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TCR Staff

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THE CYPRUS REVIEW

VOLUME 17
NUMBER 1

TABLE OF CONTENTS

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IMPOSED AND PROPOSED FEDERATIONS: ISSUES OF SELF-DETERMINATION AND CONSTITUTIONAL DESIGN IN BOSNIA HERZEGOVINA, CYPRUS, SRI LANKA AND IRAQ

Tozun Bahcheli and Sid Noel

Abstract

Federations are complex political systems that vary widely in their ongms, constitutional design, and operative political processes. They are even more complex when they combine regional autonomy for a geographically concentrated ethnic group with consociational power sharing in the central government. It is not surprising that the history of federations contains many examples of failure. Yet federation plus consociationalism remains the option most widely prescribed by international interveners as the most suitable form of government for deeply divided or post-conflict societies. The classic literature on federalism and consociationalism contains important formulations of the conditions that are conducive to success or failure that modern works tend to ignore. This paper revives these classic formulations and applies them to cases where federalism has either been imposed or is being actively promoted by the international community. The question addressed is whether the conditions that earlier writers regarded as essential for success are present.

Introduction

At the core of the federal idea is the belief that sovereignty is divisible and in certain circumstances ought to be divided. Exactly what those circumstances are, and exactly how sovereignty ought to be divided, however, are questions to which there are no clear answers. Federations vary greatly in their historical, social and geopolitical circumstances and in the constitutional structures and political practices that they have instituted or evolved. By definition, all contain two or more territorially based constituent units, and in all the people are governed simultaneously by a general government and the governments of the constituent units, each of which is supreme within its own constitutionally protected area of jurisdiction. Otherwise, federations may be large in territory and/or population or small, old or new, ethnically and/or linguistically homogeneous or diverse, rich or poor. They may have many constituent units or few. Their forms of government may be

13

parliamentary or presidential, consociational or non-consociational, or some variation or combination of these, and their party systems and electoral systems may vary across a wide spectrum.1

Any attempt to identify the factors that account for the success or failure of federations, or to draw lessons that might usefully be applied in schemes to create new federations - for example, in Cyprus, Sri Lanka or Iraq - must therefore begin on a cautionary note. Much will depend on circumstances that are unique in each case, and much will depend on the type of federation that is contemplated. Moreover, though this is less frequently noted, the criteria commonly used to measure success or failure - political stability, democracy and economic well-being - may be (and often are) contested, either on ideological or historical grounds, or both.

Finally, much will depend on the understanding of the problem that federation is supposed to solve, and that understanding varies with time and place. The United States, for example, became a federation in 1789 in response to perceived problems of governance under the Articles of Confederation of 1781. These included the confederacy's lack of reliable revenues, exhausted foreign credit, and weak legislative authority to deal with pressing issues, such as a proliferation of worthless paper currencies. A new federal constitution that provided a framework for strong national government was therefore prescribed and eventually ratified by all the states. The states had diverse interests and identities, but these were not based on ethnic, cultural, religious or linguistic differences. [2] Hence, these were not matters that the framers of the US constitution had to incorporate into their handiwork. Belgium, to take a very different example, became a federation in 1993 in response to the perceived problems of the existing unitary Belgian state in dealing with deep-seated linguistic and cultural divisions. Hence these matters had to be addressed directly, and federation became the preferred solution because it weakened the national government. The result is a Belgian constitution that devolves authority over language, culture, education, and even some important aspects of international relations, to the constituent regions and non-territorial linguistic communities.3

In every country where federalism has been recently introduced, or where it has been proposed, the problems that it is intended to address are more like Belgium's than those of the early United States. They are broadly understood as problems that arise from ethnic differences among the people - that is, from differences rooted in language, religion, culture, history, or national identity, or some combination of these. Unlike Belgium, however, in most cases there is also a recent history of violent ethnic conflict, ranging from "ethnic cleansing" to civil war and even to acts of genocide. The question, then, given that there is a strong international bias

against the break-up of existing states, is whether deeply fractured countries can be successfully knit back together as federations. And if so, are there some conditions that are more conducive to success than others? And are there some models of federation that are more likely to succeed in ethnically divided societies than other models?

In this paper, we intend to resurrect an approach to these questions that was once prominent in the literature on federalism but is today rarely invoked. Our approach is, first, to focus on the circumstances surrounding the origins of federations and to ask whether their origins affect their prospects of long-term success. More specifically, in the case of ethnically diverse societies, the question we wish to ask is whether a federation that is coercively imposed (or is formed as the result of powerful outside pressures or inducements) is likely to be effective in mitigating ethnic conflict, providing stable democratic government, and maintaining conditions of peace and security for its people. Second, we raise the related question of whether an imposed federation is likely to be a successful venue for the operation of complex consociational power sharing features. Finally, we ask whether membership in some weaker form of association, such as a confederation, might be a necessary first step towards successful federation.

The cases we shall consider are Bosnia-Herzegovina, Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Iraq. In Bosnia-Herzegovina, a federation with consociational features was imposed under the terms of the Dayton Accords (1995); in Cyprus there is concerted international pressure being applied through the UN, the EU and the US, to bring into existence a federation with strong consociational features. In Sri Lanka, too, outside pressure is being applied to induce acceptance of a federation, again with consociational features. In Iraq, the situation is less clear but the US appears to favour federation and its pressure is likely to be conclusive.

Do Origins Matter?

Writers on federalism, from the authors of the *Federalist Papers* (1787-1788) to K. C. Wheare (1946) to William H. Riker (1964) placed considerable emphasis on the circumstances that give rise to the birth of a federation. Riker's classic work, for example, is titled *Federalism: Origin, Operation, Significance.*[4]

Wheare begins by identifying the factors that are "pre-requisites of federal government." Foremost among these, he tells, us, is "the desire to be under a single independent government for some purposes at any rate." But this alone is not enough. "The prospective members of a federation must at the same time desire to retain or to establish independent regional governments in some matters at least."[5] At first glance, this seems tautological: the pre-requisite of federation is

a desire to federate. But what Wheare is getting at here is that the two desires - the desire for a common political existence and the desire for a separate political existence - must occur simultaneously, or no successful federation is possible. Desire, however, is a necessary but not a sufficient condition for federation. Communities or states must also have the capacity to form a federal union. Wheare, therefore, proceeds to ask two questions: "what are the factors or circumstances which lead communities to desire [federation]?" and "what produces in them the capacity to form an independent general government and, at the same time, independent regional governments?"[6]

This is the preamble to what is arguably one of the greatest passages ever penned on the subject of federalism, whose relevance is no less today than it was when it was written nearly sixty years ago. In a discussion that is rich in telling comparisons and argued with compelling lucidity, Wheare proceeds to address both questions. For our present purposes, we shall concern ourselves primarily with his discussion of the sources of the desire of peoples to be governed together for some purposes in a federation. These may be summarised as follows (though no summary can do justice to Wheare's elegant exposition):

- a sense of military insecurity and the need for common defence;
- a realisation that only through federation can independence from foreign powers be secured;
- a hope of future economic advantage;
- some prior political association, as a loose confederation or as parts of the same empire;
- geographical neighbourhood; and
- similarity of political institutions.[7]

Some factors, Wheare adds, are "unexpectedly absent" – specifically, ethnic factors. While a common ethnicity was a factor in some cases, such as Germany, he regards it as non-essential. "More striking ... are the examples of Canada and Switzerland where the desire to unite arose in spite of differences of language and race – French and English in Canada; German, French, Italian and Romansch in Switzerland; - of religion as between Catholic and Protestant, and of nationali ty."[8]

It is noteworthy that when he turns to the factors that produce a capacity for federation, he begins again with the idea of desire: "A desire for federal union among communities is a first and obvious factor which produces in them the capacity to make and work a federal union." Hence, the factors that produce a desire for federation also tend to strengthen the capacity to do so. But, in the end, Wheare concludes, "it must be emphasized that the capacity ... to form and work a federal union depends upon some agreement to differ but not to differ too much."[9]

In an important but neglected book published in 1968, Thomas M. Franck et al., turn to the question not of why federations succeed but of *Why Federations Fail.*[10] They had no shortage of cases to consider. The wave of decolonisation in Africa, Asia and the Caribbean after World War II produced a sudden proliferation of new federations that were imposed by hastily decamping imperial powers - who saw federation as their "exit strategy". Virtually all of these new and often elaborately concocted federal creations, such the East African Federation, the Federation of Malaya, the Federation of Rhodesia and Nyasaland, and West Indies Federation, proved unworkable, unstable, and short-lived (none more so than the West Indies Federation, which was formally dissolved, after having already disintegrated politically, on the day that had been set for its official launching!). Though long forgotten, this ghostly legion of failed and never-were federations should haunt the dreams of today's constitutional engineers in places like Sri Lanka, or Iraq.

Unlike Wheare, Franck does not speak directly of "desire" as a factor in the formation and success of federations, but rather of the "absence of a positive political or ideological commitment to the primary goal of federation *as an end in itself*" (italics in original) as the "one consistent factor" in failed federations. [11] Nor does he use the term consociational, but it is clear that he has something similar in mind when he discusses the failure of ethnic power sharing arrangements. "Racial balance or partnership seems rarely to mean the same thing for long to parties to a federation in the absence of a more primary ideological commitment to federation itself."[12]

What Makes Consociationalism Work?

The basic principles of consociational government – grand coalition, segmental autonomy, proportionality, and minority veto – were formulated and refined by Arend Lijphart in a series of path breaking works beginning in 1968.[13] These were originally derived from the constitutional structures and operative norms of government as practiced in certain of the smaller European democracies (principally the Netherlands, Switzerland, Belgium and Austria). It became increasingly evident, however, both from Lijphart's extension of his work and the research of many other scholars, that the number of cases of consociational government, or some recognisable variant of it, is historically much larger. Moreover, in the late twentieth century, the discussion of the appropriateness of the "consociational model" as a method of governing divided societies (which had always been disputed on various grounds) acquired new urgency because of the intensification and proliferation of ethnic conflict in many parts of the world. Unlike federalism, which is territorial in nature and only indirectly addresses the problem of ethnic division, consociationalism addresses it directly by offering mechanisms by which ethnic interests and identities can be recognised and secured, either alone or

17

in combination with federalism. It is not an exaggeration to state that it has become the most favoured - and perhaps also the most controversial - set of ideas in the tool-box of the United Nations and other national and international bodies that have to deal with the manifold problems of post-conflict reconstruction. Consociational ideas run like a thread through modern peace agreements and proposals – including, to cite only a few prominent examples, the Dayton Accords (Bosnia), Annan Plan (Cyprus), Ta'if Agreement (Lebanon), Ohrid Agreement (FYR Macedonia) and Good Friday Agreement (Northern Ireland).

"Consociational democracy", Lijphart writes, "entails the cooperation by segmental leaders in spite of the deep cleavages separating the segments."[14] Unlike Wheare, he does not use the word "desire" in his account of the factors that predispose leaders to favour cooperation, preferring instead "willingness". But the effect is strikingly similar. Leaders, he tells us, must have a "basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with other leaders in a spirit of moderation and compromise. At the same time, they must retain the support and loyalty of their own followers."[15] To maintain this delicate balance, he recognises, is no easy achievement. It is important, then, to be able to identify the circumstances in which leaders in deeply divided societies might possess, or acquire, the "basic willingness" to work together.

Lijphart does not address this question directly. Rather, he lists a number of conditions that are favourable to the success of consociations: multiple balance of power, small size of the country, overarching loyalties, segmental isolation, prior traditions of elite accommodation, and ("weakly and ambiguously") cross-cutting cleavages.[16] Two of these – overarching loyalties and prior traditions of elite accommodation – seem particularly likely to be sources of co-operative elite behaviour. If the leaders of different ethnic segments share overarching loyalties to a common nation, for example, it probably means that they share, at least to some extent, a common national identity, in addition to their ethnic identities. It is reasonable to suppose, therefore, that overarching loyalties would be a factor in facilitating co-operation in many areas of endeavour. The existence of prior traditions of elite accommodation would imply that such traditions could be continued, or revived if they had lapsed. Bargaining in good faith always requires trust, and while never guaranteed, trust is likely to be found among political actors who share a tradition of accommodation and compromise.

In the federations that we examine in this paper, consociational power sharing is an essential component, except perhaps in Iraq. But even there, in some of the various proposals for federation that are being discussed, there are strong arguments made for the inclusion of consociational elements.

The place of consociationalism in modern federal theory is most significantly advanced in the recent work of John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary.[17] Their approach focuses explicitly on the circumstances of multinational federations, in a world where the likelihood of another culturally homogenous federation such as Germany being formed is remote. To summarise (again without doing full justice to a lengthy, complex and nuanced exposition), they identify five factors that are conducive to the success of multi-national federations:

- the presence of a staatsvolk (dominant majority);
- self-government for the constituent national communities and consociational government at the centre;
- authentic democracy;
- voluntary or "holding together" origins; and
- prosperity.

Following Wheare and Lijphart, they extract and refine these factors from a wide-ranging consideration of cases. Their conclusion is unequivocal: multi-national federations are not doomed to fail, but "federalism is usually not enough: consociational practices, particularly at the level of the federal government, are very important to the success of multinational federalism.[18] In the cases examined below, however, the question is not whether consociationalism is important to the success of federalism but whether it can be successfully imposed or induced by pressure from outside in places when federalism itself not the preferred constitutional option and where political leaders show a pronounced lack of that "basic willingness to engage in cooperative efforts with other leaders in a spirit of moderation and compromise" that Lijphart regards as essential.

Are Confederations Useful Stepping-stones to Federation?

Among the factors that Wheare considers important contributors to the success of federations are (a) the previous existence of the constituent territorial units as distinct government entities, and (b) their previous experience of belonging to a confederation or some similar form of looser association. In support of this conclusion, he cites the Swiss and American examples of prior membership in confederacies and the Australian and Canadian experience of prior membership in the British Empire![9] In the case of Canada, it may further be pointed out that the Union of the Canadas (Ontario and Quebec, 1841-1867) was an even more significant pre-federal experience in that it produced a well-developed system of consociational governance, operated by French and English political elites who became accustomed to working with one another in grand coalition ministries.[20] In each of these federations, prior separate existence and prior association were factors that combined to produce both the desire and capacity to form and operate a federation.

When we turn to recent and proposed federations, however, in no case are we dealing with actual or possible constituent states whose experience in any significant way replicates the experience of prior association that is found in the federations discussed by Wheare. In short, Wheare's cases are cases of *coming together* and *holding together* federation; that is, they represent the voluntary and negotiated forging of a closer union by distinct and well-established constituent entities that already had links in common, and sometimes fairly strong links. Recent and proposed federations, however, while nominally cases of *holding together* federation, in the sense that they are designed to preserve existing international borders, are in reality cases of *coming apart* federation, as in Bosnia-Herzegovina, with the carving out of the Serb enclave in Republika Srpska; as in Sri Lanka with the proposal to place a federal fig-leaf *over* the de facto existence of a Tamil state; and as in Iraq, with the proposal to similarly acknowledge the de facto reality of a Kurdish state; and as in the case of the UN plan to reunify Cyprus (though the latter might better be termed a case of *pushed together* federation, since the two sides have been long apart). In no case have the constituent states had the experience of freely determining their relationship with one another and of arriving at federalism through voluntary prior association. Cases such as these raise fundamental questions about the appropriateness and efficacy of imposed or pressured federal "solutions". First, are coming apart federations that are formed to separate previously warring communities viable and sustainable? Second, might it not be better in such cases to opt first for some looser form of association that might in time grow into a "federation of the willing"? And third, can *even* "holding together" federations be maintained in the face of disintegrative tendencies if the pressure to maintain them comes mainly from external interveners?

At the core of the discussion of federation (and this applies with equal if not greater force in the discussion of consociational power sharing arrangements) lie questions of desire and willingness, and the by-product of these, which is trust. There are various models of federation, and even more varieties of consociationalism, formal and informal. The quest to find federal/consociational models that may be successfully applied in particular cases is a worthy and urgent one. But what are the prospects of success in cases where there is scant desire for either, or where there are strong contrary desires for a totally different arrangement? Finally, political desires are changeable. The absence of a desire for federation is not immutable. But by what means can a desire for federalism, or a willingness to see it tried, be legitimately instilled? Are there inducements that outside interveners can legitimately use to promote federalism if that is their preferred outcome, but not the preferred outcome of one or more of the communities who are being urged to federate? Such questions take us beyond the scope of this paper, into issues of international law and ultimately of political ethics. In the following discussion of selected cases our focus is more narrowly on the

factors that point towards success or failure in the circumstances that presently exist.

The Cases

Bosnia-Herzegovina

The massive if belated international effort and military intervention to end the war in Bosnia were linked to the belief that the fighting could spill over the country's boundaries and spark a wider Balkan war. The goals of the international interveners - principally the US, with the support of its NATO allies - were to impose an effective ceasefire and reconstruct Bosnia as a multi-ethnic federation. These goals formed the basis of the Dayton Peace Accords, signed in 1995. Since the parties to the conflict were unwilling signatories, the first goal would require a long-term commitment of peacekeeping troops and the second a long-term international involvement in the governance of the newly constituted state. In practice, the international actors appointed to oversee the democratisation and federalisation of Bosnia have effectively ruled the country. Despite their declared intention to hand over effective political control to Bosnians, progress towards that goal has been slow. And accusations of failure are becoming increasingly harsh. Gerald Knaus and Feliz Martin, for example, argue that Bosnia has been turned into a "European Raj" in which office of the UN High Representative resembles that of a viceroy, to the detriment of Bosnian democracy and independence.[21] Other critics cite as evidence of failure the High Representative's continuing draconian authority "to directly impose legislation, to veto political candidates and dismiss 'uncooperative' elected members of Bosnian governing bodies."[22] The High Representative, however, does not have the authority to reopen fundamental issues of federalism and of inter-ethnic relations, and it is these that largely underlie the dysfunctionality of the regime.

The Dayton Accords reconstituted war-shattered Bosnia and Herzegovina as a federation with two constituent entities, the Federation of Bosnia and Herzegovina (BiH) or Bosniac-Croat Federation, a federation within a federation, and Republika Srpska or Serb Republic (SR). While the Accords imposed a solution against the wishes of most Croats and Serbs, its framers sought to make the imposition palatable to them by linking these two largely self-governing entities through the medium of a weak central government. The BiH was created in the hope of placating the Croat minority, who were concentrated in Herzegovina. The SR, whose borders followed the ceasefire line, was intended to placate the Serbs, who had seceded from the newly independent Republic of Bosnia-Herzegovina in 1992, during the war.

The Accords gave the central government power over such key areas as foreign affairs, trade, and monetary policy. At the same time, the entities were also given authority to conduct their own foreign relations. More importantly, the Accords conferred greater authority to the entities than the central government in relation to fiscal powers and defence. Commenting on the limited fiscal authority of the Federation, P. B. Spahn states that "the [federal] State is fiscally dependent on the Entities, and neither possesses fiscal autonomy nor a proper revenue source of its own."[23] The supremacy of the entities' fiscal power over that of the central government is illustrated by the fact that they spend ninety-nine per cent of total public expenditures.[24] While the framers of the Accords envisaged the eventual integration of the separate armies of BiH and SR, they bowed to existing realities of 1995 by allowing the entities to retain their own armies. Since then, the Bosnian Serbs in particular have repeatedly rebuffed initiatives to integrate their armed forces with those of the Federation. The Federation army officially exists as one, but is divided into separate Bosniac and Croat components. Bosnia has been accepted into NATO's Partnership for Peace programme, but it took strong pressures by NATO countries to overcome the squabbles between the ruling nationalist parties – the Bosniac Democratic Party of Action (SDA), the Croatian Democratic Union (HDZ), and the Serbian Democratic Party (SOS) – to satisfy a key requirement of membership by appointing a state defence minister and deputies. However, their role is not to preside over a unified army but rather to "oversee the single command of the country's three separate armies."[25]

The result has been continuous quarrelling over the joint command, which is symptomatic of interethnic relations in post-Dayton Bosnia. The central government is strongly consociational in structure, but the basis of trust that would enable the elites to bridge ethnic divisions is conspicuously absent. As Florian Bieber obseNes, "the key challenge has been that each community (with the partial exception of the Bosniacs) has given overwhelming support to just one national party."[26] Despite various inducements, pressures and ultimately "heavy-handed inteNention" by the High Representative and other international actors, the leaders of the three mono-ethnic nationalist parties that dominate Bosnia's politics refuse to co-operate. Instead, they use their electoral success to pursue their own agendas rather than act in ways that would create a more integrated state.

A major goal of the Dayton Accords was to secure the right of refugees and displaced persons to return to their pre-war homes. It was estimated that 2.2 million Bosnians were displaced during the three-year war (1992-1995). But the Bosnian federal government possessed neither the will nor the resources to tackle the problem, and, for the international actors, as Richard Black has explained, "both refugee return and minority return within Bosnia have come to be seen as part of a process of challenging the nationalist dominance of the political system. The aim is to encourage members of the different ethnic and religious communities in Bosnia

to 'live together' in peaceful co-existence."[27] Officially, the total number of internally displaced persons has been greatly reduced, which represents a considerable achievement, but the efforts of the UN and others to encourage ethnic mixing have been largely unsuccessful. The SR is almost entirely populated by Serbs, and in BiH Bosniacs and Croats are concentrated in separate cantons where their ethnic kin predominate.[28]

None of this would matter, if the separate communities met Wheare's "prerequisites for federal government" – that is, if they shared a desire to be governed together under a federation – but they manifestly do not. Indeed, it is only the presence of a strong UN peacekeeping force that keeps the Republika Srspka in the federation at all. And in these circumstances, the "over-arching loyalties" that Lijphart identifies as a "favourable condition" for the success of consocialtionalism are, if possible even more conspicuously absent.

The principal goal of the international interveners in Bosnia was to counter the expansionist aims of Serbia, both militarily and politically, and the decision to reconstruct Bosnia as a federation was an important but secondary part of their overall strategy.[29] Since Dayton, the international community has demonstrated a remarkable resolve to shore up Bosnia as a multi-ethnic federation in which three principal communities share power. Substantial financial, political, and military resources have been expended to achieve this end. Nevertheless, the three ethnic communities have shown little support for a federal experiment that was not of their making. Created against the wishes of two of its principal communities, and with only the reluctant acquiescence of the third, the Bosnian federation has survived because the international community has been unwilling to accept the partitioning of the country and (thus far) has been prepared to bear the heavy cost of keeping it together.

Cyprus
In 1996, US president Bill Clinton appointed Richard Holbrooke as special presidential emissary for Cyprus in a bid to solve the island's long-standing dispute. Holbrooke, who had been the chief architect of the Dayton Accords, called for the application of a "Bosnian type" federal settlement to resolve the Cyprus issue. Predictably, both the Greek and Greek-Cypriot governments immediately condemned the idea, which they regarded as tantamount to the partition of the island into Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot zones. Thereafter Holbrooke made no further public references to the Bosnian model. Nevertheless, the circumstances of his appointment at a time of escalating Greek and Turkish tensions over Cyprus and the Aegean underscored a major similarity between the conflicts in Cyprus and Bosnia: they had become highly internationalised due to their capacity to spill over and engulf regional powers. In Cyprus, as in Bosnia, two hostile armies faced each

other across a cease-fire line. Moreover, in both cases, citing the inability of the local parties to reach a political settlement on their own, key international actors were convinced that external mediation and inducement (if not outright imposition, as in Bosnia's case) were imperative if a settlement was ever to be achieved.

On the surface, Cyprus appeared to present better prospects for a settlement than Bosnia. Following the war of 1974 that had partitioned the island, creating two mono-ethnic zones, the parties to the conflict had agreed to UN-sponsored talks that aimed to reach a federal solution. Though the impetus for reaching a federal settlement was primarily external, reflecting the international desire to preserve Cyprus as a single state, there was hope that the Cypriot communities would nevertheless embrace the idea. However, this proved illusory. Greek Cypriots, who are the majority community, preferred a unitary state with a majoritarian form of democracy. As a second-best solution, they would reluctantly endorse a federation with a strong central government in order to secure the reunification of the island. Turkish Cypriots, especially after the partition of 1974, preferred to maintain a separate Turkish Cypriot state. In 1975 they had established a Turkish Federated State in Cyprus and in 1983 went a step further and declared the *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)*. However, the *TRNC* was a state that only Turkey recognised. In the many fruitless negotiations that followed, the Turkish Cypriot government generally accepted as a second-best solution the notion of a confederation or very loose federation that would have a single international personality but would be composed of two sovereign states that would delegate competencies to the joint government. But for Greek Cypriots, a solution based on two separate sovereignties was completely unacceptable because, in their view, it would effectively legitimate and make permanent the division of the island. It was also unacceptable to the UN and other international actors, who remained committed to a federal solution with a single international sovereignty.

As in so many deeply divided societies, the broad outline of a possible settlement in Cyprus is not difficult to imagine. Indeed, since the island's partition in 1974, such an outline has been presented by mediators under UN auspices on three separate occasions in three separate documents: the "Preliminary Draft for Joint High-Level Agreement" of 1985; the "Set of Ideas" framework agreement of 1992; and most recently the UN blueprint (hereafter the Annan plan) of 2002-2004. All of these plans have sought to reconcile the Greek-Cypriot desire for a single Cypriot state with the Turkish-Cypriot desire for a two-state solution; all have envisaged creating a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation on the island; and all have affirmed Cyprus' single sovereignty.

Despite repeated failures, the international actors have persevered with their mediation efforts to achieve a federal solution. Their hope is that an acceptable

power-sharing system might yet be found if attitudes in one or both parties were to change, or if changed external circumstances forced one or both of the communities to recalculate their long-term interests.

The most recent initiative, the Annan plan, was based on the belief that the international context of the Cyprus stalemate, after remaining static for decades, had been fundamentally changed by the prospect of Cyprus' imminent accession to the European Union (EU). As a result, it was believed, it might at last be possible to reconstitute Cyprus as a single state within the EU and equip it with new European-style power-sharing institutions that both communities would support. While there had been no lack of power-sharing proposals in the past, including the elaborate "Set of Ideas" framework agreement negotiated under UN auspices in 1992, such proposals had always failed to come to fruition. According to Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci, "what was missing then, both technically in the text and politically, was a sufficiently vivid and powerful incentive of EU accession to overcome the resistance to the agreement."[30] That incentive, however, was considerably less powerful than it might have been, since the EU had not made the island's reunification a condition of membership. Hence, reunified or not, Cyprus was due to become a member of the EU, along with nine other countries, in May 2004. Nevertheless, the approaching accession date put some pressure on the two sides – and particularly on the Turkish Cypriot side, which would be left out of the accession if negotiations failed – to reach agreement on the Annan plan, which was submitted to them in November 2002.

Essentially, what the plan prescribed was a loose federation with some consociational power-sharing features. Ostensibly, it borrowed features from both the Swiss and Belgian models of federalism. As in Switzerland, the constituent states would "sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government," and, as in Belgium, "there shall be no hierarchy between federal and constituent state laws." The document then proceeded on the basis of these principles to outline the constitution of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation that in its structure (and hopefully in its functioning) would be essentially consociational. That is to say, its institutions would be structured in such a way as to ensure, in so far as it is possible to do so, the practices of executive power- sharing, proportionality, mutual veto, and segmental autonomy. For example, the plan called for a rotating presidency on the basis of two terms for Greek Cypriots and one for Turkish Cypriots. In all institutions proportionality norms would prevail. Minority veto provisions would prevail throughout. Segmental autonomy would be assured in a bi-zonal federation, as the two constituent states would retain a Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot majority respectively.

On both sides, initial reactions to the plan were unfavourable. The problem, essentially, was that both the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot leaders disliked many of the plan's key provisions. The Greek-Cypriot leaders, specifically President Tassos Papadopoulos and his predecessor, Glafkos Clerides, were worried that an outright rejection of the plan might in some way jeopardise Cyprus's imminent accession to EU membership. They, therefore, prudently declared the plan to be "negotiable". But its negotiability was obviously not a matter of fine-tuning. Most Greek Cypriots shared their leader's fundamental misgivings regarding specific features of the plan that they believed would undercut the ability of the Greek community to exercise power consistent with its majority status and to reduce "external" (read Turkish) influence.

Unlike his Greek-Cypriot counterparts, the Turkish-Cypriot leader, President Rauf Denktash, condemned the Annan plan outright, citing, among other problems, the lack of any clear acknowledgement of Turkish-Cypriot sovereignty.[31] Many Turkish Cypriots were unhappy about the deep concessions they would be required to make under the plan, but they were also ambivalent. On the one hand, they singled out three provisions as being particularly problematic: the settlement of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots in their constituent state, the recognition of Republic of Cyprus property deeds (since many of the properties in question were occupied by Turkish Cypriots or foreign residents), and the displacement and resettlement of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots that property transfers and border adjustments would require. On the other hand, they were attracted by several other provisions, including the constitutionally equal status of the two communities, the wide measure of autonomy envisaged for the constituent states, the continued presence of some Turkish troops to underwrite their security, and, not least, the conferral of EU citizenship. Moreover, it was clear to many that, if they rejected the Annan plan, in any future negotiations the Greek Cypriots would likely insist on tougher terms. On balance, they were inclined to see the proposed terms as the best that they could reasonably hope to get. In the *TRNC* parliamentary elections of December 2003 this bottom-line consideration helped the pro-EU, pro-Annan Republican Turkish Party (CTP) to achieve a narrow victory. Its leader, Mehmet Ali Talat, assumed the premiership as the head of a coalition government in early 2004, and further consolidated his party's position when he was elected to president in April 2005.

The Greek-Cypriot leadership's clear (if unspoken) preference, however, was to proceed to EU membership without a prior reunification agreement based on the Annan plan. Although this might risk cementing the division of Cyprus, it would also greatly enhance their future bargaining power (as the Turkish Cypriots also realised). For, once the Republic of Cyprus was a member state of the EU, and unburdened by the restrictions of the Annan plan, they could then insist, as good EU members, that existing EU norms and rules must apply in any future settlement

– which would preclude many of the Annan plan's guarantees to the Turkish Cypriots. Furthermore, and just as importantly, the fact that Greece and Cyprus (i.e., the Republic of Cyprus) would both be EU members would mean that there would be two Hellenic voices – and possible vetoes – to act as a check on future Turkish progress towards EU membership. This is precisely what the Turkish government feared. Hence, unmoved by President Denktash's fierce resistance to negotiating any federal arrangement that did not acknowledge the sovereignty of the *TRNC,* it compelled him to resume negotiations based on the plan with his Greek-Cypriot counterpart (who was equally opposed but more discreet about it) – and to accept the binding arbitration of the UN Secretary-General if no agreement could be reached.

Not surprisingly, these negotiations proved fruitless. The UN Secretary-General then imposed a final draft settlement, representing the fifth revision of the original plan, which was put to simultaneous referenda in both parts of the island on 24 April 2004. Since the Republic of Cyprus had signed the EU Accession Treaty on 17 April 2003, Greek Cypriots were guaranteed EU membership regardless of how they voted. Thus, feeling they had nothing to lose, and encouraged by the opposition of President Papadopoulos (and others, including the heads of trade unions and senior clerics of the Orthodox Church), an overwhelming seventy-five per cent voted no to the Annan plan. By contrast, sixty-six per cent of Turkish- Cypriot voters defied the call of President Denktash to reject the plan and voted yes. As Greek Cypriots had anticipated, the Republic of Cyprus proceeded unhindered to full membership in the European Union on 1 May 2004. And the Turkish Cypriots, despite voting yes, were left out.

Since the referenda, there has been some pressure from both the EU and the other external actors to restart reunification discussions yet again, but such efforts have been ineffectual. Sensing that the tide is running strongly in their favour, Greek Cypriots feel no urgency to revisit the Annan plan and their government's only response, when pushed, has been to propose changes that they know would not be accepted as a basis for new negotiations, such as removing Turkish-Cypriot veto rights and strengthening the powers of the central government.[32]

If the problem were merely one of finding the "right" federal formula for Cyprus, it would likely have been solved long ago, given the extraordinary international pressure, expertise, and resources that have been so single-mindedly devoted to the search. What, then, is the obstacle that has stood in the way of every plan, up to and including Annan's? It is instructive at this point in our discussion to return to Wheare's "prerequisites of federal government", the foremost of which is the presence of a desire on the part of the people for federation. For it is the absence of such a desire, above all, that explains the unbroken record of failure in Cyprus, despite the unrelenting efforts of multiple external actors. The Turkish-Cypriot yes

vote must be seen as a vote far the advantages of EU membership rather than as a vote for federation, which was viewed not as something to be desired for itself but as a risk that had to be taken. And the Greek-Cypriot no vote must be viewed as a resounding, unambiguous repudiation of federation, unmixed by the hope of gaining EU membership since that was already in the bag.

Finally, it must be asked, are the factors present in Cyprus that Wheare identifies as the sources from which a future desire for federation might grow? Two clearly are, at least on one side: Turkish Cypriots undoubtedly hope for "future economic advantage" and both sides, as the joint inhabitants of a small island, cannot escape "geographical neighbourhood". There is perhaps some "similarity of political institutions" in that both are functioning democracies, but their differences on the whole are more pronounced. The other factors are either entirely absent or negative: so far from sharing a need for "common defence" the two sides have long been obsessed with defending themselves against one another; and their "prior political association", in the period 1960-1963 (under a classically consociational constitution) was involuntary to begin with and proved a disastrous failure, leading straight to violent ethnic conflict and forcible partition. The factors that Lijphart identifies as favouring the success of consociationalism are also weak or absent altogether. Neither Greek nor Turkish political leaders have ever shown any positive desire for consociationalism, nor, during decades of almost total separation, have they had any occasion to engage in cooperative efforts that might encourage a future willingness to share power. These are hardly strong indicators of either a desire or capacity to operate a federal system.

Sri Lanka

The idea of adopting federalism in Sri Lanka (formerly Ceylon) was first broached in 1926.[33] It was then, and remains, the preferred solution of external powers. Yet the Sinhalese and Tamil communities themselves have thus far failed to embrace federation as an acceptable compromise between the Sinhalese majority's preference for a unitary state and Tamil minority's desire for separate statehood.

Since independence in 1948 there has been a pattern of growing Tamil estrangement from the government on the part of the Tamil community and, since the late 1970s, growing Tamil demands for independence that have escalated into civil war. In the early years, however, Tamil demands were relatively modest. For example, the appropriately named Tamil Federal Party advocated a federal solution to Sri Lanka's communal problems. Its four principal objectives were to achieve autonomy for the north and eastern regions of the island; equality and parity of status for the Sinhala and Tamil languages; granting of citizenship to stateless Tamils; and ending state-assisted "colonization in the North-East, which changed the demographic pattern".[34]

These demands, and the debates between the Tamils and Sinhalese during the first decades of independence, mirrored those of Turkish and Greek and Cypriots during the period of intercommunal negotiations between 1968 and 1974. Numerous Tamil proposals calling for limited autonomy in areas of Tamil predominance in the north and eastern parts of the island, for example, are comparable to the "local autonomy" demands of Turkish Cypriots before 1974. And like the Greek Cypriots, the Sinhalese were suspicious of the federal concept and feared that regional autonomy for Tamils would pave the way to secession.

