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**THE  
CYPRUS  
REVIEW**

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a Journal of social, economic and political issues

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THE  
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VOLUMES  
NUMBER 2

## TABLE OF CONTENTS

### **Eric Neisser**

A Federalism Process for Cyprus: An American Constitutional Perspective on the Cyprus Problem 7

---

### **John A. Koumoulides**

Early Forms of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus: Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence 1821 24

---

### **Nayia Roussou**

Factors of Humanitarian and Mass Culture and Aggression in Children and Young People 38

---

### **Harry Anastasiou**

Conflict Alienation and the Hope of Peace: The Struggle for Peace in Militarised 79

---

### **Plus Commentary Articles by:**

#### **Oliver Richmond**

Negotiating out of Fear and Fearing to Negotiate: Theoretical Approaches to the Ending of the Cyprus Conflict 99

---

#### **Michael J. Maranda**

Drug and Alcohol Consumption in Cyprus 111

---

#### **And Book Reviews of:**

*Dean Acheson, The Cold War Years, by Douglas Brinkley (Sofronis Sofroniou)* 121

*Riding with the Lion: In Search of Mystical Christianity, by Kyriakos Markides (Valerie Michaels Mavratsas)* 123

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
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# A FEDERALISM PROCESS FOR CYPRUS: AN AMERICAN CONSTITUTIONAL PERSPECTIVE ON THE CYPRUS PROBLEM

Eric Neisser<sup>1</sup>

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## Abstract

*This article examines how American constitutional experience bears on the Cyprus Problem. The historical evolution of American federalism, from very limited to expansive federal power, may prove instructive. Cyprus should not seek a comprehensive federal solution now, but rather adopt a federalism process, patterned after the Middle East peace process. This would entail whatever limited federal structures both sides can accept now and a structured process for further considerations as trust, experience, and real confidence develop.*

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The question of how to develop a viable formula for co-existence of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities in Cyprus, generally referred to as the 'Cyprus Problem', raises many fascinating and perplexing legal, political, economic, and social questions. As one trained in the American constitutional tradition, my focus is on the constitutional aspects of the Problem.

I do not pretend to have a solution. Even if I secretly had one, I would be most hesitant to present it, as an outsider to the island's two major communities<sup>2</sup> who has lived there for only a few months. What I thought might be useful, however, is to present an American constitutional perspective on the issues and potential solutions being discussed, in the hope that my analysis might offer a different framework for approaching the Problem.

## Overview

What is most striking to an outsider is that, amid all the talk about the Cyprus Problem, essentially no one discusses *why* the two communities should co-exist or *whether* either or both would be better off living separately. It is simply assumed that the solution must be some form of co-existence. My sense - which is admittedly impressionistic - is that the people in both communities (as compared to their current political leadership) truly want a solution and view co-existence, rather than separation, as the preferred endpoint. It is also my own opinion that co-existence would be best for both communities. However, for me, honest consideration of this issue should be the starting point for any analysis of how to solve the Problem.

In contrast, what there is a great deal of talk about are concepts like sovereignty, federalism, community rights, affirmative action, and individual rights. To me, these concepts represent a continuum of mechanisms designed primarily to protect the community in the numerical minority from domination by the community in the numerical majority.<sup>3</sup> Thus, for example, I perceive a bicomunal, bizonal federation, the commonly agreed formula for Cyprus, as simply a more elaborate structure for protecting the interests of the Turkish Cypriot community than the traditional American federalist structure. That structure consists of geographically, rather than ethnically, defined states and constitutional protection of individual rights, including non-discrimination, enforced by a federal judiciary independent of politics.

Where the Cypriot communities will ultimately come to rest on this continuum of mechanisms will not be the result of some theoretical construct or a formula derived from another constitutional system, although plainly other experiences may provide useful ideas for Cypriot consideration.<sup>4</sup> Rather, any resolution must and will reflect primarily the particular history of the island's communities and *the degree of assurance or protection* for its interests that each community feels it needs in light of that history.

The degree of assurance that each community needs, however, is not fixed in time. Rather, it reflects the level of trust at any particular point. Trust can be gained or lost over time, through positive or negative experiences. The American constitutional experience has been one of slow but gradual expansion of federal versus state power as economic and social needs developed. Given the levels of hostility and distrust between the Cypriot communities over the last quarter century, I suggest that, from the perspective of Cyprus' constitutional structure, it is a mistake to attempt to find a single, comprehensive solution all at once, right now. I am not suggesting simply confidence-building measures. Rather, the communities should try to agree on a minimal federal structure, based on the bicomunal, bizonal concept that each side has already accepted in principle, which each community could live with now, given their very limited current level of trust and hence very high current need for assurance or protection.

However, such a basic federation should be the beginning, not the end of the *process*. If such a limited system were to prove successful over time in protecting fundamental interests and building bridges, then each community might feel more trust and less of a need for assurance than at present. They might, then, be willing, at a later time, to entertain suggestions for a more powerful or centralized federal authority than they can imagine at present. I, therefore, suggest that Cyprus draw upon the recent Israeli-Palestinian experience - which involves an incremental and evolving peace process, rather than a single, comprehensive, and permanent peace settlement at the outset - and create, if you will, an incremental, evolving "federalism process" for Cyprus. By that, I mean a structured procedure for continuing discussion and reconsideration of the nature of the federation and the degree of federal versus community authority. Such a developing process may prove a more effective way of proceeding than seeking to conclude a single, comprehensive, permanent federation settlement. I will elaborate on these points below.



### Definitions and the American Experience

Part of the problem, from an outsider's perspective, is that various terms of constitutional importance are used without clear or agreed-upon definitions. These terms often carry substantial political as well as emotional baggage.

"Sovereignty," for example, means different things to different people. This has been as true throughout American history as it is in Cyprus today. Americans who have been concerned about the extent of the federal government's power, from anti-Federalists in the late 18th century to so-called "militiamen" today, have frequently asserted that American states are "sovereign." Indeed, in a very recent decision known as *Seminole Tribe v. Florida*<sup>5</sup> the United States Supreme Court decided for the first time that our federal Congress could not use the powers expressly delegated to it in the Constitution to compel states to submit to lawsuits in federal court as part of an enforcement mechanism for a federal regulation. This protection from being sued in court is generally referred to as "sovereign immunity." In so ruling, the majority flatly stated that "each State is a sovereign entity in our federal system."<sup>6</sup> Just five years earlier, the Court had similarly stated that "the States entered the federal system with their sovereignty intact."<sup>7</sup>

These statements are, to be blunt, a distortion. A sovereign entity (certainly in international and American law, if not in all legal systems) is one that has all the powers of government - both foreign and domestic - and is eligible for international recognition, like Japan, Guatemala, or South Africa. In contrast, American states have not, since the formation of our Republic, been authorized to maintain their own armies or foreign policies, to send or receive foreign ambassadors, to negotiate treaties with foreign countries, or to coin their own currency, to mention just a few key matters.<sup>8</sup> If, as the Supreme Court has said, "each State is a sovereign entity," then each of them would have authority to do such things. The truth is much more limited, as the Court appropriately acknowledged only a few sentences later in the *Seminole Tribe* opinion: "the States, although a union, maintain certain attributes of sovereignty, including sovereign immunity."<sup>9</sup>

As Justice Souter explained in dissent in *Seminole Tribe*, "[b]efore the new federal scheme appeared, 18th century political theorists had assumed that 'there must reside somewhere in every political unit a single, undivided final, power, higher in legal authority than any other power'.... The American development of divided sovereign powers ... 'shatter[ed] ... the categories of government that had dominated Western thinking for centuries.'<sup>10</sup> Of course, the Swiss, who developed a unique and highly successful form of federalism in the thirteenth century, may well take exception to this sweeping statement.<sup>11</sup> But the basic point cannot be disputed: The American system of federalism divided up attributes of traditional sovereignty between the national government and its constituent parts in an unusual way that was surely a break with the predominant mode of Western governance at the time.

Discussions about any solution in Cyprus (other than partition into two separate countries) will advance only if talk about "sovereignty" is dropped and the focus is turned to *which attributes of sovereignty* will remain with each community in a federation and

which will belong to the federal entity. Will there be one federal army or two community (federated state) armies, a federal police force as well as community forces? Will there be a single foreign policy, trade policy, immigration policy, and tourism policy, or will each community retain the right to maintain certain relations separately with some or all foreign countries? Will there be one currency or two? Will there be a federal bank? Will there be a federal court system with supervisory jurisdiction in addition to the community court systems and, if so, how broad will the federal jurisdiction be?<sup>12</sup> None of these questions are easy, but they will never be answered if the starting point remains: "each community must [be][remain][become] a sovereign entity."

Indeed, the term "federation" itself is susceptible to innumerable meanings. At its core, it signifies any system in which several separate (and in most cases pre-existing) communities, colonies, states, provinces, or other political entities agree to establish a joint government with some powers over the entire area. The interesting and important questions are: what powers does the federal entity have or, stated more positively, which functions does it serve, which powers or functions are retained by the component parts, and what are the component parts. These questions address the same point as the prior question: which attributes of sovereignty are to rest with the community entities and which with the federal entity? Such questions do not often get seriously addressed in Cyprus, because of distracting debates about history, blame, the source or nature of sovereignty, or what is the only "fair" or "correct" form of Cypriot federation.

But there is, of course, no such thing as a "true" federation. There is only, as noted, a continuum of different arrangements - from almost complete local control and responsibility for government functions to almost complete federal control and responsibility - which make more or less sense for different societies at particular times depending on their past experiences and current needs.

Many consider the American federalism experience essentially irrelevant to the current situation in Cyprus, because American federalism is not based on entities defined by discrete ethnic communities. I suggest that the American experience in protecting smaller states from domination by larger states, even though neither are ethnically identifiable, has some relevance. Moreover, as discussed below, the mechanisms used in the United States to protect racial minorities from majority domination may also prove helpful.

But what is most important, yet entirely ignored, is that American federalism has been dynamic, changing dramatically over time. The balance of federal power versus state power in the United States has altered drastically over the years. First, there was a significant shift from the Articles of Confederation to the Constitution. Even then, the Constitution provided for a very limited federal government, and the states were very concerned about federal usurpation of state powers.

Of greater importance, federalism has evolved substantially over our 207 years of experience with the Constitution - once by civil war and ensuing constitutional amendments, sometimes by changing court interpretations, and sometimes simply

through changed practices and general acquiescence to them. The most dramatic non-economic change was the adoption of the three post-Civil War constitutional amendments, which for the first time authorized federal judicial and legislative enforcement of civil rights within the states.<sup>13</sup> The most striking shift in the economic arena occurred in 1937. That year, the Supreme Court changed direction and upheld the federal National Labor Relations Act and other industrial regulations implemented during the Depression under the federal legislative power known as the Interstate Commerce Clause, after having struck down similar legislation in preceding years as beyond that power.<sup>14</sup> But the 1937 reversal was only one of several modifications of the Court's interpretation of the scope of that congressional power - and of federal power generally - over the past two centuries, including most recently the *Seminole Tribe* decision. The federalization of basic economic regulation, not to mention of social issues such as discrimination, domestic violence, and gun control, that has occurred in the last sixty years would have been literally inconceivable when the Commerce Clause was drafted and approved by the thirteen states that formed the federal government in the 1780s.

The fact that the current American federal structure was literally unforeseen when the Constitution was first written should be a sign of hope, not despair, for Cyprus. What it means is that there is no such thing as a permanent plan, and that no one can envision all future needs. Rather, Cyprus, like America, should, I believe, *start* with a limited plan along the lines of the much-discussed bicomunal, bizonal federation, honestly focussing on each community's current needs and accounting for the extremely low current level of trust between the communities in light of past experience. However, this initial plan should also build into the federal structure *procedures* to insure the *possibility of change*, and not solely by ad hoc proposals, as trust, experience, and social and economic needs develop.

In considering a current or future federal structure, Cyprus might also benefit from examining the American approach to the concepts of community or group rights versus individual rights, and affirmative action. Group or community rights are legal benefits flowing to a group rather than to an individual. Cypriots have, of course, already had some experience with group rights. Under the 1960 Cyprus Constitution, for example, the Greek Cypriot community was entitled to elect seventy percent of the seats in Parliament and the Turkish Cypriot community thirty percent.<sup>15</sup> Similar fixed percentages were provided for the two communities' participation in the Council of Ministers, the army, and the civil service.<sup>16</sup> The communities as a whole, but not any particular Turkish or Greek Cypriot individuals, had the right to those seats or jobs. This is an arrangement occasionally used, as in Cyprus in 1960, when: a) there are clearly identified communities clamoring for power and recognition; b) the communities are not geographically contiguous and not in substantial control of separate political entities, such as states or provinces within a federation; and c) there is insufficient trust by the minority community in the protections provided by a system of simple majority rule.

The American constitutional system has never recognized group rights below the

level of individual states, none of which are, or typically have been, racially, ethnically, or religiously homogeneous in anything like the way that northern and southern Cyprus currently are.<sup>17</sup> The original states had differing economic interests (slavery-based agriculture versus a mercantile economy, for example) but were not reflective of ethnic communities. Rather, the American system has relied primarily on private group action in the political process. That is, people with common interests (whether trade or occupation, natural resources, religion, or ethnic origin) form what we call "interest groups," which use their voting, financial, and other power to create or influence the fluctuating political majorities both within states and in the federal system. The American interest group political process is supplemented by a limited constitutional protection against inequality which permits only individual claims of discrimination to be heard and remedied in the courts. Indeed, even that has been true only since the equality provision, known as the Equal Protection Clause, was inserted into the American Constitution 130 years ago and, more significantly, only over the last forty years when that guarantee has finally been seriously enforced by the courts.<sup>18</sup>

This individualistic American approach is reflected in the strong, indeed growing, constitutional resistance to affirmative action.<sup>19</sup> By that term, I mean to denote a range of efforts to assure minorities (or at least individuals within minority communities) of access to enhanced opportunities in employment, contracting, and education. In its more extreme forms, such efforts include assuring minorities a fixed proportion of positions in those settings.

The American constitutional resistance to affirmative action grows as the technique approaches, or at least resembles, bestowing group rights. Thus, an African American denied the right to vote may challenge the denial on constitutional grounds in court. The relief that a court might grant in such a situation may well affect many thousands of members of that community - as, for example, when the federal courts struck down literacy tests for voter registration in certain states because they had been used to prevent African Americans from registering.<sup>20</sup> But even such broad-impact decisions are not intended to afford, or perceived as affording, a group or community right to representation, for example, by assuring control of a particular legislative seat. Rather, precisely because of this deep-seated aversion to group rights, recent efforts in southern American states to create voting districts in which African Americans or Latinos are in the majority have been struck down by the Supreme Court as unconstitutional denials of equal protection to white voters,<sup>21</sup> even though earlier suits challenging deliberate exclusion of African Americans from voting districts had succeeded.<sup>22</sup> It is worth noting that these unsuccessful efforts to enhance African American voting power provided less of a group right or guarantee of representation to the minority community than did the 1960 Cyprus Constitution.<sup>23</sup>

Despite the refusal to bestow community rights, American democracy has experienced a slow but consistent expansion of African American political power over the last thirty years.<sup>24</sup> This reflects primarily two developments - a) increased federal legal guarantees of access to the system, most prominently the Voting Rights Act first enacted in 1965;

and b) enhanced minority use of the interest group process on both the federal and state levels - by forming coalitions, swapping political support for differing legislative goals, and the like. The election of African American candidates in state-wide elections in states that do *not* have an African American majority, such as Douglas Wilder's election as governor of Virginia and Carol Moseley-Braun's election as senator from Illinois, is but the most striking example of this phenomenon.

Given the long struggle for, and less than satisfactory status of, minority rights in America, and the current status of Cypriot relations, I am not suggesting that the American model of federally-enforced individual protection from discrimination and an interest-group political process within an ethnically diverse federal structure would be a successful model for Cyprus now. Rather, I have explored these concepts for two reasons. First, the concepts of community rights and affirmative action are frequently discussed in Cyprus and the American experience sheds some light on those concepts. Indeed, the Set of Ideas, the most complete attempt to sketch out a comprehensive solution, includes certain community rights.<sup>25</sup> Second, and more importantly, if an evolving federalism process were established, as I propose, and the federal entity's authority were enhanced over time, the communities might wish to consider other countries' experience with different techniques for protecting minority rights within a stronger federal structure, such as affirmative action or community rights.

### **Why a United or Federated Cyprus?<sup>26</sup>**

It is remarkable how infrequently people in either community in Cyprus discuss whether it is a good idea, and if so why, to seek a resolution involving a unified or federated country. I am aware that, to a large degree, this issue is seen as a bridge already crossed, because both communities have for many years officially accepted the idea of a bicomunal, bizonal federation as the basis for a resolution of the Cyprus Problem. I am not suggesting that the island would be better off otherwise - indeed, I believe that a federation is the better resolution - but it is worth analyzing why the concept is so widely accepted and rarely discussed, in determining how to proceed to reach that goal.

First, Cyprus is a small island and all Cypriots relate to the island as a whole. The English colonial experience from 1878 to 1960, not to mention earlier experiences with other external powers, strengthened the common feeling of an island facing the outside world, despite the ethnic conflicts which the English period also engendered. Nevertheless, I suggest it is important to examine the interests of each community separately. I will assume here that a united or federated Cyprus would include a united economy.

The Greek Cypriot community has a booming economy, full international recognition, and strong trade, diplomatic, and travel ties to the outside world. What does that community have to gain from joining in a single state and economy with the Turkish Cypriot community?

Most Greek Cypriots do not see a social gain, as they are in no sense isolated from

the world or restricted in their social contacts (except with Turkish Cypriots). On the other hand, I do see an enrichment in interacting, as I did, with persons of both communities inhabiting the same island.

It is most unlikely that there would be any short-term economic benefit for the Greek Cypriots. They will doubtless have to share their successful economy with the far less successful Turkish Cypriot economy, incurring many transitional and welfare costs, although on a much smaller scale than the recent West German economy's absorption of East Germany. Nevertheless, a unified economy should hold some potential for longer-term economic benefits. A simple example would be that a federated state would probably allow Greek Cypriots to engage in tourism business in the north (whether in joint ventures or otherwise), which is currently impossible. That example suggests that the freedom of movement, discussed below, has economic as well as social and emotional value.

Unification would benefit the Greek Cypriot community with regard to international recognition only if the European Union (EU) were to make resolution of the Cyprus Problem a precondition to full membership in the EU. The European Union announced in March 1995 that it would begin accession discussions with Cyprus six months after the current Intergovernmental Conference ends in spring or summer 1997, although it hedged its bets by saying "taking account of the results of" that Conference.<sup>27</sup> European behavior since that announcement suggests that the EU will (in my view wisely) walk a fine line between making resolution of the Cyprus Problem a precondition to EU membership and clearly stating that Cyprus can come into the Union in its present, divided form. The hope is that the ambiguity will be a spur to both communities to negotiate seriously, out of fear that they would otherwise be left out of the EU. Significantly, some observers believe that Cyprus would not gain economically and might even suffer competitively from accession to the EU.<sup>28</sup> This suggests that membership holds some recognition/legitimacy value to the Greek Cypriot community, even though it already has international recognition as the only legitimate government of Cyprus.

I perceive two primary benefits to Greek Cypriots from federation, beyond the small potential for longer-term economic benefits and the greater assurance of EU accession. First, for twenty-two years, Greek Cypriots have been denied physical access to the thirty-seven percent of the island under the Turkish Cypriot administration.<sup>29</sup> Cypriots of both communities have very strong attachment to the land, in strong contrast to Americans accustomed to vast open spaces and a tradition of, some would say obsession with, mobility. For hundreds of thousands of Greek Cypriots, their "homes" are in the northern portion of the island. The younger generation obviously does not have the same level of intense feeling for those areas, which they have never visited, let alone resided in. Yet many still say that they, or at least their family, "come" from Kyrenia or Famagusta. Regaining the ability to return to those areas is very meaningful to, and thus a high priority for, Greek Cypriots, at least those of the generations that had lived in the north. By "return," they do not generally mean simply the ability to visit for the

day and have a picnic in Kyrenia's beautiful harbor. Rather, they mean the right to move back and live there permanently. Moreover, the Cypriot attachment to land makes the American concept of financial compensation for the lost property<sup>30</sup> unsatisfying.

It is extremely unlikely that any bizonal, bicomunal resolution of the Cyprus Problem acceptable to the Turkish Cypriots, at least at this point in time, would include the right of Greek Cypriots to move to, and live in, the north. The only exception that most people anticipate is that some portion of land in the north would be turned over to Greek Cypriot community control when a federation is formed, because of the current disproportion between the Turkish Cypriot percentage of the island's population and the percentage of the total land currently controlled by the Turkish Cypriot community. It may well be, therefore, that there can be no solution until the younger generation that has never lived in the north comes to power in the Greek Cypriot community. This particular sticking point is a good example of why developmental or incremental federalism may be the only realistic approach to the Cyprus Problem.

Second, the Greek Cypriot community would gain some military security through federation, because it is assumed that any federal solution would include a reduction in the number of Turkish armed forces on the island. Such a reduction could also provide an economic benefit, in that the Greek Cypriot community would feel freer to reduce its own defense expenditures.

In sum, the Greek Cypriot community would probably derive some enhanced economic opportunities, greater assurance of EU accession, increased access to the north, and greater security as a result of the development of a Cypriot federation.

What interest do the Turkish Cypriots have in federation, having once experienced the disadvantages of being a relatively small numerical minority under Greek Cypriot control? Their interests seem quite clear to an outsider. Turkish Cypriots certainly have an economic interest in being joined to the vastly more successful Greek Cypriot economy, which also has access to foreign markets without impediment. They would probably also benefit from EU membership. Further, Turkish Cypriots have a profound interest, reflected in conversations with outsiders, media commentaries, and formal political communications, in being recognized as a legitimate community by the international community. The existing resentment against the European "boycott,"<sup>31</sup> the international refusal to recognize the community, and the resulting economic, social, and political isolation is enormous and readily palpable to an outsider. Federation offers the possibility of international legitimacy and contact, as well as substantial economic improvement for the Turkish Cypriot community.

Of course, any agreement on a federal government would probably result in a reduction in the size of the existing armed forces in each community. This would reduce the sense of physical security that Turkish Cypriots have enjoyed over the past 22 years as a result of the presence of approximately 30,000 Turkish soldiers in northern Cyprus. For Turkish Cypriots, then, the question seems to be how to balance security needs against economic, legitimacy, and outside contact needs.

So far I have discussed only Cypriot interests. Of course, a major obstacle to resolution

of the Cyprus Problem, some would say "the" major obstacle, is the conflict between the two "motherlands" - Turkey and Greece. I am not an expert in international relations and thus leave to others a precise definition of the diplomatic, military, economic, or other interests of those two countries.<sup>32</sup> Nevertheless, I fully recognize that no analysis is complete, and thus no solution, permanent or evolving, is possible, without recognizing and satisfying those national interests. However, it seems clear that a divided, heavily armed Cyprus will continue to be a flashpoint or focus of that broader conflict. I suspect that a strong, unified, independent, and demilitarized Cyprus would not be as vulnerable to manipulation by the motherlands in their ongoing dispute. A very limited initial federal structure in Cyprus along the lines of the bicomunal, bizonal federation in the Set of Ideas would not substantially remove Cyprus from the Greek-Turkish conflict. However, my proposal for building in the possibility for expansion of the federal structure as trust and circumstances develop might provide Cyprus with the opportunity gradually to withdraw itself from that longer-standing, more volatile, and more intractable international conflict, an end, I believe, that is devoutly to be desired.

### **How to Proceed?**

If unification/federation is in fact perceived as beneficial or desirable - whether to assure admission to the European Union and physical access to all parts of the island or to achieve economic well-being and international legitimacy - the question is how to proceed to reach that goal? The prevailing assumption, among both communities, the United Nations, and now the European Union, has been that a comprehensive, overarching, permanent solution must be negotiated at this time to resolve "the Problem." The UN's proposal some years ago of "confidence building measures" (CBMs)- specific, limited steps, such as opening Varosha and the Nicosia airport, to provide benefits to both communities and improve relations - recognized that the level of trust between the two communities was currently so low as to preclude a full settlement and that measures must be taken to increase that trust before a settlement is possible. The steps suggested, however, in the CBM proposal were very limited.

The failure to achieve agreement on CBMs is a devastating comment on the state of relations between the communities and on the prospects for a settlement. I suggest that one reason for the failure of the CBMs might have been that the plan offered both communities *too little* and thus they tried to incorporate into the CBMs aspects of the large solution that they cared about. On the other hand, the concept of a comprehensive and permanent solution tries to do *too much*. The avenue that I suggest is in between those two extremes: an initial, very limited federal structure - with each community ceding to the federal structure only those powers that it could live without indefinitely - but with a built-in process for review, discussion, and further negotiations, leaving open the possibility of further expansion of the federal system, as experience and development of trust permit, and economic and social developments suggest are desirable.

The Israeli-Palestinian peace process is a model. The "settlement" of that intense



dispute was not a "peace" but a "peace process." That is, the first Oslo agreement provided for some small steps - more than simply confidence-building tidbits, but far from a full resolution - and for a process for continuing along that road. There was, in fact, an Oslo II agreement, that substantially expanded the original agreement, both geographically and functionally, but left a "final" resolution of the hardest issues to yet a further round of negotiations. It is true that the Middle East process is designed to move in the opposite direction of what a Cypriot process would aim for - namely, from a single, unified state (Israel) with very limited rights for the minority community (Palestinians) towards a separation of the two communities with increasing authority (and potentially even full sovereignty) for the minority community. The Cypriot process, on the other hand, would be designed to go from two essentially separate communities to a single federated state with the communities retaining significant aspects of their current separateness and authority.

