

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

a Journal of social economic and poltl1cal issues

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THE CYPRUS REVIEW

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Journal articles:

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Articles

VOLUME 10
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REGIONAL AND INTERNATIONAL CONDITIONS FOR A VIABLE SOLUTION TO THE-CYPRUS PROBLEM

Charalambos Papasotiriou

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to examine the geopolitical dimension of the Cyprus problem, focusing on the regional balance of power from the perspective of Greece and Turkey. Given that the Turkish military occupation of northern Cyprus entails Turkey's control, or at least paramount influence, over the Turkish-Cypriot community, and given that Greece is engaged in a defence alliance with the Republic of Cyprus, Ankara and Athens are crucial actors in the Cyprus problem. Their policies, therefore, constitute one of the decisive factors that will determine the success or failure of international efforts to solve the Cyprus problem.

In focusing on the geopolitical dimension, I do not mean to suggest that the constitutional questions that preoccupy the two communities in Cyprus are peripheral to the quest for a solution. The nature of a future Cypriot constitution, that would bring the two communities together again under one political system, is an issue of vital importance to the Cypriots. Nonetheless, I shall steer clear of the intricacies of the constitutional debates, in order to focus in greater depth upon the, at least equally important geopolitical Impediments to a solution to the Cyprus problem.

The paper will begin by examining the geopolitical aspects of the Cyprus problem from the perspective of Turkey. It will then proceed to an examination of the Greek perspective. The priorities of the EU and NATO will be outlined next, in light of the analysis of the perspectives of Ankara and Athens. The paper will conclude with recommendations concerning the geopolitical conditions for a viable solution to the Cyprus problem.

The Perspective of Turkey

Turkey's perspective is one of the most central factors in the Cyprus problem, because Turkey has been, strategically, the dominant actor in Cyprus since 1974. Cyprus is very close to the south-eastern coast of Turkey, which means that the Turkish army on the island can easily be supported and reinforced by sea and air.

By way of contrast, Greece maintains a tiny force in Cyprus, with no more fire-power than a regiment. Moreover, the nearest Greek coasts are significantly further away than the Turkish coast. Given the greater difference in distances, Greece's ability to project strategic power in Cyprus is much more limited than Turkey's.

The most significant aspect of Turkish policy in Cyprus since 1974 is that Ankara is satisfied with the present situation. From the Turkish perspective, the Cyprus problem was solved in 1974. The perpetuation of the present situation is advantageous to Turkey for the following reasons:

a) The Turkish-Cypriot community is protected from the prospect of a geographic, political and economic marginalisation, such as it had experienced in the period 1964-74, when most Turkish-Cypriots had retreated to territorial pockets amounting to about 3% of Cyprus' territory. (According to the 1973 population census, the Turkish-Cypriot community came to 116, 000 people, which was 18.4% of the population of Cyprus). By way of contrast, since 1974 the Turkish army has secured 37% of the island's territory for the Turkish-Cypriot community, although the Turkish-Cypriots have had to share this territory with a growing population of settlers from Turkey who by 1997 seemed to have outnumbered the indigenous Turkish population of Cyprus (in part because of the emigration of some 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots, mainly to Britain and Germany).[1]

b) Strategically, the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus averts the fall of the island under the control of Greece, a development which from the perspective of Turkish strategic planners would complete the naval encirclement of Turkey. Since Greece is strategically in a position to disrupt Turkish sea communications in the Aegean, thus isolating Turkey's Black Sea and Aegean ports, the southern coast of Asia Minor remains the only secure basis of sea communications in the last resort. Ever since Kemal Ataturk, therefore, Turkish policy has been to prevent the fall of Cyprus into the hands of a potentially hostile power, which might thereby threaten to complete the strategic encirclement of Turkey by sea.[2]

c) Turkey's dominant strategic position in Cyprus is a powerful instrument of pressure against Greece regarding the Greek-Turkish disputes in the Aegean. Holding Cyprus as a strategic hostage, Turkey implicitly threatens to attack the remaining territories under the control of the Republic of Cyprus in the event that Greece moves against Turkish interests in the Aegean. In the words of Sukru Elekdag, former Under-Secretary of the Turkish Ministry of Foreign Affairs and former Turkish Ambassador to the United States, "Greeks are cognisant of the fact that in the event that they escalate the crisis in the Aegean to a hot conflict, this will force Turkey to take military measures in Cyprus. Greece is aware of her vulnera- bility in Cyprus. This assessment in turn leads Greece to be cautious in the Aegean."[3]

It should be noted, that Turkey's quest for a strategically superior position vis-à-

vis Greece is shaped by the fears of Turkish leaders, that they may be forced to face multi-front threats simultaneously. Turkey is currently engaged in a war against the Kurdish insurrection in South-East Asia Minor, which has been raging since 1985. This war ties down some 250,000 Turkish troops. In addition, Turkey faces a threat from Syria *over* the formerly Syrian province of Hatay, which Turkey annexed in the late 1930s (before Syria became an independent state). This dispute between Turkey and Syria is not confined to words. Syria actively supports the PKK, the leading organisation in the Kurdish insurrection. The PKK receives not only Syrian financial support, but also military training and safe havens.[4]

Since 1967, Syria has focused her military endeavours on her conflict with Israel, deeming the *recovery* of the Golan Heights more important than the *recovery* of Hatay. But the Arab-Israeli peace process raises the possibility that Syria will reach an agreement with Israel, which would allow her to redeploy her forces from the Golan Heights to her border with Turkey. Such a prospect alarms Turkish strategic planners, who fear that in the eventuality of a Turkish-Syrian war they might have to face, simultaneously, Greek moves in the Aegean; the extension of Greek terri- torial waters from 6 to 12 miles is casus belli to Turkey (since it would enhance the Greek strategic threat to Turkey's Aegean lines of communications).[5]

Turkey also faces a potential threat from Russia. Thus far, Russia has not posed an actual strategic threat to Turkey. Yet if the competition between these two states for influence in the Caucasus intensifies, Russia may well adopt a more menacing posture vis-a-vis Turkey. Evidence of Turkish paramilitary engagement on the side of the separatist Chechens during the Chechenya warfare shows the extent to which Russo-Turkish relations are becoming strained.[6]

It is in the light of Turkish fears concerning the eventuality of such multi-front threats, that the importance of the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus as an instrument of deterring Greek *moves* in the Aegean is to be assessed.

The combination of geopolitical benefits that accrue to Turkey from the occupation of northern Cyprus is so important to Turkish strategic thinking, that Turkey has extremely high incentives to maintain the present situation in the Cyprus problem. It is for this reason that Turkey is prepared to incur the opprobrium of Western pub- lic opinion in reaction to her occupation of northern Cyprus, which contributes to the impediments in Turkey's relations with the EU.

It would take a powerful combination of counter-incentives to lead Turkey to change her policy of perpetuating the present situation in Cyprus. Thus far, such counter-incentives have been rather weak. The political cost that Turkey has incurred on account of her Cyprus policy has been relatively limited. The reason is that Turkey's geopolitical role in the Caucasus, Central Asia and the Middle East, as a regional agent of Western influence, guarantees Western support for Ankara. Neither the United States nor the leading powers in the EU are prepared to risk

Turkey's Western geopolitical orientation over the Cyprus problem. Whatever pressures they may exert on Turkey to move towards a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus fall far short of anything that might seriously risk alienating Turkey from the West.

The Perspective of Greece

Greece is in the unenviable position of having to approach the Cyprus problem from a position of relative strategic weakness. The bilateral Greek-Turkish strategic balance in itself presents difficult problems for Greek strategic planners in the border regions of the Aegean and Thrace. When Cyprus is included in the calculation, the Greek strategic difficulties are seriously augmented.[7]

Greek policy in Cyprus is under the shadow of the 1974 disaster, which created a situation unacceptable to Greece. Yet Greek policy thus far has not met any success in its objective of undoing 1974. On the contrary, since 1974 Greece has had to face an ever worsening situation. First the Turkish army invaded northern Cyprus. Then a stream of settlers from Turkey began to change the demography of the Cypriot territories under Turkish occupation. In 1983 the Turkish-Cypriot leadership proclaimed an independent republic in northern Cyprus (recognised only by Turkey so far) which suggested a firm determination on the Turkish side to perpetuate indefinitely the situation created in 1974. A parallel escalation of Turkish pressure was experienced in the Aegean.

Greece has followed two directions of policy, in order to assist the Republic of Cyprus in the Cyprus problem and to secure the status quo in the Aegean:

a) Greece has extended to Cyprus a security guarantee against further attacks by the Turkish forces, declaring any renewed Turkish offensive in Cyprus as casus belli. The so-called "dogma of the unified defence area", agreed in 1995 by Greece and Cyprus, has led to increased defence cooperation between the two countries and is thus a step towards increasing the credibility of the Greek security guarantee. It should be noted, though, that this policy can only defend Cyprus from further invasion, by reducing her strategic vulnerability. A policy of reversing the situation of 1974 by military force is inconceivable, given the overall strategic balance, and is not advocated by any policy-maker or political force in either Greece or Cyprus.[8]

b) Greece has exploited her EU membership to put pressure on Turkey. The EU is the one arena where Athens enjoys an unambiguous bilateral advantage over Ankara. This advantage is particularly pertinent, since the Western-oriented leadership of Turkey strongly desires to acceed to the EU in order to secure firmly Kemal's secular and westernising legacy. Greece has blocked EU-Turkish relations, including aid programmes, and has threatened to continue to do so unless Turkey acquiesces in a solution to the Cyprus problem on the basis of an end to the Turkish military occupation of the northern part of the island.[9]

In March 1995, Greek policy in the EU underwent a significant change, when Greece lifted her veto over the Customs Union of the EU and Turkey. In return, Greece obtained a commitment by the EU to initiate the procedure of the accession of Cyprus to the EU six months after the end of the Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996-7. In effect, Greece traded her veto on one major aspect of EU-Turkish relations for closer EU-Cypriot links. In Greek thinking, an accession of Cyprus to the EU would dramatically change the political balance between the Greek and the Turkish sides in the Cyprus problem in favour of the former. In addition, many Greeks hoped that Greek acquiescence in Turkey's Customs Union with the EU might have led to an improvement in overall Greek-Turkish relations.[10]

Unfortunately, this last hope was belied by the sharp rise in Greek-Turkish tension in 1996, both in the Aegean and in Cyprus. Concerning the Cyprus problem, the Turkish side has become alarmed at the prospect of Cyprus' accession to the EU, which would transform the situation from a Greek-Turkish to an EU-Turkish conflict. The Turkish objective is to prevent the accession of Cyprus prior to the accession of Turkey herself (which, in the foreseeable future, is unlikely for reasons unrelated to the Cyprus problem or other Greek-Turkish disputes). In the event that this objective proves unattainable, Turkey threatens, with the agreement of the Turkish-Cypriot leader Mr Denktash, to annex northern Cyprus the moment that the Republic of Cyprus enters the EU.

Tension in Cyprus increased in the summer of 1996, when two Greek-Cypriots were killed on the line that divided the island, in acts of murderous violence that the Turkish-Cypriot side justified as designed to impress on Greek minds the reality of the border between the Republic of Cyprus and the internationally unrecognised "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus". A further escalation of tension took place early in 1997, when Cyprus announced its agreement with Russia to acquire Russian S-300 surface-to-air missiles (SAMs), as part of her effort to raise her defence capabilities and thereby to reduce her strategic vulnerability. When Turkey threatened to prevent the deployment of this weapons system in Cyprus, Russian officials indicated that Russia would resist, if necessary by force, any effort by any party to elbow them out of the international arms market.

The crisis over the S-300 missiles was defused, for the time being, when it became clear that for technical reasons their deployment in Cyprus would not be possible before mid-1998.* Nonetheless, the S-300 missiles issue is a time bomb with an explosive mechanism timed for mid-1998. Cyprus has declared that she will proceed with the deployment as scheduled, and that she will not be intimidated to cancel the missile deal. Turkey has declared, that she will bombard the missile sites to eliminate what she perceives as a strategic threat to her air bases on the Turkish mainland opposite Cyprus. And Greece has declared, that any Turkish attack against Cyprus is casus belli. If the declared intentions of the governments of Cyprus, Turkey and Greece are to be taken at face value, then a war involving the three countries seems not unlikely in 1998.

* Editorial Note: Readers should bear in mind that this article was written prior to the postponement in deployment of the missiles.

The Perspective of the EU and NATO

The ever-present and apparently increasing possibility of war between Greece and Turkey presents a major and difficult problem for the major powers of the Western alliance. Their top priority in this matter is to keep the south-eastern flank of the alliance intact, by averting any armed conflict between Greece and Turkey.[11]

Western governments find themselves in the tricky position of not wishing to take sides between their two allies in the dispute. They wish to see the Cyprus problem resolved in a manner that is acceptable to both sides, so as to avoid alienating either. In particular, they are not prepared to risk the alienation of Turkey from the West, regarding her as a strategic ally of great value in the Middle East, the Caucasus and Central Asia. Thus, they are prepared to tolerate Turkish violations of international law and Western standards of behaviour, in spite of the occasional vocal pressure of public opinion in some Western countries in support of a tougher approach to Turkey on such matters.

Western preference of a mutually acceptable solution in Cyprus, by mutual concessions, provokes hostile reactions on both the Greek and the Turkish sides. The Greeks feel, that the even-handed Western approach in effect rewards Turkish aggression and allows Turkey to abuse her strategic superiority in defiance of international law and Western standards of behaviour. The Turks feel that the even-handedness of the West is unjust, since it requires Turkey to make equal concessions to the Greek side, in spite of Turkish victory in the conflict of 1974 which, they allege, the Greek side had started.

With the end of the Inter-Governmental Conference of 1996-7, the EU is pursuing a particularly fine balancing act, involving apparently contradictory tendencies. On the one hand, it seeks to give Cyprus the impression that her accession to the EU is unlikely prior to a mutually acceptable solution of the Cyprus problem. On the other hand, it seeks to give Turkey the impression that Ankara will not be permitted to veto Cyprus' accession through obstinacy in the Cyprus problem. Behind these apparently contradictory positions, one can discern the deep-felt desire of the EU, with United States backing, to convince both sides that they stand to lose more through intransigence than through mutual accommodation.

Western efforts to bridge the differences between the two sides in Cyprus have acquired greater urgency during 1997, because of the increased tension between Greece and Turkey since early 1996, which threatens to explode over the S-300 missiles issue. And yet, these Western endeavours are unlikely to succeed, unless they take into account the geopolitical dimension of the Cyprus problem, delineated in this paper, instead of focusing narrowly on the Constitutional dimension of the dispute.

The Geopolitical Conditions For a Viable Solution

From the geopolitical point of view, Turkey desires, as a condition for a solution, that there will be some guarantee that Cyprus will not in the future be transformed into a hostile base under Greek control, completing the strategic encirclement of the Turkish coasts by Greece. The unusually strong Turkish reaction to the prospect of the deployment of the S-300 in Cyprus can be taken as an indication of Turkish sensitivity on this matter. The missiles, as stated above, would be able to threaten Turkish aircraft flying over Turkish mainland bases opposite Cyprus.

Greece and Cyprus desire, as a condition for a solution, some firm guarantee that the island will be secure from any repetition of the 1974 Turkish invasion. The best guarantee would be a strongly fortified Cyprus with deterrent capabilities, e.g. an abundance of S-300 missiles to raise the cost of any Turkish air attacks.

Since these two positions tend, on the face of it, to be mutually exclusive, some creative way must be sought to square this particular circle. Perhaps the best approach would be to entrust the future security of a post-solution Cyprus to a NATO force. For the Greek side, NATO would be more credible than the UN as a guarantor of security. At the same time, the absence of a significant Cypriot defence capability might reassure Ankara, that the retreat of the Turkish army from northern Cyprus will not be followed by the transformation of the island into a Greek forward base.

A NATO commitment to the security of Cyprus may be perceived as a major material burden for the members of the Alliance, especially since the NATO troops on Cyprus would need to be, by the logic of the present suggestion, other than either Greek or Turkish. On the other hand, NATO's military presence on the island may have important strategic benefits for the Alliance, in terms of a capability to project strategic power in the Middle East. Moreover, the financial burden of a NATO force in Cyprus may be covered, at least in part, by Cyprus.

This suggested approach does not, of course, constitute a panacea for overcoming all geopolitical aspects of the Cyprus problem. For example, so long as the Greek-Turkish differences in the Aegean remain acute and entail the risk of war, Turkey may wish to continue to keep Cyprus as a strategic hostage to deter or strategically match Greek moves in the Aegean. Nonetheless, the suggested approach might remove some of the geopolitical impediments to a mutually acceptable and viable solution in Cyprus, thus making the prospects of the endeavours of Western mediators somewhat more hopeful than they have been thus far.

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A COMPACT THEORY OF FEDERALISM: CAN THE CANADIAN FEDERAL EXPERIENCE PROVIDE LESSONS FOR CYPRUS?

Alain-G Gagnon & Can Erk

Abstract

Federalism today is the adopted political structure of many states in various parts of the globe. The Canadian experience however may be particularly relevant to the Cyprus scenario and as such deserves closer scrutiny. This paper without intending or claiming to offer a prescriptive analysis, attempts to present a descriptive analogy in the hope of making a useful contribution to the search for a settlement of the Cyprus problem.

Introduction

I have always contended that if we could agree to have one government and one parliament, legislating for the whole of these peoples, it would be the best, the cheapest, the most vigorous, and the strongest system of government we could adopt.[1]

Sir John A. Macdonald

I have found two nations warring in the bosom of a single state. I have found a struggle not of principles but of races.[2]

Lord Durham

The above quotations are not referring to Cyprus, however, their relevance is far from being subtle. Both are describing Canada, the first one by the first Prime Minister of the Canadian Federation of 1867 and the second by a British observer writing in 1840. Nevertheless, the twin ideas of a desire for a unitary state on the one hand, and its unfeasibility on the other, have some uncanny resemblance to the case of Cyprus. It is our belief that these two forces of unity and diversity have been the defining characteristics of Canadian federalism, and that an arrangement that reconciles the two has the potential for export. Therefore, the Canadian federation will constitute the base from which we will draw some suggestions for Cyprus. In

other words, we will use Canada to help understand Cyprus and, possibly, suggest some ideas to bridge its division.

However, to what extent does the Quebec-Canada case provide lessons that are transportable to Cyprus? The immediate reaction of any observer with a familiarity with both of these cases would be to dismiss any comparative attempt. After all, these are unique cases in their own right and they, therefore, defy comparison. Accordingly, one should instead focus on each case within its particularity and complexity. However, this paper aims precisely to compare these different cases. The comparison is not because these cases are very similar, but because a comparison might provide certain insights. We believe that a different case might help highlight certain phenomena that would have otherwise remained peripheral or indiscernible in the case of Cyprus. Differently put, the point is not the comparability of the cases but the utility of comparison by putting the familiar in a different light.

On the other hand, it is not the intention of the authors to prescribe a solution to the conflict merely by reflecting on Canadian federalism. Our aims are rather modest: a brief analysis of Quebec-Canada relations within a federal framework and to discern certain phenomena that might be applicable to Cyprus. Therefore, the suggestions that we provide will remain within this federal framework that we use in the Canada-Quebec case.

An important point that we should clarify before we embark upon our analysis is the federal model that we use in this paper. We employ a 'compact theory' of federalism that views federalism as a compact between a number of nations to share the same state. In the Canadian context this approach is also known as the 'dualist' approach since it views the Canadian federation as a compact between two nations. According to this approach, it is imperative to disentangle the concepts of 'nation' and 'state'. The concept of state corresponds to a legal and political entity, whereas the concept of nation essentially represents a socio-cultural entity. It should be noted, however, that this approach to Canadian federalism is by no means the only one. The compact theory of federalism is an approach more popular among Francophone social scientists in Quebec and one diametrically opposed to the federal model widely held in the rest of Canada that interprets the Canadian federation as one of one nation and ten provinces. Therefore, the readers should be aware that there is no consensus with regard to the interpretation that we employ here. Our aim is not to devise some textbook definition of federalism, but use one particular approach to federalism to provide some insights into the Cyprus problem in this paper. It is our view that the compact theory of federalism is more applicable to the case of Cyprus, but that this approach is not necessarily the a priori superior one. Consequently, our suggestions are not automatically transportable to other cases, which might require alternative models.