Moreover, just as Turkey's support for its ethnic kinsmen's demands for local autonomy during 1968-1974 added to Greek-Cypriot anxieties regarding Turkish-Cypriot separatism, India's support for Tamil demands for a federation compounded Sinhalese anxieties. That federal India, home to more than 80 million Tamils in its Tamil Nadu province, would support Tamil aspirations in Sri Lanka is unsurprising. Tamil insurgents were allowed bases in Tamil Nadu from which they conducted military operations in northern Sri Lanka, and were also supplied covertly by the Indian government.

In 1983, Indian pressure on the Sri Lankan government to provide autonomy to Tamil areas yielded an understanding between New Delhi, the Sri Lankan government and Tamil United Liberation Front (TULF) on proposals for "a substantial devolution of powers to regional councils, rather than district councils which had been proposed by Sri Lanka in 1979 and 1980".[35] But these proposals failed to win enough support among Sinhalese politicians. India was subsequently instrumental in arranging a meeting between the Sri Lankan government and a Tamil delegation that included representatives of five major guerrilla groups at a meeting in Thimpu, Butan, in 1985. At the meeting the Tamils presented 'four cardinal principles' as a pre-requisite for settling the national Tamil question. These were "(i) the recognition of the Tamils in Sri Lanka as a distinct nation; (ii) recognition of a Tamil homeland in Sri Lanka; (iii) the recognition of the Tamil's right to self-determination; (iv) the recognition of the right to full citizenship and other fundamental democratic rights of all Tamils, who look upon the island as their country (i.e., the enfranchisement of the estate Tamils)."[36] Predictably, the Sri Lankan government rejected these demands as threatening Sri Lanka's sovereignty and territorial integrity.

Further disturbances ensued after the Thimpu meeting, with increased Tamil guerrilla activity amid excesses committed by the Sri Lankan army. Additional Indian pressures on the Sri Lankan government yielded yet another agreement. The Inda-Sri Lanka Agreement of 29 July 1987 contained major government concessions in the form of the proposed merger of north and east Sri Lanka as an administrative unit with elected provincial officials, as demanded by militant Tamil groups. This

concession was difficult enough for Sinhalese nationalists to accept. Even worse, from their standpoint, was the Sri Lankan government's acceptance of an Indian Peace Keeping Force (IPKF) on Sri Lankan soil.

However, Indian diplomatic and military involvement in Sri Lanka did not aim at bolstering Tamil secessionists. While encouraging autonomy arrangements for Tamils, India remained committed to preserving Sri Lanka's sovereignty. Furthermore, the IPKF soon became embroiled in fighting against the principal Tamil insurgency group, the Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam (LTTE). It was forced to withdraw in 1990 after incurring heavy losses, primarily in confrontations with LTIE guerrillas. The assassination of Indian Prime Minister Rajiv Ghandi by LTIE suicide bombers in the following year sharpened the Indian government's hostility toward the LTIE, as well as causing a loss of sympathy for Tamil militants among the Indian public.

While India remains the most influential external actor in Sri Lanka, there have also been mediation efforts by other parties who have no strategic stake in the island.[37] In September 2002, for example, Norway convened a meeting between the LTIE and the Sri Lankan government that took place in Thailand. The result was reported to be a softening in the LTIE's demand for statehood. According to Christine Bigdon, "Anton Balasingham, the LTIE's chief negotiator, made the politically most significant statement, that the LTIE is rather committed to autonomy and autonomy based self-determination, revising their original, maximalist claim for a separate state"[38]   A Canadian delegation has also been actively involved in promoting the benefits of federation in Sri Lanka.[39] However, whether such efforts have made any significant difference to the LTIE's position, or that of the government, remains unclear. In the aftermath of the Indian Ocean tsunami in late 2004, which devastated large parts of Sri Lanka's eastern and southern coasts, the LTIE "asked foreign governments for separate aid packages partly in the hope that a direct response would confer upon it a status equivalent to that enjoyed by the government".[40] And the Sri Lankan government just as categorically opposed their request.

Federalism remains on the Sri Lankan agenda mainly because of a changed international environment that has dampened Tamil hopes of achieving independence and the intervention of external actors who favour a federal solution. But many Sinhalese leaders continue to have deep reservations about proposed federal solutions, all of which involve a combination of consociational power sharing with the Tamil minority in the central government and granting of autonomous powers to a Tamil regional state.[41] And the preferred Tamil version of federation is one that more closely resembles a confederation of sovereign states. As in Cyprus and Bosnia, there is scant desire for a federation, and absent as well is the minimum level of trust that is needed for effective consociational power sharing.

Iraq

Kurdish autonomy has been a recurring and bitterly contested issue between Kurds and governments in Baghdad. Ever since the founding of the Iraqi state, Kurdish assertions of national self-determination contradict the claims of Baghdad's leaders that the Kurdish areas are an integral part of Iraq, and of the Arab world. Hence, although sometimes pressured by armed insurrections to grant some degree of autonomy to the Kurds, Iraqi governments have always been suspicious of Kurdish nationalist goals, which they fear would lead to Iraq's dismemberment.

The toll of armed rebellions has been high, particularly for the Kurds. But, on at least one occasion, after a lengthy armed struggle, Kurdish leaders were able to secure extensive political rights, including a wide measure of autonomy, from a reluctant Iraqi regime. The 11 March 1970 Peace Accord between the Kurdish leadership and the Baath government (of which Saddam Hussein was a leading member) was, in the words of a leading authority on the Kurds writing in 1996, "not only the best deal the Kurds of Iraq had been offered, but has remained the Kurds' favoured foundation stone for future relations with the rest of Iraq."[42] The Accord recognised Kurdish as one of Iraq's official languages and offered support for Kurdish education and culture. It provided that "all officials in Kurdish majority areas shall be Kurds or at least Kurdish-speaking." It further stated that a Kurd would become one of the Iraqi vice-presidents, and that Kurds would exercise legislative power proportionate to their population. The Accord additionally mandated the "unification of areas with a Kurdish majority as a self-governing unit."[43]

Ultimately few of these far-reaching provisions were put into effect, as relations between the Kurdish leadership and Baghdad soon deteriorated. Among the issues over which Baghdad and the Kurdish leaders disagreed was the Kurdish demand to include the city of Kirkuk and the nearby oilfields in the autonomous Kurdish region. Indeed Kurdish nationalist leader Mulla Mustafa Barzani proposed that Kirkuk become the capital of the proposed region. As important as Kirkuk and other stumbling blocks were, it was the larger problem of mistrust that doomed the 1970 Accord. The Kurdish-Baghdad agreement was reached at a time of considerable Iraqi weakness and relative Kurdish military strength. But once the Baath party regime had consolidated its hold on power and improved its military, it felt little incentive to apply the Accord's provisions, for it suspected that the Kurds were really interested in independence rather than regional autonomy.[44] Infuriated by recurring Kurdish uprisings - with help in turn from such enemies of Iraq as Israel, Iran, and the United States - the Baath regime under Saddam Hussein sought to crush the Kurdish national movement militarily, exacting a terrible toll on Kurds.

The Kurdish leaders learnt some bitter lessons from these reverses, particularly concerning the hazards of relying too heavily on external alliances. States such as

Iran and the United States were prepared to enter into tactical alliances with Iraqi Kurds to advance their aim of weakening the Baath regime, but no outsiders were interested in advancing Kurdish independence. Indeed, Iraq's regional neighbours, Iran, Turkey and Syria (with large and restive Kurdish communities of their own) shared Baghdad's aim of containing Kurdish nationalism and cooperated with the Baath regime to weaken it. It is unsurprising, in 2005, that at the same time as the principal Iraqi groups are being pressured by the United States to adopt a federal constitution in preparation for a return to self-government, Iran, Turkey and Syria have issued warnings against Kurdish independence.

For Iraq's Kurds then, the pursuit of independence requires confronting seemingly insuperable Iraqi as well as regional opposition. It is no wonder that the Kurdish leaders have been careful to express their political aspirations in terms of federation rather than the outright independence, even though they have enjoyed de facto independence since 1991, when the protection of an international "no-fly zone" was imposed after the Gulf War over Kuwait.

Kurdish political fortunes have greatly improved with the removal of the Saddam regime. Fourteen years of de facto self-rule have bolstered Kurdish confidence and bargaining power. The Kurds, moreover, have garnered considerable sympathy in Western countries because of their past victimisation and the evident progress they have made towards stable democratic government. They can credibly claim to be the first community to practice democracy in Iraq, citing their record of free elections and the fair treatment of minorities. Moreover, with the Saddam regime gone, the Kurdish Democratic Party (KDP) led by Massoud Barzani and the Patriotic Union of Kurdistan (PUK) led by Jalal Talabani, which control separate areas of the Kurdish autonomous region, are displaying uncommon unity. The two parties formed a United Kurdistan coalition for the Iraq elections of January 2005, and a high turnout by Kurdish voters enabled the coalition to capture 75 of the 250 seats in the interim Iraqi parliament. Its leader, Talabani, subsequently became president of the transitional government of Iraq. Barzani and Talabani boosted Kurdish unity further when they agreed to merge their separate administrations following regional elections in the Kurdish self-rule area on 30 January 2005, with Barzani becoming president of the Kurdish regional government. The Kurdish leadership, moreover, retains command of the formidable Kurdish armed militias, the *peshmerga.* All of these developments will enhance Kurdish leverage in the process of negotiating a permanent constitution for Iraq. Above all, however, it has been their collaboration with the United States and the latter's support of Kurdish aspirations – as long as these are expressed as a demand for federalism – that have given the Kurds their best chance in many decades to achieve national autonomy, albeit while remaining nominally within Iraq. Under the US-imposed interim constitution, the Kurds have a veto over future constitutional change. Hence, whatever the form of federalism

eventually decided upon in a future permanent constitution, it is unlikely to leave the Kurds with less autonomy than they already enjoy de facto.

There can be no doubt that most Kurds, if allowed to determine their own future, would prefer to create an independent state of Kurdistan rather than remain a part of Iraq. During the elections for the interim parliament in January 2005, large numbers of Kurdish voters signed a separate, unofficial petition in favour of independence. Kurdish leaders for the most part prefer to downplay their people's preference for independence as they have no wish to either provoke the ire of their hostile regional neighbours or open up a split with their federal-minded US protectors. But occasionally the mask of official prudence slips. In an interview with the BBC, for example, President Barzani frankly admitted that the Kurdish support for federalism is essentially strategic: "Independence", he stated, "is a natural and legitimate right of Kurdistan ... But in this phase, federalism is the slogan of the day and that's what we are struggling for. It's the option for this stage. As for the future, let's see how things go."[45]

It is hardly the case that federalism is strongly supported by the other major religious and ethnic leaders in Iraq. In discussions related to endorsing the interim constitution, the senior Shia cleric, Grand Ayatollah Ali Sistani, as well as other non-Kurdish Iraqis, indicated that they "equate federalism with the division of Iraq."[46] Even more than in the other cases discussed, both Wheare's "prerequisites" for federation and Lijphart's "favourable conditions" for consociationalism are conspicuously absent, and the prospects for their future emergence seem remote. In the writing of a new Iraqi constitution, it is at least possible that alternatives to full-blown federalism – such as a "federacy" in which a virtually independent Iraqi Kurdistan would be loosely linked to a unitary Iraqi state – will be considered.[47] But that remains to be seen.

Conclusion

There is no good reason why political institutions and forms of governance that are developed in one country should not be transferred to another. Federal institutions, moreover, which require a formal legal and constitutional formulation, may even be more readily transferable than certain other forms that are largely informal, such as democratic political parties. But there are many good reasons why federations should not be imposed by external actors or proposed by them in disregard of the political circumstances in which the federation will actually have to operate. Or when there is a lack of positive desire for federation - or even deep opposition to it – on the part of the intended recipients. It is precisely such factors which will largely determine whether a federation will succeed or fail. Consociationalism is an invaluable means of ensuring inter-ethnic co-operation, but ultimately its

effectiveness in particular cases will be determined by the presence or absence of favourable conditions for it, as Lijphart has made perfectly clear and as a wealth of historical evidence confirms. To impose or pressure it into existence with those conditions is virtually to guarantee failure.

For federalism or consociationalism to work in practice political elites must be willing and able to bargain with one another in good faith. And they must be able to bargain with some reasonable assurance that their respective communities will support their efforts, not necessarily in every instance, but over time; in recognition, in other words, that it is the overall balance of outcomes that counts and not any single outcome. That takes patience and at least some measure of trust. Unfortunately, as has become increasingly clear from the many examples of federal and power-sharing failure, institutions alone cannot manufacture a willingness to co-operate where none exists. The Bosnian model of federation is not one that is commonly held forth to the world as an example to be emulated. But, on our analysis, the prospect of creating bi- or multi-national federations in Cyprus, Sri Lanka and Iraq are at least as daunting as in Bosnia. This is not to say that federation in all such cases is doomed to failure. It is to say that other models of association, such as confederation, deserve more international consideration than they are presently given. And it is also to say that the democratically expressed desire for federation is ultimately the only basis for long-term success.

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Notes

1   Ronald L. Watts (1998) 'Federalism, Federal Political Systems, and Federations', *Annual Review of Political Science,* pp. 117-137.

2. It was also American policy not to admit to statehood any territory in which the white, Protestant, English-speaking population did not constitute a majority. See Nathan Glazer (1983) 'Federalism and Ethnicity: the American Solution' in *Ethnic Dilemmas,* ed., Nathan Glazer. Cambridge MA, Harvard University Press, pp. 274-292.

3. Liesbet Hooghe (2004) 'Belgium: Hollowing the Center' in *Federalism and Territorial Cleavages,* ed., Ugo Amoretti and Nancy Bermeo. Baltimore, Johns Hopkins University Press, pp. 55-92.

4. Boston, Little, Brown (1964).

5. K. C. Wheare (1953) *Federal Government.* Oxford, 3rd ed., p. 36.

6. Wheare, p. 37.

7. Wheare, pp. 45-49.

8. Wheare, p. 39.

9. Wheare, p. 49.

10. Thomas M. Franck, Gisbert H. Flanz, Herbert J. Spiro, and Frank N. Trager (1968) *Why Federations Fail: An Inquiry into the Requisites for Successful Federalism.* New York, New York University Press.

11. Franck, et al., p. 173.

12. Franck, et al., p. 182.

13. See Arend Lijphart (1968) *The Politics of Accommodation: Pluralism and Democracy in the Netherlands.* Berkeley, University of California Press; Arend Lijphart (1977) *Democracy in Plural Societies: A Comparative Exploration.* New Haven, *Yale* University Press.

14. Lijphart, *Plural Societies,* p. 53.

15. Lijphart, *Plural Societies,* p. 53.

16. Lijphart, *Plural Societies,* p. 54.

17. John McGarry and Brendan O'Leary (2005) 'Federation as a Method of Ethnic Conflict Regulation' in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Political Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies,* ed., Sid Noel. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, pp. 263-287.

18. McGarry and O'Leary, p. 287.

19. Wheare, p. 37.

20. S. J. R. Noel (1990) *Patrons, Clients, Brokers.* Toronto, University of Toronto Press, pp. 164-175.

21. Gerald Knaus and Felix Martin (July 2003) 'Lessons from Bosnia: Travails of the European Raj', *Journal of Democracy,* Vol. 4, No. 3.

22. David Chandler (1999) *Bosnia: Faking Democracy After Dayton.* London and Sterling, Virginia: Pluto Press, p. 2.

23. Paul Bernard Spahn (2002) 'A federal Bosnia and Herzegovina: Can a Weak Centre Lead the Way?' *Forum of Federations,* p. 20.

24. Spahn, p. 20.

25. *International Security Network,* 4 March 2004.

26. Florian Bieber (2005) 'Power Sharing After Yugoslavia: Functionality and Disfunctionality of Power-sharing Institutions in Post-war Bosnia, Macedonia, and Kosovo' in *From Power Sharing to Democracy: Post-conflict Institutions in Ethnically Divided Societies,* ed., Sid Noel. Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, p. 95.

27. Richard Black (2001} 'Return and Reconstruction: Missing Link or Mistaken Priority in Post-Dayton Bosnia and Herzegovina?' *SAIS Review,* Vol. 21, No.2, pp. 183-184.

28. According to the UNHCR, "minority returns" is a purely technical term referring to persons who have returned to their pre-conflict municipalities.

29. James Gow (2003) *The Serbian Project and Its Adversaries.* Montreal and Kingston, McGill-Queen's University Press, pp.172-198.

30. Michael Emerson and Nathalie Tocci (2002) *Cyprus As Lighthouse of the East*

a.   *Mediterranean: Shaping Re-unification and EU Accession Together* Brussels Centre for European Policy Studies, p. 1.

31. *Financial Times,* 9 December 2002.

32. For a list of changes to the Annan plan demanded by Greek Cypriot government, see the Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus,* June 2005.

33. Christine Bigdon (May, 2003) 'Decentralization, Federalism and Ethnic Conflict in Sri Lanka', *Heidelberg Papers in South Asian and Comparative Politics.* Working Paper No. 14, p. 1.

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36. Hannum, p. 291.

37.   According to an Economic Intelligence Unit report 'Norway, Japan, and the US remain Sri Lanka's main partners in attempting to broker peace with the LTTE. Norway is viewed as a non-partisan peace broker by all countries involved ... India is supportive of, but uninvolved in, the peace process.' See the Economist Intelligence Unit, *Sri Lanka: Country Report,* May, 2005.

38. Bigdon, p. 33.

39. 'Federalism in Sri Lanka', *Newsletter.* Ottawa, Canada: Department of International Affairs and International Trade, November 2004.

40. The Economist Intelligence Unit, *Business Asia,* 5 April 2005.

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42.   David McDowall (1996) *A Modern History of the Kurds.* London, New York, I. B. Taurus, p. 327.

43. McDowall, p. 328.

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45. 'Hungry to *vote* in Iraqi Kurdistan', *BBC News internet edition,* http://news.bbc.co.uk/go/pr/fr/-/2/hi/middle_east/4219463.stm.

46. *The Washington Post,* 30 January 2004.

47. See Brendan O'Leary (2005) 'Power-sharing, Pluralist Federation and Federacy' in *The Future of Kurdistan in Iraq,* ed., Brendan O'Leary, John McGarry and Khaled Salih. Philadelphia, University of Pennsylvania Press, pp. 47-91.

RECONFIGURING PARADISE IN CYPRUS[*]

Julie Scott

Abstract

With the current restructuring of Mediterranean tourism, rural peripheries are being incorporated into a global market as niche products offering local culture and living tradition 'lost' to the rest of the (modern) world. Yet the reproduction and representation of tradition and local identity are themselves embedded in often-contradictory globalised relations of production.

These contradictory trends have been further compounded by the effects of division in Cyprus - one island geographically, but two different political spaces, integrated into the global system in very different ways. The south has been subject to the full force of globalisation, engaging with the major international tour operators and the positive and negative impacts of mass tourism. The image of the north, on the other hand - closed off from the major global tourism players, but with its border wide open to Turkey- is that of bearer of tradition for the island as a whole; whilst 'within' the north, this role has been largely assumed by Turkish settlers, as Turkish Cypriots pursue more urban and 'modern' lifestyles.

Focusing in particular on developments in the north, the paper explores the contradictions inherent in the hierarchy of globalisation and representation in Cyprus, and the ways in which tourism refracts the political spaces of the island and mediates their relationship_ with the world at large.

Introduction

Promises of paradise have become a commonplace of tourism promotion, and it is tempting to dismiss them as mere marketing ploys. Images of 'unspoilt nature' and 'colourful traditions', evoking the sense of a place existing outside time, where innocence can be re-captured, and the authenticity lacking in the modern world rediscovered (MacCannell, 1976; Urry, 1995) – surely these amount to a wilful masking of reality, a make-over that privileges the metropolitan imagination, whilst de-centring local perspectives? The evolution in postcards I have observed in Cyprus over the past ten years appears to support this view. In the 1990s, when I first started fieldwork in Kyrenia, the images of northern Cyprus available on postcard were remarkably similar to the images of modernity and civic pride from 1950s and 1960s Britain depicted in Martin Parr's collections of 'boring postcards:'

traffic roundabouts, high rise buildings and hotel car parks (Parr, 1999). But during the course of the 1990s these images of modernity began to give way to German-manufactured postcards displaying images of 'traditional Cyprus': fields of wild flowers; shepherds on donkeys; old people with lined faces; young people, if depicted at all, in traditional Cypriot folk costume. Depictions of tourists themselves were noticeable by their absence. Postcards I bought in the resort town of Larnaca in 2001 displayed almost identical imagery, but also showed evidence of a subversive trend, in the shape of postcards depicting the traditional 'out of place'; in the image, for example, of a traditionally decked-out male donkey standing over a female tourist sun-bathing topless on the beach.

A reading of the complex messages with which this particular image is replete is beyond the scope of this paper (but see Castelberg-Koulma, 1991; Zinovieff, 1991, on the sexual and political dynamics of 'host/guest' relations). My interest here lies in the ironic use made of tourism's representational practices in order to reassert a local subjectivity in the construction of Cyprus. Central to my argument is the point that the topoi and images constructed for an external tourist market also resonate in other parallel and, in many ways, contradictory local discourses through which 'Cyprus' is constantly being produced and reproduced.

In this paper I explore the representational practices and material processes of tourism on the island of Cyprus, and how these intersect with the reflexive practices of 'local subjects'. The context of both is the cultural reconfiguration of local spaces in order to align them with the product niches of the global tourism system, within which the twin poles of 'the traditional' and 'the modern' are central organising concepts. In the case of Cyprus, the contradictions inherent in these practices are further compounded by the effects of division – one island geographically, but two different political spaces, integrated into the global system in very different ways. I draw attention to the ways in which tourism has contributed to the destabilisation of the categories of 'tradition' and 'modernity' in Cyprus (Welz, 1999, 2000), and their transformation in local discourses to become core, if somewhat slippery and contested, symbolic resources for the representation of power, place and identity.

My focus here is northern Cyprus, from where the examples of 'traditional' and 'modern' spaces, on which the following discussion draws, are taken.[1] I start, however, with a brief review of some recent developments in the global tourism system.

Tourism and the Reconfiguration of Space in the Mediterranean

The rise and fall of postcard celebrations of modernity to which *Boring Postcards* pays tribute reflect a change in consciousness which has had profound implications

for the Mediterranean. The post-war optimism and affluence captured in those postcard images of Britain marked the conditions for the start of package tourism which was to transform the Mediterranean. The high rise hotels, which mushroomed on the beaches of the Costa del Sol and soon spread throughout the region, were symbols of progress not only for the working class northern Europeans who stayed in them, but also for local people who built them and worked in them. This was a quintessentially modern form of tourism – mass market, organised on Fordist principles - and it was pioneered in the Mediterranean. It ushered in a new spatial organisation of the Mediterranean too, as economic activity shifted to the tourist resorts of the coast, leaving many rural interior regions to cope with economic and demographic decline (Selwyn, 2001). Since the late 1980s, however, the Mediterranean resorts have been overtaken by newer destinations. Rising incomes, a fall in the price of air *travel,* and the global flow of images and information, have put long-haul destinations within easy reach of the Mediterranean's traditional market, and the region's tourism industry has been the object of substantial restructuring in order to remain competitive in the global market place (Bianchi, 2001).

'Modernism has effaced the differences that make places' wrote Tyler (Tyler, 1991, p. 84); and the *reconstruction* of difference has been an important element in efforts to reconfigure the Mediterranean in line with the requirements of a post-Fordist tourism industry. 'Difference' has here often been translated as 'absence of modernity' – an illustration of Fabian's 'denial of coevalness' in action (Fabian, 1983). The highly standardised coastal tourism product is being diversified by the development of previously neglected interior regions for rural and cultural tourism. But this is a process which is steeped in contradiction. As Bianchi (2001) argues, this diversification is being carried out within existing highly oligopolistic industry structures, against a background of increasing concentration of ownership amongst European tour operators. The move towards niche-based specialisation is driven by a handful of transnational tour operators who control booking systems and dominate seat capacity. Under these conditions, mature sun, sea and sand resorts are trapped in a cycle of declining returns and deteriorating environmental conditions, whilst regions previously untouched by tourism find themselves reinvented as 'nature/culture' destinations to satisfy a growing metropolitan demand for 'authentic', 'traditional' Mediterranean culture.

Cyprus as Tourist Locale

Cyprus has certainly not been exempt from the processes outlined above, but this has been within a particular historical and political context. After 1974, the north of Cyprus became relatively isolated from the rest of the world, as a result of comprehensive diplomatic, economic and cultural boycotts, and attempts to

develop its tourism languished (Scott, 2000). Tourist arrivals to the north remain low compared with arrivals to the south, and the north is heavily dependant on the Turkish market, which makes up approximately 80% of total arrivals.[2] Greek Cypriot tourism, in contrast, has been subject to the full force of globalisation, and has seen substantial economic benefits from it. Tourism revenues generated by the stays of 2.1 million tourists in 1995 amounted to Cy £810 million (US$1.62 billion) or 40.1% of total export receipts, with more than 10% of employment provided by the hotel and restaurant sector, making tourism the 'chief earner of foreign exchange and the economy's driving force' (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos, 1999, p. 52; Sonmez and Apostolopoulos, 2000). Recently, however, attention has also been drawn to some of the problems and costs of tourism's rapid growth. If local residents (both north and south of the Green Line dividing the island) seem on the whole prepared to pay a social and environmental price for tourism-led prosperity (Aki . Peristianis and Warner, 1996), uncontrolled coastal strip development, pressure on scarce water resources, congestion and noise pollution have arguably made southern Cyprus less attractive to tourists (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos, 1999; Ioannides and Holcombe, 2001). Twenty to 30% of all tourism in the south is controlled by a single tour operator, Thomson-Preussag (Bianchi, 2001), and the traditional sun, sea and sand product is facing problems of over-capacity and declining per capita spending by tourists.[3] These are problems which are likely to be exacerbated rather than improved by the introduction of 'all-inclusive' resorts, which lock hoteliers ever more firmly into dependent relationships with tour operators and do nothing to encourage tourists to leave the confines of their holiday complex.

If tourism in the north is heavily dependent on the Turkish market, then the situation is paralleled by the dominance of the UK market in the south, which has formed a growing proportion of the total number of tourist arrivals for more than a decade. The popularity of Cyprus as a British holiday destination builds on the long standing relations between the UK and its former colony. Eighty plus years of colonial rule ended formally with Cyprus's independence in 1960, but the remaining British sovereign bases at Akrotiri and Dhekelia, which occupy 2% of Cyprus's territory, not only maintain a British military presence on the island, but also function as a source of employment for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots in a variety of roles, including as officers in the British police force. From driving on the left, to the style of post boxes, colonial buildings, and stone drinking troughs dedicated to Elizabeth II and dating from her coronation year of 1953, there is much about the landscape of Cyprus to render it familiar and 'safe' to the British visitor. Likewise, Cypriot familiarity with English, both language and culture, stems not only from the legacy of the colonial education system, but from the long-standing presence of a large and flourishing Cypriot community in the UK, many of whom, particularly in retirement, maintain a residence in both countries. At 49% of arrivals in 1998, rising to 61% in 2003, UK tourists to southern Cyprus outnumber by several fold the German

tourists who form the next largest category.[4] In the north, the UK forms the second largest tourist market after Turkey, at around 10% of total arrivals, with Germany in third place at 4-5% (Devlet Planlama Orgutu, 2001). The age profile of tourists to the north tends to be higher than the south, and includes a good number of retired British servicemen and their families re-visiting the scene of their military service from the 1950s. The international club scene centred on the resort of Ayia Napa, in contrast, attracts many younger, single tourists to the south.

Fears that the Cypriot tourism product might be entering a period of stagnation and decline have been addressed by attempts to reposition southern Cyprus as an 'upmarket' destination, built on a combination of lavish resort hotel accommodation and 'village tourism' (Ioannides and Holcombe, 2001). This project entails the translation of 'modernity' and 'tradition' into symbolically mediated encounters with different kinds of space, alternating five-star luxury with the 'authentic simplicity' of the rural. Maintaining the distinctiveness and managing the transitions between these different kinds of space is proving problematic, with efforts to develop 'alternative' forms of tourism in the Akamas Peninsula and Troodos Mountains handicapped by the dominance of the mass beach resort model. Ioannides and Holcombe (2001), for example, describe how the use of off-road vehicles as tourist transport in the Akamas Peninsula has become a means of symbolically marking entry into a 'different' kind of space. Conventional tourist buses, they argue, would do less damage to the peninsula than the fleets of small vehicles carrying four tourists at a time, but unlike the off-road vehicles, buses are not considered appropriate signals of the 'authentic wilderness experience'. Furthermore, southern Cyprus's reputation has been established on its coastal tourism product, making tourists reluctant to pay a premium for a village stay, whilst the perception of the high dividends gained in coastal resorts has fuelled demands amongst village residents for the same kind of high density development (Sharpley, 2001).

In this context, the relatively undeveloped north of the island is starting to emerge as a potential competitor, with the Cyprus Tourist Organisation acknowledging the northwards 'leakage' of a proportion of their dissatisfied tourists (Ioannides and Apostolopoulos, 1999). Yet, as Ioannides and Apostolopoulos go on to point out, tourism in both parts of the island has its problems: if Greek Cypriot tourism suffers from too much development, then Turkish Cypriot tourism suffers from too little, and each, potentially, holds the solution to the other's problem. One such solution may be 'cooperative marketing' - promoting Cyprus as a single destination to enable the island's communities to '... cooperate in tourism for their mutual advantage and gradually move toward conflict resolution' (Sonmez and Apostolopoulos, 2000, p. 41). This is an approach which has in the past been tried with some success in the cases of Israel-Palestinian Authority, Israel-Egypt, and Republic of Ireland-Northern Ireland (ibid.).[5] The potential for tourism to become a

basis for rapprochement was recognised in the 'confidence building measures' put forward in the early 1990s by the then-Secretary General of the United Nations, Boutros-Gali. The measures included the reopening of the former International Airport at Nicosia to tourist traffic, and the joint Greek/Turkish Cypriot operation of tourist facilities in the Famagusta suburb of Varosha/Mara . where most of the tourism development of the 1960s and early 1970s had been concentrated, and which has remained closed since 1974. The proposals foundered, along with the substantive negotiations of the time, but, certainly in the north, were much scrutinised and discussed in the media and at public meetings. They have been revived as part of the recent rapprochement and relaxation of internal border controls between the two parts of the island, but with the rejection of the Annan Plan for peace in April 2004, and the south's subsequent entry into the European Union without the north, the future of such developments remains unclear.

The north of Cyprus has attempted to develop its tourism, but under substantially different conditions from the south, closed off from the major global tourism players, but with its border wide open to Turkey (Scott, 2000). Of the 351,000 visitors to northern Cyprus in 1994, 73% were short-stay visitors from Turkey (Sonmez and Apostolopoulos, 2000). The north has not been able to emulate the south's prosperity, and its annual per capita income of $3,538 lags far behind the $10,591 per capita of the south. Yet although northern Cyprus finds itself formally outside the structures dominating Mediterranean tourism, it *has* been incorporated *representationally,* as one of the last surviving undeveloped corners of paradise in the Mediterranean - the bearer of 'tradition' and 'authenticity' for Cyprus as a whole and the Mediterranean generally. In fact, it is the north's very exclusion from mainstream tourism which makes it potentially a particularly attractive 'nature/culture' tourism product for the European market, as coverage in the British travel press makes clear. A feature in the Sunday Express is typical. Headed *'The Cyprus that time forgot'* (22 April 2001, pp. 79-81), the article paints a picture of northern Cyprus as a 'backwater' populated by talkative colourful local characters, where 'a crowded beach is about as likely as a rainy day in July' and 'crystal clear water laps against sand that has never seen a sun lounger' (ibid., p. 80). It is portrayed as a tranquil contrast to the resorts of Ayia Napa and Limassol, which 'bulge and bustle with thousands of tourists' (ibid.); a rare opportunity to encounter a Mediterranean which, in the words of another feature writer in the Observer, is as yet 'untainted by development' (30 August 1998).

The Denial of Coevalness and the Construction of Fantasy Spaces

If northern Cyprus is the object of a persistent 'denial of coevalness' in the travel press, this is in many respects but an extension of the 'othering' of Turkish Cypriots which has been a feature of much of the travel writing about Cyprus. Lawrence

Durrell's *Bitter Lemons of Cyprus,* the famous memoir of his 1950s stay in the village of Bellapais, contains few references to encounters with Turkish Cypriots; the languid Oriental courtesy of his estate agent Sabri, and the lonely, feeble Hodja he befriends, are part of a different world from that of the joyous, exuberant, Mediterranean he considered he had found in Bellapais (Durrell, 1989 [1957]). Similarly, Colin Thubron's *Journey Into Cyprus,* an account of a walking tour of the island he made in 1972, records his night spent in a Turkish enclave, and the atavistic link he makes between the level of car ownership in the enclave and a Turkish ancestral past as horsemen on the plains of Central Asia (Thubron, 1986 **[1975]).**

The division of the island has served to reinforce and maintain this perception of distinctive temporality and 'otherness' by offering a ready contrast between the 'modern, developed' south and the 'traditional, undeveloped' north. Meanwhile, the time inhabited by the Turkish Cypriots has become less remote, rather more cosy and familiar – a time, even, to evoke nostalgia. Consider the insistence of BBC World Service reports throughout the 1990s that road traffic in the north consisted exclusively of the odd Hillman Imp or Ford Popular, reminiscent of 1950s Britain – at a time when congestion caused by large numbers of land cruisers, expensive modern high performance cars, Mercedes taxis, and Turkish manufactured Renaults, was already a well established problem in Nicosia and Kyrenia. Similarly, British travel journalists in pursuit of the *Bitter Lemons* experience resolutely ignore incipient ribbon development on parts of the coast, or the presence of Turkish tourists attracted by a different side of northern Cyprus: beaches, casinos, shopping, and visiting war graves and monuments associated with the events of 1974. The tourism departments of the universities in the north are full of Turkish Cypriot students who want careers as managers of large, modern hotels, not a 'traditional' life of agricultural toil (nor, for that matter, the nomadic life of the steppes, *pace* Thubron).

