was actually annexed to the British Empire as before that, it was leased from Turkey on payment of an annual tribute. In 1925 it was formally declared a Crown Colony. Victorian values might have been indirectly imposed on the Cypriot women in the past but by this point the objectives of the suffragettes were still unheard of on the island.⁵¹ Neither women nor men received the right to vote for their rulers until 1960. Patriarchy and the consequent power relations at all levels prevailed. Western feminist researchers explain how the greatest influence on family life since the seventeenth century has been the institutionalisation of women's role as mothers and housewives: women were forced to obey their fathers, their husbands, their broth-

ers and the clergy. Their place was in the houses² and their sole purpose was still marriage, family and motherhood. Marital fidelity and devotion, purity and virginity were immediately associated with the health of the state and women had once more to bear the responsibility of it. Honour, and its social implications within the family, remained a crucial value in society.

"A man's honour, expressed primarily as manliness ... , basically entails ensuring the moral propriety of the members, and, especially the female members, of one's family ... A woman's honour, expressed as *ntrope* or sexual shame, revolves primarily around her sexual propriety. An honourable woman, thus, is, if married, one who is faithful to her husband; and, if single, one who maintains her virginity until marriage."⁵³

The Twentieth Century

A new phenomenon for the island arose during the first two decades of the 20th century. Although working women constituted a striking minority at the time, social and economic changes led a number of working class young women (most of them still in their early adolescence) from rural areas moving into the cities in order to find work as domestic servants in the middle and upper class households.⁵⁴ This, in turn led to their use by the male middle and upper class employers who took advantage of both their financial situation but also their fragile position as women in a society governed by men. In many cases, the wives of the abusers became aware of the situation or, worst, the young house assistants became pregnant. As a result, they had to return to their villages and families, stigmatised and humiliated- scared for life, as no 'respectable' man would accept to marry them.⁵⁵ A woman's sole destiny at the time was marriage, and this possibility was therefore ruined because her virtue and honour had been stained forever. For the unmarried woman shame directly affects parents and brothers, as her honour is almost exclusively associated with sexual modesty. It does not simply involve herself but also her immediate environment. Thus, the social pressure and personal oppression that the Cypriot woman has to deal with, has made it extremely difficult for her to revolt against the *status quo* that keeps her in the background of society.

Any form of recreation was unacceptable for women in the villages, whose sole outing was the Sunday mass, but things were somewhat different for the wealthier minority of women who lived in the cities. "Apart from religious activities and visits to the baths, they were seen going for walks with their female friends or their families; they went to dances, receptions, attended the races and also exercised, rode, and played tennis."⁵⁷ Relative to previous times in history, the Greek Cypriots enjoyed increasing prosperity. "The Cypriot people rediscovered themselves. They sang of joy and sorrow, of love and death. This change which was welcomed by the young girls, created problems for their mothers whose responsibilities increased now and obliged them to find new ways of guarding their daughters chastity

The change caused parents' insecurity, forcing them to marry their daughters off as soon as possible. In the first years of English rule the usual age of marriage was 15 years. Later, girls married at about the age of eighteen and a large number of girls married in their twenties."⁵⁸ Nevertheless, under the canon law, in the first half of the twentieth century the minimum age for marriage was 12 for women and 14 for men. In June 1935, however, this minimum age was increased to 16 for both men and women.

It was during these first years of the twentieth century that the first indirect steps towards women's rights occurred. In 1905, Greek Cypriot women who paid the tax *vergi* voted in the School Committee elections since men felt that the outcome of these elections would work to their favour. Soon after the results came out, the new legislation was withdrawn, as the outcome was not that which was expected. Women were once more denied the right of expression not just in matters of national importance but in educational issues that influenced the next generations. Their reaction to this denial was indifference, which could very probably be because of their hesitation to create unrest and the consequences of such a form of expression.

Until 1895, the maintenance of schools and the payment of the teaching staff was the responsibility of the community and the Church. In 1895, an Education Law was passed which regulated all relevant issues to the establishment and function of primary schools. As from that time, the extension of primary schools was rapid. In fact, "schools were very early seen by Cypriot leaders as an important vehicle for nationalist education and the existing schools rapidly multiplied."⁵⁹ The Educational Law of 1923 ensured that the full responsibility of employment, placement, transfer, payment, firing and pension of the teachers lay with the Government. More girls were thus given the opportunity to get educated but this hardly made any difference to attendance rates as parents opposed, or in the best circumstances hesitated to send their daughters to primary school. Rather, they made the young girls stay at home and prepare themselves accordingly for their future husbands (in terms of dowry but also moral standing in society). According to the 1946 Census by the British Colonial Administration, in 1901, 15558 male students enrolled in elementary school as opposed to 5373 women. Nevertheless, by the year 1943, the number of enrolments of boys rose to 32963 whereas of girls to 27398. In the years 1935 and 1952, laws were introduced which also regulated secondary education. In fact, the Girls' School of *Phaneromeni* in Nicosia became part of the Pancyprian Gymnasium in 1935 and offered the same curriculum to women as to men.

The educational system was undergoing drastic changes not only as an expression of social reforms but also due to political unrest. During the first half of the twentieth century,

"One of the many problems which Britain had to face, perhaps the most perplexing was the agitation by the Greek inhabitants for the union of Cyprus with

Greece. The Hellenic ideal was much older than the British occupation. Modern Panhellenism silently grew under centuries of foreign domination."⁶⁰

In October 1931, there took place the most serious demonstration up to then in favour of enosis. An important role was played by the high-ranking members of the clergy, one of whom, Dionysios Kykkotis, 'proclaimed the revolution' which resulted in the burning down of Government House. Order was restored for a very short period and resulted in the suspension of the constitution, the deportation of ten Greek Cypriots, and the censoring of the press.

Despite the political suppression, social, cultural and economic activities were enhanced. Within a period of twelve years, the trade unions increased from one in 1932 to ninety in 1944.⁶¹ Furthermore, until 1932 the leading newspaper of the island, *Eleftheria*, was published twice a week whereas in that year, a daily paper appeared and only some weeks later, a second one began its circulation. Within the next twenty years, there

"were six Greek papers, three Turkish and one English dailies, and eighteen weekly papers. Literary magazines made their appearance, the most important of which was the monthly *Kypriaka Grammata* ... Great advance was also made in education. There were, in 1953, fifty Greek and ten Secondary Schools, with a total of 16536 pupils, which represented an increase of over five times the number in 1930. In this the communities as such, by giving their labour free, or public-minded individuals by money donations have assisted greatly... Parallel developments occurred in health questions ... in road communications, in water supply and afforestation, but not, as yet, in housing conditions, particularly in the rural areas."⁶²

The benefit of all these advancements for women was nevertheless very small. The 1946 Census explains how at that time, 7.21% of the women population over the age of fourteen in Cyprus were employed full-time whereas the percentage for part-time female workers was 12.98%. Men, however, represented the overwhelming 86.80% out of a total of 154000. Women did not need any formal training or education as they worked mostly in weaving, agriculture, and dressmaking or as domestic assistants. The excuse of honour and virtue which had been used by the parents and especially fathers, was further reinforced by the low-prestige, low-paid jobs that women had the opportunity to perform. Women had to stay at home, unless in desperate need of financial contribution in the family, and received no formal education. That was their place and that is where they were forced to stay for many more years to come. In fact, it was not until 1963, that women acquired the right to equal pay in the public sector and that did not, of course, guarantee their equal chances of employment in the first place.

