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**THE
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REVIEW**

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

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Articles

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NUMBER 1



"ONE LEG IN THE PAST, AND ONE LEG IN THE FUTURE": A SOCIETY IN TRANSITION

Gisela Welz

Abstract

Modernity is a contested topic in contemporary Cyprus. Against the backdrop of the accession course to the European Union and the impact of globalisation processes on economic, political and social life, public debates on the pace and direction of social change in Cyprus are intensifying today. Based on qualitative interviews with opinion leaders and decision makers from politics and the media, state institutions, academia, and non-governmental organisations, the article explores how historical legacies, the present political situation, and contemporary social experiences both strengthen and limit the ability of Greek-Cypriot society to define its own path to modernity. In this context, the article places special emphasis on the potential of civil society institutions to function as an arena of "moral communication".

Contestations of Modernity

Is Cyprus a modern society? For outside observers, there is no doubt that it is. As soon as they are leaving one of the two airports of the Republic of Cyprus, even the tourists are immediately confronted with the mobile phones of the taxi drivers, the cars of the newest make congesting the access road to the highway, and the oversize billboards advertising global fast foods of American origin. Any illusion that Cyprus may be an island untouched by the passing of time - even though this is what the promoters of tourism like to claim - quickly dissolves. The Republic of Cyprus today fully measures up to all those criteria that supranational organisations have devised in order to determine whether a society is "developed" politically, economically, and socially. This is a prospering society, by measure of its high per-capita income making the list of the twenty wealthiest nations on earth. The latest technologies are readily adopted - according to one statistic, every third Cypriot uses a

computer. Furthermore, the citizens of this democratically ruled society are better educated than those of many other countries in the region and are considered to be highly mobile, both in terms of their desire for socio-economic advancement and their predilection for travelling abroad.

Further details of this "success story" could easily be supplied and documented by the pertinent annual statistics published by the Government's press and information office. But how do Cypriots themselves see their society? Surprisingly, it is difficult to find anyone willing to relate in a positive way to the statement that the Republic of Cyprus is a modern society. This is because they either consider Cyprus as not yet truly modern, or, conversely, as far too modern already. Within the framework of our research,¹ a large number of those interviewed saw their society as still being on its way to or not yet having achieved modernity in the fullest sense of the word. Most often, by way of explanation, they referred to what they consider the immobility, inefficiency, and incompetency of institutions that obstruct knowledge transfer from abroad and block the development of new ideas and innovative approaches within Cypriot society. The observation that clientelism and patronage still to a great extent pervade politics, the state and the economy is critiqued as anachronistic in a changing world. Others claim that a critical public culture and an intellectual arena of discourse are lacking and that the media are not responding to this challenge in any satisfactory way. Similarly, cultural life and cultural politics are often denigrated as being provincial and incestuous.

While these statements voice concern about Cyprus lagging behind a desired degree of modernisation, a different perspective emerges when the downside of the rapid transformation process that Cyprus has been experiencing during the past twenty years is brought to the fore. Increasing prosperity, so goes this line of argument, has undermined core values of Cypriot tradition such as the moral integrity of the family and the willingness to extend hospitality. Influences from Western societies that enter Cyprus by way of commodities, media, and tourism are considered to be endangering the youth of Cyprus - key words of polemics along these lines being drugs and Aids. Modernisation is also credited with being responsible for a perceived increase in motivations such as envy, avarice, and materialism among Cypriots - with older and established patterns of competition for status, that had been widespread before, being clearly forgotten in the rush to point out what is wrong with modern times. Furthermore, there are complaints that unchecked development motivated by the hope for quick and easy profit has led to an irreversible degradation of the natural environment.

These opinions shortly summarised here represent statements uttered by a wide range of persons interviewed, from politics, state institutions, academia, the media, the corporate world as well as non-governmental organisations.² While not all of

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them qualified as belonging to an elite of decision makers or opinion leaders, all of those interviewed shared a concern with the future of their society and felt the need to critically comment on the direction and pace of its development.

Critiques of Modernisation

It is easy to be misled by the apparent opposition between those who bemoan the incomplete modernisation of Cyprus and those who are angered by what they perceive as the destruction of a uniquely Greek-Cypriot culture by the influence of Western values and institutions. These two positions do not correspond in any uncomplicated or unequivocal way with other dividing lines within Cypriot society, such as between urban and rural populations, or political orientations to the left or right. Nor do those two perspectives on the status of Cypriot modernity correlate in an obvious way with the disjuncture between those social actors who emphasise the Hellenic heritage of their culture and often are more reserved about a rapprochement with the North, and those who are hoping for reconciliation and reunification with the Turkish Cypriots, a hope that frequently is combined with visions of Cyprus becoming again the multicultural and cosmopolitan hub of communications and exchanges in the Eastern Mediterranean that it once was. What cautions us most against seeing the embracing of modernisation and, conversely its critique of having gone "too far already", as two clearly delineated and separate attitudes is the fact that often they are uttered by the very same persons. The young Nicosia dentist who has been trained abroad,³ receives his patients clad in blue jeans and Birkenstock sandals and has decorated the walls of his office with original modern art. He is adamant about the ready adoption of the latest technologies by the young generation and sees the mobile phone as the epitome of what is wrong with Cypriot society today, especially the increasing superficiality of communication. In another vein, a cultural scholar who writes editorials for a recently founded daily newspaper that is favoured by liberal cultural and business elites, states with some bitterness, "Today, you are supposed to be a modern person, and close your eyes and accept all the bad things that are influences from Europe and the States. We are at a point in [the development of our civilisation] where we are just copying, we have no output ourselves."

In Cyprus today, those social actors who speak of modernity, modernism, and modernisation engage a contested terminology, attempting to position themselves and their society in a framework of transition processes that are global in scope. Their assessments of Cypriot modernity are not merely descriptive of the state their society is in, but prescriptive of its trajectory into the future: "Modernity" is chosen as a term and topic by those who are dissatisfied with the present state of affairs and want to affect change in their society. In Cypriot society, discussions centring on modernisation are intensifying at this point in time precisely because Cyprus is

establishing increasingly close links (some would add: relations of dependence) with Western Europe and the United States as a consequence of the ongoing process of accession to the European Union, and of globalisation, more generally. One could expect that in the near future, the further integration of Cyprus into transnational frameworks of various kinds will increase the extent to which international standards and regulations impact on the social and economic life of the Republic.

However, it is important to realise that debates on how much modernisation Cyprus needs or, conversely, how its society can cope with it without losing its identity, are not the main concern of public discourse in the Republic. The Cyprus Problem and strategies for potentially resolving it are predominant in political discourse, and more, generally, in the public arena, to an extent that is often astonishing to outside observers. Moreover, this almost exclusive focus with the political situation is reiterated by much of the international social science literature on the contemporary situation of the island, thereby affording political science the position of being the key discipline for "explaining" Cyprus. Even Cypriot scholars who are not political scientists rarely address topics unrelated to the issue that is deemed pivotal to the survival of Greek Cypriot society.⁴ There are also some who warn that the preoccupation with the political situation is binding so much of the intellectual energy of the country that there is hardly anything left over to meet other pressing challenges posed by the transformation of society.

The status quo of the de-facto partition in the aftermath of the 1974 Turkish invasion is to this day being precariously stabilised by an ongoing United Nations peacekeeping effort. Greek Cypriots reject this situation as unacceptable and unjust; the visions of a post-partition Cyprus that permeate social discourse, however, are as diverse as are the positions that map out the political landscape of the Republic. What unites them is that they mobilise central values of modernity without explicitly referring to them. They do so by appealing to international law, human rights, and the lawful protection of property rights - laws that have been broken by the occupying forces with the take-over of a large part of the island in 1974, the violent expulsion of its Greek Cypriot residents, and the attempt to install an illegal and consequently internationally non-recognised Turkish Cypriot state. It is the re-establishment of a lawful order that the government of the Republic, politicians from all sectors of the political spectrum, as well as the general public are demanding, asking the international community for support. Also, - and this argument mobilises genuinely modern values on another level - the sustained separation of the two main communities on the island by the impermeable Green Line is criticised on the grounds of a thoroughly modern morality by pointing to the inhumanity and utter lack of civility of the present situation which precludes mobility across the divide, and effectively prevents Greek and Turkish Cypriots from normal interaction. This is

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that Cypriot society has transformed itself in the second half of the twentieth century. Among those interviewed, there is also widespread consensus that as a late-comer to modernisation, Cyprus has had to cope with radical changes in an extremely short time-span. To illustrate this, the director of a regional development project surmises that Cyprus has been "going from agricultural society to consumerism without going through any of the processes in between." In this statement, some concern about the dizzying pace of change and its effects becomes evident, as well. Many of the people interviewed mobilise the contrast between their own childhood, portrayed as a time ruled by poverty and the lack of modern amenities, and the lifestyle of contemporary urbanites: "We are talking about one lifetime in which we passed from a very traditional Mediterranean type of society to a quite modern society," states another interviewee who is a professional in the tertiary education sector. Often, persons interviewed referred to their own biographies and to their family's history in order to create a vivid impression of what the speed of change actually meant, with the generation of one's parents - in the case of interviewees born before World War II - bearing the brunt of these transformations, pictured as embodying the strains of this process, with "one leg in the past, and one leg in the future."

The three-generations model of change that many of those interviewed employed in their descriptions is suggestive of linear change. It also, however, manages to convey the coexistence of different times, as it were, within the same family, with individual family members representing different stages of the modernisation process. Thereby, they point to a second trait - besides the rapidity of change - that characterises the Cypriot path to modernisation, namely the disjunctions and discontinuities it has generated. For one thing, these refer to the different "levels" of modernisation within society, that encompass the entire scale of orientations from traditional to modern: "There is a very wide gap in society. You have a very wide spectrum of people, of cultures - perhaps it is one culture! - but you start from the very basic village community with its own values, down to Nicosia and its more sophisticated people," as a civil servant recently retired from a leading position in government remarks.

Classical social theories of modernisation view this coexistence of differentially modernised life styles within a society and the resulting contrasts between modern urban life and the traditional rural village as a typical modernisation effect - as typical of the so-called "cultural lag" diagnosed by the social sciences. When Greek-Cypriot social actors point out that cultural values and social relations have not kept pace with the changes in economic and technological development, they seem to be in agreement with this sociological assumption that cultural and social life is slower to change than other areas of society. "Superficially, we behave like the Europeans behave(...). The odd thing about Cyprus is that in economic terms we de-

veloped very rapidly in the last forty years. But at the same time, in terms of social concepts and values, there is a lot of confusion," a politician interviewed surmises.

Legacies of the Past

As sociological and anthropological studies on the pluralisation of modernities between various societies throughout the world suggest, modernisation never occurs in a vacuum, but engages the historical conditions it encounters and is refracted by them, producing a different type of modernity in each setting. Sociologists Peter Berger and Thomas Luckmann (1995) propose that the cultural and social resources that individual societies bring to the modernisation process should be examined more closely. Cyprus is a post-colonial society where the effects of almost one century of British influence can still be felt even today in many sectors of society; while originating further back in the past, the legacy of Ottoman rule is also still pervading culture and society to some extent. What emerged in our interviews is that it is difficult for social actors in the Cypriot context to refer back to a "useable past" that may function as a resource for coping with modernity's challenges in a positive way. Some interviewees stressed that the many centuries of Ottoman rule are responsible for the late and ill-equipped launching of Cypriot modernity. Political scientist Niyazi Kizilyurek asserts that Cyprus has not been able to participate in the kind of modernisation process that European countries have undergone.⁶ Two important aspects of European modernity - economic progress and the formation of the nation state - have been slow to take hold on the island and are not "home grown" in Cyprus. The philosophical influence of the Enlightenment has not been felt in Ottoman and post-Ottoman colonial Cyprus. Kizilyurek also argues that the impact of British colonialism and its contribution to Cypriot modernity remains a rather "muted" topic in the discourse on modernisation. Indeed, in our interviews, British colonial rule was rarely invoked, and if so, did not carry positive connotations.⁷

In the interviews conducted within the framework of our project, the invasion of 1974 was often also cited as a further cause for delayed modernisation, interpreted as an interruption of the trajectory towards modernity that the Republic of Cyprus had embarked on from its inception. However, the meaning of the events of 1974 for the modernisation of Greek-Cypriot society is more ambiguous. In the second half of the 1970s, the Republic of Cyprus experienced an unprecedented economic comeback, dubbed "the Cyprus miracle" (Christodoulou, 1992). At the same time, however, Greek-Cypriot refugees from the occupied North had effectively been "proletarianised" by the loss of property and land at the hand of the invaders, and had to be integrated at great cost into the South's economy and housing market. Furthermore, important economic resources such as the tourist areas of Famagusta and Kyrenia had been lost; resulting in the need for developing new tourism des-

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tinations in the coastal towns of the south (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos, 1999). To some extent, however, the crisis also acted as a catalyst, driving the restructuring of the economy and releasing innovative entrepreneurial potential. However, not only economically, but in terms of social and cultural modernisation effects, the meaning of the displacement and loss forced on the refugees is complex and not easy to gauge (Loizos, 1981). Among the people interviewed, some who themselves were refugees, argue that the uprooting and unmooring from a traditional order of things that the displacement effected, actually set them free to become "modern", while at the same time they blame the refugee experience for much of the lack of orientation and the instability that they claim to observe in Greek-Cypriot society today.

Solving the Cyprus problem remains the biggest task of Cypriot modernisation, and is seen by many as the stumbling block that has held it back. The post-1974 (some would say: post-Independence) siege mentality of Greek Cypriots⁸ and the concurrent need for social consensus has been restricting opportunities for dissenting critiques of society. The continuing political insecurity and the persistent sense of military threat has been binding creative energies and cementing conservative attitudes that preclude risk-taking - at least in the political and social arena, though not necessarily where the economy is concerned. MP Katie Clerides who represents the ruling DISY party in parliament and is known within her party for outspoken criticism of closed-minded approaches to the problems facing Cypriot society, claims, "The preoccupation with the national problem - I should not say obsession, because we feel it is a matter of survival - has not left room for a social dialogue. How do we want to move forward? What is it that we need to do in order to become more European in terms of the ways we think and act, in terms of concepts rather than laws? We are not actually going through the process in terms of the mental work that needs to be done. Cyprus is such a small place, and it is basically a conservative society. It is very discouraging for people who have new ideas."

Centuries of foreign rule and a history of only four decades of sovereignty, marred by the shortcomings of the establishment of a bi-communal statehood upon independence, and the ensuing inter-communal conflicts culminating in the de-facto partition since 1974 - these, then, are the historical conditions that have shaped, and continue to shape, and in a sense, to delimit the path of Cypriot modernisation. The assessment is widespread that the modernisation of Greek-Cypriot society is as yet incomplete. Modernity is being defined by many as a goal that Cyprus has yet to achieve. The dominant figure of speech is that of a deficit or a deficiency. More recently, for instance, Cypriot society's bureaucracies and organisations are increasingly being criticised as inefficient and not functioning as modern institutions. In particular, movements and groups working for women's rights, for reconciliation of the two communities on the island, or for environmental conservation and sus-

tainable management of natural resources complain that the - as yet - incomplete rationalisation of administrative and political processes, the wide-spread social conservatism, and the weakness of civil society pose serious obstacles to implementing progressive policies that are firmly embedded in many Western societies. From the point of view of those demanding reforms, Cypriot modernity is as yet not fully functioning and needs to be taken quite a few steps further by emulating the structures observable in Western Europe in particular.

Images of Transition

Classical approaches to modernisation indicated that a certain amount of discontinuities in social change - such as the disparities in development between urban and rural areas - are signs of a transitional state between the traditional and the modern world. Much of what can be observed in Greek-Cypriot culture and society today seems, at first sight at least, to fall into this category of transitional phenomena, to be taken as ephemeral symptoms of an in-between state, no longer traditional, but not yet modern. To be in-between is in itself an important cultural topic in Greek-Cypriot society. Not only do the interviewees consider Cyprus to be hovering in the indeterminate area between the pre-modern and the modern, but also, contemporary discourses on geopolitics and European integration never fail to point out that Cyprus is positioned between regions and continents, affording it a privileged position as a link and bridge between Europe and the Middle East. With its not-yet resolved conflict, Cyprus also of course appears precariously poised between military conflict and peaceful coexistence - a transitional state that generates a social imagery positioning Cyprus between civilisation and the threat of barbarism.⁹

Images of transition, then, are prevalent in social discourse. Within the context of social change, this transition is interpreted as leaving the traditional order behind and replacing it with the patterns of the modern world. However, many of the conflicts erupting today in Cypriot society do not occur in some battleground between the advancing forces of modernity and those of tradition retreating. Rather, they are thoroughly modern conflicts. Increasing environmental degradation and irresponsible management of natural resources, for instance, is - in a grimly ironic way - evidence for the fact that Cyprus is a modern society. The tourism sector of the economy, in particular, with its strategy of rapid expansion is threatening to destroy the last remaining stretches of as yet undeveloped coastal areas.¹⁰ While entrepreneurs follow a modern logic of growth, claiming that "more is more", non-governmental organisations and civic groups who are protesting against these developments and demand the protection of the natural environment also are taking a modern stance, albeit a different one. German sociologist Ulrich Beck (1986) distinguishes between an older mode of modernisation as "progress", based on the belief that industrialisation and the world-wide application of science and technology

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will ultimately bring prosperity to all, and a more recent modernist perspective that recognises that most of the problems that humanity is faced with today are consequences of the application of this notion of progress. Beck calls this second mode of modernisation "reflexive" in that it makes modernity turn back on itself and critically reflect its own effects. Environmentalists who argue that not short-term economic profit, but the sustainable management of the island's environmental capital, should guide policies of tourism development, seem to adhere to that second mode of reflexive modernisation.¹¹ This and other instances of conflict, then, are no longer the outcome of a competition between traditional and modern values, but emerge from the internal contradictions of a full-blown modernity.

Reflexive Modernisation and Civil Society

The proliferation of social movements, civic groups, and NGOs that have sprung up in Cyprus in recent years - particularly in the women's movement, bi-communal activities, and environmental groups - point to a strengthening of this reflexive impetus, and the desire to achieve a society that fulfils the modern promises of social justice, peace, and the protection of natural resources for future generations. These groups are also introducing new forms of political culture into society and constitute an arena for discussions on the direction of societal change. Cypriot sociologist Nicos Peristianis, who in public statements often links current issues in Cypriot society to the upheavals of modernisation and globalisation, views these groups as evidence for a strengthening of a civil society that Cyprus had not developed so far due to the clientelistic underpinnings of social institutions: "In a patron-client type of society, you have a tremendous growth of the state, but you do not have intermediate institutions, formations that mediate between the individual and society." So-called intermediary institutions are those institutions below and beyond those of the state such as social movements, trade unions, the media as well as cultural and educational institutions. Political scientists attribute to them the capacity to safeguard democracy because they curb the arbitrary and abusive wielding of power by the state. More recently, sociologists also draw attention to the potential of intermediary institutions as agents of producing values and meanings that help the individual to make sense of social reality. Intermediary institutions create social cohesion and at the same time, serve as power points for the transformation of societies. As German sociologist Thomas Luckmann (1998) puts it, they are catalysts for social change precisely because they are able to aggregate the concerns of individuals and communicate them to larger social contexts. He points out that in modern societies, personal identities and moral values "are less obviously and not so strongly determined by social institutions" (1998:35). Conversely, in pre-modern societies, "the things a collective takes for granted were firmly anchored in homogeneous social milieus" and were "safeguarded by the norms of social institutions" that - according to Luckmann - emerged from actual social practices and were in turn legit-

imated by them. In modern societies, with their tendency towards individualisation and social fragmentation, there is a pluralisation of social milieus and normative frameworks, and a weakening of the power of society-wide institutions to provide authoritative guidelines for conduct and plausible readings of the meaning of social reality. Thomas Luckmann and Peter Berger¹² suggest that intermediary institutions step in here, providing an arena for "moral communication" that allows people to work out values and moralities that will give them orientation in a changing world (Berger and Luckmann, 1995).

The critiques of modernity and modernisation recorded in the course of our research are evidence of instances of "moral communication" that respond to a pluralisation of values and lifestyles observable in contemporary Cypriot society today. This is a recent phenomenon; the dominant system of values had insulated itself successfully, if not wholly intentionally against change well into the 1990s. During much of the process of social change initiated in the 1950s, the Church of Cyprus had successfully sustained its role as the exclusive authority on ethics, inscribing its morality into the very fabric of gender relations, of the institution of the family, and of the practices of everyday life. However, the moral authority of the Church is waning today, as socio-economic change both generates and demands the secularisation of society. Another factor contributing to the persistence of conservative values is the fact that after 1974, Greek-Cypriot society bonded around the trauma of the invasion and the prevailing political insecurity, with all social groups striving for a "maximum possible consensus" (Christodoulou, 1992: 278). Today, new social movements centring on the environment, on women's rights, and on the rapprochement between Greek and Turkish Cypriots increasingly serve as intermediary institutions that initiate and drive moral communication in Cypriot society. However, we need to be cautious about viewing them as testing grounds for new value orientations, as many of them - whether by conviction or for pragmatic reasons - do not constitute a radical break with the prevailing value consensus in society. Yet, it is beyond doubt that their critiques of modernisation - not fully achieved or, conversely, gone too far - have the potential to function as a starting point for working out a uniquely Cypriot modernity. Such a modernity would not just accidentally depart from Western precedents and models - in terms of not measuring up with its ideal standards, - but set itself apart intentionally.