The refusal to acknowledge these signs of modernity – or the modernising effects of tourism itself – suggests that they are irrelevant to an understanding of the place, and this is essentially true when what is being constructed is a tourist fantasy paradise. Without an adequate frame of reference, modernity is experienced as an inauthentic intrusion and dilution of local identity. Yet the reproduction and representation of tradition and local identity involves processes which are themselves embedded in often contradictory globalised relations of production. These usually remain hidden from the tourists themselves, but may be incorporated into local discourses as an additional layer of knowledge and reflexivity, as the following cases of the reproduction and representation of tourist spaces in northern Cyprus illustrate. I start with two examples of 'local tradition' enmeshed in relationships which are entirely modern, and then go on to consider,

by way of contrast, two cases illustrative of the production of modern gambling spaces and their incorporation into a sense of 'the local'.

Local Tradition I: Lefkara Work

The production in Cyprus of local crafts such as embroidery and weaving was rooted in a complex of cultural practices and socio-economic conditions which have been transformed by developments such as the availability of factory-produced consumer items, increased educational opportunities for girls, access to paid employment outside the home and the availability of recreational alternatives for women. In the 'traditional' context of their production, the value of such items was not measured in cash terms, but lay in their use value and in the reproduction of neighbourly and family relations of reciprocity they embodied. Women could offer their time, labour and skill embroidering linen for the bridal trousseau of their neighbours' daughters, in the knowledge that they would be able to call on those neighbours when the time came for their own daughters to marry (Faiz, 1993). Alongside the skills of sewing, lace making and embroidery, social competence in the network of relationships in which the work was enmeshed was also absorbed from childhood, through long hours of practice and observation of women sitting, chatting and working together.

Tourism has stimulated new demand for these traditional handicrafts, but this is in the context of marketised relations where the money seldom reflects the amount of labour and degree of skill involved. This has brought about the emergence of spatially separate spheres of 'lived' and represented tradition, which exist in a hierarchical relationship to each other. In northern Cyprus, where the tourist market for such items remains small, the cost of the materials is high and the rewards are low, many of the handicraft items for sale are actually produced by Turkish settlers in Cyprus, or imported from Turkey. In contrast, Faiz (1993) found that some of the *Lefkara it;i* or *lefkaritika* sold in Lefkara in the south is actually produced by Turkish Cypriot women in the north.6

Lefkara embroidery has a particular place in the politics of cultural identity in Cyprus, and this is enhanced by the special visibility and status it has acquired as a result of tourism. The most obvious aspect of this is the question of origins: who 'owns' the tradition, and what are the implications for where boundaries of identity are drawn? According to one guidebook to northern Cyprus, '... Turkish Cypriots insist that [the self-coloured embroidered linen associated with the eponymous village in southern Cyprus] originated as an art in Gaziantep in southern Turkey' (Goulding and Goulding, 1992, p. 79). This is a claim that can be read both as a statement of cultural difference between Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and as a denial of difference between Turkish Cypriot and Anatolian culture (c.f. Navaro- Yashin, forthcoming). Contrary to the guidebook's assertion, however, this is not an

44

opinion I have ever heard Turkish Cypriots express. Rather, the view I regularly encountered was that this distinctive embroidery work is the local tradition of Cyprus *par excellence,* being closely associated not just with the island, but with one particular town, where the skills for its production remained jealously guarded local knowledge for centuries. Furthermore, Lefkara embroidery is regarded by many - and especially, but not exclusively, by those on the left - as emblematic of a pan-Cyprian cultural tradition, since Lefkara was a mixed town and the knowledge shared amongst the women of all its communities. Whilst conducting interviews with the owners of the numerous small and struggling gift shops in Kyrenia during the early 1990s, I found many cases of shopkeepers who persisted in stocking Lefkara embroidery and displaying it prominently, in the obstinate belief that they ought to be promoting and selling to tourists something that (in their own eyes) so completely represented Cyprus, despite the difficulties they experienced in getting hold of good quality work, and the low sales turnover. This was due in part to competition from the south for the skills of the best Turkish Cypriot craftswomen, and the high cost of producing Lefkara work because of the duty charged in the north on the import of linen and thread, which is imported duty-free into the south. One shopkeeper had bought his stock from the handicraft cooperative in Nicosia, and complained: 'People always come in asking for it, but then they step back when I tell them the price' - thus day-trippers from the south would not buy it because they could obtain it more cheaply in the south, and very few of the tourists staying in northern Cyprus bought it because the ceramics, onyx ware and textiles imported from Turkey were much cheaper. Turkish Cypriots thus find themselves rendered invisible in one of the chief iconic representations of cultural identity on the island.

A combination of the political upheavals and dislocations of the sixties and seventies, the commodification of Lefkara embroidery production for the tourist market, and the development of a symbolic economy around the staging and representation of locality and tradition (with all its political implications), have transformed the context and meaning of Lefkara embroidery. The Turkish Cypriot population fled Lefkara in 1964, moving on again with the renewed displacements of 1974, and taking their knowledge and skill with them. The villages in which the embroidery was taken up trace the widening diaspora of the Turkish Cypriots of Lefkara. Lefkara itself remains the 'brand' for the embroidery, but has become largely a centre for sales and marketing: the hub of marketised relations of production, and the centre for the staging of locality and tradition. Its productive hinterland extends across the Green Line to villages in the north, where the work is produced to commission on a piece rate basis. Turkish Cypriot women who cannot compete in the production of handicrafts for the northern tourist market, find that they have a competitive price advantage vis-a-vis the large and profitable market in the south, which they can access by means of a network of middlemen carrying commissions, materials, and finished work through the British bases. Emphasis on

the emblematic significance of Lefkara embroidery, reflected in discourses of origin and ownership of the cultural tradition, masks the contemporary production of locality in which local actors involved in the making and selling of Lefkara work are engaged.

Local Tradition II: A Story of Ice-cream

In the summer seasons of 1992 and 1993, the appearance in Kyrenia harbour of a Kahraman-Mara ice-cream seller created a stir.

Kahraman-Mara ice-cream is a variety of ice-cream with a thick, stringy consistency, which is made by beating the mixture in tubs, using a long paddle. A speciality of Mara in central Turkey, the ice-cream is characterised not just by its taste and texture, but by the manner in which it is sold. The seller, dressed in traditional regional costume, periodically beats the mixture with the paddle in order to stop it from melting, ringing a string of bells above his head to advertise his presence to potential customers. The seller deposits a scoop of ice-cream on the end of the paddle, places a cornet wafer on top, and proffers it to the customer – but the customer has to work for their ice-cream as, with a series of twists and twirls of the paddle, and banging the bells above his head, the seller leaves the customer empty-handed or clutching an empty wafer. This is often an amusing performance, and very popular with tourists in Turkish resort towns.

The ice-cream seller had been employed by the Turkish Cypriot owner of a café-bar on the harbour, and his pitch was under the awning just outside the bar. Many visitors to the harbour, both tourists and local, thought that his colourful presence enlivened the harbour, and offered something different from the restaurants and snack bars which sell mostly international cuisine, pizzas, toasted snacks etc. Others, however, voiced strong objections, along the lines: 'But Kahraman-Mara ice-cream is Turkish, not Cypriot'.

At first this seems a bizarre objection, not only because Turkish folkdance troupes are regularly invited to perform in northern Cyprus alongside Turkish Cypriot dance teams, but also because the food and entertainment offered at most of the other establishments around the harbour is also 'not Cypriot'. When I pointed this out to one objector, who himself had had plans to open a pizza restaurant on the harbour, his answer was that 'Pizza is international – it's as much a part of Turkish Cypriot culture as it is of any other western culture.' A comment from another objector – that Turkish culture is 'too close' to Turkish Cypriot – clarified the issues further. International popular culture can never be *mistaken* for Turkish Cypriot, and so it can be incorporated without threat. Representations of Turkish culture, on the other hand, have to be clearly labelled as such – as they are when Turkish folk dances are performed alongside Turkish Cypriot ones – in order to preserve a distinctive sense of Turkish Cypriot cultural identity.

Ultimately, it was the ice-cream seller's *prominence* in the place which represents northern Cyprus's tourism on so many postcards, travel brochures, guides, and tourists' photographs, to which people objected: an 'authentic' representation of Turkey in what has become an icon of Turkish Cypriot tourism. Coincidentally, in the summer of 1993 several manufacturers of local ice-cream announced that they were closing their businesses because they could no longer compete with big Turkish companies selling ice-cream in Cyprus. Although the Kahraman-Maraey ice-cream seller had no connection with these companies (who were offering local shops free refrigerated cabinets in return for stocking their brand), people made a symbolic connection between the two. Reminiscing about the flavour, the texture, the pleasures of eating Turkish Cypriot ice-cream, brought back memories of other times and places, of the old shops and the shop-keepers who had sold it, of a Cyprus of the past. 'You can't get Turkish Cypriot ice-cream anymore, all we've got [is] this stuff!' was the common complaint. In effect, the ice- cream seller became the symbolic focus for fears concerning mainland cultural and economic dominance.

The discussions in the harbour demonstrate the degree of creative reflexivity that people bring to the reading of symbols which purport to represent their lives. In conversation, people readily identified the slippage between image and the reality of daily social and economic relations, and interpreted it in terms of on-going debates about Turkish Cypriot identity, which revolve around the twin poles of exclusive Anatolian Turkish 'roots' at one extreme, and at the other a construct of 'Cypriot' identity which prioritises the cultural contacts formed over centuries in Cyprus, of which Anatolian elements form but one of many influences. This latter model of identity is dynamic and complex, embedded in multi-layered social relationships, and does not lend itself easily to iconic expression of the type favoured in self-conscious touristic representations; rather, it emerges from reflexive critiques of the essentialist imagery employed in tourism, as I have described above, or, as in the case of Lefkara embroidery discussed earlier, from the material practices and relationships surrounding production and consumption. When this local identity is framed in terms of a modern global consciousness, the dynamics of representation become even more problematic.

Casino Tourism and the Production of 'modern spaces'
In February 1997, at the height of the public debate in Turkey over the future of the country's casinos, a cartoon appeared in the English language newspaper *Turkish Daily News.* The cartoon shows two men in suit and tie throwing dice, enthusiastically watched by a group of beaming tourists dressed in sun-hats, shorts and tee-shirts, who have just emerged from a bus marked 'Casino Tour'. Cameras and videos at the ready, the tourists are listening to the commentary of the tour guide, who stands with a bored expression, one hand on his hip, the other flung out

towards the spectacle he is explaining to them. As with the postcard of the amorous donkey discussed earlier, the humour lies in the transgression of categories derived from the conventions of tourist representation; in this case, it is 'the modern' that is out of place, the object of a gaze normally directed at a local, traditional 'other'. Modernity, so the logic of the joke suggests, is an enabling condition of tourism, not its object. Spatially and conceptually the casino belongs to the world of the tourist *subject,* not the representational spaces of objectified touristic spectacle.

In southern Cyprus the issue of casinos has long been a matter of debate. Despite a vociferous lobby in favour, pressures to allow casinos to operate have so far been opposed and resisted, both out of traditional moral concerns, and also on cultural and political grounds (*Sunday Mail 17 September 2000).*[7] The development of a casino sector in northern Cyprus, in contrast, started as early as 1975. At that time casino gambling was illegal in Turkey, and the business generated by a steady stream of Turkish casino gamblers was enough to sustain four or five small, fairly low-key establishments around Kyrenia. In the mid 1990s, the demand for the Turkish Cypriot casinos fell away as Turkish citizens were allowed access to live gaming tables in Turkey for the first time. This liberal gambling regime was short- lived, and ended in 1997, with the electoral success of the Islamic Welfare Party and a series of highly publicised casino-related scandals. It lasted long enough, however, to establish gaming as an essential leisure activity in Turkey. With the closure of casinos in Turkey, many companies switched their operations to northern Cyprus, and by 1999 more than twenty casinos were catering to the increased demand, with twenty more lobbying for licences (Scott and Aşıkoğlu, 2001a).

The pattern of casino tourism development in northern Cyprus has been extremely dependent on developments in Turkey, and in many ways is highly expressive of that particular relationship of dependency which already exists (Scott, 2001b). At another level, casino tourism development places northern Cyprus right in the thick of global trends. The world-wide expansion of the industry since the mid 1980s, driven by US based corporations, has reconfigured the world in line with its own spatial logic, according to which gaming activities are typically located in peripheral and liminal spaces, symbolically and/or geographically distant from the mainstream[8] Incorporation into this global spatial hierarchy has thus enabled northern Cyprus to convert its isolation into a comparative advantage; not as a 'traditional periphery', as with the European tourism market, but as a modern global leisure product.

But this global realignment has been paralleled by the reorganisation of *local* gambling spaces, and the marginalisation of forms of gambling which were previously at the centre of village life and gendered practice. This is particularly marked in the case of cock-fighting. Illegal since the days of British rule, cock-

fighting has nevertheless been tolerated until recently, and many informants in their forties and upwards recalled the cock-fight as a central feature of local festivals in which both Greek and Turkish Cypriots would participate. Increasing pressure from the authorities, in the form of police raids, arrests, fines, and the confiscation of valuable birds, has driven the practice underground. Although they are still a focal point for the gathering of males of all ages and social classes, cock-fights are now clandestine affairs, requiring sentries to be posted with their mobile phones at village exits and entrances to warn of the approach of the police.

Some aficionados of cock-fighting blame the intervention of animal welfare activists for the clamp-down; others suspect pressure from the licensed casinos, whom they accuse of wanting to eradicate all non-licensed forms of gambling so that the casinos become literally 'the only game in town'. Some card players tell a similar story in relation to village coffee shop gambling. The truth behind the perceived change in policy towards illegal but previously tolerated forms of gambling is hard to establish, especially since students and Turkish Cypriot nationals are legally barred from gambling in casinos. What is clear, however, is that the policy of 'turning a blind eye' seems now to have shifted from the coffee shops and the cock pits to the casinos, which have become a new form of leisure space for local people.

Long associated with glamour, sleaze, danger and criminality, casinos have now repackaged and reinvented themselves as global entertainment and leisure products. The traditional European regulatory approach treated gaming as a vice and gamblers as needing protection from themselves. But it is the US model which is taking the world by storm: the core activity of gambling is surrounded by minimal restrictions and constraints, and maximum fun, with the stimulus of alcohol, food, and big-name entertainment (MacMillan, 1996). Most of the casinos of northern Cyprus are small, especially by north American standards:[9] but the relative opulence of the decor, as well as the food and alcohol, supplied free of charge, provide local people with relief from the current grim economic conditions which make most other forms of entertainment prohibitively expensive. A barber in Kyrenia, himself an habitue of the casinos, estimated in conversation that:

> at least 80% of the local youth who have a nightlife go to the casinos for eating, drinking and playing. They go first of all for free food and drink. Then they bring their girlfriends. If they want to get drunk, they go [to] the casinos first to drink whisky and beer... The young generation don't eat at home any more.

He himself, he maintained, had not eaten at home in two years.

An evening spent observing the comings and goings in a casino in Kyrenia suggested that for many local couples the casino had taken over from the harbour

as the place for strolling, meeting friends, chatting and taking a drink and a bite to eat. The fact that the casinos bring Turkey's best known stars and fashion models to the island as part of their programme of entertainment has also done much to enhance their status as fashionable, modern leisure spaces, which enable people to get out for a while from the 'backwater' beloved of British travel writers, and escape into the mainstream of metropolitan popular culture. Nevertheless, ambivalence remains towards the casinos and the image of 'modernity' they represent, and this conservatism emerges most strongly in attitudes to female employment in the sector.

Gender at the Boundary

Twenty-five years ago, very few Turkish Cypriot women worked outside the home. Those who did were generally the educated daughters of affluent families working in urban professional occupations (Ladbury, 1979). Not only were there few educational and economic opportunities to enable the majority of women to take up paid employment, but they were also constrained by notions of 'respectability' embodied in the concept of *namus* (reputation or sexual shame). Both a woman's marriage prospects and the reputation of her menfolk depended on avoiding situations which might give rise to gossip, and this entailed restrictions on women's business activities, employment and social contacts outside the home.

Women's employment has increased dramatically since the 1970s, as a result of the expansion in their educational and employment opportunities, and a relaxation in the code of reputation, permitting greater freedom to women outside the home. Tourism has become one area in which women can readily find employment, and the resistance to work in tourism which some women experienced from their families in the early days has been largely overcome, as tourism, designated northern Cyprus's leading economic sector during the early 1990s, gained in status and symbolic importance. White collar work in hotel reception or airline offices has become a career goal for many young Turkish Cypriot women studying tourism at university. Yet a number of jobs in the hospitality and entertainment field continued to be regarded as socially and culturally unacceptable for Turkish Cypriot women to do: amongst them, waitressing in tavernas, working as singers, dancers or night-club hostesses, or as casino croupiers. The demand for female labour to perform this work was met largely by migrant workers.

Foreign women have been part of the casino scene in northern Cyprus from the 1980s, when licensed British croupiers were recruited to work the tables and train local croupiers on the job. The British women were succeeded by Turkish croupiers – men and women from the mainland – and subsequently, with the opening up of the former Soviet Union and eastern bloc countries, by the recruitment of young Rumanian women. As a cheap source of labour, the Rumanian women undoubtedly

undercut their Turkish counterparts; they also added glamour to the casino floor, enhanced both by their exotic 'foreign looks', and by the spice of dangerous sexuality attached to them through the association of eastern European women with prostitution, which had spread to northern Cyprus from Turkey, where they were known as 'Natashas' (Hann and Hann, 1992). The common use of this name for all Russian and eastern European women tended to reinforce local people's belief that 'these women are all the same'. The highly sexualised stereotype of the 'Natasha', embodying the exotic, attractive but dangerous outsider, and the absence of family pressure on these women working away from home, freed them from the constraints of reputation to perform those jobs which were not considered 'respectable' for Turkish Cypriot women. At the same time, individual women found themselves obliged to conform to local norms of behaviour in order to try to mitigate the effect of the stereotype. One young Rumanian croupier, whom I interviewed in the summer of 1993, complained:

> … sometimes it's difficult living in such a small place. My boss hears even when I have just been to the supermarket. You have to watch your friends - men and women - in case they have a bad reputation. Being Rumanian, people judge you all the time ... men always make assumptions about you. At work I have to be very serious, so as not to give people the wrong idea, and it's hard, because we always used to laugh and joke with the boys at work in Rumania. I don't smoke or drink, I haven't had a boyfriend since I have been here, and I don't go to discos.
> (Scott, 1997, p. 72)

Significantly, the situation in which this young woman found herself, and her response to it, echoed the experience of a Turkish Cypriot friend who had found herself the object of similar stereotyping whilst a student in Turkey, years before. She recounted how local residents had campaigned to have the Cypriot women's hostel closed down:

> At the time [in the 1970s] we wore mini-skirts, we laughed and talked in the street. We were away from home, and some girls had boyfriends. We didn't behave like the Turkish women, they were much more traditional then ... some of the Cypriot boys warned us that Turkish students in the hostels gossiped about us, and that we should be careful how we behaved with them.
> (Scott, 1995, p.393)

The women had responded to their situation through self-imposed restrictions on their behaviour, which were collectively enforced on all the women living in the hostel. Women who did not conform were asked to leave. She commented: 'I don't know now if we were right to do that. These things are very complex, they turn women against each other ... ' (ibid.).

As this last comment illustrates, women find themselves positioned both at the conservative core of the community, the bearers of 'traditional' standards of acceptable behaviour, and also challenging and pushing out the limits of acceptability at the boundary. The changing division of female labour within tourism and, specifically, the casino sector, is therefore revealing, as Turkish Cypriot women move into areas of work which were previously acceptable only for marginalised female outsiders. With the recent explosion in the northern Cyprus casino sector, the first Turkish Cypriot female croupiers have started to make their appearance. What has changed in the past five or so years to make that possible?

The transformation of casino gambling into an acceptable modern leisure activity, described above, has introduced Turkish Cypriot women to the casino floor as leisure consumers, but in a context which reinforces existing gender norms and sanitises women's gambling by constituting it as an activity for couples.[10] This is a very different situation from that of the casino as place of employment, characterised by night-time work away from the authority or protection of a husband or male kin, in an environment which is still associated, anecdotally at least, with criminality and deviant behaviour.[11] However, following the closure of the casinos in Turkey and subsequent explosion of gambling in northern Cyprus from 1997 onwards, a significant shift has occurred in official attitudes, in favour of the development of the sector. This followed a long period of uncertainty in which partisans of casino expansion argued that the casinos would boost tourism and provide a source of local employment, whilst critics argued that the benefits of casino tourism were exaggerated and unevenly distributed (Scott, 2001b). With the commitment, for the time being at least, to casino tourism as the best available solution to northern Cyprus's political and economic isolation, legislation was passed requiring that the proportion of foreign nationals employed in any casino should not exceed 30%.

When Turkey's casino owners moved their operations to Cyprus after 1997, a cadre of existing croupiers came with them, who were not only skilled and experienced in their profession, but had also developed contacts which enabled them to play an important role in marketing northern Cyprus as a tourism gambling destination to networks of gamblers in Turkey (Aşıkoğlu, personal communication). Research carried out by the Ministry of Tourism in 1998 found that thirteen out of eighteen casinos surveyed employed fewer than 50% local staff, and four employed fewer than 20%. Only two either met or exceeded the 70% target (Ministry of Tourism, 1998).[12] However, amongst the minority of local staff employed in the sector are a small number of Turkish Cypriot women who had learnt their trade as croupiers at casinos in Turkey. Having served their apprenticeship as female 'outsiders' in Turkey, it seems possible that the boundaries of community standards of behaviour, assisted by transformations in the public sphere associated with the

social and economic dynamics of the tourism and casino industries, may have shifted sufficiently to enable these female croupiers to come home.

Conclusion

The business of tourism is largely the business of place-making, and this is an activity in which all 'local subjects' are also continuously engaged (Appadurai, 1995). An important difference, however, is that the commodified localities of global tourism do not reflect a primarily local consciousness, but rather the logic of globalisation, in which partial and selective representations of 'the local' serve merely to differentiate an increasingly global product. In this paper I have also indicated how local subjects resist this 'de-centring' and use tourist symbols to reflect critically on identity and representation.

In Cyprus, where the contours and meaning of place are contested within and between the two parts of the divided island, the production of locality is both highly contentious and over-determined. Nationalist discourses, which mobilise grand narratives of the past reflected in monumentalised landscapes and contests over the origin and ownership of 'traditional' cultural forms, sit very easily with the iconic representational practices of tourism (Evans-Pritchard, 1993; Herzfeld, 1991). Public policies on the housing of refugees, distribution of land, availability of credits and building of infrastructure, create the conditions of everyday life, and in so doing convey messages about the nature and permanence or impermanence of the island's division (Ladbury and King, 1982; Loizos, 1981; Scott, 1998). Meanwhile, in villages and urban neighbourhoods, local actors are engaged in other spatial practices – conducting environmental campaigns, walking around Nicosia, conversing with neighbours, gardening (Welz, forthcoming; Papadakis, 1998, 1999; Jepson, forthcoming) – all activities which play a key role in sustaining social memory and forgetting, and mediating the relationship with place.

The idea of a 'motherland' – as both Greece and Turkey are often referred to by Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively – is viewed as problematic by many Cypriots, who prefer to engage with the commonalities of Cypriot culture, rather than remain trapped in the quest for distinctive national origins and ownership of 'authentic' cultural traditions. The ignorance of many Cypriots, particularly the post-1974 generation, about 'the other' behind the Green Line, has arguably been fostered by promotional strategies which brand the two parts of the island as competing tourism destinations. Bi-communal activities on the island have attempted to address this ignorance by bringing Greek and Turkish Cypriots together to learn about (and practise) their shared traditions of dance, music and food culture.[13]

But as Loizos has argued, it is in acquiring joint approaches to engaging with the material practices of *modernity* that Turkish and Greek Cypriots can best learn how to see each other more clearly (Loizos, 1998). Bi-communal meetings of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the fields of education, medicine, psychology and business, to name a few, have shifted the emphasis away from self-conscious preoccupation with issues of national identity towards collaboration on common professional concerns, and created awareness amongst women of shared gender issues in Greek and Turkish Cypriot society (c.f. Cockburn, 2004). When viewed as sources and transmitters of metropolitan leisure culture, rather than as avatars of national identity, attitudes to the 'motherlands' of Greece and Turkey – a mixture of admiration, aspiration, resentment and amusement – are remarkably similar on both sides of the Green Line (c.f. Papadakis, 1993).

Tourism has been identified as a critical element in promoting possible solutions for Cyprus, but it is already part of the local landscape, introducing a new dimension into multi-layered local constructions of place and identity, as a rich, and often contradictory, source of practices, associations and symbols. It provides the stimulus for creating new representations (and new configurations) of place, and in so doing it intersects with multiple existing discourses and practices of locality production. These interstitial spaces, where local modes of representation and reflexive discourse engage with the material processes and representational practices of tourist space, merit further exploration. By attending to such spaces, we may glimpse the emerging contours of Cyprus from a different angle, and gain fresh insights into the reproduction and creative agency of its local subjects.

Notes

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1. I carried out research in northern Cyprus from 1992-1994 and 1996-1998, returning for further short periods of fieldwork during 1999, 2000 and 2001. My recent research has been concerned with two themes in particular: the development of casino tourism, and the cultural politics of heritage.

2. In 1999 and 2000, northern Cyprus received 414,000 and 433,000 tourists respectively, of which 334,400 and 347,700 were from Turkey. In the same years, arrivals to the south numbered 2.4 million and 2.6 million respectively.

3. In the north, in contrast, the embargo on foreign investment has left the way clear for the development of a tourism sector characterised by small, family-run businesses (1997), although more recently the entry of large Turkish chains such as Dedeman and Merit into northern Cyprus has concentrated control of the Turkish Cypriot tourism industry in Turkish ownership (Scott, 2000).

4. German tourists made up 10% of total arrivals in 1998, declining to 6% in 2003 (Statistical Service of the Government of Cyprus).

5. Although there has at times been some slippage between destination marketing image and reality, the commitment to co-operate in the field of tourism was renewed by Israeli and Palestinian Tourism Ministers in a joint statement made in November 2004 (Alcantara, 2004).

6. I acknowledge with thanks my debt to Muharrem Faiz's study of Lefkara işi, published as *Kultür ve Yabancılaşma,* for the information about Lefkara embroidery on which this discussion draws.

7. However, this policy is being reconsidered, in view of the steady stream of Greek Cypriots who, since the relaxation of border restrictions between north and south in April 2003, have been heading northwards to gamble in the casinos (Cyprus Mail, 23 June 2004).

8. As Stansfield (1996, p. 135) observes, 'In most Western cultures, particularly in the nineteenth and twentieth centuries, legalised gambling has been restricted to the periphery, spatially mirroring the widespread public opinion that it *should be* on the periphery of society'. Many peripheral locations have seized on the opportunity to turn their peripherality into a comparative advantage. Border locations appealing to a target market on the other side of the border '... can appropriate all the benefits from gambling (all demand is export), while [they] can re-export all the costs (problem gamblers, bankruptcies, broken families and the like) that flow back over the border' (Felsenstein and Freeman, 1998, p. 146). Legislative 'islands' can be created, where gambling is permitted amidst a sea of prohibition. Perhaps the best known example of this is in the USA, where Native Americans have developed legal commercial gambling on Indian tribal lands, even though gambling is prohibited in the surrounding state. Location in peripheral places can also promote the kind of 'liminal' behaviour - suspension of inhibitions, role reversal and relaxation of constraints - which are often observed in tourist spaces, and which are reinforced by the atmosphere of the casinos themselves, where gambling takes place in enclosed, windowless rooms, lubricated by the free flow of alcohol. See further Scott and Aşıkoğlu, 2001a; Scott, 2003.

9. The average for the casinos of northern Cyprus is 10 tables and 70 slot machines per casino. The smallest has 7 gaming tables and 18 slot machines, whilst the largest has 22 tables and 377 slot machines. All are attached to, or located within, hotels, holiday villages, or other tourist accommodation (Scott, 2003). The larger casinos in Las Vegas typically boast around 2,000-plus slot machines and 100 gaming tables.

10. Before the advent of commercial casinos, gambling was a segregated activity which men of all classes pursued in cafes and private clubs, and upper class women in the home. See Scott, 2003.

11. Political parties seeking electoral advantage have frequently played on popular fears that the casinos lead to increased crime and rates of problem gambling; c.f. Scott, 2001b.

12. The majority of the staff were from Turkey and Eastern Europe.

13. Despite the division of the island, bi-communal meetings and activities have been able to take place periodically under UN auspices in the single remaining mixed border town of Pyla, or in the UN buffer zone. Such bi-communal meetings, and the social and cultural

context in which they occur, are portrayed in the 2003 film *Living Together Separately: Py/a, A Mixed Borderline Village in Cyprus* (Elias Demetriou and Yiannis Papadakis).

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PUTTING GENETICS TO USE

Stefan Beck

Abstract

On the basis of empirical research using a screening programme for a genetic disorder (Cystic Fibrosis) in a Cypriot village as a case-in-point, the paper evaluates the influence of genetic information for concepts of heredity and kinship practices. Far from being simple receivers of biomedical knowledge, participants of the screening programme blended traditional, analogous concepts of blood relations between kin with scientific, digital concepts of 'passing-on genetic information' from generation to generation, creating a new mode of hereditary thinking, bodily concepts, and practices of relating oneself with others. On the backdrop of the unique experiences with the established screening programme for Thalassaemia on the island, most participants felt a pervasive moral obligation for al/- encompassing "genetic transparency". While this might constitute a bioethicist's nightmare, it is argued that Cypriot modernity produced a unique "genetic citizenship" which might afford critical resources for coping with the prospects of an ongoing geneticisation.

Inquiring into the Interface between Scientific Knowledge and Vernacular Culture

> Instead of dismantling holistic systems through inappropriate analytical categories, then, perhaps we should strive for a holistic apprehension of the manner in which subjects dismantle their own constructs.
>
> (Strathern, 1992, p. 90)

In October 1996, the Cypriot press reported the discovery of a deadly disease in a village near the capital Nicosia. The gist of these messages that were placed prominently on the radio and television news as well as in several Greek Cypriot newspapers was more or less identical: They celebrated the scientific achievement of the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics whose research effort of some years in cooperation with local physicians had yielded an explanation for a number of mysterious deaths in this village. Large parts of the population - according to the reports - were affected by a genetic disease that so far had not been known to exist in Cyprus. In order to assess the threat that Cystic Fibrosis - the name of the disease - was posing to the population, geneticists in accordance with the Ministry of Health had decided to collect and to analyse saliva probes of all 170 school

children in the community. On the basis of this representative sample the experts were able to determine the frequency of 'carriers' in the village population, healthy persons that carry one copy of the gene. In those cases where both the father and mother are carriers, the chances that their children will develop the disease are 25%. These research findings, establishing the frequency of the gene in the village population, provided the impetus for the Health Ministry to offer genetic tests to all villagers to establish their individual carrier status; the aforementioned press reports were based on a press release informing the public about the findings and announcing the option for tests.

Line of Inquiry

The press reports mark the beginning of a sustained argument involving a number of parties – human geneticists, medical doctors, health policy makers, and lay persons – in the course of which the validity of scientific findings, the power of human geneticists' practices, the assessment of social and cultural effects of genetic procedures and aggregate knowledges as well as the collective identity of the villagers were contested. In the following, I am going to highlight some aspects of this conflict that point to a more general constellation of problems.[1]

The study serves as a case-in-point to show how in Cyprus, as in other societies, social actors are appropriating universal scientific knowledge and are integrating it creatively with local knowledges to apply in social situations that are no longer static and predictable but have become fluid and highly uncertain. The case under discussion is a good example of a development that has been diagnosed by sociological risk theory: Genetic knowledge transforms the *danger* of being threatened by a mysterious illness into a calculable and controllable *risk* (Luhmann, 1997) that demands affected persons to respond actively, namely by using the option of genetic testing, an option that, once it is known and available, presents itself as a moral obligation. German sociologist Elisabeth Beck-Gernsheim has pointed out that in the process of modernisation, health has been constructed as a *project* to be realised by the responsible individual (Beck-Gernsheim, 1994). Inquiring into the situation in the USA, Carole H. Browner and Nancy Ann Press (1995) argue that human dispositions and behaviours are more and more perceived through a "prism of heredity" which – in addition to the tendency that every pregnancy be seen as an extraordinary risk – would heighten the readiness to rely on genetic testing on a routine basis.

I propose to use the Cypriot case as a focus to inquire cross-culturally into this construction of health as a project of individual actors. This question will hopefully cast light on the following problematic: Does the accelerated popularisation of scientific knowledges – the "prism of heredity" – alter the culturally specific perceptions of body, disease, family and collective identity? How are older, culturally

highly familiar concepts of affliction that are known "to run in the family" blended with genetic concepts of (Mendelian) heredity? Or more pointedly: How does nature enter into culture when it comes to the popularisation of genetic knowledge?

Two Kinds of Constructivism

Some clarifications seem necessary beforehand. In most of the social sciences, a constructivist perspective has become prevalent in recent years. This perspective emphasises that there is no perception of reality that is not socially biased and culturally shaped. In keeping with the sociology of knowledge of Peter L. Berger and Thomas Luckmann, "reality" then is consistently put in quotation marks and conceived of as a product of social practice. However, while Berger and Luckmann in their 1960s studies addressed the domain of quotidian knowledge that is jointly and consensually produced by human beings in their everyday face-to-face interactions, by the 1990s, this approach began to be applied to scientific knowledge as well: In Anglo-American Cultural Studies or in Science and Technology Studies in particular, the objectivity claim of the natural sciences was challenged by employing methods from textual analyses against the backdrop of what one might call a universalist constructivism.[2]

This attack on scientific authority constitutes the core issue of a debate between natural sciences and the humanities that erupted in the United States in the 1990s. Labelled "the science wars", it has to some extent been characterised by mutual misunderstandings of terminology. Positioning themselves on a battleground between conflicting claims of objectivity and relativity, a number of excellent anthropological studies of the practices of laboratory scientists have been brought forth on the basis of extraordinary ethnographic work that discloses how certain social practices are able to produce facts while others are not.[3] Scientific practices in the laboratory setting – according to the findings of these studies – are predicated on something one might call a "realistic constructivism", a pragmatic sense of reality that takes into account that it can always be proven wrong by new and conflicting experimental evidence.

In the face of these contrasting constructivisms that are based on different assumptions and use different methods, there is a need for a conceptual distinction between what can and what cannot be subject to construction processes, a distinction that also allows for closer scrutiny of the "how" of construction processes (Hacking, 1998). The disease Cystic Fibrosis that I introduced in the beginning can serve as an example of how such a distinction works. Individuals who have this disease will die from a highly complex set of problems, often during their childhood, no matter whether they themselves or other people know or do not know what this disease is. As a bodily syndrome consisting of chronic infections of the respiratory system, an insufficient intake of vitamins and nutrients by the digestive system,

chronic inflammation of the spleen, and a heightened salt content of the sweat, this disease as well as the genetic codes that cause it, are independent of the ways they are conceptualised scientifically or socially. At the same time, however, the disease of Cystic Fibrosis is a social and cultural phenomenon that can be responded to in a multitude of possible ways always contingent on available knowledge and available options of action to take – and that indeed requires that people respond to it. Within this social dimension, illness is dependant on extensive knowledges, procedures, and experiences, and therefore is always historically situated.