The political situation did not improve on the island during the 1940s and the idea of union with Greece resulted in most of the Greek Cypriots demonstrating to the

world their desire for *enosis*. In 1949, an Ethnarchic Council was created under Archbishop Makarios II who urged people to take part in a national plebiscite on the issue. The plebiscite was held from 15 to 22 January 1950 in the Christian Orthodox churches and women cast votes for the first time. Out of the 224757 Greek Cypriots eligible to vote, 215108 or 95.7 per cent voted for *enosis*. This led to the events of the 1st of April 1955 when leaflets were distributed all over Cyprus declaring that "a secret association calling itself EOKA had embarked on an armed struggle to throw off the British yoke."⁶³ The attack began on that day with explosions directed at first at government buildings and then at officials and Cypriots who were considered collaborators. The struggle of EOKA, continued until 1959 under the guidance of General Georgios Grivas (known as *Dighenis*). In the meantime, the Turkish Cypriot community on the island was contented with the given status quo and strongly opposed to being forced into unification with Greece. Their main fear was that of becoming second-class citizens since they would consist a very small minority in the whole population of Greece. They, therefore, favoured partition of the island.

The very turbulent years of 1955-58 came to an end when negotiations between Athens and Ankara led to the creation of the independent Republic of Cyprus. The negotiations were concluded in Zurich in February 1959 and the republic came into being on 16 August 1960. On 21 September 1960 it was admitted as the 99th member state of the United Nations and in 1961 it became a member of the Council of Europe. Cyprus had to renounce both *enosis* and partition and at the same time enforce stringent safeguards for the minority. Archbishop Makarios and Dr Fazil Kuchuk were elected President and Vice-President of the Cyprus Republic. As an indirect consequence of independence, women were eligible to vote for the first time in the history of the island. "Whether Makarios owed his election to the 'housewife vote' or not, his 66.82 per cent share was due less to approval of the Zurich-London Agreements than to the belief of a majority of Greek Cypriots that in any situation the archbishop was the best man to handle their affairs."⁶⁴ Women were indeed allowed the right to vote for the first time but they were nevertheless stereotyped as the housewives whose vote could be used for the benefit of those in control: men. The independence of the Republic contributed very little to the independence of the women on the island.⁶⁵

Within three years of the independence, in 1963, violent intercommunal conflict started as a result of a Greek Cypriot determination to modify the constitution safeguards that had been incorporated into the agreements of 1960 in order to protect the Turkish Cypriot minority. This resulted in the withdrawal of the Turkish Cypriot community from their constitutional role and positions and the establishment of a 'green line' dividing the two communities in Nicosia. These borders of the enclaves, the neutral zone that divided the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot areas of the city, were guarded by the British and subsequently by United Nations troops for the following ten years. The political unrest continued and the Turkish community created

its own political and social structure under the administration of Dr Kutchuk. Progress towards a solution was slow and was ultimately overtaken by the actions of the Greek military junta in Greece who, in 1974, launched a suicidal *coup d'état* to take control in Cyprus. Turkey took the opportunity to use the Greek coup as an excuse for 'humanitarian' action in order to protect the Turkish Cypriots. As a consequence the over-extended Greek military government was humiliated and fell, and democracy returned to Greece. The consequences for Cyprus were catastrophic as the Turkish military machine advanced unhindered until 40% of the island fell under their control. International opinion supported the initial Turkish action in so far as it served to protect the Turkish Cypriots, but condemned the brutality with which it was conducted. As a result, several thousand Greek Cypriots were killed, hundreds disappeared and are still tragically missing and about 70% of the island's productive capacity fell into the hands of the Turkish army. The Turkish Cypriots, who had suffered from 1964, felt themselves to be liberated. Until today, little progress has been made in finding a solution and one of the most important issues that has dominated political discourse, but also the population at large, since the Turkish invasion of 1974 has been the tragedy of the missing: these are people who were lost to war. One of the less obvious tragedies of contemporary Cyprus are the missing of Cypriot history – women.

Conclusion

In *Medea*, Euripides's Jason gives voice to the desire of men for a world without women as they were seen as one of the greatest dangers to 'mankind': *What we poor males really need I is a way of having babies on our own- I no females, please. I Then the world would be I completely trouble free.*⁶⁶ Jason's words express an idea frequently repeated in the next two millenniums: except from her function in reproduction, women do not offer anything to men's lives. In fact, women also bring unhappiness and misery to men and therefore their energy should be restricted within the walls of the house and the well-being of the family. Their activities should be limited and kept within the private realm of the home, and are to be governed by men. They have no place in the public sphere of authority, power and law. Therefore, they have no place in historical accounts and no place in history. Very little change has taken place since Virginia Woolf complained that even though woman

"pervades poetry from cover to cover; she is all but absent from history Of our fathers we always know some fact or some distinction. They were soldiers or they were sailors. They filled that office or they made that law, but of our mothers, our grandmothers, our great grandmother what remains is nothing but a tradition. One was beautiful, one was red-haired, and one was kissed by a queen. We nothing of them except their names and the dates of their marriages and the number of children they bore."⁶⁷

Historians and social scientists all over the world have paid little or no attention to women in history. For many years, archaeologists working on Cyprus had been refining theories about life on the island based upon knowledge about behaviour linked with what is generally a man's activity; that is, hunting. Little is known though about women's activities throughout the centuries and especially during the prehistoric times. Elisabeth Wayland Barber has questioned this lack of knowledge, for example, and has asked, "For millennia women have sat together spinning, weaving, and sewing. Why should textiles have become their craft par excellence, rather than the work of men? Was it always thus, and if so, why?"⁶⁸ She argues that women do not need "to conjure a history for ourselves. Facts about women, their work, and their place in society in early times have survived in considerable quantity, if we know how to look for them."⁶⁹ In Cyprus these facts have never been sought.

The limited information though shows that the Cypriot women were oppressed and subjected to the authority and dominance of men throughout the centuries. The strong presence and blend of Orthodoxy and Islam on the island have left women suppressed, powerless and confused. Nevertheless, tracing the history of oppressed, powerless groups is a very difficult task when information is based on government records, textbooks or other official documents. We are actually just beginning to find out how little we know and understand about half the human population – women. It would take detailed analysis and extensive personal interviewing which would raise unexpected issues and new questions in order to arrive at conclusions about 'ordinary' women's lives throughout history and it has not been the immediate purpose of this paper to achieve it. This could be criticised as merely carrying out 'compensatory' research since knowledge about women is added to the knowledge about men. There are lessons to be learned and a perspective to be gained in knowing the past for this is a history that is both humbling and inspiring. Women have been hidden from the Cyprus history and it would be a distortion of history itself to assume that the course of social events has been directed by men's activities alone. The history of the island has been recorded in terms of political events, authority, financial affairs and formal institutions – the public discourse, what patriarchy has considered important throughout the ages. Personal accounts, relationships, families – the private sphere in general – has been considered trivial, and so have women, whose lives revolved around these areas. Nevertheless, these personal experiences have been as historically significant as the world of politics and public life. In order to try and comprehend the attitudes and perceptions of these Cypriot women, it is thus necessary to search for missing information about women and try and put them in the context of what we have been taught to present. However, "the hardest thing to notice, is what isn't there."⁷⁰ The poverty of Cyprus' history is the darkness it sheds on its women rather than the light.