Yet, despite the diametrically opposed goals, the tentative, developmental, incremental nature of the Middle East process seems to me to be instructive and, given the far greater degree of prior hostilities between the communities there, to provide a possible model and source of hope for Cyprus. This is true despite the significant, disheartening, and tragic current setback in the Middle East process. The existing agreements have not unraveled (indeed, even the new Israeli government does not contend that it plans to undo them) and substantial pressure exists in both communities to continue the "process" even though the end result of the process is unknown.

This idea of a developing federalism also draws strength from the American experience. As noted earlier, the current federal system, with vast federal control over all aspects of the domestic economy - e.g., manufacturing, distribution, transportation, and financing - contrasts strikingly with the early American scene in which it took a Supreme Court decision to clarify that the states could not interfere with federal regulation of river navigation between two states.<sup>33</sup> Partly this change reflects the development of railroads, airplanes, telephones, faxes, computers, and the like. However, primarily it reflects the growing recognition by citizens in different states of a commonality of economic interests and the likelihood that federal uniformity of regulation will enhance the competitiveness of all. Significantly for Cyprus, it also reflects increased trust by all states and citizens in the federal government and in the federal political process.

What would a federalism process look like for Cyprus? I am hesitant to define such a process in any detail because of my firm conviction that, to be successful, the nature of the process, as well as the end results, must be worked out by the affected parties themselves. Nevertheless, having raised the idea, I feel some obligation to indicate the kinds of possible approaches to such a process.

The mechanism most similar to the Israeli-Palestinian peace process would be to resolve some issues initially and then identify the issues that will be addressed in the second, third, and any further stages. For example, the first step of the Middle East peace process, the first Oslo agreement, created a Palestinian Authority with a police force and carefully defined the territories they would have authority over -

the Gaza Strip and Jericho. The second stage was dedicated primarily to a broader Israeli withdrawal from the West Bank and the holding of Palestinian elections. The final stage is scheduled to address the hardest issues - including the ultimate status of Jerusalem and the ultimate form of Palestinian autonomy.

Using that analogy, the first step of a Cyprus federalism process might entail the creation of a limited federal entity with some military and/or police forces and clear definition of which issues the federal entity would control. For example, the first stage would, presumably, define the name of the federal entity, the titles of federal entity officials, the national flag, emblem, and anthem, the official language(s), the size, location, and functions of any federal military force or police force, and other functions of the federal entity. It would, of course, be possible to clarify that some functions would be federal, but leave the specifics of that authority to further bicomunal negotiations. A good example might be the federal economic policies needed to conform to EU regulations. That the federal entity would be the one to deal with the EU and would have the authority to adopt appropriate economic and trade regulations to conform to EU regulations seems plausible (although, again, it is vital to note that nothing is inevitable or beyond discussion and negotiation). Yet EU regulations and requirements are numerous and complex. It might not be possible to spell out in an initial Cypriot federation agreement all that might be needed on a federal level to achieve EU conformity. An agreement to negotiate and reach agreement on such details would reflect a basic commitment and a flexible open-endedness, which is both scary to some and, at the same time, a sign of trust and hope.

The status of foreign military forces is also a classic target for multi-step negotiations. The first agreement might provide for a specific reduction and a relocation of remaining outside forces to particular locations. The first step might also include agreement on a long-term goal of removing all foreign forces, with the possible exception of those under the command of a United Nations or other international agreement-preserving entity. It might not, however, specify the numbers to be removed each year or the ultimate date for complete withdrawal, but simply set a date to begin the second round of discussions on the topic. Again, the open-endedness entails risks - that no further agreement will be reached and the status quo will continue indefinitely. Yet open-endedness also makes possible a current limited first step because it does not require a comprehensive, long-term commitment (other than to talk again) by either party. This allows whichever party is hesitant on an issue to reserve the most substantial matters until a later time, when the first step will have been implemented, tested, and reviewed.

Finally, the difficult problem raised by Greek Cypriot claims to freedom of movement, property ownership, and settlement might be subdivided into stages. The Set of Ideas already includes such a division.<sup>34</sup> For example, the first agreement might provide for freedom of movement for all Cypriots throughout the island. This would allow Greek Cypriots to visit the towns where their families previously resided and other areas of interest on day trips, but not resolve the more difficult questions of ownership of land,

compensation, or ability to settle. Cypriots have lived so long with this unsettled state of affairs that another few years would be neither a surprise nor a burden. Yet it would allow time for the experiment with free island-wide movement (and tourism) to take hold, create good-will and trust, and perhaps offer new ideas for a more permanent or complete arrangement.

Each of these examples - EU-compatible economic regulations, military forces, and freedom of movement, property, and settlement - are intended simply to highlight the possibilities raised by an ongoing process. I do not seek to direct the parties to do it one way or another. The first agreement might be close to the Set of Ideas in both substance or detail, less detailed, or more so. The key point is to start negotiations with an understanding that not everything must be resolved now, but that things are not put off forever, but rather to a date certain and a specific process.

The nature of that future process should also be considered at the outset. One very formal way of handling a future procedure for a multi-stage process is to create a formal federal constitution now but agree that, in perhaps three or five years, a further, bicomunal constitutional assembly will be convened, to consider modifications and expansion, if appropriate. To me, this is too stilted, cumbersome, and public a mechanism and, thus, less likely to produce any revisions in the second stage. Rather, my instinct is to plan for a second round of high-level, bicomunal negotiations with or without outside facilitation, mediation, or other assistance. But again, it is not for an outsider to direct either the contents of the first stage or the procedure for future stages. Rather, outsiders should only try to assist the parties to come together and suggest a variety of formulas and strategies to help the parties create a process that works for them now and into the unknowable future.

In sum, the key is to start with a limited agreement and to make specific plans for further planning and agreements that, hopefully for Cyprus, will produce a more positive and satisfying future.

### Notes

1. Eric Neisser is a professor of constitutional law at Rutgers University Law School in Newark, New Jersey and author of *Recapturing the Spirit: The Bill of Rights at 200*. He was a Senior Fulbright Scholar in Cyprus in constitutional law from January to April 1996, affiliated with, and presenting a series of lectures at, Intercollege in Nicosia.

2. I am fully aware that, in addition to the Turkish Cypriot and Greek Cypriot communities, there are Maronite, Armenian, and Latin communities in Cyprus. With due respect to those communities, I think it is fair to say that the problem of co-existence with and among those communities is perceived by commentators and participants as far less severe and complex than the issues regarding the two major communities.

3. I am aware that some members of the Turkish Cypriot community do not like it to be referred to as a "minority" or a "minority community," because those terms are seen as undermining the key concept of "political equality." There is, of course, no dispute that, whatever the precise numbers, there are far fewer Turkish Cypriots than

Greek Cypriots on the island. Reference to a numerical minority here reflects solely this demographic reality, not a political conclusion or preference on my part.

4. See, e.g., Sotiris Drakos, *Cyprus: A Constitutional Motion for Mediation* (1995)(presenting a comprehensive proposal for resolution of the Cyprus Problem based on the Swiss canton federation model).

5. 116 S. Ct. 1114 (1996).

6. *Id.* at 1122.

7. *Blatchford v. Native Village*, 501 U.S. 775, 779 (1991).

8. See, e.g., U.S. Const. art. I, sec. 10 ("No State shall enter into any Treaty, Alliance, or Confederation ... No State shall, without the Consent of Congress, ... keep Troops, or Ships of War in time of Peace, enter into any Agreement or Compact with another State, or with a foreign Power, or engage in War, unless actually invaded, or in such imminent Danger as will not admit of delay."); Articles of Confederation, art. VI, sec. 1 ("No State, without the consent of the United States in Congress assembled, shall send any embassy to, or receive any embassy from, or enter into any conference, agreement, alliance, or treaty with, any king, prince or state.").

9. *Seminole Tribe*, 116 S.Ct. at 1122, quoting *Puerto Rico Aqueduct and Sewer Authority v. Metcalf & Eddy, Inc.*, 506 U.S. 139, 146 (1993).

10. *Seminole Tribe*, 116 S. Ct. at 1169, quoting B. Bailyn, *the Ideological Origins of The American Revolution 198* (1967) and G. Wood, *Creation of The American Republic 1776-1787*, 345, 385 (1969).

11. See, e.g., G. Coddington, *The Federal Government of Switzerland* (1961).

12. I recognize that many of these questions have been expressly discussed, and tentatively resolved, in prior negotiations about a Cypriot federation. See, e.g., *Set of Ideas on an Overall Framework Agreement on Cyprus* (1992), Appendix 16 in Z. Necatigil, *The Cyprus Question and The Turkish Position in International Law* (2nd ed. 1993). I mention them both to highlight aspects of sovereignty and because my proposal for a very limited initial federal structure with a process for an evolving federalism would probably force the communities to review even some of the most basic points again.

13. U.S. Const. amend. XIII (ending slavery); amend. XIV (protecting due process and equal protection rights against state infringement); amend. XV (prohibiting racial discrimination in voting).

14. Compare *NLRB v. Jones & Laughlin Steel Corp.*, 301 U.S. 1 (1937)(upholding National Labor Relations Act) with *Schechter Poultry Corp. v. United States*, 295 U.S. 495 (1935)(invalidating a predecessor statute setting labor conditions for various industries).

15. Cyprus Constitution, art. 62, paragraph 2.

16. *Id.* art. 46 (Council of Ministers - 7 Greek, 3 Turkish); art. 123, paragraph 1 (civil service - 70% Greek, 30% Turkish); art. 129, paragraph 1 (army - 60% Greek, 40% Turkish).

17. For a period of time, some of the colonies and early states were far more homogeneous than they are in modern times. Thus, for example, the Pilgrims predominated for a long time in what became Massachusetts. Also, many northern and western states and territories were overwhelming white over the first century of the country, prior to the end of slavery, the northern migrations of African Americans, and the immigration influxes of Asians and Latin Americans. Even so, given the differing European immigrations and the differing religious groupings even among the English migrants, none of the American states have, since the Constitution's adoption, been as homogeneous as the two Cypriot communities are at the present time. *See, e.g.,* David Potter, "Social Cohesion and the Crisis of Law," in *American Law and the Constitutional Order: Historical Perspectives* (L.Friedman & H. Scheiber eds., 1978).

18. U.S. Const., amend. XIV, sec. 1. *Compare* *Brown v. Board of Educ.*, 347 U.S. 483 (1954)(holding racial segregation in public schools unconstitutional) and its progeny *with* *Plessy v. Ferguson*, 163 U.S. 537 (1896)(upholding racial segregation in public transportation) and its progeny.

19. *Compare, e.g.,* *Adarand Constructors, Inc. v. Pena*, 115 S. Ct. 2097 (1995)(striking down an affirmative action program in federal contracting and imposing the strictest constitutional review on all affirmative action programs) *with* *Fullilove v. Klutznick*, 448 U.S. 448 (1980)(upholding a short-term congressional contracting program with a fixed percentage of funds designated for minority contractors under a more lenient constitutional standard of review).

20. *See, e.g.,* *United States v. Mississippi*, 380 U.S. 128 (1965); *United States v. Louisiana*, 225 F. Supp. 353 (E.D. La.1963), *aff'd*, 380 U.S. 145 (1965).

21. *See, e.g.,* *Bush v. Vera*, 116 S.Ct. 1941 (1996); *Shaw v. Hunt*, 116 S.Ct. 1894 (1996); *Miller v. Johnson*, 115 S.Ct. 2475 (1995); *Shaw v. Reno*, 509 U.S. 630 (1993).

22. *See, e.g.,* *Gomillion v. Lightfoot*, 364 U.S. 339 (1960)(invalidating an Alabama statute that had altered a city's boundaries from a square to an irregular 28-sided figure in order to remove almost all African American voters).

23. A similar hesitance to recognize group rights is reflected in European human rights law. The European Convention for the Protection of Human Rights and Freedoms has now been ratified by 31 Europe nations, including Turkey, Greece, and Cyprus, and signed by seven others. Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of European Treaties 5-7 (updated as of January 2, 1996). Like the United States Constitution, it provides only individual political and civil rights, but with a weaker equality provision guaranteeing only equality in the exercise of the other rights. European Convention, Articles 2-14.

Recently, the Council of Europe promulgated a Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, which has been signed by many nations, but not yet ratified. Council of Europe, Chart of Signatures and Ratifications of European Treaties 157 (updated as of September 1, 1995). Although designed to advance the status

of members of national minorities, the Convention quite explicitly focusses on the rights of individual members of such groups, rather than on the rights of the group itself. For example, Article 3, the opening statement of basic principles, provides that "Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such" and "persons belonging to national minorities may exercise the rights and enjoy the freedoms flowing from the principles enshrined in the present framework Convention *individually* as well as in community with others." Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities, art. 3, para. 2 (emphasis added).

In short, European human rights law, both now and in the foreseeable future, like American constitutional law, does not afford significant community or group rights as compared to individual rights.

24. Before the passage of the Voting Rights Act in 1965, there were fewer than 300 elected African American officials throughout the United States and fewer than 100 in the seven states of the Deep South. By January 1993, there were 8015 elected African American officials nationwide and 3704 in the South. Loughlin McDonald, *The Counterrevolution in Minority Voting Rights*, 65 Miss. L.J. 271, 271-72 (1995), citing U.S. Comm'n On Civil Rights, *Political Participation* 15 (1968) and Joint Center for Political and Economic Studies, *Black Elected Officials: A National Roster* xi (1993).

25. *Set of Ideas*, *supra* note 12, at 457-58 (providing, for example, that seventy percent of the lower legislative house seats would be Greek Cypriot and thirty percent Turkish Cypriot and that seven Ministers would be Greek Cypriot and three would be Turkish Cypriot).

26. I recognize that some Turkish Cypriots consider the term "united" inappropriate, either because they perceive the term as suggesting that Turkey or the Turkish Cypriots are responsible for the current state of affairs, or because they believe that a bizonal, bicomunal federation, which both communities have agreed to in principle, does not constitute "unification" into a single state. I use the term "united" interchangeably with the term "federated" and use both terms simply to contrast any possible future arrangement involving some common, federal government, with the current state of affairs.

27. General Secretariat of the Council, Presidency Proposal, at 2 (adopted March 6, 1995).

28. See, e.g., Michael S. Michael, *Cyprus Under the Common Agricultural Policy: The Impact Effect*, 19 J. Econ. Studies 22 (1992) .

29. I consciously use the term "administration" to avoid political and legal disputes about the status of the Turkish Cypriot community's current structure.

30. The Fifth Amendment to the United States Constitution assures private property owners of "just compensation," to be determined, if necessary, by independent courts, for any "taking" of private property "for public use." U.S. Const. amend. V. Thus, in the

United States, both the federal and the state governments, are free to take over private property at any time - as long as the taking is for a "public use" and the government pays "just" monetary compensation.

31. The ruling of the European Court of Justice regarding treatment of goods from the Turkish Cypriot area is not a "boycott" in the literal sense of banning importation of such goods. Rather the decision denies to citrus fruits and potatoes not bearing an appropriate certificate from the Republic of Cyprus (that is, produce from the Turkish Cypriot community) the preferential duty treatment afforded by the customs agreement between Cyprus and the European Union. *R.v. Minister of Agriculture, Fisheries and Food, ex parte Anastasiou (Pissouri Ltd.)*, Case 432/92 (Eur. Ct. J. July 5, 1994).

Of course, there is another, more real boycott. The Greek Cypriot community refuses to allow any Turkish Cypriot goods to come into or through the Greek Cypriot community. This very real embargo has a very significant economic impact on the Turkish Cypriot community.

32. See, e.g., Oliver Richmond and James Ker-Lindsay, *The Conflict Researcher and the Strategist: Theoretical Approaches to the Analysis of the Cyprus Problem*, 7 *Cyprus Rev.* 35 (1995).

33. *Gibbons v. Ogden*, 22 U.S. 1 (1824).

34. *Set of Ideas*, in Z. Nectagil, *supra* note 12, at 459 (specifying that freedom of movement would be implemented immediately but that freedom of settlement and property would be implemented only after the resettlement process arising from territorial adjustments).

# EARLY FORMS OF ETHNIC CONFLICT IN CYPRUS: ARCHBISHOP KYPRIANOS OF CYPRUS AND THE WAR OF GREEK INDEPENDENCE 1821

John A. Koumoulides

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## Abstract

*“Άσφαλές το γενόμενον, άσαφές το μέλλον.”*

Thales, (*Stobaeus, Fforilegium, flf. 79, e*)

*On 25 March 1821, the Greeks of Morea and the Aegean Islands triggered a revolt against their Ottoman rulers who had dominated and exploited their land and fellow countrymen since 1453. The sultan viewed this uprising as a threat to order and discipline among the Christian subjects of his threatened Empire. The oecumenical patriarch Gregorios V and the Cypriots were among the first to suffer the anger and repressive measures of the Porte. The persecution of the Cypriots began on 9 July 1821, and continued indiscriminately, on a large scale, until December of the same year. This was a dark period for the Greek Cypriots. Many of them were massacred, their villages were burned, and some of them were sold into slavery in the markets of the Orient.*

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*"For the whole earth is the sepulcher of famous men; and their story is not graven only on stone over their native earth, but fives on far away, without visible symbol, woven into the stuff of other men's lives."*

Pericles. *Funeral Speech*

For over four hundred years the Greeks had endured the rule of their Ottoman masters, and social and political oppression and humiliation. These were years of trial and terror. Indeed, the history of the Greeks in the decades following the fall of Constantinople (1453-1821) is a melancholy one. It is a record of physical captivity and cultural limitations. Yet the Greeks and Hellenism survived those centuries,



They survived because they were nurtured by their faith. However orthodoxy, the Church, survived because it was saved by Hellenism. During all those years of captivity the Greeks unceasingly hoped and planned for the day when they would be free again, and be masters in their own land.<sup>1</sup> It was now time for the Greeks to liberate their land, throw off the ottoman yoke, and regain their freedom and identity; it was time to reestablish freedom in the birthplace of the ideals of democracy. The Greeks of the *diaspora* started the movement towards Ypsilandis in a letter to the Greeks of the mainland and of the diaspora, calling for a joint effort to free Greece from its Ottoman rulers. "Take up your rifles my friends and respond to the call of our country."<sup>2</sup> A British Philhellene wrote enthusiastically, "The moment is rapidly approaching for the fulfillment of the prophecy, the white haired Giaour is at the gates of Constantinople; and the crescent only shines over its walls till it determined who shall erect the cross."<sup>3</sup>

On the 25th of March 1921 the Greeks began their struggle for independence.

"Can the Europeans, can the Americans, originating in Europe, look with indifference to them whether Turkish dominion continues, and perhaps, aroused by impending danger, rises with new vigour; or whether the Greek nation resuscitates and resumes its place in the number of European states? This cannot be indifferent to them. It shall not! The cause of the Greeks is the cause of Europe!"<sup>4</sup>

As the chapter of Greece's recent history opened with its struggle for freedom becoming a force which inspired artists, men of letters, politicians and Philhellenes far beyond the limits of Greece and the geographic frontiers of Europe, the Greeks of the island of Cyprus, together with those of Smyrna, Rhodes, Crete and other places played a major role in their collective and individual contributions to the liberation of the motherland. Like other regions of the Greek diaspora the Greeks of Cyprus participated in the preparations for, and shared in the upheavals of, the Greek national uprising. Yet, although much is known and written about the contributions of other regions of Greece to the struggle, alas, the role of Cyprus in the uprising was not given the proper attention it deserved.<sup>5</sup>

The story of the role of Cyprus in the Greek struggle begins with the visit to the island of Dimitrios Hypatros, who after his induction into the *Philike Hetaireia* on 6 July 1818, was made *apostolos* of the Society with jurisdiction over Egypt and Cyprus. Three months after his initiation into the Society, Hypatros undertook his first official journey to the regions under his jurisdiction. In October 1818 he arrived in Cyprus where he met with the Archbishop and leading figures of the Greek community of the island. It is recorded that during his meeting with Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus he initiated the Archbishop into the Society. The Archbishop expressed the personal concern and that of his people for the struggle and "offered his support" for the planned Greek uprising.<sup>6</sup>

It has often been the tendency amongst students of the history of Greece and Cyprus during the years of the *Tourcocratia*, to dismiss most, if not all, the members of the higher clergy of the Orthodox Church, Patriarchs, Archbishops and Bishops, as men of weak and rather questionable character. Such charge, however, lacks sound foundations. Actually those centuries produced men of great courage, faith and devotion without whose efforts Hellenism might have not survived.

Of the Archbishops of Cyprus reigning during the centuries of the *Tourcocratia*, Kyprianos claimed the honoured title of *Ethnomartis*. Archbishop Kyprianos (1810-1821), was born at "Strovilo in the Nahieh of Dagh."<sup>7</sup> Not much is known of his earlier career, which was mainly spent as a novice, monk, deacon and priest at the monastery of Machaira. In 1783 he accompanied archimandrite Charalambos of Machaira to the province of Wallachia to raise funds for the restoration of the monastery. While in Wallachia, at the request of Michael Soutso, Prince of Wallachia, Kyprianos was asked to stay in Wallachia and serve as a priest to the Prince. After almost two decades in Wallachia, in 1802 Kyprianos returned to Cyprus where he took over the management of the estates of the monastery of Strovilo. In that capacity he won a great reputation for his zeal, his integrity and his administrative abilities. Archbishop Chrysanthos of Cyprus, recognizing the administrative talents of Kyprianos, elevated him to the rank of Oeconomos, Treasurer, in charge of the financial affairs of the archdiocese of Cyprus. The Archbishops of Cyprus and the Greek Dragomans of the island always had enemies among the Turkish officials of Cyprus and the Turkish inhabitants of the island, who resented their influence at the Porte.<sup>8</sup> This deep resentment led to a violent uprising of the Turks of Cyprus against the Greek-Cypriots on 10 March 1804. The rioters burned and looted the residence of the Dragoman and then marched towards the archiepiscopal palace which they ravaged. Archbishop Chrysanthos was molested and illtreated. Was it not for the efforts of archimandrite Kyprianos, the rioters would have burned the archiepiscopal residence. Kyprianos managed to ease the pathos of the rioters and secure the assistance and intervention of the Turkish officials of the island. His positive role in that crisis earned him the title of "guardian of the nation".<sup>9</sup> But he also managed to create enemies among the Turkish-Cypriots who resented his energy, authority and influence among high ranking Turkish officials. In 1810 Kyprianos was elected Archbishop and was consecrated to the primacy of the Church of Cyprus.<sup>10</sup> A capable, sensible, just and patriotic man,<sup>11</sup> respected for his battle against corruption, and interest in education. Kyprianos is credited with the establishment of the Greek School of the Holy Trinity, situated opposite the archiepiscopal palace.<sup>12</sup>

In the autumn of 1818 Demitrios Hypatros of the *Hetaireia* made a tour of the area under his jurisdiction. In October of 1818 he visited Cyprus. He met with Archbishop Kyprianos and initiated him into the Hetaireia. Hypatros informed the Archbishop of the Society's strategy for the planned national uprising. Kyprianos

although sympathetic and most supportive of the plan, expressed his strong skepticism and personal reservations on the role of Cyprus in the national struggle. The close proximity of Cyprus to Ottoman territories, and presence on the island of a formidable Turkish military force, made participation in the national struggle of Greece disastrous for the Greek-Cypriots. An uprising in Cyprus would result in the certain slaughter of the Greek inhabitants of the island, Kyprianos told Hypatros. Two years later Hypatros returned to Cyprus. On 2 June 1820 he made his second, and this time, more extensive visit to the island. His numerous meetings with the Archbishop and other Greek Cypriot notables, resulted in considerable support for the forthcoming struggle of the motherland.<sup>13</sup> The support was to be in funds and material goods.

On 1 October 1820, the *Archontes* of the *Hetaireia* gathered at Ismalia in the province of Moldavia (Roumania) to plan the strategy of and preparations for the *Ethniko Agona*, National Struggle. In considering the role each area was to play in the insurrection, they accepted the wishes of Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus and agreed with his fears about an "active" participation of Cyprus in the struggle. They concluded that:

"Since Archbishop Kyprianos has promised to assist in money or in provisions, all that he was able to, the Good should communicate with His Beatitude. and explain to him the situation. He should also urge him to be as generous as was the reputation of the island which the Cypriots have had the privilege of administering almost by themselves for so many years. These letters should be given to Pelopidas who, either on his way to, or on his return journey from Egypt, should stop in Cyprus and hand them (the letters) to His Beatitude. He should request that the funds be forwarded to Constantinople while provisions should be sent to locations which we shall indicate. Finally, he should urge him {the Archbishop} to take proper measures to best protect his flock from its enemies...."<sup>14</sup>

On the 8 October 1820 the Good - code name of Alexandros Ypsilantis – wrote to the Ethnarch of Cyprus:

"Your Beatitude,  
Dimitrios Hypatros assured me of the generous contribution which Your Beatitude has promised to him in support of the School of Peloponnesos. As general trustee of the school I do consider it my duty to write to Your Beatitude in order first to thank you, and second, to tell you that the School's opening day is very near. I have instructed Mr. Antonios Pelopidas, a virtuous man and a most trustworthy patriot, to visit with you and inform you in person of our plans for the Holy Establishment. May Your Beatitude, as soon as possible, give your own contribution together with the contributions of your fellow countrymen, in funds or in provisions, to Mr. Ioannes Papadiamantopoulos of Palaia Petra of Peloponnesos. The delivery to him should be done either by your own trusted individual or by the carrier of this letter."<sup>15</sup>

A second letter was addressed to Antonios Pelopidas at Constantinople. He was a member of the *Hetaireia*. In his letter Ypsilantis asks Pelopidas to travel to Egypt and Cyprus:

" I have given to archimandrite Dikaios letters addressed to our brothers in Egypt and for the Holy of Cyprus. Please take the letters and leave at once for those places. Tell our compatriots that the long-awaited hour for the implementation of our sacred plan is not far away. Urge them to make every effort to contribute much more than what they promised to under oath during their initiation. We need more because the nation's needs are much too great. On your return journey from Egypt, please make a stop in Cyprus where you should hand the letter to the Prelate, and urge him to contribute what he has promised. After you receive the funds, sail either alone or in the company of a trusted man of the Prelate, for Palaia Petra of Peloponnesos, where you will deliver them in person to Joannes Papadiamantopoulos. From him you should receive the necessary receipts."<sup>16</sup>

In accordance with his instructions Pelopidas arrived in Cyprus early in 1821. He was well received and entertained by Archbishop Kyprianos. Before his departure from Cyprus Pelopidas initiated into the *Hetaireia* Chrysanthos, the Exarch of the diocese of Lemessos, several bishops, abbots of monasteries and other members of the Church of Cyprus.<sup>17</sup>

On the 25 March 1821 the Greeks launched their struggle for their liberation from their Ottoman masters. At the Porte, Sultan Mahmud II retaliated by striking at the head of Hellenism and the Orthodox Church, the Oecumenical Patriarch, the aged Gregorios V. The vulnerable hierarch was hanged on Easter Sunday 10 April 1821. The fever and spirit of the revolution spread among the Greek subjects of the Sultan. Alarmed by the extent and magnitude of the uprising, Mahmud II issued a *Firman* ordering the immediate disarming of all the Christians throughout the Ottoman Empire.