On the other hand, our focus is not on the federal constitution and institutions per

se, but on the broader federal principles that underlie the particular institutional configuration. Formal constitutional studies have tended to ignore the place of and the role played by political and social challenges, often failing to understand the deep forces that influence the way institutions function. Therefore, our focus is on the principles of the compact rather than any institutional blueprint. This approach would enable broader applicability, and would thus make it possible to come up with conclusions that might carry suggestions for Cyprus. We will rarely make explicit reference to Cyprus; nevertheless, a federal compact between two nations of unequal size requires no clarification for its relevance. It is our belief that the unequivocal recognition of the compact between the constituent nations is of vital importance and that any constitutional arrangement must reflect this compact.

Canadian Federalism and Quebec

Quebec is unique in that its population is 80 per cent Francophone, of Catholic background, and influenced by a civil law tradition while the rest of Canada is mostly Anglophone, tending to have a Protestant background and having a common law tradition.[3] Quebec is the only province among the ten Canadian provinces where the majority are French-speakers.

Following the conquest of New France by the British, French Canadians rapidly developed a sense of cohesion in the vast expanse of English North America.[4] The Francophones' noted exclusion from continental and international markets by British merchants provided the first economic grievance. This led to feelings of exclusion that contributed to the establishment of "la nation canadienne-française."

Upon entering the Canadian federation in 1867, Quebec possessed its own political personality, and maintained some of its original powers and institutions which were formalized almost ten decades earlier in the Quebec Act of 1774 bestowed upon it by the British Crown. In addition, it consented to share with, or relinquish to, the newly formed ,federal government some of its jurisdictions.

For most of Canada's first century, French-speaking and English-speaking Canadians built their own national communities without much interaction with one another. This ignorance of each other initially led to the emergence of a consociational type of political arrangement. French-speaking Canadians, largely concentrated in Quebec, and English-speaking Canadians, mainly gathered in the rest of the country, constructed their respective political communities without much awareness of what was happening elsewhere. A critical distance between the two main political communities was instrumental in the continuation of Canada's 'federal society'.[5] This was appropriately described by Hugh McLennan as the 'two solitudes', and has been several times referred to by scholars to reflect Canada's political situation.[6] During the last forty years, Quebec has been demanding that dualism be

officialized as the key founding principle of the Canadian state. In other words, Quebec has been asking the recognition of its distinct status as the representative of one of the founding peoples of the Canadian federation, the French-speakers, along the English-speaking Canadians. For dualism to work in Canada it is necessary that the two main political communities are aware of, and willing to recognize, each other's existence as 'nations'.

Federalism as the 'Second Best' Option

Based on the brief historical overview above, Lord Durham's reference to 'two nations warring in the bosom of a single state' acquires some relevance. But then what would explain John A. Macdonald's exasperation concerning the unfeasibility of a unitary state? The federal model that we use attempts to reconcile the two simultaneous forces presented in the opening quotations, i.e. diversity and unity. The compact theory of federalism that we employ uses two conceptual pillars in the form of 'autonomy' and 'union' in order to reconcile diversity and unity. When a unitary nation-state is not a viable option, a federal arrangement can be used to approximate the benefits that would entail from a unitary state. In this respect it differs from a nation-state in the sense that the 'state' is a result of a compact between the constituent nations, and by definition is a 'second best' option to a unitary state.[7] The model that we use here is one where a number of nations enter into a compact to share a state. Thus, it is necessary to separate the 'state', which is a legal concept denoting a territorially demarcated institution performing certain functions, and the 'nation', an object of cultural allegiance, very often but not always, based on a shared socio-cultural identity. In countries where territorially based socio-cultural cleavages preclude the viability of a unitary state, federalism can be utilized as a means to achieve a union while retaining diversity. In this federal model, federalism is a mechanism to manage the divisions. Thus, federalism is instituted not as the best method of governance but as the only possible means to approximate the benefits that would emanate from a centralized unitary state.[8] Therefore, in this model, federalism is not an ideal, but a pragmatic seeking to reconcile unity and diversity.

This implies that this model of federalism is deeply entrenched within its praxis. Its origins lie in the uneasy compromise between a number of nations which decide to share the same state. The imperatives for this union range from a desire to acquire international military security to considerations of economic efficiency in the form of free movement of factors of production in a larger market.

This untidy federal arrangement should not be seen solely as a reflection of irreconcilable differences. The reason for this defiance of neatness is the complex overlap between issues where conflict and consensus, competition and cooperation coexist. This intractable complexity between the necessity of common policies and jealously guarded autonomies accounts for the untidy federal bargain. Quite natu-

rally, it carries with it a great deal of flexibility and fluidity as well.

On the other hand, federalism as an ideal form is only realizable in polities with an already existing consensus over the nature of political governance. This implies that federalism is utilized for its benefits in enhancing democracy, multiple layers of government, division of responsibilities, limited government, opportunities for citizen participation and so on. And very often these concerns are realized in neatly organized symmetrical federal systems. It is our contention that such arrangements are realizable in those polities where the 'nation' and the 'state' correspond, and where the concern is to devise the best rules of the game to organize the nation. Thus, in these polities federalism is perceived not as a problem-solving mechanism but as the ideal form of political governance, in other words, an end in itself. So does this imply that such federations are more successful than those based on a compact? It is not uncommon to come across authors who identify successful federal systems with homogenous polities devoid of regional disparities.[9] The argument is that in the absence of territorially based ethnic, linguistic, social, and economic diversity, federalism would work best. But one can very well argue that in such polities not only would federalism work best but so would democracy and any collective effort one could think of. The important point is not when federalism works best, but when federalism provides the means to manage divisions and move forward rather than being grounded in the face of irreconcilable differences. It should not come as a surprise that multi-ethnic federations are harder to sustain compared to those with ethno-linguistically homogenous populations, for, after all, they are based on uneasy compromises and inherent tension. Once the alternatives to this uneasy union are considered, the absurdity of arguments pointing to the tensions within such federations becomes apparent. The alternatives to this less-than-ideal federal union are separate states at best, and internecine conflict at worst. The first one entails lesser international efficacy due to reduced economic, political and military clout, the second one needs no explanation.

In the case of Canada, there seems to be a consensus among a number of authors who point to the 'second best' nature of the Canadian federation. For example, Gibbins[10] argues that Sir John A. Macdonald would have preferred a unitary state for Canada but the existence of two 'religious-linguistic' communities precluded such an option. Gibbins uses the opening quotation of this paper by Sir John Macdonald to support his argument. The 1840 United Province of Canada experience had ended up in a deadlock since the cleavage between the Francophones and Anglophones had rendered the unitary arrangement unworkable. However, while the unitary state had proved to be impossible to attain, there were reasons to retain a union. Robinson and Simeon[11] argue that the end of the British colonial preference system made the creation of a pan-Canadian market a necessity. On the other hand, an expansionist and strong US also made a union among the weak Canadian provinces an urgent necessity. So when the unitary experience failed, the

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federal path appeared to present the second best strategy to approximate the benefits that would emanate from a unitary arrangement while not requiring uniformity. Sabetti argues along these lines also when he asserts that "without the Francophone community, the union would have proceeded along centralized lines."[12]

The Canadian experience is particularly interesting since it is being influenced both by individual and collective aspirations. In countries where a minority or economically subordinate ethno-linguistic community is capable of commanding the politics of a specific region, the questions of territory and, by extension, federalism, become central to political life. A case in point is provided by Quebec in the Canadian context. In countries where ethnic or linguistic groups are dispersed evenly throughout a number of territories, shifting political coalitions and group politics generate conflicts that often do not necessitate federal institutions.

Federalism and Conflict Management

In addition to its utility in reconciling unity and diversity, federalism can also act as a mechanism for managing conflicts. Conflict management is not solely the preserve of federal systems though it is felt that social diversities are frequently associated with this type of political structure. The success of federal systems is not to be measured in terms of the elimination of social conflicts but instead in their capacity to regulate and manage such conflicts. It is completely misleading to expect federalism to resolve social conflicts. Rather, it can only ease tensions and be sensitive to diversity.[13] In a recent study on Canada, Kent Weaver argues that "successful conflict management in a democratic society does not mean that there is no conflict, but rather that conflict is resolved in a way that all parties accept as legitimate, even if the outcome is not particularly to their liking."[14] Conflicts must be viewed as an inherent component of all federal societies. Paradoxically, the capacity of a federal system to reflect diversity constitutes a built-in weakness since it allows for conflicts to emerge and be politicized. However, the trust that the constituent units have with regard to the system makes conflict management possible.

What must be stressed again is that federalism is not there to resolve conflicts but to manage them. In so far as federal systems seek to accommodate diversity, conflicts must be recognized as inherent to the federal setting. Diversity invariably produces some conflicts but this, it should be reiterated, does not have to be conceived as a weakness. Canadians, at least until 1982, have tended to respect the conflictual nature prevalent at the point of origin of Canada's federal system, and to view this diversity as a promotable feature of federalism.

Therefore, from a Canadian perspective, an important political use of federalism is found in its long-term capability to manage "antagonistic cooperation."[15] Ivo

Duchacek argues that:

> *A federal constitution may therefore be seen as a political compact that explicitly admits of the existence of conflicting interests among the component territorial communities and commits them all to seek accommodation without outvoting the minority and without the use of force. Or, in other words, a federal constitution expresses the core creed of democracy and pluralism, in territorial terms.*[16]

While retaining the concept of an antagonistic relationship, this interpretation suggests that political groups can join forces to achieve some purposes. Federalism does not entail the elimination of political conflicts. Rather, it proposes to account for situations in which diversity can be fully expressed and find solutions acceptable to all.

In an earlier study done by Ronald Watts for the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, he argued:

> *As in Canada, so in India, Pakistan, Malaysia, Nigeria, Central Africa and Switzerland, linguistic, racial and religious minorities that feared discrimination at the hands of numerical majorities but were unable alone to support effectively a genuine separate independence, have sought provincial autonomy within a federal political system as a way of preserving their own distinct identity and way of life. In each of these countries the multilingual and multicultural character of the society has frequently been cited by statesmen as the crucial characteristic making a federal political system necessary.*[17]

Fundamental to federalism is the need to respect diversities and to encourage them to blossom. However, there is no automatic guarantee of success tor federal arrangements. A significant caveat is offered by Maureen Covell, who takes some distance from Watts' position when stating that:

> *Federalism is not always a guarantee of protection for minorities at the national level. The existence of Quebec as a political unit has not allowed the Quebecois to prevent the perpetuation of the British connection, participation in two world wars, and, most recently, the explicit denial of a Quebec veto over future constitutional revision. The existence of the prairie provinces as institutions did not protect farmers against the effects of eastern economic domination. (...) Federal institutions provide a tool for self-defense but no guarantee of success.*[18]

With hindsight, the success of federalism in ensuring the protection of minorities and territorial interests is something that can never be taken for granted due to the dynamic forces that are competing for political resources. All in all, what is essential to examine is the capacity of these forces to strike a deal that has the potential to satisfy communities sharing a common territory for the long haul. The following

section will present two interconnected principles which we believe are capable of enabling the long term viability of this federal deal.

Autonomy and Union

Federalism's potential for reconciling unity and diversity on the one hand, and conflict management on the other depends on the explicit recognition of the compact that forms the basis of the union. The unequivocal recognition of the compact is dependent on the coexistence of two organizing principles, autonomy and union. That is to say, the autonomy of the constituent units and the union that they have entered into.

An essential element of federalism, according to A.V. Dicey, is that people desiring to find an equilibrium between forces of centralization and decentralization "must desire union, and must not desire unity."[19] A central feature of federalism has been its capability of establishing varying balances between centripetal and centrifugal forces.[20] Difficulties emerge only when a sense of unfair treatment, perceived or real, is being felt by communities.

It is with this background in mind that the Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, also known as the Tremblay Commission, set up by the Quebec Legislative Assembly (later National Assembly) in 1953 should be examined briefly. Particular emphasis is given to the notions of autonomy and union, with the understanding that if one of these two elements is challenged, this may call for an end to federalism.

Only federalism as a political system permits two cultures to live and deve- lop side by side within a single state: that was the reason for the Canadian state's federative form. (...) So, therefore, there can be no federalism without autonomy of the state's constituent parts, and no sovereignty of the various governments without fiscal and financial autonomy.[21]

Consequently, this interpretation of federalism is based on two pillars, autonomy and union. Neither of these two pillars can take precedence over the other without endangering the maintenance of a federal system. To allow one order of government to take precedence over the other is to render federalism a fiction. Federalism is thus a balancing act between these two organizing principles of autonomy and union. The long term viability of the federation depends on the recognition of the compact through these two principles. The question then is how the federal arrangement is to deal with the changes that emerge over time.

Federalism and Change

An important issue is how to accommodate change in federations. From time to time, dynamic forces throw the balance off in one direction or the other, forcing political elites to elaborate political arrangements that fit better the changing realities. According to Trudeau:

> *The compromise of federalism is generally reached under a very particular set of circumstances. As time goes by these circumstances change; the external menace recedes, the economy flourishes, mobility increases, industrialization and urbanization proceed; and also the federated groups grow, sometimes at uneven paces, their cultures mature, sometimes in divergent directions. To meet these changes, the terms of the federative pact must be altered, and this is done as smoothly as possible by administrative practice, by judicial decision, and by constitutional amendment, giving* a *little more regional autonomy here,* a *bit more centralization there, but at the same time taking great care to preserve the delicate balance upon which the national consensus rests.*[22]

The issue of change demonstrates the utility of adopting a compact theory of federalism in cases where the federation reflects the uneasy compromise between the constituent units. A formal constitutional approach runs the risk of ignoring the principles that have defined the federal compact. However, the long term success of the federal arrangement depends on the continuation of the principles of autonomy and union. The compact theory highlights the deal between the distinct nations to share the same state and thus eliminates the danger of relegating change to ad hoc constitutional revisionism. According to J.A. Corry, whatever changes occur it is essential to establish a process that would reflect a state of 'constitutional morality'. In other words, as Banting and Simeon have argued when discussing political transition in Spain,

> *... this suggests that for* a *decision to be reached there must be among the relevant elites some degree of overarching consensus on major goals, which dispute over specific constitutional provisions must not be allowed to threaten. Such elite commitments appear to be what permitted agreement on the new Spanish constitution. They reflect J.A. Corry's emphasis on* a *'constitutional morality' - self-restraint and the realization by majorities that they must not use the full potential of their power to subordinate minorites if long-term success is to be achieved.*[23]

Failing to maintain such a high level of morality and trust between the constituent nations negatively affects the relevance of federalism for plural societies. By nature, the federal compact is one where the constituent nations agree to form a federation. Thus, the federation itself does not represent 'one people'. The changes to the federal arrangement should not alter the original compact between the nations. The

question is one of representation of these constituent nations at the federal level. In federations based on distinct nations sharing the same state, the representation of the constituent units is central to any understanding of federalism. Whitaker, in one of the clearest statements about federalism to date, maintains that:

> *Modern federalism is an institutionalization of the formal limitation of the national majority will as the legitimate ground for legislation. Any functioning federal system denies by its very processes that the national majority is the efficient expression of the sovereignty of the people: a federation replaces this majority with a more diffuse definition of sovereignty. It does this not by denying the democratic principle, as such, but by advancing a more complex political expression and representation in dual (sometimes even multiple) manifestations which may even be contradictory and antagonistic.*[24]

Whitaker's contribution to our understanding of federalism is welcome as it situates the concept in the context of sovereignty and democratic representation. He gives credence to the expression of different majorities in the same state. Instead of arguing that such an understanding challenges the principle of democracy, Whitaker makes the point that federalism allows for a more sophisticated kind of representation whereby sovereignty is more diffused and complex than under a simple majority rule.

It is because of these tra-nsformations that instruments have to be invented to respond to pressing needs. As B.C. Smith appropriately puts it: "Federalism involves special techniques for managing a changing equilibrium between national and regional levels of government (...)"[25] Central to this process, however, is the requirement that consent of all partners is required to modify operative constitutional principles. Failure to obtain such consent jeopardizes the continuity of a country. Once again, the Canadian example is illustrative of such a case, where the consent of a province, (Quebec in this case, the only territory where French has a majority in Canada), was not obtained before making fundamental changes to the Canadian Constitution, e.g. adding a Charter of Rights and Freedoms with little consideration to Quebec's distinct character, and imposing an amending formula which, in most instances, recognizes no right of veto for that province.[26]

Conclusion

So far, we have forced the reader to read between the lines to discern ideas applicable to Cyprus. In this final section we will make our suggestions more explicit. The model of federalism we employ in this paper is one which views the federation as a compact between two or more distinct socio-cultural entities, or 'nations'. The federation is a pragmatic solution to reconciling diversity and unity, by making it possible for the constituent 'nations' to share the same 'state'. However, the long

term viability of this federal arrangement depends on the unequivocal recognition and continuation of this compact. This is by no means the most efficient ideal solution, yet it is the only possible one. A federal arrangement that does not recognize the existence of two separate nations in Cyprus in the form of the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots, is destined to be plagued by instability. As the Quebec-Canada case attests, the issue is not the respective sizes of the communities but the underlying principle of a compact. In the absense of the recognition of the constituent units as 'nations', any technocratically impeccable constitutional arrangement is bound to fail. The autonomy of the constituent units must coexist with the broader union. Elsewhere, Gagnon has argued that it is the lack of recognition of political communities as 'nations' that lead to political conflicts and to the quest of their own recognition as nation-states.[27] The re-emergence of Quebec nationalism could not be a more fitting example of such a denial following the imposition of Canada's new 1982 constitutional order without the express consent either of the Quebecois or of the Quebec National Assembly.

A compact that combines the principles of autonomy and union will not eliminate the problem but will render its management possible. By definition it is the 'second best' option, yet what touches all has to be accepted by all. Therefore, provided the compact is honored, our conclusion is one of cautious optimism for a federal solution in Cyprus.

NOTES

1. From Waite, P.B. (1963) The Confederal Debates in the province of Canada, 1865, p.40 quoted in Gibbins, R. (1987) 'Federal Societies, Institutions, and Politics', in Bakvis, H. and Chandler, W. (eds.), *Federalism and the Role of the State,* Toronto, University of Toronto Press: Buffalo and London.
2. Quoted in Williams, C. H. (1995) 'A Requiem for Canada?', in Smith, G. (ed.), *Federalism: The Multiethnic Challenge.* London and New York: Longman.
3. For a detailed study, see Alain-G. Gagnon and Mary Beth Montcalm, *Quebec: Beyond the Quiet Revolution,* passim.
4. Dumont, F. *Genese de la sociéteé québécoise.* Montréal: Boréal.
5. Livingston, W. S. (1952) 'A Note on the Nature of Federalism', *Political Science Quarterly,* Vol. 67, pp. 81-95.
6. Bashevkin, S. (1982) 'Solitudes in Collision? Pan-Canadian and Quebec Nationalist Attitudes in the late 1970s'. *Comparative Political Studies,* Vol. 23, No. 1 , pp. 3-24.

7. Erk, C. (1996) *Federalism; An Ideal or the 'Second Best?* Unpublished Manuscript, McGill University: Montreal, Canada.
8. This statement should not imply that there is a consensus on the functional benefits of a unitary nation-state. Instead it points out to the perceived advantages of such a unitary arrangement. This intellectual tradition that associates size and centrality with wealth and power can be traced back to Adam Smith and Jean Bodin. However, there are some who dispute this line of argument and believe that the competition inherent in federalism leads to efficiency, and therefore federalism is the most desirable form of governance. For example, see Albert Breton's contribution to Macdonald Commission Report, Albert Breton, "Supplementary Statement to the Report", in the Report of the Royal Commission on the Economic Union and Development Prospects for Canada, Volume 3, Minister of Supply and Services, Canada: Ottawa, 1985.
9. For example in an article on Australian federalism Galligan argues that "federalism works best for countries like Australia that are uniformly liberal, democratic and there are only incidental cultural and sociological differences that are not regionally based", Galligan, B. (1989) 'Federal Theory and Australian Federalism, A Political Science Perspective', in Galligan, B. (ed.), *Australian Federalism,* Longman Chesire: Melbourne. Watts uses a similar logic when he states that the multi-ethnic federations are the hardest to sus tain, Watts, R. (1994) 'Contemporary Views on Federalism', in Bertus de Villiers (ed.), *Evaluating Federal Systems,* Martinus Nijhoff: Dordrecht, Boston and London.
10. Gibbins, R. (1987) 'Federal Societies, Institutions, and Politics', in Bakvis, H. and Chandler, W. M. (eds.) *Federalism and the Role of the State.* University of Toronto Press: Toronto, Buffalo and London, pp. 16-17.This argument also appears in Robinson, I. and Simeon, R. (1994) 'The Dynamics of Canadian Federalism', in Bickerton and Gagnon (eds.) *Canadian Politics.* Second Edition, Peterborough, Ontario. Broadview Press.
11. Robinson, I. and Simeon, R. (1994) 'The Dynamics of Canadian Federalism', in Bickerton, J. and Gagnon, A.G. Ibid. pp. 371-3.
12. Sabetti, F. (1980) *Covenant Language in Canada: Continuity and Change in Political Discourse.* Center for the Study of Federalism, Temple University: Philadelphia, p.6.
13. See Gagnon, A.G. (1989) 'Canadian Federalism: A Working Balance' in Murray Forsyth (e.d.), *Federalism and Nationalism.* Leicester University Press. Leicester, pp. 147-168.