Notes

1. C.G.Jung, *Aspects of the Feminine*, Ark, 1982, p.72.
2. Luce Irigaray, *Speculum of the Other Woman*, translation Gillian Gill (Ithaca: Cornell University Press, 1985), p.69.
3. Sandra Harding, "Introduction; Is there a Feminist Method?," in Sandra Harding (ed) *Feminism and Methodology; Social Science Issues* (Indiana University Press, 1987), p.3.
4. Quoted in June Hannam, "Women, History and Protest," in Diane Richardson and Victoria Robinson (eds.), *Introducing Women's Studies* (Macmillan Press, 1993), p.303.
5. *Ibid.*, p.303 .
6. June Purvis, "Doing Feminist Women's History: Researching the Lives of Women in the Suffragette Movement in Edwardian England," in Mary Maynard and June Purvis (eds.) *Researching Women's Lives from a Feminist Perspective* (Taylor and Francis, London, 1994), p.166-7.
7. Natalie Z. Davies, "Women's History in Transition: The European Case," *Feminist Studies* 3 (1976), p.90.
8. Jung, *op. cit.*, p.72.
9. The Turkish Cypriot community identifies more with Turkey.
10. Mary Pyrgos, *The Cypriot Woman at a Glance* (1995). Pyrgos's publication is a reference article rather than an analytical piece of work, and it is not footnoted. Furthermore, there is no index or bibliography. Another, extended work of Mary Pyrgos within the same framework still remains unpublished.
11. Renate Duelli-Klein, "How to Do What We Want To Do: Thoughts About Feminist Methodology," in Gloria Bowles and Renate Duelli-Klein (eds.) *Theories of Women's Studies, Women's Studies* (University of California, Berkeley, 1980,) p.52.
12. Ceasar V. Mavratsas, "The Greek and Greek-Cypriot Economic Ethos: A Sociocultural Analysis," in *The Cyprus Review*, vol.4, Fall 1992 no.2.,p.35, footnote 25.
13. Caroline Ramazonoglu, *Feminism and the Contradictions of Oppression* (Routledge, 1989), p.22.
14. Liz Stanley and Sue Wise, "Method, Methodology and Epistemology in Feminist Research Processes," in Liz Stanley (ed.), *Feminist Praxis; Research, Theory & Epistemology in Feminist Sociology* (Routledge, 1990).
15. The Cyprus case is very complex as the men have always been under for-

eign domination as well. The Cypriot women have thus been oppressed by both dominant leaders of the state and dominated leaders of the society and the family unit.

16. The actual fact that this is an almost total lack of academic publications on women is, in itself, an important indicator of the current dominant attitudes and perceptions on the island.

17. Jung, *op. cit.*, p.72.

18. *Ibid.*, pp.1-2.

19. The quotation in itself is a sample of the attitudes and understanding of the role of women in general, written by one of the pioneers of the feminist movement in Cyprus. Matriarchy and patriarchy are not explained in the article neither is the described phenomenon of their co-existence. Rather, the terms are used unproblematically throughout Pyrgos' work to describe certain social conditions and trends. Furthermore, the writer uses no examples or documentation to support her views.

20. Footnoted in D Alastos, *Cyprus in History*, (Zeno, 1956), p.37., on myths surrounding Aphrodite's birth (my italics).

21. Alastos, *op.cit.*, p.37-9.

22. Alastos, *ibid.*, p.74.

23. Pyrgou, *op.cit.*, p.18.

24. *Ibid.*, p.20. The issue of whether the so-called maternal instinct actually is not discussed at all by Pyrgos. In fact, its existence seems to be taken for granted despite the vast amount of feminist critiques on the subject.

25. Hunt, Sir David (ed.), *Footprints in Cyprus* (Trigraph: London, 1990), p.101.

26. Pyrgos, *op.cit.*, p.20.

27. *Ibid.*, p.21 (my italics).

28. Alastos, *op.cit.*, p.77.

29. *Ibid.*, p.93.

30. June Hannah in "Women History and Protest", *Introducing Women's Studies*, Diane Richardson and Victoria Robinson (eds.) (Macmillan, 1993), p 316. Interestingly, it was only about half a century ago (1940) that women joined in philanthropic associations.

31. Alastos, *ibid.*, p.121.

32. Nancy Tuana, *The Less Noble Sex; Scientific, Religious, and Philosophical*

Conceptions of Woman's Nature (Indiana University Press, 1993), p.126.

33. Simone de Beauvoir, *The Second Sex* (Penguin, 1986), p.284.

34. N.S.Spanos, *New Cypriot Mythology*, p.6, in Greek, my translation.

35. Hunt, *op.cit.*, p.177.

36. "In the narrow society of the Latins it was difficult to find a wife or husband outside the prohibited degrees. Significant are the words of the dispensation granted to Henry de Novaria and Mary Dagulier of Nicosia, '*pro eo quod arta et ab inimicis fidei orthodoxe circumvallata existit*' and the people of the island are Greeks, they themselves are Catholics, and cannot easily find their equals outside the prohibited degrees The same reason is given over and over again, as when dispensations were granted to Exilia ... to Guy d'lbelin and Isabel ... and to Thomas de Montolif and Alice de S.Bertino So too Pope Clement VI was told in 1348 by Philip, Archbishop of Nicosia; and owing to the remoteness of Cyprus it was not easy to obtain dispensation from the Pope. Accordingly Clement granted Philip power to give the dispensation to six couples who applied for it Another reason given is that the marriage would heal a family feud ...," Sir George Hill, *A History of Cyprus: Volume I/I-The Frankish Period 1432-1571* (Cambridge University Press, 1948), *passim*.

37. Hunt, *op.cit.*, p.207.

38. Pyrgos, *op.cit.*, p.34. The actual punishment of the victim by the society at large and by her family in particular is not discussed in the paper.

39. It is interesting here to quote a male historian's version of the facts surrounding Eleanor's reaction to her husband's mistresses. Much information has surfaced about perceptions and morals of the given time. "Joanna was eight months pregnant when Peter left for the West and the jealous Eleanor had her beaten and tortured to make her miscarry. Having failed, she sent her to a home to have the child but instructed the midwives to bring the infant to her as soon as it was born. This was done. Joanna was separated from her child and thrown into jail...When Peter heard about this, he wrote to Eleanor, threatening on his return to do her so much violence that many will tremble Eleanor, obviously frightened, released Joanna from jail and shut her in a convent. She also desisted from doing harm to her other known rival, Echive de Scandelion, Peter's second mistress. Peter received other hard news. John Visconte, who was left in charge of the household, wrote to him that Queen Eleanor was unfaithful to him with the Count John de Morphou. Peter was enraged. What was sauce for the goose was most obviously not sauce for the gander! So on his return ... Joanna was taken away from the convent and installed in the Palace. The Queen was brought to trial before the Haute Cour. Conviction meant death for her and her lover. The nobles felt that to convict the Queen might bring upon Cyprus the wrath of Aragon, and in any case, such a

conviction was bound to strengthen the hands of the King by the removal of two of his opponents, while the opposite would leave him saddled with the 'dishonour' of an unfaithful wife. The Queen was exonerated." Alastos, *op.cit.*, pp.196-7.

40. Kleanthis Georgiades, *History of Cyprus*, Nicosia, p.206.

41. Queen Caterina Cornaro was forced to abdicate and the Venetians formally annexed the island in 1489.

42. Stavros Panteli, *A New History of Cyprus. From the Earliest Times to the Present Day* (1984. East-West Publications, London and the Hague), p.27. According to Theodore Papadopoulos, women and children were excepted, and it was only the male civilians who had to pay the taxation - *Haratsi*, as it was called. Theodore Papadopoulos, Social and Historical Data on Population, 1570-1881," Cyprus Research Centre, *Texts and Studies of the History of Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1965). Actually, men from the age of 14 to 60 were forced to pay, depending on their financial situation. (Kleanthis Georgiades, *op.cit.*, p.332). Pyrgos informs us that the fact that women did not pay taxes was in fact a privilege as it helped them to acquire property - their husbands registered property in their names in order to avoid taxation.