The Turkish Governor of Cyprus was Kichuk Mehmed who was appointed to his post early in 1820 by order of Deli Abdullah, Capudan Pasha. Louis Lacroix writes, "*Koutchouk Mehmet, homme imperieux et dissimule, que le capitain-pasha avait choisi a dessein pour ruiner l' influence due primat greco.*"<sup>18</sup>

The Governor dispatched his janissaries throughout the island with instructions to carry out the orders of the Sultan. Lacroix observed that, "*Les Grecs, frappes de terreur, se Jaissent desarmer pur oter tout pretexte au soupcon.*" (*La Croix*). The disarming of the Christians of Cyprus was observed and recorded in the Italian newspaper *Notizie defGiorno*:

"... That very instant the governor general announced the prohibition of the carrying and retaining of all kinds of arms, firearms and cutting weapons. Even Franks, Armenians and Maronites were deprived of them: butchers, pork-dealers, labourers and all others were stripped of the tools used in their several occupations. Ammunition exposed for sale in public stores was seized without payment and lodged in the fort"<sup>19</sup>

The methods used and ways by which the janissaries implemented their orders to disarm the Christians so alarmed the people of the island, that Archbishop Kyprianos thought it necessary to issue a circular on the 22 April 1821, urging them to cooperate and not be frightened.

"Reverend priests and all Christian inhabitants of this nation.... We are well aware that the recent events, meaning the disarmament, disturbed you a great deal... We assure you that we have done all that is possible to stop it; however, this is the order of our kind, and nothing could be done, but do not be alarmed.... Our king simply wishes to protect himself from his enemies. He has made it very clear how pleased he is with our obedience and loyalty to him from the day of the conquest to the present. It is very important my dear children, that we try and keep our record clear in the eyes of our king, this, if you want to enjoy his protection. Also all of us must pray to God that no harm should come upon us. So please open your stores again and mind your own business and relax without having the slightest suspicion. Leave all your hopes and trust in the hands of our Holy God, who because of his love and kindness would free us from all kinds of sufferings. Also please be very careful, and if any one of you still has arms which he has not returned, please bring them to us and we shall then turn them to the proper authorities. We like to believe that you will follow our fatherly advice on this matter. May the love of God and his blessings be with you all."<sup>20</sup>

While Kyprianos was preoccupied with efforts to pacify his flock and excite no suspicion by the island's Turkish authorities, his nephew, archimandrite Theophilos Theseus arrived in Cyprus. Theseus arrived late in April 1821 as an "apostle" of the *Hetaireia*. He brought with him literature from Ypsilantis for distribution among the Greek-Cypriots. But, unfortunately for them, copies of the material fell into the hands of the island's Governor. This was more than adequate to strengthen the Governors' suspicion of the Greek-Cypriots' "involvement" in the Greek revolution. Kuchuk acted swiftly. He instructed his man to carry a search throughout the island for the capture of Theseus. However, since Theseus had fled the island, they captured in his stead a man by the name of Leonidas whom they connected with Theseus. Leonidas was imprisoned and tortured. He died as a result of his treatment. The visit of Theseus to the island at this very critical period was described as being "a thoughtless act which helped confirm the worst suspicions of the local authorities with grave consequences for the people" of Cyprus.<sup>21</sup>

The search for Theseus resulted in the capture of another Greek Cypriot, the herdsman Dimitrios from the village of Aghios Ioannis of Malouda. The Governor brought him to Nicosia for interrogation. Kuchuk Mehmed, under the threat of torture and death, managed to extort a deposition from the herdsman implicating the Archbishop with the circulation of "literature in favour of the Greek struggle." The literature, according to the Governor, urged the Greek-Cypriots to revolt against the Turks when the appropriate signal was given - the firing of a cannon in Nicosia.<sup>22</sup> During the search for Theseus, a third Greek-Cypriot was captured. A Haji Petros Boskos from the village of Soleas Flassou, a letter carrier, was caught

having in his possession letters from the *Hetaireia* addressed to Archbishop Kyprianos and a prominent Cypriot by the name Michael Glykis.<sup>23</sup> The Governor's reaction was swift: with the disarming of the Christians completed by 23 April 1821, and in possession of his "evidence of implication" his suspicions of the sympathies of the Greek-Cypriots were given substance. He summoned the Turkish Agas of Cyprus to a meeting. He presented his "evidence" to them and asked for their endorsement for his appeal to the Porte. With their support he secured the Governor, then submitted to the Porte a list of 486 names, including that of Kyprianos, three metropolitan bishops, the names of the abbots and officers of all the monasteries of Cyprus, as well as the principal clerics and prominent Greek-Cypriot laymen. In his letter to the Porte, the Governor pointed out that the disarmament of the Christian population of Cyprus would be ineffective as long as the individuals whose names appeared on his list remained alive.<sup>24</sup> He also asked that additional forces be dispatched to the island. Honoring the Kuchuk's request the Sultan ordered Abdullah, the Pasha of Acre, to dispatch men to Cyprus. On 3 May 1821 a force of 4,000 men from Syria landed on the island.<sup>25</sup> Not long after their arrival in Cyprus the troops engaged in frequent acts of brutality. The executions of the Christians of Cyprus had begun. John Carne, an Englishman, who was visiting Cyprus at this time wrote that the executions were carried out with great fury. He described the executioner as a "brutal Slavonian" who had the effrontery to visit the Archbishop and claim a reward for this skill at striking off the heads of his (Archbishop's) Christian flock with a single blow. According to Carne, the Slavonian told him that the Governor paid him for each head.<sup>26</sup> Carne's comments following his visits with Archbishop Kyprianos and Kuchuk Mehmet are of great interest. Of the Archbishop, Carne wrote:

"One evening I was invited to a dinner at the archiepiscopal palace, during which a Turkish soldier came to deliver a message to the Archbishop whom he addressed in most abusive language. The Archbishop remained composed and spoke to him in a very calm and decisive manner.... The other bishops and priests at the table were pale and terrified, and to them the Archbishop gave some encouragement. He was, indeed, very moved and disturbed over the whole affair, but one could still see in his noble face, lighted with energy, his determination to defend his suffering flock.... He spoke to all of us at the table, and no one interrupted him, as if he was delivering his farewell address, a speech of a good shepherd to his harassed flock.... This man, highly eminent for his learning and piety as well as for his unshaken fortitude, was the last rallying point of the wretched Greeks; and his frequent remonstrances and reproaches, on behalf of his people, had rendered him very obnoxious to the Turkish authorities"<sup>27</sup>

"My death is not far off" Kyprianos told Carne, "I know that they are only awaiting for the right moment to kill me." Of his visit to the Governor, Carne wrote:

"One afternoon on the invitation of the Governor I went to his palace. I found him

sitting on a cushion in a cool room. His features were those of a most ferocious and savage fellow. He had nothing noble and dignified in his manners, which usually characterize Turks of high rank. As soon as we were seated he poured out a flood of inconceivable words against Archbishop Kyprianos and the Greeks, and in general fiercely threatened the Greek monastery of the Stavrou located not far from the city (Nicosia). In fact it was shortly after my departure that his soldiers sacked it and murdered all the monks .... May I say that the behaviour of this man during our conversation was that of an animal rather than of a human. It was quite clear that he was enjoying the thought of greater disasters and atrocities against the unfortunate Greeks."<sup>28</sup>

On the 16 May 1821 the Archbishop made a desperate effort to calm his flock. In his letter Kyprianos wrote:

"Kyprianos by the grace of God  
archbishop of New Justiniani and all Cyprus

Most devout priests and all other blessed Christians of the Kadilik of Kythrea, having prayed we bless you all in a fatherly way. The present circumstances and disturbances of the times which against all hope have suddenly surrounded us on account of the multitude of our sins are no doubt passed on by work of moths in an undeniably exaggerated way and cause disturbance and fear in the hearts of all our fellow-Greeks, as many of course as are unaware of the causes from which all these things sprang and still spring in a just way. They are shaken and in fear and it is therefore our indispensable duty in such circumstances to give you the fatherly advice and encouragement that we owe you so that you can understand on what our common benefit and salvation depends. Above all, my beloved children, we must run towards the infinite mercy of holy God with a contrite heart and with repentance so that He should overlook our sins and we should entrust our hopes to the trackless ocean of His mercy, and his supreme power and wisdom will look after our interests. Secondly, we must reject every passion and coldness which we have towards our brothers, and embrace dispassion and true love for one another, as our God, who is prince of peace, teaches us in all His sacred Gospel, and this is the only virtue which is sought by His sweetest mouth, our Jesus, and which can propitiate holy God, and cover a host of our sins. Thirdly, that deep submission, obedience and faith which our ancestors also preserved, and which we from the time of the capture until now owe to our most powerful and long-lived emperor, and through which we have enjoyed throughout the interval infinite gifts and mercies of his power, calm, rest and every other good, that same obedience and trust should be preserved by us unaltered in the future without our groaning at the level of the imperial taxes owed by us and we should make intercessions night and day to the highest God for the long life and unshaken

duration of his power, for the protection of the obedient and faithful rayahs and for the frightening and destruction of his opponents, and we must make davas, also for our aga effendi who does not cease to work night and day for the maintenance and protection of the rayahs of our island. When we follow these three things as we should we can depend on it that we shall not experience the slightest harm, neither will a hair fall from our head. And so you, too, my dear children, following this fatherly advice of ours, put every fear out of your hearts and place your hope in the mercy of holy God because there is not danger. The submission and faith of faithful rayahs which until now has been observed is known even, the same is kept in accordance with the guarantees and reports which we have made with our three brother metropolitans to the most powerful devlet, we hope for greater protection and richer graces of its power. Take care for God's sake, my children, that you do not fall into the slightest fault, either in word or in deed, because whoever is careless in such times in his words or his deeds is liable to capital punishment. Those who maintain the required obedience, such people, who will not experience the slightest tribulation, will enjoy greater goodwill and protection. Moreover, my children, your clothing should be sober and such as befits rayahs, your turbans and sashes and slippers should be black. For this is the command of our aga effendi and whoever is found in foreign dress will be punished severely. Make a firm decision to do this. That is all.

1821

May 16

+ Archbishop of Cyprus, your intercessor in Christ.

*Postscript note in the left margin*

To our archimandrite, our blessing. This is ordered by our aga effendi to be read to them.+<sup>29</sup>

In a letter to the Porte the Archbishop emphasized the loyalty and obedience of the Greek Cypriots to the Sultan. However, the Governor made certain that the letter never reached its destination.<sup>30</sup> Alarmed by the delay of the expected reply from the Porte, Kyprianos visited the Governor to express his concern. During the visit Kuchuk Mehmed is alleged to have told the Archbishop that he had nothing to worry about, and "swore on the Koran not to behead him."<sup>31</sup> According to M. Jerome Isaac Mechain, French Consul at Larnaka, Cyprus, as a sign of their obedience and loyalty to the Sultan, the Greeks of Cyprus visited the Governor, and handed him a signed letter of loyalty together with 100.000 piastres to be forwarded to the Sultan as a token of their gratitude. However it is believed that Kuchuk Mehmet kept the money for himself and never forwarded the document. The document was signed by the Archbishop, the bishops and leading laymen of the Christian community of Cyprus. Consul Machain observed that ". . . the Cypriots had submitted their obedience to the Sultan.... But the Governor never



forwarded these documents to the Porte, but kept them together with other correspondence. These documents would have convinced the Sultan that the island was indeed peaceful and its inhabitants obedient ....<sup>32</sup> Exacerbated and greatly disturbed by the behavior and actions of the Governor in a letter to the French Minister de la Marine et des Colonies of 4 July 1821, Mechain wrote, "... The governor of Cyprus is a harsh, vulgar and fanatical man .... He behaves towards us, as if it was the King of France that is fighting the Turks. The forces sent by the Pasha of Acre have committed many atrocities. They have especially threatened the life of the Europeans whom they confuse with the unfortunate Greeks ...."<sup>33</sup> Machain made a demarche to the Governor for the violation by his troops of the "diplomatic immunity" of the members of his consulate.<sup>34</sup> On 6 July 1821 an infuriated Machain wrote, "... The governor is a lunatic ... he treats us as enemies and holds all our correspondence ...."<sup>35</sup> Other European consuls had made repeated appeals to the Governor protesting the brutal behavior of his troops and those of the Pasha of Acre, but, alas, to no avail. The situation prevailing on the island at this time is melancholically described in the *Notizie del Giorno* as well:

"One Sunday, while a detachment of eighty Turkish soldiers was marching towards S. Tanteleone to garrison the sea-coast, it passed before the Latin Church served by the Franciscans (Minari Osservanti). High mass was being celebrated, and they had the audacity to discharge their muskets in the church, so that the dense smoke wrapped the building in darkness to the terrible alarm of the congregation, especially the Catholic ladies who fell to the ground half dead."<sup>36</sup>

The hostility of the Governor and his troops was as strong against the European community of Cyprus as it was against the Greek inhabitants of the island. With Kuchuk's request to the Porte to execute the proscribed 486 Greeks authorized, the Governor in June ordered the 486 to come to Nicosia for a meeting. Fearing that some of them might escape, he dispatched his soldiers throughout the island to escort them to Nicosia. "On a given day, Sunday 12 June, officers sent by Kuchuk Mehmet came to the place where each dwelt, and forcibly arrested them all, catching them as they left their churches after the early celebration of the Holy Mysteries. Their homes, stores and places of business were sealed until further orders; their wives and children were turned into the streets . . . and the men themselves were bound and taken to Lefcosia."<sup>37</sup>

With all the proscribed having been brought to Nicosia, on 7 July 1821, the Governor summoned the Turkish Agas of Cyprus to his palace at which time he read to them the Porte's authorization to proceed with the execution of the proscribed Greek-Cypriots. He ordered that the gates of the city be closed and the streets heavily patrolled. Two days later, on Saturday 9 July, Kuchuk Mehmed summoned the proscribed to his palace (the old palace of the Lusignan kings). The Greek-Cypriots were told that the purpose of the meeting was to deliver to them the Sultan's reply to their letter of loyalty and obedience to him. On arrival they were received at the square in front of the palace. Alas, what the Governor read to them

was the order for their execution. "The city of Lefcosia," Philemon wrote, "was thus destined to be turned into a human slaughter-house."<sup>38</sup> To Hackett "Saturday 9 July, was the day selected, when another crime was added to that long list of horrors, which have brought such well deserved infamy upon the Ottoman name."<sup>39</sup>

"Honoring" his pledge to Archbishop Kyprianos, Kuchuk Mehmed ordered that the Archbishop be hanged and not beheaded. He was hanged from a mulberry tree in the square, meeting his fate with dignity and courage. "Taking in his hand the noose from the executioner," according to Kepsiades, "he made three times the sign of the cross... and then turned to his executioner and in a firm voice said 'Execute the command of your cruel master'.<sup>40</sup> His secretary, archdeacon Meletios was also hanged. The Metropolitan bishops of Paphos, Chrisanthos, of Kition, Meletios, and of Kyrenia, Lavrentios together with the laymen Georgios Massouras of Limassol, the herdsmen Dimitrios and others, were beheaded.<sup>41</sup> The episode is recorded in the *Notizie def Giorno*. The execution, according to the newspaper"... began by having the bishop of Larnaca beheaded, decreed the same for the others of Papho and Kyrenia, and caused to be hanged the archbishop of the whole island Monsignor Cipriano and his archdeacon.<sup>42</sup> Other accounts of the melancholy episode are given in numerous sources.<sup>43</sup>

The slaughter of the Greeks of Cyprus continued on Sunday 10 July 1821. Hundreds of Greek-Cypriots found safety in the consulates and homes of Europeans as well as the French vessel *La Bonite* which was anchored at the port of Larnaka.<sup>44</sup> By 14 July, 470 of the proscribed had been executed.<sup>45</sup> Describing the situation Consul Machain wrote, "... In only a few days ... the archbishop, the bishops, the high-ranking Greek priests, the merchants, the notables of the cities and villages, finally all rich or influential people have been slaughtered, beheaded, or hanged, their properties confiscated and their families enslaved.<sup>46</sup> The humanitarian role of the members of the European community and of the European consuls, in saving so many Greeks from death of enslavement, cannot be overestimated, and should remain for ever in the annals of history. They opened the doors of their homes and consulates, and at great risk to themselves, offered asylum to so many and saved them from certain death. The European consuls had earlier offered asylum to Archbishop Kyprianos, but he refused. When Carne asked him why he did not take the opportunity to save himself, the Archbishop, according to Carne replied, "I shall remain here to offer my services to my people till my last breath."<sup>47</sup>

*They went and asked him if he would  
turn Turk and change faith  
For then they would grant him his life  
let him live sound and safe.  
If he would speak Turkish  
would pray the Turkish prayer,*

*They would make him pasha then  
their orders to declare.  
They brought with them a bundle of clothes  
to offer the Archbishop  
And strip him of his holy weeds  
and of his ancient workshop.  
My friends, you should not waste your words  
don't trouble to speak further,  
For I am destined for the grave  
and for the hangman's halter.<sup>48</sup>*

The contributions of the Greek-Cypriots to the Greek struggle for liberty were as important as those of other region of the scattered Greek world. Yet relatively little attention has been given to the role of Cyprus and the Cypriots in the national uprising. Archbishop Kyprianos of Cyprus in his conduct early in the struggle of the war for the liberation of Greece, his dignified behavior during the months of crisis (March-July 1821), his dedication to his people, and bravery in meeting his cruel fate, has shown his worthiness to be considered, not only as the *Ethnomartis* of Cyprus but also as one of the island's most admirable *Ethnarchs*.

#### Notes

1. See Runciman, Steven Sir. *The Great Church in Captivity* (Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1968).
2. Greece. *Genika Archeia tau Kratous* [National Archives] *Phi/ike Hetaireia* [Society of Friends] File I (21).
3. H. Lytton Bulwer. *An Autumn in Greece* (London: John Ebers, 1826). p. 65.
4. *The Cause of Greece the Cause of Europe* (London: James Ridgway, 1821). p.6
5. John Koumoulides. *Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence 1821-29*. (London: Zeno Publishers, 1974). "A detailed chronological ordering of events is today impossible. The more successful attempts are those of G. Hill, *A History of Cyprus*, IV, Cambridge, 1952, pp. 122-34 and J. Koumoulides, *Cyprus and the War of Greek Independence 1821-1829*, London, 1974, pp. 40-65". In Benedict Englezakis, *Studies on the History of the Church of Cyprus, 4th-20th Centuries*, (London: Variorun, 1995), p. 291, note 8.
6. E. G. Protosaltis. E. *Philike Hetaireia* [The Society of Friends] (Athens, 1964). p. 59.
7. John Hacket. *History of the Orthodox Church of Cyprus*. (London, 1901). p. 226.

8. Chrysanthos was Archbishop from 1767 to 1810. Late in the 1970s he appointed Hajigeorgakis Kornessios to the office of *Dragoman* of Cyprus. He held that post until 1809.

9. Ali Bey. *Travels of Ali Bey in Morocco, Tripoli, Cyprus, Egypt, Arabia, Syria and Turkey, Between the Years 1803 and 1807*. (London, 1816). p. 270.

10. Kallinikos Delikanis. *Ta en tois Kodexi tou Patriarchikou Archeiophylakiou Sozomena Epissima Ecclessiastika Egrapha*. (Constantinople, 1904). Kodex IB. pp. 602-604.

11. *Ibid.*, p. 603.

12. The school was originally founded in 1740 by Archbishop Philotheos of Cyprus.

13. *Greece: Genika Archeia tou Kratous (Syllogi Vlachogianni)* C. 20. One source states that Kyprianos was also visited by a Stergios Haji Kostas, a merchant and member of the Hetaireia. George Hill sir. *History of Cyprus Vol. IV*. p. 124.

14. Those gathered at Ismalia were, Alexandros Ypsilandis, Emmanouel Xanthos, Gregorios Dikaïos, Dimitrios Themelis, Petros Markezos, Dionysios Emorphopoulos, Evangelos Mantzarakis, Dimitrios Kypatros, Christophoros Perraivos, Ivos Regas and others. Konstantinos I. Myriantopoulos. *Hadigeorgakis Kornessios o Dierminefs tes Kyprou 1779-1809: Etoi Symvoulai eis ten Istoría tes Kyprou epi Tourcocratias 1570-1878*. (Lefcosia, 1934). pp. 32-33.

15. *Greece: Genika Archeia tou Kratous (Sylogi Vlachogianni)*. F. 1. Protopsaltis. p. 195.

16. *Greece: Genika Archeia tou Kratous (Sylogi Vlachogianni)* . F. 1.

17. Georgios I. Kepiades. *Apomnemoneumata ton kata to 1821 en te Nysson Kypro Tragicon Skenon* (Alexandria, 1888). p. 10. Protopsaltis, pp. 221-4.

18. Louis Lacroix. *liés de la Grece*. (Paris, 1853). p. 83.

19. In Claude D. Cobham'. *Excerpta Cypria*. (Cambridge, 1908). pp. 450-1.

20. *Greece: Ethnologikon Mouseion Athenon*. No. 4652.

21. Kepiades. p. 9.

22. *Ibid.*, p. 14.

23. Kepiades. pp. 18-19.

24. Philemon in *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 467. See also Philios Zanetos. *E Kypros kata ton Aiona tes Paligenessias 1821-1930*. (Athens, 1930). p. 14.

25. Hill, IV, p. 125.

26. John Carne. *Letters from the East*. (London, 1826). Volume II. pp. 159-71.

27. *Ibid.*, pp. 164-6.

28. *Ibid.*, pp. 173-4

29. Nicosia, Cyprus. *Archeia tes Ieras Archepiskopis Kyprou: Fakelos Archiepiskopou Kyprianou 1810-1821*. Englezakis, pp. 225-301; Koumoulides, p. 48.

30. Hill, IV, p. 129. Also, Philemon in *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 468.
31. Kepsiades, p. 14. Hill, IV. p. 133.
32. Letter of Jerome Isaak Mechain, French Consul at Larnaka, Cyprus, to M. David, dated 6 August 1821. *Kypriaka Chronika*, VII. pp. 55-7.
33. *Kypriaka Chronika*. VII. pp. 52-53.
34. *Ibid.*
35. *Ibid.*, p. 54.
36. *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 451. In Larnaca the English Vice-Consul was Antony Vondiziano, and the Consul of Russia and Sweden was Constantine Peristiani. Hill. IV. pp. 129-135. Harry Luke, Sir. *Cyprus: A Portrait and an Appreciation*. (London, 1957). p. 82.
37. Philemon in *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 468. See also Spyridon Tricoupis. *Istoria tes Hel/enikis Epanastaseos*. (Athens, 1853-1857). IV. p. 294.
38. Philemon in *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 468.
39. Hackett. p. 229. Kepsiades. p. 13.
40. Kepsiades. p. 22. Also, Philios Zannetos. p. 17.
41. Kepsiades, p. 14. "G. Massouros, P. Oikonomides, Michael Glykis, Joseph Pierakes, John Antonopoulos, P. Boskos, N. Zographos, S. Solomos, S. Symopoulos, Chr. Koutellarides." Hill. IV. p. 134. Basil Stewart. *My Experiences in Cyprus* (London 1908). p. 219. Philip Newman. *A Short History of Cyprus*. (London, 1940). pp. 188-191.
42. *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 451.
43. Rene de Mas Latri. *Chronique de l' lie de Chypre* (Paris, 1886), quoted by Hackett (page 229) was told that the bishops were first and that before executing them they "saddled them like horses, breaking their teeth as they thrust the bits into their mouths, and goading them with spurs." Philemon wrote that "the bodies of the bishops were exposed with the head of each on his back." *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 468. To Lacroix, "The gates of the palace were opened and the bleeding corpses were thrown out." p. 83.
44. G.G. Gervinus. *Insurrection et Regeneration de la Grece* (Paris, 1863) in *Excerpta Cypria*. p. 464.
45. Hill. IV. p. 131.
46. *Kypriaka Chronika*. VI. p. 58.
47. Carne. II. p. 166. Kepsiades. p. 14.
48. Composed by Chr. Tzapouras of Cyprus, 1911.

# FACTORS OF HUMANITARIAN AND MASS CULTURE AND AGGRESSION IN CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE

Nayia Roussou

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## Abstract

*This paper presents a study of school-children, from eleven to thirteen years old and their exposure to Mass Media, as well as to Media of a traditional humanitarian culture, like the theatre, books and music. The hours they watch television and are exposed to Mass Media in general, and other humanitarian, cultural activities, are then compared to their degree of aggression, as recorded by themselves in a questionnaire which sought to establish their aggressive tendencies at school and at home. The comparison which takes into consideration the contents and nature of the television programmes the children watch, seeks to trace correlations between the viewing of these television programmes with their self-confessed aggressive behaviour. The paper records the research carried out by the Research and Development Center of Intercol/lege in Spring, 1995, among a sample of 400 elementary and high-school students (boys and girls) in the unoccupied areas of Cyprus.*

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The instinct of aggression and violence has been within man, ever since the emergence of the human race, whether as an instinct of self-defence or as the urge for survival. It was natural, therefore, that aggressive behaviour would influence different forms of human creativity, like different forms of art, literature, theatre, music.