14. Weaver, R. K. (1992) 'Political Institutions and Canada's Constitutional Crisis' in *The Collapse of Canada?* Washington D.C., The Brookings Institution, 9.

15. Grodgins, M. (1966) *The American System: A New View of Government in the United States,* Stokie, Illinois, Rand McNally, p. 327. Also mentioned in Duchacek, I. {1970) *Comparative Federalism: The Territorial Dimension of Politics,* New York, Holt, Rinehart and Winston, Inc. p. 192.

16. Ivo Duchacek, op. cit. p.192.

17. Watts, R. (1970) *Multicultural Societies and Federalism,* Studies of the Royal Commission on Bilingualism and Biculturalism, Ottawa, Information Canada, 15. This suggests that if a political system fails to meet these important requirements the solution available may be sheer independence. The last decade in Canada suggests that Quebec may choose this option in the foreseeable future. See, Gagnon, A.G. and Rocher, F. (eds.) *Repliques aux detracteurs de la souverainete du Quebec,* Montreal, VLB Editeur, in which 29 authors examine the appropriateness of following such a course of action.

18. Coveil, M.(1987) 'Federalization and Federalism: Belgium and Canada' in Bakvis, H. and Chandler W. M. (eds.), *Federalism and the Role of the State,* Toronto University, Toronto Press, p. 76. A similar argument is developed by Silver, A. L. (1982) in *The French-Canadian Idea of Confederation 1864-1900.* Toronto, University of Toronto Press. Elsewhere, Vipond, R.C. (1991) argues in *Liberty and Community: Canadian Federalism and the Failure of the Constitution,* Albany, State University of New York Press, that in the early 1860s, "It was quite natural to think that the distinctive institutions, laws and cultural values of French Canada could best be protected if decisions affecting them were made in the provin- cial legislature of Quebec, the one legislature in which French Canadians would be sure to dominate" pp. 17-18. This quotation *reveals* that protection turned out to be imperfect at times.

19. Dicey A.V. (1908) *Introduction to the Study of the Law of the Constitution.* London, Macmillan, p. 141.

20. See Gagnon, A.G. 'Canadian Federalism: A Working Balance' in Forsyth, M. (ed.), *Nationalism and Federalism.* Leicester, Leicester University Press, pp.160-163.

21. See, Kwavnick, D. (1973) (ed.) *The Tremblay Report: Report of the Royal Commission of Inquiry on Constitutional Problems, Ottawa.* McClelland and Stewart, p. 209 and p. 215.

22. Trudeau, P. E. (1968) *Federalism and the French Canadians,* Toronto, Macmillan, pp. 193-194.

23. Banting, K. and Simeon, R. (1985) 'Introduction: The Politics of Constitutional Change' in *Redesigning the State: The Politics of Constitutional Change in Industrial Nations.* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, p. 20. For a more detailed analysis, see Corry, J. A. (1978) 'The Uses of a Constitution', in *The Constitution and the Future of Canada* Special Lectures of the Law Society of Upper Canada, Toronto: Richard De Boo, pp. 1-15.

24. Regomaad Wjotaler. *A Sovereign Idea: Essays on Canada as a Democratic Community,* p.167.

25. Smith, B.C. (1985) *Decentralization: The Territorial of the State* London, George Allen & Unwin, p. 15. Cf. also M. J. C. Vile, (1977) 'Federal Theory and the "New Federalism"', in *Politics: Journal of the Australian Political Studies Association.*

26. Gagnon has dealt more fully with this question in 'Everything Old is New Again: Canada, Quebec, and Constitutional Impasse', in Abele, F. (1991) (ed.), *How Ottawa Spends 1991: The Politics of Fragmentation.* Ottawa, Carleton University Press, pp.63-105.

27. Gagnon, A. C. 'Quebec's Quest for a Nation-State', *Regional and Federal Studies,* Vol. 6, No. 1., p. 28.

A FEDERAL CYPRUS IN A FEDERAL EUROPE

Nicos Peristianis

Abstract

It would be a great omission to debate matters relating to the European Union and Cyprus, and ignore the tact that they have both resorted to federalism as the way for their future. The European Union first embarked on the federal project some decades ago, while Cyprus is considering adopting a federal solution as a way out of its present political impasse. This paper briefly considers federalism in its main forms and the choice of federal modes of political organization by the European Union and Cyprus. It then notes how consociational/consensus features have been an integral element of federalist arrangements in both cases. However, whereas the consensual elements seem to have worked quite well in the case of the European Union, the same does not seem to apply in the case of Cyprus; a main reason relating to the absence of a suitable political culture in the fatter. It finally considers how accession to the European Union can strengthen civil society and citizenship in Cyprus, thereby improving the chances for success of consensus politics and federalism.

Between Federalism and Confederation

Federalism in one form or another seems to have been adopted or proposed as the appropriate form of political governance in a wide range of cases in the modern world (cf. the Middle East, the ex-Soviet Union, the Balkans). The choice of federalism is becoming so prevalent in the contemporary world, that Elazar talks of a "federal revolution", which he considers to be "among the most widespread – if one of the most unnoticed – of the various revolutions that are changing the face of the globe in our time".[1]

We should note right away that there is no "correct" version of federation: "every actual federation appears 'sui generis', since each responds to a particular set of geographical and historical circumstances".[2] Federalism is not "one, specific, well-defined system of government". It is rather a spectrum of constitutional arrangements involving the combination of self-rule and shared-rule. The constant and primary aim is to achieve political compromise between the apparently contradictory

benefits of union/interdependence and the benefits of autonomy/separation.

CONFEDERATION ⟷ FEDERATION

When political compromise ends up stressing autonomy or separation, we are closer to the Confederation end of the spectrum. When the stress is on union and interdependence, then we are closer to the Federation end of the spectrum.

Confederations developed in Europe "entail the joining together of pre-existing polities to form a common government for specific purposes such as defence, security and welfare, the common government remaining dependant for its existence and strength on the constituent polities".[3]

Federation developed in the United States (out of the previous confederal arrangement) and "involves a polity made up of strong constituent entities and a strong general/central government, each possessing powers delegated to it by the people and empowered to deal directly with the people/citizens in the exercise of these powers".[4]

The rationale behind the choice of federal models of political organization by both Cyprus and the European Union, differs in some substantial respects from the rationale behind the formation of the more "classical" forms of federation and confederation outlined above. In the case of Cyprus we have an example of a polity which was a unitary state (albeit with federal characteristics - cf. "consociational democracy"), which broke up and is exerting efforts to reintegrate on a different basis. In the case of the European Union, a number of states with a long history of independence have been working towards "ever closer union", in order to achieve a number of aims/objectives (among which the economic being the primary one), but without sacrificing their sovereignty.[5]

Let us consider the two cases in more detail. According to Murray Forsyth the case of Cyprus belongs to a category of polities which broke up, or are in danger of breaking up, as a result of incompatible aims or objectives, and are attempting to reconstitute themselves on a looser, and hence more acceptable basis. The constituent parts wish to "keep a distance" because there is a serious lack of trust between them, as a result of previous bad experiences of living together under a more integrated or unitary system. Usually at the root of mistrust lies ethnic rivalry {memories of ethnic discrimination, violence, bloody struggles, forced expulsions, 'ethnic cleansing' and so on.)

At the same time the constituent parts may wish to (or may have to) "keep together" for a variety of possible reasons (cf. geographical proximity, economic viability), their complete separation or autonomy being generally considered an unfavourable

outcome. Thus, some sort of federal arrangement (whether it be federation or confederation) seems to be the only way of keeping such parties "both together and apart".

The Greek-Cypriots are the ones who wish to be "more together than apart". This is because they consider the "break-up" a result, not so much of incompatibility between the parties to ethnic conflict but of foreign intervention(s) by a foreign power(s). Their ideal position would be a unitary state, with themselves enjoying the democratic right of majority rule and the Turkish-Cypriots the rights/protection of a minority group. Failing this, the next best solution is that of a federation with a strong central government.

The Turkish-Cypriots wish to be "more apart than together". They stress the difficult times they had when closely integrated with the Greek-Cypriots in the post-independence unitary state, the violence of the 1963 conflict, their ensuing isolation and marginalization, all leading to a loss of trust. Since their starting point is the "new reality" of the existence of two separate entities, their ideal position is that of two separate states; failing this their next best choice is that of a loose alignment/integration - i.e. confederation.

The two sides have been battling ever since 1974, each pressing for a resolution which comes nearer to their preferred position; the various mediation plans presented seem to naturally revolve around some kind of compromise along the lines of a loose federation.

To return to the general argument, one could agree with Forsyth's observation, that such attempts at federation constitute a response to a "new historical challenge", namely political disintegration, brought about by contemporary ethnic self-determination movements and subsequent efforts for compromise and reintegration. Obviously classic federations had little to do with such "negative motives", since the rationale behind their constitution was an intent to more closely integrate units which were less integrated before.

Let us now turn to the case of the European Union, which constitutes yet another unorthodox federal arrangement. Here the principles of federalism, instead of being applied to the organization/governance of a state, or a union of states, (cf. classical federation) are being utilized to achieve the integration into a supranational union of states which have a long history of independent existence, and which wish to maintain their sovereignty; furthermore, the guiding logic was, and in many ways still is, an economic one (unlike classical federations).

It is well known that the need for European integration became apparent in the aftermath of the Second World War. Politically, European countries wished to ensure that there would be no repeat of the conflict between European states (especially Germany and France) which previously led to the two world wars, devastating the

continent and spilling over to the rest of the world. An equally strong, if not stronger motive was economic: the desire to rebuild a Europe ravaged by war - but also to take advantage of a much larger regional market through removal of barriers to trade, to investment and to labour movement. One could say, of course, that behind these, and of paramount significance, was a strategic consideration: Europeans felt they would become irrelevant in the emerging bipolar world order if they did not pull their strength together, to form a third polar.

European integration was often understood in clearly federal terms. Winston Churchill envisaged as early as 1946 "a kind of United States of Europe". Yet conditions were not ripe at the time and a more gradual 'functionalist' road to unity was chosen instead, which allowed for incremental steps toward integration - mainly within specific areas of policy-making, usually economic, and at a pace controlled by member states. Although cautious and gradual, this approach had far-reaching implications since progressive moves towards economic integration brought about overall integration.[6]

The extent of integration that European federalism should aim for, has been a con- stant source of debate. Denton differentiates between the "Nationalists" and "Federalists" who hold quite different views in this debate.[7]

The Nationalists who have remained loyal to the principle of national sovereignty, believe that the union should be guided by decisions taken at inter-governmental meetings. Characteristic of this view was de Gaulle's vision of a "Europe des patries"/"Europe of the Fatherlands", within which member states would continue to retain the right to veto decisions they considered a threat to vital national interests. Thatcher's polemic versus moves to create a "United States of Europe" followed a similar line of thought, stressing the need to maintain national cultures and identities. If we translate these views into federalist terminology, De Gaulle's and Thatcher's vision of Europe is more that of a confederation than a federation.

Obviously, "Federalists" share the opposing view, believing that the European Union should be based on institutions endowed with supranational powers.

There is a constant battle between these two views, which often ends up in compromise. The Maastricht Treaty for instance can be seen as a hard-fought compromise between 'Federalists' and 'Nationalists'. It contained one decisive supranational development: the economic and monetary union, to be completed before the end of the century. This would clearly require a common monetary policy managed by a European central bank; more controversially, it could require further constraints on the fiscal policies of member states. The treaty also included aspects of political union but kept them largely of an inter-governmental character: a Common Foreign and Security Policy (CFSP), and an Internal Security Policy.

Overall it seems that presently "unifying forces appear too strong for a return to a

Europe des patries, but the dividing forces are also sufficiently well established to make a strongly integrated European federation with a common political culture unlikely in the near future".[8]

Consociational Elements in the Federalist Arrangements

We have seen how Cyprus and the European Union are moving along the federalist path and how the debate continues regarding how far down this path they should move. We have also noted how the causes behind the formation of these federal arrangements differ in both cases to the classical federations and confederations.

We next consider a common feature both cases share, namely the strong "consociational" elements involved in the federalist arrangements pursued. Consociationalism is a term used to describe a form of political accommodation, which tries to deal with the problem of peaceful co-existence in contexts of multi-nationality and multi-ethnicity. It provides a model of government which utilizes consensus politics (cf. "consociational/consensus democracy") and power sharing, so as to facilitate the "peaceful coexistence of more than one nation or ethnic group in a state, on the basis of separation yet equal partnership rather than the domination by one nation or the other(s)".[9]

Lijphart proposed that the 'ideal form' of a consociational democracy entails four major prin ciples.[10]

a) A "grand coalition" government, consisting of representatives drawn from all of the major segments of society (nations/ethnic groups). This is otherwise known as 'elite accommodation', since it is the leading elite groups of the seg- ments who jointly govern the country.

b) Segmental group autonomy, which means that the decision-making is delegated to the various segments/nations/ethnic groups, to the extent possible, either through territorial federalism or "corporate federalism" (non-territorial autonomy, i.e. self-governing institutions - cf. educational) of the segments.

c) A mutual (or minority) veto system, whereby a segment can veto government decisions in matters of vital interest to it.

d) Proportionality in political representation, public service appointments and the allocation of public funds.

These principles are applied in practice through a number of political devices, such as a written constitution (specifying the allocation of powers between the various segmental groups), a bicameral legislature, decentralized government, and others.

Consociationalism or consensus democracy, is considered by many scholars as

the most appropriate form of government for "deeply divided societies". Yet the political regime established with Cyprus independence in 1960, had all the features of a consociational democracy - but lasted only for a few short years. Why was that so? Many critics of consociational principles would support the view that the system itself was to blame - because, among other things, it maintained, legitimized and even strengthened segmental claims, reinforcing instead of ameliorating ethnic divisions. Supporters of consociationalism would counter that the conditions favourable for success of the system were not there - for instance, there were no prior traditions of elite accommodation, neither were there any cross-cutting cleavages across ethnic divisions, and most importantly there was no overarching sense of loyalty to the whole or to the state.[11]

Even though the consociational .model was originally utilized to describe the political system of particular states, it has of late been applied to account for the quite unique features of the European Union. Tsinisizelis, for instance, proposes the term "Confederal Consociation", for the European Union, pointing out that the system can be seen to "draw its inspiration" from the idea of "consociational democracy". Thus the Union consists of a plurality of national communities and is governed by a "grand coalition" of national elites. There is a mutual veto system for decisions sensitive to segmental/national interests, proportionality in political representation, as well as the practice of balancing benefits for all parties involved in the interstate negotiation processes, through the achievement of "package deals" which reinforce the integrating trends of the system. There is, in general, a constant effort to search for commonly acceptable solutions and far-reaching "amicable agreements".[12]

The European Union has thus achieved "pluralistic co-habitation", by moving from the principle of self-determination to the practice of co-determination of the constituent states. The consociational elements adopted (which seemed not to have worked in the case of Cyprus, back in the 1960s) do away with majoritarian democracy which carries the danger of alienating minorities, especially when it comes to decisions vital to sensitive national interests; possible sources of conflict are reduced or eliminated. On the surface it may seem that some of the widely accepted norms and practices of republican traditions tend to get compromised: in fact, we hereby have a redefinition of democracy – which ceases to be seen as an end in itself but as a "flexible organizational mechanism", as a "rationally controlled procedure" in the search for viable compromises, for cultivating a culture of tolerance, pluralistic coex- istence and the peaceful settlement of disputes.

Such an approach seems to be the only viable approach in a context of multinationality and heterogeneity of cultures. Since there is no feeling of common national identity, some other bond for sustaining social and political integration must both preexist but also be nurtured. Indeed, Europe may be a "mosaic of cultures and languages" but, despite diversity the various Western European countries have man-

aged to maintain a common pattern of liberal democracy, which constitutes the basis for closer integration. There is thus a "compatibility of societies", which share common political and civil values, norms and expectations. Strong civil societies and a strong tradition of citizenship make possible the adoption of consensus politics for peaceful coexistence as well as for the achievement of common aims and objectives.

In the case of Cyprus consensus politics was not practiced back in the 1960s and this led to the collapse of consociational democracy. Consensus politics was not possible in an era, which was preceded by intense ethnic strife and a "dialectic of intolerance".[13] A weak civil society and the absence of a tradition of strong citizenship could not support the necessary culture of tolerance required for living in the fragile consociational house.

Forty years later, can we ascertain whether the required political culture and the consequent political maturity are there? We should remind ourselves that, for any of the proposed federal solutions (which always contain strong elements of the consociational philosophy) to work, the primary condition of success is the existence of a "federal spirit". One could claim with a good degree of confidence that in many ways things are much better now than they were in the 1960s. If we consider Greek-Cypriot society, for instance, it is obvious that in the post-Makarios era, with the growth of party politics, new social movements (cf. women's, ecology, human rights and as of late conflict resolution groups) as well as the rapid expansion of the mass media and all kinds of pressure groups, civil society seems to have matured considerably. Citizenship has also become better established. Turning to the Turkish- Cypriot community we may also note some progress – but the weakness of civil soci- ety and citizenship are definitely much more pronounced there (cf. "strong-man" rule is still a reality, along with the strong presence of the Turkish army and Turkish settlers).[14] Overall, things do not seem to have progressed far enough to enable us to talk of strong civil societies and citizenships, and the growth of such political cultures that would nurture the federalist ethic. Yet if we consider the case of joining the European Union, we could see some hope of pushing developments in this direction. Strangely enough, this is a benefit that accession will provide, which is rarely discussed by anyone.

Accession, the European Union and Consensus Politics

Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots have different attitudes towards joining the European Community. The Turkish-Cypriots are obviously aware of the important economic benefits which could accrue following accession, but they are still quite negative, or at least skeptical, of the move, their main worry apparently being the problem of security. More specifically the Turkish-Cypriots, for various historical-political reasons, treasure highly the military protection afforded to them by Turkey. Hence, their stress on Turkey continuing to be one of the guarantor powers in a future settlement,

and their strong preference for Cyprus to join the European Union only after, or concurrently, with Turkey.

What the Turkish-Cypriots seem not to realize or adequately appreciate is that in the post Cold-War era, "security has acquired a broader meaning".[15] As one of the declarations of the European Community itself states:

> "Security in the broadest sense encompasses not only military but also political aspects, respect for human rights and fundamental freedoms, as well as economic, social and environmental aspects".[16]

Obviously, the Turkish-Cypriot community will need all the assistance it can get to improve its economic position, to further democratization and build a stronger civil society as "economic insecurity and weak institutions for domestic conflict resolution, are primary sources of disorder" .

Greek-Cypriots seem to be some of the strongest supporters of joining the European Union. For one, they have pinned high hopes on joining the Union as a means of resolving the political problem in a way, and within a context, which will secure the future reunification of the island, which is one of their primary objectives. Yet they seem to believe that the resolution of the Cyprus problem will somehow be a magical outcome of accession into the European Union. The example of the Irish problem demonstrates how this is not the case and that successful conflict resolution remains the result of laborious and painful political processes, in a spirit of mutual understanding and tolerance. Hopefully for them, it is precisely the enhancement of these latter qualities, which will be one of the greater benefits that will accrue to Cyprus, as a result of European Union accession.

We can better understand how this change in political culture could be achieved, by considering Deutsch's and Adler's analysis of how an "imagined (security) community", such as the European Union, could provide both the context and the support for such a change. Deutsch and his associates introduced the concept of "pluralistic security community", to describe a union of member states which have retained their legal independence as separate states but have become sufficiently integrated so as to enable each member to entertain "dependable expectations" that disputes among members will be settled peacefully.[17] Such confidence is based on the fact that members possess compatible core values derived from common institutions, mutual responsiveness and the existence of a sense of 'we-ness' or a 'we-feeling' among states. Security communities are socially constructed and rest on shared practical knowledge concerning the behavior among states as to the peaceful settlement of disputes. In liberal democracies, this practical intersubjective knowledge is based on historical experiences and the institutionalization of liberal values in 'civic cultures', "whose concepts of role of government, legitimacy and duties of citizenship, and the rule of law constitute the identities of individuals". This in turn encourages the creation of strong civil societies.[18]

The behaviour of member-states in a pluralistic security community such as the European Union reproduces this civic culture, which, in turn, constructs an overarching community-region civic culture.