For instance, in the handbook of German folk beliefs and superstitions,[4] similar to collections by folklorists in other countries, there are several entries regarding the occurrence of a newborn's sweat tasting of salt – a high salt content in the perspiration is one of the symptoms of Cystic Fibrosis. To ward off bad spells, thought to be the cause of this condition, traditional proverbial wisdom in several north-western European regions recommends the following: The mother should lick the perspiration off the brow of the child three times and spit out behind her back. Contemporary medical manuals, however, demand somewhat more complex management techniques to cope with the illness: A permanent treatment using antibiotics, a continuous medication of digestive enzymes, three hours of physiotherapy per day and finally lung transplantations might prolong the life expectancy of Cystic Fibrosis sufferers well into their thirties or early forties.

In this case, modern biomedicine brings two types of construction to bear: On the one hand, the "objectifying" practices of the scientific laboratory and the clinic, on the other hand, the socialising and culturalising practices of the medical system. Both are constructions, in both cases taking construction to mean literally a complex system in which knowledges, procedures, options for action, social practices etc., are interdependent. However, in the first case, the facts of natural science are being produced, while in the second case, it is social relations and moral obligations which are being produced. Both kinds of construction operate by classification. Yet the subjects/objects of classification are of a different kind: In the laboratory, a segment of a genetic code is identified as the cause for the complex syndrome of a medical disorder; in the medical system, people with a disorder are diagnosed as suffering from Cystic Fibrosis, a diagnosis that requires a specific treatment that in turn requires a high degree of compliance from the person thus diagnosed and at the same time positions him or her socially: as a patient.

In this context, a suggestion of the Canadian philosopher of science, Ian Hacking, is helpful. He proposes to distinguish constructions on the basis of the classifications they rely on. This allows him to distinguish interactive classifications from those of a non-interactive kind. The classifications of the sciences – for instance, sub-atomic particles in physics – are non-interactive, because what is

classified is not capable of modifying its behaviour or traits as a consequence of the classification. Classifications in the social domain, however, Hacking terms "interactive" precisely because those classified can change their behaviour in accordance (Hacking, 1999). When you apply this distinction to the phenomena associated with the human body, it becomes obvious that one has to expect a combination of non-interactive and interactive classifications. This is what makes scientific discourse on bodily practices so interesting and so fraught with difficulties. Against the backdrop of this distinction, we can also surmise that to talk generally of the "social construction of the body" has limited value if one does not at the same time distinguish between the different domains of construction, namely classifications of interactive and non-interactive kinds.

This distinction, itself belonging to the field of abstract logic, does have a distinct advantage in making clear what social and cultural practices serve to achieve, namely, to evolve strategies of socially coping with a medical disorder on the basis of such a classification, and, also sometimes, to manipulate such classifications. Referring back to the village introduced in the beginning, and to an actual event there, I would like to describe the least complicated of these strategies – to keep silent on and not disclose the nature of an illness, – that is, the manipulation of an interactive classification by partial denial, and attempt to show the serious implications that such a simple manipulation may have.

Manipulating Constructions

The press reports quoted initially remarked that the mystery of a series of inexplicable deaths in the village had been solved by the scientists. The confusion and concern that these reports instilled in the village in part reflected the fact that there was no public knowledge of any deaths of mysterious causes in the village. Only collective investigations brought to light the fact that geneticists had referred to the deaths of two children within the same family, deaths that had occurred a number of years ago. The parents had successfully kept the information from the local community that both children suffered from Cystic Fibrosis.[5] Also, they kept the chronic and fatal nature of the disease secret from the children themselves who thus did not know that they were terminally ill. With this policy of secrecy towards both their children and the village the parents attempted to let their children have a childhood as undisturbed and as 'normal' as possible, and – by the same token – save their siblings and the entire family from being stigmatised. In order to do so, however, they chose to deviate from some of the physicians' suggestions whereby the 'normality' of their children's lives might have been interfered with. To that extent, the active and full compliance with the management of the disease, suggested by the physicians, was refused by the parents: The medical construction of an ideal patient was contested by the parents who – to put this in a pointed manner – posed their morality of granting a light hearted childhood to the little

patients and of keeping the family life intact against the medical morality of prolonging the life of an individual patient. Indeed, the parents had to confront an insolvable dilemma since even perfect compliance to the medical regimen would not have saved the children from certain death, only postponed it.

As pointed out earlier, recent sociological discussions of risk imply that biomedical knowledge is operational in transforming those dangers that were once considered fate into risks that the individual is required to respond to by taking action as soon as such an option is known to him or her. However, as the above example shows, there is no simple one-to-one relation between knowledge and agency. Social actors interpret new knowledges – including scientific knowledge of fatal diseases – against the backdrop of already existing quotidian knowledges, social practices and narratives of a good life.[6] This observation also cautions us against the supposed homogenisation of different cultures that is thought to be effected by the global availability and application of scientific knowledge.

Disciplines such as Social and Cultural Anthropology, Folklore, and European Ethnology that engage in "thick descriptions" can reconstruct the cultural logic of quotidian practices that is not co-terminus with the logic of official discourse. In what follows, it is not the semantics of official biomedical representations and procedures that is being deconstructed, nor do I aim at analysing how media images are employed to transmit notions of nature, the body, and health that are intended to popularise biomedical knowledge or the findings of Human Genetics. Instead of engaging in deconstruction along those lines, I am more interested in addressing the strategies of everyday life in order to find out about how people actually make use of both the official semantics and of vernacular notions, thereby reconstructing both in order to pursue their own goals. In order to be able to consider both the complexity of these de- and reconstructions and their effects, of necessity the scope of observation has to be rather broad.

Kinship as Biologically Hardened Social Fact
For a number of reasons, here I will focus on kinship, partly because notions of kinship act as mediating agents for a number of diverse domains of social behaviour and agency - marriage, children, inheritance, family solidarity. In addition, kinship as a "social fact" (E. Durkheim) represents social relations between generations, between the sexes, and between individuals by establishing a classifying matrix of great precision: Not only does it designate unequivocally who is the uncle and who is the nephew, but also which privileges and obligations arise from such positions within the kinship network.

Within the framework of European cultures, these social facts are often legitimated by referring to "natural facts" that supposedly make them stable and

durable. Cross-cultural studies in the anthropology of kinship point to the fact that European notions of kinship are quite "exotic" because they use biological knowledge of reproduction and heredity as a basis, a relationship that is conventionally summed up in the metaphor of "shared blood": Kinship relations are supposed to be social relations of a special kind, because blood is considered to be "thicker than water",[7] a liquid that 'draws people together'. It is truly fascinating how this self-evidence of kinship relations is achieved by short-circuiting the completely separated domains of nature and culture. What is even more relevant is what the possible effects of such a switching of the grand notions of Nature and Culture might be.

In European cultures, kinship appears to be a "hybrid concept" (Strathern, 1992, p. 16) that joins social, i.e., interactive classifications with biological, i.e., non-interactive classifications. Both elements contribute to a formation of kinship as an instrument well suited to defining persons not only as individuals but as positioned in a network of relations (Strathern, 1993, p. 154). By the same token, this kinship concept divests these relations of their socially constructed and therefore always contingent character.a As kinship relations are being denied their basis in the social, kinship is privileged as a seemingly pre-social and therefore particularly stable mode of integration in modern societies (Pina-Cabral, 1992). This essentialising move has proved so successful that its operation has been expanded beyond the family to bigger social units. In complex societies, a "politics of blood" – as Birgitta Hauser-Schaublin has called this transfer of the blood metaphor (Hauser-Schaublin, 1995) – serves as one of the "intermediary" mechanisms that define, institutionalise and legitimate social and national boundaries.[9]

Kinship as a concept certainly will keep on promising this kind of stability in the face of the challenge that Genetics is posing. However, some important changes are to be anticipated, as kinship in its European formation – because of its recourse to biology – is very susceptible to changes that occur in the biological knowledge base. Scientific advances in genetics might conceivably lead to a situation where no longer "shared blood", but "shared genes" are being emphasised.[10] And this metaphorical switch indeed can cause decisive shifts in how proximity and distance in kinship networks are being calculated. I will illustrate this with some observations on how, in the village introduced above, genetic knowledge acts on kinship relations, for instance, in the context of arranging marriages, or concerning decisions on whether to have oneself tested for carrier status of CF (Cystic Fibrosis) or not.

Kinship In Action
The transformations affected by this new knowledges, however, have to be contextualised with other, competing processes of modernisation that during the

past thirty years have caused massive changes in conventional practices, normative orientations, and everyday life worlds in Cyprus. The specific effects of genetic knowledges on Cypriot notions and practices of kinship and on Cypriot vernacular culture generally will be approached in two steps, first, some words on traditional marriage strategies and concepts of blood relations, as well as on notions of heredity and the marriage restrictions that result from them. Secondly, I will use some of my fieldwork findings to show how biomedical knowledges impact on actual marriage strategies as well as on concepts of health.

These fieldwork findings are part of a cross-cultural comparative study in Cyprus and Germany on production of scientific facts in Human Genetics laboratory settings, those facts being communicated in genetic counselling and the media and being read by and made sense of by lay persons. In this paper, however, the comparative dimension of the study remains implicit; it is based exclusively on findings from two periods of fieldwork in Cyprus in 1998 and several follow-up studies since then. In addition to observations in laboratories and in medical facilities I conducted interviews with physicians, officials in the health care sector, and, in particular, with residents of the village.

These interviews were conducted against the backdrop of the genetic screening of school children having resulted in the detection of an unexpectedly high incidence of carriers of the gene for CF.[11] As a consequence, the health authorities in cooperation with the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics (CING) proceeded to initiate a "prevention programme", to some extent modelled upon the successful screening for Thalassaemia in Cyprus.[12] All community residents between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, the segment of the village population belonging to the "reproductive" age-group as defined by the experts, were asked to participate in a second genetic screening in order to allow them to make decisions concerning their "reproductive behaviour" on the basis of the results. My interviews with community residents were scheduled about two months after the results of these tests were made available to the testees. The interviews included persons belonging to three groups, with fifteen interviews per group: people who had participated in the test and had been told of their non-carrier status; people who had been diagnosed as carriers of the CF gene by the testing; and people who for various reasons had not participated in the testing. The interviewees were between the ages of eighteen and forty-five, men and women were represented in equal numbers.[13]

The village with its four-thousand residents, all of them of Greek orthodox faith, is a community larger than many others in Cyprus. Because of its geographically advantageous setting in the central plain, and especially because it always had plenty of water supplies, the village emerged as an economically prosperous

community already in the nineteenth century which kept out-migration at a minimum for a long time. Nearly all marriages are between people born in the village;[14] young couples prefer to settle in the village. This marriage strategy of staying within the village was accompanied until recently by negative sanctions against those who violate this principle of endogamy: If a young man married a girl from elsewhere, he and his family were likely to hear diatribes intended to hurt their prestige: Namely, that he was not good enough for a marriage candidate in the village itself.[15] What villagers themselves interpret primarily as an expression of localist pride, is a social strategy partly anchored in the agrarian economy and predicated on a complex interplay of social and symbolic factors.

Marrying within the village ensured that the land that the groom receives upon marriage,[16] and the dowry house constructed on another piece of land by the bride's family, together would provide a subsistence basis in the village sufficient for the future family. Middle aged interviewees emphasised that until not long ago, marriages exclusively were arranged by the parents, often without the knowledge and consent of the young people concerned. Since the early seventies, first young men, then the girls as well were able to veto the decision of the parents.[17] The economic, social, and moral status of the respective families were the most important criteria for successfully arranging a marriage, with one criterion potentially taking the place of others in order to make upward mobility possible: lack of wealth could - given the right circumstances - be made up for by social and moral prestige. In order to arrange a marriage, both families would need to scrutinise the others' economic and social standing very closely, which entailed confidential and secretive negotiations to be pursued. After all, a rejected marriage candidate could mean loss of face for the entire family.[18] In the agrarian society of Cyprus where conspicuous consumption until recently was largely impossible, the marriage market served as the primary arena for social distinction[19].

The incidence of medical disorders in a given family was a factor drawing attention even before actual negotiations began. Most of the people I interviewed reported that families were constantly on the look-out for other family's health problems: "They look at the family line *(gennia).* You know what the others have in their houses."[20] Against the backdrop of families constantly keeping each other under observation, it no longer comes as a surprise that - like in the example presented before - a family should attempt to hide the health problems of its members even from its own relatives. The wish to keep illnesses a secret is also linked to the conviction that many illnesses, especially hereditary ones, are the result of a mixing of blood among relatives. That these convictions are still held today is evinced by the answers given by all persons interviewed when asked what had caused the cases of CF in Athienou. They said: because of *eímomiksia.*

Eímomiksia, which can be translated approximately as incest, results from marriage or sexual intercourse between relatives (*soî*).[21] Who counts as a relative for whom the incest taboo is in effect is defined by the canonical law of the orthodox church of Cyprus. Marriages between persons who are related up to the fifth degree are sinful relations and therefore forbidden. This means that a second cousin or the son of a first cousin cannot be considered as a potential partner in marriage.[22] This regulation is not contested; quite the contrary, lay persons tend towards an even stricter interpretation according to which the blood relation remains in effect even between more distant relatives. Even relatives beyond the seventh degree are thus considered to be joined by shared blood. Connected to this there is the conviction that the blood in order to renew itself progressively through the generations requires the admixture of "foreign" blood. It is therefore considered dangerous for distant relatives to marry because thereby the circle is closed again and the blood returns with disastrous results: Misfortune, death, and passing sickness to the family are the consequences.

Only against the backdrop of these beliefs and the practice of arranging marriages within the village, does the severe impact of the news about the discovery of a dangerous hereditary disease in Athienou become understandable. The community residents assumed that the disease had been caused by a social practice and that, even though allowed by the Church, it nevertheless is considered morally problematical. The scientific explanations made available by the geneticists in effect seemed to provide credence to this interpretation: According to the scientists, the frequency of CF cases in the village is evidence of a so-called "founder effect", with centuries of village endogamy causing the accumulation of the gene in the population. The practices of human genetics strengthened the interpretation relying on the metaphor of blood as well: The researchers had taken blood samples and had sketched out pedigrees. For them, this was a standard procedure to identify the paths of Mendelian heredity. The villagers, however, imagined that the research intended to disclose incestuous links. While the concept of the founder effect in population genetics works as a purely statistical explanation of a biological phenomenon devoid of any moral undertones, the blood metaphor, applied by the lay persons – reflecting on the same phenomenon – implies a negative moral evaluation of their collective practices.

These contrasting interpretations of the high incidence of a hereditary disease – one based on genetics, the other based on the notion of shared blood – belong to separate "domains". Domain, as a term coined by the British social anthropologist Marilyn Strathern, connotes a coherent set of practices and extensive knowledge that allow for a distinctive conceptualisation of phenomena and experiences (Strathern, 1993, p. 134). While scientific domaining strategies are characterised by strictly rational styles of reasoning and practices specific to each domain, in

everyday life, however, analogous and metaphorical styles of reasoning are common, as are imaginative combinations that transcend the clear-cut boundaries of individual domains. Natural scientists, as a rule, find such vernacular styles of reasoning deeply disturbing: For the human geneticists involved in the Cypriot case the fact that many lay persons interpreted their findings as the disclosure of a moral failing constituted an irrationality at the very least – to restore conceptual order they filed this phenomenon away under the heading of "misunderstanding", thereby also excluding it from their area of competence and concern.[23] That the scientific and the vernacular styles of reasoning turn out to be incompatible is linked to their different modes of domaining – and by extension, of constructing reality. These differences should be viewed against the backdrop of processes of knowledge transfer that so far have not been sufficiently explored by the Humanities. Again, the case study can illustrate what inquiries could productively be pursued by anthropology and related disciplines. Two aspects I would like to emphasise in concluding: first the changing notion of "blood" and relatedness, and second the impact of genetic knowledge on marriage strategies.

Analogous and Digital Proximity in Kinship Relations

According to the beliefs of Cypriot lay persons, blood constitutes a non-interactive substance that anchors the social relations between kin in a specific way. Shared blood progressively should be mixed with foreign blood so that over the course of many generations the family blood as well as kinship undergoes a process of "thinning out". Blood, obviously, is conceptualised as a substance with analogous attributes: the closer the kinship-link, the higher the degree of similarity of the blood, and vice versa. Conversely, human genetics operates on the basis of a "digital" concept of heredity. Genes are conceptualised as disembodied units of pure information that have no substance-like qualities at all.[24] According to this concept, drawn from information theory, genetic information is either present or absent, but it cannot be found in varying degrees of intensity. While blood as metaphor makes it possible to view the relative *proximity* between affines as analogous with the degree to which shared family blood flows through their veins, population genetics, on the contrary, privileges *distant* relations – for example between a mutational event in the past and the spreading or accumulation of this mutation in a given population.

This concept of heredity introduced by human genetics weakens the blood-based notion of kinship but conversely also works to reinforce some of its aspects. While close kin relations lose importance, more distant ones can suddenly become more relevant. For instance, many carriers of the CF gene were perplexed as to why their siblings were not carriers as well – because they considered themselves to be of "one blood" *(efnai afmo)* with their brothers and/or sisters. Now they were provoked to investigate their relatedness to other carriers whom they had not

previously considered as kin, or even to reconstruct their descent from the imaginary figure of the "founder" that the geneticists had alluded to. Such "constructions of the genetic self" surely have an individualising effect on the actors involved, as they set them apart from the immediate family: at the same time, however, new notions of belonging are produced as they begin to consider themselves as members of a population of carriers of a gene that goes back many centuries but is, of course, a purely abstract aggregate. Hereby, the innocent dealings with the far from innocent concept of "shared blood" are being irritated to the core. Also, the biological basis of social relations, that so far had determined proximity and distance unequivocally, is no longer unambiguous.

The question remains as to how people respond to these irritations of established notions of kinship and heredity. Interestingly enough, the results of the geneticists' research were taken by many of the interviewees as proof that their own world view is correct: namely, as a 40-year-old family head explained, that nothing is secure. In particular, people found it disturbing that the practice of marrying endogamously in the village - in itself a strategy to exclude unpleasant surprises by way of possessing secure information on the economic and social status of the respective families – should now turn out to be extremely risky, even when taking the precaution of not marrying anyone even distantly related. However, this realisation did not cause the villagers to want to abandon the practice of intra-village marriages. Quite the contrary – after all, other villages may also have a CF problem, people argued, but it might not be known yet because systematic tests have not been carried out in other villages. What is more, there is a new advantage in keeping up the tradition of marrying within the village as all young people have previously been tested for Cystic Fibrosis prior to marriage and already know who is a carrier and who is not.

British cultural anthropologist Charlie Davison attributes such attitudes to the increasing prevalence of a culture of "measure and manage" that invades all areas of life, meaning that more and more decisions in life are taken on the basis of biomedical test results in an attempt to rationally assess what dangerous or beneficial consequences any decision may entail.[25] I would like to add however, that every critique of this "measure and manage" culture resonates with standard assumptions in the social sciences, which may also deserve some critical scrutiny. To name three of them: It is assumed that the criteria people apply when making decisions generally are less than rational; it is also assumed that it is science that then will supply the rational criteria. And, finally, if one applies the statement to the Cypriot case under discussion, the impression is created that to Western biomedical sciences falls the task of modernising a non-Western society.

However, as I have tried to show above, what characterises traditional marriage strategies in Cyprus is precisely that they are far from irrational, but on the contrary mobilise an immense concern with rational decision-making based on primarily economic as well as social criteria. Therefore, in Cyprus, many middle-aged parents tend to view the notion of "romantic love", adopted by the under thirty age group, as a dangerous or at least disconcerting import of Western irrationality. Most of the middle-aged interviewees in my study were doubtful as to whether one could actually build a lifelong relationship on such a transient sentiment. Those interviewed who were about thirty years of age, however, showed understanding as to the desire of the adolescent to take decisions independently. Alas, the intergenerational struggle that becomes evident here is not merely symbolic or the manifestation of young people trying to claim autonomy. Rather, the economic criteria that in the past determined what would be a "good match", today have become less important in restructuring the Cypriot service economy. Different criteria have begun to take their place, such as an academic degree acquired abroad, or the cultural competence to come out on top in the turmoil of social transformation. Land holdings or the ability of a family to uphold its honourable status no longer affords the security it once did. However, without exception all parents and young people I interviewed in the village agreed that genetic testing should precede marriage. For the parents, the test in a sense helps reintroduce an element of rationality into proceedings that have almost totally succumbed to "the power of love"; for the young people, conversely, the test helps exclude any problems that might cloud their future happiness as a couple.

While it remains to be seen whether "love" will eventually become a socially accepted criterion for marrying that is deemed rational,[26] what can already be detected today is that the secrecy that used to surround all health matters is being abandoned. Without exception, the interviewees had heard of marriage scams in the past where parents had kept the health problems of their children from the family of a prospective spouse. Today, however, uncompromising honesty in such matters is required and also practiced – not so much between the parental parties, because they no longer have exclusive responsibility in the marriage arrangement, but between the partners in marriage themselves because they are now morally obligated to mutual sincerity according to the code of love. In effect, the strict and – from the perspective of bioethics dominated by scholars in North-European or North-American universities – debatable policy of the Thalassaemia programme enforced by the church (Angastiniotis et al., 1986) was highly influential in establishing such mutuality by creating an *obligatory passage point* for every prospective couple. By granting its blessing only to those couples who present a certificate confirming that tests for Thalassaemia have been undertaken, the church has made the genetic condition a public family affair and in turn ensured that prospective spouses must declare openly whether they are carriers or not.[27]

Conclusion

In Cyprus, similar to other societies, we can observe how social actors are appropriating the wider knowledge produced by human genetics, and are using it in the context of social situations that are no longer static but have become fluid. Thus, the process of introducing such a far from "neutral" corpus of knowledge into a society is always accompanied by processes of appropriation that in turn are guided to varying degrees by personal goals, cultural values, and social patterns. What follows is that the impact of this new knowledge on cultural practices cannot be of a simple, cause-and-effect-like linearity.

Rather, both, on conceptual and on practical grounds, the genetic practices associated with modern biomedicine – such as genetic testing – as well as genetically-based concepts of heredity make available new options that affect a transformation of the body that can be captured in the intersection of two terms: flexibility and reflexivity. The flexibility of the body refers to its malleability when social actors take up new options and develop new practices. And bodies also become increasingly reflexive, as scientifically produced knowledge on the body is employed by social actors and other or older types of corporeal knowledges are added on to, modified, or replaced. Human Genetics is transforming the human body both in terms of its cognised models and in terms of everyday practices; according to the medical anthropologist Nancy Scheper-Hughes the body at the end of the twentieth century has become a "primary action zone" (Scheper-Hughes, 1994, p. 229). In the course of this transformation, the refashioning is not without bounds. Rather, it comes up against immutable biology as well as against established practices, conventional styles of reasoning, and persistent normative orientations. The outcome of the complex interplay between these factors I provisionally label as "reflexible bodies".[28] This term, at least, seems more accurate than simply speaking of socially constructed bodies, and, because it is such an unwieldy term, also has the distinct advantage of constantly reminding us that we urgently need to explore this new world order empirically and come to terms with it theoretically.

Because of the way in which modernity has established itself in Cyprus, people have already had the opportunity or rather, were forced to grapple with issues that only now are confronting populations in Northern and Western Europe. For instance, in Cyprus young couples unquestioningly deal with the imposition of having to draw conclusions from a mandatory genetic test for Thalassaemia carrier status. In this, they are being helped by the fact that the (traditional) notion that decisions for marriage should be based on purely rational criteria has not yet disappeared from social experience.[29]

Faced with revolutionising developments in gene technologies, can people in Northern European countries learn from the Cypriot experience, and if yes, what can they learn from it? A few years from now, so-called "bio-chips" will become widely available that allow for quick, reliable and inexpensive simultaneous testing for a variety of genetic dispositions and traits, thereby creating a complete "risk profile" of an individual. Up until now, such testing had to be performed in costly and complicated testing procedures for single traits and could only be carried out by experts, whereas bio-chips can also be handled by non-expert personnel. Social scientists are expecting the *promise of transparency* offered by these bio-chips to turn all too soon into an *obligation to transparency* especially in the middle classes of western industrial societies, a challenge which is not yet balanced by any ethical or normative regulations. Conversely, it is quite possible that Cypriot modernity has accumulated the kind of social experiences and moral practices that might constitute a critical resource in this context.

Notes

1. For the generous help provided during the research I would like to thank the Cyprus Institute of Neurology and Genetics, namely Dr. L. Middleton and especially Dr. C. Deltas, who – as principal investigator – granted access to his data, made contact with study-participants possible and supported this study in many respects. Dr. M. Azina-Chronidi and Dr. A. Iosiphides supported me in arranging meetings with respondents and made the village hospital a hospitable place for me. I am grateful for generous feedback and critical comments especially by Dr. V. Christophidou-Anastasiadou, Prof. V. Argyrou, S. Marangos, Prof. Y. Papadakis, and Prof. G. Welz.

2. See for example Gross (1990, 206f.): "rhetorical analyses show how the sciences construct their specialized rhetorics from a common heritage of persuasion. By means of these, the sciences create bodies of knowledge so persuasive as to seem unrhetorical – to seem, simply, the way the world is."

3. See for example the seminal study of Latour/Woolgar (1986); in addition, research in the tradition of classical studies on/in History of Science and Sociology of Science have been influential in shifting the focus from analyses of histories of scientific theories to analysing scientific practices especially in the laboratory. See for example the reader of Cunningham/Williams (1992).

4. This *Handbuch des Deutschen Aberglaubens* (1935/1936) was one of several large scale projects German folklorists were devoted to at the end of the nineteenth century. Like in similar projects, compiling information and editing was done by academic folklorists, who relied solely on information collected by questionnaires, which had been sent out before to "amateur folklorists", most of them schoolteachers or clergymen. The aim was to secure vernacular culture and folk beliefs which were doomed to "disappear" in the dynamic processes of industrialisation and modernisation. Whether the Handbuch comprises sound information or is most of all a projection of the educated bourgeois class in Wilhelmine

Germany is a much-debated issue – nevertheless, some of the information given can be considered as a useful historical source.

5.   Keeping health-related information a secret in small communities seems not to be a culturally specific phenomenon as such. Jutta Dornheim (1983), a German Medical Folklorist for example found a very similar pattern of behaviour in a village in the southern part of Germany in families with cancer patients. Nevertheless, the reasons for this behaviour seem to be highly context specific: In the case of the German village secrecy about cancer cases was a result of a connection the villagers made between cancer and contagious tuberculosis, a serious health problem in the community in former times not only for the people but – because the cattle could become infected – for their economic subsistence. In the village under study in Cyprus, secrecy seems more related to the organisation of kinship and marriage; this point will be examined below.

6.   On the significance of such narratives which are often drawn from popular culture see a study by The Wellcome Trust {1998).

7.   Cf. Zonabend {1996} for the cultural specificities of the European kinship system and the influence of the Christian Church in its development.

8.   Social agency is muted – which aligns these everyday strategies nicely with some theories of structuralism; see, e.g., Herzfeld (1997, p. 113).

9.   For the important role of the family as an "intermediary institution" in modern and late-modern societies see Luckmann, 1998.

10.   Although the notion of "genes" was applied as early as the end of the nineteenth century – as in Galton's "eugenics", – racist ideologies (especially the German variety) drew heavily and exclusively on the blood metaphor. This line of inquiry cannot be pursued here any further.

11.   The mutation tested was AF508, a mutation which homozygously causes a very severe form of CF. Other mutations, which account for more than 50% of CF mutations in the Cypriot population either homozygotically or in combination with the AF508-gene will result in a much milder symptomatology; see Deltas 1997.

12.   In the context of this paper it will not be possible to discuss the important - and for an ethical evaluation critical – differences between screenings for Thalassaemia and Cystic Fibrosis; important aspects would be the totally voluntary character of the CF screening, the marked differences in the symptomatology of the disease and – most of all – the different carrier-frequencies. Also, the highly controversial literature regarding the benefits and risks of a population screening for Cystic Fibrosis cannot be discussed here; cf. – e.g., – Honnor et al., 2000; Haddow et al., 1998; Koch et al., 1994; Danayer et al., 1997; Levenkron, 1997.

13.   Due to the fact that respondents had been granted confidentiality of their data, the procedure of arranging meetings was rather complex. The protocol agreed upon was the following: GING provided a list of names of testees to the local hospital; the physician at the hospital then approached the people on the list to ask whether they would be interested in participating in this study. The physician gave the names of those who had expressed their willingness to be interviewed to me; the aims of the study were explained at each meeting extensively, all respondents contacted agreed to participate. People who chose against a genetic test or who missed the opportunity were found by personally approaching residents at random. In a number of cases, such persons would also approach me with the explicit wish to be interviewed.

All of the interviews took place in the village hospital, because as a rule, the interviewees

preferred this "neutral" setting. For setting up the appointments and making it possible for the interviews to take place, I would like to thank Dr. C. Deltas (GING), Dr. M. Azina-Chronidi and A. Iosiphides. For assisting me in the interviews I wish to thank Stavros Marangos.

14. Only very recently the proportion of marriages between villagers and "Outsiders" has risen significantly but nevertheless stays even in the perception of villagers on a low level compared to other villages in Cyprus.

15. Interview 12/7; for similar findings see Sant Cassia. In his case study of Peyia, marriage partners originating from neighbouring villages were considered as "morally suspect" mainly because their social status could never be known with certainty: "They were referred to, jokingly, as shillokualima (a dog brought to the village), and their position was emphasized in a whole series of rituals, the most important being a mock beating of the groom's party ...." (Sant Cassia, 1982, p. 645).

16. According to Sant Cassia (1982), the practice of transferring land to a son upon marriage increasingly replaces earlier practices where property transfer was tied to inheritance after the death of a parent (see Loizos, 1975).

17. For similar findings see Loizos, 1975, p. 511.

18. See Loizos, 1995, 513f. This secrecy at the same time opened up options for fraud (see Sant Cassia, 1982, p. 655): the strict gender-separation for young people in the traditional village in addition to prohibiting the appearance of young women in public (Loizos, 1995, p. 508) made the "bridal switch", that elderly people often alluded to, possible, i.e., the groom was under the impression that he was going to get married to a chosen girl while at the wedding he would find out that she had been replaced by a less attractive older sister. "I have been betrayed" is even today a frequent saying by which some Cypriot husbands mockingly express their displeasure about their spouses.

19. See Argyrou, 1996, for an analysis of the fouartas (the "big spender"), a male strategy of conspicuous consumption which might generate social capital but not necessarily result in enhancing social status.

20. Interview 6/7. Very often, the vocabulary chosen was not as "neutral": a common expression used was kalo ratsa.

21. See also Du Boulay, 1984.

22. In recent years, the Church holds the position – relying on genetic knowledge – that marriages to second cousins can be allowed but it is not willing to promote this new point of view publicly.

23. This strategy was much criticized by other experts involved in genetic services in the Cypriot tertiary health-care system; this conflict between different groups of experts, related styles of reasoning and between private (research) and public institutions (health-care sector) cannot be elaborated upon here.

24. Fox Keller, 1995. The well known population geneticist Lee Silver for example states that the sequential code stored in chromosomes as well as in databases is the gene, which can be transmitted via biological reproduction or via the internet.

25. Davison, 1996; similarly, Dorothy Nelkin und Laurence Tancredi (1989) are predicting the emergence of an "actuarial mind-set" in everyday culture.

26. For young Cypriots today, love is the primary reason for marriage, and they prefer friendships they have chosen themselves over kinship ties they have inherited. See also the study by Argyrou (1996, 104f.): "There are several visible signs that wedding celebrations may be scaled down in the future. In fact ... members of the elite are already having close

weddings attended only by a few hundred guests." Argyrou interprets this as an attempt on their part to visibly represent their modernity, and also as a consequence of the socially secure status they have achieved that allows them to step outside of the "extended networks of social relations". For the context discussed here, however, statements by younger people are pertinent, who are no longer interested in the social revenue of big weddings and claim to prefer small celebrations in the circle of close friends.

27. . Conflicts about marriage arrangements in former times arose mainly between the parental parties, the married couple seems to have been rarely involved; see Loizos, 1975.

28. Emily Martin's (1994) excellent study on the impact of scientific knowledge on the everyday-perception of immune systems by lay people emphasises the element of flexibility of late-modern bodies; conversely, I would like to stress the reflexivity of flexible practices.

29. The "romantic love complex" is informed by a different mode of rational practices and judgements that are grounded in *aesthetics,* a socially distinctive "Urteilskraft" that makes criteria like economics, social class or status topical in a more indirect manner – by means of *aesthetic judgements,* cf. Bourdieu's (1979) concept of "habitus".

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GREEK CYPRIOT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERACTING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

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Abstract

It has been postulated that increased contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should result in increased optimism regarding the ability of the two communities to interact. This work uses a multivariate model to test whether this, indeed, has been the case. The findings suggest that contacts between the two major communities on the island have fostered increasingly optimistic views of interacting with Turkish Cypriots. Interestingly, there is little evidence that demographic characteristics of respondent are useful in predicting a person's optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots. The data for the analysis is taken from a May 2004 survey of 1,000 Greek Cypriots.

Between 1974 and 2003, a United Nations monitored zone physically separated the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the island of Cyprus and there were few social or business interactions between members of the two major ethnic groups. Then, in April 2003, the leadership of the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot statelet declared that it would not impede visits to the areas under control of the Republic of Cyprus. The floodgates were opened and large numbers of citizens from both communities began crossing the United Nations' "Green Line" to visit areas in the other entity. The UN still monitors the Green Line but now Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots interact on a daily basis – many Greek Cypriots visit the tourist sites, casinos, and restaurants in the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot statelet in the north and many Turkish Cypriots work, shop, and study in the areas controlled by the internationally recognised government in the south.

But have increased contacts led to increased perceptions of the ability of the two ethnic groups to live together peacefully? What are the correlates of those who are most optimistic or pessimistic about living and working together? In order to answer these questions, we investigate likely causes for various preferences via an econometric analysis of the data gathered from a recent survey.

Previous Works

There is a substantial literature written about the politics of Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem (see Attalides, 1979; Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999; Joseph, 1999, 1997; Kyriakou, 2000; O'Malley and Craig, 1999; Peristianis, 1998; Richmond, 1999, 2001, 2002; Stravrinides, 1975; Theophanous, 1996, 2000). Such literature generally delves into explaining the sources of the Cyprus Problem with the normative goal of exploring the internal or external structural changes that will ensure a sustainable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Often, external players are cited as the cause of the Cyprus Problem (see, for example O'Malley and Craig, 1999) or the EU or UN are seen as critical players that can allow for a sustainable solution to the Cyprus Problem (see for example Peristianis, 1998; Theophanous, 2000).