43. "Nevertheless, despite their enhanced and seemingly omnipotent position, the status of the Church leaders was difficult and delicate They often became victims of intrigue, plots, and rebellions." *Ibid.*, p.32.

44. *Ibid.*, p.39. One can not assume that this is necessarily true. In fact, as soon as the Turks invaded the island, there followed murders and disasters. On the 15th September 1570, Saint Sophia Cathedral was turned into a mosque. (It is still a mosque to the present day). The most beautiful young women were sent on ships to the Sultan as a gift. Among them was Maria Synglitiki who acted, according to Kleanthis Georgiades, "in the most memorable manner of heroism in Cypriot history: in order not to remain a hostage together with the other young women, she ignited the powder magazine of the ship, which exploded taking the purest youth of Cyprus to a wet grave." (My translation). Kleanthis Georgiades, *op.cit.*, p.229.

45. *Ibid.*, p.40. It is also explained here how women, and especially the young, pretty, unmarried ones and were locked in the house, hiding themselves from the urges of the Pasha or some other Ottoman official "who might claim them for their harem."

46. Hunt, *op.cit.*, p.253.

47. In fact, Ottoman women had to hide their faces when they went out, and this habit was gradually adopted by Christian women both as a sign of morality and respect, but also because of fear that if they were beautiful, or if the high officials of the Ottoman rule would take them up as mistresses against their will. It is important

to note that to present day, it is customary for older women in rural areas to be seen wearing a scarf, hiding their hair. This is an especially important ritual for these women when they go to church.

48. Pyrgos, *op.cit.*, p.41. It is interesting here to note that the same issue for disputes between the couple exists to the present day and I have, myself, witnessed serious family arguments over the issue of the dowry which have sometimes resulted in divorce. In fact, a husband who does not demand a dowry, is nowadays regarded with respect as this is a sign of his personal integrity and love for "his" bride.

49. Pyrgou, *op.cit.*, p.47.

50. At the end of the 19th century the wealthy young women spoke foreign languages, were interested in music and painting; they recited Greek and French poetry, danced, dressed in the latest fashions and *behaved like Europeans*. Many studied in Athens, Smyrna, Constantinople, Alexandria and Beirut." *Ibid.*, p.47 (my italics). Pyrgou seems to suggest a positive change in the life of women under the British. In terms of standard and 'quality' of life, one would agree but that very same way of life also seems to have promoted further inequalities for women. In fact, the stereotyped, delicate, passive upper class image of the woman who is unable to 'be out in the world' and must be looked after but keep silent at all times was not only sought for but rewarded in terms of social acceptance and indeed, admiration. The latest fashions from Paris fascinated the wealthy Cypriot women who, for the first time, had access to expensive clothes and accessories - trophies given to them by men when being 'proper ladies.' They were also given by the parents to attract eligible husbands for their daughters. Ibsen's heroine in *The Doll House* but also, closer to "home," Victorian modes of behaviour and double-standards were promoted under British rule.

51. Nevertheless, the first female teachers appeared on the island on approximately this time.

52. Discussing the structure of Nicosia during British rule, Attalides points out that "the necessity to segregate, especially unmarried women, is satisfied by this structure, as well as covered balconies, which are found not only in Moslem, but also in Christian houses," *op.cit.* (1981), p.101.

53. Mavratsas, *op.cit.*, p.17.

54. SurrIDGE B.J.A., *A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1930), *passim*.

55. Commenting on SurrIDGE's survey on rural life in Cyprus, Storrs found that "Though sad reading, it was to be the basis of much social legislation-as in the treatment of domestic servants - for many years", Storrs *R., Orientations* (Nicholson & Watson, London 1937), p.570

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56. The Census of 1931 showed that the rural population constituted 80.5 per cent of the total. Further on, Surridge's study explains how over 25% of the rural population lived below the minimum level of subsistence which it had fixed, 50% around that level, and the rest, the wealthy, above that level. A clear indication of a vast working class as opposed to a very small middle and upper class.

57. Pyrgou, *op.cit.*, p.48

58. *Ibid.*, p.48. It is interesting to note here how mothers were responsible for their daughters moral upbringing and social respectability but it was the father as a rule who had the final word on their personal life, outings, and choice of their future husband.

59. Michael Attalides, *Social Change and Urbanization in Cyprus* (Nicosia, 1981), *passim*.

60. Stavros Pantelis, *op. cit.*, p.417. *Enosis* means union, and it was the slogan of those who wanted to join Greece.

61. *Report of the Cypriot Delegation to the Second World Trade Union Congress* (Paris, 1945).

62. Alastos, *op.cit.*, p.361-2 .

63. Panteli, *op. cit.* _P.265

64. Panteli, *op.cit* p.331. Archbishop Makarios remained the President of the Republic until 1977 when he died from a heart attack.

65. A rare exception to the stereotyping of women and their abilities was Archbishop Makarios' decision in 1960 to appoint Mrs Stella Souliotou as Minister of Justice in the cabinet.

66. Euripides, *Medea*, 573-79 lines.

67. Virginia Woolf, *A Room of One's Own* (London, Grafton, 1929), (Reprinted 1977), p.45.

68. Elisabeth Wayland Barber, "Women's Work. The first 20000 Years; Women, Cloth and Society in Early Times" (W. W. Norton & Company, 1994), p.29.

69. *Ibid.*, pp.299-300.

70. *Ibid.*, p.299.

SOME THOUGHTS ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM, US FOREIGN POLICY AND THE ROLE OF CONGRESS

John Brademas

It was during the Administration of President Lyndon Johnson that I became personally engaged in a foreign policy question: I made clear my strong objection to the military junta in Greece that came to power in 1967. Although then the only Member of Congress of Greek origin (and a Democrat), I testified against the Administration's request for United States military aid to Greece which, I reminded the House Foreign Affairs Committee, was a member of the North Atlantic Treaty Organization. The NATO Charter was created to defend nations that adhere to democracy, freedom and the rule of law; the military dictatorship ruling Greece, I asserted, supports none of these principles. The United States should, therefore, not provide Greece military assistance. During the years of the junta, I refused to visit Greece or to set foot in the Greek Embassy in Washington.

In 1974, however, I found myself far more deeply involved in American policy toward Greece. In July of that year, the colonels engineered an unsuccessful coup against the President of Cyprus, Archbishop Makarios. Although the coup precipitated the fall of the military regime and triggered the restoration of democracy in Greece, it was also the pretext for an invasion by Turkish military forces of Cyprus. The initial invasion, in July, was followed, in August, by Attila II, a massive intervention of 40,000 Turkish troops.

Because the Turkish forces were equipped with weapons supplied by the United States, Turkey's government was in direct violation of US legal prohibitions on the use of American arms for other than defensive purposes. And because American law mandated an immediate termination of arms transfers to any country using them for aggressive purposes, I led a small delegation of Congressmen to call on Secretary of State Kissinger to protest the Turkish action and insist that he enforce the law, i.e., order an immediate end to further shipments of American arms to Turkey. This was, the same week that Richard Nixon resigned the presidency of the United States, and my colleagues and I reminded Kissinger that the reason Mr. Nixon was then on his way to San Clemente was that he had not respected the Constitution and the laws of the land. "*You should do so,*" we insisted. Kissinger

apparently did not take us seriously and neither he nor President Gerald R. Ford took any action in response to our admonition.

Consequently, several of us in Congress, notably the late Congressman Benjamin S. Rosenthal of New York, then Congressman Paul S. Sarbanes of Maryland and I in the House of Representatives and Senator Thomas Eagleton of Missouri led a successful effort in late 1974 to impose, by Congressional action, an arms embargo on Turkey. We were strongly supported not only by other Democrats but by a number of leading Republicans. Because the executive branch of the United States government willfully refused to enforce the law, we in Congress did so.