Aggression and violence in traditional forms of art, however, even though an object for reflection, have never been a source for as deep an anxiety, or as an occasion for such intensive research, as is the case with violence on television. This difference is justified, considering that art in its various forms is a kind of processed culture, addressing itself to the individual; some forms of art (e.g., the theatre) give the individual the right and the privilege of choice, as to the time needed for personal assimilation, or rejection of messages.

Television, on the other hand, being a par excellence medium of mass communication, establishes a new "mass culture", the influence of which causes concern on the part of many thinkers, as to its negative contents - e.g., violence - because of its daily, familiar presence in the home.

Research and experiments into the influence of television on the behavior of children

and young people, two very sensitive groups of viewers, have been on the increase, during recent decades.

In Cyprus, there may not have been serious increases of child or juvenile delinquency during the last few years, but there is a rising tendency, quantity and quality-wise, of general acts of crime. Serious research, therefore, into the influences on the individual at an early age, should be carried out, as character is fashioned through time and finds expression at different stages and ages of a person's life. Intercollege has conducted this in-depth survey report, the first of its kind in Cyprus, in connection to children's aggression, against the background of their extra-curricular hobbies and interests. These interests are examined in connection to their television viewing habits - television being the most powerful and time – absorbing mass medium – as well as interests in humanitarian (processed) culture.

The results of this survey confirm conclusions drawn from similar investigations conducted in other countries, abroad. This can mean just one thing: our anxiety can no longer express itself on theoretical levels. It must seek documentation through scientific or experiential research, so we can talk about evidence and face progress and technological development, in a consistent and organised manner, in the light of our own tradition, culture, education and civilisation.

This course of action is *even* more imperative today, as Cyprus prepares to enter into the galaxy of Europe, where she will be called upon to maintain a balance between her own cultural foundations, while simultaneously adopting a pan-European vision of the cultural course of man. In this imminent change, the correct use of all cultural modes in our time and place is imperative. Television, as the major factor of this "alternative culture", the informal education going on in our sitting-rooms every night, is a medium we must use in full consciousness, both for ourselves, as well as our children.

### **The Main Objectives of the Project**

The main objective was to examine whether there are indications of relationships between the cultural factors chosen by children (Mass Media among them), their individual socio-economic background (profession and education of parents) and the aggression or delinquency, exhibited at home and in school.

### **Other Objectives**

a. To examine whether there is deviation on the part of children from family and school principles, as far as discipline and respect of school and family rules is concerned.

b. To establish whether there is social deviation and to survey the habits of children, with emphasis on TV viewing, as far as hours of viewing, contents and conditions (alone, or in the presence of others.)

### **Literature Review**

*Train children well*

(Euripides, *Suppliant Women*)

Anxiety about violence and its relationship to human thought and behaviour has been expressed in all forms of art, for many years.

The deeper man probed into technology and the quicker and more effective communication became with contemporary media, the more his anxiety rose, with regard to the possible influence of violence through different forms of art.

An interesting publication circulated in 1974, was the book *Violence in the Arts* by the American author, John Fraser.<sup>1</sup> In this book, the writer investigates with documentation, violence in the theatre, the cinema, painting and literature. Even in one of the most "innocent" works of the so-called "children's literature", in *Alice in Wonderland* by Lewis Carroll, there is violence in different forms on occasion, accompanying the protagonist:

"In the Alice books, likewise, one is confronted with the steady strong impingement of other individualities on Alice herself, and even though no physical violences are actually inflicted on her, her situation is still continually one in which she must defend herself or be put down, and in which constant alertness is demanded - ask the question wrongly and get no answer; misinterpret an answer and find a door locked or one's body turning against one; lose one's head metaphorically and lose it literally." <sup>2</sup>

The author's conclusion is that not only is there violence in art, as a natural extension of violence in life, but to a point, it is necessary that violence should be there:

"And as one passes from the Alice books - with their risks and traps, and astonishing rudenesses, and insistent claims of people to authority over the heroine - to the world of Jane Austen, one is reminded anew that a really worthwhile kind of polite culture is one that doesn't dull the mind and blur responses but heightens and sharpens awareness and makes for more effective conduct." <sup>3</sup>

In conclusion, violence in art, according to Fraser, is justified when it achieves noble goals like self-defence and does not aim at imposing authority on another individual. Besides, we must not forget that we come across aggression at all times and places in the world. As Greek author, Vassilis Vvoidaskis correctly comments in his book, *Aggression as a Social Problem in the Family and at School*:

"At no time and in no place on earth, have there been people in an organized society, without aggression, crime, murders, violence, revolution and war. On the contrary, one can argue that all this has been in the foreground of social co-habitation of men; their opposites i.e., absence of aggression, murder, violence, revolutions and war have been exceptions." <sup>4</sup>

Of course, there are many definitions of aggression, all with common elements. For reasons of pure documentation, we would like to give the meaning of aggression as expressed by J. Schott, in the aforementioned book by Vvoidaskis:



"The meaning of aggression is attached to an act, whose immediate objective on the part of the actor, is to deal damage or pain." <sup>5</sup>

Aggression( in its extreme form-violent) even though a most ancient phenomenon that passed and still continues to pass in all the forms of human art, is going through a very dense phase during the second half of the present century. The two world wars, Vietnam, the revolution of the blacks in America, as well as of women and the young people, since 1960, on a global scale, have added their own dimensions to life and its various forms of expression.

Television is one of the contemporary social media, having developed and matured during the same time-periods that the violence experiences we referred to in the previous paragraph, occurred. Violence could not, therefore, stay out of television programmes. Many world thinkers, however, consider that condensed televised violence, exceeds the parameters of real-life violence, thus causing concern as to its possible effects on adults, as well as on young people and children more especially, these last two age-groups being among the more sensitive viewers.

Studies on the relationship between televised and actual violence, exceed 3,000. Their results, as summarized in 1983 by the American National Institute of Mental Health, consist of the following eight conclusions:

1. The more systematic and frequent the viewing of TV violence, the more viewers are influenced. This happens especially to people with a sensitive personality - primarily children who have a still unformed personality and absorb as sponges the persistent behavioral modes they watch. Other such sensitive viewers, are people who live in personal or social conditions that make them specially vulnerable to violent modelling, during the viewing process.
2. The influence of televised violence on children can be both deep and protracted.
3. Extended television viewing causes a passive assimilation of ideas, attitudes and behaviour models, especially by children, blocking, as a result, the development of critical thinking and of the emotional world. In other words, it prevents the proper development of their personality. It can thus become a cause of reduced application in school.
4. The regular depiction of violence as a means of solving all human differences, creates the impression especially with children who cannot tell myth from reality that the relationships between the members of society, are exclusively relationships of violence and personal assertion, through extermination i.e., criminal. The law of social or vicarious learning, further supports the adoption of similar behavioural expressions, on the part of television viewers.
5. Conditioning to violence, even in its most merciless and brutal forms, leads to the

gradual collapse of values that comprise the moral and social safeguards of human behaviour.

6. Dramatized violence has a stronger influence than factual images, as it creates emotional reactions, often combined with subconscious identification. Especially if the 'tough, violent guy' is depicted on television as a hero.

7. Adults are not at all immune. Reference here should be made, among other reports, to the experiment by R. Gorney and D. Loyg of the University of California, Los Angeles. The husbands in 183 couples, aged 20-70, were exposed to television viewing of different programmes for 21 hours during one week. The programmes contained different grades of violence. The wives did not know what their husbands watched, but wrote down daily their behaviour towards them. The husbands themselves, also wrote down their own moods. Results indicated that men showed a more aggressive behaviour, with 35% of those who had watched hard violence, showing hostility towards their wives.

8. The same pattern occurred with the exposure of husbands to sexual violence and pornographic material: The treatment of their sexual partners (wives) was demeaning, causing them mental and physical suffering." <sup>6</sup>

In a research experiment that the author carried out in the United States in 1972, about the reaction of four-year and seven-year-old girls and boys, to televised aggression in cartoons, the basic conclusions were as follows:

1. "Younger children namely four-year-olds appreciated hostility in television cartoons, more than older children namely seven-year-olds. This was true regardless of sex. Younger children also tended to appreciate aggression more than older children, although to a nonsignificant degree.

2. Girls, of both age groups, showed more negative reactions than boys to both the hostile and the aggressive contents of the television cartoons. The above findings seem to be in agreement with the findings of Himmelweit *et al.* (1958), that verbal and physical aggression were found to be equally disturbing to some children, more especially with girls than boys. They also concur with the observations of Leven and Wardwell (1962) that boys score higher than girls, in all types of aggression, because of patterns of social acculturation, along these lines." <sup>7</sup>

Research into this subject has been going on, of course in many countries. In the United Kingdom, it is interesting to note that the television channels themselves carry out such research. The Independent Broadcasting Authority is one channel that carries

out regular research about the impact of television, in many different ways, using different questionnaires.

One such investigation, in 1987, tried to establish a link between the viewing habits of children and their self-confidence with regard to crime (*British Children, Their Television Viewing and Confidence in the Face of Crime*).

Some of the conclusions were as follows:

"... Further than this, age also correlates with increased bravery, or confidence in the face of hostile acts. This does not accord with any idea that years of acclimatisation to (aggressive) television, will produce fearful viewers; on the contrary, those who view more adult films and drama, show more bravery in the contemplation of possible hostile acts against themselves. This is in sharp distinction to the negative links between such viewing experience and professed physical and social courage in the contemplation of positive stresses such as injections, going on circus rides, or being made to perform in front of adults." <sup>8</sup>

In the above investigation, however, there was no evidence to support a positive link between the viewing of adult programmes and the possible or expected hostile acts on behalf of the children. Neither was a positive link established between the viewership of adventure programmes and bravery before hostile acts. That is why the survey did not give evidence to support imitation learning from television programmes.

Further research in England-again by IBA-tries to collect evidence about "how violent" the viewers consider television programmes, discriminating between violence, in British, from violence in American programmes. The production of *The Little Tottoises*, is one such example. The programme was produced in America in two versions, one for the American public, with triple the amount of violence, to the version produced for Europe.

In the monograph of IBA, *Violence on Television: What the Viewers Think*, <sup>9</sup> one reads the view that all the levels of programming at IBA, must be made "in the public interest." This explains the fact that television violence, both in the programmes imported from the States, as well as in the programmes produced in Britain, is an object of research and evaluation, by the British viewers, themselves.

It is good to bear in mind, that when we speak about American productions included in the IBA research, we are referring to such serials, as *Knight Rider*, *Magnum*, *Murder She Wrote*, etc. These programmes are shown in America, Europe and Cyprus, in exactly the same version.

The same concern about the relationship between televised and real violence, is an object of research and writing, in many other parts of the world. Andreas Christodoulides, a Greek writer on Mass Communication, in a lecture given at Intercollege, in 1994, referred to the studies by Professor Joe Grebel, who, having studied different factors concerning the impact of television in Germany, had concluded that:

"The influence of television is not the most important, but should not be underestimated

either." Grebel suggests that this influence can take three forms:

- a. Psychological: it creates familiarity of the viewer with violence and leads him to look for new, violent stimuli.
- b. Emotional: violent scenes are considered normal, create no emotional reaction and the viewer looks for other means of emotional arousal.
- c. Cognitive: society is what we are and only through counter-violence can we survive."<sup>10</sup>

In Greece, research about children and television, began in the 1970s. Anastassios Voltis, an educationist, was an early worker in the field. His report in 1977, dealing with 3-12 year-olds, examined *Television, a Supreme Factor in the Mental Health of Children and in the Shaping of their Behaviour*. Some of his conclusions were as follows:

- Children viewed television 3 - 7 hours daily.
- The majority of children preferred violent programmes.
- Programmes with emotionally unsuitable content, were generally preferred , especially by girls, with priority to Greek feature films.

Other tendencies, were as follows:

- Loss of night sleep: Almost all children sat up until the 12 o'clock midnight news.
- Fighting with parents who confessed inability to detach children from the TV screen.
- Shaking of the family unity: the traditional Greek dinner, where all the family met together, was being abandoned.
- Children stopped discussing and reflecting. Television offered easy solutions. Children did not act. But they were *neither educated, not all the time anyway!*<sup>11</sup>

This pioneering investigation was followed by others in Greece and critical judgement on the subject of *Television and Children* more especially in today's climate of electronic pluralism, is rising in volume and intensity and publications and research ring a continuous bell of not only concern, but agony.

Christos Michaelides, in an investigation carried out in Athens, in 1994, by the title, *TV: 24-inch Citizens* published in *Eleftherotypia*, on January 11, 1994, counted 640 rapes in seven days, on the six major channels of Greece<sup>1,2</sup> The government spokesman of Greece, Mr. Venizelos, in a press conference he gave on January 13th, 1994, emphasized that the wave of violence and blood and satanic scenes, are not simply imposed on the viewer. They set the boundaries for his sensitivity.<sup>13</sup>

The efforts for a common television code of practice are still going on, in Greece. A few comments on the subject by Professor Stelios Papathanassopoulos, Mass Media lecturer at the University of Athens, taken from his book, *Emancipating Television* are

in order at this point:

"Recent developments in the area of television and other news media, indicate that they do not relate at all, to the visions which see television as an ideal medium in the context of a society, whose course is determined directly by its citizens. " Free broadcasting", for example, which in 1970, promised something new and different from state broadcasting, beyond consumerism and advertising, has nothing common today, with "private broadcasting". In effect, the viewer has been turned into a consumer, or a simple subscriber. This indicates that the new television field and the viewership research surveys, have little to do, with the genuine needs of the citizen/viewer of the television channels and the advertising industry. So, the creation of an intensely antagonistic environment, should be examined in the light of a wider social perspective. The change of the viewer to a passive consumer, indicates the absence of any social policy".<sup>14</sup> Public concern about the subject of juvenile delinquency became worldwide, in 1993, when British public opinion was shaken by the murder of a two year-old by two eleven-year-olds, who, according to the judge of the case, might have been influenced by violent scenes contained in a video-tape they had viewed before committing the murder.

Child delinquency in the United States is a source of much concern: In 1992, four murders were committed by children below 9, while children between 10 - 12, committed 30 murders. Furthermore, children below ten, were convicted for 1104 attacks against people, 291 robberies and 123 rapes. Concern in the States, is so intense, that President Clinton, in Miami, in 1994, suggested that a list of ten grades of permissible violence be adopted by all American channels.<sup>15</sup>

In Cyprus, television violence has become more frequent and more intense very recently, with pluralism arriving on the scene. Even though research is absent and the range of the problem and the possible impact on children, cannot be really documented, there still exist voices of concern and agony about what viewers (especially the young) watch.

We sample the following research reports from Cyprus:

In the 12th elementary school, of the Acropolis suburb, in Nicosia, research carried out in 1993, gave evidence that 50% of 250 children in the 3rd and 6th grades, watch television, over three hours daily.

- 40% of the children have television sets in their own bedrooms.
- 50% see programmes unsuitable for them and 24% are afraid.
- 28% watch television, late at night.<sup>16</sup>

Investigation carried out by the association "Mental Health for All", in Larnaca, with the assistance of the Larnaca Intercollege students, registered the contents of

all television channels in Cyprus, during two days in October 1994. Viewing covered 110 hours and 30 minutes of television transmissions. Published findings were impressive:

- Violent scenes - 66 cases
- Thefts, burglaries, robberies - 30 cases
- Violence on juniors - 11 cases
- Violence on women - 14 cases
- Use of arms - 13 scenes
- Murders - 16 scenes
- Group murders - 8 scenes

According to the research, therefore, 10,950 scenes of violence are aired annually on Cyprus channels.<sup>7</sup> Greek-Cypriot educationalist, Nicos Leontiou, responding to an invitation in spring, 1995, (extended to him by two Parents' Associations, in different areas of Cyprus), spoke about "Children and Television". He conducted a "mini-survey", as he called it, in thirteen elementary schools, with five questions addressed to sixth-graders, to establish their extra-curricular activities, including television-viewing. He came up with the following conclusions:

- Most children prefer games (30 - 40%)
- Very high percentages prefer television and video: 41% in the unoccupied district of Famagusta, 28% in the town of Nicosia and 23% in the town of Limassol.
- 15 - 20% give priority to school subjects or reading of non-school books.

The most important finding, according to Mr. Leontiou, himself, is that which concerns the quality of the films or programmes viewed by the children:

- Only 4% of the children in Nicosia watch children's programmes.
- In Limassol, they are not at all interested in news.
- TV games are preferred by only 10% of the children.
- Sports programmes are preferred by 15%
- 58% of the children in Nicosia, 50% in Famagusta, 43% in Limassol, watch those programmes, which are considered unsuitable for them i.e., they contain violence, oppression, crime, unrestrained sex.<sup>18</sup>

It is estimated that child delinquency in Cyprus, has not risen in recent years. This is the conclusion of a report prepared by three specialist-sociologists: Nicos Peristianis, sociologist/economologist: Prodromos Prodromou and educational psychologist, Michalis Papadopoulos.

One of the basic conclusions of this report is that in Cyprus, crime is not on the increase, either on adult, or on juvenile levels. It is observed, however, that there are

some differentiations in quality, which should cause concern. This is a point taken up by the specialists, who comment as follows in their report:

"In the first place, the number of examined trespasses, is rather small. 220 cases of juvenile delinquency are reported out of which 178 should be seriously examined. These small numbers are a match to the small population of the island. Furthermore, the serious offences were committed by under-aged youngsters from among sub-groups in the population. That is why the whole subject should be handled with great care. We should remember that a certain decision by a group of young offenders, could change substantially, certain trends.

A second point touches on what is really self-evident:

We are only dealing with cases reported to the police, with relevant supporting evidence. In other words, we are dealing with only a part of juvenile delinquency. Additionally, we must remember that the number of cases taken to court, as well as the number of convictions, depends on the prevalent attitudes on police duties, or on reform measures.

Finally, we must observe that absolute numbers e.g. number of offences by the under- aged have a relative value. Juvenile delinquency, as a statistically indicative size, must be counted versus the whole population. The Index of Under-aged Offenders (IUO) counts the number of under-aged offenders ( 7 -15 year-olds) for every 100,000 inhabitants of this age group, in the country. To simplify, we could safely say that the number of offences corresponds to the number of offenders, if we suppose that every offence has a different perpetrator.

This index appears to be stable in Cyprus, with a slightly declining tendency during the last four years. If we compare the IUO of 1992, with that of 1985, we can identify a significant decline. But if we compare 1992 with 1976, or 1980, there is a significant rise:

*Index of Under-Aged Offenders (reported)*

| 1976 | 1980 | 1985 | 1988 | 1989 | 1990 | 1991 | 1992 | 1993 |
|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|------|
| 130  | 189  | 310  | 180  | 265  | 258  | 252  | 244  | 166  |

(Source: *Criminal Statistics*, 1992)<sup>19</sup>

Child delinquency therefore may not have risen significantly in Cyprus during recent years. However, the numbers of the following table, prepared by the Welfare Department for the decade 1980 - 91, do not agree. According to this table, the percentage of young individuals condemned for serious offences, showed a serious increase in 1987 - 88, with a decline until 1990. After 1991, it again showed an increase. Thus, the picture for 1980 - 90, showed an increase, as follows:

Rise by percentages, 1980 - 90:

| Age     | %  |
|---------|----|
| 16 - 20 | 15 |
| 21 - 24 | 61 |
| 25 - 29 | 60 |

Considering that the effect of television is cumulative, we cannot rest easy on the fact that there is no increase in juvenile delinquency. This increase must be examined cross-temporally. Today's 30-year-old adults, were children that received the television messages during their formative years- messages of violence, horror and unlawfulness, as part of their informal, socio-cultural education. Besides, they continued being exposed to these messages, for decades. It would definitely be dangerous to acquit television, because we do not as yet, have child-murderers in Cyprus. Historical, as well as experimental research and analysis must be conducted along practical, scientific directions. Because, when we do have the same tragic phenomena observed in more developed countries, social damage may be too great and too deep and therapy much more difficult.

One of the factors examined by Papadopoulos, Peristianis and Prodromou, in their report, is the role of the Mass Media, in the informal education process of children and the young and the possible relationship between television aggression and juvenile delinquency. Some of the observations emphasized in this report, are interesting and relevant to the present study:

1. Regular and protracted television viewing can motivate people to face the world as just a "show".
2. The direct and detailed TV information, reinforced by the unmatched strength of "live" moving images, acts as a multiplier of impressions.

The report further comments that fictional violence is presented on an even greater scale on television, in adventure films (mainly imported) that have a significant share in the programming time of all Cyprus channels. Besides, the density of violence in imported productions, according to the report, seems to be constantly on the rise.<sup>20</sup>

We would further add that alongside imported productions, today, we also have the Greek productions, which seem to rival the violence of imported programmes. No effort, in any case, is made, to hide the imitation of imported popular programmes, the aim obviously being to gain a higher share in the battle of the ratings.

The above background of research and concern in Cyprus, gave occasion to the Research and Development Centre of Intercollege to conduct the present study,



suggested and co-ordinated by the author, who also wrote out all the texts of the survey/report, under the title, *Factors of Humanitarian and Mass Culture and Aggressive Behaviour in Children and the Young*. The intention of the survey was the investigation of aggressive tendencies in children and young people, in connection to their TV viewing habits, the frequency of their theatre, church and cinema-going, as well as of reading books outside school-book material.

No serious research, of course, can ever ascribe exclusive responsibility to television programmes for any negative behaviour or behavioural tendencies observed in TV viewers, especially the young, sensitive and vulnerable viewers. For even though it is true that research indicates that children watch television on a regular basis, for a number of hours daily, there exist, on the other hand, social, family and school institutions, that can and might reinforce negative television stimuli, or can extinguish or balance these stimuli out. If, for example, children read non-school literature of quality, they will be equipped to counter-balance the corruption of language in many television programmes.

Sarantos I. Karghakos, a Greek writer, in a lecture he gave at Intercollege in February, 1995, by the title, *Television, Children and the Greek Language*, made some interesting observations, from which we quote the following excerpts:

"Television, with its fake jargon, not only increases the paucity of language, but also creates it. Only cheap shows can be supported by such language. Barbarian, poor, distorted words, senseless and empty of sequence, promote a linguistic death, with speech bacteria that contaminate the language criterion of young children." <sup>21</sup>

We could further argue that if children indulge in more sports, go to the theatre more frequently, socialize more, if they maintain close bonds with their parents and family, they will give less time to the "magic tube". We could therefore suppose that, as a natural consequence, the influences of television violence, of horror films and aggression, which is included in cartoons, as well as after-midnight horror and sex in films, can be limited and children can receive more positive influences in the formation and development of their spiritual and mental world.

We would like to complete this literature review on the subject, with a reference to similar research carried out in 1992, in Greece, by Alexandra Koroneou, under the title, *Young People and the Media of Mass Communication*. The goal or main question of the research, as shaped by Koroneou, was to establish the degree of truth, with regard to the homogeneous influence of the Mass Media. The working hypothesis, in other words, was that Mass Media are used in many different ways, depending on social inequalities (social class, gender, etc.) and these inequalities must differentiate decisively the use, by the viewer, of the Mass Media. The conclusions of this research include the following findings:

"The national cultural output has first place in the choice of the young people, in spite of the dissemination of foreign, especially Anglo-Saxon culture. This is disproportionate to the different genres of cultural products in art and entertainment. Even so, even in areas in which the structure of the industry favours imported productions, as in the

cinema, we established the priority given to national cultural products. Significant national elements (language, rhythm, symbols, etc.) are constituents of Mass Media products.

The preferences of the young people are differentiated, depending on the social areas in which they live. It is impressive that the young people who are more "open" to the influences of the "ephemeral empire" as Jules Lipvetski calls mass culture, belong to the privileged and educated families who also show a particular sensitivity to the maintenance of their national identity".

One of the general conclusions of Koroneou, is the following:

"Common choices of young people from different social classes, are not restricted exclusively to the area of mass culture, but extend to more elitist fields. So children of all social strata, indicate an indifference to the theatre or to classical music concerts. Lack of interest in educational and children's television programmes, is also common behaviour among children and young people of all social classes. Finally, the most generalized feature, is the undoubtable charm exercised on young people, by fiction."<sup>22</sup>

In her questionnaire, Koroneou aimed at revealing correlations between preferences to various cultural factors - television, cinema, theatre, music, non-school book reading, as well as the living-area and the socio-economic background of children and juniors. We believe it is appropriate, in summing up, to refer to recent research in the newspaper *Fileleftheros* about juvenile delinquency, from which report we note the following:

"Exactly a year ago (in June, 1994), the Welfare Council in Limassol, investigated in detail, the subject of juvenile delinquency and came up with the following conclusions: A rising tendency in school violence was established, that expressed itself in minor trespasses, but also in extreme, anti-social behaviour."<sup>23</sup>

In the two articles, there was reference to an incident, in November, 1994, in which a student from Nicosia stabbed his classmate, in high school. Mention is also made of different incidents of anti-social behaviour of young people in disco-clubs in Limassol and Nicosia, in 1994 and 1995. In 1995, the incidents took the form of clashes with the police, with massive participation of young people, in a climate of intense aggressiveness.

To conclude, in spite of the research prepared by the three specialists for the House of Representatives and its general conclusion that there is no increase in juvenile delinquency in Cyprus, in recent years, events and their dimensions do not permit laxity or indifference. The present investigation is an expression of concern, with the primary objective of research into the role of television (mass culture) among other (humanitarian culture) factors - theatre, church, books, music, cinema - which can potentially exercise an influence on the character of the child and the relationship of these factors to the aggressiveness in the behaviour of children, aged 11 - 13.

*Methodology*

The sample for this survey consisted of 400 children, aged 11-13 years, from 24 schools 12 high schools and 12 elementary schools, from the four towns and the five districts of unoccupied Cyprus.