Adler notes that liberal pluralistic communities (such as the European Union) may exert influence through the various forms of power available to them (cf. sheer power, the power to set agendas and ideological power); what is interesting is his addition to the list of such powers, of another form of power, namely that of setting the "underlying rules of the game, of defining what constitutes acceptable play and of getting other players to commit themselves to these rules, because these rules are now part of the self-understanding of the players". This power to influence the norms and rules which frame and redefine reality and thereby determine the range and value of political choices as Adler notes are," the most subtle and most effective form of power".[19]

When applied to the case of the European Union and the power it has over aspiring members, the argument becomes that, by eliciting acceptance of the liberal/democratic norms and values through which the political game within the European Community is played, aspiring entrants are encouraged to develop a new self-understanding and a new self-definition/identity; i.e. we (Cyprus) are a democratic state and a democratic state solves its internal and external disputes through peaceful means, exercises tolerance, respects civil rights and so forth. In other words the shift in emphasis is that:

> "... the state follows democratic norms not just because its people believe in democracy, but because the category 'democratic state' now defines, in part their identity".[20]

It is important to appreciate a theoretical point here, coming from Adler's constructionist perspective, namely that the "sense of community" within the European Union is no longer seen as "a matter of feelings, emotion and affection, but as a cognitive process through which common identities are created". Thus, the point is not whether one is European because one "likes" or "feels warm" towards other Europeans (whether they be British, German, French, etc). "What matters is how we perceive and define ourselves and not how we feel about others".

One could counter that the existence of the "stronger" national identities, (based on deep emotive feelings, common history, myths and memories), make the creation of an overarching European identity difficult, if not impossible to achieve. Habermas notes that a shared European identity is possible if it builds on the civic dimension of nationality, i.e. citizenship, rather than on the myths of common origin, and believes we can have "cautious optimism for the course European developments could take".[21] Laffan stresses the importance of appeals to the shared collective future and destiny (rather than to the past) and the need to accept diversity as a positive value - i.e. that one is European through being German or British etc.[22] Barry Buzan adds

that people are quite capable of holding multiple identities at the same time: "one can, for example, be English, British, European and Western, simultaneously".[23]

One could only note, in closing, that such insights can help Cypriots deal with the issue of their own collective identities, prompting the realization that nothing stops them from being Greek- or Turkish-Cypriot and European, whilst living in a federal, democratic Cyprus, characterized by European consensus politics.

NOTES

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3. Elazar D. (1987) *Exploring Federation.* Tuscaloosa: University of Alabama Press.
4. Ibid.
5. Forsyth M. (1996) *The Contemporary Meaning of Confederation* (in Greek), in *Tsinisizelis M.,* Thoughts on the European Union (in Greek), Athens: I. Sideris. Forsyth provides a similar analysis for the prevalence of confederation as an attractive paradigm, adopted as appropriate for the solution of many contemporary problems. Although Forsyth narrows his focus to confederation, my view is that it is federalist solutions in general, (whether federations or confederations) which seem to be on the rise (Elazar 1987).
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21. See Haberman J. (1996) 'Citizenship and National Identity', in Steenbergen Bart Von (ed.) *The Condition of Citizenship.* London: Sage Publications.
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OVERVIEW OF CONFLICT RESOLUTION ACTIVITIES IN CYPRUS: THEIR CONTRIBUTION TO THE PEACE PROCESS

Benjamin J. Broome

Abstract

This paper aims to provide an overview of the conflict resolution activities in Cyprus and an examination of their role in the peace process. As such its focus will be on what is otherwise know as 'Track Two' diplomacy. Reference will also be made to the lessons learned from these activities.

One of the most unfortunate results of the lack of progress toward a political settlement in Cyprus is the increased distance between the two communities, leading to distorted images of the other, growing mistrust, and increased differences in culture and mentality. The events of August 1996, in which several individuals were killed in the buffer zone, demonstrate that the level of frustration among the general population is rising and the situation in Cyprus is quite volatile. The tension following these events led to a rise in extreme nationalism, increasing the voice of hardliners and making it more difficult for peace builders to promote trust towards the other community. Many experts fear that even if an agreement is signed, it will be difficult to "sell" it to the general population, and there may be serious attempts to sabotage the agreements. For many, the situation is dismal, offering little hope for settlement in the near future.

In contrast to the pessimistic situation on the political *level,* in recent years there has been significant progress in bringing citizens from the two communities together for various activities. It has become clear that diplomatic efforts that focus only on the official level are not sufficient. Increasingly, diplomats, local officials, and the citizens of Cyprus are recognizing that bi-communal activities offer one of the few ways to make progress, while the political situation remains deadlocked. There is now widespread recognition by the diplomatic community that much work must be done at the citizen level in order for official efforts to be successful.

During the period 1994-1996, I worked in Cyprus as a Fulbright Scholar, offering

workshops, seminars, and training in the areas of communication, problem solving, and conflict resolution. My colleagues in this endeavor consisted of a core group of individuals from both communities who are committed to efforts at the citizen level to promote understanding, confidence, and reconciliation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The participants in this core group created a collective vision for building peace in Cyprus, and we worked together on a number of conflict resolution projects with a variety of bi-communal groups. I came to deeply appreciate and respect the motivation and commitment of the individuals in this core group, and I gained a great deal of satisfaction from working with them. I believe that their activities are playing a key role in moving Cyprus toward a lasting peace, and I see their work as critical in successfully implementing any political agreement that may be reached.

In this essay I will attempt to provide an overview of the conflict resolution activities in Cyprus and an examination of their role in the peace process. I will also make some observations about what we have learned from the conflict resolution activities. While the views that I will express are those of a third-party scholar, I will attempt to relate my personal experience in Cyprus rather than present primarily academic theory and research. The latter has been done by several respected scholars, and I would like to take advantage of this opportunity to personalize the case for conflict resolution activities by drawing from my own experiences in Cyprus.

Before continuing, I must point out that there are other bi-communal programs that have goals in common with those that I will describe here, although they were not initiated under the rubric of "conflict resolution". Rather, they were focused on specific concerns that needed to be addressed in a bi-communal setting. UNHCR (United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees) has been the primary leader in promoting these types of activities, creating bi-communal task forces to deal with sewage systems, architectural restoration, medical services and the like (see Lasaan, 1997). Other diplomatic entities, such as the Goethe Institute and the French Cultural Center, have sponsored bi-communal programs in the arts, and the European Union has organized two very successful forums with the trade unions. For a number of years, the Slovak embassy has hosted meetings between the leaders of the political parties in the two communities, and the British have sponsored at least one ongoing bi-communal group. The conclusions I present might apply to the experiences of these groups as well, but my focus will be on activities that are directly connected to the academic study and practice of conflict resolution.

Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus

Conflict resolution activities have progressed through five identifiable phases (see Figure 1 below).

Figure 1: Overview of Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus

The arrow should be interpreted as "Made Possible" or

"Laid the Groundwork For" the subsequent phases.

Phase V: Local Initiatives in Conflict Resolution (1995-1997)

- Agora/Bazar to form 15 bi-communal project teams, 1995.
- Special projects (e.g. music concerts) and study groups (e.g. federation & E.U.) 1995-1997.
- Ongoing meetings & workshops for Educators, Citizens group, management trainees, others, 1995-1997.
- Pivotal Ledra Palace gathering after August events, 1996.
- Conflict Resolution Skills Training workshops for university students, 1997.
- Workshops in Turkish Cypriot community for various groups (e.g., women's organizations), 1996-1997.
- Presentations, exhibitions, and workshops in Greek Cypriot community by Peace Center, 1994-1997.
- Training for groups outside Cyprus (Israeli-Palestinian group, Irish Group, London Cypriots), 1997.
- Internet Project, Hade Magazine, Co-Villager visits, youth encounters, environmentalists, others, 1997.

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Phase IV: Interactive Design and Problem Solving Workshops (1994-1997) (see Broome, 1996; Broome, in press)

- 9-month series of weekly design sessions on peacebuilding efforts in Cyprus, 1994-1995 (GIC &*TIC* "Problematiques", Collective Vision Statement, Collaborative Action Agenda).
- Ongoing design workshops held with young business leaders, young political leaders, university students, and women's group, 1995 & 1996.
- Design workshop *w/ GIC, TIC,* Greek, & Turkish peacebuilders, Les Diablerets, Switzerland, 1997. Interactive Management Training Workshop, December, 1997.

↑

Phase III: Training Program in Conflict Resolution (1991-1997) (see Diamond & Fisher, 1995)

- Series of mini-workshops on conflict resolution in Nicosia, 1991 & 1992 (Diamond).
- 10-day workshop in Oxford, England, 1993 (IMTD}.
- Bi-Commural Steering Committee formed, 1993 (IMTD).
- Six 7-day workshops held in U.S. and Nicosia, 1994 (Cyprus Consortium}.
- Five 7-day workshops held in U.S. and Nicosia, 1995-1997 (Cyprus Consortium).

↑

Phase II: Citizen-Organized Bi-Communal Contacts (1989-1991) (see Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993)

- Local Steering Committee formed by participants in Berlin workshop, 1989
- Bi-Communal meetings and conflict resolution workshops at Ledra Palace, 1990.
- Citizens Movement for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus formed, 1990.
- Joint art exhibits, music concerts, and poetry evenings, 1990 & 1991.

↑

Phase I: Periodic Third-Party Problem Solving Workshops (1996-1993) (see Fisher, 1997)

- One 5-day workshop for high-level representatives in London, 1966 (Burton).
- One 5-day workshop for political leaders in Rome, 1973 (Talbot).
- Series of meetings for intellectuals in Nicosia (' Operation Locksmith"), 1985 (Doob).
- Two weekend workshops at Harvard, 1979 & 1984 (Kelman).
- Two 4-day workshops for educators in Nicosia, 1993 (Fisher).

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Although there is some overlap between the various phases, the events of each phase served as the impetus for the phase that followed. As Figure 1 suggests, much of the conflict resolution activity in Cyprus has involved the assistance of outside third parties. At the same time, it was a local initiative that was responsible for bringing in most of these experts from abroad, and the current situation is characterized by a preponderance of locally-directed activity. From a relatively humble beginning, some form of conflict resolution work in Cyprus now takes place several times weekly, and hundreds of people are waiting for the opportunity to become involved .

The first phase of conflict resolution activities dealing with the Cyprus conflict started in 1966, when John Burton and his colleagues in London offered a five-day workshop in "controlled communication" (see Burton, 1969) that brought together high-level representatives from the two communities (Mitchell, 1981). Some years later, in 1973, an informal seminar involving political leaders of the two communities was held in Rome (Talbot, 1977). Attempting to build on the success of this event, Lawrence Doob made plans to offer a workshop in Cyprus in July 1974, but the events of that period precluded such an activity (see Doob, 1987). A locally organized workshop involving intellectuals, called "Operation Locksmith", was held with Doob's participation in 1985. In 1979 and again in 1984 problem-solving workshops were conducted for community leaders by Herbert Kelman and his colleagues at Harvard University (see Stoddard, 1986). Ron Fisher held a series of 4 workshops over a five-year period, with the two primary workshops focusing on the educational system in the two communities (see Fisher 1992 & 1997).

The second phase began with a local initiative of intercommunal contacts that started in September 1989 (see Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993). Following their participation in a workshop in Berlin, a group of individuals from both communities formed a steering committee and engaged the assistance of the United Nations in arranging bi-communal meetings. Sixty-five individuals participated in the first workshop, which was given positive press coverage, and numerous follow-up meetings were held, both in a bi-communal setting and in separate community groups. In mid-1990, the contacts were institutionalized into a joint social action movement under the name "The Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Citizens' Movement for Democracy and Federation in Cyprus". This group sponsored several public presentations and discussions, and it organized a number of talks by foreign diplomats stationed in Cyprus. Other meetings were organized to jointly study and analyze the concept of federation, and there were joint art exhibits, music concerts, and poetry evenings. The groups encountered difficulties in holding many of their planned events, primarily because political concerns often prevented the granting of permission to Turkish Cypriots to attend bi-communal meetings. Nevertheless, a large number of people were exposed to conflict resolution concepts and principles through this citizens' initiative. It was during this phase that the Peace Center was

formed in the Greek Cypriot community.[1]

The third phase began in July 1991, when Louise Diamond, a conflict resolution specialist from the Institute for Multi-Track Diplomacy (IMTD) in the United States, visited Cyprus at the invitation of members of the newly formed Peace Center in the Greek Cypriot community. During this visit and on a subsequent trip in November 1991 she met with members of both communities, as well as the international diplomatic community, to explore the need for training in conflict resolution and how funding could be secured for such efforts. Some of the people with whom she worked had taken part in the earlier workshops conducted by Ron Fisher. In April 1992 Diamond offered several public presentations and mini-workshops on conflict resolution, and in October 1992 she conducted a full-day workshop in each community. A joint steering committee[2] was formed for purposes of promoting conflict resolution efforts in Cyprus, and plans were drawn up for offering more extensive training. Their plans were eventually realized in July 1993, when a group of 10 Greek Cypriots and 10 Turkish Cypriots went to Oxford, England for a 10-day workshop facilitated by Louise Diamond and her associates (see Diamond & Fisher, 1995).

The Oxford workshop proved to be pivotal in forming a strong and committed group of citizen peace builders that spanned the political spectrum in both communities and included people from various levels of society. Although its participants (particularly the Greek Cypriots) were subjected to wide-spread criticism and harsh personal attacks in the media, the event led to a sustained effort in conflict resolution activities that has continued to the present day. Partly as a result of the success of this program, a number of conflict resolution workshops were held in the summer of 1994 organized by the Cyprus Fulbright Commission (CFC) and conducted by the Cyprus Consortium, a group that consists of IMTD, the Conflict Management Group (CMG) of Harvard University, and National Training Laboratory (NTL) based in Virginia. The team leaders for this effort were Louise Diamond and her colleague Diana Chigas (from CMG). Funded by U.S. Agency for International Development and administered by CFC, several week-long workshops were offered, including two that covered basic conflict resolution principles and skills and one that offered training for those interested in conducting local conflict resolution workshops. Additional workshops were held in the United States for policy leaders and for returning scholarship students. During the period 1995-1997, more workshops conducted by the Cyprus Consortium were held both in Cyprus and in the United States, including an advanced training of trainers workshop. Currently, the Cyprus Consortium is putting together a bi-communal team that will conduct an intractability study to examine why the conflict has been so difficult to resolve and to find ways to move forward in a productive manner.

The fourth phase had its beginnings in 1994, with the establishment of the resident Fulbright Scholar position in conflict resolution. This position was requested by

those who had participated in various conflict resolution efforts in previous years. It was a bi-communal effort, initiated by those who had been involved in the Citizens' Movement for Democracy and Federation, and brought to fruition by the efforts of Daniel Hadjittofi, Executive Director of the Cyprus Fulbright Commission. Both the local initiators and the Fulbright Commission saw the need for an outside third-party expert in conflict resolution who could be in full-time residence over an extended period in order to offer on-going training and to help facilitate bi-communal contacts. Initially, this position was offered as a "serial" fellowship intended to be repeated for a three-year period, contingent upon its success. It was extended for a fourth term beginning in 1997, and a fifth term has already been approved for 1998. Most of these terms cover a nine-month period.[3]

Before taking up the Fulbright position in September of 1994, I participated as a member of the Cyprus Consortium's training team for the summer 1994 workshops. From these workshops there emerged a core group of individuals who expressed a commitment to offer conflict resolution workshops and develop projects that promote greater awareness within each community and greater understanding between communities. They included participants from most of the earlier workshops, including the London educationalist group, the local "Citizens' Movement", and the Oxford workshop, as well as newer members who joined the process for the first time during the summer 1994 workshops. They called themselves the "Conflict Resolution Trainers", and they are often referred to simply as the "Trainers".

During the nine months from October of 1994 through June of 1995, a series of planning and design workshops were conducted for this group of thirty-two individuals, which consisted of approximately equal numbers of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. A problem solving and design process referred to as Interactive Management (IM) was used (see Broome & Chen, 1992; Broome & Keever, 1989). IM has been successfully applied in many parts of the world to help groups deal with complex problem situations (see Broome & Cromer, 1991; Broome & Christakis, 1988; Warfield, 1995). The design sessions focused on developing a strategy for peace-building efforts in Cyprus. During these sessions, the group progressed through three stages of planning and design: (1) analysis of the current situation, (2) goal setting for the future, and (3) development of a collaborative action agenda (see Broome, in press). The group met in the evenings on a weekly basis, and occasionally on weekends. In the beginning months of the work I met with the Greek Cypriot and the Turkish Cypriot groups separately, because the political situation did not permit bi-communal meetings. These became possible in February of 1995, after which we met together in the buffer zone.

Several important results emerged from this series of design workshops. First, each community group produced a systems analysis of the obstacles to peace-building efforts in Cyprus. By exploring the relationships among various factors that

inhibit efforts to build peace, the group was able to present a holistic picture of the situation confronting those who work for peace in each community. Their analyses were the source of much learning when the two community groups exchanged their products at their first bi-communal meeting, and they have been instructive to those outside the group interested in a deeper analysis of the situation. Second, the bi-communal group created a "collective vision statement" for the future of peace-building activities in Cyprus. They proposed goals for their efforts and explored the manner in which various goals support each other, resulting in a structure of goals that could guide their choices and their actions. They struggled together to understand and appreciate ideas that at first seemed incompatible with their own community's goals, and in the end they developed an inclusive product that addressed the needs and concerns of the collective whole. Third, the group developed a plan of activities that would guide their work over the following 2-3 years. They proposed a total of 242 separate possibilities for workshops, presentations, training programs, and other events that could make a difference in Cyprus. From this large set, they selected 15 projects for immediate implementation, and they held a bi-communal "agora/bazaar", or "activities fair", at which they "recruited" interested participants to join them in carrying out the 15 projects.[4]

The work of this core group of conflict resolution trainers over nine months, capped by the agora/bazaar in 1995, marked the start of the fifth phase, which proved to be a major turning point for conflict resolution work in Cyprus. For the first time, there was a significant expansion of types of activities and numbers of participants involved in conflict resolution activities, and most of the training was provided by Cypriots rather than by outside parties. Guided by their vision statement and the set of 15 projects, the core group of conflict resolution trainers formed new groups with young business leaders, young political leaders, educationalists, students, women, and various assemblies of citizens. Other groups formed to study or examine special topics, such as European Union issues, the concept of federation, or identity concerns. Special events were held, such as concerts, poetry evenings, and other cultural activities. At the end of 1996, over 300 people were involved in ongoing groups, and hundreds more had been exposed to conflict resolution prin- ciples and concepts through various weekend workshops. During 1997 there was a significant expansion of bi-communal activities, and at the time of this writing more than 1500 people are actively involved in various groups and projects, many of them started by their initial participation in a conflict resolution workshop.

Although most of the current activities are locally initiated, the Fulbright Commission has continued to support them, particularly through the continuation of the Resident Scholar position. The Fulbright Scholars have continued to work with many of the previously-formed groups, and they have provided training in facilita- tion to many of the newly-formed groups as they dealt with relational and organiza- tional problems. In addition, they have served as a resource and mentor to those

most active in the conflict resolution work. The presence of a third-party scholar at a critical time in the expansion of the conflict resolution activities was invaluable as the activities gained momentum. With much of the introductory conflict resolution training now being offered by local facilitators, the third-party scholars are able to concentrate on either advanced or specialized training, often leading workshops that are held outside Cyprus.

Contribution of Conflict Resolution Activities to the Peace Process

While it may be premature to state that a bona fide citizens' movement for peace has come into full swing, there is no doubt that the conflict resolution activities over the past several years have provided the impetus for inter-communal cooperation on a scale that has probably never existed in Cyprus, certainly not in the past 33 years. It is very difficult to know how much influence the conflict resolution training has had on the political process of negotiating an agreement, but in a small society such as Cyprus it is inevitable that ideas and views have made their way into the thinking of officials. Although many people are critical of conflict resolution activities, they have set the stage for bi-communal business ventures and the establishment of bi-communal institutions that will be critical for developing strong connections between the two communities after a settlement is reached.