In this unusual episode, my colleagues and I had active allies outside Congress. Not only did we, understandably, have the help of Greek American and Armenian American persons and groups across the country but also of many others who shared our commitment to the rule of law. Given that there were only a handful of us of Greek origin in the House of Representatives and none at all in the Senate, I have always found amusing the charge that we were a powerful "*Greek lobby*," dictating foreign policy to the executive branch of the government of the United States. The reasons my colleagues and I prevailed were straightforward: We were better organized politically both within Congress and in the country at large and we had a superior case, both legally and morally. It was this combination of factors that brought what was a remarkable victory.

Later, during the 1976 presidential election campaign, I advised the Democratic nominee, then Governor Jimmy Carter, on his statement coupling "*improvement in relations with Turkey with increased fair progress on the Cyprus issue*." More plainly put, Carter linked a resumption of US arms supplies to Turkey with substantial progress toward a just resolution of the situation in Cyprus. It was this linkage, of course, that Kissinger opposed.

In 1978, however, after a year as President, Carter changed his mind, chiefly because of concern over the status of American bases in Turkey, which his counselors considered essential to Western deterrence of Soviet expansion. The President called on Congress to lift the arms embargo on Turkey. Although I was Democratic Whip in the House, third-ranking member of the Majority Leadership, and Jimmy Carter a Democratic president, I strongly opposed his reversal of position. The White House vigorously promoted its view and prevailed in the House of Representatives - by only three votes. The close margin was, given the pressure applied by the executive branch, a moral victory for Congressman Sarbanes, our allies and me.

In the 1980s - I was no longer in Congress - the Reagan Administration was content to leave the pursuit of a solution in Cyprus to the United Nations and made no serious steps to encourage one. As presidential candidate in 1988, Vice

President George Bush called for "a constitutional democracy (in Cyprus) based on majority rule, the rule of law, and the protection of minority rights" Once in office as President, Bush attempted to bring the parties together to find a solution but was unable to do so. I would argue that Bill Clinton is the first President since Lyndon Johnson to give serious attention, over time, to resolving the Cyprus issue. I note that in his 1992 campaign for President, then Governor Clinton declared:

"The United States and the world community will not accept the permanent division of Cyprus. The search for a just and viable solution to the Cyprus problem must be vigorously pursued. Such a Cyprus settlement should be consistent with the fundamental principles of human rights and democratic norms and practices. Accordingly, a Cyprus settlement can be just and viable only if it provides for the withdrawal of Turkish occupation forces; satisfactorily accounts for all American and Greek Cypriots missing since 1974; provides for the rights of refugees; ensures the sovereign independence and territorial integrity of the state; and establishes a democratic constitution which respects and guarantees the rights of both communities."

In March of 1994, I was one of a group of Americans of Greek origin who met at the White House with President Clinton, Vice President Albert Gore and National Security Advisor Anthony Lake to discuss both Cyprus and the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia (FYROM). The President was clearly well-informed on both subjects and sympathetic to what my colleagues and I told him. President Clinton's appointment as his Special Envoy for Cyprus of Richard Holbrooke, architect of the *Dayton Accords* and a diplomat of wide experience, is, I believe, a significant indication of the priority the President and Secretary of State Madeleine Albright have assigned to Cyprus.

Indeed, recently, before talks in Washington with Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides, Secretary Albright said, *"In our meeting today . . . I will assure the Minister of America's interest in seeing the people of Cyprus achieve a lasting settlement to the intercommunal dispute on their island. There could be no more dramatic a demonstration of that commitment than the President's decision to name Ambassador Richard Holbrooke as our special emissary to promote the Cyprus settlement . . ."* She continued: *"... What we see is the reunification of Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island is unacceptable . . . (We) continue to support the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will do everything we can to bring the process forward."*

Now, given the impasse of a near quarter century and in light of the current instability of the Turkish political scene, I think it would be a mistake to expect a breakthrough in the short term. Holbrooke himself has said, *"This is going to be a long haul. It's not going to be a short, intense negotiation like Dayton was."* As you know, Ambassador Holbrooke has said he would not *"do anything specific"* until after the

UN-sponsored talks between President Clerides and Mr. Denktash. I add that the distinguished British diplomat who has been working on the issue, Sir David Hannay, welcomes Ambassador Holbrooke's intervention as does the US Congress, which has been concerned with the lack of progress on Cyprus. And if there is agreement between the Executive branch and Congress on the need to intensify efforts for a settlement on Cyprus, there is also, especially in the House of Representatives, bipartisan agreement. The International Relations Committee of the House, chaired by Ben Gilman, Republican of New York, joined by the senior Democrat on the Committee, Lee Hamilton of Indiana, on June 25 favorably reported their resolution urging "a *United States initiative seeking a just and peaceful resolution of the situation on Cyprus.*" The measure includes a call for "the demilitarization of Cyprus and the establishment of a multinational force to ensure the security of both communities."

Here, based on my conversation in recent weeks, I believe I can best contribute to a discussion of the Cyprus issue by telling you what, on the basis of my conversations in recent weeks with a number of persons, some in government and some not, but all at senior levels, and from the various countries concerned, seem to be factors fundamental, 23 years after the events of the summer of 1974, both to understanding the Cyprus problem and to forging a viable, realistic and just settlement of it.

First, I would assert that a normalization of relations between Greece and Turkey depends upon a resolution of the issue of Cyprus. Indeed, a senior Turkish diplomat made this same point to me a few months ago even as I heard this view echoed in Istanbul in May during a *Carnegie Endowment for International Peace Forum*. The *Forum*, composed of seven Greeks, seven Turks and seven Americans, of whom I am one, involves academic, business and political leaders from all three countries, including two former Greek and two former Turkish foreign ministers and senior retired military officers from the two countries. At a dinner one night in Istanbul, a leading Turkish business figure asked me what I thought was the most important action to improve Greek-Turkish relations.

I replied, "*Cyprus.*"

He said, "*I agree. And what you (Americans) must do is help us (Turks) get out graciously and without humiliation.*"

It is my impression - reinforced by the comments of others - that the forces in Turkey pressing most vigorously for moderation, modernization and democracy there and for better relations with Greece are these top Turkish businessmen.

Second, Turkish political and military leaders must be persuaded that resolving the Cyprus question is in the national interest of Turkey. In economic terms, for example, Ankara's officially acknowledged aid to Turkish-occupied Cyprus this year

totals \$250 million, not including the cost of keeping 35,000 Turkish troops there. Here I would offer another argument for this proposition: Turkish armed forces on the island are now considerable, of such size and nature that to protect them adds further to the security commitments of Turkish military commanders. It is a burden that Turkish leaders have taken on themselves, and one must ask, from a *Turkish* point of view, is it a wise one? But much more important than economic reasons, there is a powerful political rationale for Turkey to move, at long last, toward a Cyprus settlement.

Consider the present situation in Turkey. Beleaguered by economic troubles, pressures from the military, hostility between Islamists and secularists, widespread criticism on human rights and dealing with the Kurds, thoughtful Turkish leaders know that the occupation of Cyprus is not only a continuing financial burden but a huge obstacle to Turkish ambitions for stronger ties with Europe. Even this week the new government led by Melsut Yilmaz declared, in a statement of its hope for eventual membership in the European Union, "*Turkey will ensure its rightful place in the new Europe that is being drawn up.*" Yet it must be clear that even putting aside demands from the European Parliament concerning democracy and human rights, so long as the Cyprus question goes unresolved, Turkish membership in the EU is not possible. Relevant are recent statements of Greek Foreign Minister Pangalos and Undersecretary Kranidiotis that if political objections can be overcome, Greece has no philosophical or dogmatic objection to Turkish accession to the European Union. This posture, coupled with Greek removal of a *veto* on Turkish participation in the Customs Union with the EU, means that the Greeks are saying, "*We're not the obstacle to Turkish entry into Europe.*" Yet if membership in the European Union is not on the immediate horizon, enhancement of the relationship with the EU can be a significant incentive for a Turkey that seeks to be in Europe.