*Age*

In Cyprus, children at 11, are in the last class of the elementary school and at 12-13, in the first two classes of high school. Apart from this, at the ages of 11-13, we usually find those factors which form the most critical points in the age of children, in relationship to their habits, interests and their reaction to different influences exercised on their character and personality. The borderline between childhood and teen age, are, as we all know, decisive, in the whole course of human psychology. It is therefore understandable that all types of influences, as well as the type, quality and density of the influences received during this period, is of a definitive nature.

Furthermore, the resulting differentiations at the ages of 11 - 13, that refer to habits, preferences and interests, can possibly give us a different picture, as far as aggression at school and at home is concerned. We should here note that every effort has been exerted to secure sincere answers from the children, as far as their aggressive tendencies are concerned. Any elements of honest self-appraisal obtained, for comparison and correlation, will, it is hoped, enrich our knowledge and historic experience about this burning issue of the formation of human character. Furthermore, the discovery of any influences on the child and the teenager, of television, especially, as a medium contributing to the further promotion of crime in the country, will be enriched.

*Gender*

The goal was that the sample include an equal number of girls and boys, since population analogies at the ages of 10 - 14, which include the sample of this Survey, are, according to the *Demographic Report* of 1992, roughly equal.

*Sample*

For the goals of this Survey, it was considered essential to use a stratified sample of 400 children of both genders, from the whole of Cyprus, with the following analogies, from the rural and urban areas of unoccupied Cyprus:

|           | URBAN | RURAL |
|-----------|-------|-------|
| Nicosia   | 120   | 45    |
| Limassol  | 90    | 24    |
| Larnaca   | 40    | 26    |
| Paphos    | 22    | 13    |
| Famagusta | 0     | 20    |

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FACTORS OF HUMANITARIAN AND MASS CULTURE AND AGGRESSION IN CHILDREN AND YOUNG PEOPLE

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TOTAL                    272        +            128 = 400

|           | URBAN |      | AREAS |       |
|-----------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| AGES      | 11    | 12   | 13    |       |
| Nicosia   | 40    | 40   | 40    |       |
| Limassol  | 30    | 30   | 30    |       |
| Larnaca   | 14    | 13   | 13    |       |
| Paphos    | 8     | 7    | 7     |       |
| Famagusta | 0     | 0    | 0     |       |
| TOTAL     | 92    | + 90 | + 90  | = 272 |

|           | RURAL |      | AREAS |       |
|-----------|-------|------|-------|-------|
| AGES      | 11    | 12   | 13    |       |
| Nicosia   | 15    | 15   | 15    |       |
| Limassol  | 8     | 8    | 8     |       |
| Larnaca   | 8     | 9    | 9     |       |
| Paphos    | 5     | 4    | 4     |       |
| Famagusta | 6     | 7    | 7     |       |
| TOTAL     | 42    | + 43 | + 43  | = 128 |

The above stratified sample safeguarded the balanced representation of the Cyprus population as to the relevant age-groups, not only arithmetically, but also geographically. It is definitely interesting to find out if there are any differences between children and teenagers of urban and rural areas. It is also of interest to establish differences in the tendencies, if existent, between the children and the teenagers of the different towns of unoccupied Cyprus.

#### *Interviews*

The schools participating in the Survey were drawn by lot. Before conducting the Survey among the schools drawn, they were telephoned and the topic of the Survey was mentioned to the headmasters, who were also requested to select the number of students necessary, according to the statistical analogy of the sample. It was further emphasized to the headmasters, that the children should be chosen completely at random, without regard to their school record or conduct. The questionnaires were completed between the 6th and 15th June, 1995.

During the completion of the questionnaires, (which was supervised by one or two people from the Research and Development Centre of Intercollege), even though the children were sitting in the same room, no communication was allowed among them. If they had questions, they could have them answered by the people supervising,

before continuing with the questionnaires.

#### *Research Group*

The Research was coordinated by Nayia Roussou, Senior Lecturer in Mass Media subjects, at Intercollege. The Research group consisted of the following people:

Nayia Roussou, Nicos Peristianis, Eleni Zambela-Ieridou, Maria Peristiani, Christia Brooks, Christos Theocleous, Iliana Kanara, Koula Gregoriou, Anna Christou, Panayiota Ioannou, Maria Zanettou.

#### *Questionnaire*

The questionnaire consisted of 46 questions, divided into parts that deal with the habits of children, as far as extra-curricular interests and activities are concerned. These parts, were as follows:

a. The first part (1 - 8) aimed at finding out the more general interests of the children, as to viewing movies in the cinema, seeing plays, going to church, reading non-school book publications, magazines, listening to the radio and preferences for singers - male or female'. This part of the questionnaire was considered necessary to find out which cultural and socializing factors contribute to the personality of the child and to which extent. To understand better the logic of these questions and the goals they serve, we could introduce in our analysis, certain theoretical meanings used in similar research abroad, as in the case of the Research Survey by Alexandra Koroneou, on *Young People and Mass Communication Media*.

According to child psychologist/educatiqnist, George Snynders, referred to by Koroneou, "the culture of a country can be divided into "primary" (which includes "mass" culture) and "human" or "noble" which is considered more individualized, or "processed". It is natural, therefore, that stereotyping and homogenization, as well as the daily familiarity of the television experience, should not possibly act as beneficially as the "noble" or processed types of human culture i.e., the theatre, books, music. Reading, the theatre, music, but church-going also, which is a strong factor for the initiation of the child in the contemporary climate of accepted spiritual values of Cyprus society, were considered as the wider frame or environment which can potentially exercise an influence on the child and its character. The influence of radio, even though it belongs to the electronic family of mass media, was never considered, in any country and by any thinker or researcher, equally important as that of television. We can, however support that its contents can enrich the spiritual world of the listener, whether we are talking about informative, artistic, or musical/entertainment programmes. The influence of television never acts in a vacuum. The viewer, underaged or adult, receives the messages and the influences of television, against the background of his remaining education and other factors that play a role in the shaping of his personality. However, this all-mighty contemporary medium, *Pandora's box* as many call it, has been repeatedly accused of negative influences, especially on the particularly sensitive world of children

and young people. Television influence, as far as children's aggression is concerned, has been discussed in the introduction of the present Survey and has introduced us to the problem of the subject. To this effect, 17 questions - (9-25) - which were about television, aimed at finding out the television habits of the children that had taken part in this Survey. The hours, the zones, the days of watching, the channels and the programmes preferred by the children, the cartoons and the television sports which they usually choose, as well as the characteristics of the programmes they prefer, are investigated through these questions. Some comments on the reasoning behind these questions, will probably light up the approach adopted in the Survey, as to the TV habits of the participating children.

The frequency of watching, as to hours (question 9) is, we believe imperative to establish initially, once more, that which many other previous investigations, in Cyprus and abroad have already established that television-viewing definitely forms a daily part of the life of Cyprus children (see at the research by the Association *Mental Health for All*, in Larnaca, 1993, the Survey by the Elementary School of Likavytos, in 1994 and the survey by Nicos Leontiou in 1995).

The zones, the hours of the week and the channels in today's pluralistic television scene in Cyprus (Q. 9 - 12) are also parameters for the initial positioning of the viewing habits of children, before their content preferences are investigated (Q. 13 and 17 and 19 - 20) as well as the characteristics or elements of the programmes which children consider instrumental in their choice of a programme sentiment, humour, violence, crime, horror, etc. (Q. 18).

The titles of the programmes that were mentioned in the questionnaire (Q.17a and 17b) were taken from the magazines promoting the television programmes of the Cyprus channels - CyBC, ANT1, LOGOS, and SIGMA - during the days the Survey was being conducted. The criterion for the choice of the programmes was in some cases, the violence or unsuitability of the programmes for the *children-Anatomy of Murder, Adult Zone*, etc., and in other cases, the popularity among children of programmes like the *Knight Rider* and *Beverly Hills*, which are shown in the early family zone hours. The goal in the selection was to find out the preferences of the children as to programmes either addressed to them i.e., cartoons or programmes which are transmitted in the family zone as well as the programmes transmitted at late hours, containing scenes that are unsuitable for children of the present Survey's sample group. The desire of children for identification with cinema or television heroes, can give us a measure about the preferences of children, as to the models proposed by the television screen. The reference to "cinema" heroes, as well as to the television ones, is not random. Very often, popular cinema films are aired on television, featuring well-known names of contemporary or older cinema productions. Naturally we would not exclude the viewing of films in cinema-houses, as there are no indications as to the contrary. This explains why there is a relevant question in the survey (Q.1). Besides, we must not forget the effort of the cinema owners to face the sharp competition on behalf of television, with quality movies. So there could be a tendency to go back to the cinema, not only on

the part of adults, but also of children.

The conditions under which a child watches television are definitely of interest. So is the total communication of the child with its parents and family around the television set: Does it watch alone or with another member of the family? (C, Q. 15). Do his parents communicate between themselves and does the child participate? Are certain programmes, furthermore discussed at school, so that the child can position himself in his natural environment? The child's feelings when he sees horror films, for example, are all points of interest, as they map out the manner and conditions of television viewing and preferences of the child.

The scale of aggression in the questionnaire, compliance with the rules of the school, and attacking schoolmates, or destroying objects (Q. 27. 32 & 34) were definitely considered necessary to give us an all-round picture of the aggressive tendencies in the children. This part on the aggressiveness of the children was based on the sincerity of the children and their willingness to evaluate themselves objectively, sincerity being the cornerstone in any investigation, the foundation on which the whole institution and value of any research lies. It was stressed to all the participating children that the answers were anonymous and they were expected to be frank and honest in their answers. The sample was random and this was pointed out to the headmasters, in the telephone contact made with them, before the investigation began, so they would bear this in mind, when selecting the participating group from their school.

Questions 38 - 46 aimed at finding out demographic features about the children - gender, age, place of residence, occupation of the father and the mother, educational level of the parents and the family situation of the parents (married or divorced); in the case of divorced parents, the child should state who he/she was living with.

### **Selective Presentation of Results**

Some of the findings or results that are interesting, are the following:

- The hours of television viewing by the participating children, which were as follows:
- 63% of the children watch television *over* two hours a day.
- 29% from one to two hours.
- 7% less than one hour.
- 1.2% only during the vacation.
- There are no children who *never* watch television

Percentages of viewing by channel, were as follows:

| CHANNEL | %    |
|---------|------|
| ANT 21  | 71.0 |
| SIGMA   | 13.5 |

|       |     |
|-------|-----|
| RIK 1 | 3.5 |
| RIK 2 | 3.2 |
| LOGOS | 2.2 |
| ET 1  | 0.2 |

- A very important majority of the 11 - 13 year-old children - 63.5% - view television between 8.00 and 11.00 p.m. and 11.8%, after 11.00 p.m.

- The categories of programmes preferred by the children, present particular interest: 70.29% prefer programmes of action, detective stories, stories of violence and horror, as well as cow-boy movies (Westerns).

The findings about self-confessed delinquency or aggressiveness in school, or at home, are also of interest.

#### *School aggression*

- Half the children (54.5%) do not get involved in fights, "ever". But of the remaining children

- from 2.0% to 37.1%, get involved, as follows:

|                |         |
|----------------|---------|
| "regularly"    | (2%)    |
| "often enough" | (6.5%)  |
| "sometimes"    | (37.1%) |

#### *Cursing or using foul language*

|                |         |
|----------------|---------|
| "sometimes"    | (39.2%) |
| "often enough" | (7.2%)  |
| "sometimes"    | (2.2%)  |
| "never"        | (51.4%) |

#### *Aggression at home*

- The numbers of children that ruin objects at home, are as follows:

|                |         |
|----------------|---------|
| "sometimes"    | (41.8%) |
| "often enough" | (4.2%)  |
| "regularly"    | (2.5%)  |
| "never"        | (51.5%) |

- They go to church as follows:

|                       |         |
|-----------------------|---------|
| "every Sunday"        | (41.2%) |
| "on big holidays"     |         |
| (Christmas or Easter) | (24.9%) |



"very rarely" (32.6%)  
"never" (1.2%)

As far as theatre-going is concerned, 53.9% go to the theatre 1 - 3 times a year, 9.4%, 4 - 6 times and 4.2%, over six times.

The findings with regard to reading of non-school books, were as follows: 52.7% of children read from zero to three books a year; 46% read four or more annually. These percentages, compared with the 700 hours approximately spent by children on viewing television, gives a clear picture of the supremacy of television in the life of the children of this age-group.

### ***Correlations of Television Viewing and Aggressiveness***

Careful analysis of correlations between the hours that children view television and their aggressive behaviour, at school and at home, has given us the following results:

- There is a positive correlation between the hours of television viewing and verbal aggression, since the highest percentages of the children who curse, seems to exist among children who view television over 2 hours a day, as follows:

- 46.6% "never" curse
- 40.7% curse "sometimes"
- 9.5% curse "often enough"
- 3.2% curse "regularly"

On the other hand, children viewing television one hour a day, or less, answered as follows:

- 65.4% "never" curse
- 19.2% curse "sometimes"
- 15.4% curse "often enough"
- 0.0% curse "regularly"

It is worth mentioning that 82.8% of the children who answered that they curse "often enough", view television two or more hours, daily. An exception worth mentioning is the following: the big percentage 80% of the children who view television only during vacations( this being 1.2%) curse only "sometimes". Still, if we bear in mind that out of 400 children, only about five view television only during vacations and only three out of five curse "sometimes", the finding might be considered circumstantial and statistically non-significant. The correlation however, of rising television viewing with the rising tendency to curse, is definite.

Aggression against schoolmates (Q. 032) gives exactly the same tendencies. Out of the children who view television *over* two hours a day, 35.7% "attack others sometimes", 6.3% "often enough", 3.1% "regularly" and 54.9% "never". 88.9% of the children who replied that they attack their classmates regularly, view television *over* 2 hours daily. Nine percent of the children who view television over two hours daily, destroy objects "sometimes" and 1.6% "regularly", whereas 89.4% "never" destroy objects.

Furthermore, 15.4% of the children who view television one hour or less, daily and 5.1% of those who view from 1 to 2 hours daily, state that they "sometimes" destroy objects. A positive correlation also has been established between a rising tendency of aggression at home and denser television viewing. Here are some of the findings:

Question no. 36: "How often do you curse at home?"

Out of the 34% children who watch television *over* two hours daily, 9.0% curse "sometimes", 9.0% "often enough" and 2.7% "regularly". High percentages-40%-of-the children who view television between one and two hours daily, curse "sometimes", while 11.55% of the children who curse "often enough", view television one hour or less daily.

#### *Programme zones and aggression*

Another series of correlations between programme zones watched by children and the degree of aggressiveness at school and at home, gives us the results shown in Two-Dimensional Table 1. For reasons of economy of space in this *volume* only 8 two-dimensional table are being reproduced.

Aggression seems to rise in the children who watch television later in the evening (8.00 -11.00 p.m.) and climaxes in the children viewing programmes after 11.00 p.m. These programmes have a viewership of 11.4%, among the Survey's age-groups.

#### *Channels, serials and aggression*

The correlations of channels and aggression at school and in the home, as shown in Two-Dimensional *Table no. 2*, give us a picture indicating different tendencies.

The preferences of children to channels with regard to programme zones, are also of interest, as shown in *Table no. 3*:-

The big majority of children watch at all hours, ANT 1 (70.8% - 80%) and SIGMA (9.9% -21.1%) beginning at 5.00 p.m. and continuing till 11.00.

This becomes important because in general, the large numbers of the young viewers of the Survey, mainly prefer the same channels (ANT1, 77.4% and SIGMA, 13.4%).

The significance of the above causes worry, in view of the contents of the programmes aired at these hours and bearing in mind the aggressive tendencies displayed by the

children watching these two channels. Typical series containing violence, but also generally unsuitable for children, are the following:

*Anatomy of a Murder*, *Vice Squad*, *Miami Vice*, and *Adult Zone*. Ratings of children's viewing, as indicated by the present survey were as follows:

|                            | %     | %         | %         |
|----------------------------|-------|-----------|-----------|
|                            | Never | Sometimes | Regularly |
| <i>Anatomy of a Murder</i> | 61.6  | 29.9      | 8.5       |
| <i>Adult Zone</i>          | 79.6  | 16.9      | 7.4       |
| <i>Vice Squad</i>          | 57.4  | 31.0      | 11.7      |
| <i>Miami Vice</i>          | 40.1  | 37.3      | 22.7      |

29.2% of the children who "never" see *Anatomy of a Murder*, get involved "sometimes" in rows, 3.7% "often enough" and 1.2% "systematically."

Percentages, however of aggressive behaviour rise with the corresponding rise in viewing. As a result, about half (50.8%) of those who watch *Anatomy of a Murder* "sometimes", get involved "sometimes" in rows at school (Q. 028), 9.3% "often enough" and 2.5% "systematically." Finally, out of those viewing the programme "systematically", 44.1% get involved in rows "sometimes", 14.7%, "often enough" and 5.5% "systematically." The same rise in aggressive behaviour at home is observed to the same percentage, in the answers to the question "How often do you destroy objects at home?" (Q. 037). It is, on the other hand, interesting to note that only 0.4% of the children who never watch *Anatomy of a Murder*, destroy objects "systematically," 5.0% of those who view the series "sometimes" and 8.8% of those who view it "systematically" destroy objects also "systematically". The same rise in aggressiveness is observed with the rise in the viewership of *Adult Zone*. Only 1.0% of children who "never" view the series, get involved in rows at school, "systematically", 4.5% of those who view it "sometimes" and the biggest percentage, 6.9% of those who view it "systematically", also get involved in school rows, "systematically." Furthermore, children who destroy objects at home "systematically", display the same range of aggression as those who are aggressive at school - 1.4% ("never") 1.5% ("sometimes") and 17.2% ("regularly").

Percentages of children who "systematically" fail to conform to school rules in connection to the series *Vice Squad*, also show rising tendencies, as follows:

Nine percent of the children who "never" see the series, conform to school rules; 3% of those who view the series "sometimes" and 4.4% of those who view the series "regularly," show "systematic" failure to conform to school rules. As to the question about their involvement in school rows, the percentages were as follows: 0.4% of those who "never" watch the series, 2.5% of those who view the series "sometimes" and 13.0% of those who view the series "regularly", get "systematically" involved in rows at school.

It is interesting to note that as *Table no. 4* indicates, there are rising percentages of aggression among children who view "systematically" *Anatomy of a Murder, Adult Zone* and *Vice Squad*. The percentages, however, drop substantially among children who view *Miami Vice*, in comparison to other series. *Afetiries* a cultural youth programme, is at the lowest range. It is also interesting to note that the children who prefer programmes with violence and horror, display the greatest percentages of "systematic" aggressive behaviour, when compared to viewers of all other categories of programmes (Q. 013), as shown in *Table no.5*.

One of the results indicating a deviance from possible correlations is the fact that the percentages of those children preferring "sentimental" contents, display higher percentages of "systematic" aggression in their behaviour, than children viewing violence and horror.

This is obvious in the following questions:

- Q. 032 "How often do you attack your classmates at school"? 6.4%
- Q. 033 "How often do you steal at school?" 4.3%
- Q. 034 "How frequently do you destroy objects at school"? 4.3%
- Q. 036 "How often do you curse at home"? 6.4%

Another interesting comparison in percentages of viewing, is that between different series locally-produced or imported, some of which are violent in content and some are entertaining, e.g., *Beverley Hills, Afetiries, Santa Barbara*, etc. Percentages, as displayed in *Table no. 6*, show that *Beverley Hills* is the most popular among children. The comedy *Married with Children, Miami Vice* and *Afetiries* follow. Violent series claim their own percentages, which may be lower, but it is worth remembering that they are not really meant for children and they are not aired in the family zone. The hours of the day that children watch television are also of interest, as the programmes suitable for the age-group of the Survey (11-13) are aired in the morning, afternoon and early evening, until 8.00 or 8.30 p.m. After 9.00 p.m. programmes are aimed at adults. However 63.5% of children watch television between 8.00 and 11.00 p.m. And 11.4% watch television after 11.00 p.m. In other words, 63.5% of the children (probably including the 11.4%) are exposed to programmes which are unsuitable for their age-groups.

#### *Hours and manner of channel viewing*

What channels do children watch during the hours mentioned above, or generally in the different time zones?

It is interesting to see *Table no. 7*. The overwhelming majority of children watch ANT1 at all hours, SIGMA following. The question about the channels viewed by the children between 8.00 p.m. and 11.00 p.m. was answered as follows:

| ANT1  | ET1  | LOGOS | RIK1  | RIK2 | SIGMA |
|-------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| 52.5% | 0.2% | 3.4%  | 11.1% | 5.4% | 22.7% |

The greatest share of television viewing among children who view after 11.00 p.m., is claimed by SIGMA (21.9%). This is disquieting, since SIGMA airs the *Adult Zone* series during these hours, which usually contains sex, horror and violence. Of course, we cannot exclude the possibility of false testimony on the part of the children, since stating that they watch this zone, gives them the feeling that they are old enough to watch programmes which are meant for adults only.

Another dimension involved in the issue of children viewing television at unsuitable hours (with violence, sex or horror scenes) is the question as to whether they view alone, or in the company of family members. It was established that 8.4% of the children who watch television between 8.00 and 11.00 p.m. watch alone. The same is true for children who watch after 11.00 p.m. 13.5% watch programmes unsuitable and dangerous for children, without any other person present.

#### *Gender and aggression*

Another dimension of the Survey was the correlation between gender and aggression. The findings are shown in *Table no. 8*. The traditional tendency of the boys being more aggressive than the girls are verified once more, as far as percentages and degree are concerned. The only exception is the slight superiority of girls in verbal aggression at home (Q.036) with 36.5% cursing "sometimes" versus 36.2% of the boys. Additionally, 8.2% of the girls, but 7.1% of the boys curse "often enough". Furthermore girls surpass boys in aggression at home, in Question 037, with 44.7% girls versus 38.8% boys destroying objects at home "sometimes."

#### *Preference of programmes with violence and aggression and living area*

The above was another relationship investigated with questions and correlations in the Survey that was carried out. So, the preference of violent programmes, in connection to the living area of the children-town or rural area-gives us the results of *Table no. 9*.

Children who prefer violent programmes are more numerous in the town and countryside of Nicosia, in the towns of Limassol and Larnaca, with the children from Paphos, ranking well below the others. Children from the countryside of Limassol and the town of Paphos, "sometimes" prefer violent programmes. All other areas follow with roughly equal shares.

The correlation of some variables that correlate the family background of the children with their degree of aggression, deserves some comments:

The family situation of the parents whether they are married or divorced, (Q.045) in relationship to aggressiveness (Q.027 and 037), has yielded no positive correlation. The correlations of the ages with the degree of aggression *Table no. 11* gives higher levels for 13-year-olds, in contrast to 11 and 12-year-olds. Additionally, 12 and 13-year-olds seem to like violent programmes more than 11-year-olds (Q. 039), answering with higher percentages "Yes" to the relevant question about violent and non-violent

programmes. In other answers "No" and "Sometimes" are answers with no substantial variation as to the preferences of older children, as compared to younger children, in regard to violent contents:

Question: "Do you like watching programmes with violent contents"?

|               | YES   | NO    | SOMETIMES |
|---------------|-------|-------|-----------|
| 11-year- olds | 16.3% | 26.3% | 57.5%     |
| 12-year-olds  | 26.8% | 26.3% | 46.9%     |
| 13-year-olds  | 25.8% | 28.8% | 45.5%     |

There is a significant differentiation in percentages between the clearly affirmative answers of the 12-year-olds (26.8%) and those of the 13-year-olds (25.8%), in contrast to the 11-year-olds (16.3%).

The findings with reference to children's aggression, in relationship to the educational level of the parents, positively indicate the following: The children with parents who have a secondary school education display more "systematically" an aggressive behaviour, in comparison to the children whose parents either have no formal education at all, or, quite the opposite, children whose parents have a university education.

The question as to whether parents or guardians know which programmes children are watching, gave the following findings:

Only 4.7% of the children watch television, while their parents "never" know what they watch. 48.8% answered that "sometimes" their parents know which programmes they watch and 46.6% that their parents "always" know. Additionally, 43.4% replied that some time or other their parents have forbidden them to watch certain programmes, but the majority (56.6%) answered that their parents do not know" what they watch.

#### *Factors of human culture and aggression*

The questions about factors of "human culture" are few ( 1 - 4 and 6), but they do give us the stigma of the quest of this Survey.

Cinema may have been initially considered a mass medium. However, the great event of the invasion of television, has turned the cinema movie, with its particular characteristics - directing, acting and cinema going - into a more "human" or "elite" form of culture, perhaps, than the mundane home medium of television.

The answers about cinema-going were as follows:

19.7% replied that they go to the cinema over 6 times a year.

18.0% go 4 - 6 times a year  
40.9% go 1 - 3 times a year  
21.4% never go to the movies

Consequently, the cinema experience seems to be quite rare for children of this age group.

A similar situation prevails as to theatre-going:

"Never" - 33.5%  
"1 - 3 times" - 53.0%  
"4 - 6 times" - 9.4%  
"Over 6 times"- 4.2%

A much smaller percentage - only 4.2% - go to the theatre over six times a year, in comparison to 19.7% who go to the movies over six times a year. The religious sentiment, on the contrary and church-going as a factor of religious/human culture, seems to be more highly developed:

41.2% go to church "every Sunday"  
24.9% go "only on big holidays - Christmas and Easter"  
32.6% go " very rarely"  
1.2 % "never" go to church

This latter figure, compared to 21.4% and 33.5% who "never" go to the cinema, or the theatre, gives the picture of a strong superiority of Christian upbringing which children in Cyprus can still claim today.

In the area of non-school-book reading, things are not as dark as they are in the theatre and cinema:

- 7.6% "never" read anything outside school-books  
- 11.1% read "one" book a year  
- 18.9%, "two" books a year  
- 17.9%, "three" books a year  
- 46.3%, "four or more" books a year

The survey also referred to the preferences of 11-13 year-olds, as to the music and the singers they like.