In essence, the bi-communal activities show that a federation can work in Cyprus, and they provide an arena in which participants gain "practice" in implementing the federal model. Such a model requires a very different attitude and approach on the part of both communities than currently exists. The distortion of the past, the negative images of the other community, the placement of blame on the other, the lack of trust between the two sides, and the unwillingness to make concessions all hamper efforts to find a solution to the Cyprus problem, and they make it unlikely that any political agreement, particularly one involving federation, can be successfully implemented. The conflict resolution activities can help overcome these obstacles, and they can help develop more productive attitudes and approaches. Specifically, they can lead to:

1. A more balanced view of the past

It would be misleading to suggest that anyone can be completely objective about the past, but the deliberate distortion of history to serve primarily political purposes creates unnecessary division and presents a serious obstacle to reconciliation. Generally, both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are very selective in their memory of past events, and their description of these events is far from objective. The past has been distorted beyond recognition by the educational systems and political propaganda of both sides. Such one-sided interpretations of historical events push the two communities further apart and allow little room for healing

processes. In the conflict resolution workshops, participants are able to hear the other side of the story, to listen to a different interpretation of the past. They have the opportunity to help each other understand the distortions and to correct the misperceptions. Members of both communities learn that the view of events they have come to accept as the "truth" is biased and one-sided. By listening to another viewpoint, participants begin to understand their own history better, and they develop a desire for correcting their own community's interpretation and presentation of the "facts".

2. Less negative images of the other community

It is difficult to share a small geographical area with someone you do not like, respect, or otherwise consider as your equal, and it is especially difficult if the other is considered your enemy. Both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots tend to paint a negative image of each other. The general Turkish-Cypriot description of Greek Cypriots is especially harsh, often portraying the Greek Cypriots as suppressors and murderers. Although there is acknowledgment of the "good Greek Cypriots", the all-too-common image is one of extremists intent on exterminating the Turkish Cypriots. At first glance it might seem that the Greek Cypriots are less negative in their portrayals of the Turkish Cypriots, especially given the often-heard references to the kindness of Turkish-Cypriot neighbors and their affection for certain individuals. However, it becomes clear upon closer examination that the Turkish Cypriots are not viewed with respect or equality. Such images of the other do not make it easy to enter into productive negotiations about issues that divide communities. From their participation in conflict resolution workshops, individuals are able to encounter members of the other community as fellow human beings rather than as objects of hatred or contempt. Turkish Cypriots learn that their neighbors on the other side of the buffer zone are usually well-intentioned, even though they make mistakes. Greek Cypriots come to accept Turkish Cypriots as equals - intellectually, socially, and culturally. Both do away with the extreme images that have been promoted in their media and educational system, adopting a more realistic picture of the other community. They realize that a wide variety of views and intentions exist in both communities, and the stereotypes and prejudices that have dominated their thinking about the other is both counterproductive and dangerous.

3. Acceptance of mutual responsibility for the current situation

It is rare that full responsibility for a problem can be attributed solely to one party. In Cyprus the case can be made easily that both parties share the blame equally (along with Turkey, Greece, the U.K. and the United States). Yet in each community, the tendency is to place almost full blame for the situation on the other. This kind of blaming places each of the parties in a defensive position, causing each to focus on attacking the other rather than acknowledging its own responsibility for creating and maintaining the situation. Such blaming actions quickly spiral into a mutually

destructive exchange of accusations, making it impossible for the two sides to consider concessions to the other. While the conflict resolution workshops cannot erase the feeling that the other is to blame for the troubles that divide the island, they go a long way toward helping individuals accept the notion of co-responsibility. Only when conflict is viewed as mutually created can parties work together in resolving it. By analyzing the situation in Cyprus in an atmosphere where all views can be heard and respected, the participants are able to understand the complexity of the conflict, and they learn that simplistic "finger-pointing" is of no value in promoting realistic solutions to the conflict.

4. Increased trust of the other

No relationship can last long without the existence of mutual trust. Lack of confidence in the intentions of the other leads to continuous questioning of each other's motives. It is clear that both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots are suspicious of the motives of the other community. Even more serious, each side doubts the sincerity of the other about wanting an agreement. Each believes that the other is gaining positive benefits from the current situation and stands only to lose if the conflict ends. Such mistrust leads to continuous posturing by both sides, resulting in a game of exaggerated demands and resistance to backing off first for fear that one will take advantage of the other. Through the interpersonal contacts that occur in the conflict resolution workshops, participants build trusting relationships with mem- bers of the other community. A climate of openness and security often develops, in which true sharing can take place. Of course, increased trust in a few individuals does not eliminate the overall distrust of the other's authorities and their intentions vis-a-vis one's own community, but it helps to differentiate the individual human beings that make up the other community from the official stances stated by author- ities for public consumption. In the long run, this more sophisticated understanding of the other community and the development of trust in individuals from that community will make it easier to support ideas that move the process forward, rather than retreating behind the wall of unrealistic demands.

5. Willingness to promote positive steps toward reconciliation

No deadlock can be broken until one side or the other makes the first conciliatory gesture. If each side maintains a hard-line stance, it offers no way for the other to take positive steps that might relax the situation and lead to a positive climate for negotiation. In this case, it is not so much what one or the other says or does as what they fail to say or do. Although both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots sometimes use a rhetoric of cooperation, neither offers suggestions that might help defuse the tension. Each is afraid of taking the first step toward building confidence. In order for fruitful discussions to take place between the two sides, each needs to offer an opening toward peace, a window in which a future could be built together. Once participants have lost some of their fear of the other, it becomes much easier

for them to promote actions that send positive messages to the other community. Members of the conflict resolution groups are able to see the effects of their own hard-line policies on the other community and how these play into the hands of the extremists. They learn first-hand how damaging certain policies and actions can be for accomplishing the very goals they are intended to advance. These individuals can serve as a moderate voice in their own community, realizing that strength comes from a willingness to reach out toward the other as much as it does from attempts to push the other away.

The attitudes and approaches described above are not always accepted as legitimate goals by those who favor a maintenance of the status quo. In fact, it is precisely because they help bring about such changes that conflict resolution activities are often criticized. For some, the "truth" about the past is not to be questioned; the enemy cannot be regarded as one's friend or equal; accepting responsibility is an admission of guilt; trusting the other is dangerous; and compromise of one's position is a sign of weakness. Viewed in this light, conflict resolution activities are nothing less than attempts to undermine the position of those in power, to destroy the hard work that has been done to build up one's case against the other community, to poison the minds of people so that they cannot see the true dangers. While these fears must be acknowledged, they can only be judged as unformed and short-sighted. In the long run, no viable solution to the Cyprus problem can be found if the current attitudes and approaches continue to rule the day. Changes must occur so that reconciliation and cooperation replace acrimony and discord. To the extent that conflict resolution training can promote these changes, it must be seen as playing a crucial role in the peace process.

Major Findings from the Conflict Resolution Activities in Cyprus

Based on my own experience and on what I have learned from the other conflict resolution activities in Cyprus, several observations and findings emerge. Although I will not provide a direct comparison with situations elsewhere, my own findings are consistent with what we have learned from application of conflict resolution activities in other parts of the world.

1. There is a great desire within each community to know the people of the other community.

When examined from a purely objective point of view, there should be little enthusiasm within either community to communicate and develop relationships across the "green line". The negative portrayals of each other in the press, and the educational system, and from political propaganda, combined with the difficulties surrounding any form of communication or contact, do little to promote interest in bicommunal meetings. Fortunately, we have found that the waif of separation, even

though it has existed for more than a generation, has not destroyed the desire of people to know their neighbors. People are eager to come together, and it is not only because of curiosity about "life on the other side". Many people have expressed to me that they feel a part of themselves missing because they are separated from one another. There is a spirit of kinship that exists between the two communities, and most people are eager for the "family feud" to end so they can develop more normal relations with their "cousins".

Less than three years ago, there were only a handful of people involved in regular bi-communal contacts. As the conflict resolution work developed, it became clear that there exists a large unspoken desire to join these activities. This is evidenced by the hundreds of individuals who have participated in conflict resolution workshops and the thousands of others who have attended various bi-communal events, such as concerts or receptions organized by the United Nations. The number of people currently involved in various bi-communal groups has continued to grow despite the fact that for large periods of time bi-communal contacts were not permitted by the Turkish Cypriot authorities. Today the most pressing problem is the need for more people with training in conflict resolution who can work as facilitators with new groups that are ready to be formed. This increase in contacts has not eliminated the mistrust and anger toward the other community, but there clearly exists a willingness to meet together to work on overcoming these difficulties.

2. Productive dialogue between the two communities can take place under the appropriate conditions.

When speaking about bi-communal activities with my Greek Cypriot friends who are not involved in the conflict resolution activities, one of the most common statements that I have heard goes something like this: "If the Turkish troops left Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots and the Greek Cypriots would have no trouble getting along with one another." Although this statement greatly masks the complexity of the sit- uation, our own experience in bi-communal activities has shown that members of the two communities can speak easily with one another and can readily form friendly relations in social situations. Rarely do major disputes arise during either social gatherings or in workshop settings. However, there is equal truth in the contentions of some Turkish Cypriot academics that the real problem between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots lies not at the individual level, where friendly relations are not difficult, but at the community level, where the Turkish Cypriots have been badly mistreated by the Greek Cypriots.

My own conclusion is somewhat different from either of these positions. On the one hand, I have learned that polite conversation and friendly relations are not the same as mutual understanding, respect, and ability to work together. I have come to believe that the initial friendliness of most bi-communal gatherings exists at only a surface level and is made possible by the natural politeness of Cypriots and the

resistance, especially by Turkish Cypriots, to confrontation in social gatherings. At the same time, I have learned that productive dialogue is possible, both at the individual and the community level, when the appropriate conditions exist. In order for productive dialogue to take place, it is important to provide a "safe space" in which people can share their views in an open yet structured manner without fear of attack and free from worry about politicization of every issue. Mechanisms must be provided that allow systematic movement from initial statements of concern towards deeper exploration of difficult issues. Much work needs to be done to help build trust and to create a sense of interpersonal "safety".

I have seen time and again the relational damage that can be done when people are simply placed in the same room and expected to find ways to overcome decades of misinformation and lack of trust. They often have no choice but to utilize the rhetoric of their own side's propaganda, without realizing the effects it has on the other person and on relations between the communities. Of course, progress is seldom possible without difficulties, and even with the most carefully designed plan of activities, there are many delicate moments when the whole process is on the verge of falling apart. However, the more the groups have worked together to build trusting relationships, the more difficult it is for a single incident to unravel the group. In a situation such as that in Cyprus, where there has been such a long period of separation, these trusting relationships are not likely to happen without some assistance. Members of both communities must work extremely hard to deal with the burden of past traumas. Conflict resolution activities offer one way for this to happen.

3. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots share a great deal in common, but it is critical to address the differences that exist both within and between the two communities.

In their attempts to stress the need for communal separation, Turkish Cypriot rhetoric tends to overemphasize the differences between the communities, while in their attempt to stress the need for a unified island, Greek Cypriot rhetoric tends to overestimate the similarities. This is a case in which the views of both sides are essentially correct on one level and dangerously wrong on another level. By giving primary emphasis to the commonalities between the two communities, the Greek Cypriots are failing to take into account fundamental areas of disagreement that prevent the two sides from coming together. By focusing on the differences, the Turkish Cypriots are helping to create a situation where people may not be able to live together again when a solution becomes a reality. I have seen almost every group with which I have worked in Cyprus go through a stage in which the Greek Cypriots are shocked by the disparity between their views and those of their colleagues in the other community, and I have seen Turkish Cypriots constantly struggle with (and sometimes resist) the realization that there is much more commonality between the two sides than they expected. By designing appropriate activities

and taking the group through an appropriately structured process, groups can develop a more balanced picture that is closer to the reality of Cyprus, putting them in a much better position than the general population for working together in a true partnership.

It is also important to recognize that neither community speaks with a single voice. Most of the groups that have formed are composed of individuals from various political persuasions, with quite different views about what must be done to improve the situation in Cyprus. It is very misleading to state that this is the "Greek Cypriot position" or the "Turkish Cypriot position". Indeed, we have found that there is sometimes more similarity across community lines than there is within each community. It is often the case that Greek Cypriots will form closer ties with other Turkish Cypriots than they will with many of their compatriots. Of course, there is an "official" position on each side, and in the beginning stages of group work it is these views that often dominate. However, as the group develops a more open climate of sharing, individual differences are brought out into the open and form the basis for discussion. From the more than 200 bi-communal meetings and workshops in which I have participated, I have rarely seen discussion about issues which fall along strictly community lines. This richness of intra-communal differences may make it more difficult for the extremists on either side to promote separation of the two communities, and it is a factor that promises greater possibility for inter-com- munal cooperation in the future.

4. Both communities must find a way to help each other overcome the pain and suffering associated with the past.

The psychological burden carried by people in both communities is one of the major barriers to reconciliation. The Turkish Cypriots do not easily forget their past treatment as second-class citizens, particularly during the period 1963-1974, when they were confined to small enclaves and feared for their safety anytime they traveled outside these protected areas. Many have lost relatives, including immediate family members, friends, and neighbors, who "disappeared" or who were victims of raids on villages. No one in the Turkish Cypriot community wants to live through such a time again. Many of the Turkish Cypriots who lived prior to 1974 in the south of Cyprus did not want to leave their homes, but they felt they had no choice. Since 1974, Turkish Cypriots have faced other difficulties, resulting from non-recognition and an economic embargo, that they continue to blame on the Greek Cypriots. They live constantly in a state of uncertainty about what will happen in the future and whether or not they will be forced once again to move and start over. The pain that has resulted from these bad memories and anxieties about the future weighs heavily in their willingness to cooperate with Greek Cypriots.

Similarly, Greek Cypriots suffered a traumatic shock in 1974, being pushed out of their homes and away from their land and businesses, witnessing the killings, rapes, and destruction that accompanied the advance of the Turkish army. The

agony from having family members and relatives still unaccounted for, and the deep desire to return to their homes and communities, haunt the entire Greek Cypriot community. The sense of injustice and the feelings of helplessness follow them on a daily basis and bring anger, resentment, and feelings of revenge. It is often expressed as ultra-nationalist rhetoric that simply deepens the pain. For many, the simple act of meeting with Turkish Cypriots is seen as a betrayal to those who have suffered. For some, bi-communal meetings signify "giving in" to injustice and wrong- doing.

This pain, suffered by both communities and attributed to each by the other, cannot be overcome by simply blaming it on the other community, "punishing" the other community, or calling for a return to previous conditions. Neither can the wrongs of the past be righted by simply changing or legitimizing the current situation. The emotional trauma must be addressed by giving individuals the opportunity to meet with members of the other community and discuss their feelings together. These discussions cannot undo the past wrongs, but they can help lift the burden that pre- vents creativity and forward movement. Even those who remember the past situation more favorably (mostly Greek Cypriots) are weighted down by feelings of inconsistency. They wonder how it was possible to destroy the previous harmony, and even though they blame external forces, there is a nagging guilt associated with the possibility that they contributed to this situation by their own well-intentioned but thoughtless actions. As long as each community is mired in the past, it will be impossible to make progress.

In order to move toward a shared future, individuals in both communities must be willing to share their own pain in a constructive manner, and they must be willing to listen to the feelings of the other. There must be acknowledgment of responsibility for what happened in the past, and the public discourse in both communities must change so that the needs and concerns of both communities are taken into account. Provocative actions that heighten tensions only reinforce the pain for both sides, and all attempts to bring harm on the other only speed up the spiral of self-inflicted suffering. Conflict resolution activities offer one means, although certainly not the only way, to help individuals deal with their own psychological injuries and minimize the suffering that each side continues to bring to the other.

5. One of the most important roles of the diplomatic community is support of bi-communal activities

Over the years, the Cyprus conflict has attracted a great deal of international attention from the diplomatic community. Scores of initiatives have been designed to broker an agreement, and hundreds of diplomats have visited Cyprus to hold talks with the leaders of the two communities. Despite this, the only notable successes, besides the prevention of further large-scale bloodshed, are the high-level agreements of 1977 and 1979, which provide a framework for a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. However, after nearly 35 years of intercommunal talks, the two

communities still seem far apart on issues regarding sovereignty, equality, freedom of movement and settlement, security arrangements and other basic concerns.

Faced with the lack of progress on the official level, diplomatic missions are giving increased emphasis to citizen peace building efforts. Reflecting on the lessons that have been learned in other parts of the world, most recently in Bosnia, work at the citizen level is being recognized as an integral part of diplomatic efforts toward bringing the two sides in Cyprus closer together, and diplomats are more aware of the way in which conflict resolution activities can make their own job easier.

This increased awareness of the important role of bi-communal contacts has led to greater coordination among the diplomatic missions to support them. The ambassadors from many of the major embassies have met together on several occasions to discuss ways to make bi-communal contacts easier to arrange. They have published statements that voiced their united support for bi-communal exchanges, criticizing those who put obstacles in the way of such events and calling for greater freedom for people to meet. Their support has made possible many activities that could not have taken place otherwise. One example of the impact of such efforts by the diplomatic community is the successful holding of a critical bi-communal gathering on 30 September, 1996, just one month after the tragic events in the buffer zone during August. Although many insisted that it was the worst possible time to hold such an event, the core members of the bi-communal groups felt the need to reaffirm the work in which they had been engaged. Nevertheless, there seemed little possibility that the authorities would give permission for the Turkish Cypriots to cross the checkpoint and come to the Ledra Palace. In the end, the gathering was made possible partly because the invitation was issued in the name of various embassies, providing a sense of legitimacy and security that encouraged participation and eased fears of sabotage. Additionally, the way was opened in January 1997 for bi-communal activities to take place on a frequency that is unprecedented. This also came as a direct result of the efforts by the diplomatic community to voice their strong support for bi-communal events. Since this "opening" of the permissions process, a plethora of groups have begun meeting at the Ledra Palace, and dozens of exchange visits have taken place in which Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have traveled together across the "green line" to visit places on the two sides.

Conclusion

In conflict situations, one of the most serious obstacles to peace is often the different definitions of "peace" held by various parties. Cyprus is no exception, and the different views of peace held by the two communities are well known. The Turkish Cypriot official view is that peace already exists in Cyprus, and all it would take to maintain peace is legitimization by the international community of the status quo. The Greek Cypriot view is that peace cannot exist until the violations of human

rights that have taken place since 1974 are corrected. Taken alone, these very different views of peace are a tremendous challenge to those at the negotiating table. Even more critical, however, is whether one views peace simply as a signed agreement between the two communities or as a sustainable state of affairs in which the two communities develop mutual trust, respect, and willingness to work together toward a shared future. Until now, the two sides have resisted the former and avoided the latter.

It has not been the aim of conflict resolution activities in Cyprus to produce a signed agreement. Such efforts are the responsibility of the officials who have been appointed by their respective governments or authorities to carry out this task. However, activities such as those described in this paper should make it easier for a viable agreement to be reached, and they can significantly increase the likelihood that any signed agreement will be successfully implemented. Despite the many criticisms and accusations, the personal attacks against participants, and the tendency to downplay the importance of conflict resolution activities, more and more people are drawn to participate in workshops, seminars, and training programs that promote communication, problem solving, and skill development. It may not be possible to involve everyone in Cyprus in such activities, but their effects have already been felt across the island. If they can continue to take place, and if they can continue to be conducted by competent facilitators and trainers, they will play a key role in bringing a sustainable peace to a conflict-weary island.

NOTES

1. Although this center operates primarily in the Greek Cypriot community, its stated purpose is bi-communal in nature, with the intention of involving both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots in the operation and activities of the center. Due to current political constraints, it is unable to operate as a true bi-communal organization, but it offers a number of conflict resolution workshops in the Greek Cypriot community and it organizes a number of presentations that focus on bi-communal organization.
2. This group later became known as the "Bi-communal Steering Committee". It served in the capacity of advisor for development of further conflict resolution activities, and it eventually obtained a permanent room in the Ledra Palace for its office and meetings. It has been recognized in at least one U.N. report for the valuable role it plays in promoting better relations between the two communities.
3. I came as the initial Fulbright Scholar in Conflict Resolution and repeated the next 2 terms, staying in Cyprus approximately two and one-half years, until January, 1997. Philip Snyder took up the position of Fulbright Scholar in conflict resolution during 1997, and John Ungerleider and Marco Turk came in fall 1997

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and are continuing through the summer of 1998.

4. A full report of these workshop activities is available, containing a copy of all the group products. Write to the Cyprus Fulbright Commission at P.O. Box 4536, CY-1385 Nicosia, Cyprus, Tel: 357-2-449757 or Fax: 357-2-369151.