Third, another basic ingredient in the search for a solution, the prospect of membership by *Cyprus* in the EU, was described by Holbrooke as "*the biggest new factor in the 30-year stalemate.*" With the commitment of the Council of Ministers of the EU in 1995, following approval of the Customs Union with Turkey, to start negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus on its accession to the EU within six months of the end of the Intergovernmental Conference (already concluded in Amsterdam), no longer is Cyprus to be held hostage for membership to Ankara. Certainly neither the Turkish government nor Mr. Denktash should be allowed to block accession by Cyprus, and the United States should continue to support Cypriot membership. In light of Turkish objections to accession by Cyprus to the EU, incentives to both Turks and Turkish Cypriots to greater involvement in Europe should vigorously be explored.

Fourth, the matter of security - for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots - is obviously among the factors indispensable to a solution. For it seems to me that in any settlement acceptable to both sides and to Greece and Turkey, there must be, fol-

lowing departure of foreign troops, provisions for a multinational peacekeeping force to assure such security for all Cypriots. Such a force might well be a NATO operation, for NATO is the one organization where Greece and Turkey are on the same level. From my perspective, it would be wise for such a force to include troops from the United States as well other members of NATO. Even a modest commitment of US forces would represent a powerful demonstration of the seriousness with which American leaders of both parties in both the Administration and Congress regard the importance of defusing what Dick Holbrooke has rightly described as "a time bomb."

Fifth, is the matter of the constitutional arrangements for a united Cyprus. The United Nations, the European Union, the United States and the Republic of Cyprus are all agreed that there must be on the island a bizonal, bicomunal federation, with a single sovereignty. There are successive Security Council resolutions, including *Resolution 1092*, adopted on December 23, 1996, which declares that any settlement "*must be based on a State of Cyprus with a single sovereignty and international personality and a single citizenship, with its independence and territorial integrity safeguarded, and comprising two politically equal communities . . . in a bicomunal and bizonal federation, and that such a settlement must exclude union in whole or in part with any other country or any form of partition or secession. . . .*" The goal now will be to negotiate an agreement that provides for such a single sovereign state within which Greek Cypriots will accord a significant degree of self-government to Turkish Cypriots who, in turn, must agree to territorial compromises that will enable them to share in the economic growth that both reunification and membership in the EU would entail. After all, everyone is aware that there is huge gap in *per capita* annual income between Greek Cypriots - \$12,000 - and the North - \$4,000.

The challenge here must be to take into account the fears and apprehensions of both Greek and Turkish Cypriots so that both communities will feel they are dealt with fairly. I observe, by way of suggesting an example of the tone or attitude that one hopes would characterize a federation that can command the support of both communities on the island and both Greece and Turkey, that the proposal of Costa Carras for cross-voting should be given serious consideration. Rather than voting only for candidates of their own community as before, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would vote twice, all citizens casting ballots in the elections of both communities. In this way, candidates and legislators from each community would for the first time acquire a stake in appealing to the other.

A significant result of accession to the EU by a united Cyprus would be that Turkish Cypriots would then be part of a Cypriot delegation to Brussels, one way of ensuring that Cyprus would not be hostile to Turkey. Most would agree that it is unlikely - one never says "never" - that there will be a sudden accord on an issue that for so long has eluded resolution by so many. Moreover, a breakthrough is

probably not possible until after the elections in Cyprus in February. Nonetheless, it is important to begin laying the groundwork now, and UN Secretary General Kofi Annan's talks with Clerides and Denktash are part of this process as Sir David Hannay observed in a thoughtful essay in *International Herald Tribune* ("*At Long Last, Cyprus Should Seize the Chance to Heal Itself*"). For we must build bridges today for action next spring.

With the end of the Cold War has come the possibility of resolution of many long-simmering conflicts. As we observe in the Middle East and Northern Ireland, however, not to speak of the on-going drama in the former Yugoslavia, it is not easy. Nonetheless, the rest of the world is moving toward solving difficult problems. The North Koreans have agreed to four-power talks aimed at formally ending the Korean War. The Indians and Pakistanis are discussing Kashmir. Formerly Communist states are being brought into NATO. China *may* be beginning to communicate with the United States in more rational terms. Surely it is time for Greece and Turkey to normalize their relationship even as did France and Germany under de Gaulle and Adenauer, thereby paving the way to progress for both.

The *Financial Times* described the July 8 agreement between Greece and Turkey as "*the biggest breakthrough in their strained relations for a decade ... pledged to respect one another's sovereign rights and renounce the use of force in dealing with each other.*" That was solid evidence of what the *Financial Times* also called "*strong pressure from the US.*"

Surely, key to the relationship between Greece and Turkey is Cyprus. Settlement, during the year ahead, of an issue over two decades old would obviously be a major triumph for US foreign policy, for Europe, for Greece, and, most important, for all the people of Cyprus. It would be splendid if even before the start of the next millenium, we can see a United Republic of Cyprus, in which all its citizens enjoy the fruits of freedom, democracy and the rule of law!

• This commentary is an edited version of an address given by the author in London, on July 10, 1997

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The Impartial Soldier (in retrospect), by Michael Harbottle, Oxford University Press (Oxford, 1970), 210 pp.

Brigadier Michael Harbottle, author of one of the seminal books on UNFICYP's involvement in the Cyprus problem in the 1960s, and anecdotal work on peacekeeping in general, died recently. The book that survives him, although published in 1970 by Oxford University Press, still has much to teach academics and practitioners and contains insights on UN peacekeeping in general, despite its apparent focus on the military and peacekeeping aspects of the Cyprus problem. The book provides an insight into the genesis and development of what is today, a vital part of our armoury against conflict. When the book was written, peacekeeping was a relatively new and untested "... method of containing, and settling conflicts between states in the age of world-wide interdependence."¹ Today peacekeeping is much maligned and misunderstood but no less valuable.

Harbottle was Chief of Staff during the 1960s, at a time when UNFICYP was attempting to dampen down conflict across the entire island in order to prevent the conflict in Cyprus from spreading to Greece and Turkey and potentially destabilising NATO at the height of the Cold War. Harbottle was well aware and highly critical of the practical involvement of Greece and Turkey on the island although *The Impartial Soldier* concentrates on the inter-communal aspects of the Cyprus problem and communicates the despair that the author felt at neighbour fighting neighbour. Harbottle's involvement in Cyprus during the 1960s led to his subsequent collaboration with General Indarjit Rikhye, then military advisor to U Thant, the UN Secretary General. This relationship pioneered a significant understanding of the significance of UN peacekeeping in the context of world peace.

In the opening words of the book, Harbottle denied that he was the impartial soldier of the title. But whatever his personal stand on the Cyprus problem, in effect, during the period with UNFICYP he acted as if he was one of the soldiers of " . . . any nation who dons the light blue beret of the United Nations and serves anywhere in the world where trouble threatens and peace has to be maintained or restored."² Harbottle, present on the island during the EOKA campaign, was ever mindful of the battle of words which was waged (and is still being waged) between the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot sides, and was careful to point out in the opening pages of the book that if his work appeared more critical of Turkish Cypriot positions, this was merely because they were a minority and were therefore engaged in a more desperate struggle for human rights and personal liberties than the Greek Cypriot side. While this is a pertinent fact today which the Turkish Cypriot side may do well to take into consideration in their dealings with all official and international agents, the Greek Cypriot side too were and are in a similar position with respect to Turkey. This, I suspect was also in Harbottle's mind when he recounted the events of 1967 at *Kokkina*, of which he had first hand experience.