Findings about the singers they preferred, were as follows:

Out of the ten top singers (male and female) preferred by children, nine are Greek and only one is foreign (see list below). Here are the names in order of preference:

Thanos Kalliris, Thanos Rouvas, Stephanos Korkolis, Evridiki, Giorgos Dalaras, Lambis Livieratos, Giorgos Alkeos, Michael Jackson, Anna Vishi, Vassilis Papaconstantinou.

Other names of foreign singers and groups included *Metallica*, *Aerosmith*, *Nirvana*, as well as Luciano Pavarotti and Maria Callas.

### *Cinema and aggression*

As to the correlation of findings re. human or processed culture and different types of aggressive behaviour in children, please see *Table no. 12*.

Five percent (5%) of the children who go to the cinema "over six times a year", curse "systematically". The same percentage 5% also get involved in school rows "systematically". Five percent (5%) "destroy objects" at school "systematically", whereas other groups who go to the cinema more rarely, or never at all, show zero percentage in destroying objects "systematically" at school. The same percentage -5%- of the strong frequenters of the cinema, also "curse at home" "systematically" and finally 6.3% of the strong friends of the cinema, "ruin objects at home" "systematically."

Answers to the question as to what television or cinema hero children would like to resemble:

(Q.23), were as follows, by order of preference for the first five:

| Boys                                    | Girls                 |
|---|-----------------------|
| 1. Sylvester Stallone or Rocky or Rambo | 1. Aliki Vougiouklaki |
| 2. Tom Cruise                           | 2. Shannon Doherty    |
| 3. Jean Claude Van Dam                  | 3. Claudia Scheaffer  |
| 4. Arnold Schwatseneger                 | 4. Pamela Anderson    |
| 5. David Hasselhoft                     | 5. Cindy Crawford     |

Boys wanted, mainly to resemble men with a "strong touch" image on television, or in the movies, whereas girls preferred to be like actresses or models, known for their beauty and lovely appearance. Other answers included Clint Eastwood, Power Rangers, Michael Night, Bruce Lee, or Greek stars Jenny Karezi, Miltos Makridhis, Lambros Constantaras, etc.

### *Theatre and aggression*

Children who go to the theatre over six times a year, do not apply themselves at all to "systematic" aggression:

- 0% "curse at school"
- 0% "attack their classmates"



- 0% "destroy objects at school"
- 0% "curse at home" and
- 0% "destroy objects at home"

In other words, aggression is reduced with increasing exposure to the theatre - a genre of "human" culture. This seems to be supported by the findings of "systematic" aggression, as well: Children who "never" go to the theatre score high percentages of "systematic", aggressive behaviour, as follows:

- 3.7% "curse at school"
- 4.4% "attack their classmates at school"
- 2.6% "destroy objects at school"
- 1.5% "destroy objects at home"
- 3.0% "curse at home"
- 2.2% "destroy objects at home"

#### *Churchgoing and aggression*

A very large majority of the children who go to church every Sunday-62.3% "never" curse and only 1.8% curse "systematically" at school. However, another big majority 80.0% of the children who "never" go to church, "never" curse, whereas 0% of these children curse "systematically", a fact which does not actually reveal any tendency at all.

Answers to the question as to "how often do you destroy objects at school" were as follows:

None of the children who go to church "every Sunday" destroys objects "systematically". Two per cent (2.0%) of the children who go to church only on big holidays, have replied that they destroy objects at school, "systematically".

#### *Non-school reading and aggression*

Children who read four or more books a year, present a reduced "systematic" aggression, as follows:

- 3.2% curse "systematically" at school, versus 6.5% who never read "non-school material.
- 2.1% "attack their schoolmates, versus the higher percentage of 3.3.% of those who "never" read non-school material.
- 0.5% "curse at home", versus the higher percentage of 6.7% of those who "never" read non-school material

- 2.1% "destroy objects at home", versus the maximum percentage of 6.7%, who read one book a year, or the 3.2% of those who read "no" books at all, outside school reading.

In the same *Table no. 12* there is a comparison of the systematic aggression for five questions of the Table, with regard to the superlative grades of watching television, cinema, the theatre, non-school reading and church-going. This comparison rendered the following results:

Without doubt, all the children watching television over two hours a day, indicate higher percentages of "systematic" aggression, in "cursing" at school and at home, in "getting involved in rows" with their classmates and in "destroying objects" at school and at home, in comparison with the children going to the theatre, to church and reading to the maximum, in the relevant question. Children who watch television to the minimum point - only "during vacation" - indicate zero aggression. Contrary to this, children who watch television to the maximum - over two hours daily - show aggression to the maximum point. The pattern is repeated among children who "never" go to the theatre, "never" go to church and "never" read non-school readings. It is also interesting to note that children who go to the cinema "over six times a year" indicate higher percentages of "systematic aggression" than children viewing television to the maximum point of the relevant question - over 2 hours daily.

#### *Human culture, living-area and education of parents*

A correlation of some variables of human culture with the living-area of the child, has given us the following indications:

"Reading of more than 6 books a year:"

|           |       | %    |
|-----------|-------|------|
| Nicosia:  | Town  | 68.2 |
|           | Rural | 31.8 |
| Limassol: | Town  | 82   |
|           | Rural | 18   |
| Larnaca:  | Town  | 63.3 |
|           | Rural | 36.7 |
| Paphos:   | Town  | 72.7 |
|           | Rural | 27.3 |

"Going to the theatre over six times a year:"

|         |       |      |
|---------|-------|------|
| Nicosia | Town  | 57.1 |
|         | Rural | 42.0 |

## THE CYPRUS REVIEW

|          |       |       |
|----------|-------|-------|
| Limassol | Town  | 75.0  |
|          | Rural | 25.0  |
| Larnaca  | Town  | 100.0 |
|          | Rural | 0.0   |
| Paphos   | Town  | 100.0 |
|          | Rural | 0/0   |

### *Television viewing and formal education of parents*

In *Table no. 14*, which cross-tabulates the percentages of television viewing with the formal education of the parents, the following consistent correlations can be observed:

The greatest percentage of the children 47.6% - who watch television at a maximum level over two hours a day-have a father with high-school education. 2.0% only have parents with College or University education.

### **Notes on the Findings**

The present survey is, as far as we know, the first to examine television viewing habits, as a factor of mass culture in 11-13-year olds, in relation to their aggressive of behaviour, as well as the connection of other factors of human culture (theatre, church-going, music, reading), to the children's aggression at home and in school. However, extensive research has been carried out in Cyprus in previous years, about the television habits and the hours of watching, of children. Here are some findings from two such major surveys, to enable us to compare with the findings of the present survey:

In 1969, in a survey carried out by M. Efstathiou, among 8 - 12-year-old children, it appeared that children were watching television 10 hours on the average, a week, to a range of 1-25 hours. The survey covered 686 children from six towns and 11 villages.<sup>24</sup> A survey carried out by the Ministry of Education and Culture, in 1982, with Dr. Antonis Papaioannou, educational psychologist, as coordinator, came up with the following findings, some of which are related to the present survey.<sup>25</sup>

- The range of average time of television viewing by children at Nursery and Elementary school, varies between 10 and 16 hours, with an average of 13.78 hours. The distribution of this time-range climaxes from the younger to the older age-groups. In High-school, there is a descending *average* of viewing from the younger to the older age-groups.

- As far as viewing of time-zones, the programmes after the News Bulletin at 8.30, seemed to attract *very* small percentages from among Elementary school children and higher percentages from High-school classes.

- The age-group of the present survey 11-13 year-olds (top grade Elementary school

and second grade, High-school (Gymnasium) marked the following percentages:

Sixth Grade, Elementary School - 22.80%

First Grade, High School - 28.24%

Second Grade, High-school - 32.10%

The most popular programmes, by age-group, were as follows:

|                           | <i>Indescribable</i> | <i>Cyprus Raphaela For honour and Charlie's</i> |              |               | <i>Angels</i> |
|---------------------------|----------------------|---|--------------|---------------|---------------|
|                           | %                    | <i>themes</i>                                   | <i>money</i> | <i>Angels</i> | %             |
| 1st Grade,<br>Elementary  | 90.32                | 89.83   | 81.88        | 77.66         | 67.32         |
| 1st Grade,<br>High school | 93.65                | 93.53   | 85.61        | 84.79         | 71.97         |
| 2nd Grade,<br>High school | 93.54                | 88.72   | 81.94        | 81.78         | 78.00         |

The present survey indicates that a big percentage 63% of the children view television over two hours daily perhaps three or more. It is significant today to look, not at the number of viewing hours, but at the time-zones viewed by the children. These time-zones seem to have moved for different age-groups. (63.5%) watch television between 8.00-11.00 p.m. and 11.8%, after 11.00. The average viewing percentages for these age-groups, in 1983, was 30%. A point of interest is, furthermore the programmes watched by children of the present survey:

|                              |       |
|------------------------------|-------|
| <i>Regularly</i>             |       |
| <i>Beverly Hills</i>         | 57.5% |
| <i>Married with Children</i> | 49.4  |
| <i>Knightrider</i>           | 41.3% |
| <i>Miami Vice</i>            | 22.7% |
| <i>Afetiries</i>             | 19.7% |

Altogether, 93.9% of the children watch programmes with action and violence, vs. 57.5% who watch *Beverly Hills*. The remaining 20, perhaps could not find any programme titles in the survey's list, to which they could respond.

It is obvious from the above tables that the programmes preferred by children today, in relation to the programmes preferred by them in 1983, have dramatically changed. Imported programmes with action and violence included *Charlie's Angels* in 1982 and they include *Miami Vice*, in 1995. The question, of course was how different are today's programmes from older ones. It is also important to remember that a big percentage of the children -70.29% - prefer action films, as well as police, violence, horror and cowboy films. This holds true, in spite of the popularity of some other programmes as seen in *Table no. 15*.<sup>26</sup>

It is therefore obvious that we should worry and investigate, simply because of the fact that the crushing majority of the children watch programmes which are not addressed to them - after 8.30 or even 11.00 p.m.

Naturally we must not ignore, on the other hand, that the channels themselves have moved their time-zones. In 1983, CyBC ended its programmes around 11.00-11.30 and the adult zone was considered to be between 8.30 and 11.30. Today one of the Cyprus private channels - SIGMA - has established a so called *Adult Zone* after 12.00, midnight. Conclusively, programme zones for all age-groups seem to have shifted, with increasing recipes of sex and violence, after 9.00 p.m.

Besides, we should not forget that the survey by the Association *Mental Health for All*, after looking at Cyprus channels, recorded that over 10,000 scenes of violence are broadcast annually. Since children watch, by majority, adult programmes with violent contents, children are exposed to possible scenes of sex and violence for about 700-800 hours annually. What could this really mean? In 1978, W. A. Belson, published the results of a survey which he carried out over a number of years in Britain, with 12-17 year-olds, with the following findings as to the influence of television violence on boys:

1. The boys who saw frequently violent scenes on television, marked an increase in the degree of violent acts they performed - lightly or more seriously. In those cases of (light) violence, a dialectic relationship was established between television and the boys: television seemed to lead them to violent acts, but this also led them on to view further acts of violence. This kind of relationship did not seem to be present in the case of serious forms of televised violence.

2. Interpersonal violence on television seemed to exercise more influence on boys as to violent behaviour.

3. Great exposure of boys to televised violence increased their degree of aggression in sports, in games and in the use of foul language.

4. Exposure of the boys to televised violence, led them initially to light and later to behaviour forms of violence.

5. It was also established that televised violence did not prompt boys to perform or to wish to perform violent acts. The possibility however, of the boys expressing their internal violence, through acts of violence, because of television viewing, could not be excluded.

6. It also appeared that the great exposure to verbal aggression on television programmes, increased the foul vocabulary of the boys and their great exposure to sports programmes with violent contents, increased the degree to which they boys were violent in sports and games.

7. The "catharsis" theory was not supported by the researcher: The exposure to violent contents on television did not help boys get rid of their violent tendencies, but the opposite, made them more violent, irrespective of the fact that other researchers have supported that only certain forms of violent tendencies are subject to catharsis,

8. The general conclusion of W. A. Belson was that exposure of boys to televised violence increases their violent behaviour in social life and that they imitate television violence.<sup>27</sup>

Even though the percentages of children viewing programmes with violent contents, were small in the present Survey - from 4.6% for *Wild Night* to 22.70% for *Miami Vice*, correlations with aggressive tendencies, both at school and at home, indicated a positive relationship. Contrary to this, a negative relationship was established between factors of human culture and aggression. This should not surprise us, as processes in the different forms of human culture surveyed here-theatre, church going and reading-do not contain elements which are stimulating to instincts and conducive to the imitation of violent acts. Because even when a book or a play contains violence, its influence cannot be compared with television violence.

Greek professor Giotopoulou-Marangapoulou, phrases the following view, as recorded by researchers Papadopoulos, Peristianis and Prodromou, in their Report submitted to the Committee for Internal Affairs of the Cyprus House of Representatives, under the title, *The Phenomenon of Juvenile Delinquency in Cyprus Society*.

"Violent, criminal television contents certainly form a crime-generating factor. However, as with all other social phenomena, one generating factor of a social phenomenon, is not enough for its production. Its influence range and intensity depend on other variables both social and inter-personal".<sup>28</sup>

Somebody, could, therefore claim that children who watch television programmes with violence and express violent tendencies, perhaps turn to violence because they

already have (aggressive) tendencies. This therefore, does not mean that their aggression increases because they view violent television programmes. As Belson concludes, 'the possibility that violence exhibited by children is a reflection of their internal violence, expressed because of television violence, has not been "precluded." However, it must not be forgotten that Belson in his experimental survey also "recognised that his conclusions indicated that boys' exposure to televised violence increases their violent behaviour in social life and also that they imitate television violence.'<sup>29</sup>

The homogenizing influence exercised by mass communication, is, of course, another source for reflection and anxiety. Indeed, the findings of this Survey, have indicated that long hours of viewing are positively related with increased aggression of the Survey's age-groups, with variations, as to geographical area, gender, ge-groups and the education of the parents. In addition, the "human culture" factors, in more dense forms, indicated a negative relation with aggression: More frequent theatre and church-going, as well as more non-school reading were related to less aggression. The experience of this type of culture has been observed in families with high school to university education. Perhaps, the higher the formal education of the family environment, the stronger the dialectic modes of behaviour move in, to replace aggressive patterns. Is not this, besides the manner in which a new cultural capital is formed in the ranks of the educated classes, which new capital will become the basic investment of a future society?

The above findings support one of the basic tendencies established in the survey by Alexandra Koroneou, *Young People and Mass Communication Media*, which was carried out in Greece. This was that the language of the Mass Media does not act in a homogenizing fashion on society, equating the perception of reality by different social classes. Contrary to this Koroneou speaks of cultural subgroups, supporting the following view in her findings:

"Even though in all use of free time, homogenizing behaviour can be observed, the most characteristic example being television, contemporary social research proves that receivers of mass messages integrate them on the basis of difference and in-equality."<sup>30</sup>

This further supports the well-known communication model by Defleur, which functions on the basis of the Cultural Norms Theory. According to this theory, as recorded by Denis McQuail and Sven Windhall, "Media do not act directly on individuals, but affect indirectly culture, collective knowledge, informal cultural practices or norms and the values of a society. They offer a series of images, ideas and evaluations on which the public can draw, individuals choosing their own pattern of behaviour."<sup>31</sup>

Another dimension which must be investigated is the very personality of children, in the light of the rich television experience they have in today's pluralistic communication media, in the island of Cyprus. This pluralism offers many advantages - many sources of information, as well as the democratization of pro-social or anti-social experience. It can be an oasis of cultural experience, with the airing of concerts, exhibitions, theatre-plays, quality movies and constructive programmes for children or adults. This

does happen to a degree. The question is, to what degree and what is the extent of negative programmes on our screens? How can all this force to the good - entertainment, opening up of communication avenues, familiarity with other people and other cultures on television, co-exist with violence, crime and explicit sex scenes? How do children use television? What tendencies do they grow? Are they daring or timid? Optimistic or pessimistic? What professional tendencies do they have? How do they regard the national problem of Cyprus and what kind of a solution do they see? How do they think and what attitudes do they cultivate towards Turkish-Cypriots and possible co-existence with them?

In future research these and other questions must be put to the children, like questions about the viewing of information programmes news and panel discussions. An area which was purposefully left out of the present survey, as the main goal was to examine violence in the fictional programmes and its relationship to aggression. It is, besides, internationally accepted by research that it is the violence in fictional programmes that potentially exercises more influence on children, than violence in news programmes where we have straightforward images, without a myth, a structured direction and other elements of entertainment-music, drama, plot.

It is suggested that the present research be studied by all the institutions connected with children-Parents' Associations, the Ministry of Education and Culture, the Youth Organisation, radio and television channels, cultural institutions and associations of Psychologists and Sociologists. A responsible common social policy can be formulated only with a co-ordinated approach to the entertainment of children through television and other media and channels. This policy should offer children the proper education and should make them useful and proper citizens in the future. The function of electronic channels, with proper rules and codes, is a very important factor which must be examined immediately. The Ministry of Education and Culture, as well as educationists themselves, should examine with the same urgency, the leisure-hours of children as well as their informal education.

The anti-social behaviour of children and the young, is not a matter that affects only a few. It is a matter that concerns all the inhabitants of the country. The sooner we realize the possible influences of the Mass Media of Communication, the more effective will be our efforts to prevent juvenile delinquency. The Mass Media are not a vaccine or an intravenous injection acting automatically on the character and behaviour of the individual. They are a cultural and socio-political factor created and used by the very societies themselves. It is time for society as such, to check and use, to organise the sources of informal education and culture of junior and senior citizens of this country. We believe that Cyprus is too small a place, with very serious problems, to face, in addition, the threat of dangerous mass communication, without having an appropriate counter-proposal, integrated in its social, educational and cultural structures.

### **Notes**

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29. Vassilis Voudaskis, *Television Aggression and Violence and their Influence on Children and the Young*, (Athens, 1992), p. 120.
30. Alexandra Koroneou, *Young People and the Media of Mass Communication*, (Athens, 1992), p. 164.
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**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.1**

| TIME-ZONES         | No 31         |                  |                     | No32  |                  |                     | No 34          |                  |                     | No 36          |                  |                     | No37           |                  |                     |
|--------------------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|---|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|
|                    | some-<br>imes | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times                                      | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically |
| C 101              | 42.7          | 7.3              | 1.2                 | 26.8  | 6.1              |                     | 6.2            |                  |                     | 37.0           | 13.6             | 1.2                 | 44.4           | 4.9              |                     |
| C 102              | 37.9          | 7.1              | 0.9                 | 27.7  | 3.1              | 0.4                 | 5.4            |                  |                     | 35.9           | 6.7              | 1.8                 | 40.8           | 2.2              | 1.3                 |
| C103               | 42.0          | 8.6              | 2.0                 | 34.4  | 6.6              | 3.1                 | 9.8            | 0.4              | 1.2                 | 36.7           | 9.4              | 3.1                 | 44.1           | 4.7              | 3.1                 |
| C 104              | 50.0          | 14.6             | 10.4                | 45.8  | 10.4             | 6.3                 | 12.8           |                  | 4.3                 | 42.6           | 17.0             | 2.1                 | 40.4           | 12.8             | 4.3                 |
| TIME-ZONES         | Questions     |                  |                     |   |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |
| C 101= Before 5:00 |               |                  |                     | No 31 How often do you steal at school?             |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |
| C 102= 5:00-8:00   |               |                  |                     | No 32 How often do you attack classmates at school? |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |
| C 103= 8:00-11:0D  |               |                  |                     | No 34 How often do you destroy objects at school?   |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |
| C104= After 11:DD  |               |                  |                     | No 36 How often do you swear at home?               |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |
|                    |               |                  |                     | No 37 How often do you destroy objects at home?     |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.2**

|         |         | No 31         |                  |                     | No32           |                  |                     | No 34          |                  |                     | No 36          |                  |                     | No37           |                  |                     |
|---------|---------|---------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|----------------|------------------|---------------------|
|         |         | some-<br>imes | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically | some-<br>times | often-<br>enough | syste-<br>matically |
| 1 ANT   | (77.4%) | 38.7          | 7.1              | 1.6                 | 32.8           | 3.9              | 1.9                 | 6.7            | 0.3              | 1.0                 | 35.9           | 7.7              | 1.9                 | 44.2           | 3.5              | 1.9                 |
| 2 EAT   | (0.2%)  |               |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     |                |                  |                     | 1.0            |                  |                     |
| 3 LOGOS | (0.2%)  | 33.3          | 11.1             |                     |                |                  | 22.2                |                |                  | 11.1                | 55.6           |                  | 11.1                | 33.3           |                  | 11.1                |
| 4 PIK1  | (3.5%)  | 50.0          |                  | 1.0                 | 28.6           | 7.1              |                     | 7.1            |                  |                     | 50.0           | 7.1              |                     | 28.6           |                  |                     |
| 5 PIK2  | (3.2%)  | 61.5          |                  |                     | 46.2           |                  |                     |                |                  |                     | 38.5           | 15.4             |                     | 46.2           |                  |                     |
| 6 SIGMA | (3.4%)  | 35.2          | 11.1             | 5.6                 | 29.6           | 13.0             | 1.9                 | 20.8           |                  |                     | 30.2           | 7.5              | 3.8                 | 32.1           | 11.3             | 5.7                 |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.3**

| VIEWING HOURS          | ANT1 | ERT 1 | LOGOS | PIK 1 | PIK2 | SIGMA |
|------------------------|------|-------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| C 103<br>(8:00-11:00)  | 80   | 0.4   | 1.6   | 2.7   | 2.3  | 12.9  |
| C 102<br>(5:00-8:00)   | 79.3 | -     | 2.7   | 3.6   | 4.5  | 9.9   |
| C 101<br>(before 5:00) | 76.5 | -     | 2.5   | 4.9   | 1.2  | 14.8  |
| C 104<br>(after 11:00) | 70.8 | -     | -     | 2.1   | -    | 27.1  |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.4**

| VIEW SYSTEMATICALLY | %    | HOW OFTEN DO YOU DESTROY OBJECTS AT SCHOOL? |           |              |                |
|---------------------|------|---|-----------|--------------|----------------|
|                     |      | NEVER                                       | SOMETIMES | OFTEN ENOUGH | SYSTEMATICALLY |
| "Anatomy of murder" | 8.5  | 88.2  | 11.8      | ---          | ---            |
| "Adult zone"        | 7.4  | 65.5  | 20.7      | ---          | 13.8           |
| "Vice Squad"        | 11.7 | 87.0  | 16.9      | ---          | 2.2            |
| "Miami Vice"        | 22.7 | 89.9  | 9.0       | ---          | 1.1            |
| "Afetiries**"       | 19.7 | 94.8  | 5.0       | ---          | ---            |
| (**"Inroads")       |      |   |           |              |                |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.5**

## TYPES OF PROGRAMMES POPULAR WITH CHILDREN

| (Grade 4:<br>Systematically) | ACTION  | POLICE | VIOLENCE/<br>HORROR | CbWBOY/<br>WESTERN | SENTIMENTAL | SOCIAL | ... |
|------------------------------|---|--------|---------------------|--------------------|-------------|--------|-----|
| <b>M</b> 029                 | -   | -      | 4.1%                | -                  | -           | -      | -   |
| M030                         | -   | -      | 4.0%                | -                  | -           | -      | -   |
| M 031                        | 0.9%  | 1.8%   | 8.0%                | -                  | 2.2%        | 2.3%   | -   |
| <b>N</b> 032                 | 0.9%  | 1.8%   | 4.0%                | -                  | 6.4%        | 2.2%   | -   |
| <b>N</b> 033                 | 0.9%  | -      | 2.0%                | -                  | 4.3%        | -      | -   |
| <b>N</b> 034                 | -   | -      | 2.0%                | -                  | 8.5%        | -      | -   |
| N 035                        | 1.9%  | 1.8%   | 16.3%               | -                  | 8.5%        | 2.2%   | -   |
| N036                         | 0.9%  | 1.8%   | 4.1%                | 1.3%               | 6.4%        | -      | -   |
| N037                         | 2.8%  | -      | 8.2%                | -                  | 6.4%        | -      | -   |
| Questions:                   |   |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| <b>M</b> 029:                | Have your parents or guardian been called to your school because of your bad behaviour? |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| M030:                        | How often do you get punished for disobedience?   |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| M 031:                       | How often do you use bad names in school?   |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| <b>N</b> 032:                | How often do you attack your classmates at school?                                      |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| <b>N</b> 033:                | How often do you steal at school?   |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| <b>N</b> 034:                | How often do you destroy property in school?  |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| N035:                        | How often are you disobedient at home?  |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| N 036:                       | How often do you use bad language at home?  |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |
| N 037:                       | How often do you destroy property at home?  |        |                     |                    |             |        |     |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.7**

| HOURS            | ANT1 | ERT1 | LOGOS | PIK 1 | PIK2 | SIGMA |
|------------------|------|------|-------|-------|------|-------|
| Before 5:00 p.m. | 31.0 | 4.4  | 9.4   | 14.0  | 3.4  | 13.3  |
| 5:00 - 8.00 p.m. | 43.0 | 0.7  | 5.4   | 15.8  | 13.8 | 18.2  |
| 8:00-11:00p.m.   | 52.5 | 0.2  | 3.4   | 11.1  | 5.4  | 22.7  |
| after 11:00 p.m. | 20.5 | 0.5  | 3.2   | 3.7   | 3.2  | 21.9  |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.9**

Question: Do you like programmes with violent contents?

|           |             | <b>YES</b> | <b>NO</b> | <b>SOMETIMES</b> |
|-----------|-------------|------------|-----------|------------------|
| Nicosia   | Town        | 42.3       | 42.3      | 32.5             |
|           | Countryside | 0.8        | 47.9      | 3.0              |
| Limassol  | Town        | 23.8       | 42.9      | 33.3             |
|           | Countryside | -          | 41.9      | 58.1             |
| Larnaca   | Town        | 22.5       | 70.0      | 7.5              |
|           | Countryside | 20.0       | 48.0      | 32.0             |
| Famagusta | Town        | -          | -         | -                |
|           | Countryside | 14.3       | 57.1      | 28.6             |
| Paphos    | Town        | 8.7        | 47.8      | 43.5             |
|           | Countryside | -          | 72.7      | 27.3             |

**TWO-DIMENSIONAL TABLE NO.12**

SYSTEMATICALLY

|  | Question No. 31 | Question No. 32 | Question No. 34 | Question No. 36 | Question No. 37 |
|--|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|-----------------|
| "How many times a year do you go to the cinema?"   |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| NEVER  | 2.3             | 1.1             | 0.0             | 1.2             | 3.5             |
| OVER SIX TIMES                                     | 5.0             | 5.0             | 5.0             | 5.0             | 6.3             |
| "How many times a year do you go to the theatre?"  |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| NEVER  | 3.7             | 4.4             | 1.5             | 3.0             | 2.2             |
| OVER SIX TIMES                                     | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             |
| "When do you go to church"                         |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| NEVER  | 0.0             | 10.0            | 20.0            | 20.0            | 20.0            |
| EVERY SUNDAY                                       | 1.8             | 1.2             | 0.0             | 0.0             | 1.8             |
| "How many books do you read outside school-books?" |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| NONE   | 6.5             | 3.3             | 3.2             | 9.7             | 3.2             |
| FOUR OR OVER FOUR                                  | 3.2             | 2.1             | 0.5             | 0.5             | 2.1             |
| "How often do you watch television?"               |                 |                 |                 |                 |                 |
| ONLY DURING VACATION!                              | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             | 0.0             |
| OVER 2 HOURS DAILY                                 | 3.2             | 3.1             | 1.6             | 2.7             | 3.1             |

# **CONFLICT, ALIENATION, AND THE HOPE OF PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN MILITARISED CYPRUS**

**Harry Anastasiou**

In 1960 the Cyprus Republic was established as a single, ethnically mixed bicomunal state, with a single flag and an army numbering merely 2000 men. Today, Cyprus is geographically, ethnically and communally divided, with foreign troops on its soil, with all the male members of the population trained as soldiers and equipped with all powerful, up to date weapons. An island of half a million inhabitants, Cyprus stands divided since 1974 into *de facto* two states, one legal and one illegal, and with four flags; the Cyprus Republic flag and the Greek flag in the Greek south and the Turkish flag with the flag of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" in the Turkish occupied north. And for more than thirty years, the island has been under the direct supervision of the peace-keeping forces of the United Nations. Briefly, this is the tragedy of Cyprus.