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GREEK-CYPRIOT POLITICAL CULTURE AND THE PROSPECT OF EUROPEAN UNION MEMBERSHIP: A WORST-CASE SCENARIO

Caesar V. Mavratsas

Abstract

This paper argues that Cyprus' entrance into the European Union prior to a solution to the Cyprus problem may, provided that nationalism continues to be the dominant political orientation among the Greek-and/or the Turkish Cypriots, solidify the current partition of the island. This must in no way be seen as an argument against Cyprus' prospective Europeanization. On the contrary, one of the paper's main theses is that Europe can function positively vis-à-vis the social, economic and political modernization of the island.

Cyprus is characterised by a relatively underdeveloped civil society and a con- comitant absence of a viable liberal ethos – an ethos that would guarantee not only "civilized" politics but also what Ernest Gellner (1994) called "the conditions of liberty". In Greek-Cypriot society, the political sphere is dominated by corporate interests providing for a clientelistic hyperpoliticization and an excessive statism.[1] As a result, Greek-Cypriot political culture creates a wide spectrum of problems whose fundamental consequence is the structural and institutional blocking of modern rational political practices and orientations. The latter would not only further the socio-economic development of the island but would also facilitate the efforts towards a solution to the Cyprus problem.

This paper examines two basic features of Greek-Cypriot political culture: first, what I call authoritarian clientelistic corporatism; and, second, nationalism. Both elements are briefly placed in the institutional and normative context of the island and the analysis focuses upon how they both affect the prospect of Cyprus' membership in the European Union, placing obstacles to Greek-Cypriot harmonisation with European norms and standards. The problems that the Greek Cypriot ethos is likely to create in Cyprus' adjustment to the political culture of the EU are already evident in how the European prospect has been handled thus far in Greek-Cypriot politics. Nonetheless, there can be no doubt that the prospect of entering the EU is

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likely to seNe as a catalyst which may set in motion fundamental processes of social and political transformation - as a catalyst, if you will, for social and political modernization. And one cannot overlook, of course, that EU membership will guarantee the international security of the Greek-Cypriot community. It is widely claimed, moreover, that joining the EU will also assist in achieving a political settlement of the Cyprus problem. The argument here is that Europe will pressure the Turks out of their intransigence and into accepting a compromise on Cyprus. My analysis suggests that the logic of this argument is dubious at best. One of my main propositions is that insisting upon entering the EU prior to a solution to the Cyprus problem may, provided that nationalism continues to be a dominant political orientation among the Greeks and/or the Turks of the island, solidify the current partition of the island. This is, as the subtitle of the article indicates, a provisional worst-case scenario; a projection, if you prefer, which, I must repeat, can be expected to hold if - and only if - nationalism continues to set the parameters of ideological orthodoxy and political praxis. The paper must in no way be seen as an argument against Cyprus' prospective Europeanization. On the contrary, one of its main theses is precisely that Europe can function positively vis-à-vis the social, economic and political modernization of the island. It is important to stress, moreover, that the entrance of a re-united Cyprus in the European Union will be greatly beneficial - socially, economically and politically - to the Turkish-Cypriot community as well. Rauf Denktash's vehement opposition to Cyprus' European prospect - an opposition which appears to set him apart from a wide range of social forces in the Turkish-Cypriot community - is perhaps the strongest indication that the Turkish-Cypriot leader wishes no solution to the Cyprus problem.

Greek-Cypriot Political Culture

Let me begin with a brief account of the basic character of Greek-Cypriot political culture by discussing two key features of it, authoritarian clientelistic corporatism and nationalism. The basic consequence of these two elements is what may be called a liberal democratic deficit in Greek-Cypriot politics. Given that the European Union is fundamentally based on basic principles of liberal democracy, there can be no doubt that Greek-Cypriot political culture "suffers" from a 'European deficit.'

Authoritarian Clientelistic Corporatism

The dominance of political society over civil society is one of the key features of Greek-Cypriot society. Greek-Cypriot social life, thus, appears to be overpoliticized and is characterised by a powerful state and a personalistic political system of clientelism and patronage. In this respect, Greek-Cypriot society is very similar to Greece where, as many analysts have noted,[2] the state is fundamentally a mecha-

nism which promotes particularistic interests and is essentially controlled by personalistic authoritarian parties.

In conjunction with a perceived need to cope with the uncertainty and the danger posed by the Turkish invasion and occupation of 1974, the weakness of civil society gives rise to what has been aptly called the "corporatism" of Greek-Cypriot politics (Christodoulou 1992:277). The term denotes political practices which are initiated and carried out by organized groups and which avoid – to the extent, of course, that this is possible – confrontation on key social and political issues and seek to build a consensus among a wide spectrum of forces and interests.

Greek-Cypriot corporatism functions in a more general context of what we may call authoritarian politics. We may indeed talk about the absence of social criticism and about what Kitromilides (1994) calls "the defeat of liberal democracy;" and on a more general level about the weakness of civil society. The latter is, of course, the issue of the most interest to a sociologist, and it merits to be treated more systematically here. In the tradition of sociological theory, the concept of civil society points to the presence of "intermediary" structures whose primary role is to protect the individual from arbitrary and oppressive political rule. The existence of such voluntary and spontaneous institutions creates a sphere of 'free space', as it were, in which the individual can pursue his/her interests (material but also "ideal", to use Weber's term), unrestrained by any centralized agent of authority – and provided, of course, that he/she does not interfere with the well being of their fellow citizens.[3] The institutions of civil society create a relatively egalitarian and tolerant milieu in which no single social group – and certainly no single individual – can dominate and submerge all others; and a milieu in which social criticism is incorporated into mainstream politics. It is precisely this tolerance that allows for individual freedom[4].

Nationalism

With the advent of British colonialism, Greek-Cypriot irredentist nationalism, in the form of the demand for enosis (union) with Greece, began to be transformed into a mass/popular movement and to give rise to an opposing Turkish-Cypriot nationalism which essentially demanded the partition of Cyprus.[5] The independence of 1960 was certainly an unorthodox solution to the Cyprus problem – a problem which emerged out of the clash between the two opposing nationalisms and, perhaps more importantly, the manipulation of this clash by the British administration. From 1960 to 1974, enosis continued to be the dominant Greek-Cypriot ideological orientation. In conjunction with Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, as well as the intervention of foreign interests, Greek-Cypriot nationalism fueled intercommunal strife, culminating in the Turkish invasion of 1974. As a result of the disaster of 1974, and until about the mid-1980's, Greek-Cypriot nationalism was suppressed at the expense of a different ideology that stressed "Cypriotness", as opposed to

'"Greekness" and pledged support to the independence of the island. The retreat of nationalism, however, was only temporary and it soon resurfaced as a dominant ideology, albeit in a changed form-a form, it must be added, which has not yet crystallized and nor is, tor that matter, clear. What Greek-Cypriot nationalists now demand is not union with Greece but the reaffirmation of Greek identity in the context of an independent polity which is organically tied to notions of Greekness and is politically anchored to the Greek state. Nationalism has again begun to define ideological orthodoxy.[6]

The "national problem" and the "national unity" that it dictates function as the common denominator of Greek-Cypriot corporatism. On a more general level, nationalism acts as the overarching emblem of the underdevelopment of civil society. The relationship between nationalism (which stresses the importance of the national over the individual) and civil society and the liberties that it entails should, I believe, be immediately obvious. The relationship can be summarized by saying that nationalism further weakens the institution of civil society – promoting, if you will, an "uncivil" society.

Greek - Cypriot Political Culture and Cyprus' Prospective Europeanization: Obstacles and Challenges

I will now discuss specific areas of Greek-Cypriot politics which appear both as obstacles to Cyprus' prospective Europeanization and as challenges tor the island's modernization. I will be brief and schematic, preferring to pose some questions and raise some problematics rather than to offer any definite answers. It will be clear that the divergence from European standards constitutes both an obstacle and a challenge tor the modernization of Cypriot society.

Human rights, individual liberty and the challenge of democratization

- Will it be easy for Cypriot society to adjust to European standards concerning individual liberties? See, for example, the still unresolved controversy about the decriminalization of homosexuality.
- Will Greek Orthodoxy continue to be ***politically*** protected at the expense of other religions?
- Will there be adequate protection of the individual from the arbitrariness of the state - be it in the form of the police or that of bureaucratic control?
- Will there be an increasing democratization of the political process?
- Will there be more room for social criticism?

- Will there be more genuine freedom of speech?

Excessive politicization and the partitocratic state

• Will the state be a relational and effective administrator of the political and economic relationship between Cyprus and the EU?

• On a more practical level, will the state be able to manage rationally EU funds and other assistance? Or, to put it conversely: Will there be a partitocratic exploitation of the benefits of Europe? Will there be an acceptance of European checks and balances?

• Will party interests stifle the development of more universalistic interest - be it in reference to Cypriot society or, more generally, greater Europe?

Identity and Nationalism

The basic question here, at least in my mind, is:

• Will EU membership solidify the current division of the island? At the same time, one may ask:

• Is there a nationalist motive behind the desire for EU membership?

There is a danger, if I may use the expression, that the Greek-Cypriots have given up on insisting upon the reunification of the island and are willing to "sell" the northern part of the island for the price of entering the European Union - a development which will certainly benefit them both economically and in the narrow political sense that the EU will provide for their security in an already divided island. My initial question may be put differently: Will the Greek-Cypriots see joining the EU as the solution to the Cyprus problem - even if it solidifies the current partition of the island?

Surveys show that fewer and fewer Greek-Cypriots view a federal solution to the Cyprus problem favorably. More than two thirds of Greek-Cypriot refugees, moreover, are not willing to return to their homes under Turkish-Cypriot authority – in the context, of a bicommunal and bizonal federation which would, theoretically at least, provide for the reunification of the island. The separation of the two communities, thus, is beginning not only to be accepted as a fact of life but also to be seen – given the current situation – as the most preferable option. This is certainly attested to by survey data, and comes out even more forcefully in qualitative and ethnographic research on Greek-Cypriot political culture and its perception of the Cyprus problem. The prevailing mood of the Greek Cypriots appears to be captured in statements to the effects that: "It is better if things stay as they are – who wants to worry

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about Anatolian settlers wandering about freely among us?" or "we can do better on our own – why should we make our lives more difficult and more dangerous?"

Some more question concerning nationalism and identity:

- Will there be space for the development of a wider European identity?
- How will the Greek-Cypriots deal with the increasing demand for a commonly accepted European foreign policy?
- Would the Greek-Cypriots be able to develop a sense of European history and destiny – as opposed to their national history and destiny?

The Current Political Debate on EU Membership

To an even casual observer of Greek-Cypriot politics, it is clear that the "European prospect" largely functions as a political slogan, whose persistent users are not aware of basic facts and issues concerning Cyprus' prospective Europeanization. Europe has been one of the dominant issues in Greek-Cypriot political discourse for the last few years – at least since Cyprus' formal application for membership in July 1990. With AKEL's recent shift, the entire political spectrum views Europe favorably and supports the Republic of Cyprus' application. As is the case with so many other issues, however, there is very little of what Weber calls "substantial rationality" in the Greek-Cypriot political discourse on the EU. An even more serious problem, I repeat, may arise out of the Greek-Cypriot stress upon entering the EU independently of (and prior to) a solution to the Cyprus problem, especially if nationalism continues to be a dominant ideological force. The issue, to put it crudely, is that at least in some Greek-Cypriot circles, joining the EU may be understood as the final solution to the Cyprus problem – a solution in which the Republic of Cyprus is being transformed into a Greek (and not a Cypriot) political entity which "will live happily thereafter" in the security of the European Union. A Europeanized but divided Cyprus satisfies (even in a perverse sense) the nationa- list aspiration of a purely Greek polity on the island.

The link to nationalist ideology is I think clear. Joining the EU prior to a solution to the Cyprus problem (and thus prior to the reunification, in one form or another, of the island) may be taken as a serious indication that the Greek-Cypriots and their political leadership no longer consider the reunification of the island their foremost priority – having placed their emphasis upon the creation of a Greek-Cypriot ***nation-al*** state. In the political mainstream, the only skeptical voice concerning the possibility of joining the EU comes from AKEL which argues that the "European prospect" must concern the entire island – and by no means only the Greek Cypriots; and it must therefore be pursued only if it will contribute to the solution of the Cyprus problem and the reunification of the island. Given that until very recent-

ly AKEL was adamantly opposed to joining Europe mostly on ideological grounds (the EU being perceived as an imperialist alliance of corporate interests), the credibility of its recent shift towards "qualified" support of EU membership and the ability of the communists to influence mainstream political culture in the process of Cyprus' prospective Europeanization, are problematic.

The Challenge of Civil Society, Liberal Democracy and Modernization

The analysis of the ideological origins and evolution of modern Greek-Cypriot political culture can shed invaluable light upon the character of contemporary Greek-Cypriot politics and the role it will play in Cyprus' prospective Europeanization. On the level of philosophical analysis and the historical evolution of ideology, one may talk about the failure of the spirit of Enlightenment to transplant a viable liberal ethos which continues to lurk behind Greek-Cypriot political culture, even as we approach the twenty-first century. The failure of the Enlightenment to play a leading role in political life and thus to modernize society essentially canceled out the essence of liberal democracy.

It appears to me that the fragility of civil society in contemporary Cyprus is, more than anything else, an ideological or cultural problem. Notwithstanding its structural roots and dimension, which it would be naive to disregard, the weakness of civil society is increasingly appearing as an issue of collective consciousness and public morality. In many cases, even when the structural and institutional framework has been modernized (in the Weberian sense) and is no longer problematic, Greek-Cypriot politics carries on in ways that are anything but modern, with a clear antinomy between material development and "archaic" and slogan-ridden political thought. This, I believe, points precisely to the fact that traditional cultural orientations linger on and are independently consequential.

If the Greek Cypriots genuinely desire to be Europeanized, they must first accept that they face a significant cultural disadvantage; and they must then realize that they must not only work as Europeans but also think as Europeans. Cyprus' "European deficit", I hope this paper has established, is directly related to the weakness of civil society and the dominance of nationalist ideology. It is in light of these two crucial factors that one must be very cautious with the arguments in favor of entering the EU prior to a solution to the Cyprus problem and the assumption that Europe will pressure the Turks to compromise on a political settlement. Given that ideological orthodoxy on the island is defined by nationalism, Europe cannot take it for granted that the Greek Cypriots themselves are willing to accept such a compromise – a compromise which would most certainly involve sharing power with the Turkish Cypriots. I do not think then that Europe – or anyone else, for that matter – would attempt to impose a deal that neither of the two sides truly desires. The situation would be entirely different if the Greek-Cypriot emphasis upon the earliest possible entry into the EU, independently of the resolution of the Cyprus problem,

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was not motivated by nationalist axioms; and, perhaps more importantly, if the stress on Europe coexisted with a sincere and systematic attempt at building bridges of communication with the Turkish Cypriots. The latter is absolutely essen- tial if a viable settlement on Cyprus is *ever* to be achieved – and if Cyprus is to embark on a substantial process of modernization and Europeanization.

NOTES

1. This aspect of Greek-Cypriot social life has rarely been the subject of systematic analysis. Some relevant discussion can be found in Christodoulou (1992), Mavratsas (1995), Papadakis (1993), Peristianis (1995), Stamatakis (1991). The role of corporate - primarily party - interests, the clientelistic hyper- politicization and the excessive statism are issues that dominate the political discourse of ordinary people and they are often commented upon in the press.
2. On the Greek case, see Charalambis (1989), Lipovats (1995), Mouzelis (1994). On a comparative examination of Greek and Greek-Cypriot politics, see Mavratsas (1995).
3. On the Weberian concept of ideal interests, see Kalberg (1985).
4. On the concept of civil society, see Gellner (1994), Hall (1995), Keane (1988), Mouzelis (1994, 1995).
5. See Attalides (1979), Crawshaw (1978), Kitromilides (1979), Loizos (1974), Markides (1977), Patric (1989).
6. See Mavratsas (1996, 1997), Peristianis (1995), Papadakis (1993), Stamatakis (1991).

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THE EASTERN QUESTION REVISITED: GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE HISTORICAL CONTEXT OF GREAT POWER POLICY MAKING

S. Victor Papacosma

Abstract

As the new millenium begins to dawn on us, the old heritage of the 'Eastern Question' seems to remain as prevalent as ever. This paper aims to chart a historical path of this important issue and how the continued presence of main factors throughout the nineteenth and twentieth century have shaped and led to Greek & Turkish political posturing in the region.

Europe's diplomatic history in the nineteenth century and through World War I cannot be discussed without significant attention being placed on the Eastern Question. Over the years analysts have advanced many short definitions to capsulize the entangled dimensions of this thorny issue, but all essentially emphasize the problematic situation and uncertainty that emerged with the decline of the Ottoman Empire and the resulting political vacuum created in the Eastern Mediterranean region. Balance of power considerations on the part of the great powers and rising nationalism among the subject peoples of the Ottoman Empire became the prime forces in the unfolding drama. Although today the changes in the diplomatic environment from this earlier era are considerable, it is nonetheless of some benefit to refer to the nineteenth century for a clearer understanding of contemporary Greek-Turkish relations and the role of these states in the policy making of stronger powers with interests in the eastern Mediterranean.

The term, "Eastern ·Question" as a commonly used term, did not become popular until the 1820s during the Greek War of Independence, although, as a problematic situation, an Eastern question can be said to have existed for decades. Some historians point to 1699, with the Ottoman Empire's defeat by the Habsburg Empire and the signing of the Treaty of Karlowitz, as an important turning point. Europe would not be threatened again by Ottoman power as it had been in the previous three centuries. The new, quite opposite problem confronting Europe would be the

recession of Ottoman power, the Eastern Question.

The proceedings of the Congress of Vienna (1814-15), which marked the end of the Napoleonic era, did not touch on the Ottoman Empire in Europe but did reveal that the victorious great powers and defeated France did have conflicting interests in the Eastern Mediterranean. Thus, Britain deemed the eastern Mediterranean as a critical link to its imperial holdings in India and further east. Tsarist Russia held to longstanding aspirations to acquire Constantinople and control of the Straits. And as the strongest Orthodox state, it had served itself as a protector of Orthodox Christians within the Ottoman Empire. For its part, France, from the period of the Crusades, had established strong commercial and cultural interests in the area. Austria, as the architect of the conservative order arranged at Vienna, sought to maintain the status quo as tightly as possible.

When the Greeks rose in rebellion in the spring of 1821, the powers, despite nurturing ambitions in the region and despite concern over the barbarous treatment of Christian subjects by the Turks, neither welcomed its outbreak nor the prospect of intervention. The powers shared concerns over the disturbance to the status quo and uncertainty over the consequences if they became involved. While public opinion throughout Europe came out in strong support for the Greek cause, governments resisted pressures for intervention. Ultimately, Britain, France and Russia did act on Greece's behalf, but it was essentially mutual suspicions among them about one power gaining exclusive influence over the Greeks, rather than a sincere desire for Greek success, that drew them into the struggle. Not to act together meant that they might end up fighting each other, a situation they then wished to avoid.

Although Greece emerged independent by 1830, subsequent events revealed that the circumstances of its creation delineated Greece's future international position. Seeking to maintain the original status quo as much as possible, the great powers carved out a diminutive Greece, which included barely one-quarter of all Greeks living in the eastern Mediterranean. The new state also found itself with three guarantor powers – Great Britain, France and Russia. The Greeks were to focus their efforts in subsequent decades on the pursuit of the Megali Idea (Great Idea) and the liberation of their brethren still under Ottoman overlordship. The three guarantor powers assured that Greece's territorial integrity would not be threatened; concurrently, rivalries among the powers and balance of power considerations prevented Greece from advancing its own interests against the Ottoman Empire. The basic diplomatic pattern that emerged had Tsarist Russia seeking by various means to extend its influence southward towards the Mediterranean at the expense of the Ottoman Empire, an objective opposed by Britain, France and Austria. The Sublime Porte regularly sought to exploit the rivalries among the powers, a tactic long and successfully pursued by the Turks since their arrival on the European continent in the fourteenth century. Because of its strategic positioning as a barrier to Russian expansion southward, the Ottoman Empire successfully played on the fears of the

British, in particular, and also of the French and Austrians, to acquire their diplomatic and military support in warding off Russian and other threats to its territory. In its attempts to advance the Megali Idea, Greece, much smaller in size and with scant resources, would try but could not succeed in playing this diplomatic game of manipulating great power rivalries. Moreover, on several occasions when Greece sought to advance its own interests, it found itself checked by the dominant naval powers in the Mediterranean.