Harbottle was well aware of the fact that since 1964, UNFICYP had had a difficult and arduous task in quelling the intercommunal violence that had spread across the island, and holding the ring. He was also aware of the conceptual difficulties raised by the fact that while UNFICYP needed to create the necessary conditions for the UN mediator to help the two sides towards a solution, the peace-making operation in Cyprus was the weak link in the ring.³ This was because the two sides were holding out either for their maximum objectives or for the support of their motherlands and were determined not to give in. Harbottle's comments on the negotiations between the two sides were as follows:

"Repeatedly, throughout the pages of this book the same pattern of distrust, fear, evasion, and intransigence appears, often making negotiations and reasoning impossible."⁴

In the contemporary context these words seem to contain a certain grim foreboding. Harbottle must have been acutely aware of the fact that a peacekeeping operation could not hold the ring forever and that the two sides needed urgently to display the will, and make the necessary concessions, for a solution. A solution had to be found through negotiation and mediation, or more violence would ensue, as it did in 1974, after the failure and termination of Galo Plaza's UN mediation attempt in 1965 and the inconclusive inter-communal negotiations from 1968-1974. The book is littered with similar statements decrying the "... intransigent and stubborn attitudes by both Government and Turkish Cypriot leadership towards negotiated settlements in all matters-military, political, economic, and judicial" With the benefit of hindsight, it is clear to all today, that had a solution been reached during this period, which had provided the Turkish Cypriot side with the limited local autonomy that they were asking for, the situation today would have been very different. The hard-line elements of the Turkish Cypriot leadership and Turkey would never have been able to take control of the situation unless Greek Cypriot extremists had themselves intervened against Makarios' Government.

Harbottle was unequivocally clear that the UN mission (but more particularly the United Kingdom's contribution) acted according to the principles of non-intervention, impartiality and consent. He quotes the then US Ambassador to Cyprus to this end: "When you are unpopular with both sides at once then you're really know that you are doing your job properly-with total impartiality."⁵

For those who are studying the Cyprus Problem in the 1960s, this is an invaluable text. Not only does it give an early glimpse into the inner workings of a peacekeeping force, and its evolving philosophy during such turbulent times, but it also provides an interesting insight into the characters of the opposing sides. It does this in a monolithic sense in terms of the conflict itself, but also in terms of the principal figures (such as Makarios, Grivas, and Georghadjis) who were involved in the conflict, or those who were or attempting to prevent the situation from escalating further

(such as Osorio-Tafall, and Bernades). His view of UNFICYP was that it was involved in an important role and was doing the best it could to prevent violence in a heated and often irrational environment. He believed that this latter point was responsible for the failure of UNFICYP to carry out part of its mandate, that is to effect a return to normal conditions. He was often scathing of the lack of co-operation that Grivas, for example, showed to the Force. He was also scathing of the stands that the Turkish Cypriot side often took against Makarios Government's attempts at normalisation. For example in the 1967 *Kokkina* incident he was clear that the Cypriot Government had the right to resume its police patrols in the region and viewed Turkish Cypriot opposition to their resumption as inspired by purely political motives. Thus while he thought that the Government's decision to restart its patrols in the region was insensitive, he thought that Turkish Cypriot opposition was calculated to escalate tension.⁶ Therefore, the UN did fail to prevent the ensuing battle, which, however, led to the withdrawal of Grivas and the Greek troops and to the start of the intercommunal negotiations. In Harbottle's words, "Avowedly evil does bring forth good-sometimes."⁷

The definition of how successful UNFICYP has been depends on how one looks at the role of UNFICYP from the early sixties to the present day. During Harbottle's time the force patrolled a complex series of fault lines in order to bring about a stable situation in which negotiations towards a settlement could flourish. But he was well aware of a fact that few today pay much attention to: the UN force depends on the consent and co-operation of the two parties which in return expect that it will behave neutrally and will not intervene in the dispute in any way, other than to dampen down violence. But if the two sides do not want a stable situation, or successful negotiations, the UN force can do little more than attempt to dampen the conflict. This in itself was considered enough in the Cold War era. In the post Cold War era, and despite many arguments to the contrary, this must still be defined as success as open conflict is obviously worse than the current situation of stability and quiet:

"Peace-keeping must be the compliment of peace-making; without it the other cannot proceed ... People tend to forget that the peace-keeper is not the peacemaker. The peace-keeper can only provide the stable military situation, within the atmosphere of which peaceful solutions to the problems can be worked out and ratified....Achievement therefore for the peace-keeper is to maintain that stability and to prevent an outbreak or renewal of the fighting ... He does need to run very fast to stay in the same place, but provided he does this and does not slip back, then he is achieving the object and purpose for which he has been provided."⁸

Harbottles' words cut to the root of the role of a peacekeeping force: according to his interpretation UNFICYP has indeed been a successful force. But given the lack of will, or the ability of the parties to utilise the peacemaking resources of the

UN it can achieve little more than it has already achieved. What is more, efforts to fundamentally alter the concept of peacekeeping such as in Somalia or in Bosnia are doomed to failure. The concept of peacekeeping is derived from the diplomatic function of the UN rather than the military concept of enforcement. It is a compromise between enforcement and inaction and it is the best tool we have for preventing the escalation of disputes and preserving a basic form of peace and security, which after all, is the primary function of the UN. Harbottle's views were thus. Peacekeeping is a limited exercise that has an intrinsic value, while the success of peacemaking depends on the will of the disputants. The two are separate concepts and must not be confused. **Oliver Richmond.**

Comments

1. Foreword by K.G. Younger, in Michael Harbottle: *The Impartial Soldier*, London; New York: OUP, 1970, p.viii.
2. *Ibid.*, p.xi.
3. *Ibid.*, p.3. Harbottle writes that UNFICYP was not successful in providing conditions which would enable talks to lead to a settlement although it was generally able to contain violent incidents.
4. *Ibid.*, pp. 14-15.
5. *Ibid.*, p. 18.
6. *Ibid.*, pp. 158-159.
7. *Ibid.*, p. 160.
8. *Ibid.*, p. 197.

Words of Cyprus

Etymologicon lexicon tis omiloumenis Kypriakis dialectou (Etymological Dictionary of the Spoken Cyprus Dialect), by Kyriacos Hadjioannou, Tamassos Press (Nicosia 1996), pp. 265.

Kyriacos Hadjioannou is a philologist and historian of some distinction who has written over a dozen scholarly works on the language, the culture and the history of Cyprus including his eight-volume magisterial collection of excerpts entitled *Ancient Cyprus in Greek Sources*, published between 1971 and 1992.

The present work, which includes a very short toponymic supplement, is a mine of information on the etymology of many, but by no means all, words of the Cyprus dialect, a dialect which can be distinguished from standard Modern Greek not only

by its special vocabulary but also by its pronunciation which in some ways is closer to classical Greek as can be seen from the pronunciation of double consonants, its unique preservation of a number of ancient terms and even by the preservation of the ancient pronunciation of the letter as *u* rather than the modern Greek *l* and of the antique suffix – skō.