For more than forty years, the history of this island has lived through successive and varied conflictual relationships, even through relationships of violence. In view of this irrefutable reality, it is essential to reflect and acknowledge that as inhabitants of the island, we have all been inevitably formed in and through this history of many and different conflicts. As individuals and as political groups, as communities and as a culture, we have been haunted and stigmatised, one way or another, by this protracted, never-ending confrontation with "the others", whoever they may be, the right, the left, the Greeks or the Turks.

It must also be noted that following the violent events of 1974, the various intra-communal conflictual relationships, especially among the Greek-Cypriots, has been subsumed and reconstituted around the henceforth major axis of Greek-Cypriot community on the one hand and Turkish-Cypriot community and the Turkish army on the other. And by implication, due to the Turkish military invasion and the pain it induced, the adversarial attitude was generalised, especially through the nationalist prototypes, to one of universal animosity between Greeks and Turks. On both sides, the same nationalism which originally created the problem comes, after the fact, and finds justification in the very historical events which itself created. It validates, in other words, the nationalist stereotype that enmity between Greeks and Turks constitutes a diachronic, invariable and existential fact, an immutable

and eternal phenomenon. This stance, or better, this perspective, whether it originates from Turk or Greek, leads to the same outcome. It precludes, *in advance*, the prospect for peace and reconciliation. And under these conditions, the search for a "solution" is transformed into a vain, time-consuming preoccupation. Under the nationalist rubric, even if "the solution" is found on the diplomatic plain, whatever it may be, even the most ideal, it becomes historically unfeasible, even most dangerous.

On account of the general impact of nationalism on public culture, the mentality of "us and them" has been shaped not so much by the historical experiences of peaceful coexistence and symbiosis, which have indeed existed, but, rather, exclusively from the events of hostility and violence. The kind of events which the nationalist spirit, wherever it comes from, onesidedly and selectively prefers and utilises in constituting its historical hermeneutic, in which the values of man and civilisation become determined by conflictual prototypes (Anderson 1991, p.6; Kitromilides 1990). And this is the mentality which has tended to become an inseparable dimension of the process of socialisation in the established culture of Cypriot society, in its entirety, inclusive of both communities.

By the nature of things, if peace is to be sought and pursued in Cyprus, it is imperative to begin with a diagnosis of the dynamics of conflict as they pertain to both the adversarial attitude itself, and the hostile interactive relationship between the two communities.

What is of utmost significance as a starting point for peace in Cyprus is the acknowledgement that each community has its own experience of injustice and subsequently and by implication its own sense of justice. The difference between the two, hinges on the fact that the traumatic experiences that each side has reaped from the conflict refer to and derive from different events, incidents and historical periods. For the Turkish-Cypriots, the painful memories concentrate mainly on the period 1963-1974. Their recollection concerns the constraining underdeveloped life in their enclaves, which encompassed just 3% of the territory of Cyprus, the defeats in the bloody conflicts with the Greek-Cypriots, with a loss of human life staggering in the eyes of the Turkish-Cypriots as a numerical minority. It concerns the missing persons (483 Turkish-Cypriots over 32 Greek-Cypriots in 1964) and generally the feelings that they were living under conditions of perpetual siege (Volkan 1979, pp 18-25, 119).

For the Greek-Cypriots, on the other hand, the experience of injustice originates mainly from the more concentrated, but inundating events of 1974, with the Greek Junta's *coup d'etat* and the Turkish military intervention. The tragic memories refer to the unprecedented loss of human life, to the mass uprooting from their homes, from one moment to the next, to the unrepeatably destruction of property, to the refugees and the 1619 missing persons. Most significant is also the fact that the pain and injustice that resulted from the *coup d'etat*, with all the mixed feelings of confusion and guilt over the civil bloodshed, were unconsciously transferred and



fused with the pain induced by Turkey's "Attila" operation. While with the recent re-emergence of nationalism, this transference was attempted by certain nationalist groups almost consciously, as a substitute for their guilt in initiating the civil violence among the Greek community.

The differentiated traumatic experience of the two communities, through entirely different points of reference are not only restricted to the different historical periods to which each side remains selectively and prejudicially bound. They relate and concur also in the same historical periods and events, but in relation to different needs and concerns of each community. Presently, for example, the Turkish-Cypriots', (while feeling secure with the presence of Turkish troops on the island), attention is primarily focused on the unbearable weight of their deteriorating economy. On the other hand, the Greek-Cypriots, while prospering in the economic domain to the point where economic survival is not at all an issue in daily life, are preoccupied with the pain and the injustice regarding their occupied lands.

Through all these contradictions and ambiguities which reign in the perceptions, priorities and needs of the two communities, there appears yet another dimension of the alienation incubated in the history of protracted conflict. It concerns the selective reference and interpretation of history on the part of each side. This tendency, while germinating within and by the psychology of conflict, is embraced, completed, culturally patterned and intensified by a nationalist mentality (Gelner 1983, pp. 48-49; Hobsbawm 1990, pp. 76-77; Anderson 1991, pp. 202-206). Each side amplifies and projects univocally its own experience of pain and injustice, while diminishing and burying in the depths of the unconscious, its own guilt and its own responsibility for all that has occurred and have been perpetrated in history.

It is thus not at all surprising that the Turkish-Cypriots try to entrench their sense of justice and the corresponding arguments by referring exclusively to the period prior to 1974, while entirely ignoring the awesome consequences resulting from Turkey's military invasion (Denktash 1982). But also conversely, it is not surprising that the Greek Cypriots, while attempting to render a historical interpretation of the Cyprus problem, focus for their own sense of justice on the period of 1974 and thereafter, without any substantial reference to the specific historical events of the 1960s. Here, we encounter two diametrically opposed, historical perspectives and memories, which have created and sustained an insurmountable problem of communication between the two communities, posing thereby a major obstacle to peace (Papadakis 1994, pp. 401-409).

### **The Dialectic of Non-communication**

Consequently, yet another outcome of the relationship of protracted conflict which has been inherited is the alienation which results from the inability of the two communities to communicate within a framework of common points of reference. The interactions between the two sides, through a history of antagonism and incidents of violence, have differentiated into exactly opposite patterns the

experiences, the perceptions and the existential structure of meaning from which each side interprets the various events and behaviours, be they their own or the other side's. This dynamic leads with almost mathematical precision to an essential form of alienation which institutionalises psychologically, intellectually and culturally a dialectic of non-communication between the two communities. This form of alienation derives from the fact that the meanings which each side attributes to the various events are diametrically opposite to those attributed by the other. This condition is pervasive, permeating everything, whether they be events, or institutions, or speeches, or political decisions, news reports, or historical analyses, etc.

For example, when the Greek-Cypriots claim the right of the refugees to return to their homes, (which surely constitutes a human right), the Turkish-Cypriots interpret it as an attempt by the Greek-Cypriots to take everything for themselves and throw them to the streets, helpless and without shelter. Their fear of such a prospect is such that it overshadows their ability to acknowledge that the Greek-Cypriots claim does in fact concern human rights. On the other hand, when the Turkish-Cypriots demand recognition of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", the Greek-Cypriots attribute it exclusively to an arrogant imposition of the *status quo* through the might of arms, to a flagrant violation of justice. Without however the Greek-Cypriots reflecting on the fact that behind the Turkish-Cypriots claim for state recognition, which in and of itself is illegitimate, lies a past traumatic experience of existential fear which triggers a deep need for security and collective identity. It is precisely this feeling that has been usurped for years by Turkish nationalism and Turkey, which in turn feeds and sustains Greek nationalism by provoking the latter to countervailing reactions.

The dialectic of non-communication also holds true in the flying of the Turkish and Greek flags by the Turkish-Cypriot and Greek-Cypriot communities respectively. Whereas from an objective historical vantage point, the two flags have undermined and continue to undermine the state sovereignty of the Cyprus Republic, subjectively for each community, the symbolism of the flags summarises and represents meanings and experiences directly opposite to those attributed to them by the other side. For the Greek-Cypriots, and especially for extreme nationalists the Greek flag constitutes a symbol of ethnic pride, glory, grandeur, collective identity, etc. The equivalent national symbol of the Turkish-Cypriots, that is the Turkish flag, is viewed by the Greek-Cypriots as a symbol of shame, barbarism and darkness. Since 1974 in particular, the Turkish flag contains for the Greek-Cypriots the meanings of invasion and occupation, of missing persons, of illegality, of injustice, of violence, of partition and of part of Cyprus.

For the Turkish-Cypriots however, the Turkish flag embodies a symbol of collective protection, of salvation and support from the motherland. It refers to the guarantee of their physical security by the all-powerful Turkish state and is a reminder of the condition which entrenches the collective identity of the Turkish-

Cypriots. In the eye of the Turkish-Cypriots, the Greek flag, on the other hand, is a symbol of domination, degradation, oppression, siege and violence. It represents for them their negative experiences of the 1960s, the backwardness, the perpetual enslavement, the uncertainty, the missing persons, the union of Cyprus with Greece. All these meaning patterns of the two sides, which come into conflict around the national symbols, derive from a series of diachronic associations of subjective historical memories on the one hand and of nationalist stereotypes on the other.

The fact that the national flag of each community is the flag of another country, distinct from Cyprus, complicates the meanings even further. For each side, its national flag turns out to be a symbol of unacceptable claims over the island by another state which simultaneously supports the unacceptable positions of the corresponding Cypriot community. Ever since the rise of nationalism on the island, even after independence and more so in 1974 and thereafter, the Greek-Cypriots viewed the flying of the flag of Turkey by the Turkish-Cypriots as an abominable symbol of foreign intervention. And this is exactly how the Turkish-Cypriots viewed the flying of the flag of Greece by the Greek-Cypriots community, as an extension of the sovereignty of Greece over the island of Cyprus. These interpretations are held tacitly but intensely by the Greek-Cypriot and the Turkish-Cypriot communities, revealing thereby the impasse in communication which results from the national symbols.

At a deeper level this dialectic of non-communication betrays a form of hypocrisy which is normally born within the schismatic psychological make-up of nationalism and the personality which expresses it. Namely, while the flag of "my own" ethnic group constitutes a necessary, rightful and inalienable symbol of national pride and justification, the flag of the "other" ethnic group is seen as an unacceptable phenomenon, a symbol of abomination and high-handedness.

Each community sees its own national flag within an absolutely positive perspective of idealised meanings. For the other community, this same flag functions as a symbol of conflict, injustice, violence and evil. However, the crucial point is that the relationship between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, in their communication through the national symbols, is not determined by the meanings that each side attributes to its own flag, but to the meanings which each side attributes to the flag of the other side. Through the national symbols, we thereby encounter a type of communicative interaction where each community receives from the other meanings and messages that each perceives and understands conditions for genuine communication. When we grasp the national symbols, not in isolation and in the abstract, but in the context of the relationship of the two communities, we see the national flags functioning as symbols of conflict, threat and militarism. This concrete reality, which supersedes any abstractly attributed meanings, was once revealed in an innocent observation of a six year old, who upon seeing his national flag in a military parade, turned to his father and said,

"look, the flag of war!"

Here, the dialectic of non-communication between the two communities, through a metastasis, is transformed into communication of animosity. This condition which is created by the interactive psychodynamics of meaning around the national symbols is reinforced by the fact that consensual symbols of common experiences, of a shared history and of peaceful coexistence between Greek-Cypriots with Turkish-Cypriots are essentially non-existent. Even the flag of the Cyprus Republic, as a symbol of bicomunal symbiosis and partnership, remains without substance in the nationalist historical experience and culture of the two communities, precisely because in the last analysis it was never supported by a genuine predisposition for peace and common visions. On the other hand, after 1983, the flag of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" has even less reality and substance than the flag of the Cyprus Republic, not to mention the further complication that it carries non international recognition.

Moreover, the propaganda which is assembled and disseminated by the means of mass communication transforms the above mentioned experiences, perceptions and interpretations from suggestive tendencies and implicit references to crystallised stereotypes and explicit meanings which integrate and condition public culture (Ellul 1965, pp. 34-38). Needless to say, this is the general dynamic of the specific content (McLuhan 1964, pp. 24, 32; Meyrowitz 1985). Under these conditions, the old stereotypes of nationalism, which are yet again in fury, are revived partly because in the up-to-date systems of mass communication they find a perfect alibi by which they become entrenched and proliferate. Apparently, nationalism finds its own stereotypical and impersonal structure of thought congruous with the modus operandi of the mass means of communication.

The fact that the two communities no longer have direct contact, through interpersonal relationships, restricts the entire spectrum of communication to the abstract level of the mass media. The end result being, that communication occurs solely in the form of an impersonal exchange of stereotypes, through what by now have become standardised, mutual accusations, characterisations, victimisation and a rhetoric based on exaggerated, and often unfounded nationalist assumptions. And all this takes place outside of any framework of authentic dialogue, the kind that is mainly attained through direct interpersonal communication. It is a fact that in mass communication people are exposed to a plethora of information, mass communication of itself is devoid of the capacity to build personalities transcending the culture of stereotypes and to foster essential attitudinal changes in the direction of peace.

The specific language which is standardised in and through the means of mass communication, especially with the re-emergence of nationalism, is the one which conditions the content of public culture. Consequently, the way of thinking which is interwoven with this kind of language binds, and often muzzles, anyone who enters the public realm. In the Greek-Cypriot community this condition occurs mostly

spontaneously, and at times with a more or less subtle form of state intervention, or even without intervention, depending on who is in government. More so than not censorship in the Greek-Cypriot community direct supervision and intervention by the administrative authorities is more intense and reinforcing. Hence, while in the case of the Turkish-Cypriots, nationalism in the media culture is a direct extension of centralised statism, in the case of the Greek-Cypriots, nationalism in the media occurs as a "free" enterprising mass culture, which in turn reflects, as well as conditions, political life. It is in this framework that the dynamics of conflict prompt the Turkish-Cypriots to feel that their authoritarian style of administration in the Turkish statist tradition is justified as a means of collective survival and protection from the overwhelming effects of the nationalist, hellenic culture of the Greek majority. While the Greek-Cypriots, in the very same framework of conflictual interaction argue that the Turkish regime of the north undermines democracy which, in their view, is the prerogative of their government as the sole legitimate administration of the island.

Free, private broadcasting is not a reality in the Turkish-Cypriot community. But the rising number of private radio and television stations in the 1990s in the Greek-Cypriot community did not necessarily generate greater diversity and pluralism in public opinion, regarding perceptions and perspectives on the Cyprus question. On the contrary, the overall effect was an intensification of nationalistic messages, stereotypes and programmes. Along with the more explicit techno-professional and commercial criteria governing the mode of functioning of the mass media, nationalism as an implicit criterion on the level of content, begun to operate as the lowest common denominator in terms of which the broadcasting agencies conduct their free-enterprising market competition. This is particularly evident when considering the fact that many political journalists, a lot of whom combine amateurism with excessive zeal, go about their work thinking that offering competitive service in the interest of their country amounts to covering events in the most "patriotic" of spirits.

This dynamic interplay between competing mass media triggers cycles of interactions, which tend to generate amplifications of nationalist images and a drive towards a crystallising consolidation of nationalist stereotypes. Nationalism, in effect, colours to a lighter or heavier degree, explicitly or implicitly, from the most extreme church-owned media to the milder semi-public agencies. In this regard, the critical insight that the "freedom" of the mass media need not necessarily lead to a democratisation of public opinion is particularly confirmed when open competition among the media is undertaken in terms of a general nationalism, which more than any other image typifies public culture (Ellul 1965, pp. 232-235).

In any case, the standardisation of communication between the two communities through the mass media and the nationalist stereotypes leads also to a unique form of alienation in self-communication. It concerns the fact that the Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots have each created for the most part two languages. One

is a nationalistically predetermined public language, and the other is a personal, private language. This is a condition which normally appears in social groups which live and communicate in and through systems of mass propaganda (Ellul 1965, p. 207).

However, concerning the matter of peace, the essential in this dualism is that while in the public language and culture are projected the expected nationalist, monolithic stereotypes, in the private word and thought there often exists genuine soul-seeking, agony, self-reflection, acknowledgements of faults and a longing for peace. But the messages of private thinking, which are far more sensitive and consenting compared to those of the public word, never reach the other community, precisely because they are eclipsed and annihilated by the public word. What is interesting, but also tragic for the issue of peace, is that whatever positive experiences of symbiosis and peaceful co-existence between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots may have been inherited, they are restricted to people's private and personal memory. While, due to the impact of nationalism, these personal memories are essentially absent from the public and formal collective memory which is reflected in Cypriot general culture. For true to the esoteric logic of nationalism, the part of public culture which refers to the relationship between Greeks and Turks is constituted abstractly, utilising solely the negative "material" of history. This holds true for the public culture of both ethnic communities in Cyprus. The difference lies in the fact that in the Greek-Cypriot community censorship occurs as private thought is processed more indirectly through the power of public, nationalist thought, whereas in the Turkish-Cypriot community it is imposed in a more direct and authoritarian way by the nationalist regime of the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish administration.

An imminent danger which is already in sight, derives from the fact that with the proliferation of electronic means, the messages and images of the mass media are beginning to saturate society. As the abstract culture of mass communication surpasses the stage of mere information and becomes established as a comprehensive and all-inclusive mental environment, the dynamic of this resultant public culture will have the tendency to swallow and eradicate private and personal opinion, thought and inner independence (Ellul 1965, pp. 165, 169-171; Meyrowitz 1985, p. 16). And if the public culture of mass communication becomes identified, among other things, with the reign of nationalist stereotypes, then the possibilities for communication, and consequently for mutual understanding, between the two communities will radically disappear. And along with this, peace will appear as an untenable reality, as an illusory goal.

This issue of mass culture is particularly crucial for the post-1974 generation of Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots, as it involves youths who stand historically suspended between two realities. On the one hand, while they have no personal experience of the violence of the past, they also had no positive experience of symbiosis with their counterpart in the other community. But on the other hand,

they stand open, exposed and susceptible to a nationalist oriented mass culture, not to mention mass education, in relation to which the new generation has no way of conducting its personal reality-test.

All the above indicates that reinforced and direct interpersonal contact between the two communities constitutes one of the most essential elements and catalysts for improving the conditions and possibilities for communication. This however has never been pursued publicly, formally and systematically. With the exception of some marginal political groups, its task has been left for the most part to the private initiative of citizens. To those who are always left exposed to the reactionary criticisms of nationalists from whom the leadership of the two communities never managed to become decisively disengaged. All those who fiercely object to interpersonal contact, either indirectly through a portion of Greek-Cypriot public opinion, or more directly through intervention from the Turkish-Cypriot administration, understand, perhaps, the positive power of interpersonal contact. For certainly, the enhancement and entrenchment of positive contacts would leave the most nationalistically inclined person in each community exposed to their own insufficiency through their enslavement to permanent animosity.

### **The Preservation of the Conflictual Relationship**

Yet another factor of alienation lies in the fact that the conflictual relationship between the two communities has become institutionalised and is maintained both as an experience and as a value in the prevailing establishment of Cypriot society. The Greek-Cypriots and the Turkish-Cypriots continuously, and in a variety of ways, invest materially and psychologically in sustaining the conflict. Already, since decades ago, they have invested human lives and blood. Today they continue to invest millions in armaments. Moreover, they invest knowledge, energy, time and the most formative years of all their youths, who are obliged to do compulsory military service. Education, the means of mass communication, most political speeches, even cultural expressions, all these, are oriented to the pain and the injustice, but also to the consolidation and the reproduction of the conflictual relationship between the two communities, and beyond, between the two respective nations. The pain and grief of the past, while certainly touching the human dimension of the problem, are assimilated and transformed by nationalism into a justification for prolonging and intensifying animosity and the authoritarian type of attitude, especially in the collective mentality of the younger generations. Increasingly, the manner in which the mass media process and project the Cyprus problem, tends to convert the search for justice into a catalyst for enhancing an aggressive, violent and militarist spirit. This reinforces not so much the physical, but the invisible psychological wall which divides the two communities.

Especially with the re-emergence of nationalism in the 1990s, one observes that conflictual prototypes, extreme warlike speeches, and perceptions begin to permeate Cypriot culture, distancing yet further the worlds of the two communities.

This is particularly evident in the repeated paralysis, and often absolute impasse, experiences on the formal political plane, which is not solely due to factors within the diplomatic sphere. All along, the orientation of society as a whole tended towards conflict while awaiting for a handful of politicians to find a solution. Ironically, the current relapse of explicit nationalism is occurring at a time which the confluence of certain international events, particularly vis-a-vis the European Union, seem to favour the reaching of a political settlement.

, The spirit of nationalism presents, possibly, the most comprehensive and complete perspective of the adversarial mentality. For in the absence of restraining exogenous factors, it naturally leads to absolute confrontation between the two communities, as it intensifies suspicion and anger through its inherent irrationalities. Due to its narcissistic and utopian nature, nationalism creates an insurmountable contradiction between the public culture it influences on the one hand, and the diplomatic effort on the other. In essence, it concerns the radical discrepancy between ideology, or better, myth and reality.

For example, while in formal politics the Greek-Cypriots espouse a bizonal, bi-communal federation, extreme nationalism declares that all of Cyprus is Greek. In politics the Greek-Cypriots claim that they desire the restoration of the Cyprus Republic, but nationalism exhibits symbols and slogans which undermine and nullify the independent state status of Cyprus. While in diplomacy it is asserted that the sole objective is the settlement of the problem through negotiations, nationalism and the culture it represents utters triumphant words in warmongering speeches and in documentaries on ethnic "epics" depicting idealised military virtues, even with the sanction of the Orthodox Church. There is a determined pursuit of gaining entry into the European Union, but nationalism is preconditioned by visions of a monoethnic state. The term "union" and related words, have since 1974 been dropped from the formal political vocabulary of the Greek-Cypriots. Nationalism between, shapes and conditions behaviour in such a way as to give the impression that Cyprus is but a province of Greece. In formal politics there is an appeal to "human rights" for each and every citizen, but in the nationalist mentality pervades a chauvinistic and xenophobic tendency which rejects, in advance, the "other", which happens to be culturally different. There is a conscious pursuit of aligning social institutions to the European model, while nationalism enhances ethnocentric and monoethnic public education.

### **The Comprehensiveness and Transcendence of the Spirit of Peace**

In contrast to the collective narcissism and absolute egocentrism of the nationalist mentality, the spirit of peace follows the comprehensive approach to the phenomenon of human conflict, in a manner that embraces impartially all the antitheses and ambiguities of the problem. The spirit of peace transposes the historical events into a new perspective, with the courage to reorder and redefine the injustices and the violence, whatever their origin, while simultaneously



acknowledging the need for justice for any and all concerned. This transposition presupposes a transcendent stance, within a hard, and certainly painful realism, simultaneously intertwined with an all-embracing compassion founded on inner spiritual strength (King 1982, pp. 9, 15-16). Moreover, it also entails a coming to consciousness of the fact that protracted animosity and conflict with "the other" is directly linked to inner tensions and conflicts within one's very own self (Sandole 1993, p. 16). This understanding outlines a new form of struggle which requires far more existential courage than the type which is propagated by the idealised, militarist prototypes of nationalism. And this is precisely because the struggle in the spirit of peace battles not only one, but two enemies. One is the evil and the injustice that has been induced by the "the other" by the side of the opponent. The other enemy is the evil and the injustice that has been committed by oneself, by one's own group. In the battle for peace therefore, one front is outside and the other front is within oneself, where one has no face to confront one's own hatred, one's own instinct for vengeance, one's own fanaticism, one's own nationalism.