Even when Russia was in the position militarily to advance towards Constantinople, as in the fighting during 1829, balance of power considerations restrained St. Petersburg and worked in Constantinople's favor. A special Tsarist commission resolved that maintenance of the Ottoman Empire was more to the Russian advantage than any possible alternative. It concluded that partition of the empire would create a "labyrinth of difficulties and complications" with the other great powers and would also enable the other powers to seize various parts of the Balkan peninsula, and thus "Russia would be called on to meet dangerous enemies in southern Europe instead of indifferent Turks." St. Petersburg was determined to follow a program of increasing its influence within the Ottoman Empire for the time being by more diplomatic means.

An opportunity surfaced when Sultan Mahmud II, unable to defeat his rebellious Egyptian vassal, Mehemet Ali, found that he could not draw on the aid of Britain and France because of other preoccupations. With no other alternative and with the explanation that "a drowning man in his despair will clutch at a serpent," the Sultan, in 1833, agreed to the presence of Russian soldiers and sailors at the Straits. The resulting Treaty of Unkiar Skelessi (July 6, 1833) between the two empires essentially made Russia the guarantor of the Ottoman Empire and marked the apogee of Russian influence in Constantinople. These developments indicated an interesting shift from Russia's earlier military attempts to extend its influence southward at the expense of the Ottomans – the two empires had fought six major wars since the reign of Peter the Great. But Russia was concerned that a dynamic Mehemet Ali, (if he soundly defeated the Ottomans), would be a much stronger foe than the existing regime. Temporarily saved by a traditional enemy from a major threat to Constantinople by Mehemet Ali, the Ottomans well recognized the obviously short-term dimensions of this uncomfortable relationship.

The British, always wary of Russian policy and potential threats to London's regional interests, resented these gains. During the 1830s British leaders and the public found their anti-Russian sentiments heightening to the extent that the term "Russophobia" was coined. To counter Russian threats to British imperial interests, London commenced a policy of bolstering the power of the Ottoman Empire so that it could maintain its position as an effective buffer against pressures from Russia and other neighbors, such as Mehemet Ali. Concurrently, Britain pressed for reforms within the Empire to strengthen its military capabilities and to improve con-

ditions for its subject nationalities. For the remainder of the 1830s and in the 1840s, London and St. Petersburg, for divergent reasons, would pursue related policies of sustaining the Ottoman Empire. The Russians well recognized that any unilateral attempt to subdue the Turks militarily would meet with the opposition of the British, French and Austrians.

Greece, by contrast, suffered a fate similar to that of other small, economically weak nations in strategic geographical locations: it found itself precluded from independent action by the overriding concerns and rivalries of the great powers. Greece's maritime location further intensified its vulnerability as dominant naval powers in the Mediterranean could easily exert pressure on Greek governments. A first example came with the inglorious Don Pacifico incident. When Athens did not respond favorably to London's demands for compensation to one of its citizens and for several other grievances, Lord Palmerston in a demonstration of gunboat diplomacy ordered the blockade of Piraeus in January 1850. Threatened next by a bombardment of Piraeus, the Greek government had to yield to London's demands in April 1850.

A more serious episode occurred with the outbreak of war between the Ottoman Empire and Russia in 1853. Although no major crises involving the Turkish realm had occurred during the 1840s, mutual suspicions among the powers remained and heightened by the beginning of the new decade. A number of complex and not always major disputes (not to be dealt with here) led nonetheless to a breakdown of relations between St. Petersburg and Constantinople, which would be backed by the British and French. London did not respond positively when its ambassador in St. Petersburg reported that Tsar Nicholas I had remarked: "We have a sick man on our hands, a man gravely ill, it will be a great misfortune if one of these days he slips through our hands, especially before the necessary arrangements are made." Britain and France sought the propping and maintenance of the "sick man of Europe" and not his dismemberment.

The Greeks, sentimentally drawn to the Russian side, sought also to take *advan*-tage of Turkish problems by launching their own campaign against Constantinople. Greek guerrilla bands in Epirus, Thessaly, and Macedonia began a campaign against Turkish positions. In March 1854 the British and French, having first signed an alliance with Turkey, declared war on Russia, concurrently pressing the Greeks to terminate their aggression against the Turks. To demonstrate their opposition to Greek policy, the Anglo-French allies blockaded Piraeus and landed 3000 troops in the port in May 1854. King Othon's government was thereby forced to declare Greece's neutrality in the Crimean War. The troops remained in Piraeus until February 1857, well after the war's end the previous March, to reinforce Anglo-French displeasure at Greek attempts to act contrary to their wishes.

Although on the side of the multinational coalition that defeated Russia, the

Ottoman Empire did not emerge completely unscathed from the war and, for example, had to agree, along with Russia, to the complete demilitarization of their Black Sea coasts. In formally admitting the Ottoman Empire to the Concert of Europe, the signatory powers to the Peace of Paris (March 30, 1856) agreed to respect and guarantee the empire's independence and territorial integrity. Once again and despite major divisions among them, great powers sought the maintenance of "the sick man", out of concern that his demise would lead to major disputes among them over the disposition of the deceased's property. Aspirations for a healthy recovery rode on assurances from Ottoman authorities that they would honor the terms of the reform edict, Hatt-i Humayun, promulgated one week before the Paris treaty's signing. By reforming itself and by providing better conditions for the empire's subject nationalities, it was believed that their impulse to rise against the Turks would be blunted. The British, maintaining their role as Constantinople's principal friend and ally, placed special emphasis on the prospects for reform. But the years that followed indicated that hopes for reformed Turkish governance and a rejuvenated empire were misplaced.

Greek pursuit of the Megali Idea remained stalled. Greece did receive the Ionian Islands in 1864 from Britain as a sign of support for the Greek choice of its new monarch, George I, from the Danish dynasty. But uprisings by the Greeks on Crete demanding enosis (union) with the Greek mainland in 1841, 1856, and then 1866-69 regularly revealed the inherent inability of Athens to act effectively in their support. In part out of concern over Russian inroads, the powers diplomatically involved themselves in the last revolt to pacify conditions on the island and pressured Constantinople to offer some voice to the Cretan Christians in the island's administration and to lighten the tax burden. But by the 1870s Tsarist Russia's role for Greece experienced change. No longer seeking to extend its influence in the Balkans under the general banner of Orthodoxy, St. Petersburg now advanced the cause of Panslavism, making the Bulgarians, a historical rival of the Greeks, their favored group.

Britain's positioning toward the Ottoman Empire also showed some modification. Increasingly, influential segments of the British population came to view the Ottoman social and political system with a more critical eye. The Liberal Party's William Gladstone was particularly outspoken in this respect. Thus, developments after an uprising in Bosnia Herzegovina in 1875, which encouraged resistance to Ottoman authorities elsewhere in the Balkans, divided the British political world. In the spring of 1876 Turkish irregulars in Bulgaria massacred well over 10,000 Christians and destroyed several dozen villages. Gladstone passionately condemned the Turks in his pamphlet, Bulgarian Horrors and the Question of the East, stating "Let the Turks now carry away their abuses in the only possible manner, namely by carrying off themselves." The Liberal leader, then in the political opposition, called not for outright partitioning but demanded autonomy for the subject

Christians. Prime Minister Benjamin Disraeli would not yield to public pressure and pursued a forceful foreign policy that sought to disrupt cooperation by the conservative powers of the recently formed Dreikaiserbund (Three Emperors League) - Germany, Austria-Hungary and Russia. In the process he forged a British policy sympathetic to the Turks that hindered peaceful resolution to the spreading Balkan conflict and stiffened Turkish obstinacy.

With the breakdown of negotiations, Russia declared war on the Ottomans in April 1877. After initial defeats, the Russian army advanced quickly toward Constantinople, and in late January an armistice was signed. But, as in 1829, St. Petersburg had to establish how far it could extend its power without creating a hos- tile coalition against it and fomenting a major war. Disraeli dispatched British war- ships into the Straits and anchored them on the Asiatic side of the Sea of Marmara. The resulting Treaty of San Stefano on March 3, 1878 brought heavy losses for Turkey in the Balkans and in the Caucasus region. The most controversial dimension of the treaty was the creation of a Greater Bulgaria as an autonomous principality. Excluding Constantinople, Adrianople, and Thessaloniki, it incorporated virtually all the territory between the Danube in the north, the Black Sea in the east, the Aegean Sea in the south, and Lake Ohrid and beyond in the west. Opposition to the San Stefano treaty came from many directions. London and Vienna were particularly concerned that this large Bulgaria would significantly upset the regional balance by becoming a Russian satellite and providing Russia with access to the Aegean and a threatening proximity to the Turkish capital. Confronted by a coalition of great powers against it, St. Petersburg yielded, and the Congress of Berlin, meeting in June 1878, rewrote the earlier settlement in terms less favorable to Russian interests. Among the major adjustments, an autonomous Bulgaria emerged but sig- nificantly reduced from its San Stefano size. It was also at this point in time (June 4) that Britain pressed the Porte to agree to the Cyprus Convention as compensa- tion for Russian gains in the war. In return for acquiring the right to occupy and administer Cyprus, London committed itself to resist any further Russian expansion in Asia Minor.

During the hostilities between the Turks and Slavs in 1877, Greek leaders were divided on whether to intervene militarily. Pressured by the powers not to act, the Greeks nonetheless mobilized but by then the warring parties had signed the armistice. The Greeks joined the chorus of opposition to San Stefano. Athens was not formally represented at Berlin, but it did present its claims to Crete (where the Greeks had once again risen in rebellion) Epirus and Thessaly – for which it received assurances from the powers that they would seek to influence Turkey in yielding territory. It was only in 1881 that the powers, led by the British, came through with their promise (albeit in lesser proportion) and convinced Turkey to cede most of Thessaly and the Arta district of Epirus to Greece.

The diplomatic situation had altered. Serbia and particularly Bulgaria now joined

the Ottoman Empire as regional rivals to Greek expansionist interests. Russia sought out the Slavs as regional clients and could no longer be utilized by the Greeks as a potential foil to Anglo-French pressures. More than ever, the British and, secondarily, the French had to be considered before undertaking any diplomatic initiatives. Consequently, with no regional allies and confronted by Anglo-French pressures, Greece had little choice but to deal with these very same powers and to seek rewards for "good behavior".

Greece's vulnerability again became apparent in 1885. When Bulgaria announced the annexation of Eastern Rumelia, Greece and Serbia demanded territorial compensation in light of Bulgaria's breach of the Treaty of Berlin and out of concern for the revamped regional balance of power. Prime Minister Theodoros Deligiannis ordered mobilization of the Greek army in late September and maintained it despite strong warnings from the powers not to intervene against the Turks. In late December the powers called for the Greek army's demobilization. When repeated calls for demobilization met with unsatisfactory responses from the Greek government, the powers imposed a blockade of the Greek coasts on May 8, 1886. After a change in government and the implementation of demobilization, the powers lifted the blockade on June 7. The heavy costs of mobilization added to the spiraling national debt of Greece, which received nothing in return for the effort.

In 1897 the powers could not unite in common policy to prevent a Greco-Turkish conflict in response to the Cretan uprising that had begun the previous year. On March 18 they established a blockade of Crete, but the Greeks blundered into a war that resulted in a quick, decisive defeat at the hands of the Turks, who had their army recently reorganized by the Germans. The influence of the powers tempered the peace terms for Athens, and the Turks extended autonomy to the island. Britain, France, Russia and Italy arranged to keep detachments on Crete to ensure peace; Austria-Hungary and Germany, not wishing to alienate the Sultan, with whom relations were improving, did not add their forces. Additionally, Greece's finances were subsequently to fall under the stern supervision of an International Finance Commission.

As the nineteenth century ended and the new century commenced, some evident changes in the Eastern Question's dimensions had become apparent. Two new powers, Germany and Italy, made their presence felt in the Eastern Mediterranean and the former, in particular, had made significant economic and other inroads in the Ottoman Empire. After its takeover of the Suez Canal and the subsequent occupation of Egypt in 1882, Britain became more concerned about Turkey in Asia rather than in Europe, as London sought to secure its control of India against pressures, notably Russian, in Central Asia. Although the policy of Russia had contributed to the liberation of all four Balkan regimes, not one of them assumed the role of pliable client, as had originally been feared by the other powers. Nonetheless, all powers remained concerned about the Ottoman Empire's condi-

tion, because, as one· historian has stated: "Though admittedly sick, it was more convenient alive than dead." Its sudden demise or threatened demise could, release great shock waves in the sensitive balance of power as it had done for decades. Constantinople would continue to play on the insecurities of the powers in order to maintain the Empire's integrity. The signing of the Anglo-Russian Convention in 1907 - as part of the pre-1914 alliance developments that were dividing Europe into hostile camps - resolved some but not all problems that had contributed to the longstanding rivalry between London and St. Petersburg. The uncertainties of the Eastern Question persisted.

Greece remained a secondary factor in the considerations of the powers. Athens would be reminded again of this status when, in October 1908, the Greek government, in the aftermath of Austria's annexation of Bosnia Herzegovina, belatedly sought to achieve Crete's union. Athens found no support from the powers for this proposed elimination of, Turkey's by then, (largely symbolic) suzerainty over the island. Thus, London, which, the previous autumn, had urged the Turks to yield to Austrian and Bulgarian demands (the latter for independence), glaringly revealed these sentiments in a July 1909 report:

> *It would…be reducing our sympathy and good will toward Turkey to a farce if, after the Turks had accepted in these two cases [i.e., Bulgarian independence and the annexation of Bosnia-Herzegovina by Austria] our advice, disagreeable though it was, we went on to put pressure upon the Turks to give way to Greece in a manner which they considered humiliating… .The Turkish flag still flies there [i.e., Crete], and it would be very humiliating for Turkey for the flag to be hauled down and replaced by that of Greece, a Power not only much weaker than Austria or Bulgaria, but also one which the Turks knew quite well they could defeat so easily again as they did in fact [twelve years ago].*

Ottoman-controlled Macedonia had since the 1890s become the scene of considerable violence and guerrilla band activity as the Greeks, Bulgarians, and Serbs hotly contested for influence in a region that they saw falling from Turkish control. Sensitive to the threats to the status quo, the powers sought to pacify the region with reform measures. Nothing really worked. And the powers, now divided into definable rival alliances, were establishing other priorities.

Russia sought to align Serbia and Bulgaria in the Balkans as a unified front against an Austrian Orang nach Osten, but once they signed a pact in March 1912, Belgrade, Sofia, and then Athens, set their sights on eliminating the Turkish presence in their midst. The Balkan League, seeking to take advantage of the Ottoman Empire's involvement in a war with Italy, determined to launch its own campaign against Constantinople in the fall of 1912. The powers unsuccessfully and belatedly sought to prevent the outbreak of war in October 1912. In quick and surprising

fashion, the Balkan allies succeeded almost completely in ousting the Turks from the European continent. Resulting disputes over the division of Turkish territory among them and Bulgarian opposition, in particular, led to another round of fighting in the early summer of 1913 that had Bulgaria battling against all its neighbors. Greece came out of the Balkan Wars a big winner, annexing Crete, Southern Epirus, the largest section of Macedonia, and occupying many Aegean islands.

The Turks, who had succumbed to Greek naval dominance during the Balkan Wars, refused to accept the loss of the Aegean islands, whose final disposition was to be left to the European powers. In December 1913, to strengthen its inferior navy, Turkey purchased the British-built Rio de Janeiro, originally constructed for Brazil, and actively sought other large vessels. The Greeks hastened to find capital ships in order to meet the impending threat of Turkish naval superiority and to secure their hold on the islands. The very tight market forced the Greeks to search far and wide for sellers. Athens finally found two 13,000 ton pre-dreadnought battleships in the United States. Through diplomatic channels in Washington the Turks loudly protested this proposed transaction. From Athens Prime Minister Eleftherios Venizelos persuasively communicated to President Woodrow Wilson that these two ships would be used by Greece only to assure the maintenance of peace and the preservation of the balance of power in the Aegean. Unwittingly, the United States had become directly involved in a distant region where it then had quite marginal interests. Having brought Greece and Turkey to the brink of war, the Aegean islands issue receded into the background only with the outbreak of World War I.

That Germany's interest and involvement in the Ottoman Empire had increased substantially while the position of Britain had receded became apparent several days after the outbreak of fighting in World War I when Constantinople signed, on August 2, 1914, a secret agreement to side with Germany. For a period, the Porte duplicitously continued to negotiate with Britain and France and maintained a status of armed neutrality before entering into the fighting in early November.

Eleftherios Venizelos, the architect of Greece's Balkan War gains, saw a prime opportunity for acquiring more territory during the First World War. With minor variations Venizelos pursued a policy of maintaining a "good behavior" position vis-à-vis Greece's powerful patrons. After a long hiatus, Greece's guarantor powers – Britain, France, and Russia – had come together once again within the Triple Entente for larger balance of power considerations. Bearing in mind Greece's posi- tioning in a Mediterranean dominated by Anglo-French warships and historical pat- terns, it seemed apparent from the beginning of the war that Greece would have to consider some accommodation with the Triple Entente. But although most Greeks united in their desire to extend their frontiers, they were divided as to how and under whose leadership. While King Constantine I spoke out for continued neutrality, a policy basically beneficial to German strategic interests in the southern Balkans, Venizelos pressed for Greece's entry into the war on the side of the Entente. Greek

society became polarized - and Greece suffered. Exploiting the political disarray to their advantage and despite Greece's professed neutrality, the Entente landed troops in Thessaloniki in the early autumn of 1915. The following autumn Venizelos formed a provisional government in the northern city, and in June 1917 an Anglo-French ultimatum forced the allegedly pro-German Constantine to leave Greece. Venizelos returned to Athens as Prime Minister and brought Greece formally into the war on the victorious Entente's side.

With the Ottoman Empire in the ranks of the defeated and because of his undisputed loyalty to the victorious coalition, Venizelos had placed Greece in a favorable position to receive considerable territorial gains at the Paris Peace Conference. Had the terms of the Treaty of Sevres (10 August, 1920) been ultimately fulfilled, many Greeks long under Ottoman rule, would have been incorporated into the Greek state. But the divisions in Greece, (which led to Venizelos's electoral defeat in November 1920 and Constantine's return in December), in addition to policy disputes between Greece's erstwhile patrons, Britain and France, and the rising Turkish nationalist forces of Mustafa Kemal led to the defeat of the Greek army and the destruction of Smyrna in September 1922.

The fragility of Venizelos's tactics had been revealed, in large because of the heavy dependency on the support of Britain and France. With the return of Constantine, the Entente's bugbear, France saw a ready opportunity to seek· accommodation with the Turkish nationalists, as did Italy. The Bolshevik regime in Russia, on the premise that the Turks were also suffering from the intervention of foreign imperialists, signed a treaty of friendship with Kemal in March 1921. By not sustaining its original support of Greece, Britain contributed to Greece's inevitable defeat. As Venizelos had initially succeeded in exploiting allied differences for grand gains, so did Mustafa Kemal to defeat the Greeks and to make the Treaty of Sèvres an irrelevant document for altered conditions. The Treaty of Lausanne (24 July, 1923) registered Greece's defeat and Turkey's victory, supplanted the Treaty of Sevres, and redefined boundaries and terms of peace in the Eastern Mediterranean. The mandatory exchange of populations between Greece and Turkey sought, among other objectives, to eliminate ethnic claims to territory.

In his campaign to remove the foreign presence and Christian minorities from Turkish soil, Kemal had largely succeeded in creating a "Turkey for the Turks." The Eastern Question, which should have ended formally with the Treaty of Sevres, had a last phase in the Greco-Turkish war and a definitive end with the Treaty of Lausanne – which also buried the Megali Idea with all of its historical and contemporary implications..

Relative detente characterized relations between Greece and Turkey after the signing of a treaty of friendship in 1930 and extended into the early Cold War era as both states became linked with the West and entered NATO concurrently in

1952. The security of their borders against possible aggression from the north was to be maintained by membership. The new alliance did not, however, preclude the reemergence of older historical paradigms and animosities when the issue of Cyprus and enosis surfaced in the 1950s.

Turkey's assigned role in NATO as a critical buffer state against Soviet expansionism and its positioning at the strategic Straits was not an unfamiliar one. And as in the previous century, the Turks once again drew on the insecurities of the Western powers to bolster their bargaining position in a number of areas, and quite often in their relations with Greece, which worsened in the decades since the mid-1950s. Because of its smaller size and location on a relatively softer front vis-à-vis the Warsaw Pact, Greece's, role within NATO, resulted in a more vulnerable status for its positions – again, reminiscent of nineteenth-century patterns.