The Cyprus dialect consists of layer upon layer of diverse elements starting with a Mediterranean substrate which was almost completely replaced over three thousand years ago by the Greek branch of the great family of Indo-European languages. There followed a Hellenistic and then Latin element after the incorporation of Cyprus in the Roman Empire followed by Latin-Byzantine elements which eventually became predominantly medieval Greek elements. The Frankish conquest of Cyprus in the 13th to the 15th centuries has also left very clear traces on the language as has the Venetian conquest in the 16th century.

The Turkish conquest of the 17th to the 19th centuries has left very strong traces (which are now fast receding) whilst the recent British occupation has left much fewer but unmistakable traces in the Cypriot version of such short verbs or names as *park, risk, shock, shoot, check, charge, test, train, flirt, cash, cancel, relax, confirm, etc.*

There is also some Arabic and even some Catalan influence on the Cyprus tongue but, in contrast to standard modern Greek, remarkably little Slavic or Balkan influence.

Being essentially a classical scholar Hadjioannou is most illuminating and convincing about the classical origin of his derivations and comments. He is completely oblivious of any pre-Greek Indo-European connections and that is a pity because such connections do exist and could be very interesting.

He also appears to be rather weak or niggardly about the rich connections of the Cyprus dialect with distinctly Byzantine elements. I get the impression that here the author restricted himself to the perusal of glossaries and dictionaries of the period with very little delving into primary sources. Even so, he very rarely resorts to the great *Glossarium ad Scriptores mediae et infimae Graecitatis* by Ducange and never to the very useful *Greek Lexicon of the Roman and Byzantine Periods*, by E.A. Sophocles.

Let me prove the above contention by briefly commenting on just one word of this dictionary. Hadjioannou rightly includes and translates the word *elidjia* as stature (rather than the usual age) and he refers to Herodotus and the gospel of St. Mathew as sources for such a shift of meaning. But the word was current with such meaning throughout the later Byzantine period and beyond. We can find it with this meaning even in the 10th century *Dhigenis Akritas* epic poem and later in the 15th century Cyprus *Chronicle of Leontius Makhaeras*, where a prince is trying to hide from

his enemies by putting on the clothes of someone of the same stature. Strangely enough the eminent British translator of the *Chronicle of Makhaeras*, Richard Dawkins, and all previous and later translators render *elikia* as *age* rather than *stature*. Hadjioannou refers often to Dawkin's *Glossary to the Chronicle* but he missed the above mis-translation as he restricted his attention to the Glossary.

One can pinpoint many such *lacunae* in Hadjioannou's dictionary. Quite a number of obvious words of the Cyprus dialect are also surprisingly missing. Some of his etymologies can also be easily disputed, especially those ascribed to *onomatopoeia*, and some others which seem to be off the mark, even *a priori*. Another serious *lacuna* is the complete absence of any idioms of the Cyprus dialect.

The author tries to pin down the Frankish elements of the dialect to the Provençal idiom of the French language but he may be too restrictive in this connection. For example, the word *luxuria* for lust is more pan-European rather than Provençal through the middle ages.

Such blemishes, mostly faults of omission, do not detract from the value of this important work. Most of the author's derivations are both ingenious and solidly based on both fact and theory.

All the same, the dictionary could be enriched in various ways. Its method could have been improved with the use of recordings of long conversations in cafes, factories, homes, playgrounds, etc., and through greater use of primary sources. It is also obvious that the author lacks rich libraries and he could do with a few able research assistants.

Words are the most atomic and fundamental elements of culture. Hadjioannou's etymological cum historical dictionary is, in spite of its brevity and incompleteness, a valuable contribution to the development of the culture of Cyprus and of the Greek world in general. In this sense he is a worthy continuator of the work of such distinguished scholars as Adamantios Koraes, George Hadjidakis and Simas Menardos. **Sofronis Sofroniou.**

Cypriotica, by Kimon Neophytou, Types International (South Africa, 1997), pp.154.

Cypriotica, a collection of twelve short stories, by Kimon Neophytou is the fourth publication by the author, who is a Greek-Cypriot expatriot from Paphos, living in South Africa.

These stories were written between the years 1988 and 1996. Yet they all carry seeds of traditional, modern and one could say, even post-modern Cyprus. Rural Cyprus, caught in the struggle between urbanisation and the traditions of the countryside, is a source of inspiration for the author in several stories. Love of his roots,

respect for the customs and age-long values, love of the land and pride in its ownership, human relations and conventions respected for many generations, surge into a picturesque narrative with strong, firmly outlined characters in stories like *The Balcony* and *Papou's Ghost*.

The contemporary reality of the tourist presence is another subject that comes up in some of the stories by Neophytou. The lure of the beautiful, liberated women of the north is very much a part of the life of many male Cypriots today. Neophytou gives this modern strain of Cyprus life in a rather romantic mood. In the *Fisherman and His Boat*, Yiannis, in love with a German tourist, eventually decides not to leave the island and his Greek girlfriend, because of a strange apparition that warned him, not to leave the island, not to leave Yiannoulla. In *Akamas* the longest story of the collection, the beauty and sensuality of Cyprus landscape wake up the suppressed *pathos* in a northern visitor who finds fulfilment in an erotic encounter with a fallen-off Greek Orthodox priest who disagrees with the Christian Orthodox dogma and eventually forms a new Church, based on the ancient mysteries. Fragments and pieces of Cyprus' customs and Cyprus life are scattered all over the story but the soul-searching of the protagonist Karen who came to Cyprus to get over her frustrating affair with a man who had rejected her, overshadows all other strains and events in the plot.

The philosophical vein is also very much a part of almost all the stories in the collection. Reflection on man and his substance, his search for God, peace and happiness, the existential cry of man for identification with nature, love, land and religion, are all interwoven with Cyprus seen through the eyes of the author: a native but also a visitor at the same time, who can afford the cool gaze of detached appraisal of the island, its life and its people.

The metaphysical presence, with overtones of the inexplicable and the real but *still* unseen, the face-value experience of immaterial worlds, weave their supernal fragments into an almost post-modern canvass of Cyprus reality: Examples are the apparition in the *The Fisherman and his Boat*, *Papou's Ghost*, *Father and Son*, *The Donkey*. People's physical senses are not their limit. And this is worked out very dexterously in human relations, attitudes and experiences as all these become a part of the development of the story, forming an invisible canvas against which the decisions and progress of the characters are placed.

The 1974 invasion has its share in the collection. But not in any conventional account of the events, the misery, the injustice and the tragedy. Instead, a romantic nostalgia of pre-invasion times and its connection, with a new philosophy to be pursued and applied, makes its mark.

"And I remembered how we used to sit with our Turkish neighbours from a village just down the road from ours, laughing and talking as we broke almond husks together Lovely evenings they were, full of joy, full of laughter Would we

ever be able to repeat such joy? Would we ever be able to live as neighbours again, helping each other, enjoying each other's company? . . . the old idea of kosmos came strong to mind Something was fundamentally amiss. The true light of Cyprus had been discarded, forsaken or suppressed. So that there was a certain poignancy in Hamid's visit to Cyprus: the Greeks of the island needed to be re-awakened up from their slumber, needed to be reawakened, albeit rudely, to their ancient wisdom."

Of course we cannot help wondering how an earnest Turkish author would be describe the post -1974 social/intellectual holograph of the Turkish Community.

Kirnon Neophytou is an earnest writer. In the unadorned direct language he uses, in the characters he creates, in the situations and circumstances he projects. One feels in closing the book that the author did reach his readers, he did make connections with them, and he did also capture a slice of Cyprus life in its simple complexity, in its poignancy, in its transit journey from war to consumership, from peace to technology, from conflict to the promise of peace. **Nayia Roussou.**

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