Is Cyprus Becoming "Westernised"?

More recent findings from sociology and from social and cultural anthropology suggest that modernisation processes in each society meet with particular, historically generated conditions (Eisenstadt, 2000). This does not only mean that the transition from traditional to modern structures proceeds at a different pace - including delays, setbacks, and detours - in each case, but also, that the end results

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of the transition will be different in each society. The modernity of one society is not like the modernity of any other. While this diagnosis has been reached primarily when looking at social change in non-Western societies, it would be erroneous to assume that this does not apply to the societies of Western modernity's core as well. Indeed, social historians and anthropologists have never ceased to point out that there are important differences between the modern everyday cultures and mentalities of Western European societies. The term "the modern European society" represents an abstract concept that has no equivalent in empirical reality. Rather, what we are witnessing today is a multiplicity of options to live modern lives and develop modern attitudes towards the world. Accordingly, in recent years, anthropologists have become more cautious about positing a homogenised world culture as the outcome of modernisation. Instead, they are suggesting that modernisation results in both sameness and diversity, setting in motion a contradictory dynamic of differentiation and homogenisation. The increase in interactions and exchanges between societies that is both the product and the root of modernisation does not only assimilate cultures to each other, but also acts as a catalyst for the production of new types of difference and differentiation that may not necessarily be co-terminous with the boundaries of nation states, but more often than not, cross and transcend them in a myriad of ways. In an important way, this points to the fact that cultural difference is not merely a relic of pre-modern times. What is unique about a society and culture may not be left over from tradition, but could well be the outcome of its grappling with the recent challenges of modernisation. It is of course true that the global diffusion of modern institutions - bureaucratic statehood, formalised transfers of knowledge, mass media and telecommunications, industrialism, and a military apparatus,¹³ that accompanies the globalisation of the economy, has a strong impact on all societies. It would be wrong, however, to assume that the effects of this are the same everywhere: "As the civilisation of modernity enters into contact with other cultures, changes and refractions result, so that one may see it alternatively as an increasingly internally diverse civilisation or as multiple modernities," suggests Swedish social anthropologist Ulf Hannerz.

There is a problem, then, with those understandings of the modernisation process that expect its outcome to be the same everywhere and explain difference and diversity as mere left-overs from earlier times, bound to disappear the very moment full-blown modernity is established. Such a view cannot acknowledge discontinuities and disjunctions as having a status and quality of their own that is not transitional but more lasting and stable. Nor can it accept them as anything other than stations or stagnations on a path leading to an imagined ideal of modernity, identified with the West. In Cyprus, that which is culturally and socially specific to Cyprus, its modes of everyday life, types of social relations, symbolic practices and collective memories are generally understood to be an expression, or rather, a relic, of a pre-modern culture. Subsequently, it is expected - and anticipated with considerable

excitement by some, or fear by others - that its particularities will disappear once Cyprus has successfully completed the metamorphosis of becoming a thoroughly modern society. This scenario of Cyprus becoming "Westernised", indistinguishable from other European societies, is a pervasive trope of public discourse and can easily be backed up by first-hand observations. On a Saturday morning along Nicosia's Makarios Avenue, the fashionably dressed young adults thronging the lifeline of the capital's shopping district or sitting at the tables of its sidewalk cafes seem indeed indistinguishable from their peers in Rome, Berlin or London. Still, their values and aspirations in many cases are very different - and indeed also not quite identical with those of their generation in Beirut, Tel Aviv, Athens, or Istanbul. A manager of a leading consultancy and market research firm that has its headquarters in Nicosia surmises that "there is a lot of mimetism, of copying without assimilating" and goes on to say that if you would ask the young people about their attitudes towards gender roles, these would tend to be very much like those of the generation of their parents. So, while it is true that much surface homogenisation has taken place, especially in terms of the transnational commodities and media products that are being consumed, the practices into which these imports are being embedded grow out of and feed into a specific, historically shaped social life.

Cypriot Modernity

What makes the Cypriot way of leading modern lives and holding modern attitudes towards the world unique is in how it engages tradition. I would insist, however, that tradition is both something more, and less, than the notion of the cultural heritage of a people handed down unchanged through the ages, recognisable as a clearly defined set of customs and beliefs. Traditions are not encapsulated in old artefacts, but emerge from everyday routines and attitudes that underlie the social relations of people. Traditions cannot be found in museums, but are reflected in and created by the social experience of people past and present. Tradition, then, is both the essence of collective memory and the fabric of contemporary social life. Tradition is local in that its emergence requires an actual locus in space and time where people communicate with each other, creating, transmitting, and modifying a common culture. The localised nature of tradition also suggests that traditions are shaped by the specific, historically generated political, social, economic, and environmental conditions under which people live. In the case of Cyprus, these conditions imply both an openness to the world and the introverted, parochial nature of a small society. Contradictory as these may seem, both traits - or traditions - contribute in an important way to what makes Greek-Cypriot society modern these days.

Openness to the World

It is often said that Cyprus has for millennia been situated at the crossroads of

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multiple cultural influences and confluences. Centuries of foreign rule imply a long history of inter-cultural contacts. Most recently, the rhetoric of the business community priming Cyprus for becoming the "regional communications and trade hub" in the Eastern Mediterranean emphasises this historically inherited openness to the world and makes much of the ability of Cypriot people to integrate these influences productively into the fabric of their culture. Interestingly enough, the experience of living in the multi-lingual and multi-religious society that Cyprus once was and hopefully will become again is less often mentioned as a type of social capital - perhaps because it has not produced a culture of tolerance that would extend acceptance to non-Cypriot social or cultural Others. The openness to the world that characterises Greek-Cypriot society today is also the effect of mobility, of Cypriots emigrating, living in the diaspora scattered over the English-speaking world and Greece, but also in other European countries, and later coming back to the island. Up until the 1990s, there were very limited opportunities for tertiary education in the Republic of Cyprus, necessitating young Cypriots without exception to go abroad for academic training. Many - but not all - returned to embark on a professional career in Cyprus. Christos Eliades, the president of an NGO safeguarding the rights of medical patients who himself was trained as an urban planner and sociologist in France, views this group of repatriated university graduates as an important force in the modernisation of Greek-Cypriot society: "They are the ambassadors of new ideas, of change - by virtue of having been exposed to different mentalities, to a different way of life." Many of those interviewed in the course of our research had also spent years of their lives abroad. In the interviews, this biographical experience emerges as an impetus for criticism in a twofold way. On the one hand, many express the wish that the institutions in their society would function more like those in the United States, Great Britain, Germany or wherever else they lived as students and often as professionals as well. In this sense, the social experience of emigration and return migration seems to fuel a demand for Cypriot society becoming "Westernised" in the sense of an increase in efficiency, transparency, and rationality. On the other hand, however, the very same experience of living abroad also prompts them to utter an often harsh criticism of the quality of social relations - or rather, the lack of it - in their host societies which they perceive as impersonal, anonymous, highly individualised and superficial. This criticism has to be understood against the back-drop of that other set of traditions making Cypriot modernity unique: the way in which social relations are shaped by the smallness of Greek-Cypriot society.

A Densely Networked Social System

The Republic of Cyprus today is a densely networked social system, linking villagers with urbanites, expatriate Cypriots with those living on the island. Kinship ties and the bonds of co-villagers often crosscut social class barriers and serve as the underpinning of patron-client relations.¹⁴ This clearly represents a "social capital"

hailed by contemporary theory in economics as a resource that makes small societies competitive in a globalised world (Musyck and Reid, 2000). The downside of the parochial nature of society is an intense social control, even in the urban context, with not only the individual being held accountable for her or his actions by public opinion, but these also reflecting back on family and kin. Interpersonal contact and communication remains primary even after the advent of television with much leisure time dedicated to commensality, to eating and drinking in the circle of family or friends. With Cyprus being a small island, the short geographical distances, now even more easily bridged by car on a modern road and highway system, seem to facilitate this cultural predilection, in much the same way as the advent of the latest telecommunications technologies - mobile phones and internet - does not so much replace face-to-face communication as feed into it. Words like "warmth", "spontaneity", "hospitality", "solidarity" only partially capture an attitude that is also extended to foreign tourists and non-Cypriot guests - albeit not to migrant workers from Third World countries. In our interviews, many people were at a loss to find terms to describe the immediacy of social contact and the high degree of social accessibility that characterises Cypriot society. Anna Marangou, an archaeologist whose newspaper columns on current issues in culture and society receive much public attention, put it most succinctly by emphasising, "our culture is not about the commercialisation of the human being."

Conclusion

Cypriot modernity is produced by an interplay between the local and the global. The cultural uniqueness of Cyprus is not merely a residual category of modernisation, something that is bound to disappear, but rather a resource that can be utilised to actively shape modernity on the island. The collective memories and contemporary social experiences of Cypriots have the potential to empower them to take charge of the modernisation process and define its outcome, to have a say in how and to what end they want Cyprus to modernise.

Notes

1. In 1999, the Institute of Cultural Anthropology and European Ethnology of Goethe University Frankfurt, Germany conducted a research project on "Cyprus: Contemporary Culture and Society", addressing issues of modernisation and European integration and focussing on the emergence of civil society in the Republic of Cyprus. Funding was provided by the German Academic Exchange Service (DAAD) and Goethe University Frankfurt. We wish to thank Intercollege Nicosia, the University of Cyprus, the Cyprus American Archaeological Research Institute and the Cyprus Conservation Foundation for their support of the research undertaken in November 1999. Information on the project is available at www.rz.uni-frankfurt.de/FB/fb09/ku1turanthro/e/projects/cyprus/intro.html

2. Close to one hundred interviews took place in the context of a two-week stay in Cyprus with a group of ten students and Ph.D. candidates in November 1999 under the direction of the author. Other interviews as well as more informal talks were conducted by the author during five additional visits to Cyprus between 1998 and 2000.

3. Members of the medical professions without exception have received their training abroad as the young University of Cyprus does not have - and will not in the foreseeable future - have a medical school.

4. Other topics for social research could also include emigration and immigration, tourism, consumer culture, the management of natural resources, the role of media in society, health care, the educational system, tourism, as well as the emergence of civil society.

5. See Amelang, forthcoming, as well as Schulze, forthcoming.

6. See Kizilyürek 1993, Kizilyürek 1998.

7. Zervakis (1998) and Faustmann (1998), however, assert that the reform projects that the British colonial administration initiated early on - even though they were not implemented until much later, starting in the 1930s - have indeed contributed to the modernisation of Cypriot society.

8. See Mavratsas 1995, Mavratsas 1998.

9. There are transitional social groups as well in Greek-Cypriot society. The large population segment of refugees from the occupied North embodies an in-between situation in a poignant way: They have managed to build up a new life in the south, but at the same time feel strongly connected to their lost homes in the north and hope for the opportunity to return.

10. The Akamas peninsula, one of the last wilderness areas of Cyprus containing sensitive coastal ecosystems and the habitats of rare species, was designated to become a national park. In March 2000, however, the Cyprus government passed a decision to allow for tourism development in this area. See Baga, forthcoming.

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11. For an application of this theoretical approach to an analysis of the Cyprus water management crisis, see Weber, forthcoming.

12. The team Berger/Luckmann is best known as authors of the book "The Social Construction of Reality" (1996). Quotations from Berger/Luckmann 1995 translated from German by the author.

13. These are the institutional dimensions of modernity listed by Anthony Giddens (1990).

14. Community studies in Cyprus conducted by anthropologists and sociologists have emphasised this quality, enabling social actors to cope with the challenges of modernisation successfully while remaining embedded in and actively utilising a "traditional" system of social relations. See Loizos 1975; Markides et al. 1978.

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THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND CYPRUS

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Abstract

European integration is held to be one major element in the development of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe. (Neo-)functional integration is also often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of violent conflict, including ethnic conflicts. After an analysis of the posited mechanisms between integration and peace, this assumption is first examined in the light of one particular instance of ethnic conflict, that of Northern Ireland. It is argued that the main contribution of the European integration process to the settlement efforts was to help improve interstate relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In a subsequent analysis of the Cyprus case, it is concluded that the prospect of EU membership has as of yet failed to contribute positively to the settlement efforts. Finally, the implications of these findings for integration theory and ethnic conflict resolution are extrapolated.

Introduction

European integration and the emergence of European institutions in the 1950s - the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Economic Community, the (failed) European Defence Community, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, and the Council of Europe - is held to be one major element in the development of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe. In particular it is credited for the historic French-German reconciliation, which transformed the relationship between the former enemies into one of peaceful cooperation. Furthermore, functional integration is often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of violent conflict, including ethnic conflicts. After an analysis of the posited mechanisms between integration and peace, this assump-

tion is examined in the light of one particular instance of ethnic conflict, that of Northern Ireland. The lessons from Northern Ireland are then used to evaluate the contribution of the European integration process to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Integration Theory

The motives behind post-World War II European integration were many. Narrow national self-interests, such as the French desire to keep Germany weak and under control while rebuilding French strength, and U.S. pressure for European coordination in relation to the Marshall Plan (and, after the advent of the Cold war in 1946-47, for the rapid revival of a West German state as a bulwark and ally against the Soviet) are factors that should not be discarded. However, the founding fathers of the European institutions were also motivated by more ideational considerations. The two World Wars had shown that Europe needed more than the nation state to guarantee peace and prosperity. Moreover, these two objectives were believed to be intimately linked. The reconstruction of the European economies was seen as a major instrument for peace as it presented the European countries with a common interest that, it was assumed, would promote the development of a security community, where the use of violence would become unthinkable. Dominant theoretical perspectives on international integration, in particular functionalism (Mitrany, 1975), transactionalism (Deutsch, 1957) and neo-functionalism (Haas, 1964) provided the theoretical underpinnings.

Functionalists posited that economic cooperation between states would lead to increased interdependence and a mutual interest in political cooperation. Coordinating agencies would be established for states that possessed common functional interests. David Mitrany emphasised the necessity of a gradual 'bottom-up' approach as he believed that imposition from above (from a supranational authority or group of political elites) would spark fears of losing sovereignty and be perceived as a threat to national identity. It would therefore entrench rather than erode borders. Gradually, however, through a natural process whereby citizens came to share functions and develop a multiplicity of contacts, state boundaries would erode.

Like Mitrany, the transactionalist approach of Karl W. Deutsch emphasised the role of citizens in the pursuit of integration. What would eventually erode state boundaries was the development of mutual sympathies and trust, an ever expanding 'we feeling' as a result of integration and increasing transactions between peoples. Eventually a security community - "the attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to ensure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change."

(Deutsch, 1957, p. 5) - would emerge.

Neo-functionalism, most closely associated with Ernst Haas, shared with functionalism the emphasis on economic factors in encouraging cooperation. But while Mitrany had argued that emphasising the political aspects of cooperation risked undermining cooperation by creating a 'back-lash' among national elites, and that attempts to create a unified political framework therefore would prove divisive, Haas argued that cooperation could not be achieved in the absence of an overarching supranational institution. For neo-functionalists, the ultimate goal of the integration process was the attainment of a federal union of states.

Neo-functionalism saw political and economic interest groups as the driving forces of integration and thus shifted the locus of integration from the popular level of functionalist theory to the elite level. Economic cooperation, itself perceived to be politically neutral (or 'low-level' politics) and therefore providing a non-contentious starting point of an integrative process, would eventually 'spill over' to political cooperation ('high-level' politics), which would in turn lead to the establishment of central political institutions. Once formed, these supranational institutions were to provide the underlying dynamism for the integration process. By mediating between governments, a supranational authority would be able to conclude package deals where all sides would gain.

The posited peace promoting elements of integration theory can be summarised in the following way:

- i. Integration will promote prosperity and the realisation of economic interests.
- ii. Economic cooperation will 'spill over' to the political arena and lead to political cooperation.
- iii. Integration will create habits of peaceful cooperation and provide arenas for problem solving.
- iv. Integration will lead to the development of bonds between people, shared identities, and a concern for the welfare of the other.
- v. Integration will lead to the eventual erosion of state boundaries.

When we in the post-Cold War era take stock of the European integration process it is clear that although not all of these elements can be said to be fully present - even with the establishment in 1992 of the European Union national identities and state interests remain strong in the considerations of publics and politicians alike and the erosion of state boundaries have only just begun - the integration process has nevertheless successfully bound the countries involved together in a security community. The use of violence between them has indeed become unthinkable. However, parallel to this development we have seen an increase in the

threat to security and well-being arising from conflicts within states, notably ethnic conflicts. Among the countries thus plagued by violence arising from ethnic conflicts we find, somewhat paradoxically, several of the countries who themselves are involved in the European integration project (France, the United Kingdom, Spain). In this respect, the European experience reflects a global development whereby security threats arising from international conflicts have been superseded by threats arising from intrastate conflicts (Gurr, 1994; Sollenberg, 2000).²

The success of the (neo-) functional interdependence model of European integration process in ending French-German rivalry is often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of conflict, including ethnic conflicts. Shifting the focus from the international to the intrastate arena we may therefore ask: to what extent has the development of European integration promoted a development towards internal peace and conflict resolution *within* these countries as well? In this article, we will undertake this examination in respect to one particular conflict situation, namely that of Northern Ireland. Using the above stated propositions on the peace promoting elements of integration, the question that we will seek to answer in the following sections is the following: To what extent did the development of European integration contribute to the settlement of the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland in 1998?

The question of the potential contribution of integration to ethnic conflict resolution is of additional interest in that arguments pertaining to the benefits of European integration in contributing to ethnic conflict resolution have also been advanced in relation to one of the candidate countries for EU membership, namely Cyprus. Using the lessons from Northern Ireland as a backdrop, we will therefore undertake an evaluation of the prospects for European integration to contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

In the remaining parts of this paper, European integration will be narrowed down to one of its institutions, the European Community (from 1992 the European Union)³ This limitation seems justified as these institutions are the outcome of the most extended and far-reaching integration processes in post-war Europe. The establishment of the European Union represents a new feature of international association in that member states ceded some of their sovereign rights to a supranational organisation and conferred on it some powers to act independently. It is also a process which involves all the main parties to the two cases of ethnic conflicts this paper is concerned with, as they either are long-standing members of the union, in the case of Northern Ireland, or aspire to become members, in the case of Cyprus.

The Contribution of European Integration to Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland became part of the European Community (EC) in January 1973, when the United Kingdom, together with Denmark and the Republic of Ireland, acceded to membership.⁴ Subordinate to London on matters to do with foreign affairs, the decision to apply for membership was beyond the control of the local parliament in Belfast. The majority of the Northern Irish MPs at Westminster, however, voted against the principle of entry.

Northern Ireland and the EC/EU

Northern Ireland joined the Community at a time of immense political and civil unrest. In 1968, the conflict had entered a new violent phase, a phase that with varying intensity was to last until the ceasefires in 1994. The year preceding accession, 1972, was the worst year for fatalities.⁵ Moreover, less than a week after the signing of the Accession Treaty, Ireland and the United Kingdom found themselves in a position of diplomatic confrontation, underlined by the burning of the UK embassy in Dublin.

In addition to civil unrest, Northern Ireland's entry into the EC coincided almost exactly with another major political change: the imposition of direct rule from Westminster after fifty years of semi-autonomy.⁶ EC membership, and entry into participation in a wider supranational arena, was thus paralleled by the opposite tendency of reassertion of national sovereignty. At the same time, with the simultaneous accession of the two 'motherlands,' EC membership put the two parts of Ireland in a joint framework after fifty years of separation.

From an Irish perspective, in addition to offering an opportunity to replace the country's traditional dependence on the UK European integration also raised the prospects of Irish reunification. Irish politicians of the time clearly subscribed to the rationale of functional integration and expressed hopes that common membership of the EC would bring the parts of the island closer together and promote the identification of Northern Unionists with the rest of the island. For them European integration equated Irish integration (Keatinge, 1984).

This prospect did not escape the Northern Protestants. For them, EC membership was no more than an attempt to use a European backdoor to 'settle' the Northern Ireland problem to their disadvantage. Proud to be 'more British than the British', Europe was seen as a real threat not only to cherished British values and traditions - the Monarchy, sovereignty of Parliament, Protestantism - but to the ex-

istence of Northern Ireland itself. Membership risked softening the border with the 'hostile' and 'annexationist' neighbour in the south and erode the union with Great Britain (moreover, with the latter's consent). In addition, the uncertainties generated by the introduction of direct rule and the loss of the regional parliament gave the sovereignty of the national parliament an added dimension.