Despite the voluminous literature written on the Cyprus Problem and the ethnic clash on the island, there has been little or no quantitative analysis of the perceptions of one ethnic group of the other. Instead, authors tend to make generalisations of the bargaining positions of the two ethnic groups that inherently suggest uniformity in positions. An exception to this is Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004) in which two waves of surveys were fielded, one before the liberalisation of the crossing of the Green Line and one following the liberalisation of the Green Line in April 2003. The surveys asked Cypriots of both the Greek- and the Turkish- Cypriot communities to rate perceptions of the reconciliation between the two communities on the island and their feelings about pursuing a business relationship with a person of the other community in the near future. The intention of the study was to test the notion of contact theory – the notion that when peoples interact, they will have more optimistic perceptions of their ability to interact with the other ethnic group.

Yildizian and Ehteshami's (2004) major finding is that the increased movement of people across the Green Line has encouraged the development of more optimistic views of interaction between the communities, supporting the notion of contact theory. However, this work has several methodological weaknesses. The major methodological weakness is that the authors assume that they have tested contact theory because time had an impact on interactions between people of the different ethnic groups. Essentially, the assumption is that time caused contacts. However, this overlooks the real notion that the contacts are not distributed evenly throughout the island. Furthermore, there are many different types of interactions that were not explored. The work only explored the notion of the ability to reconcile the peoples and to do business together – there are many other types of interactions that can take place. Finally, this work did not use a sophisticated design, allowing for control variables.

In this work, we look into the data collected in a recent survey to learn if contact theory has been effective among Greek Cypriots. We explore the spatial aspects of contact theory. In addition, we explore several other explanatory factors that may play a role in explaining pessimism/optimism regarding interacting with another ethnic group. The study is somewhat exploratory, looking for possible explanations as to what causes the variations in views of dealing with another ethnic group in Cyprus. Such research has important practical implications for those who study the Cyprus Problem and are seeking reasonable measures to solve the long-standing political and social divisions on the island, since it should indicate the degree of success that fostering contacts between the ethnic groups has accomplished in setting the stage for reconciliation between the ethnic groups.

Data and the Tests

The College of Tourism and Hotel Management commissioned CYMAR Market Research Limited to interview one thousand Greek Cypriots to learn about public opinion relating to rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots following the April 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Respondents were between the ages of 18 and 65 and there were no older respondents in the sample because it was carried out as part of a commercially available omnibus study in which no modifications of the sample could be made. One-thousand Greek Cypriots were surveyed in face-to-face interviews at their homes throughout the government-controlled areas of the island.

CYMAR used stratified multistage sampling to find respondents. In the first stage, CYMAR divided up the population into urban and rural areas in accordance with the government's population census of 2001. Urban areas were divided into areas of roughly the same size (approximately 1,000 inhabitants). As a result, the greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 areas, Limassol into 161, Larnaca into 72 and Paphos into 45. Forty-five urban areas and fifteen rural areas were chosen. The urban areas were chosen by random methods while the probability of being chosen as a rural area was proportionate to the size of the population of the village.

Within each area chosen in the sample, random methods were used, as much as possible to locate the households from which to find respondents. Starting points were found with the assistance of a computer programme designed for the purpose. Interviewers went to every n^{th} household to commence interviews. At each household a respondent was chosen from the adult with the most recent birthday. To ensure that interviews had taken place, 15 per cent of the respondents were contacted by telephone to confirm that a CYMAR interviewer had visited them in the course of the research. No refusal rates were reported or recorded, and CYMAR

reported no particular problems during the course of the fieldwork. In general, the interviews seem to portray a generally representative view of the population in terms of gender, district, and urban/rural location.

One weakness of the study is that it was performed as part of an omnibus with a commercial organisation. An omnibus service is a package offered by commercial market research firms that allows multiple organisations or individuals to carry out a collective study on the general population. The strength of such a study is that the costs are minimised since the study is shared with a number of persons or organisations buying questions on a survey. This is a benefit for those who only want to ask a few questions of the general public. This is also beneficial to the analyst who has questions and some access to funds but does not have available professional data collection services. The weakness, however, is that the market research firm determines the sample frame and methodology. In this study, for example, the research excluded those over 65 years of age, probably because most commercial interests are not interested in older respondents. Despite these weaknesses, the generally representative sample of data collection and the large number of observations remain the strengths of the study, allowing everyone a reasonable amount of security in the knowledge that data are generally representative of the population of the government-controlled areas of Cyprus and that the resulting patterns found within the data are "real."

Optimism Regarding Interactions

The degree of optimism regarding the ability of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to coexist is the dependent variable for this analysis. Survey respondents were given a list of activities that indicated different types of interactions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The list of activities presented were "work together," "live together in neighbourhoods," "socialise," "intermarry," and "do business together." The respondents were asked how long they thought it would take for the two groups to live together successfully and peacefully. The possible responses to the question were "never," "ten years or less," "five years or less," "three years or less," and "one year or less." The responses were coded on an ordinal scale with "never" coded as "1" and "one year or less" coded as "5". The survey responses reflect the respondents' optimism regarding the ability of the two peoples to coexist peacefully and interact on these different dimensions. Higher numbers indicate greater levels of expressed optimism. Table 1 below illustrates the dispersion of the data.

Table 1. Frequencies of Valid Responses (%) and Mean Score

	N	Never (1)	10 years or less (2)	5 years or less (3)	3 years or less (4)	1 year or less (5)	Mean
Work Together	995	6.8	8.3	12	19.4	53.5	4.04
Live as neighbours	988	11.6	14.6	18.9	29.6	25.3	3.42
Share a social life	993	14.4	15.8	21.6	23.6	24.7	3.28
Intermarry	987	54.2	24.2	11.4	5.2	5	1.82
Share businesses	991	17.3	20.1	19.2	21	22.5	3.11

Note: Figures may not add up exactly to 100 due to rounding.

Each type of interaction attempts to measure a different dimension of familiarity and intimacy with Turkish Cypriots. The expectation is that working together and socialising would be less offensive to Greek Cypriots than marriage. Indeed, marriage was the dimension to which Greek Cypriots showed the highest degree of pessimism. It is likely that religion and ethnic distrust would make intermarriage and sharing businesses the more difficult for them to be optimistic about. We now turn to the likely explanatory variables to help explain the variations.

Independent Variables
/. Distance to Checkpoints in Nicosia
Contact theory stipulates that contacts between ethnic groups should lead to an alleviation of ethnic frictions. To measure this, one method is to assume that time played a role in allowing for contacts, as Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004) have done. However, there is a spatial element in Cyprus, since Turkish Cypriots must cross over the Green Line in few places. Half of the crossing points are in Nicosia, therefore, the distance to checkpoints is one way to measure the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots, and thus contacts with Turkish Cypriots, in the Republic of Cyprus. Nicosia is, in many respects, a bicommunal city. Turkish Cypriots work, shop, study, and socialise in areas under government control in Nicosia because of its proximity to the crossing points to the Green Line. Although there are other crossing points in the Famagusta district, those Turkish Cypriots who cross over generally just cross into the areas under the control of the Government of Cyprus during the day for work alone.

To measure this diffusion of contacts, we have measured each respondent's home from Nicosia, assuming that the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots into the Republic

of Cyprus is related to driving distances and that Nicosia is the major crossing point. Because the survey data indicate only the district in which the interview with the respondent took place, each district was measured in terms of driving distance in kilometres from the main city in the district, according to the Cyprus Tourism Organisation's data. Nicosia is coded as zero, Limassol 83, Paphos 143, Larnaca 45, and Famagusta 80. These figures are not perfect measures of residential distances from the Green Line's crossing points and do not reflect the exact driving distances of many of the respondents in each of the districts. However, they give a rough indication of distance from the Green Line and thus a reflection of probable contacts with Turkish Cypriots. We expect shorter distances will correlate to higher amounts of optimism and longer distances with lower amounts of optimism.

II. Refugee Status

Refugee status is another hypothesised attribute to influence optimism/pessimism toward interacting with Turkish Cypriots. The refugees have undergone a very different life experience than non-refugees and, arguably, may therefore have greater antagonism towards Turkish Cypriots. The refugees are coded with a dummy variable with "1" representing refugees and "O" representing non-refugees, according to their self-description. Around 39 per cent of the respondents to the·survey reported being refugees. It is expected that refugees will show less optimistic views towards interacting with Turkish Cypriots.

III. Age

It is expected that younger respondents will show greater pessimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots because they have not had the ability to interact with them, until quite recently. Older respondents, it is expected, will show greater optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots, since many of them grew up in an environment in which there was not a political division of the island and may well remember days in which both communities interacted on a daily basis. Respondent age is measured in years, according to self-reporting. The mean age of the respondents in the sample is 44. The expectation is that older respondents will exhibit more optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

IV. Education

The highest education level achieved is also a consideration in the analysis as there may be some influence on attitudes. The highest education level achieved is based on self-description and denoted as "1" for those with a primary education, "2" for a secondary education and "3" for a tertiary education. We expect that those with additional education will be more optimistic, on the assumption that higher levels of education will lead to greater critical thinking, thus undermining the nationalist educational curriculum in primary schools.

V. Gender

Gender may also play a role in perceptions of "the other." Males are indicated with a "1" and females with a "O". Since the survey was generally representative of the population, about half of the respondents were male. We expect that males will display less optimism, as nearly all of them have experienced military service, in which they have been inculcated with nationalist ideology.

VI. Visiting the "other" Cyprus

A continuous variable derived from the question *"how many times have you visited the occupied areas?'* Responses were grouped into five categories, 'O', '1', '2', '3' or '4+'. Forty-seven per cent of the respondents said they had never visited the occupied areas while 20 per cent said that they had only been once. Around 12 per cent of the survey respondents reported that they had travelled to the occupied areas twice. Eight per cent reported travelling there three times and 13 per cent reported travelling there four or more times. With about half of the respondents reporting never to have crossed the Green Line, there is the suggestion that there is a political bias for not crossing the line, possibly because they do not want to be near Turkish Cypriots. The expectation is that those who have crossed the most frequently will illustrate higher levels of optimism towards interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

VII. Socioeconomic Status

It is also hypothesised that socioeconomic status is an influence on political and social attitudes. The expectation is that those respondents with a higher socioeconomic status will be more pessimistic regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots, because they are the ones who benefit from the political and social status quo on the island - political and ethnic separation. Socioeconomic status is classified on a scale from A to E, with A being the highest tier of the spectrum and D and E the lower tiers. For the survey, interviewers classified each respondent into the categories of A or B, C1, C2, or D or E. Higher numbers express higher socioeconomic status. The expectation is that the higher levels of socioeconomic status will be indicative of less optimism.

VIII. Party Preference

Party preference may influence different views on the world and thus differences in opinions and perceptions on interacting with Turkish Cypriots. For this analysis, those who said they would vote for AKEL, DISY, and DIKO for the elections to the European Parliament were used. About 20 per cent of respondents reported they were AKEL voters, about 18 per cent DISY supporters, and about 12 per cent DIKO supporters. The respondents are marked with a dummy variable, indicating their voting preference for these three parties. We expect some differences based upon party affiliation, since party affiliation is a reflection of a person's political philosophy.

IX. Preferences for a Division

Political preferences for a solution to the Cyprus Problem may also play a role in influencing perceptions of interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Survey respondents were asked *"what do you think the best permanent solution for the island is?'* Responses were coded as "like now/status quo," ''two separate states," "federal solution," or "unification." About 16 per cent of the respondents said that they favoured the status quo while 13 per cent stated a preference for a two state solution. About 15 per cent stated a preference for a federal solution and 51 per cent felt that unification was the best solution. The remaining respondents did not have a preference, did not know, or refused to answer. The status quo response and the two separate states response are coded together for this analysis, since both responses imply that political division is the preferred solution to the Cyprus Problem, either via a de facto separation or a recognised legal separation of the states. A dummy variable indicates those who want separation and division. We expect that those who would desire division would be less optimistic regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots, since separation implies irreconcilable differences between the communities.

Findings

Two different methods were used to analyse the data. First, standard OLS regressions were used to analyse the data, since this is the method most familiar to social scientists, although it may not necessarily be the most correct approach because the dependent variable is ordinal. Therefore, a second approach was used, a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach, more specifically, Ordered Logit. Ordered Logit was used because it is the correct approach given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. The outcomes of the two approaches will be compared following the analysis using both methods. Because there were some refusals or "don't know" responses to some of the dependent variables, a number of cases could not be incorporated into the analysis.

Table 2 (opposite) illustrates the output of the OLS models. The models show some strengths and weaknesses. As a start, all the intercepts are statistically significant, thus allowing for estimations for the dependent variables. However, the A-squares and adjusted A-squares are low, meaning that the models at best can only explain about 16 per cent of the variation of the dependent variables.

Table 2. Optimism of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots - (OLS Coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses)

	Work Together	Live as Neighbours	Share Social Life	Inter-marry	Share Businesses
Intercept	4.546*** (18.893)	3.833*** (14.499)	3.636*** (13.937)	2.078*** (9.001)	2.963*** (11.001)
Distance to Nicosia	-.008377*** (-10.471)	-.003614*** (-4.119)	-.006948*** (-8.011)	-.003427*** (-4.465)	-.005197*** (-5.805)
Refugee	-.0598 (-.743)	-.0269 (-.305)	.05 (.572)	-.0477 (-.618)	-.002337 (-.026)
Age	.00036 (.12)	-.002698 (-.811)	.002733 (.829)	-.00688** (-2.357)	.004864 (1.431)
Education	-.119 (-1.391)	-.09516 (-1.009)	-.125 (-1.346)	.08227 (1.003)	-.0004354 (-.005)
Males	.271*** (3.65)	.144* (1.776)	.239*** (2.98)	.111 (1.566)	.271*** (3.264)
Visiting Occupied Areas	.09737*** (3.545)	.03511 (1.164)	.02487 (.833)	.02744 (1.04)	.09049*** (2.938)
Social Status	-.04606 (-.791)	.02942 (.461)	.055 (.871)	-.01402 (-.252)	.05099 (.783)
AKEL	-.01815 (-.184)	.089 (.824)	.102 (.952)	.165* (1.75)	-.01664 (-.151)
DISY	.0559 (.549)	.151 (1.350)	-.044 (-.398)	.0029 (-.03)	-.147 (-1.289)
DIKO	.0357 (.298)	.0746 (.570)	.122 (.936)	.121 (1.045)	.155 (1.154)
Prefer Division	-.444*** (-4.993)	-.731*** (-7.488)	-.902*** (-9.349)	-.243*** (-2.85)	-.969*** (-9.739)
R-square	.165	.083	.163	.047	.161
Adjusted R-square	.156	.073	.154	.036	.151
N	995	998	993	987	991

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

In terms of testing contact theory, it seems that the distance to Nicosia is one of the best indicators of optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Distance to Nicosia is negatively correlated with optimism toward dealing with Turkish Cypriots on all measured dimensions. This means that those who live further from Nicosia tend to have more pessimistic views on interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

This suggests that the contacts made and the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots has made a positive impact on optimism on all dimensions.

Many of the other independent variables fail. We see that refugee status, education, and social status play no significant role whatsoever in influencing the perceptions of optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots. Age does play a role in influencing perceptions on intermarriage between the communities, with older respondents being less optimistic that marriages between the two communities will be commonplace. Males, it seems, are more optimistic than females regarding their views, contradicting our expectations on all five dependent variables, although not all are statistically significant. All in all, though, it seems that males are more optimistic regarding working together, living together in neighbourhoods, and sharing social lives and businesses to a statistically significant degree.

The indicator for visiting the occupied areas is also a meaningful indicator but for only two of the dependent variables in the analysis - working together and sharing businesses. However, it should be added that all the coefficients are positive, indicating that those persons visiting the occupied areas show a predisposition toward optimistic perceptions of interactions with Turkish Cypriots, although there is indication that it is statistically significant for only two of the independent variables.

Political party preferences appear to play little or no role in conditioning opinions regarding optimism/pessimism on interacting with Turkish Cypriots. However, there is indication that AKEL supporters display more optimism on intermarriage and DISY supporters more optimism on living as neighbours. Otherwise, party preferences fail miserably in explaining the dependent variables in the analysis.

Finally, the preference for a division plays a role in shaping views on optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. It seems that those who prefer a division show a systematically pessimistic view on interacting with Turkish Cypriots for all the dependent variables measuring optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Those who prefer division are more pessimistic regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots systematically.

The findings of the models using Ordered Logit show mostly the same findings as the OLS findings, as shown in Table 3 opposite. What is interesting is that the pseudo-A-squared values given in the Ordered Logit regressions are strikingly similar to the ones found in the OLS regressions. What is also interesting is that the two independent variables that were consistently statistically significant in the models run with OLS regressions were also consistently statistically significant in the models run with Ordered Logit. The independent variables measuring distance to Nicosia and preferences for division are systematically related to the dependent variables in each of the regressions run, whether it is using an OLS or an MLE

approach. Of the 55 boxes in the matrix only two of them were different in a meaningful way. In the Ordered Logit regressions the role of education in conditioning the dependent variables for working together and sharing a social life are statistically related, while in the OLS regressions, this was not so. Otherwise, there were virtually no differences in the findings using the different approaches.

Table 3. Optimism of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots - (MLE Coefficients with significance levels in parentheses)

	Work Together	Live as Neighbours	Share Social Life	Inter-marry	Share Businesses
Distance to Nicosia	-.0144*** (.000)	-.0049*** (.000)	-.0098*** (.000)	-.00644*** (.000)	-.00714*** (.000)
Refugee	-.110 (.429)	-.069 (.578)	.0544 (.661)	-.049 (.713)	-.00997 (.936)
Age	-.0008 (.866)	-.00233 (.618)	.00379 (.419)	-.0135*** (.007)	.0046 (.316)
Education	-.244* (.089)	-.15 (.259)	-.223* (.091)	.184 (.198)	-.0524 (.691)
Males	.454*** (.000)	.21* (.066)	.307*** (.007)	.165 (.181)	.361*** (.002)
Visiting Occupied Areas	.201*** (.000)	.0579 (.174)	.0371 (.383)	.0206 (.648)	.128*** (.003)
Social Status	-.0663 (.495)	.048 (.589)	.104 (.245)	-.0213 (.824)	.0923 (.303)
AKEL	-.0921 (.580)	.094 (.536)	.156 (.307)	.238 (.141)	.0291 (.848)
DISY	.156 (.376)	.233 (.138)	.00522 (.973)	-.136 (.428)	-.148 (.345)
DIKO	.0775 (.703)	.0836 (.650)	.168 (.364)	.211 (.291)	.235 (.202)
Prefer Division	-.630*** (.000)	-1.00*** (.000)	-1.269*** (.000)	-.459*** (.003)	-1.366*** (.000)
Cox and Snell A-square	.176	.08	.16	.052	.159
Nagelkerke A-square	.191	.084	.167	.057	.165
McFadden A-square	.075	.027	.055	.022	.054
N	995	998	993	987	991

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

Conclusions

The data analysis supports the findings of Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004). Indeed, it seems that contacts between the two ethnic groups have made the public more optimistic toward interactions between the groups. This finding has significant implications for creating an atmosphere of reconciliation between the two major ethnic groups on the island. If optimistic attitudes towards coexistence, cooperation, and reconciliation are necessary preconditions for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, then contacts between members of the two major ethnic groups seem to be a vehicle to promote the preconditions.

Despite the improved design of a test of contact theory, there are still some weaknesses that future research should investigate. First, future work should try to test contact theory in both political entities on the island. It may be that contact theory works better among one community than another. Second, future work should intentionally be designed to test contact theory by asking respondents to rate their interactions with people from the other community. The present use of distance to the crossing points is useful but is definitely not the definitive measure of contacts with people from the other community.

Apart from the findings regarding contact theory, the conclusions show that few of the demographic variables seem to play any role in conditioning the attitudes towards interactions with Turkish Cypriots. The major demographic aspects examined (refugee status, socioeconomic status, and education) play no major role in influencing optimism/pessimism regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Age only plays a role in forming opinions regarding intermarriage between members of the two major communities. The only demographic variable that seems to play a systematic role is gender with males appearing to be more optimistic on three of the five dimensions appraised in this analysis.

The most intriguing outcome from the research is that those who prefer a division on the island are also those who have a more pessimistic view on interactions with Turkish Cypriots. This means that political attitudes toward the best solution to the Cyprus Problem are linked with attitudes regarding interacting with people from the other major ethnic community on the island. Another interesting finding is that political party preferences seem to play no role in conditioning perceptions of the ability of both communities to interact successfully and peacefully.

A criticism of the research in general would be that the survey took place during a very "political" time in Cypriot history. The survey's fieldwork took place less than a month after the Annan Plan referendum and during the same month as entry into

the EU and a few weeks before Cyprus' first elections for the European Parliament. Research should be repeated again with similar questions and methodology to determine whether this very "political" period may have influenced the way in which Greek Cypriots perceive the issue of interacting with Turkish Cypriots.

In addition, future research should incorporate measures of religious and national animosity into a model. Religious aspects and the nationalism should be explored, since they may play a large and important role in perspectives on the other. Perceptions of the incompatibility of Islam and Orthodox Christianity or the incompatibility of Turkishness and Greekness may be at the root of the problem.

At any rate, this analysis has made some contributions to the study of interactions between the two major ethnic communities on the island of Cyprus. It has tested contact theory and supported the hypothesis that contacts lead to more optimistic views on interactions between the communities and has done so using a multivariate analysis with a large number of observations. Hopefully, future analysis will be effected to delve further into the question of contacts in Cyprus because attitudes towards interacting with members of the other major ethnicity surely play an important role in setting up the preconditions for a meaningful and stable solution to the Cyprus Problem.

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RECKONING WITH ANTHROPOLOGY'S REPLOTTING OF NARRATIVES OF LIBERAL COLONIALISM: A COUNTER-NARRATIVE OF INSURRECTION BECKONING TO THE DECOLONISATION OF REASON

Marios Constantinou

Abstract

In this paper I evaluate in essay-form the intervention of a self-styled anthropological discourse that sets claims to postcolonial theory in order to frame the Greek-Cypriot irredentist insurrection (1955-1959) in a Manichean allegory of high-toned and overwrought binary signifiers of aphotic, unilluminated, night-time nationalism imputable to a villainous, recidivist and coercively like-minded communitarianism emblematic of Greek-Cypriot culture on one hand, and the enlightened, unbigoted, freethinking progressivism attributed to Turkish-Cypriot culture on the other, {the latter operating as a back-up signifier for a licensed civil modernity, deputised by a misunderstood liberal colonialism). By selectively recalibrating aspects of postcolonial theory serviceable to the urgency of reenfranchising colonialism in an age of imperial succedaneum, the anthropological discourse under review aspires to bail the indigenised natives out of their atavistic unreason and irredentist infirmities, while nursing them mentally until they graduate from the consummated modernity of the West. Contrary to such renovated missionary ambition and anthropological evangelism trading condescendingly with the unprincipled and unauthorised modernity of ex-subject populations, I suggest a duological counter-narrative of the nation, venturesome enough to evoke but also cross its boundaries when they become totalising, mindful that the other is not always and already what the coloniser had imagined s/he would be. This is, after all, an essay on the decolonisation of whatever has been left over from the perpetrated euthanasia of postcolonial reason after the latter's salutatory high-jump from the comfort of its cosmopolitan observation tower.

With the decline of the grand narratives of modernity some cosmopolitan strands of postmodern/postcolonial theory, unconscious of their geopolitical collusion with Western power, tend to convert the merciless cynicism of colonial modernity into new, equally ruthless, narrative forms of cynical enlightenment, which naturalise Occidentalism and which unless critically understood in a contestatory process, no vision of mental decolonisation can be made possible.

> With us there is nothing more consistent than a racist humanism
> since the European has only been able to become a man by
> creating slaves and monsters.
>
> (Sartre, 1967)

Containing the Cynical Malaise of Commissioner Liberalism

Toward the closing of the 1990s, the weather-hardened and dean of Cypriot anthropologists, Peter Loizos, sensed the urgency of admonishing the community of scholars who are venturing into the meandering folds of the Cyprus problem: *"Scholars can make things clearer by calling each other to account over significant details in their interpretations of matters of common interest … they can make a further contribution by refusing the pressure toward ethnic stereotyping in politics, towards abstracted generalisations in daily life …. Clear understandings can be fostered by keeping sight of the particularities of time, place, persons, individual responsibilities, contexts, and by not lumping together, not aggregating. By not favouring only one way of doing, of seeing, of being a man, a woman, a citizen, a people",* (Loizos, 1998, p. 48). Indeed, the amassment of people into the aggregate categories of being Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot embraces a greater existential density than their nominal classification, or their presently coerced geographical designation would make known. For this reason, the aspired unity of a prospective UN-sponsored nation can be sustained only in manufactured and simulated narratives of moral cynicism which due to their heteronomous, godfathered nature, constantly fragment into multiple realities and spheres of meaningless existence. In turn, this undermines endeavours to establish new communities and experimental identities that cross and unite disparate groups in some kind of *commoning.* These multifaceted, tortuous, convoluted and idiosyncratic ways of being Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot, which actually means being locked into the ambivalence of being a self but with self-contradictions, although not necessarily unrecognised by the scholarly community in Cyprus, received only sparse attention so far, and has been respected only faintly and ephemerally. Even if vaguely intuited, this experience of inaudible impairments and muffled incapacitations remains instinctive and precognitive as far as anthropologists (and sociologists) are concerned. They have not really pondered the issue by putting energy and minds on it, or wonder about, or turn it over, weigh, understand it and evaluate its implications. No indication of hermeneutic empathising has been manifested for tragically fated experiences such as the failed irredentist insurrection, a source of thwarted feelings, depressing disillusionment, resentment and discontent, but also an unfailing source of self-empowerment and moral grandeur against bondage and captivity of all colours and stripes. Between outright dismissal, down turning thumbs or ritual sanctification, Loizos' counsel has gone largely unheeded, with gross

implications for the quality of scholarly work, a retrogression further aggravated by the trendy capitulation of intellectuals and their willingness to enlist their work squarely in the service of planetary forces, or become advocates of either community's polemical logomachia, to the detriment of fresh insights, imaginative and resourceful breaks with schematised interpretations.[1] I sense that this is an alarming sign of a fundamental crisis of intellectual and political imagination and a symptom of a patent outgrowth of cynicism, which is mistaken (by impatient partisans) with reason and deliberation. When scholars reproduce the ideological conventions and state-forms of journalistic commentary and news reporting, we are already facing cynicism as a pressing theoretical proposition and moral posture. The cynical manipulation shaping campaigns, reporting and citizens' decision- making seems to have decided also the public fate of many intellectuals as well. Having yielded to New World Order liberalism, the better part of Cypriot intellectuals allowed themselves to be converted to mere solicitors of unquestioned fatalities (EU constitution), frenzied envoys of reasonably predictable miscarriages (Annan Plan), and emissaries of imperial adventurism (Palestine, Afghanistan, Iraq) thus reducing liberalism to a mere ideological vulgarity, a totalitarianism without terror.

Cynicism means that all hermeneutic conflicts involving some traces of excellence, intelligence, skill and flair will be ending ingloriously with a liberal giggle. This smug, cat-that-swallowed-the-canary kind of liberalism, insofar as it reflects the moral and ideological globalisation of imperial neoliberalism, appears (in some respects) as American as the apple pie and may be identified as *cynicism without.* Eventually, however, it evolves into a latent cynicism within, with no significant alternatives to it (Goldfarb Jeffrey, 1991).

Being a commitment to nothing at all, cynicism undermines any normative practice, orientation or promise, thus, conflating permanently reason with power. Originating in a dog philosophy of bathtub simplicity, cynicism evolved into a late Roman Empire cult of resignation to the status quo, emphasising the animal side of Aristotle's political animal, in order to question the normative foundations of political philosophy. Although Diogenis, the archetypical satirist and social critic conceived cynicism as a self-chosen project of poverty, directed against the philanthropic pretensions of imperial power, it has presently been misappropriated by the latter as a means of stripping life down to iron geopolitical opportunism and market realism, in order to further accumulate power and capital. The shift that has taken place is from critical cynicism directed against empire, to a mocking and enervating imperial cynicism that mutes any critical impulse and ridicules normative commitments by way of universalising paltry truisms such as "they all do it anyway", "you have done it to me earlier". At the present state of Empire, cynicism reflects an average, lightweight, urbane cottage-headedness. It reflects the cultural underside of an imperial mass democracy of consumption and letters that supplants critical reason with sophistic casuistry and pedantic Jesuitism.

I want to call attention to cynicism as a generally unrecognised interpretive frame of hardboiled-realism, as it currently reflects in scholarly work. I intend to illuminate the discursive processes by which this substitution occurs and by which critical ideas turn into cryptograms of an imperial civil code, a kind of cultural glue that presently fixes the mass order of neo-liberal societies. This *cynicism without* which originates in the US academic life, is in the process of evolving into a *cynicism within* by replacing a critical debate on values, by impoverishing our constitutional imagination with machtpolitic, by exonerating colonialism, by pardoning imperialism, by excusing elites, by blaming the victims, by rendering economic, political and cultural domination invisible. I, therefore, believe that cynicism as a hegemonic interpretive frame imposed by an artless and spoon-fed realism, amounts to a systematic distortion of human intelligence, which in the long-run enervates the very democratic capacities for a process of constitution-making without imperial patronage. As it was stated above, cynicism alternates between resignation and apology. In what follows I will be concerned with the second, a discursive technique of absolving colonialism in an age of imperial succession.

Professing Imperial Haematics in Cold Blood: Homage to Pax Ottomanica

The groundwork for clearing colonialism and conquest of any charges, commences with a marked distinction of Cyprus' communal histories by an improbable discourse that appropriates "blood". This still remains to be established with respect to Greek-Cypriot discourse, insofar as the latter appeals less to a blood genealogy for legitimation than to panegyric acclamations of the sparkling legacy and grandeur of Greek civilisation which subsumes blood. Haematic discourse seems to be shaping more consistently the Turkish-Cypriot national imaginary, insofar as it invokes "rivers of blood" spilled by the forefathers during the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus (Rebecca Bryant, 1998, p. 59). This is not an uncommon motif in discourses of legitimation and sounds no less hilarious than the crackbrained and imbecilic eulogium heralded from the housetops by its Greek-Cypriot counterpart. What strikes one with wonder, is that a scholar and connoisseur of the Cyprus problem notarises this makeshift and self-serving ideological manoeuvre, claiming that the contingency of the Ottoman conquest of Cyprus "provides a future that is makeable, while an inevitable history is merely part of a grander scheme" *(ibid.,* p. 59). Pulling the strings around the meaning of the Ottoman conquest in order to contrive a natural imperial humanism **(**Pax Ottomanica) in anticipation of liberal colonialism (Pax Britannica), suggests crafty brilliance and cunning cynicism which has always been the unspoken premise of humanism at any rate. In a baffling contrast to EOKA's "undemocratic goals", Bryant argues, that ''the Ottoman capture and rule of Cyprus" amounts to "a contingent history which is much closer to human life" than an Hellenic genealogy "which overtakes one as inevitable *(ibid.,* p. 59). As a discursive contrivance that engineers *haematic humanism,* itself a plasma of

moderate, decent, open-minded, and non-discriminatory nationalism, it is intriguing enough. Critical reason is lost in some wonder, but it may still solicit an answer: what is so remarkable about the "contingency of Ottoman conquest", what are the implications, and why does this sanguinary humanism issue into a liberal Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, absolutely unenclosed, uncompelled and unconditioned, with no-strings-attached to it by geopolitical alignments and cold-war machinations?

The arbitrariness of the Ottoman conquest, in my view, is neither a subsidiary supplement to Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, nor a circumstantial and provisional marker of its legitimacy. Arbitrary events with shaping force in History, are of no less axial significance than less arbitrary and less contingent ones. Contingent outcomes once realised, create iron inevitabilities and even new regimes of legality in search of legitimation. Feigning a counterfeit contrast between EOKA's irredentist campaign (which is common in the British Mediterranean) and the Ottoman conquest, saturated with post-dated allusions to liberalism and alluring intimations of humanism is well-seasoned, but it cannot stand up to scrutiny. Similarly, overdrawing discrepancies and/or similarities between opposing geopolitical, irredentist claims stands on unsafe grounds.

Bryant never really fleshes out her concept of contingency on which she relies heavily in order to ascribe to Turkish-Cypriot nationalism celebrated postmodern virtues such as open-endedness, open-mindedness, undecidability, indeterminacy etc. This arcane concept, however, is deployed by postcolonial cultural studies in order to denote the aleatory, random and unpredictable processes that define agency and identity as after-effects of ambivalent intersubjective individuation. In other words, contingency evokes the unreliability and perplexity of signs that define postcolonial hybridity. In illustrating the matrix of contingency, postcolonial critics appeal even to Hannah Arendt's remark on the ambivalent temporality, dwelling on the notorious unreliability of ancient oracles that neither reveal nor hide in words but only give manifest signs (Homi Bhaba, 1994, p. 189; Hannah Arendt, 1958, p. 185). Does Rebecca Bryant raise the issue of contingency in the abovementioned sense? She does grope toward this end, although in a very diffident and precarious mode, precisely because she intuits the impossibility of locating a transgressive subaltern agency of the postcolonial, hybrid variety within the enunciative position of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism. What she could bring out, however, but did not proceed carrying it out because of its unbefitting implications, was to identify the heroes of her story, fully aware that *"we can never point unequivocally to them as the authors of the story's outcome"* (Hannah Arendt, 1958, p. 185) particularly because they are located in contingent constellations of the local and the extra-local, of the native and the imperial. Presently, globalisation capitalises upon the structures of colonialism, preserved by neo-colonialism and the failure to decolonise the mind (Couze Venn, 1999, p. 47).

A Postdated Tribute to Pax-Britannica: Replotting Narratives of Liberal Colonialism

There is a sense, however, in which Bryant's exonerative anthropology overlaps with the postcolonial theoretical imaginary. In tandem with postcolonial theory, her replotment of the colonial narrative no longer portrays imperialists as simply aggressive patrons of domination, nor are Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots narrated as its acquiescent, unassertive and compassionate victims. The concept, for instance, of Greek-Cypriot irredentism as an unfixable and irreconcilable form of life, is subjected by Bryant to lopsided and partisan interrogation, with the synergy of liberal tales of suspense concerning its undemocratic nature. Her postimperial narrative reconstruction of the colonial drama of Greek-Cypriots abounds in speculative and postulational tall stories which revise relations of domination and servitude as solely internal and constitutive, not external to their community. So far Bryant operates squarely within the plotline of postcolonial theory. Yet, her shooting script confines relations of domination within the Greek-Cypriot community alone, thus rescuing Turkish-Cypriot nationalism as a postcolonial envoy, implying postmodern practices of policed recognition and respect rather than a metaphysical contention for justice which is saved for Greek-Cypriots (Bryant, 2004, pp. 217- 249). The future, it seems, belongs neither to the defiant slave, nor to the absolute master, but rather to those who seek mutual respect without self-respect, while practicing recognition within the transactional discursive spaces and hegemonic geopolitical sites of Western power.