As a result, Turkey has been able to assume more assertive policies without much concern about serious opposition from its allies. For example, the 1974 invasion of Cyprus with all of its barbaric implications and violations of international law and of moral norms supposedly shared by Turkey's NATO allies, is an ongoing reality. Pressure from the United States and European allies has been hardly significant or effective. For all the concern of Europe over the mistreatment and massacring of the Ottoman Empire's Christian subjects during the period of the Eastern Question, effective intervention on their behalf had occurred infrequently or not at all (for reasons already stated). Promises of Ottoman reform periodically assuaged the consciences and opportunism of Western political leaders. And so it is today, as Ankara seeks to divert attention from human rights violations with promises of reform to its Western friends. One prominent example preceded the December 1995 customs union agreement between Turkey and the European Union when the former gave explicit guarantees that it would take positive action on human rights, democratization, the status of divided Cyprus, and policy towards the Kurds. And as in the past, governing authorities have tended to level only moderate criticism toward the Turkish leadership, while public opinion has generally been much more critical. Thus, the European Parliament has advocated a harsher policy toward Ankara, but the European Commission has balked at antagonizing Turkish senti- ments.

Turkey's studied and continuing challenges to Greek sovereignty in the Aegean provide another example of Ankara's relatively unimpeded provocations. The initial and instinctive call of NATO allies in response to the winter 1996 Imia crisis was for the two disputants to negotiate their problems - the objective of Turkish tactics of more than two decades that seeks a political rather than legal solution. Eventually, a number of states acknowledged the appropriateness of Greece's position, which called for submission of the dispute to the International Court of Justice. But the general tendency of allies to assume what they consider an even-handed stance has usually worked in favor of the Turks, because it is they who are in violation of

the rule of law.

Where as some observers at first forecasted that the end of the Cold War would lead to a diminution of Turkey's significance for the West, this has not occurred because of a skilled policy by Turkey and its international supporters. Turkey redefined its mission as a buffer. It now served itself as a moderate Islamic model in the midst of aggressive and expansionist Islamic fundamentalism and as a pro-Western bastion in an inherently volatile region that included Iraq, Iran, and Syria. Its geostrategic positioning has thus redirected the concerns of the West and resurrected its importance.

As for Greece, it has steered with difficulty through these troubled waters and has too often ineffectively presented its cases to allies. In turn, it has had few options available to it – for established nineteenth-century reasons. Even when Prime Minister Andreas Papandreou sought to forge a more independent foreign policy for Greece, he had to acknowledge certain constraining realities. A falling out with NATO and the United States would have only improved Turkey's diplomatic and mil- itary muscle in the Aegean and Cyprus and accentuated Greek weaknesses. Moreover, the United States had consented to maintain a military balance between the two feuding allies, thereby providing the support that Greece could not expect to find from other sources. And, of course, NATO and the U.S. Sixth Fleet dominat- ed Mediterranean waters. In many respects, then, Greece has been regularly reminded of an earlier subordinate role to stronger patrons that required "good behavior" in order to acquire diplomatic support and "rewards".

Lord Stratford de Radcliffe wrote in a letter to The Times (London) in 1875: "The Eastern Question is a fact, a reality of indefinite duration." The significance of Turkey's fate today and the policy of the powers toward it indeed constitute an ongoing "Eastern Question". In the contemporary context, though, the pre-1914 patterns have undergone a shift. Now one witnesses a Turkey not in territorial recession or trying to maintain the status quo, but one intent on pursuing a revisionist policy, seeking actively to expand its influence in the region against resistant neighbors. In December 1996 Islamist Prime Minister Necmettin Erbakan, addressing Turkish reporters, directed his comments at Europe to warn it that Turkey must be considered more as an equal: "Turkey is a powerful country at the center of the world. The European countries have to review their policies on world affairs and on Islam." Again, as in the past, the Turks are drawing on the concerns of the Western powers in the broader region and over Turkey's role within it, in this instance to advance Ankara's ambitious program in the eastern Mediterranean.

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Commentary

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GOBBI'S POSITION AND AN ALTERNATIVE PERSPECTIVE

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In a letter that was published in the Cyprus Mail on 26 February 1998, Hugo Gobbi, the former special representative of the UN Secretary General in Cyprus, refers to his new book on Cyprus entitled Contemporary Cyprus and puts forward views that were also expressed in his previous book *Rethinking Cyprus* (1993). The central message of Gabbi's views is that the solution of the Cyprus problem should be based on partition. Among other things, Gobbi essentially suggests a two-state solution based on the Ghali or Gobbi maps in order to avoid possible future friction.

Gabbi's conclusion that Cyprus should be partitioned is based on wrong assumptions. One such assumption is that the Cyprus problem is primarily an inter-communal problem and that the two communities cannot live together. But this is not so. The main reason for the present situation in Cyprus was not inter-communal strife but foreign intervention culminating in the Turkish invasion of Cyprus in 1974 and the continuing occupation of 40% of the island. The inter-communal aspect is just one of the many other dimensions of the Cyprus problem. Among these are the geostrategic dimension, Greco-Turkish antagonism and Turkish expansionism. Consequently, even if Gabbi's suggestions were adopted, the Cyprus problem would not be solved but would rather enter a new phase. Gobbi himself recognizes in his letter that Turkey is behind the Turkish-Cypriot community. As he puts it " ... *the Turkish Cypriot community is like an iceberg, a small piece of ice over the waves of the sea. But under the surface is a tremendous block of ice in the form of Turkey* ...". Consequently, the solution that Gobbi proposes far from resolving the problem will rather aggravate it as it will legalize the presence of Turkey in Cyprus with negative consequences both for Cyprus and the broader area.

On the basis of its maximalist policy on Cyprus, Turkey does not tolerate the sovereign exercise of independent policies on the part of free Cyprus, especially in matters of foreign affairs and defense. Turkish efforts to thwart the accession of Cyprus to the EU, the completion of the common defense dogma and the deployment of the Russian S-300 anti-aircraft missile system, are indicative of the intentions of Turkey. One of the questions that Gobbi should answer is whether, in the case the Greek side consented to a two-state solution, Turkey would tolerate the exercise of the right of self-determination of the 'Hellenic Republic of Cyprus' for union with Greece.

A two-state solution will indeed increase tensions in the Eastern Mediterranean since it will lead, among other things, to the extension of the Greek-Turkish borders to Cyprus and the intensification of the antagonism of the two countries in the Eastern Mediterranean. At this point it should be noted that, while during the Cold War period NATO considered that Western interests were better served with a divided Cyprus, today in the post-Cold War period Western interests as well as international law and regional and international peace are better served with a united Cyprus. For such a scenario to materialize though, Turkey must change its policy regarding Cyprus.

Furthermore, there are additional arguments which contradict Gobbi's views. Specifically, if Mr. Gobbi's suggestion about the partition of Cyprus into two states is adopted, then a very dangerous precedent will be created in international relations. The message that will be clearly given is that a homogeneous population is a necessary prerequisite for the existence of a state. This is very dangerous especially when almost all the states in the world today are multinational. The recent break up of states that were multinational, (e.g. the Soviet Union, Yugoslavia and Czechoslovakia), developments that Gobbi indirectly invokes, is not the rule. If this becomes the rule then we will have the dissolution of many states not to mention the possibility of a series of bloody conflicts. Again we should be reminded that currently in Europe and in America as well as in other parts of the world there are no homogeneous populations. In addition, if today's de-facto separation in Cyprus, which is a result of aggression and continuous infringement of international law, becomes de-jure, i.e. becomes legalized, it would mean that, far from being punished, expansionism and aggression are rewarded.

Gobbi invokes the negative experiences of the past following the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus on the basis of the Zurich-London agreements as an element that probably indicates that a federal settlement will not be viable. It should be noted though that friction and inter-communal strife were the result not only of the lack of common objectives of the two communities, as Mr. Gobbi suggests, but of systematic foreign interference and interventions as well. In addition, it should not be forgotten that the constitution itself was a source of friction while at the same time the two communities did not even have the necessary experience and political maturity for exercising power and solving problems.

It is indeed true that following a federal solution to the Cyprus problem there will be problems. But there would be more problems with a two-state solution or a confederation. Bizonal federation is not the ideal solution for Cyprus. But it is the product of a historical compromise. Ironically, the Turkish Cypriot identity can be maintained only within the framework of a United-Federal Cyprus, member of the EU. Security for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots as well as for other parties involved, could effectively be promoted by Cyprus' membership in a collective security organisation. The challenge is to create a framework which will maximize on the

one hand the advantages from the reunification of Cyprus and on the other hand minimize the cost. This prospect is in line not only with the interests of all Cypriots but also with international law as well as with the promotion of regional and international peace and stability.

Book

Reviews

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Labour Utilization and Income Distribution in Cyprus

E. Demetriades, N. Khoury and S. *Mattis (eds)*

"This isle, who has got so far as to know it?" mused the unrivalled Greek poet, Nobel laureate, George Seferis, who fell in love with Cyprus at first sight. Four decades later many and varied have the illusion that they know this isle. After all, there is not much to it. Cyprus now boasts an educated population (10 per cent of whom are university graduates) and also its own new university in addition to its thriving private tertiary education sector. Furthermore, its proliferating and voluble media fill the air with a mass of "information". It is my guess that Seferis will, given the chance, repeat his agonizing question.

It is particularly gratifying, therefore, to receive a new, well-produced book and in dipping into it to find a number of essays which expand our horizons and deepen our perceptions. They do this through probing scientifically into vital areas of the economy and society of Cyprus. It is a pioneering contribution, and a second volume, dealing with crucial aspects of the most vital asset of Cyprus - its human resources. It comes from the same cooperating agencies, namely the Department of Statistics and Research of the Cyprus Ministry of Finance, the International Labour Organisation and the United Nations Population Fund. The title of this second book indicates its main content: ***Labour Utilization and Income Distribution in Cyprus.*** It contains 8 chapters, written by 10 different authors and is edited by Drs Evros I. Demetriades and Nabil F. Khoury and Mr. Symeon Matsis.

The two main themes of this book, labour utilization and income distribution, have a necessary internal link, since one expends one's labour mostly to earn one's income (either directly and/or indirectly, e.g. through education) while furthermore access to employment and its rewards largely determine income distribution in our society. The editors had in mind those interlinks in selecting what to include in the book but the essays in the book seem to have been prepared independently with resulting overlaps and varied emphasis.

Substantive Matters and Issues

It should prove helpful to highlight here the following sample of issues dealt with by the authors and of their findings in order to give an idea of the flavour of this important book of essays. A previous volume dealt extensively with the reservoir from which labour is drawn, namely the population of Cyprus. It highlighted population size, composition, characteristics and trends in order to identify and to define the human resources. It was made clear that all in all these resources amounted to less than 300.000 people, actually those who happen to be economically active;

that means that they constitute less than half (some 47 percent) of the total population. They sustain the economy and maintain both themselves and those in a dependency category (those studying, the rich, the young and the old).

The calculations are that this economically active population may not be much more than 350.000 by the year 2020. This strategic fact of a minute labour force for a whole country underlines a fundamental constraint in the economy. This realisation compels a search for effective means to mitigate that handicap. The concern therefore, of the second book is to assess problems connected with strengthening the effectiveness of the labour force through attracting more people into it and tack- ling associated issues such as remuneration, occupational satisfaction and wider conditions of work, plus the influence of family, gender and status.

One can broadly view the contents of this second book as thematically presenting three main thrusts: (a) ***labour demand and supply,*** including the mobilization of "idle" female labour and the import of foreign labour; (b) ***institutional and social parameters of labour utilization,*** including labour market functioning, time use, social and health issues affecting labour participation; and (c) ***income distribution, levels of living and poverty.*** In Chapter I the reader is offered a very useful overview of the content of the rest of the book prepared by K.C. Doctor and N.F. Khoury.

a. Labour Demand and Supply

In Chapter 2, S. Matsis and A. Charalambous, concentrating on the period 1980-1992, focus on the rapid growth of the economy (average annual rate of growth 6 per cent) and on the heavy demand for labour (averaging 3 per cent growth a year), and for educational qualifications and skills. Simultaneously the economy diversified rapidly leading also to diversified labour demand, productivity, remuneration and mobility in the various sectors. Overall labour retained its share of GDP (at 45 to 50 percent) but with strong trade union support in conditions of full employment labour improved its remuneration by securing a rate of growth of real earnings (5 per cent on average a year) above the growth of productivity.

The authors reckon that the natural growth of population must have supplied less than half (45 per cent) of the new labour; some Cypriots also returned from abroad; but the bulk of the supply of new labour came from the participation of women in this force. Women in the labour force represented about 40 percent of all women of working age in 1982 rising to 47 per cent in 1992. Higher pay and higher educational attainments among women helped the process along.

Sectors, however, with low productivity and with heavy labour demand resorted to tapping an outside source of cheap and understanding work force, i.e. foreign labour from poor, mainly developing countries. The authors seem restrained in their

handling of a subject which has become quite controversial and to some extent out of hand. Since the official policy was established in 1992 foreign labour rose to some 13 per cent of the Cypriot labour force, one-third of which believed to be in Cyprus illegally. Besides the social problems hinted at in the text, the authors underline a main conclusion that the availability of cheap, relatively abundant labour, has retarded investment in technology, waived the need for modern entrepreneurship and helped in the expansion of low quality tourism.

b. Institutional and Social Parameters of Labour Utilization

There are influences at work defining both the supply and the utilization of labour, themes approached from different angles.

A comprehensive and searching treatment of the characteristics of the Cyprus labour force appears in Chapter 3 by B. Cohen and W.J. House.

The creditable educational attainments of the labour force are highlighted. As shown in the Household Income and Expenditure Survey 1990/91, over one-third of the labour force had completed secondary education, another 8.7 per cent had completed post-secondary education and another 9.6 per cent completed university education. By 1990/91 male labour registered 10 mean years of education, while female labour reached 9.6 years. In fact, the relatively few women in the better status and pay occupations were as well, or even better, educated as men. They were, however, grossly under-represented; occupational status and pay have been discriminatory for years putting women in the labour force at a disadvantage. Efforts, therefore, to increase labour supply have been vitiated.

Furthermore, efforts to raise the quality and productivity of labour have come up against the lack of sufficient employment opportunities to attract the young and educated into the labour force. Evidence includes the high unemployment of such labour and the fact that about 25 per cent of all Cypriots who complete their stud- ies abroad do not return.

Using advanced statistical techniques, the authors detect in the data a trend according to which new entrants tend to bring additional educational attainments and qualifications to occupations aimed at competing successfully for jobs and higher earnings. Some of the educated labour opt instead for their own small enterprises which they choose to start.

Systematic observation of time-use among the population is a new tool of considerable potential in the study of labour utilisation. In Chapter 4 by D. Pitiris, results are examined of preliminary work which throws light on how age, gender, education and status in the family affect the use of one's time. Furthermore, the results give some indications of how seeking paid employment is restrained; in the case of

women, household duties and child care tend to hinder highly educated and skilled personnel from taking up such employment.

This theme is expanded and documented in Chapter 5 by E.I. Demetriades. It is shown that while men in the labour force represent around 92-99 percent of all men aged 15-54, in the case of women the picture is variable: women in the labour force represent 69.1 per cent of all women aged 15-24, while the proportion drops to some 60 per cent in the ages 25-44, reflecting the effects of child-bearing and child- care. Educated women are shown to be more motivated to work outside the home and able to find more employment opportunities.

Figures analysed in this Chapter indicate that health problems and hospitalisation for obstetric reasons have tended to prevent women from working. The general conclusion is then reached that more education, more access to health care and more provision for child care would go a long way towards attracting women into the labour force.

This thematic category is brought to a conclusion with an attempt to pull together the various threads by a close look at the labour supply source potential in Chapter 6 by R. NcNabb. The focus is again on bringing women into the labour force. Male economic activity rates are high in Cyprus. It does not mean that there is no ample scope for more effective and more productive utilization of the male work force. For one thing, training or re-training to meet skill shortages, not to speak of supporting policy and management reform, have great potential but, as the author observes, they have yet to be assessed.

The author uses the Labour Force and Migration Survey, 1986/1987 as his source. Interviewees in that Survey gave the factors that prevented them from entering the labour market. The author lists them as: being in full-time education; for men, also doing their national service; and for women, also housework and child-care. Of the inactive men 93 per cent intended to seek work in the future; but only less than 30 per cent of inactive women expected to do so. It is interesting to note that about half of the inactive women interviewed had been in employment before, but that was mostly more than five years earlier. What makes re-employment difficult is the need for training or re-training after prolonged absence. A study of available figures indicates that women may leave employment for child care, but what brings them back depends on complex factors such as need, education attainment, prior experience and opportunities on offer.

c. Income Distribution, Levels of Living and Poverty

The utilization of labour available in households is directly linked to the theme of

this category. Analysis of figures from the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1990/1991 in Chapter 7 by D. Pitiris gives a picture of unequal distribution of incomes both per household and per capita. It seems that inequalities in Cyprus are moderate, certainly compared with what are found in developing countries, but also in comparison even with conditions in some developed countries. There is evidence that the general standard of living rose during the 1980s, but at the same time the gap between high and low earners widened, but not as much as in various developed countries. Low incomes tended to be found in large households, or in households headed by older persons, usually women.

Where the poverty line is drawn is explained in Chapter I of the book. Households whose members cannot meet basic needs and whose incomes fall below a socially acceptable level are considered as falling below the poverty line. Conventionally, that line is drawn at the level of 50 per cent of the national household income per capita. On that calculation it seems that around 4 per cent of households in Cyprus are in poverty, a level of poverty which had been maintained for some years. Single-person households, headed by an old person, usually a female of low education, tended to be the features of those in poverty. It is believed that with some assistance such households could rise above that line.

Levels of living are the subject of the last Chapter, by E.I. Demetriades and K.K. Glauser. They are approached from the angle of consumption, its level, content and quality. Based on the 1990/91 figures again, the authors indicate that the 10 per cent households in the lowest income category accounted for only 2 per cent of total consumption achieved by the 10 per cent of households in the highest income category. However, figures indicate that even the poorest 10 per cent of households possessed household durables, such as refrigerators and cookers at a remarkably high level, but to a much lesser extent others such a washing machine. The authors note also that the poorest households derived their incomes from pensions, remittances and gifts. Obviously of an old age they had need of household durables to look after themselves.

Some Observations on the Overall Contribution and Presentation

The sketch given above is a sample taken from the rich content of a very important book. It is intended to give an idea of the contribution that this work makes to our knowledge and to our deeper understanding of subjects vital to Cyprus. The book should appeal both to specialists and to the educated public. It is certainly required reading for policy makers and opinion formers including their aides and advisers, not to speak of our entrepreneurial class and the aspiring career seekers.

Specialists will find novel approaches in the application of advanced statistical methods and mathematical formulae to Cypriot economic and social data. This

reviewer, however, has some doubts as to whether the data in the main source used, namely the Household Income and Expenditure Survey, 1990/91, are sufficiently solid, comprehensive and complete to stand the rigours of application to advanced mathematical formulae with a view to testing findings and hypotheses. This cautionary comment is made here not only because of inherent difficulties in obtaining sufficient and firm data in social surveys, especially of a society like Cyprus which is largely unstudied, but also because the 1990/91 Survey happens to be the first full-scale one of its kind in Cyprus. There can be no doubt that the next one will be even more valuable and far more solid. However, the authors, not all of them widely known in Cyprus, must be experienced enough to judge; and they seem satisfied with the outcome of this pioneering approach.

One thing is clear. The authors are very reserved and cautious in their judgement of policy implications flowing from their findings, concentrating on what the analysis hinted at, while policy recommendations are eschewed. This may reflect the public service status of the authors and of the sponsoring agencies.

The data base used widely in the book, (it is noted that no statistic refers to anything after 1992), is by now dated. Cyprus, however, has moved on meanwhile. There have been rapid developments, for instance, in the acute and controversial issue of foreign labour, yielding a crop of employment, economic, social, cultural and even human rights problems. For one thing the numbers have doubled since 1992 and about one third of foreign labour are believed to be in Cyprus illegally.

An interesting and positive development has taken place in the area of boosting the incomes of older women, many of whom were below the poverty line. With the introduction in 1995 of the so-called social pension, women of sixty-eight and over who have no other pension, receive a modest pension from the state calculated to meet basic needs. A new study should show whether poverty has been lifted from the lives of many Cypriot woman.

It is clear, therefore, that studies like the ones presented in this book should be continued, expanded and intensified. Not only should this book be wholeheartedly welcomed but more of this kind of research should be demanded by legislators, policy advocates, policy makers and students and critics of the socio-economic fabric of Cyprus. Every educated Cypriot, every citizen, has the right and duty to know.

Meanwhile we must all be thankful to the authors and the sponsoring agencies for opening our eyes and minds to crucial issues embracing our most vital resource, the people populating Cyprus, who are not only the creators of its wealth but also the recipients of its benefits. This work deserves special attention.

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