Neither were the Northern Catholics initially overwhelmed by the prospect of EC membership. Republican and Nationalist forces shared a mistrust of the EC as an alien, capitalist/imperialist entity and as a threat to (Irish) sovereignty and neutrality.⁷

During the years of membership, these early positions have, however, undergone profound changes. The Anglo-Irish crisis was followed by improved relations and joint efforts in relation to the political turmoil in Northern Ireland. Fierce Protestant opposition to power-sharing within Northern Ireland as well as with the Republic (the so-called Irish dimension) undoubtedly helped put the prospect of Irish unification in perspective. The Southern Irish grew reluctant to incorporate a hostile Protestant population who in the event of Irish (re)unification would comprise twenty-five per cent of the population.

Northern Unionists have remained largely 'Euro-sceptic' but different orientations have emerged. The biggest party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) has, despite its many reservations, been prepared to work constructively within European-community. This pragmatism may be explained by the fact that the UUP electorate counts many farmers enjoying the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as business interest keen on the European market. At the same time, the UUP has been adamant to prevent a development of creeping integration with the Irish Republic, such as the establishment of joint institutions.

By contrast, the second largest Unionist party led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), has remained strongly opposed to the European integration project which they see as a Catholic-inspired creation of the European Christian Democratic parties and as a back-door meant to undermine the border with (Catholic) Ireland (Hainsworth, 1996).⁸

The strongest support for European integration has come from the (Catholic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Its initial scepticism was soon replaced by a pro-integration, post-nationalist agenda. SDLP, and in particular its leader (since 1979) John Hume, have consistently held forth the European experience and principles - proportional representation in voting, power-sharing and compromise - as an example for the island of Ireland (Hume, 1993).⁹ SDLP's post-nationalist vision - a supranational Europe of regions rather than states - has not, however, been

able to attract Unionist support. Unionists continue to see the SDLP's agenda as all-Ireland nationalism - albeit coveted in European integration terms.

Northern Ireland is represented in the European Parliament by three members.¹⁰ Without exception the three MEPs have come from the same parties, the UUP, the DUP, and the SDLP (with Ian Paisley each time topping the poll, far exceeding his party support). The MEPs provide a direct link between the province and the European structures. In addition, the province is represented indirectly on the Council of Ministers by the UK government's ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Another contact point between the province and Brussels is the Northern Ireland European Commission Office in Belfast, which can articulate local concerns in Brussels and vice versa. However, the effectiveness of the centre has been hampered by the absence of a regional administration in Northern Ireland.¹¹

In relation to the political problems of Northern Ireland, the European institutions have been loath to take on a more active role, choosing instead to treat it as a purely domestic affair of the United Kingdom. As can be expected, this has particularly been the stance of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, where Northern Ireland is represented by UK ministers. The European Parliament, where Northern Ireland has direct representation, has taken a slightly more active interest in the province. So for instance did the parliament in 1984 support a ban on the use of plastic bullets, used by the British security forces for 'riot control.' And on one occasion the Political Affairs Committee even took the controversial and unprecedented decision of launching an investigation into the political situation of Northern Ireland.¹² The Northern Irish MEPs have also at times used their influence in the parliament to highlight the economic problems of the province as a peripheral region of the Community.

EC/EU Contribution to Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland: an Evaluation

In April 1998, after many failed attempts and two years of negotiations, a political settlement involving all the major parties to the conflict (including the two governments and the major political parties in Northern Ireland, with the exception of the DUP) was finally achieved.¹³ Generally called the Good Friday Agreement after the day it was signed, the agreement was subsequently ratified in two separate referenda by large majorities on both sides of the border (71 per cent in the north and 94 per cent in the south). In July a general election for a new Northern Irish assembly, based on power-sharing between the two communities, was held.

The Good Friday Agreement is comprehensive and addresses the totality of the relationships involved in the protracted conflict. Internally to Northern Ireland the agreement provides for a reintroduction of devolved government in a regional as-

sembly. It also provides for the creation of a North-South Council for cooperation between the two parts of Ireland. In addition, a (consultative) British-Irish Council (BIG) made up of members of the two governments, and devolved institutions in the United Kingdom are to be established. In addition to the settlement of the major issues, violence has decreased dramatically in the province (albeit not ceased completely) as a result of a cease fire observed, with some backlashes, by the main paramilitary (militant) organisations since 1994.¹⁴

Any attempt to evaluate the contribution of Northern Ireland's EC/EU membership to the settlement of the conflict will have to start by pointing out some obvious facts. Initially, the addition of a European dimension did not have any noticeable impact on the intensity of the conflict. The province became a member at a time when violence was at its height. Moreover, violent conflict continued to plague the province more than two decades after the accession to the EC. In fact, for the people in Northern Ireland, the continuing 'Troubles', as the conflict is euphemistically called, and the process of European integration have been two parallel experiences.

This does not preclude, however, that the experience of European integration may have had other less immediate effects. For these we return to our previous analysis of the posited links between integration and peace. On the basis of that analysis, we may ask: Has the EC/EU experience promoted prosperity and economic cooperation between the parties? If so, has cooperation in the economic field spilled over to the political arena, creating habits of peaceful cooperation and problem-solving? Has the shared experience of EC/EU membership lead to the development of bonds and mutual concern between the peoples of the British Isles (Great Britain and Ireland, north and south)? Have borders become less significant?

As one of the most peripheral and socio-economically disadvantaged regions of the community, Northern Ireland has enjoyed a special status as an Objective One region. This means that the province has enjoyed considerable financial support from the EU's structural funds. Northern Ireland farmers have also enjoyed the benefits of the CAP; in fact, support to farmers accounts for almost half of the total EC grants and subsidies in Northern Ireland (Hainsworth, 1996). Despite this economic assistance, however, analysts generally agree that community membership has not provided significant prosperity. With the exception of farming guarantees, the contribution has been marginal to the Northern Ireland economy, especially compared with the UK subvention. Nor has Northern Ireland's standing as regards EC regional disparities improved during the years of membership (Keatinge, 1984; Hainsworth, 1985; Keatinge, 1991; Hainsworth, 1996).

EC/EU membership has also failed to promote economic cooperation between

the two parts of Ireland. The Irish decision to join the European Monetary System in 1979, while the United Kingdom remained outside, can even be said to have had the opposite effect.

However, one by-product of EC/EU membership has been the increased scope for Anglo-Irish dialogue. Although the rules of the Commission prevent the discussion of foreign policy and defence policy matters arising between member states, the Irish and British heads of governments have made it a habit to hold bilateral discussions on the margins of council meetings. These meetings can be seen as precursors to the institutionalisation of Anglo-Irish contacts agreed to in the 1980s, which in turn facilitated the governments' joint peace initiative in 1993.¹⁵ Through the EC/EU, British and Irish ministers and officials have maintained regular contact on an agenda much broader than Northern Ireland and involving less antagonistic issues. It seems plausible that these contacts have led to increased familiarity and sympathy in Anglo-Irish relations. It has also helped the Irish republic overcome the asymmetry it suffers from in relation to its much bigger and more influential neighbour (who is also its former colonial ruler).

Provincial economic interests have also, albeit on rare occasions, been capable of uniting Unionists and Nationalists, often against the British government who has been criticised by both communities for failures to secure European funding and for not transferring to Northern Ireland the full value of allocated Euro-funds (Hainsworth, 1996). Divided on most issues, the three MEPs have nevertheless occasionally managed to join efforts in lobbying for European economic assistance to the province. These examples on the European arena should, however, be taken as evidence that European integration has given rise to habits of cooperation within Northern Ireland itself.

Neither is there any evidence that the experience of EC/EU membership has produced a shared 'European' or 'Northern Irish' identity capable of transcending divisive ethnic identities. After twenty-seven years of membership, the overwhelming majority of the people in Northern Ireland continue to identify themselves first and foremost as Catholic/Irish or Protestant/British, a fact that was acknowledged in the recent agreement where representation is based on communal identity. And although checkpoints have been dismantled and roads reopened, the borders between north and south still remain in the minds of people.

Although its contribution has been marginal in relation to another international actor, the US has played a far more active role, some impact of European integration on the 1998 settlement can nevertheless be seen. The Good Friday Agreement itself contains several trans- or supranational features, for example, the two confederal elements of the North-South Council and the BIC. The North-South Council

is itself structurally modelled on the EU Council of Ministers.¹⁶ There are also elements of co-sovereignty in the form of an inter-governmental conference for matters not devolved to the regional assembly.

The EU has also sought to underpin the current peace process with direct financial assistance to cross-community and cross-border initiatives. EU contributions have consisted of economic aid through the International Fund for Ireland and the establishment of the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland (European Commission, 1995). These initiatives very much echo the functionalist approach to peace through economic development and cooperation.

It thus seems safe to conclude that the experience of European integration has indeed had an impact on the political situation although it is doubtful that this is due to functional integration along the lines envisioned by integration theorists.

The Contribution of European Integration to Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Cyprus

Of the four main parties to the Cyprus conflict, one is already a member of the EU, and the other three aspire to become so. Greece joined the EC in 1981. Turkey, having become an associate member of the EC, applied for full membership in 1987, entered a Customs Union with the EU in 1996 and was granted candidate status in December 1999. The Republic of Cyprus became an associate member of the EC in 1973 and signed a Customs Union agreement in 1987. In 1990, an application for membership was submitted. The application was accepted by the Commission three years later. In 1998, membership negotiations were initiated. The Republic of Cyprus hopes to become a full member at the time of the next enlargement, expected to take place 2003-2005. Asserting their own sovereignty in the north of the island, also the Turkish Cypriots have expressed an interest in joining the EU but have called for separate negotiations to be held between the EU and the two communities. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots have argued the need for a settlement to the conflict to be in place prior to EU membership.

Cyprus and the EC/EU

Early relations between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus were closely linked to Cyprus' relations with the UK. After its establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus remained heavily dependent on the British market and when the UK applied for membership, first in 1962 and then again in 1971, Cyprus followed suit.¹⁷

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been insufficient for the Turkish Cypriots to set aside their political demands. At the same time, there is no doubt that also the Turkish Cypriots are keen on joining the EU (although they have not submitted an application for membership on behalf of the "TRNC"). Several opinion polls have returned a large majority in favour of membership.²⁸

However, the Turkish Cypriots' aspiration for membership is not unconditional. A majority argue that a settlement of the conflict has to be in place before membership. There has also been some reluctance in joining the EU before Turkey, although in official proposals this position has lately been slightly modified. The August 1998 proposal for the establishment of a confederation on the island, opens up the possibility of a future confederal Cyprus joining the EU before Turkey, on condition that a 'special arrangement' provides Turkey with "the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation" (Oenktash, 1998). Thus, more than disputing the desirability of EU membership for Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots have disputed the nature of the process whereby this goal is being realised, which they so far have not been part of. Turkish Cypriot calls for separate talks to be held between the EU and the two communities have invariably been turned down by union representatives. The union has also clearly stated that there is no question of renegotiating already closed chapters should the Turkish Cypriots at some point decide to join the accession talks.²⁹

Already inside the European structures, Greece has been an active advocate of the Republic of Cyprus' accession. At the same time Greece has been able to use its position to influence Community policy towards Turkey, another aspiring member and party to the Cyprus conflict. The bones of contention between Greece and Turkey are many but Cyprus figures prominently. Greece has threatened to block EU enlargement if its partners try to block the Republic of Cyprus' accession and initially opposed the Customs Union with Turkey.³⁰ Eventually, in what has been called 'an historical compromise', a package deal was negotiated in which the Greek government accepted the Customs Union while the EU Council of foreign ministers confirmed the Union's will to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its development and set a date for the initiation of accession negotiations (Brewin, 1999).

For Turkey the EU represents a challenge and at times a conflict of interest. Relations with the EU and aspiration for full membership are intimately linked to Turkey's relations (and conflicts) with Greece as well as her own interests in Cyprus and loyalty to the Turkish Cypriots. Which of these interests that figure most prominently in Turkish policy making have varied depending on priorities of the ruling government. At the time of the signing of the Customs Union agreement (1995), not opposing the initiation of membership negotiations for the Republic of Cyprus, which was the 'price' Turkey had to pay for Greece to drop its veto, caused a strain in her

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relations with the Turkish Cypriots.³¹ Subsequent disillusionment and frustration after the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, when Turkey's accession status was put on hold while the Republic of Cyprus was recognised as a candidate country, resulted in a crisis in EU-Turkey relations and a strengthening of Turkey's relations with the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara (and the Turkish Cypriots) suspended all political dialogue with Brussels and introduced several measures to formalise their relationship, among them, the establishment of an Association Council mirroring that between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus.³² EU-Turkish relations remained at a low until the Helsinki meeting of the European Council in December 1999, when candidate status was finally granted.

EC/EU Contribution to Conflict Resolution in Cyprus: an Evaluation

An evaluation of the EC/EU contribution to conflict resolution in Cyprus has to start from a different point of departure than a similar evaluation in the case of Northern Ireland. While all the parties to the conflict Northern Ireland are long standing members of the EC/EU, in the case of Cyprus only Greece has a history of such close association. Therefore what is being evaluated in the case of Cyprus is rather an ongoing process that has membership as its goal rather than the actual impact of membership.

Although the issue of membership and a settlement to the Cyprus conflict are intimately linked as far as the parties to the conflict are concerned, the approach of the EC/EU has been to seek to distance itself from the settlement efforts, leaving those to be conducted under the aegis of the UN. In the period leading up to the Republic of Cyprus' application for membership (1990), this approach presented few problems. However, once the application was submitted, the EC/EU arrived at a situation when certain decisions needed to be made.

The first of these decisions was whether or not to accept the application submitted by a *de facto* Greek Cypriot government on behalf of the whole island. Predictably, the legitimacy of the application had been challenged by the Turkish Cypriots on the grounds that they do not recognise the *de facto* Greek Cypriot government as a legitimate representative of the Republic of Cyprus nor as a legitimate representative of their community.³³

The Commission in its Opinion of June 1993, although acknowledging that the application had been challenged "by the *de facto* authorities of the northern part of the island" did not, however, express any reservations on the legitimacy of the application. It was confirmed that the Community considered Cyprus eligible for membership. The Commission did, however, express some reservations as to the initiation of the accession process, which, it stated, would start "as soon as the prospect

of a settlement is surer" (Commission of the European Communities, 1993).

As UN efforts failed to bring the prospect of settlement any closer, while pressure (not the least from Greece) to proceed with the accession of Cyprus continued, the EU was faced with the decision whether to proceed with the accession also in the absence of progress. In a series of steps, the issue of accession of the Republic of Cyprus subsequently came to be severed from the requirements of progress towards a settlement.

The turning point came at the June 1994 European Council meeting in Corfu where the Council announced that the next phase of enlargement of the union would involve 'Cyprus' and Malta.³⁴ This was the first time the need for a settlement and accession was explicitly de-linked. The conclusions contained no references to the need for a settlement before accession (European Council, 1994).

Another step in this direction was taken at the Council's Cannes meeting of June 1995 when the Republic of Cyprus was given a date for the initiation of accession negotiations.³⁵ Accession negotiations were to start six months after the conclusion of the forthcoming (1996) Intergovernmental Conference.

In the summer of 1997 UN sponsored peace talks stalled on the issue of the EU when it became clear that the Commission's programme on policy reforms to adapt the union to enlargement (Agenda 2000) recommended the initiation of accession negotiations with Cyprus even in the absence of progress.³⁶ The situation was further compounded by the Greek Cypriot refusal to discuss issues related to EU during the UN talks with references to these being strictly 'governmental' (Pillai, 1999). The Turkish Cypriots responded by withdrawing from the talks, demanding that the "TRNC" be recognised and that accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus be suspended.³⁷

The December 1997 Luxemburg Council meeting, at which a date was set for accession negotiations to begin with Cyprus while Turkey was denied its sought after candidate status, further aggravated the political situation. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots ended most of their formal as well as informal contacts with the EU and, as noted above, 'in response' to the integration between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU took several steps towards formalising economic integration between Turkey and the "TRNC".

The Helsinki summit of December 1999, confirmed the EU policy of de-linking membership and the requirements for a settlement. The conclusions stopped short, however, of declaring that the union was willing to accept a divided Cyprus as a member. The Council stated that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession

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of Cyprus to the European Union. *If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition.* In this the Council will take account of all the relevant factors" (European Council, 1999, italics added).

While the Republic of Cyprus has been making rapid progress in the accession negotiations, settlement efforts have remained at a standstill. Several rounds of proximity talks during 2000 failed to restart negotiations. The date for the 'final decision', that is, whether or not to accept a divided Cyprus as a member in the event of the parties failing to reach an agreement for reunification, thus draws closer.

Notwithstanding EU attempts at de-linking the issues of membership and settlement efforts, once the application for membership was accepted a dynamic was set in motion that inevitably was to impact on the settlement efforts. Moreover, the application for membership was a deliberate attempt by one of the parties to involve the EC/EU more actively in the settlement efforts. The Republic of Cyprus' application for full membership of the EC in 1990 came at a time of great disillusionment with the lack of result in the UN sponsored intercommunal talks. The Greek Cypriots had come to the conclusion that the key to a settlement lay in Ankara³⁸ and believed that 'Europeanisation' offered an arena on which pressure could be brought to bear on Turkey, and thereby indirectly on the Turkish Cypriots, to "proceed towards a negotiated settlement" (Press and Information Office, 1997, p. 7).

It was also inevitable that the nature of the integration process in itself would upset the balance in the union's relations with the parties. While the UN negotiations are conducted with both parties as equal representatives of the respective communities, that is, neither is seen as a government representative, the EU is a union of states and needs a government counterpart. The union concludes deals in negotiation with governments, and makes decisions in the expectation that they will be implemented by governments. With recognition extended only to the de facto Greek Cypriot government on the island, the UN principle of equality cannot be upheld in EU-Cyprus relations. In relation with the EU, while both communities in Cyprus claim to represent sovereign states only one enjoys the status of international recognition and therefore the status as interlocutor in EU-Cyprus relations. This asymmetry is accentuated by the fact that one of the 'motherlands' remains outside the European institutions while the other has been able to influence EC/EU policy from inside. This situation has prevented an even handed approach to the parties to the Cyprus conflict.

In contrast, in the case of Northern Ireland, with neither of the two communities claiming statehood and the joint accession of the two 'motherlands', the EC/EU approach has been characterised by equidistance in relation to the parties. While both

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governments have had direct links with the European institutions, the two communities in Northern Ireland have been equally disadvantaged.

An additional complicating factor in the Cyprus case is that EU membership is not equally compatible with the aspirations of the parties as regards a future settlement. For the Greek Cypriots the priorities are the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, the re-institution of island wide freedom of movement and settlement as well as a return of property currently inaccessible in the northern part of the island. These goals are in line with the union's *acquis communautaire*. Moreover, as the presence of the Turkish troops in the north of the island could be projected as an illegal occupation of part of the territory of a member state by a non-member state, EU membership for the Republic of Cyprus would undoubtedly bring additional pressure on Turkey to reconsider her Cyprus policy.³⁹

At the same time, meeting the Turkish Cypriot aspirations would rather require that exceptions be negotiated to the full implementation of the *acquis communautaire*.⁴⁰ Their priorities are the continuation of Turkish security guarantees; the achievement of political equality (currently stated as demands for recognition of the "TRNC"); continued self-determination in part of the island; and for freedom of settlement and the right to property to be implemented only gradually and in a way that does not upset the demographic balance.⁴¹

Finally, despite its professed non-involvement in the settlement efforts, the European institutions nevertheless regularly express their support for a particular solution to Cyprus and by producing their own recurrent 'evaluations' of the political situation and the settlement efforts.⁴² As has been the case in Northern Ireland, these initiatives have generally emanated from the European Parliament who has initiated several reports, on the basis of which resolutions are adopted.⁴³

Taken together, these elements have prevented the EU from developing equidistant relationships with the parties to the conflict, thus undermining the ability of the EU to act as a third party, and have severely impeded the ability of the European integration process to contribute constructively to a settlement to the Cyprus conflict. Rather than acting as a 'catalyst' for a settlement as was initially hoped, the prospect of EU membership has therefore rather introduced another bone of contention in an already polarised environment.

Conclusions

We started this paper with some posited links between integration and peace, derived from integration theory. Time has come to summarise our findings on the prospects of integration to contribute to peace in situations of ethnic conflicts.

The two cases of ethnic conflict examined here suggest that ethnic conflicts may not be as susceptible to the mechanisms of functional integration as posited by integration theory. Rather both the case of Northern Ireland and that of Cyprus lend support to arguments that ethnic conflicts are rather resistant to economic incentives for conflict resolution.

The Northern Irish case also suggests that political cooperation need not be the result of economic cooperation as integration theory holds. Depending on the outcome of recent political initiatives it may indeed suggest the reversed relationship of political cooperation leading to, rather than resulting from, economic cooperation.

Both cases examined here point to the conclusion that in a polarised context political arguments may actually stem economic cooperation in the bud: when seen through the prism of ethnic and national antagonisms the concept of 'low-level' politics loses its meaning and the onset of an integration process is prevented.