It is plain that Bryant beats around the bush, shunning from providing a critical account of the devastating encounter between ex-colonials and imperialist masters (who are still masters), putting forward instead only narrative resources that enable communities to undergo a remedial group therapy that will take them beyond their previous experiences of each other. By condoning the mental perversions brought about by colonialism (which impacted perniciously upon intercommunal relations), Bryant is forced to fence her discourse within a space of representation authorised by colonialist normalcy. By turning a blind eye to the postcolonial psychoanalytic reflexivity of the ex-colonials, who like Franz Fanon pondered the pathologies and ill-resolved conflicts at the root of the colonial vocation (Fanon, 1967, 1970), Bryant appears to join the predacious rationalism of western power, which normalises its own history of expansive domination by inscribing the colonised in a fixed hierarchy of civil progress. She seems to imply a normative consent to God's honest truth that coloniser and colonised are involved in a hierarchical bigwig miscognition, where each point of identification is a pervert iteration of the otherness of the European self: liberal and despot. Actually Fanon quotes M. Manoni approvingly on this point, arguing that the coloniser has fled from respect because "he cannot accept men as they are". Europe's "Prospero complex" intuited on time by

Shakespeare in "The Tempest", is defined by an "urge to dominate, which is infantile in origin and which social adaptation has failed to discipline" (Fanon, 1967, pp. 107-108).

Why then did Bryant not survey the sadistic authority and leadership complex of the coloniser in the first place, and then account for the Greek-Cypriot displacement of physical and affective misery toward Turkish-Cypriots? This lapse of critical reason to reflect sufficiently on the mental ruins left behind by colonial tyranny, equipped with inquisitorial psychotechnic apparatuses, puts the colonised continually under erasure. Instead of idle talk with some of EOKA's prodigious spokesmen and indoctrinators (Bryant, 2004, pp. 165,167), themselves inadvertently put in the service of certifying the anthropologist's prearranged and predeliberated fixations, it would have been much more visionary and inspiring to interview dismantled-to-pieces survivors of the British torture chambers and hanging executions, and detect in person the severe mental difficulties they suffer down to our days in coping with "others" as well as their own manifestations of otherness. Against the hangdog culture of the colonised, we ought to counterpose and dissect the hangman's culture of the bigwig killer, and the public executioner. Otherwise, we fall prey to the coloniser's narrative demand "embodied in the utilitarian or evolutionary ideologies of reason and progress" (Bhaba, 1994, p. 98). A narrative demand which is "a police matter" of *"inquisitorial insistence, an order, a petition .... To demand the narrative of the other, to extort it from him like a secretless secret, something that they call truth about what has taken place"* (Derrida, 1979, p. 87).

Becharmed and subject to the same relations of representation, Bryant "asked her informants what they had hoped to gain from the EOKA struggle and from *enosis:* it was not a struggle, they claimed, for increased rights and opportunities, but for union with their mother Greece" (Bryant, 1998, p. 59). Western narcissism articulates its narrative command by defining the anthropological essence in terms of the perceived utilitarian coordinates of reason: gains and losses. To the coloniser's narrative kind of command-anthropology, the anti-colonial insurrection is incogitable and contrary to reason, unless it is self-serving, fortune-hunting, gold- digging, leading to privatism and penny-pinching individualism. Astonishingly, it does not cross the anthropologist's mind that insurrections and uprisings may be launched against imperial rule for reasons of dignity, self-respect and self-rule, for reasons of moral uplifting and nobility, for reasons of community and solidarity and not for handy reasons of profitability, functionalism, convertibility, advantageousness, expediency and serviceability. It is true, that virtue politics when pursued with imprudent tenacity and uncompromising notionateness may lead to self-destructive ends, deviate to vice-ridden, spleen politics and may be led astray by unintended consequences. But this is an inherent possibility for all forms of

human action, the EOKA epic being no exception, although consistent western manipulation, scheming, wire-pulling and frame-ups contributed to its degeneration and defilement. All the same, adversity, misfortune, adventure, and miscarriage is an indispensable form of Greek, tragic drama play, and I see for this reason no striking moral superiority in misrepresenting, railing against or belittling what was knightly valiant, princely handsome, altruistically selfless, and larger than life, as the dauntless Afxentiou revealed to the colonial toughies who reduced him to anthracite ash fuel, deep in the solemn woods of Machairas. I suspect that Afxentiou's anthracitic speech act (apart from being an answer to academic prattle-prattle, and loose tongue western noology) remains a hard coal that still burns almost without flame in the Kyp(riot)ic imaginary. Kyp(riot)ic anthracite constitutes that unsymbolisable and traumatic hard kernel at the core of anthropological humanism (a Lacanian *petit* a), operating as the main source of Western rationality's psychotic breakdowns. It is anthropologically impossible to study a *being* in the form of a flameless, burning coal, with the meticulous aid of a comtroller's computable rationality. Only reason, upon ruins witnessing ashes, may intuit that for Afxentiou and the rest of his sacrificial fellowship of knight-errants, Hellas was not an issue of passports and satellite television but an alibi, an excuse prompting them to become equal to the task, measuring up with themselves, with the unreckonable, with death itself.

Instead, Bryant laments that to them "freedom meant enosis' (Bryant, 1998, 59). One may point out that this notion of freedom is no less fraught with risks and possible self-deceptions than the partisan elite of the US independence struggle contemplating a new Rome upon the hills by way of conquest and imperial expansion, or the Pilgrims fantasizing a new Jerusalem, or putting one's faith in the belief that the Turkish nation exists in latency throughout China, the ex Soviet Union and Eastern Europe.

Bryant discusses approvingly Turkish-Cypriot views that British education could be assimilated into an ideology of linear progress conducive to community improvement: "every Turkish teacher's first duty is to inculcate in the children a national consciousness and a national idealism .... Once we have done this, along with *our blood, our race,* and *our history,* we will boast and feel pride in winning our rights (Halkin Sesi, 12 April 1950). This orientation (Bryant argues) towards a better, progressive future presents a *sharp contrast* to Greek-Cypriot nationalism that sought to restore an imagined former order of the greater Greek world" (Bryant, 1998, p.58). This may be a slip-up of inopportune nature, recurring habitually in the United States among scholars closely associated with the tabulated ideological agendas of the states of Greece and Turkey. But conjuring silver dollars out of thin air does no service to a place already saturated by mother states-cynicism. Patronising the haematic and racial imaginary of one nationalism while criminalizing

the other in a place of state-subsidised, superpower-financed and mother nation-sponsored nationalisms encouraged in their postcolonial adventurism, is unseasonable at best, unpromising and hopeless at worst. I think, it is scholarly more propitious to rescue and redeem in critical analysis the anti-colonial, anti- imperialist dimensions of irredentism, set apart from the climacteric extremities directed against the contiguous other without and within. All the same, the voluntary oversight of the psychopathology of colonialism by some strands of postcolonial theory, advocating a politics of contingency, difference and respect, (at the expense of justice), is being presently outflanked by global strategies of imperial and sub- imperial power which evacuate the position they claim and depotentialise any ostensible post-modern challenge (exemplified by the Turkish-Cypriot politics of contingency), by integrating it in new differential hierarchies and geopolitical alignments which can be combated only by new forms of solidarity and militancy.

The Functionalist Fallacy Concerning the Education of the Colonised as a Symptom of Anthropology's Failed Self-Decolonisation

On the issue of education, Bryant makes an astute remark, pointing at the failure of the Greek-Cypriot leadership to acknowledge strains within the apparatus of the colonial administration, mainly manifested in the contrastive outlooks between military (Worseley) and classically trained scholar-commissioners (C. D. Cobham). This is, indeed, an ingenious insight into the state processes of colonialism in Cyprus because it brings into sharp relief the plausible view that British education policy-making could be contingent upon changes in administrative personnel or upon events taking place in other parts of the Empire (Bryant, 1988, p. 56). The complication, however, that is not addressed by Bryant, is who prevailed in this inter-governmental conflict in the long run: the militarists or the classicists? She considers the anti-colonial uprising of 1931 a "provocation", and seems to be glossing over the consequences of cultural engineering and the offensive attempts at curriculum control by the colonial administration which did covet begrudgingly to establish its own mercenary education, and did go about creating its own loyalist constituency by allocating scholarships and lowering school fees as a means of capitalising on poverty.

Be that as it may, inconsistencies in anti-colonial opposition abound as in every insurrectionary experience, but they do so as well in Bryant's creedbound evaluation of anti-colonialism. For instance, although she credits the scholarly training and ministrant classicism of some high-commissioners as charitable and benign, she seems to withhold her assent for classical education in Greek secondary schools, and even sounds disconsolate that government grants were rejected; that the instrumental rationality of technical education was discouraged *"despite Cyprus' growing industries in the post-war period" (ibid.,* p. 61). What is

puzzling is why this is so hard to swallow for Bryant. Rejecting government monies and government control in the early 1950s (apart from a single Commercial Lyceum), constitutes such an act of defiance that elsewhere, for instance in the US, it would lead one to readily identify in its intent all the normative protocols of American patriotism, namely republican virtue and self-government in education. Is it not Allan Bloom who in "The Closing of the American Mind" (1987) bemoans the eclipse of classical education and biblical imagination (in the US academia and high schools) as a symptom of consolidated multicultural nihilism? Why, indeed, is it so reprehensible and disgraceful for the colonised to espouse and champion their own community-empowering version of classicism? Is it because it discourages capitalist ethos? It seems to me that the problem lies elsewhere. The colonised did not pursue their classicism from below in a consistent and thorough fashion, namely they failed to contextualise and radicalise it in changing circumstances, so that they could qualify it as an inclusive, yet defiant classicism apropos of postcolonial modernity. Instead, it remained stagnant, motionless and lifeless, operating as a reaction-formation to colonial haughtiness and cocksure imperial narcissism. Eventually, it became ceremonial and commemorative of bygone glories, customary and deprived of nerve, before it was finally crushed by the Church itself, the latter being (in Weberian fashion) a catalyst of secularisation and disenchantment, as well as a promoter of the capitalist ethos of industrialisation.

In addressing the relation between education and nationalism, Bryant seems to impose a sociologically untenable distinction between schools as sites of production/reproduction of nationalist subjects on one hand, and schools as sites of socialisation on the other (Bryant, 2004, p. 141). In the first place, Bryant avoids explaining why it is impossible for education to operate on both registers by fulfilling both functions: reproduction as well as socialisation. But even if she had done this, the most she could accomplish would be to deliver a consistently functionalist explanation of seamless integration into community structures. By ruling out the hypothesis of treating educational structures and curricular contents as sites of contestation and contention, Bryant cannot in the end but submit to the functionalist fallacy of *"deeply inscribed routines and practices no longer seen as forms of control" (ibid.,* p. 143). She overstates the coherence of techniques of cultivation that evoke "a latent potential of the ethnic subject" *(ibid.,* p. 155). Techniques of learning and indoctrination, structures of socialisation, may break down, counteract one another, or overreach, creating spaces for sly civility, dissimulation and resistance, converting themselves to counter-hegemonic purposes. That is the reason why Bryant cannot account for discursive dislocations within Greek-Cypriot identity such as leftist irredentism in the 1950s, which evolved into pro- independence leftist republicanism in the 1960s. Rather, she attributes disestablishments or recompositions of identity to wholesale economic determinism: "as Greek Cyprus has grown economically powerful, Greek-Cypriots

have begun to imagine ... cultural independence" *(ibid.,* p. 7). Instead, I would suggest a different line of research that breaks with warehouse functionalism and recentres attention to equivocal and antinomic structures of feeling and affect, pointing to the indexicality of inconclusive meanings.

The hegemonic image of *enosis,* for instance, did not bear the same uniform signification for all classes. *Enosis was signified and resignified from contradictory class locations, from right and left, and therefore was singularised in antagonistic fashion from above and below.* Oral reports by witnesses of that tumultuous era of the 1950s, testify that the irredentist campaign of the left met at the time the malignant opposition and wrath of mainstream right-wing irredentism, to the point where identifiable left-wing lodges in the countryside were systematically assaulted, in order to strike down and seize the Greek flags from their masts. Even the left's rather *casuistic irredentism* could not be tolerated, because it seemed to be signifying in distorted fashion the radical potential of *plebeian republicanism.* The *hermeneutic indexicality* of a Greek flag masted on the balcony of a left-wing lodge in the 1950s was indexing much more than it was actually saying, and it was precisely this *inner republican horizon* and *secular subtext* that were the real stakes involved in the short-lived episode of the equivocal and unreliable irredentism of the left. Sociological and anthropological discourse on Greek-Cypriot irredentism is at last obligated to start elucidating existing and fundamental ethnomethodological distinctions between *referential* (i.e. primary, prompt and linear, semantic) associations and those which are *indexical,* contingent and random. The sociological import of this distinction must be understood in terms of the historical and ethnographic specificities of left-wing and right-wing irredentisms, along with hybrid combinations in between. We can no longer account for Greek-Cypriot irredentism as an invariable structure when there is ample ethnographic testimony that the social interaction of meaning in that context was *unstable, variant* and *risky.* The field so far is suffused with analyses which accommodate the *syntactic* component of irredentism. They do not, however, account for the *indexical context* and the way in which meaning was generated in precarious, ongoing social interactions. These views, rather tend to subsume meaning under syntactic components, ignoring intuitive, active and resistant redeployments of the *hegemonic syntax of irredentism* among the colonised. The reductionist grammar implicit in conventional approaches to irredentism, neglects reflexive processes which actively modified hegemonic irredentism in context-bound, indexical and semantic settings. We are no longer entitled to keep encoding enosis by using the syntax of a reified ideal. If irredentism was indeed an effective symbolic structure embedded in the Greek-Cypriot lifeworld, then we ought to shake off our syntactic assumptions and resist the comfort of pre-established meanings. We have formalised the syntax of irredentism too severely, allowing meaning to be inordinately divorced from context. The cognitive shifts engendered by the semantic

reflexivity of discrepant irredentisms were not ruled by an invariant syntax. *We have to rethink the invariant as contingent, if we actually want to make sense of the semantic and indexical displacements in the syntactic structure of domination. The challenge is to reconsider the syntactic density of power along with semantic idiosyncrasy.*

As it was argued above, Cypriot sociology and anthropology so far have been hesitative in identifying the parameters of *hermeneutic indexicality* and *moral complexity* pertaining to the clashing *irredentisms* that unfolded among the colonised. This task of doing the necessary justice to the fact that the public ethos favouring independence emerged gradually from the ranks of this *pragmatic* and I would say *reflexive irredentism,* is a labour that still drags on. Because this was indeed a borderline and precarious irredentism, which in the face of geopolitical adversity and the risk of partition shifted to seeking independence, maintaining only a nominal and trivialised attachment to the ungraspable ideal of enosis. This kind of cogitative and *prudential irredentism* eJ:Qerging precariously from a charismatic background, and despite its inherent performative contradictions, was constantly on the verge of converting to a pro-independence course of action. In fact it was Makarios himself, the virtuoso prophet of enosis who actually casted his charismatic prestige upon the baseborn idea of independence, thus ending its ignoble status especially after 1964 due to his consequential disapproval of the Acheson plan, whictl provided for *conditional enosis,* involving territorial compensations for Turkey in Cyprus. The very cogency and legitimacy of the disreputable idea of independence is to a great extent indebted to the Makarios leadership. Whatever traces of a percolating irredentism can still be detected in Makarios' public oratory after 1964, were only vestiges of a growingly hesitant and *reluctant irredentism* that was straining the concept of enosis to a breaking point, and was for this very reason eliciting even more verbose, overblown and immoderate irredentist opposition from the militant right-wing fringes (Constantinou, 2003, pp. 155-156).

Postcolonial Theory by Default

Programmatically Bryant places her work squarely within the problematic of postcolonial and subaltern theory, and stipulates "anthropology's mission as one of uncovering counter hegemonic and silenced voices". Moreover, she enlists Gayatri Spivak's notion of "strategic essentialism" as a deconstructive method of "examining the construction of relations of discursive dominance, and how these relations structure social life" (Bryant, 2004, p. 48). The theoretical aspiration of her postcolonial gesture, however, is to set aside and silence an important cognate of this discourse, namely the historical setting that prompts the coloniser against the colonised, deeming the axis of this relation familiar and sufficiently examined *(ibid.,* pp. 8-9). I take to task this assertion, reasoning that it leads to the normalisation of

postcolonial theory, rendering it a strange bedmate and improbable accomplice of colonial dominance.

Spivak, one of the celebrated and authorial figures of postcolonial theory to whom Bryant appeals in order to enfranchise her narrative, actually counsels that one of the standard ways of arguing is to appeal to reason, and one of the standard ways of making a rational argument is to appeal to evidence, *to point to things.* But it seems that at the end, the arguments produced *point to an absence* (Spivak, 1990, p. 20). I want to mark out these non-narrated absences which plague Bryant's anthropology, and which due to inattention, become thoughtless and politically unconscious.

By opting not to address the complicated edge of irredentist opposition to imperial rule, Bryant becomes discursively authorised to place anti-colonialism squarely into a matrix of power, prone to the compulsive victimisation of the other. My contention is that the form of colonial rule shaped the form of revolt against it. I suggest that "Greekness", for instance, evolved simultaneously as an engineered form of disciplinary control over the natives, as well as a form of revolt against it. Ethnicity was, is, and can never be about identity alone: it involves two contradictory moments, (suppressed by Bryant) encompassing social control and normalisation, but also implicating in latent metaphysical form, an unrealised and figurative potential for social emancipation. That is the reason why it makes sense to neither just embrace ethnicity uncritically (which is common among Greek-Cypriots), nor to dismiss it in a cavalier and disdainful fashion (which is what Bryant does in the case of Greek-Cypriot irredentism).

Bryant is so strikingly indisposed to consider the loathsome Greek-Cypriot irredentism in the above duological sense, that she expectedly fails to account for its resonant and charismatic appeal, which was eventuated by a decline of credibility in colonialism's civilising mission in the eyes of an increasingly critical subject population. Whatever social reforms were undertaken by the colonial administration, were vitiated by the aggravation of what was believed to be an officially masterminded and manipulated intercommunal conflict, engineered to keep the natives divided, in order to perpetuate foreign rule. Ranajit Guha (the founding editor of the *Subaltern Studies* movement to which Bryant is piously attached) suggested that the metropolitan state differed from its colonial apparatus insofar as the former was hegemonic in character, while its claimed dominance was founded on a power relation in which motivation, inducement, influence and exhortation were much more compelling determinants of bourgeois state rule than coercion. This alone, demonstrates that the state structure of colonialism in Cyprus exemplified a case of failed hegemony or what he calls "dominance without hegemony" (Guha, 1997). By not troubling oneself to consider the paradox that the

foremost liberal democracy of the Western world established in Cyprus, as elsewhere, an autocratic structure of unlimited rule, assures blindness to a hermeneutic detail of colonial experience: namely that circumstance whereby the withdrawal of legitimacy by the subject population was suffused by an uncanny irredentist pride, which stubbornly refused at that point to take Western superiority in culture and education for granted.

Postcolonial theory, and particularly those strands of occidental anthropological discourse that nominally claim it in jovial and acrobatic fashion, may not have much to teach us about "colonialism both as a political system and as a persistent intellectual influence in the postcolonial era" (Guha, 1997, p. 85), unless they focus on the frustrated attempts of colonial engineering to assimilate (by means of education) the civil society of the colonised into an administrative structure of hegemony.

In Cyprus, as in India, instruction in English was geared to induce members of the subject population to qualify for employment in the colonial administration, both as a measure of increasing middleclass acquiescence to colonial rule as well as a policy of establishing collaborative structures, so that in the condition of dominance the moment of persuasion and consent would outweigh that of coercion. Bryant drops out of sight the manifest and unmistakable intent of the colonial elite to designate norms of Western instrumental rationality and stabilise them with the authority of common sense, *"all the more persuasive and seductive, as this coincides with models of modernisation" in the advanced capitalist West* (Gauze Venn, 1999, p.46). What is elusively described by Bryant as "British administration", "government grants" etc., is inscribed in the scientific and disciplinary knowledges institutionalised in the apparatuses of education, the judiciary, health, commerce, production and communication, established and policed in a discursive space characteristic of Occidentalism, but remaining invisible and unrecognised (by cosmopolitan postcolonial discourse) as a drive of aspiring hegemony, appearing instead in the neutral colours of unquestioned instrumental rationality, functioning as common sense *(ibid.,* p.47).

What is bewildering, is that Bryant seems of have pursued a line of research which is at variance with the critical intuitions and insights of subaltern studies. For instance, Bryant anathematises the Greek-Cypriot cosmology as conservative and illiberal, imputing it to the excessive unanimity and consonancy by which it equated freedom with duty, instead of right (Bryant, 1998, p.65), and similarly considers the discouraging of children from buying English products as a moral demand appropriate to an undemocratic society that calls for obedience to a consensus *(ibid.,* p. 64). Contrary to this representation, Ranajit Guha foregrounds the dramaturgical effect of a garden variety, histrionic Anglicism as it was staged in

plays, whereby an educated debauchee, for instance, delivers a speech in which India is portrayed as a "vast prison" save his own clubhouse, "a hall of liberty" and a "palace of freedom". In this fraudulent mimicry of liberal Anglicism, "the prison" stood for Hindu conservatism *and not for colonial subjection,* Guha argues. "Liberty" and "freedom" were meant by this Anglophiliac showmanship "to militate only against values and relations internal to Hindu society, and not against those that inhered in the power structure of the raj". It demonstrates how concepts and signifiers that were once politically inflammable and were used as gunpowder for revolutions against despotism and tyranny, had their critical potential extinguished by colonialist education. *"Indeed, what most of the nineteenth-century beneficiaries of that education imbibed from it as a code of power, was unquestioning servility to the ruling power"(Guha,* 1997, pp. 168-169).

Now, it is precisely this docile and prostrate anthropology which seems to be at odds with the critical thrust of postcolonial theory. It is rather unoriginal and abject to abhor civil disobedience and the implied solidarity forged by the moral consensus of the subject population, headed as it were by charismatic leaders. Irredentist communitarianism did certainly suffer from deficits of mutual respect directed toward its own others, but what it did not fall short of was self-respect, and that is precisely what this improbable postcolonial theoretical servility to the discursive power of colonialism intends to crush. No semantic sleight, however, can be deployed to disqualify from moral discourse the strategic essentialism of the subject populations vis-a-vis their colonial masters, in order to dignify measures of imperial control.

Animating bicommunal education via intellectual exertion and the acquirement of practical skills, is precisely how the colonial regime wanted education to be thought by the colonised. The question that remains cynically unaddressed, is whether the ostensible bicommunal education nourished and patronised by the British, and so ostentatiously celebrated by Bryant, was simply a harmless code for a civic bicommunal alternative to a supposedly paroxysmic irredentism and intercommunal strife.

Well, there was more to bicommunal education than civic enlightenment, which is a major assignment for all liberal articles of faith. Civic enlightenment was ventured of course, and was patronised as a liberal postulate, but it was also operated to the purpose of evangelising and infixing the idea (to both, missionary converters, and beneficiaries of sponsored bicommunalism) to look upon it as a benign cultural management of intractable communalism, ignoring that education was related to colonial dominance as a hegemonic means of persuasion, as well as a fixture of its coercive apparatus. Bicommunal schooling of native youths was an important qualification for recruitment into the colonial administration and a passport

for crossing the poverty line. Training a caste of public officers recruited among the colonised was expected to set up a paragontic model of influence and infiltration of the civic fibre of the colonised, exemplifying the moral and intellectual improvement they ought to be aspiring to.

Guha is well placed where he is to get this through his head: "education, therefore, was designed as a servant's education, conforming undeviatingly to the master's gaze by annexing the past, in order to pre-empt its use by the subject people as a site on which to assert their own identity" (Guha, 1997, p. 171). Why did Bryant not hang upon this upright, local intelligence? Why not trouble oneself with English as a status-marker and source of prestige, bound to forge a hegemonic instrument of persuading the subject population about the beneficial consequences of its own subjection, of committing bicommunally the colonised to the conviction that colonialism is an inescapable, historically necessary and desirable progress?

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Notes

1. Symptomatic of this intellectual crisis which may signal the euthanasia of critical reason are reports by students during the referenda over the Annan Plan, that they were subjected to cheap demagogic propaganda (for and against the proposed scheme) during classroom sessions.

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Commentary Article

Cyprus: The Way Forward[*]

James Ker-Lindsay

"Cyprus: The Way Forward" was the title of a Wilton Park Conference held in Larnaca, Cyprus, from 7-10 February 2004.[1] The 150 participants came from both Cypriot communities and abroad and included representatives from politics, academia, the media, civil society, international organisations, government service and the business community. Despite the fact that speaking invitations were sent to a number of senior members of the Cyprus Government, in the end no high level representatives of the administration attended. AKEL, the largest party in the government, did send its party spokesman to address the first session of the conference, but it did not have any formal presence at the other sessions. Indeed, the only Greek Cypriot party with any real presence at the event was the United Democrats. In contrast, there was a strong turnout from the Turkish Cypriot side, with representatives from the Republican Turkish Party (CTP), the Peace and Democracy Movement (BDH) and the Democrat Party (DP) attending. However, ongoing campaigning for the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections, which were held on 20 February, meant that senior members of the parties were only able to attend briefly.

The event took place under a constant barrage of attacks from much of the Greek Cypriot media. Contrary to press claims, the event was not closed to outsiders. It was just held under standard Chatham House rules with the press barred from covering events taking place inside the hall. In reality, this meant very little as there was a constant stream of information about proceedings passed to the press. It is also worth pointing out that the event had been held in Cyprus in order to try to dispel any views that it was in some way a 'secret' conference. To some degree the negative coverage of the event was heightened by the fact that just a few days earlier, Dimitris Christofias, the leader of AKEL, had heavily criticised British policy towards Cyprus. In a speech made in London, he called the British demons and referred to the United Kingdom as the 'nemesis' of the Greek Cypriots. These views were endorsed a few days later, while the conference was going on, by President Papadopoulos.[2]

The Basis for a Settlement
Despite clear and vocal opposition from a significant minority of Greek Cypriots, there is a general acceptance – both on the island and internationally – that a settlement of the Cyprus issue should be based on the UN plans that are currently on the table. The word plans, rather than plan, is significant in this statement. It is

important not to become fixated with the final version of the UN plan as a basis for any future progress on Cyprus. Instead, it would be beneficial to refer to the UN plans as a whole package. The fact that there are parts of the final plan that are obviously unacceptable to Greek Cypriots does not mean that efforts would be needed to negotiate new provisions. In many cases, acceptable elements were included in previous versions that were then discarded.

Linked with this, it is useful to make it clear that the UN plans were not the product of a specific negotiating period that started in January 2002. Instead they represent the latest evolutionary step in a process that started with the signing of the High Level Agreements in 1977 and 1979 and continued through many subsequent steps, such as the Set of Ideas. And, as an evolutionary process, it is obvious that there is still room for further real changes, and not just cosmetic alterations, to be made. Still, while there will need to be some substantial revisions to current provisions if the plan is to be acceptable to Greek Cypriots, changes made by the Greek Cypriots cannot be made at the expense of Turkish Cypriot concerns. The fundamental balance created in the plans cannot and should not be reversed.

Revising a Settlement Plan

Needless to say, there were a *very* wide range of specific proposals for changes to the plans presented *over* the course of the conference. While many ideas were extremely interesting, and certainly worthy of further development, the general feeling was that the conference was not designed to put forward specific suggestions for amendments to the plans - a task best left to the political leaders. Instead, the conference produced a number of general observations regarding the broad provisions of a settlement and the implications of these in terms of a revised plan.

Constitutional changes

The constitutional aspects of a settlement neither catch the imagination, nor deeply concern, many Cypriots in the same way as other issues, such as property or security, attract attention. Indeed, there seems to be few real areas of difference on these issues. As far as taking this matter forward in future, two main points are worth mentioning. The first is that there is a world of difference between workability, acceptability and desirability. Just because an element is not particularly desirable this does not mean that it cannot work. Secondly, the pursuit of a perfect constitution is a task that can *never* succeed. There is not a constitution in existence that is not in some way or another overly complicated, contradictory or just plain untidy. Moreover, the political will to make a constitution work is far more important than specific provisions. As one observer put it, if you test the constitution to destruction, you will destroy it no matter how perfect or well developed it might be.

Economic issues

There have been many concerns expressed about the economic aspects of a settlement. While deep reservations were expressed about many of the provisions contained in the third UN plan, a number of improvements were made to the fifth version of the plan that should have ensured greater economic and financial security. However, even then many leading economists and business leaders continued to voice grave fears about the economic and financial elements of the settlement. Given that many provisions were drawn up with great haste, there would seem to be room to re-evaluate many of these issues in order to secure provisions that would better protect the economic viability of any post-settlement state. Moreover, in the year since the referendum there have been a number of changes in the economic situation in both parts of the island that could necessitate a review of the provisions.

Settlers

As any discussions about the issue quickly shows, one of the greatest problems about tackling the issue of settlers is the lack of information on the subject. In the absence of data, there are wide disparities between the various numbers that are presented. Some Greek Cypriots have placed the number as high as 160,000. In contrast many Turkish Cypriots put the number as low as 40,000. Although discussions on this topic during the conference resulted in a broad acceptance that the number of Turkish citizens who have since been granted 'TRNC' citizenship is approximately 60,000, and that there are a further 40,000 Turkish workers on the island, it is clear that hard and fast data is needed. Therefore it would seem useful for a census to be conducted, according to international standards, and with international observers, in order to arrive at some sort of figure upon which to base further discussions.

Property

The issue of property is one of the two key issues of concern for Greek Cypriots. It is clear that the provisions in the final UN plan were extremely complicated. They were far beyond the ready comprehension of most voters. Moreover, complaints have been heard that while the provisions looked to be fair in theory, in practice many of the conditions laid down were so onerous that very few Greek Cypriots would have a realistic chance of receiving any of their property back. To this extent, there would certainly seem to be a need for further discussions on this matter, not only in terms of the actual provisions relating to property, but also in terms of trying to reach a system that would be more widely understood by the population.

Security

This has frequently been listed as the single greatest concern of Greek Cypriots. In actual fact, the subject of security relates to two issues. First of all, there are

questions relating to traditional military security. In this sense, one firm proposal does come to mind concerning the Treaty of Guarantee. It is clear that many regard the treaty as an anachronism, but that it is a vital element in any solution at this time. Looking ahead, however, there would seem to be grounds to propose that the Treaty lapses at the moment of Turkish membership of the EU. In fact, some would argue that this would be absolutely necessary. From a European perspective, the Treaty of Guarantee stands in contravention of one of the most fundamental principles of the EU, namely that no matter how serious an issue, no member state shall use, or threatened to use, force against another member state. The idea that one member state will have the right to intervene militarily in the affairs of another member state is therefore regarded by many as wholly contradictory to the very underlying premise of the European Union. While some argue that there is no way that Turkey would accept the termination of the Treaty, there are in fact grounds to believe otherwise. As it happens, there does seem to be an element of understanding in the upper echelons of the Turkish military that EU accession will change the security relationship Turkey has with both Greece and Cyprus.[3]

On a second point regarding military security, it is clear that there are certain potential flaws in the current UN proposals that need to be addressed. For example, attention was drawn to demilitarisation and the protection of the state. Traditionally, the danger to Cyprus has been cast in terms of a conflict between Greece and Turkey. However, since 1 May 2004 Cyprus is now the eastern outpost of the European Union, sitting on the doorstep of the Middle East. The island does need to have some security, especially in terms of air defences. Some thought needs to be given to how Cyprus could receive the protection it needs without recourse to Turkey, an option that would be rejected by Greek Cypriots.

However, security also refers to issues relating to implementation. One of the great fears harboured by many Greek Cypriots is that the provisions of the plan will not be fully honoured by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots. In particular, they feel that in the event that Turkey cannot remove its troops according to the specified timetable, or if land due to be handed back cannot be given over as the inhabitants have not yet received new homes in the Turkish Cypriot constituent state, then it will be the Greek Cypriots that will be asked to show goodwill and compromise. Many Greek Cypriots want to see steps taken to ensure that the timetable agreed to in the plan will be honoured when the time comes.

Language revisions
Finally, a small but potentially significant step that might engender a greater degree of confidence in any revised plan would be to go through current plans with a view to expunging language or provisions that are seen to use particularly harsh language. There are aspects of the plan that seem to have been written with a view

to making an agreement more palatable for Mr Denktash. With his departure from the political scene there might be room to rewrite parts of the plan to moderate the language. Needless to say, this is not a major issue, but it is perhaps something that should be considered and taken on board, if only to encourage greater public support for any new, revised set of proposals.

Getting to 'Yes'

One thing that is absolutely clear is there can be no question of reaching a settlement through a process that does not involve putting a revised plan before the people of Cyprus. A second referendum will need to be held. This will require work to be done on the way in which the public is informed about the terms of any new settlement plan and how the debate over a new plan is framed. In the period since the last referendum, there has been some excellent work done on the issue of public opinion. Alexandros Lordos and Muharrem Faiz, presented the findings of a number of polls they had conducted on various aspects of a settlement.[4] The results challenged many of the opinions that are now forming concerning the actual wishes of the two communities regarding a solution. For example, it appears clear that the majority of Greek Cypriots are in fact willing to accept a bizonal, bicommunal federation. Moreover, it was suggested that with specific steps taken to improve various aspects of the UN peace plan, such as those relating to security, it appears possible that a second vote could achieve 65% support from the Greek Cypriots. This would be on a par with Turkish Cypriot support in the first referendum.

Similarly, it was accepted that one of the most beneficial things that can be done is for there to be a regular and ongoing public opinion polling process that can be used to inform the political leaders about the wishes of the people. However, one concern expressed was that while people may want to see improvements made to provision relating to security, for example, there is the question of how they will judge whether those changes that have been made conform to their requirements. In other words, there is still room for politicians, and those closely involved with the talks, to act as arbiters of the acceptability of the final product. This needs to be thought about.

Another issue that needs to be addressed is the way in which the media addresses the issue. It was pointed out that most of the Greek Cypriot media took a very negative view of the UN peace plan and waged an unremittingly hostile campaign against all those who supported the agreement. This included preventing supporters of the plan from expressing their views. Attention was given to the fact that neither Alvaro de Soto nor Gunther Verheugen were allowed to speak on Greek Cypriot television. In the event that a second referendum is held, steps will need to be taken to address this problem and ensure that a free and fair debate takes place.