As was the case in Northern Ireland, the absence of a political settlement stands in the way of any process of integration also in the case of Cyprus. Trade relations between the two parts of the island are virtually non-existent. The on-set of an economic integrative process is precluded by mutual non-recognition and the use of economic means in the conflict. Until the parties arrive at a political agreement of some sorts, economic cooperation between them therefore seems unlikely. There are at present no sign that either of the parties would be prepared to compromise on political positions for any economic gains that EU membership may entail.

Thus, the two cases analysed here suggest that for integration to promote peace in ethnic conflicts it may be necessary for economic cooperation to be *preceded* by an agreement on the arena of 'high-level' politics, that is, the posited links between economic and political cooperation may have to be reversed.

Finally, it was noted in the Northern Irish case that the European integration process had provided the two 'motherlands' with an arena for discussion and developing habits of peaceful cooperation and problem-solving thus indirectly contributing to settlement efforts. However, in the Cyprus case, due to the prevalence of asymmetric relations between the parties and the union, the integration process has not been able to do for the development and improvement of Greek-Turkish relations what it did for Anglo-Irish relations. The decision during the December 1999 Helsinki summit to accept Turkey as a candidate country *may* change this situation but the necessity of a long-term perspective on Turkey's accession prevents any certainty on the matter. The prospects for European integration to contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict under conditions of symmetry thus remain to be evaluated.

cation remained dormant until 1969 (Gaudissart, 1996).

18. The constitution was based on power-sharing and political equality between the two communities. It provided for a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president elected separately by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community respectively. In the main executive organ, the Council of Ministers, there were to be seven Greek Cypriot Ministers and three Turkish Cypriots. The legislative organ, the House of Representatives, consisted of 50 representatives, 35 elected by Greek Cypriots and 15 by Turkish Cypriots. For each community, a communal chamber was established exercising legislative and administrative power on subjects relating to i.a., religious matters, educational and cultural matters and civil status. A Greek Cypriot perspective on the 1960 constitution is given by Criton G. Tornaritis, former attorney general of the Republic of Cyprus (Tornaritis, 1980). For a Turkish Cypriot perspective, refer to Zaim M. Nedjatigil, former attorney general of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Nedjatigil, 1977).

19. The Turkish Cypriots living in these areas were at first governed by a central organisation known as the General Committee. In addition, the Turkish Communal Chamber continued to function and the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives continued to meet. The Committee was replaced in 1967 by the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration, followed in 1971 by the Cyprus Turkish Administration, and in 1975 by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (Nedjatigil, 1977). See also <http://www.com.gov.nc.tr/cm/yonet.htm> (accessed 16 October 2000).

20. Under the first financial protocol under the Association Agreement (1979-1983) the Turkish Cypriots received twenty per cent of the EC aid; under the second protocol (1984-1988) their share was only 4.5 per cent (Alemdar, 1993). It is hardly coincidental that the reduction coincides with the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence (1983).

21. The Turkish Cypriots' position thus resembles that of Northern Ireland. As a province of an applicant state, Northern Ireland was not directly represented on the main negotiating teams. However, the British government held frequent discussions with local ministers on issues of particular concern to Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish officials were appointed as advisers to the negotiating team (Hainsworth, 1985).

22. On 15 July 1974, Greek Cypriot supporters of *enosis* (union with Greece) under the leadership of Greek officers overthrew Makarios and installed in his place Nicos Sampson, a leader of the militant 1950s and 1960s EOKA movement. Acting on the legal basis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, under which Turkey together with Greece and the UK were accorded the role of guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey launched a military intervention five days later. In a subsequent advance, 37 per cent of the territory was occupied. Turkey still maintains a large contingent of troops (est. 30 000) in the northern part of the island.

23. In two so-called high level agreements (in 1977 and 1979) the parties agreed on guidelines for the establishment of a bi-communal federation with territories administered separately by the two communities. Although, until the Turkish Cypriot August 1998 proposal for

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a confederation rather than a federation, both parties continued to subscribe to the federation formula no progress had been made to this end.

24. Some member states (the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) objected to the decision (Tsardanidis, 1984, p. 370, footnote 39). However, as late as 1992 three-quarters of all Turkish- Cypriot export went to EU countries (Axt, 1999). This situation was to prevail until 1994 when a Court of Justice ruling of 5 July 1994 (following a dispute between the British ministry of agriculture and Greek Cypriot exporters), called on member states not to recognise other certificates of origin and plant health than those issued by the Republic of Cyprus (Emiliou, 1995).

25. The EC/EU policy has been to conduct these contacts in consultation with the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

26. As a result of such encouragement, on 12 March 1998 President Clerides in a letter extended an invitation to the Turkish Cypriots to join the delegation. As acceptance was seen as amounting to recognition of the validity of the Republic's application on behalf of the whole island, and thus the legitimacy of the Republic's claim to represent both communities, the invitation was (predictably) turned down (Dodd, 1999).

27. The Conclusion of the EU Council of Ministers of 6 March 1990, reconsidering the Republic of Cyprus' application for membership for example, stated that "Cyprus's accession to the EU should bring increased security and prosperity to both communities on the island. In particular it should allow the North to catch up economically and should improve the outlook for growth and employment, particularly for the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Council considers that this community must perceive the advantages of EU accession more clearly and its concern at the prospect must be allayed."

28. According to an opinion poll published in the Turkish Cypriot daily *Ktbns* on 8 September 2000, 94 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots want to join the EU. 72.7 per cent support membership *after* a settlement to the conflict, 30 per cent on condition that also Turkey is admitted while 21.3 per cent are willing to join the EU also in the absence of these conditions.

29. As of March 2001, 17 of the total 31 chapters have been closed. According to chief negotiator George Vassiliou, Cyprus hopes to close four to six more by the end of June (and the Swedish presidency) (*Cyprus Weekly, March 23-29, 2001*). It should be noted, however, that the Commission reserves the right with all candidate states to return to chapters before final admission.

30. Turkey in her turn has threatened a similar course of action regarding the expansion of NATO should the Republic of Cyprus be admitted while Turkey herself is prevented from developing closer ties with the union.

31. Of course as a non-member Turkey finds herself at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis Greece when it comes to her ability to influence EU decisions.

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32. To respond to each step towards integration between the Republic of Cyprus and the EC/EU with corresponding steps towards integration between the "TRNC" and Turkey is a pattern that has been followed since the Republic's application for membership was submitted. A few months later, passport control's between the "TRNC" and Turkey was abolished and a Customs Union was established.

33. The Turkish Cypriots consider the Republic of Cyprus defunct as it is not governed according to the partnership arrangement agreed as part of the 1959 Zurich Agreements, establishing the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, the 1960 constitution accorded the Turkish Cypriots a veto right in relation to foreign policy issues "except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate" (Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, Article VIII). They also prohibited the Republic of Cyprus from joining any political or economic union with any other state (Treaty of Guarantee, Article I) or engage in any activity aimed at promoting either union with any other state or partition of the island (Treaty of Guarantee Article II). The Turkish Cypriots interpret these articles as also preventing membership of the EU, which, they argue, would indirectly mean union with fellow-member Greece. International lawyers remain divided on the issue, see (Axt, 1999). For the Turkish Cypriot arguments, see (Denktash, 1990).

34. EU documents tend to refer to the Republic of Cyprus as 'Cyprus', giving rise to speculations on whether the union deliberately refrains from pronouncing an opinion on the relation between today's Republic of Cyprus and a future unified Cypriot state, itself a matter of dispute. The Greek Cypriots hold that a future Cypriot state should be seen as a successor to the Republic of Cyprus while the Turkish Cypriots hold that the Republic of Cyprus as established in 1960 has ceased to exist and a future state would therefore mean the establishment of a completely new partnership.

35. As noted earlier, the Council decision was the outcome of a 'compromise' in which Greece lifted its ban against the signing of a Customs Union agreement with Turkey.

36. Accession negotiations were subsequently launched on 30 March 1998.

37. After the December 1999 Helsinki summit meeting the contacts were resumed (without the fulfillment of the Turkish Cypriot demands). The contacts continued in the form of proximity talks during 2000.

38. The then President of the Republic, George Vassiliou, presently chief negotiator with EU, pursued a policy of further internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. He initially refused to meet with the Turkish Cypriot leader, instead demanding a meeting with the then Turkish prime minister Ozal. The request was turned down (Bolukbasi, 1995; Richmond, 1998).

39. For a Greek-Cypriot perspective on the EU, see (Joseph, 1997, esp. Chapter 7). For Greek Cypriot perceptions in relation to the Cyprus conflict, refer to (Stavrinides, 1999).

40. Negotiating exceptions, at least for a transition period, would not be incompatible with

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current EU practice. Denmark, for example, was permitted to refuse Germans permission to buy second homes in Denmark and Finland negotiated exceptions regarding *inter alia* freedom of movement in relation to the autonomous Aland islands. However, given that the Turkish Cypriots are not involved in the negotiations they are in no position to raise such demands.

41. Unlike the Greek Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots have no desire to resettle in the areas they previously inhabited. For Turkish Cypriot preferences see e.g., (Denktash, 1996/97) and (Ertek0n, 1999).

42. For example, at the June 1994 Corfu European Council meeting where the Council stated "any solution to the Cyprus problem must respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country" (European Council, 1994).

43. See e.g., (Poos, 2000). Due to their non-participation in the process, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have refused to cooperate with the EU institutions in the accession procedures. EU officials therefore mostly rely on contacts with and information from representatives of the Republic of Cyprus also concerning the northern part of the island. As a result, their reports cannot be said to be based on a balanced understanding of the situation.

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GENDER IN ARMED CONFLICT AND PEACE PROCESSES

Cynthia Cockburn

Abstract

This article introduces the concept of gender relations and cognate terms such as gender order, gender regime and gender complementarity. It applies them to militarisation and armed conflict, war-resistance and the pursuit of peace. A perceived link between militarism, nationalism and patriarchy is considered as prompting women-only antimilitarist organisation. A distinction is made between peace making and peace building, and women's contribution to the latter is illustrated. Women's life experience, rather than women's nature, is proposed as a source of the social courage and social intelligence that are specially productive in peace building.

Gender Relations and a Gender Analysis

Those of us who research the theme of 'gender and armed conflict' - and there are by now many such researchers in many countries - are often asked 'what difference does it make if you use a gender analysis to study war?' To begin to answer the question, each of us needs to make clear, at the outset, what we mean by 'gender'.

In this article¹ I use the term gender in the sense of a social relation - the relation between 'women' and 'men' as social beings. In this sense the gender relation is one of differentiation and complementarity - masculine qualities are precisely 'not-feminine', and *vice versa*. As well as a relation between people, the gender relation is one between qualities and values, the contrasted and complementary attributes of masculine and feminine, ascribed to individuals and to other phenomena. The gender relation shapes human bodies, behaviours, discourses and cultures. And it is of course simultaneously shaped by and changed through those things.

Jill Matthews, and others after her, have used the abstract term 'gender order' to suggest a systematicity in relations of gender in human society, and a power relation inherent in them, at the large societal scale (Matthews, 1984:13). But of course the particular form taken by the gender relation between men and women, masculinity and femininity, varies from culture to culture, society to society, and from one historical period to another. It is useful therefore to use the term 'gender regime', proposed by R.W. Connell, to specify the set of gender relations prevailing in a given culture, such as that of an organisation or institution (Connell, 1987:120).

In current societies of which we have knowledge, men and masculinity are dominant over women and femininity - but the degree and dimensions of differentiation, complementarity and inequality differ widely. Gender relations could in theory be woman-dominant, or they could minimise difference and inequality between the sexes. But those circumstances would not obviate the need for a concept of gender and gender relations with which to detail a society and its system of power.

A male-dominant gender order in Europe has survived several transformations of the economic system, the mode of production. But the detail of its operation has changed in certain ways. It is appropriate to call the male-dominant system of feudal and monarchical times 'patriarchy': a system characterised by a hierarchy of men whose social power is founded on and derived from their authority as head of family. In the historical shift from feudalism to capitalism in Europe, relations between men changed (and equalised) more than relations between men and women. The gender order of Europe continued to a male-dominant system. But Carole Pateman shows how, along with the shift in class structures brought by capitalism, and in ways of thinking brought by the movement known as 'the Enlightenment', a form of male dominance effected through father-right gave way to one achieved through the dominance of men as such. She suggests the new system might more accurately be termed 'fratriarchy', the rule of the brothers (Pateman, 1988). But 'patriarchy' has remained the popular term for the gender relations we live, so that many feminist thinkers and writers also use it.

As to using gender analytically, I believe it is important to distinguish gender analysis from a simple gender awareness. Gender awareness is always endemic in society, in the sense that a social differentiation between the sexes is taken for granted. It is seen as natural, as deriving from human biological dimorphism (two differentiated biological forms mating for reproduction). Women are viewed as one kind of person, and as 'naturally' engaging in one kind of behaviour and activity. Men are seen as another kind of person, as 'naturally' engaging in a different kind of behaviour and activity. In everyday life, one needs only to comment on gender when the pattern is broken, when someone flies in the face of what is supposed as natural.

This unproblematised view of gender is what I term gender awareness. I would define gender *analysis* as something quite different. A gender analysis begins only with the asking of a feminist question: *why* the difference? The question implies a refusal to accept biological dimorphism as the whole story, and probes for social reasons and processes. A feminist gender analysis follows up this question with an observation: gender complementarity does not result in equality. Women suffer disadvantage, and worse, from gender differentiation. When we observe this we begin to detect a power relation in gender.

Our gender analysis has become more penetrating over time, as we have learned from each other in different countries and continents how male power works now and has worked in the past, in evolving but coherently enduring formulations. We have learned from each other in different political traditions. Socialist women (we could cite for example Zillah Eisenstein (1979) among many others) have shown convincingly how patriarchal power, gender power, interacts with and multiplies economic power (class power) and imperialist power (which is class operating worldwide). Eco-feminists (such as Maria Mies, 1986) have suggested that women and nature are in a sense both colonised by men. Postmodernist feminist scholars (such as Linda Nicholson, 1990) have shown us how important are discourse, representation and symbolism to gender power - and how we get caught up in oppressing ourselves.

Bringing a Gender Lens to Bear on Violent Conflict

How then could a feminist gender analysis shift our perception of violent conflict? As an illustration, I will recount a moment in recent British history. In 1991 there was an outbreak of rioting in some British cities. Some of the rioting had to do with ethnicity. Black minority people had long felt aggrieved by their neglect, their impoverishment, the discrimination against them in British society. Some white people resented the presence of ethnic minorities. These incidents, that were quickly termed 'urban riots', involved looting, breaking into shops, stealing and burning cars. The 'rioters' were in conflict with the police, who were deployed on the streets in large numbers. There were violent clashes.

The newspaper analysis of these events was in terms of race or of age (many of those involved were mere teenagers). It took a feminist journalist, Beatrix Campbell, to point out that the rioters were also *male*, and that this was significant (Campbell, 1993). There was something here about masculine expectations, masculine ways of doing things, masculine violence, masculine cultures. But she took her analysis further in pointing out that the police were also men, who trained and formed their recruits in masculine cultures. Their willingness to 'take on' the young black men (and a lot of them showed considerable relish in doing this) was an expression of

masculinity. Campbell spoke of the lads and the police having a 'shared predilection for masculine company and mastery', and a similar 'compulsion to take control, to overcome' (Campbell, 1993:190). In a way, two groups of males were hyping each other up to more and more violence.

This was not merely an interesting observation. Seeing things this way would actually lead to entirely different, gender analytical, policies for dealing with the situation - a gender strategy. One might, for instance, seek to change police cultures as well as youth cultures.

Having begun with these thoughts about gender and gender analysis, and the example of a local, small scale, kind of violence, I would like to go on to show the kind of phenomena that come to view when we take a gender lens to warfare and peace processes.

One of the questions I would like to address in this article is 'can women contribute to the peace process?' There is a short answer to the question and a longer answer. The short answer has to be 'yes - of course women can and do contribute to peace processes, although they are seldom prominent'. When people are busy trying themselves to end a war, the world watches on their TV screens important people doing serious things, and few among these important people are women. Madeleine Albright has sometimes represented the United States. Hanan Ashrawi was at one time spokesperson for the Palestine Liberation Organisation. But numerically the principal actors are almost all men.

In one sense perhaps we should not be too troubled that women are usually absent from top-level peace manoeuvres. We could in any case be a bit sceptical of the self-styled 'peacemakers'. Very often they are the war-makers themselves – Slobodan Milosevic and Franjo Tudjman, the two men who must be held most responsible for the disintegration of Yugoslavia, were among the signatories of the Dayton Peace Agreement that ended the fighting in Bosnia. The brokers of peace may be international figures, the President of the United States, the Prime Ministers of certain Western countries, whose strategic and economic interests may have been one of the causes of the collapse into war in the first place.

There is, however, a longer answer to the question 'can women contribute to peace processes' - and it is more interesting. It involves defining 'peace process' to include a great many more activities than top-level negotiations alone, and a lot more moments than the mere signing of a ceasefire. I shall return to that thought in a moment.

Meanwhile, to think about peace we should begin by thinking about war. And not

just thinking about women in war, but about *gender*, about patterns of relations existing in society between the sexes, between women and men, and how these feature in war. War is a highly gendered phenomenon. We might think about some of the phases in the cycle of war and peace, and see how men and women are differently situated in them.

The Approach of War: Gender in Militarisation

Consider the years before armed conflict breaks out – when war is still on the horizon. In preparation for war, a country becomes more militarised. It is possible to see a closer relation between political and military elites, and sometimes the regime may actually be a military dictatorship. Men, and sometimes women, are probably required to serve periods of compulsory military service. The police force grows in size and reach. A rhetoric of national security is prevalent, and there is greater secrecy. There may be new censorship laws, limiting freedom of expression and movement.

As a society militarises it necessarily loses democratic qualities it may have had. And it simultaneously becomes more patriarchal - men, male qualities and forceful leadership are valued more highly. The dominant culture becomes more masculinist. Patriarchy and militarism go hand in hand, and both are always bad news for democracy and for women.

In fact, because of this, we may make the error of thinking militarisation makes its demands only on men. But Cynthia Enloe has written perceptively about how women are involved in militarism and militarisation (Enloe, 2000). She does not mean by this only the first thing that might come to mind: the recruitment of women into the military. Rather, she reminds us that for the military to obtain and keep the number and kind of men in its ranks that officials believe they need, military policy makers are obliged to control women in many aspects of their civilian lives. Very particular concepts of womanhood (she says) have to be sustained if the plans of the militarists are to succeed.

In what way do militarist politicians need to control women? First and foremost, of course, as wives and mothers. Women must support their soldier sons and husbands when they put loyalty to national defence before staying home with the family. And it is the case that military planners want to attract women as recruits to expand national armies – but for the most part not as soldiers, but in routine support jobs. They also need women to take on the occupations normally filled by men, so as to release males to fill the ranks of the armed forces. They need women to work in factories producing uniforms and weapons.

And they need women to love men in uniform. Cynthia Enloe writes about how deeply into a society we have to look to judge whether and how much it is militarised, how deeply it has affected our culture. We even have to ask ourselves: is a man in uniform seen as specially attractive? Does a girl like to be seen on his arm, walking in the street? That is one measure of the status of military in society.

Militarisation is accompanied by high expenditure on arms. This is often at the expense of spending on public services, including health and education that are of particular importance to women, given their customary role in the family. In the main, poor countries spend much more of their national product on arms than rich countries. And the more arms are current in a society, the more volatile the political situation and the more vulnerable the peace - and women. Daniel Volman, thinking about the build up to the recent wars experienced in Africa, points to the massive flow of arms, particularly cheap individual weapons, into that continent in the previous thirty years. He writes, 'Africa today is literally awash in arms, particularly guns and other light weaponry of the sort that have much more impact on thesecurity and daily lives of civilians, *especially women*, than tanks and combat aircraft' (Volman, 1998, my italics).

And as Volman says, women do very directly suffer from the arming of society. Domestic violence often increases as societal tensions grow. It is more common, and it is more deadly, when men carry weapons. In the build-up to the war in the former Yugoslavia, groups providing support to women victims of domestic violence in Belgrade reported a significant increase in phone calls to their help line. They noticed that the violence against women in the home was happening particularly after jingoistic TV programmes, showing militaries and fighting, with exaggerated appeals to national honour (Maguire, 1998). At the same time, in Zagreb, Croatian women were noticing a change in the seriousness of the violence against women in the home, related to more men going armed. They said: 'No more wooden sticks, shoes and other "classic" instruments of violence, but guns, bombs etc... Everybody has weapons' (Boric and Desnica, 1996:136).

It is worth noting in passing that arms dealing involves a shadowy and notably masculine world of crooks and criminals. And often these are the very same men that are involved in the exploitation of local prostitution and the international 'trafficking' of women. This latter trade, involving transportation, buying and selling of women into sexual servitude, a business organised and managed by men, has grown rapidly in recent years, and much of the provision of sexual services is aimed at soldiers, including international peace-keeping forces.

Militarisation is a step by step process, Cynthia Enloe writes, 'by which something becomes controlled by, dependent on, and derives its value from the military

as an institution, or militaristic criteria'. But, she adds, what has been militarised can be demilitarised.

So looking at this period before wars even begin, we can already see several ways women can and do counteract the tendencies they see leading their country into war. I think we can rightly see this resistance as preventive work women contribute to peace processes. A woman, even one woman alone, can simply fail to be the kind of 'proper woman' the state wants her to be at this moment. She may be sceptical of the military posturing, be not at all thrilled at the idea of her man wearing a uniform and carrying a gun. She may tell her husband to sew his own buttons on that uniform.

But this one woman can do more if she organises with other women around a feminist antimilitarist agenda. Together for instance they might write in to the media, or phone in to a radio chat show, to complain about cuts in expenditure on social benefits and services due to increased national spending on the military. They might go public in their objection to men bringing guns and grenades into the home. They might organise a 'zero tolerance' campaign against violence by men against women. They might as parents demand the removal of national propaganda from the school curriculum, or a ban on army recruiters coming into schools and showing off their equipment to susceptible children and teenagers.

Women are often the ones who resist the dangerous language that starts to be used in a build-up to war. When nationalism is being invoked by political leaders, there is greater stress on patriarchal familial ideology, deepening the differentiation of men and women, masculinity and femininity, preparing men to fight and women to support them. The more 'nation' and 'people' are invoked as some kind of essential and primordial realities, the more relations between men and women are essentialised too (Yuval-Davis, 1997, Yuval-Davis and Anthias, 1989). Columnists in popular newspapers remind women that biology and tradition make them the natural keepers of hearth and home, to nurture and teach children 'our ways'.

So - we have seen how patriarchy and militarism are linked. But here we can add a third linked element: ethno-nationalism. All three are both ideologies and social structures. All three thrive on, require, enhance and increase men's dominance. All three are perpetuated through masculine cultures. Through their discourses men are reminded that they are the physically strong ones, that their natural job is to protect 'their' women and children. To protect the ethnic nation, too, of course, which is often represented as 'the motherland'. Through this retelling of old gender tales, men are readied to give their lives. And women are readied for losing their husbands and sons, so they will not rebel against the state for sending them to their deaths. Birth-rates come to be seen as strategically important. This kind of dis-

course increased vastly in Yugoslavia in the late 1980s, before the outbreak of war, and it was only women, feminists specifically, who took it seriously as a warning of war.

In these kinds of pre-conflict moments we are discussing, an ethic of 'purity' can sometimes grip people's minds and it can legitimate a political 'purification' of the state, a rooting-out of its internal enemies, and a sweeping away from the land of those people who are seen as alien. The term 'ethnic cleansing' was not used until the Yugoslav wars. But the process, and the ideology, had of course existed in other ethno-nationalist wars before.

Purity is a dangerous ethic for women. In extreme forms of patriarchy men's honour is seen as depending on women's 'purity' to such an extent that women who try to escape this strict code, or who inadvertently fall, or are dragged, from the code of so-called honour, can be killed by their menfolk, and the men do not merely go unpunished but are praised for it (for example Butalia, 1997).

For women, in such circumstances, the threshold of war is lower than for men. A woman experiencing domestic violence might say, 'Don't talk to me about war. My whole life is a battlefield'. We can see here an important point: simply in asserting their own human rights as women, women may rightly be seen as contributing to peace processes.

Gender in War and in Opposition to War

Let us move on now from the pre-war moment, and think about the next phase in the cycle, when a cold war becomes a hot war, when fighting starts. We can see how this is gendered too. We might think of recent wars in Bosnia, in Mozambique and in Palestine. The terrible conflict Cyprus has experienced is likely to have involved a similar gendering.

In Bosnia-Herzegovina between 1992 and 1995, men, the majority of them, were caught up in the fighting. Rather few women actually fought, though some were enlisted in support roles. Some men were already under arms when the fighting began, serving in the very big Yugoslav National Army. Those who were not already enlisted were rounded up on the orders of nationalist politicians into militias, forced to join local units in defence of their own town or village. Of course some men actually wanted this war. Some actually conceived the plan and directed war strategy. Some relished the killing. Some raped. (Of the many detailed accounts of this war, I will cite only Woodward, 1995, for instance, and Stiglmayer, 1995.)

The Bosnian war was gendered in another way too. When a population was cap-

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tured by the enemy side, men and women were treated differently. Men were more often simply shot, others were imprisoned and tortured. Women were sometimes held in schools or hotels, converted into brothels, where they were held in a kind of sexual enslavement, and raped continuously over many weeks.

Women in fact were characteristically the 'war victims'. In many ways the Bosnian war was a war waged against women and the feminine. 'Ethnic cleansing' is war against everyday life, involving the specific destruction of the homesteads, animals, gardens, shops and markets that are the basis of family life. Women were the majority of those who became 'refugees' and 'internally displaced people'. These were shockingly unanticipated identities for women who had lived their previous lives in a modern, developed country. Nothing had prepared them for this.

In all wars - and this has been well documented in Mozambique for instance which had a very long and terrible war between 1976 and 1992 (Jacobson, 1999) - men and boy children are the ones who leave the home, and get killed and imprisoned in large numbers. It is women and girls who have the task of helping the very young and the very old to survive in a wrecked economy. Women's strength is pitted in a daily struggle for shelter, food and health. They have to heal themselves and other women after sexual abuse; keep their children safe from unexploded shells and landmines; support each other in the long search for surviving relatives and friends. Eventually, they have to come to terms with the fact that many are never going to come back and that they are now this thing called a 'single parent', and 'head of household'. This has been a gender-specific reality for many Cypriots too.

This difference in the experience of war on the part of women and men accounts for particular kinds of activity by women in response to war. Often women's organisation starts with mutual help, distributing food aid, improving their refugee camps, therapy for rape survivors. But sometimes, even in the middle of a war, women are organising against war. Men may be the typical fighters. But there are always men who refuse to be enlisted into the military. Usually they do this out of a belief that their state or their movement is wrong in what it is fighting for, or that fighting is not the right way to obtain it.

In Israel currently there are not a few Israeli Jewish men of military age declaring themselves 'conscientious objectors', and some Israeli Jewish mothers and wives supporting them. They are refusing combat roles in what they consider unjust actions by the Israeli military against Palestinians. There are several organisations that support these COs. One is called New Profile. Its members are predominantly women, but the membership does not exclude men. New Profile is opposed to the Occupation and to the militarism of Israeli society. Interestingly, notwithstanding the inclusion of men, indeed recognising thereby the gendered nature of

war and war refusal, it calls itself a 'feminist' organisation.

Also, sometimes, when a war is seen as unjust and unwarranted, women actively and publicly organise protests against the pursuit of war by their governments. There is a very old and long-lived organisation (it was founded in response to the horrors of the first world war) called the *Women's International League for Peace and Freedom*. More recently, and more radically, we have seen the growth of a network of women worldwide called *Women in Black against War*. The author is one of the coordinating group of a Women in Black network in London. Women in Black started in Israel and Palestine in 1985, with weekly vigils against the Occupation. The network spread to Italy where there are many members. And to Yugoslavia: Women in Black in Belgrade bravely demonstrated in the city centre every Wednesday for eight years against the Milosevic regime's role in the wars in that region. There are Women in Black groups in different cities in the USA, in Spain, Belgium and many other countries.²

The London group of Women in Black see their role as monitoring the British government's policies and their effects on war processes and peace processes in their own or others' countries. They have often held protest vigils in Trafalgar Square when it was felt the British government was blindly following the USA into military actions, effectively taking Britain into war without consulting British voters. A year-long campaign was organised in 2000 for the ending of sanctions against Iraqi people - which Women in Black consider a continuation of war against Saddam Hussein's regime that is quite wrongly being conducted by means of starving ordinary Iraqis and depriving them of medicines – with particularly dire effects on women and their children.

We have to ask why do women, like those of Women in Black, sometimes choose to organise without men as women opposed to war? It is because they have made a gender analysis of violence. They have detected a link between the occasional violence of war and a perennial violence against women: masculine cultures and patriarchal systems are implicated in both. Gender relations need challenging, such women think, along with militarist relations.

Redefining Peace Processes

These women's anti-war actions can be seen as part of the overall contribution of women to peace processes. But there is a more important, more sustained and less visible contribution that women make. As I suggested earlier in this article, we can see more of women contributing to peace processes if we broaden our definition of these processes. Let us say that when we talk about peace *making* we mean such specific activities as negotiations for ceasefire, 'proximity talks' and confer-

ences for peace agreements. We then need another word for the kind of grassroots work by many ordinary people that goes on in the background, out of sight of the media, even out of sight of politicians, long before and long after those high profile moments of peace making.

Sometimes this grassroots work is called 'peace *building*, or 'building constituencies for peace'. Already thirty years ago Adam Curle was making this kind of distinction in identifying 'development' as one of the key components of work for peace. He meant the restructuring of conflictual relationships from below, community development 'to create as he put it 'a situation, a society or a community in which individuals are enabled to develop and use to the full their capacities for creativity, service and enjoyment. Unless development in this sense can take place, no settlement will lead to a secure and lasting peace' (Curle, 1971).

I believe the decision made recently³ by Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot women to set up twin non-governmental organisations to further women's activities simultaneously in the two communities, under a bi-communal umbrella, could prove to be precisely this kind of peace-building work through grassroots development.

But I will illustrate with an example from a country I am more familiar with: my own. There is a war in the UK, as some of you know only too well. It is a relic of colonialism, and it is largely acted out in Northern Ireland. But not only there. It affects the Republic of Ireland too. The violence involves the British state and two political movements, the one, associated with Catholics, an expression of Irish nationalism, the other, associated with Protestants, struggling to retain the union with Britain. Northern Ireland, and particularly Belfast, the principal city, is marked by deep territorial segregation and enmity between the two communities.

There are some very ordinary working class women living in the poorer parts of the city of Belfast who have, my research shows, made a very significant contribution to peace building (Cockburn, 1998). Belfast does not have just one line running through it, like Nicosia. It is a patchwork of little districts, either 'Protestant' or 'Catholic'. (I use these problematic words in quotation marks, as I believe we always should use ethnic or national names. They are mere identity tags. Can we know, unless we ask and listen carefully to the reply, what any one person called a Catholic or a Protestant feels her real self and her real belonging to be?)

At the height of the fighting in the eighties and nineties, each of these little Belfast districts was ringed around by a line. Sometimes these have been actual physical walls, similar to the walls in parts of the Nicosia buffer zone, constructed by the British army for purposes of pacification. In other cases the lines were marked with symbolic colours and images, painted on pavements, lamp posts and walls by local

people. When I worked among them in 1996, each neighbourhood lived in fear of its neighbour across the line. These communities were dominated by groups of armed men, feeling the need to defend their own people against the other, or against the British state.

Women told me how they had started setting up women's community centres *inside* the confines of their own sectarian communities. The male political and military leaders did not like this much, it has to be said. Especially when some of these women at a certain moment started to think politically for themselves, instead of letting men, in the customary way, decide what was and what was not thinkable. Around 1991 or 1992, they sensed that a permanent ceasefire had become a possibility. Cross-communal contact looked more possible, and could help to push the peace process forward. The question was: who could afford to step over these dangerous lines? For men it was almost impossible. They were too caught up in political parties and the *military* commands. The women saw that a way forward might be easier for them than for their menfolk. Some of the women's community centres in the different districts (Catholic/Republican, Protestant/Unionist) gradually formed an alliance, supporting each other, working at first, not directly for this dangerous thing called 'peace with justice', but for ordinary everyday things they could talk to each other about. We might read the recent moves among Cypriot women in a similar light.

They found things they had in common as women living in poor housing, as women having to deal with the police, prisons, government departments and local councils, women suffering violence. They learned to be very alert to external conditions, such as how much violence there had been this week. They learned to be sensitive to the level of confidence among them. And so they were able gradually to extend their mutual agenda, the matters they could talk to each other about, from politics with a small 'p', the politics of daily life, to politics with a big 'P', matters of parties, representation, borders, state constitutions.

Some people think the work of women such as these played a significant part in the peace process in Northern Ireland. The process, it has to be said, was unusually consultative. Opinion was widely canvassed. And it was due to the matters raised by women in the consultation, in the coalitions they effected, in the lobbying they did, that notions of equity, fairness and inclusiveness got built into the Good Friday Agreement. Equality, what is more, meant equality between the sexes as well as between ethno-national groups. The Northern Ireland peace agreement is rather unusual in being concerned not only with stopping the fighting but with the *quality* of a future peaceful society.

So Northern Ireland may be seen as a good example of how, in wars that involve

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ethnic communities living adjacent to each other in fear and enmity, sometimes the ground for peace can be prepared by grassroots work in which people of goodwill keep open lines of contact and communication. And women are well placed to be those people - in Cyprus as elsewhere.

Finally it is important to stress that this foundational work by women in the building of a peaceful society is not all 'emotional stuff'. We should not believe those who say 'women are natural peacemakers', 'women are born pacifists' - on the grounds that they are the sex that mainly care for children and nurse the sick. Can we really say women's biology makes us nurturing and sensitive? If we believe that, how do we explain caring men - or violent women? Experience shows that both sexes are capable of almost any kind of behaviour.

It is true however that women do often prove themselves as peace-builders, working at local level, even if they do not often get invited to participate at higher levels. But it is important to recognise that women are not being particularly emotional. Peace building is not a 'soft' option. On the contrary, they are exercising intelligence and courage.

What women in war zones, including Cypriot women, have taught me is that the reason women's responses sometimes differ from those of men is: *women learn from women's lives*. Women's life experience (*not* their biology), the way their faculties have been schooled, gives them a potential for a very special kind of intelligence that I would call *social intelligence*; and a very special kind of courage, *social courage*.

What do I mean by social intelligence? Of course women are people whose intelligence is manifest across the spectrum. Women make good mathematicians, good scientists, good artists. But our lives as women may have taught us a special additional intelligence – intelligence in social relationships. Because we are the ones who have characteristically had responsibility for keeping the family and the community together, while men have characteristically pursued politics, administration and war, we have learned the words and gestures, the thoughts and behaviours, that can foster understanding and heal rifts.

And social courage? Of course women, like men, can show bravery in threatening circumstances. But I am thinking of a rather different kind of courage that women's typical gendered experience of life, women's gendered cultures, may have given them. That is the courage needed to cross those other 'green lines', the ones drawn inside our heads – our own heads and those of 'the other'. To find ways of opening minds and visualising new futures. And the intelligence to do so safely and productively. Many Cypriot women demonstrate this kind of courage and intelli-

gence in their persistent attempts to establish bi-communal contact and co-operation, and it has been my privilege to learn from them.

SELF-GOVERNMENT - ENOSIS OR IMMEDIATE ENOSIS: THE INFLUENCE OF ZAKHARIADIS ON THE SHIFT IN AKEL'S STRATEGY (NOVEMBER 1948 - JANUARY 1949)

Yiorghos Leventis

Abstract

*This paper focuses on the meeting between a two-member delegation from AKEL, the Cyprus communist party, and Nikos Zakhariadis, the leader of KKE, which took place in November 1948. In particular, it considers the impact of this meeting upon AKEL's strategy in relation to the Greek Cypriot campaign for self-determination which was equivalent to **enosis**, the union of Cyprus with Greece. This paper argues that the meeting was instrumental in persuading AKEL's leadership to revert to an uncompromising stance towards British colonial rule and to embark on a political campaign in favour of immediate **enosis**.*

By 1948, Britain had scaled down its presence in Greece, decolonised India and withdrawn from Palestine. Conversely, the British were strengthening their hold over Cyprus. In British eyes, the onset of the Cold War, the perceived threat from the USSR and the continuing importance of the Middle East magnified the potential strategic importance of Cyprus. These factors reinforced the British government's determination to cling on the island and resist the demand for self-determination. Incidentally, they also affected British perceptions of AKEL, the island's influential communist party.

Against this international background, in November 1947 the colonial administration in Cyprus called a Consultative Assembly to formulate proposals for a con-

stitution promoting self-government within the framework of continuing colonial rule. This was done in accordance with the statement of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the House of Commons on 23rd October 1946. Representative elements of the island's Greek majority and Turkish minority were therefore invited to participate. The response was mixed. Within the majority Greek community, AKEL mayors together with AKEL-led trade union leaders agreed to take part. Right wing invitees declined to participate, in conformity with a decision of the Ethnarchy Council, a body headed by the archbishop. In contrast, all Turkish invitees agreed to participate.

Notwithstanding the initial British undertaking, the Colonial Office proposed its own draft constitution in May 1948. To the disappointment of Greek Cypriots this fell considerably short of self-government. AKEL, which had assumed the responsibility of negotiating with the colonial administration, was deeply affected by this adverse development. The Right intensified its political attacks on the left wing party, accusing its leaders of collaborating with the colonialists. Given the limited nature of the draft constitution, AKEL immediately withdrew from the Consultative Assembly, leading to its collapse. Nevertheless, the party maintained its policy of achieving self-government by means of the establishment of a constituent assembly, in the expectation that such a development would represent the first stage on the road to self-determination, that is *enosis*.

As the months passed in 1948, such hopes faded with the result that the party's leadership became increasingly introverted. So much so that they began to question the wisdom of the step-by-step approach until the achievement of self-determination. As Andreas Ziartides, the leading left wing trade union leader, recalled in an interview with the author in Lefkosia (Nicosia) shortly before his death:

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Consultative Assembly in May 1948, intense arguments began within the party with regard to whether we had committed a mistake by entering the Consultative Assembly and adopting the demand for self-government. The party was split in two. By 'split' I do not mean that there was an acute rift ... There were two different views. On the one hand there were those who believed we had made a mistake and on the other hand there were those who believed we did well ... Besides, there were those who wavered between the two opinions ... I did not take a firm stance but I won't lie to you I was among those who believed we made a mistake.¹

At this critical juncture, KKE, the Communist Party of Greece, stepped into the picture. It did so quite by accident, with crucial consequences. It so happened that in mid-1948, Nikos Savvides, who was a member of the central committee of AKEL and the deputy mayor of Ammochostos (Famagusta), arrived from Athens conveying a message to the party leadership. He related that in the course of a discussion

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with Vassilis Bartzotas, then a senior member of the KKE's central committee and of the *Democratic Army*, the left wing guerrilla movement, it was revealed that KKE disagreed with AKEL's gradualist approach to *enosis*. It seems that this piece of information prompted AKEL to send a party delegation abroad to consult the leadership of fraternal parties about the 'appropriate left wing path' on the national question of Cyprus.