However, care should be taken not to take the behaviour of the Greek Cypriot media as being indicative of some deep flaw in the nature of democracy in Cyprus, a view that has been widely expressed. For example, as the EU Constitution referendum campaign in the UK is likely to show, the media all over Europe are more than capable of distorting the truth to pursue a political agenda.

Restarting the Process

Although the conference examined ideas for changing the plans, and looked at ways to address public attitudes towards a settlement, there was little doubt that the key question was how to get the parties back to the table. One issue that had come up at an early stage was the idea that somehow the European Union could take a more active role in the future peace talks, perhaps even replacing the United Nations. This has been gaining currency in Greek Cypriot circles in recent months. However, as a number of participants pointed out this notion stood against the standard practice of the EU. Moreover, it has been categorically rejected by a number of senior EU officials. The EU had not intervened directly in such issues before - for example in Ireland or Spain - and would not want to do so now. Instead, the EU's role was vital for creating the conditions for the parties to reach a settlement. Furthermore, even if the EU did want to have a direct role, questions were raised as to whether Turkey would accept it in such a role. To this extent, it is accepted that the United Nations Secretary-General must retain a central position in the search for a solution.

In terms of the positions of the various interested parties, the general view was that Turkey remains committed to reaching a settlement of the Cyprus issue as soon as possible. Even though the 17 December 2004 decision to open up membership talks was an important milestone, the prospect of having to extend the customs union agreement to include the ten new EU members, including the Republic of Cyprus, has given Turkey the impetus to continue to press for a settlement. Similarly, there were few doubts expressed about the willingness of the Turkish Cypriot community to engage in new talks if such an opportunity arose. By extension, the prevailing view was that the key to any settlement at this stage lies in the hands of the Greek Cypriots and that, as things stand, there is little political will for movement on their part.

While many expressed frustration at the Greek Cypriot position, the view was put forward that it would be counter-productive to force the Greek Cypriot leadership back to the table before they are ready. Despite Turkish pressure to return to talks as soon as possible, the 3 October date for the start of Turkish EU membership talks should not be seen as being a deadline of some sort. It is not. Instead, the view was expressed by several participants that it would be better to give the Greek Cypriots time to work out exactly what they want, rather than push them into a

corner. Already there are signs that the two largest parties, DISY and AKEL, are formulating positions regarding specific changes to the UN blueprint.[5] This could well yield results. Moreover, a broad acceptance by the main parties on the terms of any new plan, assuming the terms are realistic, would facilitate the settlement process significantly and would help overcome the vocal opposition from rejectionists.

Regarding the time frame for a resolution, there were several good reasons to suggest that a return to the table might even be held off for a couple of years. This thinking was based on the view that perhaps the Greek Cypriots were worried about the implications of a settlement on their hopes of joining the euro. It was pointed out that if a settlement was reached before the euro is adopted, the eventual date for joining would be pushed back significantly. This could have serious consequences. For a start, once the euro is adopted many of the provisions of the final UN plan, such as running the Cyprus pound and the Turkish lira side-by-side, would change significantly for the better. It would also lock the European Union into supporting the agreement financially. Another factor to consider is the European Constitution. Once the treaty comes into force it will create certain new conditions that would need to be taken into account in any new peace plan. Another interesting view put forward was that the process might benefit from a change in leadership at the UN. Kofi Annan's second and final term in office is due to end on 31 December 2006**.**

However, balanced against this argument for delay, the Greek Cypriot leadership must be aware that postponing any return to the table is likely to come at a price. First of all, a delay could negatively effect the specific terms of a settlement. Concerns have been expressed about the arrival of large numbers of Turkish workers in Northern Cyprus over the past few months.[6] Most of them have been brought over to provide labour to fuel the construction boom taking place. Although these workers are not settlers, it is likely that a number of them will stay, which will further alter the demographic balance in Northern Cyprus. In the meantime, every new house built on Greek Cypriot property potentially changes the very nature of the eventual settlement (restitution versus compensation) that will be offered to the original owners.

Secondly, the Greek Cypriots must be careful not to base their calculations on the belief that Turkish-EU accession is a certainty. It is not. Although the current Turkish Government is certainly keen on EU membership, there is a strong undercurrent of Euroscepticism in many parts of Turkey and it is not inconceivable that at some point in the future a Turkish Government may opt for a 'special relationship', rather than full membership. Similarly, there are countries in Europe that remain deeply troubled at the thought of Turkey joining the Union and may at

some point try to halt the process of Turkish accession. France and Austria have both announced that they will hold referendums on Turkish EU accession. Bearing this in mind, it is certainly not beyond the realms of possibility that Turkey may not join the EU, in which case the chance of a settlement would probably be lost forever. As one participant noted, good gamblers know when to cash in their chips. The Greek Cypriots need to be careful to balance the time taken to reach a position against the various other factors at play that will make a settlement more complicated or more difficult, if not impossible, to reach.

Managing the Interim

The last set of issues concerns how best to deal with the current period of political inactivity. The general view was that time should not be wasted while a decision is taken on settlement talks. There is much that can, and should, be done. Perhaps the most important work that can take place in the meantime involves steps to bring about economic convergence between the two sides. Given the considerable concerns expressed about the financial and economic elements of a settlement, any steps to increase the relative wealth of the Turkish Cypriot community should be welcomed as a means to ease the eventual reunification process. Likewise, active efforts should be made to see the implementation of the EU acquis in the Turkish Cypriot areas. Again, this would ensure a minimisation of potential shocks in the aftermath of reunification.

However, these steps should not represent recognition by the back door. There is no question of recognising the 'TRNC', or even engaging in a process of 'Taiwanisation'. This has been clearly stated by Cyprus's EU partners, including the United Kingdom, as well as by any number of other countries, including the United States. Instead, the aim should be to ensure the long-term viability of a settlement. To this end, there needs to be a more measured and less cautious response from Greek Cypriots towards the proposals that have been developed to assist the Turkish Cypriots. The current fear of recognition is preventing the implementation of a number of steps that could really benefit Cyprus and the Cypriots, both Greek and Turkish, before, during and after a settlement. Similarly, Greek Cypriots should not assume that economic convergence or steps aimed at EU harmonisation will necessarily decrease Turkish Cypriot willingness to solve the island's division. While this argument is understandable, in fact there are good reasons to argue that development will continue to spur the Turkish Cypriot desire for a solution. For example, as the Turkish Cypriots engage in the process of harmonisation they will want to be sure that at the end there is the prospect of full membership of the EU. That cannot happen without a settlement. Likewise, no matter how high their economic development, the Turkish Cypriots will still remain politically unrecognised without a settlement. Balanced against this, the Greek Cypriots should be careful to recognise that by preventing the Turkish Cypriots from developing their economy

they could well be feeding Turkish Cypriot resentment against them and thereby undermining efforts to reach a settlement.

However, leaving aside the trade issues, there are many other positive steps that can be taken in the meantime. Naturally contacts between the two communities must continue to take place. Since the opening of the Green Line, there has in fact been a reduction in the number of formal bicommunal activities that have taken place. This needs to be addressed. Even though the two sides can mix freely, efforts need to be made to encourage the two communities to continue to get to know each other again and learn to co-operate on a wide range of social, economic and political issues. Similarly, contact between political parties is important. Such contacts not only help to establish common ground in terms of a settlement, but it also creates the foundations for bicommunal political co-operation in a post settlement Cyprus. Politics after a solution would be helped if people could move beyond a simple definition of interests in ethnic terms, and could see political debate restructured to reflect the types of political, left and right, debates elsewhere in Europe.

Another important idea to consider is the continuation of confidence building measures (CBMs). However, it is important to ensure that such steps remain unilateral actions designed to engender reciprocity. While the idea of negotiated CBMs has been mooted in the past, there is always the danger that a formal discussion process on CBMs could harm the overall settlement process. For a start, such a process would divert attention away from the need to reach a settlement and become a process in itself. Secondly, the failure to reach agreement on CBMs can engender mistrust rather than build confidence. This obviously harms the overall political atmosphere between the two sides and thereby sets back efforts to reach a solution. As was pointed out, had the proposal to open the Green Line been subject to discussion between the two sides it is highly unlikely that the restrictions would ever have been lifted.

Conclusion

In summary, there is a clear view that the UN plans continue to represent the basis for a settlement and that certain changes will be needed, mainly focused on property and security, if any future agreement is to be accepted by the Greek Cypriots. In the event that a deal is reached, another referendum will need to be held and careful attention will need to be paid to the conduct of the campaign. However, there appears to be little likelihood that a new round of talks will be held in the near future. While Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots appear ready to re-engage in discussion, the Greek Cypriots appear cautious about returning to the table. While pressure should not be brought to bear on the Greek Cypriot side, they

should be aware that delays do not necessarily work to their advantage. Moreover, until such time as they are ready to resume discussions, the Greek Cypriots should support efforts to improve the economic conditions of the Turkish Cypriots and assist them to meet the terms of harmonization with the EU acquis. In addition, the overall conditions of the island would benefit from greater contact between the two sides at all levels and from the continued development of goodwill gestures and confidence building measures.

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This commentary is based on the concluding address delivered to the conference by the author, 'What needs to be done to achieve a settlement?' Please note that the views contained here represent the personal opinions of the author. They should not be taken to reflect the opinions of any other participants at the conference or of Wilton Park.

1. As an academically independent and non-profit-making Executive Agency of the British Foreign and Commonwealth Office (FCO), Wilton Park is underwritten financially by the FCO, which also provides advice and contacts.
2. 'Brit bashing is back in fashion', *Cyprus Mail,* 13 February 2005.
3. See the interview with General Hilmi Ozkok, the Chief of the Turkish General Staff, published in *Eleftherotypia,* 18 October 2003.
4. Alexandros Lordos, *Civil Society Diplomacy: A new approach for Cyprus,* an evidence based report in co-operation with CYMAR Market Research Ltd. and KADEM Social Research Centre, 2005. See also the earlier findings published in Alexandros Lordos, *Can the Cyprus Problem be solved? Understanding the Greek Cypriot response to the UN Peace Plan for Cyprus,* 2005.
5. The basic points of these two papers were compared and contrasted in *Politis,* 6 February 2005.
6. These concerns were subsequently outlined by Mr Papadopoulos on 23 February when he met in Brussels with Olli Rehn, the EU Enlargement Commissioner. 'Papadopoulos briefs Commission on North', *Cyprus Mail,* 24 February 2005.

Book Reviews

The Cyprus Question; 1878-1960
The Constitutional Aspect

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou
Minnesota-Mediterranean and East European Monographs,
(Minneapolis, Minnesota, 2002) 156 pp.

Evanthis Hatzivassiliou is a lecturer on contemporary history at the University of Athens and despite his young age already an old hand in Cypriot historiography. So far he has published three excellent books on the British Colonial period in Cyprus which constitute a highly recommendable read for the expert as well as for the ordinary reader. This book is an updated version of a Greek monograph first published in 1998. While his other two publications deal with the 1950s, this work ambitiously covers the entire British colonial period choosing a new - and highly rewarding - topic: the constitutional aspect of the Cyprus dispute. It is the first attempt - at least in English language - to analyse the diverse constitutional orders Cypriots lived under or, as importantly, could have lived under, had diverse constitutional proposals been implemented, between 1878 and 1960.

The book is divided into five chapters, introducing the reader first to the major problems and peculiarities of the constitutional development of Cyprus before embarking on a chronological analysis of the constitutional orders and proposals during the 82 years of British rule.

His general and well substantiated thesis is that constitutional development was restricted, or even dictated by the demands of international politics and the realities of geopolitics from the start of the British colonial period: *"Between 1878 and 1948 international considerations merely reinforced the reluctance of the colonial officials to concede greater power to the indigenous population, but after 1950, the influence of international considerations assumed enormous and, by the late 1950s, dominant proportions."* The author leaves no doubt that the predominance of international factors was to the detriment in particular of the Greek but - and this thesis is more disputable - also of the Turkish Cypriots since the needs of the local population were hardly considered in the formulation of constitutional proposals for Cyprus. Indeed, all constitutional proposals after 1956 were primarily designed with a view to reach an international agreement on the future status of Cyprus acceptable to Greece, Turkey, and Britain. This can also be said about the Cypriot constitution of 1960. They also undermined the political dominance of the Greek Cypriots and de facto ended their dream of *enosis.* But these were positive

developments for most Turkish Cypriots, who managed to increase their political powers in any constitutional proposal since 1956 and, therefore, clearly benefited from the increasing importance of the role of Turkey.

This does not mean that Hatzivassiliou draws an all negative picture of the constitutional development in Cyprus. In fact, it started off promising. The beginning of British colonial rule brought the introduction of institutions and popular vote to Cyprus in 1882, at a time when such political freedoms were largely unknown to most territories in the wider region. But already in 1882, the unusual international status of Cyprus – under the sovereignty of the Ottoman Empire, and the administration of Britain – could not but be reflected in the organisation of Cypriot public life, "distorting it" as Hatzivassiliou puts it, for almost four decades by organising it along ethnic lines and giving the Greek-Cypriot majority population no equivalent representation in the Colonial Parliament, the Legislative Council. In this body Turkish-Cypriot representatives and colonial officials always constituted a majority. This arrangement turned the Turkish Cypriots into a partner of the colonial administration and the Greek Cypriots into a permanent parliamentary opposition to both. This basic principle remained largely untouched after Cyprus became a Crown colony in 1925. The Legislative Council was reformed but the basic principle of ethnic division and its power balance were hardly changed. The number of Greek- Cypriot representatives was increased from nine to twelve but this was counterbalanced by the addition of three British Colonial officials.

The failed 1931 uprising marked the turning point in Cyprus constitutional history: there would be no return to constitutional government until independence in 1960. According to Hatzivassiliou, the negative experience with the Legislative Council made Greek Cypriots distrustful toward the idea of gradual constitutional development; they rather saw it as a tool which the British used to prevent *enosis.* This view became dominant among Greek Cypriots especially after 1945, and largely prejudiced them against subsequent constitutional offers. In this context, the author applies two very helpful concepts for the characterisation of Greek-Cypriot nationalism during the colonial period. According to Hatzivassiliou, the *enosis* movement on the island followed two successive patterns, based on two historical precedents. Between 1878-1931, the Greek Cypriots were following the *Ionian Pattern* i.e. a policy imitating the peaceful struggle of the Ionian radicals for union with Greece hoping that the British, who had ceded the islands in 1864, would react similarly. The pattern lost its appeal shortly before the 1931 revolt and especially during the period of direct rule that followed. After the Second World War another pattern became prominent: the Cretan one - emphasising a dynamic, even violent, claim for liberation. Cooperation and gradual constitutional development under a colonial administration became far less acceptable under the Cretan pattern. For Hatzivassiliou, the change towards the Cretan pattern was a mistake. It locked the

Greek Cypriots in rigid, dogmatic positions failing to realise they were facing a European democracy with a tradition of gradual political development. Greek-Cypriot leaders viewed any British constitutional proposals after 1948 as a trap rather than a step in the desired direction. This work rightly leaves no doubt that the colonial rulers bear the main part of responsibility for the radicalisation of Greek- Cypriot nationalism. They refused to offer real political power-sharing to the majority of the population before 1931 but rather kept the Greek-Cypriot representatives a minority in the Legislative Council and then insisted openly on keeping the island indefinitely after World War Two.

Looking at the numerous constitutional proposals between 1948 and 1960, Hatzivassiliou makes the plausible argument that three constitutional proposals were a lost opportunity at least for the Greek Cypriots: in 1948 and again in 1955- 1956 the British and Greek Cypriots came close to a mutually acceptable constitutional settlement, remarkably the only two serious attempts to find a colonial settlement i.e. an agreement between the colonial people and its ruler based on Greek-Cypriot majority rule and a protected Turkish-Cypriot minority status. The 1948 constitutional proposal was ''A *liberal constitution [which] would realize the Greek Cypriot's wildest dreams of the 1930s; but in the late 1940s, it might not be enough."* The basic clash of interests jeopardising all attempts to solve the Cyprus problem between 1945 and at least 1956 was that after World War II only a constitution with a prospect for the union of the island with Greece would do for the Greek Cypriots, which was unacceptable to the British who had decided after the war to keep this island indefinitely.

In 1948, the Greek-Cypriot representatives demanded a large degree of self-government including all ministries except foreign affairs and defence. This was rejected by the British who signalled that the legislative would have a Greek-Cypriot elected majority and an association of Cypriot political leaders with government departments. But attacks from the Greek-Cypriot right which did not participate in the negotiations created the need for the left to present tangible concessions which were not forthcoming. In the end, the British were prepared to give ministries to the Cypriots in five years time, but this concession was not communicated to the Cypriots with highly detrimental consequences for the constitutional development of the island. The initiative failed and the Greek Cypriots lost the British concession of majority rule, a target they had been fighting for since 1882. The political left now adopted the "enosis and only enosis" line of the political right and started to participate in the ensuing internationalisation campaign, which would ultimately backfire on the Greek Cypriots by bringing outside powers into the conflict. The Turkish Cypriots had interestingly accepted the British proposal making clear that they would not consent to Greek-Cypriot demands for self-government, which would place the minority under the majority's domination. For Hatzivassiliou, *"the*

1948 proposals can thus be described as a major opportunity which all sides lost to set Cyprus on the path of normal constitutional development. The Greek side lost the opportunity to create a relaxed, if not self-governing, system, even to gradually build an essentially Greek Cypriot administration on the island. In the following years, neither the British nor the Turkish Cypriots would be prepared to accept an offer as liberal as the Winster proposals, while the Greek Cypriots themselves would be reluctant to accept anything less than the offer they had rejected in 1948."

The negotiations between the British Governor Harding and the Greek-Cypriot leader Makarios in 1955 and 1956 signified the second lost opportunity. Again, a Greek-Cypriot dominated administration was the base of the proposed agreement together with a vague acknowledgment of a Greek-Cypriot right for self-determination in an unspecified future, but the negotiations failed mainly over the issues of control over inner security and amnesty for the EOKA fighters. For Hatzivassiliou, the differences in the end were not insurmountable but the consequences of the failure disastrous. The British had for the last time negotiated directly with the colonial people. From now on international considerations would play the predominant role and outside interests would prevail over domestic needs.

The constitutional proposals of 1954 and the Radcliffe proposals of 1956 were not lost opportunities, as Hatzivassiliou plausibly argues. Despite some very favourable and liberal aspects – Hatzivassiliou even characterises the Radcliffe proposals as the most liberal constitutional offer the British ever made to the Cypriots – both had no chance of being accepted for the same reason: they were both accompanied by British political statements which completely discredited them from a Greek-Cypriot point of view. The proposal of 1954 was linked with the famous "never" statement to the complete independence of Cyprus by the British Undersecretary for the Colonies, Hopkinson, during the debate on the constitutional proposal. In 1956, the proposal was accompanied by the recognition of a separate Turkish-Cypriot right for self-determination by the Colonial Secretary Lennox-Boyd. The latter statement marked Cypriot history decisively also on a constitutional level: *"Inevitably, when a group of people (in this case the Turkish Cypriots) are granted such a right (even through a legal absurdity), they tend to put forward much wider constitutional demands, and do so more strongly than would otherwise have been the case."* The significance of the 1956 statement can indeed hardly be underestimated. It was made to blackmail the Greek Cypriots into the acceptance of the constitutional proposal and, therefore, the continuation of British colonial rule but it in fact changed the status of the Turkish-Cypriot community from that of a minority to that of a second and potentially politically equal community. The immediate consequences were the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot demands for partition. After 1956, the Turkish-Cypriot right for self-determination together with the increasingly powerful position of Turkey formed the base for the near political

equality of the Turkish Cypriots in the 1960s constitution and – together with the facts created in 1974 – political equality in any envisaged post-1974 order including the Annan Plan.

Followed by the ill-fated Foot and Macmillan plans, which reflected the climax of potential mainland Turkish and Greek involvement in the administration of Cyprus, the island arrived at the constitutional settlement of 1959-1960. Though the author is highly critical of its imposed character, inflexibility, and provisions like the need for separate majorities for cases of electoral law, tax bills and municipal legislation, he belongs to the small camp of writers who considers the constitutional order of 1960 workable and a lost opportunity rather than a construction bound to fail. He sees the main reason for its failure in the politics pursued by the extremists on both sides after 1960: *"The constitution was indeed immensely complex, but not unworkable. In the end, the way a system is implemented is perhaps more important than its actual legal character. Implementation also involves aspects such as mutual trust and the desire to compromise."* Its main advantages from a Greek-Cypriot point of view were the creation of an independent and sovereign state, thereby removing the British colonial rulers, who could not mortgage the future of the island further, as they had done with the 1956 statement or the Macmillan Plan, the removal of the Turkish government representative and the preservation of a unitary state. The democratic principle of majority rule was still upheld though modified in the 7:3 ratio and in some fields subject to Turkish-Cypriot veto rights. The Greek-Cypriot president played the decisive executive role either directly or through his control of the Ministerial Council.

The constitution did not solve but froze the differences on the island, the most the constitution could aspire to achieve in the situation of 1959-1960. The establishment of mutual understanding between Greek and Turkish Cypriots was left for the future as was the Greek hope that in the long run the Greek-Cypriot majority would prevail: *"[The] fundamental unspoken assumption of the Greek side was that tension would work in favour of the extremists and of those advocating partition, while smooth political development would work in favour of moderate forces and of the Greek Cypriot majority."*

There is not much one can criticise in this thoroughly researched and well written study of Cypriot constitutional history during British rule. There are a few minor details, as for example, the fact that the author has omitted the concept of suzerainty from his discussion of the legal status of Cyprus until 1914.

The most disputable aspects of this book are the lessons and political demands deriving from his analysis for any future constitutional order in Cyprus. The fundamental assumption by which all past but also future constitutional designs are

evaluated is the application of majority rule as an indispensable element of any Western democratic constitution. Consequently, in the case of Cyprus, he rejects any constitution which is not built on Greek-Cypriot majority rule as undemocratic: *"a bicommunal society does not necessarily imply that democratic principles are not applicable; even in a federation [...] these principles are modified, not cancelled. [...]*

With the possible exception of Belgium, one can indeed not think of any other Western democracy in which the majority principle has been set aside to give an ethnic minority political rights equivalent to those granted to the Turkish Cypriots in the Annan Plan - and in Belgium the population ratio is very different making equal power sharing more acceptable as just for the majority. In the case of Cyprus, however, the question is not if Hatzivassiliou is theoretically right but whether or not his thesis could *realistically* provide the basis for a constitutional arrangement given the intricacies of the island's recent political history. What is promoted in the book, an arrangement based on Greek majority rule, is not feasible in terms of Realpolitik.

It was already clear at the time of writing in 2001-2002 and is even clearer after the Annan Plan that demands for Greek-Cypriot majority rule stand no realistic chance partly because of the continued domination of international considerations in the search for a solution. But the necessity of political equality is now also the outcome of the political and social reality on the island after 1974. The Turkish-Cypriot claim for political equality was accepted by both the Greek-Cypriot leadership in the High Level agreements and by the international community. Consequently, there were only symbolic leftovers of the majority rule principle in Annan V and this is unlikely to change. This might indeed fly in the face of democratic constitutional theory, but it was accepted by the European Union, the guardian of Western democracy in Europe. The EU raised no objections to the violation of the majority principle, on the one hand in order to address power political realities but on the other also in order to overcome the legacy of ethnic strife and division.

Therefore, Hatzivassiliou's well substantiated objections to political equality for the Turkish Cypriots, for example in the form of a rotating presidency, are unavoidably overruled. If Cyprus is ever to have a joint constitution again, it will remain a sui generis case something Hatzivassiliou – and most Greek Cypriots – lament as "unjust" with very good reasons. But as far as one can foresee, this island has only two options. The first is that Greek Cypriots accept the principle of political equality as the price to be paid for reunification. This means the indeed risky attempt to produce a constitutional paradox, which will create a constitutional precedent: the creation of a Western liberal democracy based on political equality between numerically very unequal ethnic groups. In such a case, by highlighting the

inherently unjust nature of the constitution rather than focussing on the advantages of reunification, Greek Cypriots will be sowing the seeds of their own discontent thereby jeopardising the viability of the new political order.

The second option is to remain divided.

Hubert Faustmann

Cyprus: The Search for a Solution

This book describes events related to efforts to solve the Cyprus problem between 1996 and 2004 and is written by one of the protagonists, the retired British diplomat Sir David, later Lord Hannay. Sir David was appointed by the Conservative Government in 1996 as the British Government's Special Representative for Cyprus, and continued representing, and perhaps shaping British policy on Cyprus, during the subsequent Labour governments of Tony Blair.

When one begins reading this book, one is not struck by the modesty of the author, who, on the second page, points out that "most of what has been written about Cyprus … are at best distorted … at worst little better than polemic and propaganda ... So for someone who has always been a student of history, it was tempting to try and redress this balance a little." For this reason it is tempting to this reviewer to point to some of the inaccuracies or mistakes contained in his first chapter, an historical background of events in Cyprus between 1960 and 1996. TMT was formed in 1958, and EOKA B in 1971 for example, and not both in 1963, as is asserted in this chapter. President Johnson's warning to Turkey against invading Cyprus took place in 1964 and not 1967. The coup in 1974 was organised and not just "encouraged" by the dictatorial regime in Athens. Under the coupist regime in Cyprus Turkish Cypriots were not attacked before the beginning of the invasion by Turkey. The 1975 Vienna agreement was about limited freedom of movement, not about population exchange. Mrs Titina Loizidou was not awarded damages by the European Court of Human Rights for dispossession of her property by Turkey, but for being denied its use. To be frank though, these errors do not seem to add up to distortion. The account of recent Cypriot history which David Hannay gives in this part of the book, apart from the errors indicated, is fairly objective and free of ethnocentricism. He correctly refers, for example, to the campaign waged by EOKA against British forces in the 1950's as a guerrilla war. However one wonders what current effect a mistaken view of history can have. For example what effect on his current thinking on the Cyprus problem did his mistaken impression that there had been an agreement on population exchange between the communities have?

This account is one of the background chapters. He also provides succinct and fairly objective accounts of the players and the issues involved in the Cyprus

problem. The bulk of the book consists of a readable step by step account of the United Nations efforts to bring about a solution of the Cyprus problem between 1996 and 2003, in which not only the United Nations but also the United Kingdom, usually in the person of David Hannay, and the United States, were key players. In this account, he is objective in detailing the unrelenting negativity of Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, but also the full backing provided for this obstruction of efforts to reach a solution by Ankara.

Not being an historian however, I read the book not so much for the sequential account of events, but for the light it casts on what I regard as four key questions. Firstly, since David Hannay is not only an author, but was primarily involved in the Cyprus problem as a British Government Representative, what does he reveal about what he was actually trying to do, about what his instructions were, and about what British interests in the issue were? Secondly, and perhaps most importantly, this same period was the period during which Cyprus became a candidate, then negotiated and attained accession to the European Union. How does David Hannay interrelate this with the UN process? Thirdly, was there during this time a change in Turkish attitude, and to what does David Hannay attribute it? And, finally, what is revealed about why the final product was acceptable to the majority of Turkish Cypriots and unacceptable to the great majority of Greek Cypriots?

There is relatively little in the book on which to base answers to the first set of questions, but what there is, is interesting. In the preface, David Hannay describes not why the British Government offered him the job, but why he agreed to take it. The political reason that he gives is the following: "The commitment given by the European Union in 1995 to open accession negotiations with Cyprus, divided or not, within six months of the end of the Inter-Governmental conference which was drawing up the Amsterdam Treaty (in 1997) meant that we were sliding towards a parting of the ways which might either consolidate the division of the island or lead to its entering reunited into the European Union. It also had the potential to lead to a serious crisis in the relations between Turkey and the European Union and thus to a threat to the peace and stability of the Eastern Mediterranean. So the case for making a further determined attempt to reach a settlement was a serious one."

He describes his mission as having four components: The first was to channel British interest in Cyprus through the United Nations. Secondly, the Cyprus problem should not result in frustration of the planned enlargement of the European Union which was a major British foreign policy objective. Thirdly, to get a settlement of the Cyprus problem before it joined the European Union. This objective was to be pursued in such a way as not to put at risk British relations with Cyprus, Greece or Turkey.

Throughout the book, the impression is given that the practical way in which the last two objectives were pursued included a pragmatic taking into account of Turkish power and Turkish demands, and also trying to ensure that the Cyprus problem would not become a barrier to Turkey's own accession to the European Union. Sometimes this might be done through public support of what was in fact a disputed position. When in April 2002, the British Minister for Europe came to Cyprus and referred to its "peoples" there was naturally concern on the Greek Cypriot side. David Hannay in the book pretends that he does not know that recognition of "two peoples" (as against one people with two ethnic communities) was a basic Turkish demand. These kinds of public steps, included the issue of "acknowledgement" (a term whose paternity he declines and attributes to Denktash), and the question of "rotating presidency" (which is not mentioned in the book), but which in 1999 or 2000 involved David Hannay floating an idea which up to that point had been a Turkish demand.

For Cyprus, Greece, and many EU governments at a subsequent stage, the process of accession of Cyprus to the European Union, the interest of Turkey to be considered a candidate for accession, and efforts to solve the Cyprus problem were, for a number of more or less obvious reasons, mutually re-enforcing processes. David Hannay's attitude is a little contradictory, but basically, this reviewer perceives a tendency for him to share the view of nationalists in Turkey, Greece and Cyprus that this interrelation was in some sense dangerous. In the quotation from the book above, David Hannay gives as one reason for taking up the job the need to avert the dangers to Turkey's relations with the EU and the threat to peace and stability in the Eastern Mediterranean, which he sees as deriving from the process of Cyprus acceding to the EU. He reverts to these fears at other points in the book, though conceding that one might also hope that "the EU dimension" might act as a catalyst for a comprehensive settlement. Intriguingly David Hannay refers to his bad relations with the Greek Foreign Minister in 1996, Theodoros Pangalos, as being rooted in "some rather sharp disagreements between us over Europe's relationships with Turkey and Cyprus" during 1985-1990 when Hannay was UK Permanent Representative to the EU. Pangalos was an ardent proponent and supporter of Cyprus accession to the EU. Was Hannay an opponent?

Certainly in the book he shows only limited appreciation of the intense and positive effect which the process of accession of Cyprus and the EU's developing relations with Turkey had on transforming the situation in the Eastern Mediterranean from a zero-sum game to one in which all could gain through the impact of the EU's expanding, calming and civilising influence through the mechanism of conditionality. Or to be more accurate, it does show an understanding of the positive effect on the issue of a solution in Cyprus from the candidacy of Turkey to the EU. But he appears to basically see problems and

complications arising from the accession course of Cyprus to the EU, which need to be unravelled, particularly in respect of making sure that the EU *acquis* is modified in the case of Cyprus to accommodate the United Nations' solution plan. As David Hannay sees and reports it, Commission officials, including Commissioner Verheugen, agreed to subordinate the EU *acquis* to the UN solution plan and modify it accordingly, rather than the other way round. It also emerges from David Hannay's account that considerable effort was put in both by the UN Secretariat and the Commission, so that the *acquis* would not be a problem for elements of the Annan Plan which violated its provisions, and so that the *acquis* could not be subsequently used to change elements in the UN solution plan. The references in 2001 and 2002 of the Council of Ministers of the EU and the Seville European Council to the EU accommodating any settlement when Cyprus joined the EU gave a green light, according to Hannay, to the Commission to intensify contacts with the UN negotiating team to define "necessary transitional arrangements or derogations".

At various points in the book David Hannay incidentally records the sharp change in the Turkish Government's attitude on Cyprus. On his first visit to Ankara, in June, 1996 as British Representative on Cyprus, Hannay was asked by the top Turkish official dealing with Cyprus, lnal Batu, "whether there was any chance of trading a unilateral Turkish Cypriot ceding of territory in return for international recognition of the Turkish Cypriot state." Hannay replied that he did not think so. Ecevit reiterated to Hannay the view that the Cyprus problem had been settled by him in 1974, and continued to insist on this when he became Prime Minister of Turkey again in 1999. This was the real and effective Turkish position, as it comes out in the book. Denktash and the Ecevit Government thought that the Cyprus problem had been "solved" in 1974, and therefore throughout the UN negotiations would not even consider plans which took into account almost all their demands. What happened from January 2004 onwards, after the Turkish Cypriot demonstrations and elections, is worth quoting: "The Turkish Government ... resolved its own internal contradictions and concluded that an early settlement on the basis of the Annan plan offered a potentially acceptable outcome and the only sure way of furthering its major policy objective of getting a green light for the opening of its own accession negotiations with the EU at the end of 2004. The Turkish Prime Minister moved rapidly, through a series of high level meetings with the EU, the UN secretary-general and the president of the United States, to indicate that he was anxious for a resumption of the negotiations on the conditions laid down by Annan... " It would have been interesting to know more about these meetings.

As David Hannay's account makes clear, by this time, the Accession Treaty between Cyprus and the EU had been signed in Athens in April 2003, including protocol 10, clarifying that accession was taking place without a solution, and what would happen in case of a solution after accession. A few days later the Turkish

army made movement of people between the area it occupied and the rest of Cyprus possible. The division did not crumble, because unlike the German case the army that maintained the division and the country to which the army belonged did not crumble, but the Denktash myth did. The Denktash myth was that the two communities were dangerous to each other, and on this assumption much of the negotiations since 1974 had been based. David Hannay stepped down from his post at the same time as De Soto closed his office in Nicosia and the Secretary General produced a report for the Security Council blaming Denktash for the failure of the negotiations.

This sequence of events already throws some light on why the Turkish Cypriots voted yes and the Greek Cypriots no in the subsequent referendum in April 2004. Being a Greek Cypriot, the reviewer cannot resist the temptation to pick out some of what went into the making of the Annan plan in the UN negotiations. This is not to criticise either the UN or David Hannay. After all, they as well as the Greek Cypriots had to confront the blank wall of Turkish insistence that no solution was the solution in Cyprus. It is only to record the direct lineage of the UN solution effort to what David Hannay himself refers to as ''the dog days'', or which this reviewer likes to refer to as the "cruel and peculiar circumstances" in which negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem took place after the Turkish invasion in 1974.

The stage was set for the beginning of negotiations in December 1999 and January 2000, by Clerides coming up with a series of compromise positions, which in Cyprus problem jargon refer to the High Level Agreements, already a compromise between the two communities achieved in 1977 and 1979. Denktash for his part started with a further retreat from even his hard-line positions of 1992. "His basic thinking", according to Hannay, "basically amounted to two separate states linked by little more than a permanent diplomatic conference in which each side had a veto". He also wished no Greek Cypriot refugee (or Turkish Cypriot for that matter) to return to his home, demanded, even momentary recognition of sovereignty of the ''TRNC'', and wanted that part of Cyprus to join the EU only when Turkey did.