The leadership of AKEL decided to seek the opinion of the 'national party', the KKE, on the question of strategy and tactics regarding the Cypriot national liberation struggle. Consequently, Fifis Ioannou, the General Secretary, and Andreas Ziartides, a member of the polit bureau and General Secretary of PEO, the Pan-cyprian Federation of Labour, left Cyprus incognito and travelled to Greece via Cairo, Paris, Prague, and Budapest where they were provided with forged passports. In early November 1948, they reached the headquarters of Zakhariadis and Vafiadis in Lemos, in the mountains of northern Greece. Their mission was to brief them on AKEL's policy and officially receive KKE's approach to the Cyprus question. As Ziartides related:

We thought, why not seek the opinion of fraternal parties ... We set out around the middle of October for abroad. We had a programme to see the French, the British, the Greek, and the Soviet Parties and Cominform in Bucharest ... In Paris we told them the reason we wanted to see the leadership of the French Communist Party; we were received by one of the secretaries who said: "Listen comrades, this is a serious matter of yours, you should solve it on your own. It is not easy for us to intervene and give a guideline (opinion) on this matter". This is what the French Party told us.²

The two Cypriot communist leaders first met with Markos Vafiadis, the commander-in-chief of the *Democratic Army*. On hearing of the purpose of their visit, Vafiadis told them: 'It is better if you discuss this with Nikos [Zakhariadis]'. It was surprising that a leader of the Greek left wing movement of the calibre of Vafiadis would refrain from all comment. But, as Ioannou and Ziartides found out a few days later, the latest plenum of the KKE's central committee purged Vafiadis from his position as 'commander-in-chief and prime minister' of the 'government of the mountains'. That presumably explained his silence.³ The two AKEL delegates therefore waited to see Zakhariadis, the KKE's General Secretary, the domineering leader, (in)famous for the Stalinist code and methods of liquidation of 'Trotskyists', 'opportunists' or 'traitors'.⁴ In an interview with the author, Ziartides recalled the meeting with him and his close associates:

We saw Zakhariadis a couple of days after [our arrival]. Vladas, Gousias, Ioannides and one or two others were present, I do not remember if Petros Rousos was there I think he was absent ... Fifis Ioannou made a presentation from his notes for

fifteen to twenty minutes. He initiated the subject. Then Zakhariadis talked *for not more than five minutes, I hesitate to say seven I never say ten*. He told us roughly this: "Listen, comrades, you made a mistake. You deviated to the right. You had been discussing with Imperialism the question of a constitution, whilst at the same time we, up here, your Greek brothers 'fought' the British in an armed struggle. It was a mistake. You should not expect to arrive at *enosis* via such a [colonial] constitution. You should go back and correct your mistake."⁵

Ziartides was categorical that no theoretical or political discussion of substance took place:

Nothing, nothing, nothing! ... [T]he rest [of the Politbureau members] did not speak ... I think Ioannides put a minor question ... I did not say anything and we left. *What I would like to convey is that it was not a serious discussion for such an important issue that troubled Cyprus.*⁶

Fifis Ioannou, in several articles published in the Cypriot daily *Apoyevmatini* in 1976, gave a somewhat different account of the meeting with Zakhariadis. He recalled that Zakhariadis praised the contents of the document on AKEL's history and activities which he handed a few days earlier to the KKE's polit bureau. According to Ioannou's narrative, Zakhariadis told them that the conclusions within the document were 'very sound'. Then, Ioannou asked him to judge the platform for *Self-government-Enosis*. At this point, Zakhariadis became more critical arguing that

The line for constitutional reform in Cyprus is a version of 'liberalism.' We, here, will [march victorious into] Athens in one way or another in two months time. Therefore, you there in Cyprus can no longer be talking about self-government as an intermediate stage to the ultimate aim of *enosis*. *Enosis* with Greece should become your immediate aim!⁷

He went on to explain to his Cypriot comrades that Ioannou's article on 'guaranteed abstention' (from any constitutional process) forwarded for publication in *Rizospastis* was rejected because the KKE's leadership could not appreciate its substance. Not without reason, Ioannou felt uneasy about Zakhariadis' reference to AKEL's gradualist approach to the *enosis* question as 'liberalist deviation'. Thus, he ventured to suggest that: "if your estimate, that in two months you will be in Athens, is proved wrong, does our line of *Self-government-Enosis* continue to be a 'liberalist deviation' or is this slogan defined as 'liberalist' from the point of view of you marching victorious into Athens?" Zakhariadis reiterated dogmatically that AKEL's line was 'liberalist' and that it should be reappraised. He even encouraged the Cypriot communists to engage in armed struggle. Ioannou was shocked to hear the suggestion that guerrilla warfare be initiated. He suspected that Zakhariadis was being carried away by revolutionary passion and that he had overestimated the

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chances of KKE's success in its armed struggle against the British-backed nationalist government in Athens. Thus, from the Cypriot communists' point of view, the question they had posed remained unanswered: in the event of KKE's failure to emerge victorious, would the pursuance of self-government as an intermediate stage to national restoration still be regarded as 'a deviation from the correct national liberation path'? Ioannou recalled that this scepticism perturbed him because Zakhariadis passed his dismissive and dogmatic verdict on AKEL's strategy. Nevertheless, he dared not raise the matter again with Zakhariadis:

I never grasped the opportunity to bring up the question anew, perhaps because I was possessed by the fear not to be misconstrued for lack of confidence in Zakhariadis' sound judgement ...⁹

According to this account, during their farewell meeting Ioannou found the courage to tell Zakhariadis that he and Ziartides were still unclear about the 'correct' strategy, as the advice given to them in Greece was diametrically opposed to that received from the CPGB (Communist Party of Great Britain), which had urged AKEL to confine its actions to legal means. Ioannou claimed that Zakhariadis then suggested that the only way of resolving the controversy was by consulting the Cominform. He recalled his relief upon hearing of the suggestion that AKEL leadership should visit Bucharest and liaise with Cominform:

To say the truth ... I breathed a sigh of relief! I was not disputing the correctness of the KKE's views, to say this would be a great exaggeration - irrespective of who was vindicated later. But from the moment we heard Zakhariadis reverse our strategy and tactics, which were so widely supported by the working masses of the Cypriot people, I felt inside me the deepest void ... the opinion of such a high level organ such as Cominform made me naturally feel relieved and convinced that we would at last establish the right way to follow in Cyprus.¹⁰

Fifis Ioannou's account of the visit to *the mountain* is in certain ways different from that related to the author by Andreas Ziartides, the other member of the AKEL delegation. In a second interview that sought to clarify what Zakhariadis had actually told the delegation, Ziartides reiterated two interconnected points, which suggest that the reader should view with caution Ioannou's account in *Apoyevmatini*. The first point on which Ziartides disagreed with Ioannou - and he insisted that he was entirely right in this regard - was that the decision to consult the Cominform along with other fraternal party leaderships was taken in Lefkosia before their departure. According to Ziartides, the visit to the Cominform in Bucharest had already been scheduled, irrespective of the views of Zakhariadis. The decision was not therefore taken after the meeting with him. In addition, Ziartides categorically asserted that they met Zakhariadis only once. Accordingly, there was no question of the latter appearing more moderate at a second meeting. Ziartides pointed out that

their meeting with Zakhariadis preceded his meeting with Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the CPGB, in London and therefore when in Greece the AKEL delegation had not as yet received the views of the CPGB on the problem of strategy posed for AKEL after the collapse of the Consultative Assembly. Below is the dialogue between the author and Ziartides on this point:

Question: With regard to the emphasis with which Zakhariadis supported his position: Fifis Ioannou claimed that at the farewell meeting Zakhariadis appeared more moderate. When Ioannou said to him that the CPGB advised a gradual approach to *enosis*, a struggle by stages ...

Ziartides: But until that time we had not seen the CPGB.

Question: Are you saying that until that time *you were not aware of their views?*

Ziartides: Yes, all right, we were aware of them, but at that special mission we had not [yet] seen the British Communist Party. The CPGB had told us its view *before* the Consultative Assembly, but after its failure and the emergence of the problem [of what was to be done] it had not given us its view... Then in respect of what Fifis says about Zakhariadis being more moderate during our farewell, I do not remember such a thing. I am sure it was not like this because our farewell was not that ... organised. We finished the meeting, Zakhariadis stood up, we shook hands, he got into his car with his comrades and Roula Koukoulou - his wife - and departed.

Question: You did not see him again?

Ziartides: We did not see him for a second time.

Question: You saw him only once?

Ziartides: Only once!

Question: Fifis says something different.

Ziartides: Well...maybe Fifis writes in a literary fashion!

Question: He claims that you stayed for a couple of days after the meeting with Zakhariadis and that he came back to see you off the third day.

Ziartides: After the meeting we did not see Zakhariadis in front of us even for a moment. He got into the car and left!

Question: What you have just said is at variance with what Fifis had written [in *Apoyevmatim*]

Ziartides: It is up to you who to believe!¹¹

In fact the two AKEL leaders did submit a formal request for official and structured discussions between the communist parties of Greece and Cyprus. In their letter to the secretariat of the central committee of the KKE, Ioannou and Ziartides explained the purpose of their visit:

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We are here under the instructions of the Central Committee of AKEL, with three basic aims [in mind]:

1. To get a closer view of the technical difficulties that we encounter in our specific duty to reinforce the armed struggle of the Democratic people of Greece, and to exchange views on how to overcome earlier rather than later such difficulties.

2. To discuss extensively the Cypriot political situation, and also the line, the strategy and the tactics of our party in Cyprus. To examine together the general but also the internal party difficulties which we encounter and [to find] the way to overcome them.

3. To enrich our political and organisational experience ... ¹²

The two AKEL leaders attached a background historical report on the political situation and on party politics in Cyprus¹³ together with a list of 'certain special issues' on which KKE was asked to comment in detail. The historical report presented a precis of the origins and development of the leftist movement. Lastly, they submitted a document setting out the basis for discussion on the logistics of reinforcing the guerrilla war waged by the *Democratic Army* against the 'monarchofascist government' in Athens. Their request included the following:

- (i) preparatory discussion with the General Secretary of the KKE;
- (ii) official discussion at a meeting with the Polit Bureau;
- (iii) preparation of a document setting out the views discussed;
- (iv) assessment of the military and political situation in Greece;
- (v) arrangement of common meetings and press conference with the political and military leaders of the *Democratic Army*.¹⁴

The attached list of 'special issues' was extensive. The first question concerned the ideological purpose of the struggle and was highly critical. Greece was, for the most part, under Western control. In the four years following liberation from German occupation, successive post-war governments in Athens were kept in place because of British (1944-47) and subsequently American support (1947-48). That was not a happy state of affairs for AKEL. From 1946 onwards, KKE initiated a bitter civil war to overthrow the regime in Athens and to 'liberate Greece from Western imperialism.' AKEL enthusiastically supported the KKE's decision to initiate immediately an armed confrontation against the 'nationalists' in Greece. Whether the KKE could secure a victory was another question. For the time being - the end of 1948 - the right wing 'monarchofascists' were still in power in Athens and the policy of securing self-government was faltering. The Cypriot Left faced a crucial dilemma.

Should AKEL continue to campaign for *enosis* under these circumstances? What *kind* of Greece was Cyprus going to be united with? Should AKEL support union without reference to the regime in the mainland or should it connect the issue of *enosis* to the prospect of the KKE gaining power? Ioannou and Ziartides posed the question: '*enosis* with *any* Greece, irrespective of its regime, or *enosis* with a *democratic* Greece'.¹⁵

Seventeen more questions were added seeking guidance on domestic organisational structures, tactics and on the external aid which AKEL could obtain. For example, Ioannou and Ziartides asked for the systematisation of the broadcasts of 'Free Greece' radio station¹⁶ to Cyprus and of 'our direct and regular link-up'. The two AKEL leaders requested the despatch of a good and experienced KKE cadre to cater for the organisational networking and the overcoming of the party crisis. Furthermore, they asked for KKE's assessment of the international situation, in particular if there were any prospects of a new international conflict as a result of antagonisms within the capitalist world. Lastly, they raised the matter of AKEL's external relations. The crucial question was how the party could benefit both financially and politically from the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe. They asked the KKE whether it was advisable to brief nine fraternal parties in Europe on the 'designs of the Anglo-Americans in Cyprus' and whether they could establish regular contacts with them. They appealed for university scholarships and the possibility that Eastern European countries could open consulates in Cyprus. In exchange, they offered to provide teachers for Greek children behind the iron curtain.¹⁷ These were sons and daughters of *Democratic Army* fighters, taken (voluntarily or otherwise) to the 'People's Democracies' for safety reasons i.e. fear of reprisals from the government's armed forces.

Nevertheless, the willingness and promptness which the leadership of AKEL showed in 'coming' to the aid of KKE and fighting the 'nationalists' was not reciprocated.¹⁸ The KKE paid little if any attention to the request of their Cypriot comrades for a considered opinion on the correct strategy.¹⁹ In concentrating on the civil war effort, the leadership of KKE failed to devote the time and energy required to deliberate and bring about a well-versed policy towards the Cyprus question. The autocratic and domineering character of Zakhariadis can also be cited as a contributing factor in this respect.

Cominform also offered no advice on the best strategy for AKEL. Fifi Ioannou stayed in Bucharest waiting in vain for meetings. Likewise, Moscow simply ignored the Cypriot party's request for 'guidance'. It would not be farfetched to deduce that Moscow's attitude had much to do with its acceptance that Greece (and Cyprus) were to be kept under the British sphere of influence in accordance with the infamous 'Percentages Agreement' reached between Churchill and Stalin.

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As soon as Fifi Ioannou returned to Cyprus (on 30 December 1948) he called an extraordinary meeting of the central committee and the polit bureau of AKEL in order to apprise their members of his mission. The communique that followed was rather economical with the truth. Indicatively, it made no reference at all to self-government. Neither did it mention the KKE's position on AKEL's campaign for self-rule nor the reluctance of the Cominform Secretariat in Bucharest to express an opinion. The communique merely noted Ioannou's 'satisfaction about the enlightenment' he and Ziartides had shed 'on the situation prevalent in Cyprus and separately on the immutable longing of the Cypriot people for union with mother Greece.'²⁰ In an equally misleading statement, Ioannou claimed that it was made clear to him that 'the government of Free Greece, the *Democratic Army* General Staff, the KKE, and the AKE (Greek Agrarian Party) absolutely adopt the national programme of EAM and that the Cypriot *enosist* cause has always been in the first line of their interests as it has been the cardinal and clearest national claim of Hellenism'.²¹ In this respect, the Governor in Cyprus was also misinformed, as his report to London reveals. Referring to AKEL's General Secretary he wrote:

In Belgrade he had established contact with the Markos [leftist guerrillas] Government which had given approval for the AKEL strategy of clamouring for self-government now with the hopes of Union in the future.²²

The AKEL party leadership, however, continued its consultations with regard to the party's tactics and strategy throughout the following two months. The long gestation resulted in the central committee resigning en masse after a bout of self-criticism. 'The serious mistakes in the political line and tactics of our Party weigh heavily upon the entire central committee and the party cadres' stated the *Provisional Central Leadership* in its first communique. It attributed the allegedly mistaken tactics to the fact that the majority of the members of the resigned central committee comprised of elements exhibiting petty bourgeois influences and tendencies. Such elements could not form part of the leadership.²³

As promised in the first announcement, the *Central Provisional Leadership* issued, a week later, a lengthy and detailed address to the Cypriot people in which it sought to analyse 'the objective reasons for the deviation towards self-government'. Further an attempt was made to set out the long and short-term goals of the struggle. The proclamation began with a historical review of developments since the war. It noted that AKEL believed that the sacrifice of its members in the 'great anti-fascist war' laid the moral and political foundations on which the national liberation claim could be based. For this reason, the declaration explained, AKEL could never distinguish between the 'anti-fascist struggle' and the Cypriot national cause during the war. The party expected London to reward the Cypriots by granting them the unfettered right to determine their own future.²⁴

The proclamation also outlined the adverse conditions being faced. These were, on the one hand, the unwillingness of the Cypriot Right and the Greek government to co-operate with the Left in bringing the Cyprus issue to international fora. This aversion to internationalisation stemmed from Greek foreign policy, which refused to unsettle Anglo-Greek relations. The cornerstone of this philosophy was the axiom that Greece could not survive as a western democracy without the paternal protection of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the British were not to be provoked in international fora for the sake of Cyprus. On the other hand, the deception of imperialism, as it was put, refused to honour its own declarations on the right of self-determination of peoples. The proclamation further accused 'the right wing plutocratic reaction' of being 'the prop of the loathsome Palmer regime'.²⁵ AKEL pointed out that right wing party cadres served in the Executive and the Advisory Council, in school boards and in appointed rural councils. It was in this context that AKEL found that self-government could have furnished a way out of the impasse by supplying the 'foundation for political and economic relief and the furtherance of the national liberation struggle'. In self-critical mood, however, the provisional leadership admitted that this policy was mistaken. The reappraisal concluded that it was an 'illusion' because at a time when the movement was willing to compromise on a constitution securing true self-government, the government intensified its policy of restricting political freedom, using violence against striking workers and sentencing trade union leaders for organising illegal processions and protests. Consequently, the party, having gone through all those experiences, became convinced that 'nothing can save Cyprus and its people but the immediate deliverance of the Island from the English imperialist yoke and our *enosis* with Greece.' Thus, the *Provisional Central Leadership* declared:

For our life, for our existence and the development of our land there is only one way out: to be nationally liberated and to join our fate with the fraternal Greek people.²⁶

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Zakhariadis had adopted an authoritarian manner in expressing his ideas about what AKEL should do in connection with the national struggle for self-determination. It is equally clear that this convinced the Cypriot party's leadership that it had committed a serious strategic error in negotiating constitutional reform with the British administration. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that Zakhariadis's position was pivotal in engineering the crucial shift towards an uncompromising strategy in favour of immediate *enosis*.

Notes

1. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 10 June 1994.
2. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, 10 June 1994. Historically AKEL's requests for support of its aims and guidance on tactics from fraternal parties had met with uninterested attitudes and dismissive responses which obviously never matched the party leadership's expectations. International communist solidarity was at least indifferent. Further it may be noted that in January 1965 the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko spoke in favour of a federal solution of the Cyprus dispute without consulting the Cypriot communist party. (*The New York Times*, 22 January 1965) Ironically he had met Ezekias Papaioannou (General Secretary of AKEL) in Europe a few days before putting out such a statement, yet Gromyko never raised the issue with his Cypriot comrade. AKEL subsequently released a statement condemning Gromyko's declaration. Moreover in July 1974 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus a Soviet Embassy press release in Lefkosia reported that the invading Turkish forces were allegedly 'fighting the putschists who violated constitutional order'. AKEL once more distanced itself from such a view issuing a document that condemned the Turkish invasion. This was done against the will of the Soviet Ambassador in Lefkosia. Personal Interviews with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 20 April 1994.
3. Interview with Ziartides, Lefkosia, 10 June 1994. Also Fifis Ioannou commented on Vafiadis refraining to give his opinion: 'I thought that something was going wrong in the leadership of the KKE and of the *Democratic Army* ... It was not long before what I suspected had become a certainty that Markos was pushed aside and ... Zakhariadis was in full control.'. Fifis Ioannou: *This is How the Cyprus Question Started. At the Footprints of a Decade 1940-1950.* *Apoyevmatini*, 21 August 1976.
4. For an analysis of the Zakhariadis phenomenon in connection with the Stalinisation of the world's Communist Parties see for example Haris Vlavianos: *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War, The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party* (Macmillan, 1992), 194-198.
5. Interview with Ziartides, 10 June 1994.
6. Ibid.
7. Fifis Ioannou op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 21 August 1976.
8. Ibid.
9. Fifis Ioannou, op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 23 August 1976.
10. Fifis Ioannou, op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 27 August 1976.
11. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 4 August 1995.

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12. Archives of Contemporary Social History (ACSH), Athens, K371: Φ20/21/13, Ioannou & Ziartides (on behalf of the Central Committee of AKEL) to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KKE, 'Free Greece', November 1948.

13. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/14. The 48 hand-written pages report traces the development of the leftist movement and its confrontation with the Right. It was a cumbersome document.

14. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

15. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

16. This is the radio station controlled by the Greek communists.

17. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

18. ACSH, K371: Φ20/21/15 (1948): V. Vassiliou, member of the Central Committee of AKEL to Partsalides, member of the Polit Bureau of KKE, n. d.:

"1. The issue of Volunteers.

We now have in Cyprus 350 volunteers for the *Democratic Army*. From those 90% are ex- servicemen, members of AKEL and single. They are absolutely ready to depart. Finance is the only obstacle existing. The party does not have the necessary funds for them to travel up to France. For each one 25 pounds is needed."

Vassiliou was already on the Greek mountains as a member of a mission of Cypriot doctors who responded to AKEL's call for volunteers to join the medical services of the *Democratic Army*.

19. On checking the minutes and the conclusions of the meetings of the KKE's Polit Bureau for the years 1948 and 1949 deposited at ACSH, no discussion could be found of AKEL's requests.

20. *Democratis*, 31 December 1948, 1.

21. *Democratis*, 31 December 1948, 1.

22. Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office (CO) 537/4041: Political Situation December 1948. Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

23. *Democratis*, 9 March 1949, 1: 'On the Basis of the Party's Reform Forward for the Liberation of Our People'.

24. *Democratis*, 17 March 1949, 1: 'Declaration of the Provisional Central Leadership of AKEL: The Only Salvation Lies in the Decisive Struggle for [the Solution of] the Economic Problems and the Immediate National Restoration of the People'.

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25. The reference is to the governorship of Palmer 1933-1939 during which civil liberties were suspended *sine die*.

26. *Democratis*, 17 March 1949, 2.

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BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS, 1960 - 1974: A TALE OF FAILURE OR IMPOTENCE?*

Claude Nicolet

Abstract

Upon Cypriot independence, in 1960, the British were relieved about having a troublesome policy issue out of the way. Their reaction was to relax and - in the eyes of U.S. officials - not to be overly concerned about either the Communist danger or the intercommunal problems on the island. The Americans were thus injected into the limelight of Cyprus diplomacy as a consequence of British withdrawal from their role as Western security interest guard in early 1964, leaving the U.K. on the sidelines. At least the U.S. diplomats could usually count on British moral support in their attempts to solve the Cyprus issue, including support for some of their conspiratorial schemes in 1964. Only after the Greek coup d'etat on Cyprus, in July 1974, were the British pushed back into Frontline diplomacy by their status as a Guarantor Power. The different policy parameters produced sharp disagreements between the U.S. and the British. At the end, the two blamed each other for having failed to prevent the Turkish invasion.

Introduction

British policy in Cyprus must be seen in the context of the end of colonial rule on the island. The British were more or less kicked out. Still, since they left as rulers, their new policy came to be defined by two important parameters: Their Sovereign Base Areas (SSAs), to guarantee continued British military coverage of their regional role in the Mediterranean Sea; and their role as Guarantor Power, to continue to guard over the island's political future together with Greece and Turkey.

On the other hand, the story of United Kingdom policy in Cyprus cannot be told without some references here and there to United States policy. Not only did the

U.S. take over much of Britain's earlier role in 1964, but the policy was also often formulated, or at least discussed, jointly, within the traditional Anglo-American relationship.

The situation in 1960 was thus the following: The United Kingdom left by pressure at a time when its economy started to force her to redefine her role in the world anyway. In December 1962, former United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson would infuriate the British, when he claimed in a speech that Britain had "lost an Empire and has not yet found a role".¹ The quotation could be translated into the Cyprus situation: In 1960 Britain lost an island and would not find a new role there for quite a while, either.

Negligence and Administrative Confusion, 1960 - 1963

Upon the Cypriot declaration of independence, in August 1960, the British, like other countries in contact with Cyprus, had to define their willingness and capacity to grant aid to the new republic. The special case about Cyprus and Britain was that the removal of two-thirds of the United Kingdom forces and most of the civil service personnel would leave a gap in the Cypriot economy. As Cyprus was also supposed to become a Commonwealth member, other countries such as the United States, gladly stepped into the background regarding aid, so as not to encourage Cyprus to orient itself elsewhere than to the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom. However, Britain did not fulfil its task as expected and the U.S. soon became alarmed that Communist countries could jump into the gap with attractive alternative aid. Britain thought the United States was unduly pessimistic in the outlook of the Cypriot future. Moreover, not only did Britain have too many economic problems herself by then to be more forthcoming in general, but the United Kingdom policy was also marked by a disastrous bureaucratic inefficiency at the time. Since the island's independence, and especially after its admission to the Commonwealth, the responsibility for Cyprus within the British Government was divided between the Foreign Office, mainly because of the military bases and the status of Britain as a Guarantor Power, and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). Moreover, the CRO experienced a rapid turnover in officials, who were at least in the beginning rather inexperienced desk officers.² In addition there was the continued British uneasiness with the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios.

As the quarrels between Greek and Turkish Cypriots about the constitution and the rights of the communities grew more serious, throughout 1963, the British were again rather slow in responding, if compared with the United States. The climax of this relaxed United Kingdom attitude was High Commissioner Arthur Clark's dubious role in the formulation of Makarios' 13 points to amend the Constitution that he proposed to the Turkish Cypriots and this is what sparked the Cypriot powder keg in December 1963.

It is not necessary to go into the details of Clark's role during that time. Suffice it to say that Clark cooperated with Makarios, presumably on a purely personal basis, exceeding his authority.³ He possibly actually helped Makarios formulate some of the proposals and we know from British documents that Clark had his government's authority to discretely put forward his ideas to the archbishop.⁴

The crisis was too much for the British. There was no plan for a situation like this one and in contrast to some other countries Britain did not expect such an explosion. In spite of all this: When U.S. officials told the British that Cyprus was clearly no issue that the United States wanted to be responsible for and that they would simply follow the British lead, the United Kingdom had to act.

Shoving the Issue Over to the United States: 1964

At least the British managed to arrange a cease-fire and at the same time attempted to find a way to a political solution by inviting all parties to the conflict to a conference in London in January 1964. It was no surprise that nothing came out of that conference, as all parties adhered to their stubborn standpoints. At the same time the British decided that this was already their last attempt at peacekeeping. Even though they had their forces on two military bases they decided that they were neither able nor willing to act on a peacekeeping force but would instead pass the problem over to another forum.

The first idea for an alternative to a British force was a NATO force.⁵ This was soon dropped, however, contrary to what many followers of international conspiracy theories claim. A NATO force was unsuitable, because many NATO partners would be against it, the forces were not equipped or trained for internal security measures, and establishment would take too long.⁶

The next best idea that would not open the door to Eastern bloc troops or control was a force constituted by partner countries (among them NATO allies and Commonwealth members). This scheme failed too, however, mainly because President Makarios resisted all attempts by U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball to receive his approval for such a force. Instead, though Makarios did not have his way either, the "compromise", the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), was much closer to his than to the Anglo-American position.

It was at this time, in the late winter months of 1964, that the United States took over from the United Kingdom the guarding of Western interests in Cyprus. This was primarily because the British, in the eyes of United States officials, were not concerned enough about the island's, but merely the SSA's future, and because Britain was facing the U.S. with a *fait accompli* by unilaterally deciding to hand over

the peacekeeping role to whoever would be ready to receive it.

From 1964 to 1974, therefore, the British played a side role within the international dimension of the Cyprus conflict and often merely decided on whether to endorse, or actively support, U.S. plans, even though as one of the three Guarantor Powers Britain still retained a certain amount of formal responsibility. On the other hand, the U.K. was still involved militarily by constituting the largest contingent in UNFICYP.

The famous June crisis was symptomatic for this British political withdrawal. While U.S. intelligence received information about an impending Turkish invasion of Cyprus, British intelligence predicted normal manoeuvres.⁷ While President Johnson sent a stern letter that eventually made Turkey cancel her plans, the whole staff of the British embassy in Ankara was thus on a field trip to Istanbul and found out after their return that something must have been brewing but was over as soon as it had begun.⁸

More interesting is the British role regarding plans for a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem. The United States officials in Washington and in the embassies of the countries concerned came to the conclusion during the spring of 1964 that the best solution to the Cyprus problem was to grant *enosis*, however not without concessions to Turkey.⁹

What is important for us and is a rather new insight thanks to newly released British documents is that the United Kingdom, in the summer of 1964, also favoured *enosis* with some concessions for a solution. When the U.S. officials told the British about their favourite scheme, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Rennie, wrote to Prime Minister Alexander Douglas-Home: "[i]t would be bad enough if the Turks were to learn too soon of American support for *Enosis*, but it would be disastrous if they heard that we had expressed the same view."¹⁰ Indeed, High Commissioner William Bishop, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee and the FO's Central Department all came out in favour of *enosis* with concessions.¹¹ While Foreign Secretary Butler was reported to express doubts as he "worried about [the] political effect on [the] Tory backbenchers of now pushing [a] solution which it could have had eight years ago", Prime Minister Home on 29 May finally came to the conclusion himself that "we should[...] prefer *enosis*".¹²

However, while America became active in the political field, the British kept their preferences to themselves, being relieved that the U.S. had definitely taken over from them by President Johnson's commitment to Prime Minister Inonu in his letter of June that the U.S. would become more active in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. They thus asked the United States to take the lead in the attempt

to mediate and represent British interests. They simply told the Americans that they intended to keep their SBAs and wished to be informed, if not consulted, about progress.

During the famous Acheson mission to Geneva, the British, though appointing Viscount Samuel Hood as their representative to the talks, contented themselves to receive news about Acheson's thinking and comment on it in order to signal support or make reservation on it. It is unnecessary to go into the specific plans here. Suffice it to mention that there were more than just two Acheson Plans and that the more dubious ones included conspiratorial schemes to induce either the Greeks or the Turks to invade Cyprus and to then stop the other army respectively in time to prevent a bloodbath.¹³ All of the plans simply reflected the U.S. fear that Cyprus could go Communist. In early August, as Acheson and Ball started to think about supporting Greece in a scheme for "instant *enosis*" to be established by a Greek overthrow of Makarios, British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Ralph Murray, in support of the scheme urged the Foreign Office: "[...] it we do not want a serious risk of a weak but still independent Cyprus pursuing long-term intrigues with the Soviet Union and Egypt we should go all out for *Enosis* by hook or by crook."¹⁴

The British were well aware of the consequences of such a conspiracy. When Acheson told Hood that within this plan the Greek forces that had been infiltrated into Cyprus during the previous months would be encouraged to "remove Makarios", Lord Hood concluded in his top-secret letter to the FO: "this is pretty explosive stuff!"¹⁵ Eventually, in spite of British approval, the plan was not executed, primarily because the Greeks were not ready to grant Turkey the few concessions regarded as necessary by the U.S. and U.K. to give the green light.

Acheson and Ball were so frustrated by the lack of a Greek-Turkish agreement that in desperation they devised another plan that would have endorsed Greek unilateral intervention on the island with the removal of Makarios, while the United States would have prevented Turkey from reacting. The scheme was meant to frustrate a possible Cypriot-Soviet axis, and it was simply believed that a Greek invasion could manage this while a Turkish invasion could not. Now *this* was when the British had their finest hour, though not because they specifically cared about the fate of the Cypriots. Lord Hood sent an urgent telegram to the Foreign Office, commenting, "we should not be the gainers if we saved Cyprus but lost Turkey".¹⁵ On a slight variation of this plan, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Harold Caccia, consequently warned that Her Majesty's Government "might even have to dissociate itself from any such development", thus threatening the withdrawal of U.K. support to the plans. Prime Minister Home duly sent a respective message to the U.S., but by the time it arrived cooler heads in the United States itself had already prevailed.

As a consequence, the Acheson mission and Hood's presence in Geneva came to an end. Thanks to a gradual de-escalation on Cyprus proper, no more of these extreme schemes came forward. The lessons learnt by U.S. and U.K. officials included the insight that it was best to wait for the Greeks and Turks themselves to come up with a deal - the Cypriots themselves still had no voice regarding their own future.

Waiting-position: 1965 - 1967

That the general Western policies towards Cyprus were in a mess is evident by the exercise of U.S. officials to push the British back into the forefront of Cyprus diplomacy, in the autumn of 1964, and the British blockage of the attempt. The new Foreign Minister Patrick Gordon Walker in October let the Americans know that the new Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson would not contemplate any new initiatives, but would be prepared to help, if the United States decided to devise any new schemes.¹⁷

It took several months for Greece and Turkey to take up a dialogue about the island's future. However, when ideas and proposals became more concrete, the British were suddenly pushed back into the picture. The reason was an ingredient in Greek schemes that was being attempted to be sold to Turkey: the cession of the British SBA Dhekelia. With the cession of British territory in Cyprus, Prime Minister George Papandreou thought he had found a miracle solution that would not involve ceding Greek territory but would still give Turkey a military base.¹⁸ However, the belief that the small base would satisfy Turkey was an illusion. The British knew this. This is why they let it be known that they would only contemplate throwing Dhekelia into the lot if there was evidence that it would remain the last item to constitute a solution viable to all parties involved. King Constantine received the same answer upon his similar attempt, in November 1966.¹⁹ While the Greek-Turkish differences seemed to have been bridged to a large extent, it was now President Makarios who was known not to agree, and in contrast to the Tory Government in 1964, the Labour Government in 1966 actually seemed to care and thus to consider the Cypriot president's opinion, largely thanks to their pro-Greek Cypriot High Commissioner Sir David Hunt.

It must be pointed out, however, that the United Kingdom would have been willing to give away Dhekelia, if it had promised success for a solution, because contrary to Akrotiri, Dhekelia had lost in military value within the changes in military technology and Britain had been experiencing disastrous economic problems that made it scale down on strategic bases in the Mediterranean throughout the 1960s.²⁰ The climax of this economic turmoil was probably the necessary devaluation of Sterling in November 1967, which absorbed all British administrative powers during

the very week Cyprus experienced its most dangerous crisis since 1964.

Though not much more could be expected from the United Kingdom anyway, given its passivity since 1964, the sterling crisis may have been the primary reason why Britain again remained on the sidelines, while United States trouble-shooter Cyrus Vance almost single-handedly managed to pull Greece and Turkey back from the brink. A war seemed imminent following the showdown in the area of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, and the U.S. only for a very short instance at the outset of the crisis attempted to push the British into the limelight of crisis diplomacy. On the other hand, Britain made no secret of her wish to extricate herself from the problem.²¹ As late as two weeks into the crisis, the Foreign Office eventually considered how to support the Vance mission. But by then, the British Embassy Counsellor in Washington was told that there was nothing more for Britain to do but to support the American formulas.²² Eventually, U.S. Ambassador Bruce cabled from London that the British had at no time during the crisis "evinced unhappiness about 'being left out' [...]".²³

Hiding Behind U.S. Diplomacy: 1968 - 1973

Genuine cooperation between America and the British was only resumed in early 1968. After the shock over events in late 1967 and especially the speed of escalation of the crisis, within hours they devised new schemes to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The British study on the "Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute" called for an approach to the problem in three "tiers".²⁴ The first tier (or phase) would contain a general improvement of living conditions on the island, hopefully by March 1968. The second tier would entail bicommunal constitutional talks that could last until the following year. Finally, the third tier would provide approval of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, to the Constitution worked out by the two communities. The U.S. study in broad terms agreed on the different aspects and on how to handle them.²⁵

Thanks to a local *detente* and eventual international support the talks between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash did begin, in the spring of 1968, but they did not result in much agreement. During the early stages of these talks the British, together with their American colleagues decided that it was best not to interfere, but instead to encourage both parties to move on. Nevertheless, they soon expressed concern over the lack of progress that was obvious as early as in autumn of 1968.

However, in general, the British were again retreating behind the back of the Americans in any action the latter decided to take. This included the diplomatic interventions in Athens to prevent a Greek coup against Makarios in March 1972. As it seemed, the U.S. mostly did the talking, while the British let the local officials

know that they backed whatever the United States was backing.

Reluctant Reinvolverment: 1974

When the Greek junta attempted to overthrow President Makarios, on 15 July 1974, things were no longer that easy, of course. The British Government was reinvolved in the Cyprus problem against its will, by its status as Guarantor Power that was supposed to guarantee Cypriot independence and territorial integrity. The consequence was a deep split between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and British Foreign Minister James Callaghan.

To sum up the two positions, the U.S. regarded the crisis within the NATO context, whereas the U.K. was primarily concerned about the invasion of a Commonwealth member. The U.S. approach thus made it less willing to antagonise either the Greek Colonels or the Turks. Callaghan himself, as he remembered in his memoirs, felt fewer inhibitions.²⁶

Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit on 17 July confronted Britain with a request to allow Turkey to use the British bases for a military intervention to restore constitutional government. To most observers it was obvious that a Turkish call for the return of Makarios was mere window-dressing, in order to let a Turkish invasion appear legal according to the Cypriot constitution. In spite of Callaghan's rather naïve assessment in his memoirs that Ecevit's claim that he was "almost weeping" over the departure of Makarios was a genuine testimony of how much the relations between the archbishop and the Turks had improved over the past few years,²⁷ the British refused a Turkish use of their bases, because, as Callaghan later stated, the island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops, and the British had already called on the Greek Government to withdraw their officers.²⁸ Nevertheless, to be fair, it was not Britain's refusal to cooperate with Turkey that led to the failure of the consultation, but rather the Greek Colonels' continuing refusal to comply with the British urgings, as they still regarded a Turkish invasion as unlikely.²⁹

When Turkey invaded after all, the British seemed rather helpless. So did the Americans. However, a cease-fire was arranged and the U.S., Britain and France jointly called for a couple of conferences in Geneva under British auspices. These conferences again produced little agreement. Callaghan and Kissinger sought to save the conference and to prevent a second Turkish military move, the former by chairing the conference and the latter from the sidelines and through his emissary Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman. When the Turkish forces broke the cease-fire at the end of July and the UN forces were in danger of being attacked, the British sent some reinforcements to be placed under UN command. Furthermore, Callaghan informed the British press that some Phantom aircraft would be

sent to the island, and dropped a heavy hint that British troops would be authorised to fire on Turks to stop any breach of the ceasefire.³⁰

The Americans, however, had a different opinion about the situation in Cyprus. Hartman argued that there was no longer an odious regime in Athens and no illegal regime in Cyprus after the Colonels had departed, that the Turkish Cypriots were protected, and that there was a strong UN resolution. These were rational arguments that should appeal to Turkish intelligence and restrain them from action, Hartman argued.³¹ Therefore, the U.S. was not happy with Her Majesty's Government's approach. To President Ford, Kissinger complained that the British were "threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard".³² The Secretary preferred to trust his former Harvard student, Prime Minister Ecevit. Therefore, Kissinger only promised diplomatic support to the British, while emphasising that threats of military action were neither helpful nor appropriate.³³ Callaghan had to transmit the news to Clerides, pointing out to him that the United Kingdom was no longer a superpower, that it could not afford another Suez, and that any strong-arm action could not be contemplated by the United Kingdom, except within the context of the UN or an American initiative.³⁴

When Turkey eventually cut the Gordian knot by seizing the territory it had been demanding, the disappointed Callaghan allegedly wrote Kissinger an angry letter accusing the Americans of "disgraceful and duplicitous behaviour".³⁵ On the other hand, Kissinger was reported to have remarked that "Callaghan's handling of the peace talks showed the dangers of letting 'boy scouts handle negotiations'".³⁶ Neither accusation seems very appropriate. If anything could have stopped the Turks, it would have been the threat, or even limited implementation, of joint British-American military action. To what extent Callaghan really wanted to stop Turkey militarily but was hindered to do so by American refusal to participate is still not clear. – Not to mention what the American intentions really were.

Conclusions

When trying to assess the British policy towards Cyprus between 1960 and 1974, we cannot just look at the question of whether Britain would have had a right to intervene militarily in Cyprus and – if so – whether it should have used that right in 1964 or 1974, after the constitution had been breached. We must also look at what the British role was, in trying to prevent situations from happening that brought forward such questions in the first place. However, while it can be said of the Americans that they at least prevented a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in June 1964 and in November 1967, no such thing can be said of the British. Moreover, neither Britain nor the U.S. was able to come up with a longer-term scheme that would have promised success regarding a political solution to the Cyprus problem. Still, con-

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trary to the role of the U.S., Britain can be blamed for not living up to her general responsibility as one of the three Guarantor Powers, among other reasons because she often failed to grasp the critical nature of the communal and regional tension in and around Cyprus. Especially, Britain must be blamed for quickly withdrawing from most of her responsibilities in the crucial year of 1964 with an *après-nous-le-déluge* attitude, leaving the U.S. with a *fait accompli*. But here the aspect of impotence comes in, as the limited number of troops would have prevented Britain taking any forceful action in the absence of trilateral Guarantor Power agreement to restore the *status quo ante*. On the other hand, the poor state of the British economy prevented the United Kingdom from assuming a more vigorous role in terms of aid or a general responsibility for the safeguard of Western interests.

British policy in Cyprus was thus mainly characterised by both, failure and impotence, with only very few laudable instances in-between. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Britain – or the U.S. for that matter – can be blamed for the various disasters that Cyprus experienced between 1960 and 1974. After all, most of the Cypriot problems were still homemade.

Notes

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* This article is based on a speech held on 5 May 2001 at a conference entitled *Britain and Cyprus: Colonialism and its Impact*, at Intercollege, Nicosia.

THE PLACEMENT OF CYPRUS' EMBASSIES: THE INFLUENCE OF REALPOLITIK AND CULTURE

Craig Webster

Abstract

Countries have to make decisions as to where to invest in diplomatic representations. Diplomatic representations are especially important for small countries, as they frequently lack military and economic power to influence the world in their favour and often have limited means. In this study, the author looks into how Cyprus decides to allocate its resources to send diplomatic representation to countries. The author performs a logistical regression on 149 countries and finds that there is evidence that Cyprus allocates resources to maximise its influence on the most powerful countries and EU member states, allocates resources to other countries in the Middle East region, and seeks to invest in relationship building with fellow Christian Orthodox countries. However, the findings do not support the notion that building relationships with Commonwealth states is a priority.

Introduction

Where does a country with limited financial resources strategically "invest" in the game of world politics? International relations is a game in which each country is thrown but it needs to invest its resources wisely in order to maximise returns from investments. Embassies and the placement of embassies represent unilateral investments in dyadic relationships with the host country. Embassies are intended to build bridges with the host country so as to influence the host country's policies in favour of the embassy's home country. But not all countries can afford the resources to send embassies to every country in the world. Therefore, these countries must invest strategically. In this paper, I will investigate how Cyprus invests its resources and explore the logic of the investments.

Cyprus, although a country with a small population and a small economy with

limited resources, faces unlimited demands from the international arena. Like any state, Cyprus must develop relations with other countries to achieve political objectives and to support economic growth. Unlike a major power, it cannot afford to administer embassies in nearly every country in the world. In the following section, I will illustrate that there are several arguments for why Cyprus should allocate scarce resources in the conduct of its foreign policy. Then, I will test these propositions to see if Cyprus allocates these resources consistently with the arguments. The conclusion will illustrate what has been learned about Cyprus foreign policy and which questions are raised for future research.

Realist Concerns, Geography, and Cultural Ties

There are different reasons for why a country chooses to allocate scarce resources and here we will explore the various reasons why Cyprus values a relationship with another state. Some of the reasons why Cyprus values relationships with other states are rooted in realpolitik concerns while others are based upon cultural links. Below we will explore the possible reasons why Cyprus favours building a relationship with one state over another before we put these propositions to the empirical test.

The first, and arguably the most important reason that Cyprus may value a relationship with another state is that it is useful in the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. The Cyprus Problem is a major concern for the government of Cyprus, as anyone familiar with the research on the country must know. Indeed, much of the literature written about Cyprus and its politics is centred on how to solve the Cyprus Problem (see for example Richmond, 1998 and Theophanous, 1996). When considering which countries will be most useful in solving the Cyprus Problem, it is apparent that the most powerful countries in the international system would be most helpful as they have the power to sway the outcomes in the international system. For example, it seems unlikely that Paraguay could influence Turkey to negotiate a settlement in favour of the Government of Cyprus, while the USA could. Therefore, we expect that the state of Cyprus would have a bias in favour of currying favour with the most powerful countries in the system to attain its goal of a settlement of the Cyprus Problem.

The second reason, which is closely linked with the first, is entry into the European Union. One of the main goals of Cyprus in the past few years has been to enter the European Union. This has been closely linked with the settlement of the Cyprus Problem, as it is assumed that the European Union will provide a framework in which the peace and security of the Republic of Cyprus may be assured (Joseph, 1997a, p. 126 and Joseph, 1997b, p. 114). Therefore, it seems that the Republic invests in building strong relationships with members of the European Union to

achieve the goal of attaining membership in the community. If this logic guides Cyprus foreign policy, one can expect to find that European Union states are more likely than other states to host an embassy from Cyprus.