In June, 2002, Hannay pointed out to Mehmet Ali Birand how far possible solutions were moving towards meeting basic Turkish interests and concerns. Cyprus would have a new flag and a new national anthem and a new name. "It would in fact be the new partnership, for which the Turks and Turkish Cypriots had been calling."

At the end of 2002, before the Copenhagen European Council at which Turkey and Denktash once more refused everything, Hannay comments that "Denktash and the Turks had no excuse if they did not understand that the structure of a

strengthened and open-ended Treaty of Guarantee, a continued Turkish troop presence on the island and a removal of all the existing Greek Cypriot troops and their weapons was potentially on offer."

The character of what was finally on offer, in other words, as well as Turkish negativity landing Cyprus in the EU without a solution, cannot but be considered major factors in the outcome of the referendum, as well as President Papadopoulos' refusal to accept the Annan V plan.

The end of the book is a little chaotic, since it seems to end twice; once with the nth break-up of negotiations by Mr Denktash in March, 2003, with the support of Ankara {this time Erdogan's not Ecevit's Ankara). And secondly, in a postscript which takes account of the belated Erdogan Government drive for a solution after January 2004. Part of the first ending is a chapter entitled "What Went Wrong and Will it Ever Go Right". This chapter seems to have very little to do with the preceding chapters, so much so that it creates confusion in the reader's mind about whether it was written referring to events up to March 2003, or to events up to May 2005. In this chapter it seems that David Hannay pours out all the ethnocentric arrogance which he seems to keep in reign in most of the rest of the book.

For example, though his book clearly shows that the frustration of all efforts between 1996 and 2003, where he concludes his account, were due to Denktash's misbehaviour with the backing of Ankara, in this conclusion-drawing chapter he also comes up with two other reasons for failure: The "blame game", a specialty of the Greek Cypriots, and also the "zero sum game". In this chapter, Hannay even comes up with an inferiority complex of the Greek Cypriots "because Turkey dominated their island militarily". And as proof of this he recites Clerides' statement that bad weather always comes from the Taurus mountains (in Turkey). Referring to the occupied territories (occupied by Turkey) is for David Hannay "a weird politically correct vocabulary", while another indication of this weirdness is referring to the people of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus as the Turkish Cypriot Community. I wonder whether David Hannay really ignores the fact that the struggle over defining the meaning of a situation is a real struggle, and that defining the occupation away is a means of legitimising it. Or the fact that military inferiority is real and not a complex. Or that peoples have a right to self-determination which communities do not. Or even that foreign troops in another country's territory against its will is what defines occupation. But I do agree with one of his conclusions in this chapter. "There cannot be a complete resolution of all the disputes between Greece and Turkey without a settlement of the Cyprus problem."

Michalis Attalides

An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999 - 2004.

Claire Palley
Hart Publishing, (Oxford and Portland, Oregon, 2005)
xiii + 395 pp.

This is a detailed, erudite, dense and earnest book. What lends it its edge is that the author completely declines to accept that just because Cyprus is small and occupied, it should be treated by different human rights standards and standards of respect for her sovereignty and of the niceties of international law; different to what other states have a right to.

In her Introduction Claire Palley says that "she has striven to provide an accurate account from the available information and has sought to refrain from mere propaganda" and I agree that advocacy, which is a fully respectable activity for a lawyer, is not the same as propaganda. In one sense, this book is the complete opposite of David Hannay's recent book on the negotiations, which seems to only to be concerned with the procedural aspects of reaching a solution, and appears to be completely indiffer'ent to the content, and is certainly not concerned with the content measured against legal or other principles.

One of the aspects of the book that I appreciated most was her clear description and documentation of what I personally had clearly and frustratingly felt in my efforts to understand the Annan Plan: That the principles enunciated in the Foundation Agreement, which, especially in the earlier versions of the plan, appeared almost straight-forward and acceptable, frequently suffered from successive limitations in the subsequent sections, addenda and legislation, so that they were frequently negated. The way she puts it on page 33, "The Foundation Agreement was written as the Plan's international marketing tool" is fair.

Thus for example on page 108 Claire Palley describes how hidden away in a law regarding the Continental Shelf, prepared by the UN, there is a provision resulting in a situation such that, in the area opposite Turkey, Cyprus would have no continental shelf.

All the basic concepts of the Cyprus Problem and of the Annan Plan are there, and are discussed in an erudite and detailed way. I can not imagine that anyone

will be able to write about the Cyprus problem ever again without referring to this book. And clearly this is the book to go to if you wish to learn about the differences between "good offices", "mediation" and "arbitration", and which side refused which, at different stages of the negotiations.

I myself learnt quite a lot. Firstly the author makes a strong case that the UN Secretary General should never engage in arbitration or even in making "bridging proposals" or in "completing gaps", because such an activity immediately makes the UN Secretariat a party, in a sense, to the negotiations, rather than an impartial facilitator of negotiations.

I wonder whether, and I think that Claire Palley at some point implies this, such a degree of commitment, and the frustration on the part of the UN Secretariat, resulting from its own excessive involvement, and the disappointment resulting from the rejection of Annan V by the Greek-Cypriot referendum, may to some extent be responsible for that paragraph, which is hard to reconcile with objectivity, or with detachment, which the Secretary-General inserted in his Report of 28 May 2004, which recommends in paragraph 93, that the Security Council should "give a strong lead to all states to cooperate both bilaterally and in international bodies to eliminate unnecessary restrictions and barriers that have the effect of isolating the Turkish Cypriots, deeming such a move as consistent with Security Council Resolution 541(1983) and 550 (1984)."

This paragraph is the one which could be used to steer things to an alternative solution to the Cyprus problem, alternative to the one provided for in Security Council Resolutions, including 541 and 550; it is alternative because it follows the "Taiwan model" or the "Independent region of the EU" model as a long-term method of attempting to defuse the situation. And it is a model which, though not giving Turkish Cypriots participation in the Republic of Cyprus, or in EU institutions, also does not give Greek Cypriots any of their land or property back, and leaves the northern part of Cyprus dominated by settlers and the Turkish army.

But let me return to further interesting facts that I learned from Claire Palley's book: There have only been two mediators appointed by the UN. The first was the Finn, Sakari Tuomioja (under whose auspices the Acheson plans were worked out in Geneva), and Galo Plaza, whose report so strengthened the unity of Cyprus by rejecting all forms of division, that after him the Turkish side refused the appointment of another UN mediator.

However, I also learnt from this book that at his famous, but hitherto quite mysterious meeting at Davos, on 24 January 2004, Erdogan raised the question of the United Nations appointing a mediator, or the acceptance of arbitration by the

Secretary-General. (Let me say that I also learn from this book that the Secretary-General indicated to Mr. Erdogan that no such function was envisioned by his mandate).

My aside would be this: Had our side known this at the time, together with other more public indications at that time, they would have taken Erdogan's intentions more seriously and would not have counted on being saved from a largely unworkable plan by the rejectionism of the Turkish side.

Going back to the theme of good offices, mediation and arbitration, I also learnt that in the Paris discussions of September 2002, (hitherto also quite mysterious), the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot sides agreed with the Secretary-General that he should make "bridging proposals", thus opening the door to a certain amount of mediation and arbitration, and ultimately, arguably, to the five models of the Annan Plan.

Continuing on the theme of good offices, mediation and arbitration, we come to the New York meeting of February 2004, but here I have to be a little critical of Claire Palley, because in the book she fails to resolve my basic unanswered question of recent Cypriot History which is this: We went to New York opposed to the Secretary-General even completing the gaps in the Annan Plan. (Designated points, usually figures, which the Secretary-General had not completed, but left to the two sides, presumably so that they would feel they had done some negotiating.) And we came away, not only accepting that the Secretary-General could complete the gaps, but also as the Secretary-General says in his Report, that the procedure agreed in New York "enlarged the role for me, from completing any unfinished part of the Plan, ('filling of the blanks'), to resolving any continuing and persistent deadlocks in the negotiations." In other words after New York, the Secretary-General could not only fill in the blanks, he could change the plan at any point on which there was not agreement between the two sides, in other words at any point where one side disagreed.

Claire Palley gives explanations for this change of attitude of the Greek-Cypriot side in New York which I find rather weak: In a footnote (11 on p.101), "subject ... to duress occasioned by international pressures". In another footnote (19 on p. 103) she notes: "The international furore had his good offices (confusingly meaning arbitration) been rejected would have been so damaging that the Republic of Cyprus's position as the State of Cyprus could have been thrown open to reconsideration by angered states".

Though the author considers, and I agree with her, that the $64,000 question is "Why did the Greek-Cypriot side agree to the Secretary-General finalizing the text

then putting it to referendum..." I do not consider the above explanations adequate, and nor do I consider her other explanation adequate, which is basically, in her own words, that "they believed that he (the Secretary-General) would be persuaded by reasonable argument to make the changes the Greek-Cypriot side urged in order to have a functional settlement." In other words, the Greek-Cypriot side believed that once everything had been reopened to renegotiation, its own view of functionality would predominate over that of Turkey. One wonders how.

My guess would be neither of these explanations, though both are based on valid assessments. My guess would be that our team went to New York not having fully incorporated into their thinking the real changes on the Turkish side, particularly in Ankara, with the Erdogan government, and were therefore wrong- footed by Denktash's overnight change of position and acceptance of arbitration by the Secretary-General. They then followed in order not to be dubbed the politically intransigent side. Had they done their political homework more thoroughly they would have been better prepared. They might not have known at that stage about Erdogan's offer to Annan, but the debate and change in climate in Ankara was evident, as well as the crucial significance for the Erdogan government (as against Ecevit) of EU membership, and the need to clean up or appear to clean up their act on Cyprus.

This being the case though, with the history of an active role for the Secretary-General, it could be that the author might be a little less critical of the UN Secretariat, in her photo captions, particularly. When she does give serious consideration to the Secretariat's behaviour, a serious and, I think valid, analysis does come out both about the tilt towards Turkey, and the "slippage of the secretariat" as far as the content of the Annan Plan is concerned. I will just quote her on the latter: "... it was perhaps too easy in applying ingenuity to find ways around the two sides competing claims to occupancy and ownership of property to move by one degree after another so far from the principles governing the right to property and the right of refugees to return to their homes in safety that these principles were no longer applicable in reality, lip service merely being paid to them."

Claire Palley also illustrates, and clearly documents the successive compromises of the Greek-Cypriot side, in contrast to the Turkish position, which hardened and became more extreme, while also the divergent positions gained in United Nations eyes "equal validity". The author documents this very well through the Secretary-General's report of April 2003, where he writes about the "visions" of the two sides being wide apart. What the Secretary-General does not comment on is that the Greek-Cypriot "vision" as the Secretary-General describes it, at that stage, was not a vision but a previous compromise for "bizonal federation".

Denktash by contrast at this stage had a new vision, which was not the compromise of bizonal federation, but a further retreat from this, to quote the Secretary-General's report the vision of a "Confederation of Cyprus founded on two pre-existing sovereign states" or his new term "partnership state".

Appendix 6 is an extremely useful table comparing modifications of the various provisions through the four successive versions of the Annan Plan (she leaves out Annan IV for reasons which she explains). Only Claire Palley with her vast legal knowledge and her extensive immersion in the Cyprus problem over many years could have prepared this table.

Clearly this book takes a side. And the side taken clearly justifies the right of the majority of Greek Cypriots to say no to the Annan Plan, and the book castigates the behaviour of the UN Secretariat, EU officials and foreign governments. I would urge particularly those who disagree with this position politically to read this book. It brings so much to light, that it could form the basis of a beginning of a real dialogue about what the solution of the Cyprus problem should and could look like.

Finally, I would like to express some reservations:

(a) I would have enjoyed the erudition, the cross referencing, and the painstaking detail in the book without some rather exaggerated comments which are interspersed here and there, and which I do not think add to the weight of the book, such as references to the UN secretariat "debasing itself", or "demeaning itself in a petty spat" or references to a "peevish descent" on the part of the secretariat or its "cynicism". Or her statement that UK Embassies should have fluttering on their flag poles not only the Union Jack, but also the Turkish crescent and star.

(b) For the same kind of reason I do not find that the numerous photographs and the frequently sarcastic captions add to the book. To the serious reader, the photographs are an encumbrance. The non-serious reader will not learn much from the captions, but is likely to have prejudices reinforced.

(c) Thirdly, the rather simplified account of the events in the sixties is not really necessary in the book.

(d) Nor was it really necessary to adopt government views on all issues, including casting aspersions on citizens who chose to seek a grant of 14 000 pounds from UNOPS in order to advocate a "yes" vote in the referendum.

In conclusion, I would like to make a general comment which is connected, not with the academic quality of the book, but with some of its political implications.

I do not find one of the assertions which is repeated from time to time, i.e. that the UN Secretariat was from 1974 until Annan 11, basically fair-minded and attempting to do justice to Human Rights, and the basic UN principles, and then suddenly became lop-sidedly pro-Turkish, under the influence of its own vanity, and Anglo-American pressures, and EU indifference.

The drifting towards Turkey's positions, has, since 1974, been part of the tragic geopolitics of the Cyprus situation. When you are weak you not only lose territory, respect for your sovereignty, and safeguards for the human rights of your people, you also have an uphill struggle to win the battle of ideas: the ideological battle, the legal battle, the battle to persuade, and in the end the negotiations' battle. This has always been the case, and is so today.

The political as against the legal question is how a small and weak country handles these battles in the best interests of its citizens. I would venture to say that this is the challenge for the political class of Cyprus, not just the winning of legal and moral points of argument.

Michalis Attalides

The Cyprus Problem: *An International Relations Debacle* or merely *An Unclimbed Peak?*

Introduction

This essay aims at reviewing two important texts that appeared in 2005 by placing them in the current context that brought Cyprus so close to the resolution of its 'intractable problem': Claire Palley *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999 – 2004,* HART Publishing, Oxford and Portland, Oregon and David Hannay's *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution,* I. B. Tauris, London. They were not the only books on Cyprus that appeared since the publication of the UN plan in late 2002. However, the high profile of the two authors makes their books special: both are British 'actors' in the latest failed initiative and their contrasting views are highly relevant to the debate about *what happened, how it happened* and *what is the way out.*

Before and After the UN Plan

The publication of the UN plan, Annan I in late 2002 was a watershed. It has decisively changed the terms of the debate, it has politicised citizens and brought about important transformations of political forces in a way that no other plan or event has done since 1974. The plan 'appeared' at a time when Cypriot society as a whole, both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot, was in the process of transformation. Moreover, it coincided with the final stages of Cyprus' accession to the EU and the new impetus of Turkey's own bid to accede. Turkey, a country undergoing a long-term process of political and societal transformation has made the leap on Cyprus.

The Annan plan was not some 'unexpected' and 'surprising' text that appeared out of the blue as it is often presented in the media; it was rather a culmination of years of slow 'negotiations', and largely reflected the balance of forces, internal and external, that shape the conflict; a plan, however, that has so far failed to properly take into account certain Greek-Cypriot concerns. The processes that brought Cyprus so close to a solution accelerated when the historic conjuncture of Cyprus' accession to the EU coincided with Turkey's own European aspirations, the collapse of the bi-polar world and the expansion of the EU.

If one is to reflect on the perceptions of the solution to the Cyprus problem, political party, ideology and sectional interests, the positioning of various political

forces and shades of opinion as regards the UN plan, it becomes apparent that the plan *constitutes an important historical moment.* Not only does the actual plan mark a qualitative historical shift away from schematic and formulaic concepts of some imaginary world that would somehow 'emerge' as 'the solution', but it has created *a new political dimension in politics.*

The Greek-Cypriot 75.8% of the valid vote who voted against the plan or 65% of those entitled to vote is *not a monolith* as it is often presented; it is in fact a very fluid and evenly divided public opinion in Greek-Cypriot society, given AKEL's stance prior to the 24th April referendum. The question remains, *what is to be done next:* with the exception of the extreme right all political parties agree that the Annan plan is still on the negotiation table, even though rejected. It is there as the basis for negotiation; but at this moment we can only speculate as to what each side is willing to accept. This is why the insight of the two authors is particularly timely and useful.

Two Contrasting British Views on Cyprus: The Barrister *versus* the Diplomat

Following the publication of the first version of the UN Secretary-General's plan to resolve the Cyprus Problem, a number of Greek language publications appeared, and a small number of English language publications. Overall, the Greek and Greek-Cypriot publications have been outright opposed to the plan, many of which contained opinionated and distorted pictures of its content and context. Generally, the books and articles written in English appeared a little 'more balanced', representing perhaps the sharp contrast in Greek Cypriot politics between the politics for internal consumption and the 'international relations politics', which is more diplomatic. Moreover, most of the writers who published in English are on the whole pro-solution, pro-federal solution.

A notable exception is Claire Palley's book,[1] whose author is the chief legal advisor to the Cyprus Republic Government. It is a bold defence of the official Greek-Cypriot position through and through and as such it is extremely valuable. If now *it is read together* with Sir David Hannay's book we get a very interesting picture indeed. In fact this is the best way to appreciate the two perspectives, which could not be further apart, not only in style and method, but most importantly in content and conclusions as to the way out.

Palley's 'Chronicle of a Death Foretold': A UN Debacle?

Claire Palley's basic position is that the UN plan is but a debacle of the United Nations. It is a devastating critique from beginning to end leaving very little to the imagination of the reader. The attack is not confined to the bureaucratic and ineffective policies of the international organisation or its tendency to comply with

the interests and priorities of the major powers; it goes further. Palley claims that the UN officers are involved, at least in the case of Cyprus, in 'Machiavellian spin games'. The failure of the UN initiative is, according to the legal scholar, not the result of a contest of two sides which could not match in the end. At no moment was there any indication of the possibility for a 'fair and acceptable settlement'. It was more or less a sham; an initiative that was doomed from the outset. This doom scenario is of course the darling conspiracy theory of Greek-Cypriot media and the position of most Greek-Cypriot political parties. Apparently, according to this school of thought, the aim of the superpowers was *not* to resolve the Cyprus problem, but to decriminalise Turkey and open its way to the EU; Greek-Cypriots are the victims of an international conspiracy to deny their fundamental rights - the argument goes.

We all know that matters are not as clear-cut as that. History is the result of fierce contestations; nothing is predetermined even if there is disequilibrium of forces. Moreover, an historical explanation that fits the kind of argument I mentioned may well be valid for 50 or 100 years, but may not be valid for a particular conjuncture. It is a matter of historical enquiry that requires close scrutiny. The notion of collective communal victimhood may act as an obstacle both to a fair historical understanding of the past as well as the prospects of reconciliation in the future.

Palley's densely argued text is well structured and nicely annotated with an abundance of pictures to meet all tastes and a very useful appendix which summarises all the main positions at each of the versions of the Annan plan. Presumably aimed at the expert reader, the book is overloaded with footnotes and references, which are extremely valuable to specialists but tiring for the lay reader. She has no calms about stating where she is coming from; Ms Palley has for decades been the legal advisor to the Cyprus Republic. As she rightly admits in page 2, "no report or history can be 'objective'".

The main problem with the book is that it is too opinionated to leave any space for debate. It has a clear and unbending stance: the failure to resolve the problem lies squarely with Ankara and the UN failed miserably in its mission in Cyprus, as the UN itself violated the very notion of 'Good Offices' transforming itself into a binding referee. This was done in order to appease Turkey under pressure from the US and the UK. Up to this point one can see the validity of her argument, even if one does not share her view on the subject. However, the difficulty with going down this road is that (a) the Greek-Cypriot side actually signed an agreement in New York to follow this procedure; (b) the final text was put to a democratic vote of both communities; and (c) it has been a standard Greek-Cypriot demand that the UN and great powers 'get involved' to put 'effective pressure on Denktash and Ankara to

abandon their intransigent stance' and this formula was invented primarily to bypass the intransigent Denktash, as Hannay points out in his book.

The critique on the UN plan that is contained in the book contains useful, albeit 'over the top', insights as it points to the loopholes, some of the functional difficulties and concerns of the Greek-Cypriot side over the functionality and the viability of the venture: what if the constitution proved to be unworkable and collapsed soon after? What if Turkey did not keep to her promises? A number of core issues are addressed with vigour: the issue of the settlers who would be allowed to stay under the plan; the guarantees of Turkey and stationed troops; the British bases; the property rights of Greek-Cypriots; the right of return of displaced persons. All these are issues that need to be rethought, if we are to have a second go at the solution. However, the critique would have been more persuasive and the points raised could be addressed much more effectively, had the author concentrated her fire on certain core issues. The book would have been far more persuasive, had it embarked on a more constructive approach, pointing out a realistic alternative to each point in question, rather than being a pure polemic. Moreover, the way in which the author attacks UN diplomats on a personal level does assist her case that it was power politics that determined the outcome not justice, human rights and principles. What is the point then of trying to ridicule De Soto? Finally, the book paints the future in very uncertain colours, leaving the reader with some nebulous comments about the potential of Cyprus' EU accession right at the end of the book. A particularly weak point for Palley's position is that whilst she makes a strong case for the risk of a possible collapse of an agreement after it is signed, she never attempts to weigh this risk against the risk of indefinite perpetuation of the status quo, which may consolidate partition. Cypriots were forced to decide on whether the 'calculated risk' was worth taking, sometimes referred to as a 'constructive risk', by juxtaposing this risk to the likely result of rejecting a proposed solution. Such an approach is never considered by Palley.

The most problematic of Palley's views, however, are those connected with the way she presents the reasons that 'swayed a large majority of Greek-Cypriot voters to reject the plan' (chapter XVII) and some unsubstantiated claims that may have some validity at the level of abstract legal theory, but show that the author has very little political understanding of the situation in Cyprus. Moreover, there are contradictions in the book as regards the potential for solution in the future. For example, on the question of the settlers problem after the rejection of the plan, she rightly points out the danger of more settlers moving to the island, but then argues that there will be a political cost for Turkey, should the numbers become 'too excessive'. The author however fails to pinpoint what this political cost will be. She also does not explain *how to exit the current cul-de-sac.* At the very end of the book, Palley suggests the return to Annan version I and II for renegotiation as

'Annan II and V were Secretariat impositions imposed by the major powers on the Security Council' (page 258). On a general note of hope, she closes with the claim that the UN Secretary-General should have ended with paragraph 81 in his 2 May 2004 Report, which refers to the opportunities of the two communities to cross the divide but which is 'not a substitute for a settlement'.

Overall, the book is useful in presenting the most authoritative account so far of the Greek-Cypriot arguments for the overwhelming rejection of the UN plan. The weakness of the book is that it is unable to offer a more balanced account, but how could it as it is written by an adviser of one of the two sides. More importantly, the book does not offer anything constructive to build upon in order to exit the current impasse of the Cyprus problem.

It is here that we turn our attention to the book of David Hannay.

Cyprus from a Lord's Eye: An Unclimbed Peak?

Sir David Hannay, *Cyprus, the search for a solution* is a robust and well written account of the latest international initiatives for the resolution of the Cyprus Problem from 1996 onwards. He embarks upon an 'anatomy of a negotiation, not a history of Cyprus' and does not attempt to hide his own interests. The book is very readable, at points humorous and 'user-friendly', presumably designed for a wider audience (hence the omission to include any footnotes etc.). This does not make it of less value. It is written by an authoritative actor in the UN initiative who knows the ins and outs of the international scene and had a major input into the Annan plan. The book is well structured and logical, but at the end he leaves matters a little blurred; perhaps deliberately so. The Cyprus problem is still in need of a solution and perhaps the book may contain a little of what is reputed to be Sir David's own medicine of 'constructive ambiguity'.

At the beginning he presents himself as a retired diplomat, whose 'reluctance to quit entirely the scene of international diplomacy' is drawn to the intractable 'Cyprus Problem' like 'a mountain climber drawn towards an unclimbed peak'. This is a little exaggerated of course. He was appointed by the British Government (both by the Tories and Labour). He is a serious diplomat of a former colonial power with important stakes at play (stability in the region; British bases; stationed troops; geo-strategic interests in the near Middle East). To be fair, David Hannay does not for a moment underplay the importance of a solution, and the dangers of yet another failed attempt to resolve it. He points out that the complexities of the negotiations themselves were very difficult to understand and sums up the nature of the problem:

'This was far from being a classical, bilateral international dispute, to be addressed within the framework of the relations between a limited number of nation states. It was rather a very modern negotiation, a kind of three-dimensional game of chess. Since neither United Nations diplomacy nor that involving the European Union is particularly well or widely understood'.

In his brief historical introduction, Hannay makes some interesting comments, which illustrate his grasp of the problem and his awareness of the widespread Cypriot mistrust of the UK. After all, the role of the former colonial master and generally the British imperialist past of 'divide and conquer' naturally concern former colonised people sceptical about British motives and designs. It must be pointed out, however, that nationalists often make full use of these fears to realise their own goals, which has little to do with a consistent 'anti-imperialism'.

The few historical errors he makes at the beginning are of no significance to the thrust of his arguments. He tells us that 'the story of Cyprus, from classical times down to its independence in 1960, was one of dominations by outside powers' (page 1). It is amusing to read candid comments from a British diplomat such as: The history of external domination has left its mark on all Cypriots; it has contributed to the feeling, widely prevalent on both sides of the island, that Cypriots are not masters of their own destiny, that their fate will inevitably be decided by forces situated outside the island'.

Hannay makes some observations about the 1960 Constitution that the Cypriot consociation escapes any comparable category and that it would only function if there was political will on both sides (page 4).

'The 1960 Cyprus constitution is difficult to categorise in any of the commonly known definitions; it was neither federal nor confederal; it was perhaps closer to a unitary structure, but it contained elaborate checks and balances between the powers exercised by the leaders of the two communities as president of the two communities. It could only ever have worked smoothly with a high degree of cooperation between the two sides; in the hands of people who were in no way motivated to try to make it work, it provided a recipe for deadlock and frustration'.

Hannay is acutely aware of the limited role of personalities; the importance of national and sectional interests involved and 'personalities are not all-important'. He is correct in recognising that 'even the strongest and most dominant characters are not entirely free agents, and that national and sectoral interests, the weight of history, the flow of events outside those directly related to the problem, will influence the outcome every bit as much and sometimes more than the actions and views of the individual players.' It is here that Hannay's analysis does not realise its own

insights: the 'sectoral' and 'national interests' need to be elaborated; the role of social and political forces must be properly rooted in an analysis of the socio- economic and political context; perhaps this is too much to ask for a retired British diplomat who just wanted to present his account with a watchful eye to the future.

Hannay (at page 10), however, refers to the sticking 'universe', of the importance of personality in different capitals, but the most obvious difficulty was Turkey: Who decides what? What is the 'true position of Turkey'? How far is she willing to go to resolve the Cyprus problem? He observes:

> 'It was never at all clear where Turkey's Cyprus policy was being decided or who was at any time playing the key role in deciding it. It was often tempting to believe that the answers were nowhere and no one, and that policy was largely being decided by default, falling back, for lack of agreement on any new policy, on the old one'.

Another observation is apt: in the case of the four 'players' (Turkey, Greece, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots), 'the public debate on Cyprus in each of them was ill-informed, formulaic and chauvinistic' (page 11):

> 'Negotiations to resolve the Cyprus Problem had been going on for so long and so fruitlessly that most commentators, journalists and their readers had become bored and cynical, unwilling to look at the issues with a fresh eye or to challenge conventional wisdom. Indeed many journalists, especially on the island, seemed to consider it their patriotic duty to follow the long-established partisan line and to denounce any politician who dared to suggest that any aspect of it might be re-examined'.

Hannay quite accurately presents the key issues that make up the Cyprus Problem: The four 'core' issues - governance, security, territory and property plus a couple of other sensitive issues which were important for one or the other side, such as the settler issue for the Greek Cypriots and the question of whether the agreed state that would emerge out of the negotiations would be a 'new' state or a 'continuation' of the Republic of Cyprus, which boils down to the actual status of the unrecognised 'TRNC'. He refers to 'two intangible but nevertheless real fears', Turkish-Cypriot secession was the Greek-Cypriot nightmare and Greek-Cypriot domination was the Turkish-Cypriot one. As for the issue, 'governance', he rightly points out that Greek Cypriots want mechanisms for deadlock-resolution, stressing 'functionality' which in fact underpins the case for numerical majority rule as majority rule is more 'effective' and 'functional'. The Turkish Cypriots wanted dualism and political equality, including the executive leadership which is of course symbolic and effective - hence the insistence on rotating presidency and veto.

A crucial issue when analysing the collapse of the UN plan is of course 'what exactly went wrong and will it ever go right?' Here Hannay's account is extremely thin, a mere twelve pages long. He also stresses the importance of AKEL's position for final outcome of the Greek-Cypriot vote and looks to AKEL as a major force in finding a way out. Neither in the section dealing with what went wrong (and whether it will ever go right), nor in the postscript does he ever really engage with these issues and perhaps wisely so: this is not his field, nor is it his stated goal.

The problem with Hannay's diplomatic approach, which is largely also reflected in the UN plan itself is the attempt to always appear 'even-handed'. To cut the middle ground is, on certain matters, the 'art of negotiation', but the 'Solomon-type of solution' may be unworkable or unacceptable: 'the middle way' is not always fair and the efforts to bend over backwards may create mistrust and misunderstanding. Moreover, the UN plan (in which Hannay's role was not a minor one) failed to properly address certain core issues. What he fails to appreciate properly in his book is that there are a number of circumstantial or conjunctional reasons that were important factors in determining the referendum outcome. Neither Hannay, nor Palley address what might be considered to be fundamental flaws that had a fatal result in the outcome of the UN plan.

Overall, the book by Hannay was a surprise. I must confess that I started reading this book with a lot of prejudices: 'here is another arrogant British diplomat who is trying to sell his story', I thought. But what I read was not this. It is a fascinating account which is well-written and argued out in a balanced way. Moreover, it provides some clues as to the ways out. Of course it contains no recipes for a solution; and Sir David, being who he is, i.e., a British Lord cannot project into the future. It is a diplomat's tale. However, we can, and indeed we ought to, take up some points in order to push the issue further in understanding what went wrong and how to get it right next time.

Conclusion: What Went Wrong and How to Learn From the Past?

In this final section I venture to raise some of the issues that warrant debate regarding the UN referenda which have not been brought up by either of the two scholars, but would prove valuable if and when there is a 'next time'. As regards the UN plan, a number of factors need to be addressed, both in terms of content and procedure.

Firstly, the references to the nature of *the state to emerge* were left deliberately vague and a method was adopted of using meaningless neutralities to refer to the future such as 'the state of affairs' etc. In legal terms, from a constitutional point of view, I am in no doubt that the post-Annan 'new state of affairs' was to be a

bicommunal, bizonal federation, but the 'symbolisms' were not there. The idea of 'virgin birth' for example that attempts to explain in neutral terms the 'emergence' of 'the new state of affairs' may have been diplomatically ingenuous in meeting the two opposing sides' position on the past, but proved to be a political disaster in the end. *This notion was subject of abuse and distortion as it played on the security of Cypriots that would be left without a past and without a state of their own, and thus without a future.* The UN plan was designed in a way that could be claimed as their own by both sides being based on the notion of 'regime iiitegrat'ton', as was pointed out in a recent conference.[2] That it was designed *not* as a popular reconciliation and societal integration and had little scope for citizen involvement in the design, legitimisation and public debate, is an additional failure. *To acquire legitimacy, to inspire loyalty and support, a reformulated State form requires* that it appears *stable,* it must be *firm* and be *named for what it is* and *must be properly anchored in a legitimised ideology of the past.* 'Constructive ambiguity' may be useful in avoiding sticky situations in diplomatic deadlocks but it does not resolve the core issues and it does not result in a legal certainty that can acquire loyalty and legitimacy by an untrusting community.

Secondly, the UN did a terrible job in piecing this deal together, in spite of the heroic efforts to make it work. A simple issue would have made all the difference, if for example what was put to the referendum was better presented. The choice ought not to have been a holistic 'Yes' and 'No' because this does not reflect what the *actual choice is for the Cypriot people.* What was put to the vote was a massive package, which entailed millions of reasons to say 'No' and few to encourage a positive outlook. In fact, the Cyprus referendum is an excellent example for peace- making avoidance. A simple recipe would have been *not* to put the Treaties within the deal, which are attached as additional protocols. These were never negotiated between the representatives of the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots as they were issues settled between Greece and Turkey (and the UK). Of course, for an agreement to be accepted there should be a complete agreement on all the elements the settlement consists of - a 'fine balance' between the internal- constitutional and the regional international elements of the deal. However, it would have been possible to keep the 'Yes' *versus* 'No' for the Constitution and Foundation Agreement and have a separate ballot for the Treaties. A separate ballot could have comprised *the real choice that is available,* which is: either the Treaty of Guarantee as 'agreed' in 1960 and currently in force, OR the amended Treaty (which is marginally improved). This was the actual choice for Cypriots. However for most Greek Cypriots, *the NO vote was a general rejection of the Zurich accord and the foreign right to intervene in Cyprus, as exemplified in the sense of insecurity and fear.* An understandable feeling as the occupation of the northern part of Cyprus continues this very moment.

There are more effective 'cumulative methods' in proceeding with referenda in attempting to involve the people that also try to properly *involve* ordinary citizens and organised groups in the process, rather than leaving it to secretive talks between the political elites. In the case of Cyprus no consultation was even considered. It was assumed that the political parties and the leadership were 'locked' in the deal, as stakeholders they would put their weight behind the deal. Obviously this proved to be a gross miscalculation, as it relies on 'good will'.

Finally, it must be borne in mind that no one, other than Cypriots themselves, has the power to decide how to proceed to find a solution. Internal forces, power contestations, local ideologies and agency play a vital role that cannot be underestimated. Neither Palley, nor Hannay can provide us with magic recipes for the future. Foreign powers would be forced to listen if the two leaderships attempt to address the core issues with good will; it is not a zero sum game. The leaderships of the two communities must begin to discuss the way out of the impasse on the basis of the UN plan in a new round of negotiations. At the same time it is essential that foreign forces, the UN, the EU and major powers retain their concern and involvement so that there is convergence of interests and the will to reach a solution as soon as possible *on the basis of a renegotiated UN plan that addresses the concerns of the Greek-Cypriots and retains the support of the Turkish-Cypriots.*

Nicos Trimikliniotis

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1. There are other exceptions but these are mainly Greek-Cypriot or Greek writers (for some examples see *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 16, No. 2, papers by V. Coufoudakis and G. Camp).
2. Erol Kaymak: 'Does Cyprus Need a Truth and Reconciliation Commission?' at *Reconciliation and Citizenship in Cyprus: A Trans Communal Concept for Social Action,* organised by IKME, BILBAN, SYMFILIOSI 23 July 2005, Goethe Institute, Nicosia.

NB. The titles *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary- General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004,* by Claire Palley, and *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution,* by David Hannay, are available from Moufflon bookshop, 1 Soufouli Street, 1096 Nicosia.