The third reason that Cyprus values a relationship with another country is proximity. As a player in the Middle East it is necessary for Cyprus to seek representation in countries in the region. The reason for this is that Cyprus has gained from having healthy relationships with all the countries in the region with the exception of Turkey. In addition, the geopolitical principle suggests that interests generally decay over distance, when all else is taken equally. If there are regional concerns in the development of relations with other states, we expect the Republic to have a bias towards developing relationships with other Middle Eastern countries.

The fourth reason that Cyprus values a relationship with another country has to do with cultural influences. One of the strongest cultural influences in Cyprus is its religion (about 78% of the population of the country is Orthodox). There has been a great deal of literature in International Relations dealing with the influence of culture upon the conduct of foreign relations. Mazrui (1990) and Huntington (1997) are at the forefront of the movement that stresses that cultural influences shape the way that leaders perceive other countries as being likely allies or likely enemies in the conduct of international affairs. If culture plays a role in the conduct of foreign policy for the Government of Cyprus, one would expect that its foreign policy would favour relationships with other countries which have populations that are largely Orthodox.

The fifth reason Cyprus may value a relationship with another country is shared experience under British tutelage. Cyprus is a member of the Commonwealth and has therefore dedicated itself to building relationships with other countries that have also gone through similar experiences as part of the British Empire. These countries have certain cultural similarities that may facilitate cooperation and favourable relations between the countries. For example, in many of the countries, English is widely spoken either as a unifying language (as in India) or as the language of the educated elite (as in Bangladesh). Such a shared historical experience may facilitate cooperation while slight impediments may occur when dealing with other types of countries, such as those that are members of the Francophonie. Therefore, if the shared historical experience within the British Empire does play an influence in the conduct of Cyprus foreign policy, we would expect the state to favour building relationships with other Commonwealth states.

Data and the Tests

To test which considerations play a role in the allocation of resources for Cyprus,

we need to define and operationalise concepts. After we have defined and operationalised the relevant concepts, we will perform the appropriate tests to indicate which of the influences on Cyprus foreign policy appear to be systematic. Table One summarises how the concepts have been operationalised in the analysis.

Embassies as Investments

The dependent variable for this analysis is a unilateral investment in a dyadic relationship with another country. The concept of investments is operationalised with the presence or absence of an embassy in a country. We assume that placing an embassy in a country indicates that the Republic of Cyprus values the relationship with the country. This is denoted by a dummy variable in the analysis with "1" representing a state with an embassy from the Republic of Cyprus and "0" representing a state without an embassy from the Republic of Cyprus. The information gathered refers to embassies operating in 1999. The countries in which the Republic of Cyprus has an embassy are Australia, Austria, Belgium, Bulgaria, China, the Czech Republic, Egypt, France, Finland, Germany, Greece, Holland, Hungary, India, Iran, Ireland, Israel, Italy, Kenya, Libya, Mexico, Russia, Spain, Sweden, Syria, the United Kingdom, the USA, and Yugoslavia.

Table One
Concepts, Operationalisation, and Hypothesised Relationships

Concept	Measure	Hypothesised Relationship with Dependent Variable
Power	GNP logged	Positive
EU member	EU member (dummy variable)	Positive
Regional players	Middle East or North African country (dummy variable)	Positive
Orthodox Population	Per cent of population adhering to Orthodox Christianity	Positive
Commonwealth member	Commonwealth member (dummy variable)	Positive

Independent Variables

I. Power

The most apparent reason that embassies are placed in particular countries is that they are used to influence international affairs in favour of Cyprus. The best investments will be with countries that are most powerful. There are many ways to operationalise power as a concept. In this analysis, we use GNP as an indicator of power. It has been defended as a useful measure of power in the international arena (see Organski and Kugler, 1981) and data availability makes it more comprehensive than the major rival measure (the Capability Index by the Correlates of War Project). The data in this analysis are derived from figures in UNICEF's 1996 Progress of Nations report and they are reported in US dollars. According to this data, the most powerful countries in the world (in descending order) are the USA, Japan, Germany, France, Italy, the UK, China, and Canada. The least powerful by this measure in the sample are Guinea-Bissau and Eritrea. This variable has been logged because the GNP of the USA and Japan would otherwise drive the findings – the GNP of the USA is more than three times the GNP of Germany. We expect that countries with larger GNPs are more likely to have embassies than those with smaller GNPs.

II. EU

The other major consideration dealing with Cyprus foreign policy is the EU question. For this purpose, we use a dummy variable to indicate whether states are EU members. The EU members (in 1999) are denoted with a dummy variable with "1" representing members in the EU and "0" representing non-members. We would expect that countries which are EU members would be more likely to host embassies from the Republic of Cyprus than those which are not members.

III. Middle East Region

Another reason why a country values relationships with the other country is proximity. We have operationalised the concept of "Middle East Region" by placing a dummy variable to denote the geographical region in which Cyprus is located, the Middle East. Therefore, a "1" denotes all those countries that are designated as being Middle Eastern and North African. We would expect those states that are in the Middle East to be more likely to have an embassy than those which are not in the region.

IV. Christian Orthodoxy

One of the chief elements of the culture of the population of Cyprus is its religion, Christian Orthodoxy. For this analysis, countries are measured at the ratio level for the percentage of the population adhering to the Orthodox faith (including Coptics). The data come from the CIA's WorldFactbook. Some adjustments had to be made to the data, as the data for Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Russia, and the Ukraine were not given. Therefore, we assumed that all Russians in these countries were Orthodox, and that the Ukraine is as "Orthodox" as Russia (80%). The alternative to this was to denote Orthodoxy with a dummy variable and much valuable information would be lost. Moldova, Greece, and Armenia are the most "Orthodox" countries in this analysis, each having a population that is over 90 per cent "Orthodox". Bulgaria, the Ukraine, and the Russian Federation are not far behind. Therefore, if Cyprus is guided by its religion in the making of its foreign policy, there should be a systematic bias in favour of the most "Orthodox" countries.

V. British Commonwealth

One of the most enduring legacies in Cyprus is the British colonial period. For this analysis, we denote the membership in the Commonwealth with a dummy variable as we have for many of the variables above. The members (in 1999) are denoted with a dummy variable with "1" representing membership (even if membership was suspended) and "0" representing non-members. We would expect that members in the Commonwealth would be more likely to have an embassy from Cyprus than non-members.

Findings

To analyse the data we ran a standard logistical regression with Cyprus embassies as the dependent variable with the five independent variables. A form of Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) procedure was necessary to properly analyse the data because the dependent variable is dichotomous. There were 149 countries in the analysis. Countries with a population of fewer than one million persons were not included in the analysis. Furthermore, Turkey was removed from the analysis because it is seen as a special case, due to the occupation of the northern part of the island by Turkish troops.

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The model seems to work well at first glance, as the output in Table Two shows. The model is statistically significant, with a Chi-square that is significant at less than the .01 significance level. The constant is also significant at less than the .01 significance level. In addition, the five independent variables were able to build a model that can classify 87 per cent of the data for the dependent variable.

Table Two
Allocation of Cyprus Embassies Logistic Regressions
(Standard Errors)

Variable	Coefficients	R
LogGNP	.80*** (.197)	.32
EU	3.12*** (.967)	.24
Middle East	2.16*** (.856)	.18
Orthodox	.03** (.013)	.16
Commonwealth	.94 (.888)	.00
Constant	-11.34*** (2.41)	
Chi-square	66.545***	
-2 Log-likelihood (null)	143.99	
-2 Log-likelihood (full)	77.45	
N	149	

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

Table Two (a)
Prediction Success of Logistic Analysis of Allocation

		Predicted Values		
		0	1	Total
Actual values	0	115	6	121
	1	13	15	28
		128	21	149

In the model in Table Two, we see that most of the independent variables work as we had hypothesised and are statistically significant. The only exception is the independent variable denoting the Commonwealth. It is in the hypothesised direction but clearly not statistically significant. The most powerful explanatory variable is logged GNP, our operationalisation of power. The output from the regression shows that as power increases, there should be an increase in the probability of having an embassy in a particular country. Moreover, it should be noted that the variable for power is the variable that is best correlated with the dependent variable (its correlation coefficient is .32).

The other independent variables also work in the direction postulated and at a statistically significant level with the exception of the dummy variable denoting Commonwealth membership. The findings show that if the host country is an EU member state, the probability of hosting an embassy from the Republic of Cyprus goes up statistically. In addition, the probability of hosting an embassy goes up if the country is in the Middle East. Apart from the political and geographical indicators, it seems that it is more probable that a country will host an embassy from Cyprus if its population is "Orthodox". The findings, however, do not confirm that Commonwealth status increases the probability of hosting a Cyprus embassy.

Conclusions and Future Research

The regression shows us that there is evidence that Cyprus invests in relationships with powerful players in the international arena, EU member states, and other Middle Eastern countries. There is also evidence that the Christian Orthodox culture has influenced the decisions as to where to invest in diplomacy and build strong bilateral relations. However, there is no evidence that relationships with fellow Commonwealth members are favoured above others.

One could be sceptical of the findings regarding the impact of Christian Orthodoxy because the findings may well be an artifact of the Cold War. Indeed, it is the countries with high proportions of their populations who are adherents of Orthodoxy that were members of the Soviet Bloc not too long ago. Therefore, the findings may be driven less by cultural predilections than the historical politics of Cyprus during the days of the Cold War in which the Republic tried to maintain warm ties with those states in the East and the West.

The findings do support the historical fact that Cyprus has been a reluctant member of the Commonwealth. Indeed, Cyprus long ago entered into the Commonwealth but with a lack of consensus among political leaders regarding how essential the Commonwealth is for the Republic. When considered from the realist perspective, investing in relationships with many Commonwealth countries is a great

waste of resources. For example, the expected return from investing in an embassy in Cameroon is quite small, while investing in an embassy in a European Union member state or a major power could be an investment in resources that might ultimately lead to solution of the Cyprus Problem.

Although the model has properly classified almost 90 per cent of the cases, there are some cases that remain enigmatic. For example, Kenya and Mexico are countries with embassies from the Republic of Cyprus that seem difficult to explain using such a Rational Actor Model. Although the model we have used seems to be quite good at explaining the phenomenon under study, a few anomalies raise the question as to whether another theoretical framework could or should be used to study the phenomenon. It may be that additional information should be gathered in order to explain the allocation of resources from other perspectives. For example, it may be necessary to know how the Foreign Ministry filters its information when allocating resources and which players hold key positions in the allocation process, as Allison and Zelikow (1998) would suggest in using either an Organisational Behaviour Model or a Governmental Politics Model. From such a model we could perhaps explain the embassy in Kenya because of the connection that President Makarios had with the country. At any rate, the model used in this analysis meets the criteria of a good scientific model in that it is generalisable, parsimonious, and has strong predictive powers.

Other anomalous cases are much easier to explain. For example, Japan and Canada are both powerful countries as we have measured them, but they do not have embassies from the Republic of Cyprus. It is likely that these two countries do not have embassies because decision-makers in Nicosia conceptualise power from a realist perspective. As we have operationalised power, Canada and Japan are powerful even though neither has a significant military apparatus. Decision-makers in Nicosia probably focus on military rather than economic power.

Future research should look at how the leadership in Cyprus thinks of distance and geo-politics. It may well be that the leadership, while being quite "European" in outlook, may think of geo-politics and distance as measured not in geographic distance but flight time. Therefore, distance may be more likely conceptualised as ease of travel rather than in terms of geographic proximity. Proximity, then, may be determined by commercial factors, such as tourism (the main source of income). Therefore, tourism may influence how the leadership in Nicosia thinks of space and geo-politics

To conclude, this first systematic analysis of the allocation of Cyprus' resources in foreign policy has shown that Cyprus invests in its relationships in a way that is consistent with its foreign policy goals. The leadership understands power politics

and acts in such a way to promote the interests of Cyprus with the most powerful players in the system, EU members, and other Middle Eastern countries. However, culture probably does play a role, as the investments in relationships with "Orthodox" countries indicate. Interestingly, while the British influence permeates the society, the Commonwealth as a foreign policy goal remains largely a commitment on paper.

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Commentary

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The role of the EU was also important in encouraging an agreement. It provided the communities with an incentive to coordinate, cooperate and find a consensus fast at the national level if their position was to be heard at the EU level. Also, the EU framework induced the communities to mediate their extremist positions towards one another and be more willing to compromise on issues that otherwise they would not have done so. Finally, the most important incentive to cooperate came from the realisation that reaching a consensus is critical for the survival of the Belgian system, a realisation that has become stronger after the recent decentralisation of the Belgian state. In the words of a Belgian Ambassador, 'with increasing autonomy and responsibility has come common sense and a realisation from the communities that unless they talk to each other the whole project will collapse'.

Perhaps the most negative aspect of the Belgian system is how complex, time-consuming and personnel-consuming it is. This was reflected in the endless discussions between numerous Belgian actors at different levels of the decision-making process. This had also its positive side effect however. The complexity of the Belgian system as well as the consensus-like and non-confrontational culture that underpins the system enables Belgian representatives to feel at ease at the EU level. Belgian ministers entered the EU negotiations more prepared than their counterparts given the fact that they have gone through all the 'preparatory process' discussing the various EU issues, having a sound grasp of the opposing arguments, speaking several languages, and most importantly being used to negotiating in a structure with several actors. This enabled Belgian ministers to be constructive negotiators at the EU level, that is, being defenders of legitimate Belgian interests, but also having a consensus-minded and respectful approach towards their EU partners.

Overall, the examination of the Belgian case has indicated that EU policy-making in federal states is a challenging task, especially when the state consists of various ethnic groups that have a history of conflicts between them. In these cases, there is a need for an efficient constitutional structure that will set the framework for the conduct of this policy, and that will promote equality, justice and mutual respect between the communities. This structure, however, is not sufficient in itself to ensure the peaceful coexistence between the communities. The latter can only be realised when the communities involved are *willing* to make that structure work for them under any circumstances. In some cases, a given policy will challenge the vital interests of one of the communities while in other cases it will challenge the interests of both communities. In the first case, the communities usually manage to cooperate successfully, defending their common interests with great fervour and uniting their regional resources to the advantage of the whole. In the second case, the situation changes with the regional governments striving to achieve the maximum outcome for their communities, often engaging in heated arguments and con-

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flicts, and often showing lack of solidarity towards one another. Yet at the same time, these are exactly the cases where the communities have the chance to reveal their true commitment to the state and their willingness to keep the federal structure alive. For Belgium this commitment and willingness certainly exists with the communities being very careful not to cross the line in trying to defend their interests.

Whether Cyprus will be able to follow that example is an issue of debate. Undoubtedly, the inter-ethnic conflicts that have underpinned the history of Cyprus are graver than those existing in Belgium. The system, therefore, established in Cyprus for the conduct of EU policy will be geared towards that reality. Yet the basic principles that will underpin that system should not differ from that of Belgium. Principles such as that of consensus-building, respect of the jurisdiction of each community, as well as a commitment to the federal state (which will be encouraged by the federal government) will need to exist if the common project is to be kept alive.

**Book
Review**

VOLUME 13

NUMBER 1

The European Union and Cyprus

Christopher Brewin

The Eothen Press, (Huntingdon, 2000) 290 pp., pb.

Looming on the horizon, for the EU, Greeks and Turks are some uncomfortable and difficult decisions over the accession of the island of Cyprus and the shape of any outcome to the longstanding negotiating process between the two communities. This book is a timely, well researched, and interesting discussion of the dynamics of the interrelationship of these two issues and any plausible outcomes in the context of a broad discussion about the needs and exigencies of any potential solution to the Cyprus problem. It provides an interesting and important interpretation of the situation, of the EU accession process, its motivations and import, and of the merits of the positions of the two Cypriot communities. Chapter I examines the events leading up to the 'turning point' in 1995 when a package deal 'transformed the prospects of Cypriot accession to the EU' (p.16). Chapter II examines Cypriot relations with the then EEC prior to this turning point. Chapter III looks at the relationship between the accession process, a settlement of the Cyprus problem and the wider context of Greco-Turkish relations. Chapter IV and V examines the relations between each community and its motherland vis-a-vis their relationship to the EU. Chapter VI discusses the role of the EU in Cyprus and the nature of its relationship with other international actors involved in various aspects of the settlement process. The final chapter discusses the implications that Cyprus has for the nature of the EU in terms of European identity, institutional responsibility and economic integration.

The 'colours' of this study are nailed firmly to the mast early on when the author criticises the duplicity of the EU External Relations Commissioner's statement in 1997 that there is no place for barbed wire and barricades in a united Europe. He argues that this was bound to lead to a Turkish Cypriot response aimed at increasing the division of Cyprus institutionally and increase their alienation. Later in the study it is also claimed that the collaboration between the EU, UN and the Clinton Administration since 1995 was more or less bound to fail as EU enlargement negotiations would drive the Turkish Cypriots into the arms of Turkey: "In short the EU was not bound to bring the negotiations to a successful conclusion." (p.30). Though the logic is clear here, this seems to assume that the Turkish Cypriots had no other choice (i.e. it was not possible that they might choose to join in with the acces-

sion process and allow its catalytic effects to emerge, rather than blocking them on the grounds that the two communities could never live together). The Turkish Cypriot leadership would say that this indeed was the case and that any application for accession of the Republic was illegal without their say so. In their call for the recognition of the 'realities' of the situation (i.e. the rather ugly reality of the presence of 35,000 Turkish troops as well as the heavy militarisation of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities), they seem to have forgotten that every action has a reaction, and that if they are determined to be recognised as a separate state after having long accepted a federal solution, the Greek Cypriot side is going to do its best to prevent this. This is where the EU comes in. The Greek Cypriot application was motivated more or less completely by a desire to escape the regional hegemony of Turkey, something that is of course an anathema to the Turkish Cypriot and settler community. So while it would be useful if the issue of Turkish Cypriot status could be worked out, it would also be useful if the Turkish Cypriots and Turkey realised that their heavy handed and militaristic policy in Cyprus is more or less destined to reduce any Greek Cypriot cooperation, rather than increase it. Indeed, this is why the EU may turn out to be so important in the region if it can be instrumental in breaking this cycle of reaction and response.

This seems to me not to be the only inconsistency in the stance taken in this study. There is a great deal of tension between this studies' decidedly pro- Turkish Cypriot slant when it comes to recognition of the entity that they have created, and the notion that EU norms of pluralism need to be institutionalised in member states - and that this may have a catalytic impact upon the Cyprus problem. It overplays the Greek Cypriot desire for absolute control of the island and the Turkish Cypriot need for absolute control of their territory. It also underplays the element of entrepreneurship which underlies the thinking of the Turkish Cypriot leadership in association with Turkey, while emphasising the linkage the Greek Cypriots have created between EU accession and a solution, and more recently for Turkish accession.

However, the point is that the somewhat naive view that the EU would act as a panacea for Cyprus' problems and those of the region is flawed. The exploration of this developed in this study is critical. Notwithstanding, in the context of the EU, the extreme positions of all parties could be managed by the gradual institutionalisation of pluralism that EU membership should entail. So far, the Greek Cypriot side openly admits that they feel that a bizonal solution is unjust but that it is the only feasible way of settling the problem. The position of the Turkish Cypriot side however, is that based upon their experiences in the past, and those of other Muslim minorities, that they can only find security in a mono-ethnic homogenous territorial entity with the military guarantees of Turkey. Apart from transgressing most EU norms, this also implies that there can be no real settlement of the Cyprus problem which should therefore be characterised as primeval - and that the only way forward is through

division of the island in a two state solution, perhaps with EU accession in the future. But these do not necessarily follow on. A two state solution institutionalises norms which do not fit into those of the wider international community, nor into the EU. The Turkish Cypriot claim that any settlement be based upon the 'realities' of the situation is a claim that the international community and the EU cannot endorse – as such realities threaten its own norms. This tension is something which is not adequately addressed in this study. It is patently obvious that the Greek Cypriot acceptance of a bizonal federation, while not necessarily completely disingenuous, is more in tune with the 'realities' of today's world than those of the Turkish Cypriot community - where reality for them means separation rather than accommodation.

This said, this book constitutes an important contribution to the literature on Cyprus and is a timely analysis of the shifting dynamics introduced by the question of EU accession. It is also a more general reminder that ethnic groups such as the Turkish Cypriots need to be represented, need adequate security guarantees, and be able to assert their own identity in an environment that has often not provided these resources. This is also a reminder of how poor the international system often has been in providing the necessary conditions for ethnic groups to manage their post-colonial freedom in an inclusive and pluralistic manner, and how susceptible they are to the development of strategic (and often exploitative) alliances, based on common identities, which are aimed at their nearest neighbours. As Brewin points out, the nature of the EU would be *very* different if the relationship between Cyprus, Turkey, and the EU was to be defined by a continued frontier between Greeks, Turks and Cypriots in Cyprus (p.247).

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