What does this form of struggle for peace mean in practice for Cyprus? If the Greek-Cypriots in the spirit of peace, are to oppose the illegal Turkish-Cypriot state and the regime of occupation in the north, they must at the same time convince all concerned by word, actions, deeds and especially by attitude, that the Turkish-Cypriots are exposed to no physical danger from the Greek-Cypriots. Further, though the Greek-Cypriots may not recognise the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus", they may recognise unreservedly the existence of the Turkish-Cypriot community, with the common but also different cultural elements which characterise it in relation to the Greek-Cypriots. Similarly, if the Greek-Cypriots are concerned to preserve their cultural heritage, (which ought not be confused with the perpetuation of nationalism), they must be simultaneously concerned as a community and especially as civil society, with the conservation of the cultural heritage of all the ethnic groups of Cyprus, including that of the Turkish-Cypriot community. The preservation of cultural heritages cannot in essence be achieved through antagonistic relations, precisely because the conflictual nature of the antagonistic spirit falsifies civilisation. For as it ushers into civilisation primitive drives, aggressive instincts, mass excitations, militarism, chauvinism and the fanatical personality, it proceeds to exalt them, establishing them as socially acceptable virtues. This transformation of destructive primitive urges to accredited popular values has always been a constitutive part of the legacy of every kind of nationalism.

Again, within the meaning of the struggle for peace, if the Greek-Cypriots are to enhance the human rights of their own community at those junctures where they have been undermined, where Greek-Cypriots have been pained and have lamented, they must also support the human rights of the Turkish-Cypriots respectively, precisely at those points where, in their own unique historical experience, they too have been hurt and have lamented, both as individuals and as

a collective. This posture constitutes one of the imperative requirements for any person or movement worthy of struggling for peace if the Greek-Cypriots genuinely aim at the reunification of the island, they ought to strive to reconnect with the Turkish-Cypriot community through a renewed relationship of peace and tolerance. In other words, the peace-maker must cross the "green line" first within himself, if he desires to cross it geographically, let alone if he hopes for its dissolution altogether. Here is precisely where the vanity of nationalism hinges, in that while it demands a political solution, it does not seek peace, and while it feeds hatred, it wants reunification. A position doomed to failure, since it inevitably discloses an indiscriminate and provocative insincerity, the result of which can only be the further reinforcement of tension and conflict. Peace requires a spirit capable of cultivating psycho-human living-space in relation to "the other". It entails a struggle for the capacity to include "the other" as an element in one's own psyche, in one's language, in one's attitude. It requires that one gives the "other" a place in one's existential space and experience, in contrast to the absolutism of nationalism, which, on all levels, excludes and targets "the other" and "the different". Particularly in light of the globalization process of the pending 21st century, this issue is of crucial significance. For under the new conditions which are emerging internationally, the continuity of different societies and cultures, not excluding Greek and Turkish, will increasingly depend, not so much on the capacity for survival from within, but on the potential for symbiosis with the other.

Finally, it is only through the spirit of peace that the Greek-Cypriots may offer the Turkish-Cypriots an authentic way out from their guilt, which unconsciously and often consciously haunts them, as well as from their fears and insecurities, which condition them into their introverted defensiveness. But also on the political plane, it is solely in and through the same mode of peace that the Greek-Cypriots may offer the Turkish-Cypriots, not only formally and diplomatically, but also realistically, the historical possibility of disengaging themselves from their radical dependency on an illegal state and on the military might of Turkey. Beyond this, the development of a public mentality of peace strips naked all those who conceal ulterior motives, and dissolves every pretext which third parties may exploit to the detriment of Cyprus. And the repercussions of this renewing dialectical relationship which emerges from the deliberations of peace, will no doubt be enormous in benefits for the Turkish-Cypriot and the Greek-Cypriot communities alike. This is so, because only in the all-embracing spirit of peace can the adversarial relationships, the authoritarian personality and conflict-habituated culture commence entering the process of essential transformation. We are referring to a process similar to what has begun, but certainly has not been completed, in the Arab-Israeli peace process, and that between blacks and whites in South Africa. Moreover, it is this all-embracing peace mentality which starts bridging the two contradictory perceptions of history and the two subjective experiences of what constitutes justice, which confusingly reign in protracted conflictual relationships. Even more essential, is that in this manner, only the spirit of peace is capable of dissociating the human pain of the past and

legitimate human needs from their exploitation by nationalism with its related extremism and aggressiveness.

A fundamental issue for reflection for all those who are engaged in the struggle to transcend the chasm created by conflict, hatred, violence and suspicion, concerns the link between peace and justice. The most common, that without the realisation of justice there can be no peace. According to this view, the principle condition for achieving peace is the reparation of the evil that has been done, the restoration of the conditions of life as they were. This approach however is always insufficient. In and of itself it never arrives at peace. Outside of the sphere of influence of the will for peace, justice remains at a level of partial and deficient restoration, but at all times stays far from fulfilment as a condition for peace.

Concerning the Cyprus problem, the rendering of justice, even to the greatest possible extent, leaves enormous gaps. For instance, the Cypriot refugee may repossess his home, and the lost properties may be compensated for. But the original way of life, and the dreams associated with it, that have been lost with the passage of time can never be returned, no matter what form of justice is pursued. The fate of many missing persons, from both communities, may be verified, but the numerous innocent people who lost their lives, from both communities, will always remain in the memory of pain. How can one render justice to a family that has lost not only its livelihood, but also its loved ones? Or to a mother who has lost her child, whether Greek-Cypriot or Turkish-Cypriot? How does one offer justice to a woman that lost her husband? With money? With symbols? With marble statues? Nothing in this mutable world can substitute the loss in all these matters. And precisely at this juncture, justice is mute! Here, both as a possibility and as the avenue to peace, justice is always insufficient. Though necessary within the limits of practical capabilities, it is nevertheless always inadequate in arriving at peace by its own intrinsic means. For, following every historical episode of conflict and violence between adversaries, there results a residue of injustice, that justice, in and of itself, can never redeem. It is the wound which leaves its mark, as it were, no matter how well it heals.

One of the key reasons for this insufficiency derives from the fact that protracted conflictual relationships between rival groups, especially as they pass through incidents of violence, polarise and break up justice. They fragment and dislocate it. Violence always creates a mounting accumulation of irreparable injustices, no matter how necessary the use of violence may appear in the light of momentary historical circumstances. And herein lies the illusion of war as an option.

In protracted conflict with episodes of violence, justice is never entirely with one or the other side. What normally occurs is that in its meaning, justice is interpreted from within the uniqueness of the pain of each side. In Cyprus too, the sense of justice for each community is directly intertwined with, and thus exclusively defined by each one's own traumatic experiences. And it is precisely due to this reason that in any relationship of hostility and conflict justice becomes thoroughly subjectivized.

In other words, the pain and anguish which results from the conflict leads each person and each side to a monopolistic perception of justice, by claiming justice solely in reference to their own experience of loss and suffering. And the greater the suffering the greater the subjectivization of justice, which inevitably results in diametrically opposed positions on what is fair and acceptable. Put simply, the logic of this dynamic functions as follows: "I am hurting and I am suffering. Since I am hurting and suffering, it means that I have been treated wrongly. And since I have been treated wrongly, justice is on my side. And since justice is on my side, then wrongdoing and therefore injustice lies with "the other", with the side of the enemy!" It is in this manner that any history of hateful rivalry between people leads precisely to opposing and contradictory perceptions of justice. Here is revealed yet another aspect of alienation in the relationship of conflict, in that justice assumes an entirely subjective form and meaning. A fact which both enhances and in turn becomes enhanced by non-communication, suspicion and anger, generating frustration.

Most difficult, but also most necessary for peace in Cyprus, is the acknowledgement that in the long history of conflict between the two communities, from the 1950s to 1974 and thereafter, the culprit and the victim alternate, both in the overall pattern of events emerging from the different historical periods, and in the very cycles of the events themselves within each historical period. The tapestry of the history of violence and of ritualised vengeance, on not only the guilty but also on the innocent, is woven in turn and simultaneously by each of the communities and their respective "motherlands". Thus understood, the quest for justice cannot be pursued as a one-sided affair, nor can justice of itself rectify the evils committed.

The suggestion thereby is that peace, as mentality and as will, leads and transcends justice, while it simultaneously grounds it and completes it. The key to the matter lies in the profound fact that peace opens up the possibilities of life, vitality and creativity far beyond the benefits of retribution or of the defeat of the "enemy". This priority of peace is imperative because only in the spirit of peace, as a way of life and as an invaluable principle of life-optimisation can Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots alike generate the inner strength and rationale to shoulder the residue of the pain and the anguish of the past, which justice alone is incapable of rectifying. But even the restoration of any justice that is objectively possible and viable, such as the justice that is normally sought by formal political diplomacy, even this justice, can attain realisation solely in the spirit and process of peace and reconciliation. In fact it is often the absence of even schemes of fair solutions that appear from a rational point of view as most viable and practical. Conversely, it is the spirit and will for peace that prevents the implementation point of view as most viable and practical. Conversely, in the spirit and perspective of peace, even the most difficult and delicate of resolution schemes may attain implementation and be sustained to fruition.

All of the above hold true precisely because the mentality of and for peace brings the two interpretations of history and the two perceptions of justice within a

single, unified field of thought, in a manner which commences the bridging process. Once this process sets in, the persuasive will for peace, manifested simultaneously through individual and collective means of expression, could substantially contribute in reducing suspicion and building confidence and trust. Be it initiated by political decision, and a subsequent institutionalisation of the process, or by a general socio-cultural momentum for change, it is only in and through this peace-generating process, that Cypriot Greeks and Turks may become liberated from their fear of each other. And it is only then that they may be rendered free from the anxiety and nervousness by which each side holds stubbornly and desperately onto its own weapons, be they military, legal, economic or ideological and psychological as in nationalistic militarism.

In the last analysis, when all the arguments have been given, when all the pressures have been applied, when all the political schemes have been suggested, when all is said and done, it all comes down to a fundamental inner decision, a decision more of the heart than of the mind, where in the end one stakes everything on either choosing the road of conflict or on choosing the road of peace. Though rarely addressed explicitly, this kind of decision is of utmost gravity in both a deeply personal and a general collective way, as it constitutes one of the central conditions determining whether the future will be closing down in further animosity or opening up in revitalising hope.

### **The Price for Peace**

The nationalist mind always incites us to take risks of extreme measure, of giving everything in the engaging conflict with "the enemy"; our energy, our wealth, our thoughts, our stamina, our will. And in times of violence or war, it invokes us to offer, as a matter of sacred duty, our very lives, and even more so, the lives of our children. But we ought to ask ourselves: If for rivalry and for war, with all their ambiguous results and tragic side effects, we are to be ready, according to nationalism, to give everything, for peace, what are we ready to offer? What price, what boldness, what courage, what sacrifice is peace worth? It is said that in wars, the Greeks have created epics. For peace is it capable to create epic history? Heroes of war we have in great abundance. but are we capable of nurturing and giving rise to heroes of peace? For the likely event of war we see numerous preparations, investments, scenarios and exercises. For peace, what pre-education do we have, what investments, what preparation, what knowledge? The suffering and anguish of war we generally seem to accept. But can we shoulder the pain for peace? As peace also has its price and its sacrifices. The difference lies in that while the pain of war is a pain of despair and of inner void, the pain for peace is one of profound existential meaning, it is a pain of rebirth, life-giving, akin to that of a woman in labour. All these issues raise fundamental questions as to who we are and what we have become as human beings through our socialisation into the adversarial mentality of a conflict-habituated culture. They raise questions as to

what we have become, not in our stated priorities, but our lived priorities and values.

In the la t analysis, irrespective of the particular form the political solution will take to be mutually acceptable and genuinely viable, the reunification of Cyprus, in effect, passes through peace-making and peace-building between the two communities. One of the chief irrationalities of nationalism, which repeatedly drives history to a *cul-de-sac*, is that it always tends to seek political solution to the conflict without seeking peace and reconciliation. The politics of diplomacy for solving the problem is validated and rendered credible only when it is framed by a spirit of peace, expressed in word, in deed, in social life, in disposition, in culture. A political solution cannot be elaborated exclusively through diplomatic cleverness, nor through fiery nationalist speeches, nor through exhibitions and parades of "victorious" armies. Any genuine solution that would coincide with peace has to be processed through the means and the mind of peace.

The struggle for peace is one of striving for in-depth mutual understanding, beyond and beneath the surface of sated political positions. It is a straining, embracing effort to reconnect with one another through the mode of "relational empathy" (Broome 1993, p. 103). It is a striving for mutual repentance and forgiveness, as the sole means of effectively healing the wounds of the past, of transcending those primitive instincts of reactionary militarism and vengefulness which always lead to new tragedies. It concerns the necessity for inner catharsis form the historical accumulation of numerous evils and sufferings (Fitzgibbons 1986, pp. 629-633; Montville 1993, pp. 117-121). It concerns the cultivation of a peace-loving personality and of a peace-oriented culture, as both a precondition and a finality, for the transformation of society from an order of conflict to an order of peace.

There is much which separates Greek-Cypriots from Turkish-Cypriots. But what we have in common is our tragedy, mutual pain, existential agony and the perpetuating historical dead end. And here is also the starting point from which we ought to initiate the struggle for peace, the humanisation of our relationship, in that we are partners, bound together to a common history of pain and suffering. We must therefore, orient this inevitable partnership to a new realm, that of peace, which is the only one that leads to genuine justification, to existential emancipation and the edification of authentic freedom.

Concluding, it ought to be noted that the restoration of peace simultaneously entails, also, the restoration of the individual, or better of the concrete person, of our very self. For the man who lives in animosity and hatred through a conflictual relationship is also the man who lives a schism within his own soul. He lives a dichotomous life, divided between that part of his self which is human, which pains, which desires, which longs for fulfilment, and that part of his self which feeds on vengeance, fanaticism and aggression. In this perspective, the man who wages war against the enemy, is also waging war against his very self! Thereby, peace

and restoration in our relationship with "the enemy", simultaneously means peace and restoration with and within our own self. It means freedom from the cancerous growths of antagonism, conflict, violence and animosity.

There exists an ancient saying which gives a vivid rendition of the human condition in which evil ways and the predisposition for animosity is perpetuated from generation to generation. It states: "The fathers have eaten sour grapes, and the children's teeth are set on edge"! The antidote to this existential impasse is the spiritual and cultural turn towards peace, as the authentic precondition of freedom.

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CONFLICT, ALIENATION AND THE HOPE OF PEACE: THE STRUGGLE FOR PEACE IN MILITARISED CYPRUS

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
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# NEGOTIATING OUT OF FEAR AND FEARING TO NEGOTIATE: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE ENDING OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

Oliver Richmond

This commentary sets out to explain the problematic nature of the main approach relating to mediation and negotiation in light of efforts aimed at conflict settlement in the Cyprus dispute, since the inception of the United Nations mission in Cyprus in 1964. It maintains that the main approach to the ending of the dispute in Cyprus, that of mediation and negotiation, which is located in the realm of high politics, has itself been drawn into the issues of the dispute as a result of some of the actions and policies of the disputants and their sponsors. I conclude, to a certain extent, that neither side in the dispute should lay blame for the failure of the United Nations to bring about a solution, without first reassessing its own approach to the peacemaking operation and asking if it has been committed to a compromise, or whether they have viewed the United Nations peacemaking as a way of minimising compromise and avoiding making the costly concessions a solution would entail.

United Nations' peacemaking in Cyprus has fallen victim to a typically Realist vision of the process in which settlements are based on coercion, or at the very least, hard bargaining, and are prone to short-termism.<sup>1</sup> While it is commonly argued that the intention underlying the international communities' approach to United Nations' efforts in Cyprus has merely been an expression of great power interests in the region (and therefore the United Nations operation should be reassessed in terms of its coercive potential), it also appears that there are dynamics within the conflict situation which have promoted the same conflictual vision within the relationship between the two Cypriot parties, even at the negotiation table. This anomaly has also been observed in other conflict situations in which mediation has played a role, such as between Israel and Egypt or the Palestinians, or in ex-Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> The essence of this dynamic is that regardless of the international communities' perception of the objectives of a mediation effort, what is as significant is the perceptions of the two parties of what they desire from such a process. From this arises the proposition that mediation is as much dependent on the views of the parties which are in conflict, as on the skill of the third party in opening up channels of communication, re-allocating the resources of the two sides for a settlement, or merely enforcing its own vision of a solution or that of its sponsors. From this standpoint, and

after thirty-two years of United Nations' mediation, good offices, and negotiation, it must be asked what has motivated the two sides to negotiate in the forum of the United Nations and if this motivation has necessarily been directed at the search for a compromise. If not, this would explain why after three decades, the potential for conflict in Cyprus to spark a wider conflict still exists, as the events of 1996/97 have shown.

The standard perspective from the point of view of mediation theory is that the two sides take part in negotiations as they desire a settlement (rather than a resolution) to the conflict. Moreover they have accepted that they cannot 'win' in open conflict, and are not able to negotiate without the assistance of a third party. From this point of view, the mediator need only find the formula for third party activity most suited to the conflict environment in order to enable the two sides to decide on a mutually acceptable exchange of concessions, in return for a solution which would bring stability and security.<sup>3</sup> Of course this is a substantial task, and in practice and in terms of theoretical approaches there are weaknesses and difficulties in implementation. Particularly in a case such as Cyprus, it is difficult to argue that both sides were actually in a position to identify a need for mediation when conflict broke out 1964. If the two sides are required to have accepted that a hurting stalemate existed from which a mediated settlement could extract them, then clearly this was not the case. At the local level, the Greek-Cypriot side was dominant, until the arrival of UNFICYP in 1964. In 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot side was dominant, with the aid of Turkey, (and were it not for the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary General), would have clearly 'won' the conflict. With respect to this point, it becomes clear that the United Nations could also be viewed by the two sides, not just as being an aid to a settlement of the problem, but also as an obstacle, at different points in time to either sides' main objectives. Without a position of hurting stalemate, it is difficult to accept the argument that both sides wanted a settlement:<sup>4</sup> it is more likely in this case, that they viewed third party intervention as something to be moulded for the furtherance of their quest of their initial objectives. It is a problematic proposition that both sides automatically altered their initial objectives as a consequence of United Nations' involvement in the problem.

A growing body of literature on mediation has talked of the tendency of the disputants to be highly critical of the mediator and the process, and of the turn towards what has been described as 'directive mediation', in order to force the disputants to make difficult concessions required to reintroduce a co-operative *status quo*.<sup>5</sup> This seems to be symptomatic, not of the failure of the traditional concept of the neutral mediator who was able to educate, open channels of communication or to use his own resources to encourage settlement, but to be symptomatic of the tendency of the disputants to view the objectives of the mediation process very differently to those of the mediator or his sponsors. What is being suggested here is that the assessment of traditional peacemaking was flawed in so much as the tendency of mediation to fail in situations such as Cyprus led to the point of view that traditional

peacemaking could only be effective if it harnessed a substantial reward for the two sides or if it beat them into submission. The irony of this approach was clear to those academics who had set out to fundamentally challenge the Realist perception of the world.

To argue that traditional mediation has failed because it only produces settlements imposed from the outside, (thus negating the mediator's traditional role) tends to ignore the reason why settlements needed to be imposed from the outside. But if we reject the '*outside-in*' view of international mediation (which concentrates on the role of the mediator and the various techniques he uses), and view the environment in which mediation takes place from the '*inside-out*', (from the point of view of the disputants and their sponsors), we may have a clearer understanding of why mediation has failed in Cyprus.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Disputants' View of Peacemaking: Facing the Demon**

From an 'outside-in' point of view, we tend to assume that the objective of mediation is to find a compromise settlement. This assumption is based on the fact that a more harmonious situation cannot exist in the *Realpolitik* vision of the world. If we reverse the perspective, however, and look from the inside-out, the picture is very different. In a situation such as Cyprus where the relative positions of the two sides do not reflect their relative power, but reflects the intervention of the international community in the form of the United Nations in 1964 and 1974, can we assume that both sides aim at a compromise solution through the good offices of the Secretary General?<sup>7</sup> Or were the disputants motivated to accept a peacemaking mission because it was viewed as a device through which time could be gained for reorganisation? Was mediation viewed by the disputants as being potentially coercive and in support of one side or other, or as a face saving device. Was mediation viewed as an agent of legitimisation or empowerment?<sup>8</sup> Or finally, was mediation merely viewed as a relatively cost free method of continuing the dispute and avoiding or delaying the costly concessions entailed in a possible compromise solution?<sup>9</sup>

That the United Nations' operation was accepted by the parties in order to aid them in the search for a compromise solution is in itself a difficult assumption. When UNFICYP was introduced to Cyprus and when the peacemaking operation was established concurrently in 1964 by Security Council resolution 186, there was an observable interplay of interests in the Security Council at that time which disrupted the process of establishing a United Nations force and set up a series of dynamics which was to result in the hindrance of the peacemaking operation. The complex process of negotiation which occurred behind the scenes in the Security Council between the United Kingdom, the United States, the USSR, Greece, Turkey and to some extent, Makarios' government at the time, was indicative of the conflictual nature of the relationship between the two Cypriot parties and their motherland sponsors.<sup>10</sup> Yet I would suggest that the prime motivation for the establishment of the United Nations' operation in Cyprus in 1964 stemmed from the inter-

ests of the Western Alliance in preventing a damaging Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, rather than dealing with the difficulties of the two Cypriot sides. According to this logic, all that was therefore needed in Cyprus was an effective peacekeeping operation which would dampen the conflict. The establishment of a peacemaking operation was very much peripheral and as a result, little attention was paid to the necessities of successful mediation between two sides of an intra-state conflict, or to the international level of the conflict with respect to Turkey's objectives.

Both sides viewed the establishment of both a peacekeeping and a peacemaking operation through a conflictual lens. For the Greek-Cypriot side, it was hoped that UNFICYP would help them re-establish order at their direction. For the Turkish-Cypriot side, they believed that UNFICYP's role was to help them effect a return to the conditions of the 1960 Treaties, and to protect them against the attentions of Greek-Cypriot extremists. It soon became clear that the peacekeeping force was under the control of the Secretary General and would not become an arm of one side or the other.<sup>11</sup> While it was comparatively easy to prevent the peacekeeping force from becoming politicised, the same was not true of the peacemaking operation. However, the acceptance of the peacemaking operation revealed some significant insights into the positions of both sides. For the Greek-Cypriot side, with control of the government and the institutions of state, the presence of a peacemaking operation gave credence to the position of the Turkish-Cypriot side, whom they in contrast viewed as 'rebels.' For the Turkish-Cypriot side, the fact that a peacemaking operation had been established by the Secretary General meant that their position as a party to a conflict had been recognised internationally. This was of great importance to a party which was essentially involved in a 'recognition game'<sup>12</sup> which had begun with Denktash's protestations over the Security Council's recognition of Makarios' Government as representative of the Republic of Cyprus in March, 1964.

A further dynamic which was influential in the early days of mediation in Cyprus was related to the balance of force between the two sides. For the Greek-Cypriot side, (as long as Turkey was kept out of the equation), they were in a position to 'win' the conflict. Much of Makarios' motive for accepting a peacekeeping force from the United Nations, rather than a force gathered from NATO countries, was his belief that the presence of the United Nations would prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus. However, when UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus, and it became clear that it would not simply enable Makarios' Government to prevent the Turkish-Cypriot side from rebelling, the dynamics of the situation became subtly different: UNFICYP may have become viewed at a certain level of preventing elements of the Greek-Cypriot side from attaining their objectives. In a sense the conflict was frozen on the ground, at a position where the Greek-Cypriot side were dominant. Yet freezing the conflict in this way would have been viewed as benefiting the Turkish-Cypriot side.

Because of these dynamics, the conflict moved to the level of mediation and ne-

gotiation, setting a precedent that has been followed ever since. In its primary form, the two sides were in dispute over the objectives of the mediator, and the tools that he had at his disposal. For example, was Tuomioja, the first mediator to which the two sides agreed, to create a new solution, which would support Makarios' desire to abrogate the Treaties? Or would he base a solution on the 1960 Treaties, which would be in line with the Turkish-Cypriot position? Was he allowed to make suggestions, or merely to help at a procedural level? The Greek-Cypriot side saw the former as favouring its position, as the mediator's responses would be conditioned by Security Council resolutions and the United Nations' Charter. The Turkish-Cypriot side were determined, with the help of Turkey, to prevent the mediator from making suggestions as it clearly felt that this would be detrimental to its position. The Turkish-Cypriot side wanted the mediator to operate at the procedural level, and were able to force this to happen by rejecting the report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza in 1965, and objecting to the fact that he had made suggestions for the settlement of the problem which may have favoured the Greek-Cypriot side. Of course, his suggestions were based on the afore-mentioned Security Council resolutions and the United Nations' Charter. However, the Turkish-Cypriot side was then able to reject the United Nations' mediator and as a result mediation moved to the less direct level of the good offices of the United Nations' Secretary General and his representatives. This development has been symptomatic of the tendency of the two sides in the dispute to feel that the United Nations' Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary General should support its positions, or alternatively were biased against them. A pattern of conflict seemingly emerges, therefore, from the process of peacemaking in that its many aspects, procedural or otherwise, became politicised and came to be viewed by the two sides as tools for point-scoring over the opponent.

While the Turkish-Cypriot side were initially successful in limiting the direct involvement of the United Nations' mediator, and ultimately in ending this role, they have not been successful in constraining the lesser forms of the peacemaking operation. However, the success they had in ending mediation has enabled them to have more control over the process of peacemaking and therefore its outcomes: this is where the significance of the politicisation of peacemaking lies. If one of the parties gains a level of legitimisation for their position, or a level of control over the process, then this strengthens their position *vis-a-vis* the third party and their opponent.

For the Turkish-Cypriot side, though, the fact that United Nations' Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have constantly supported the Greek-Cypriot side has been a difficult obstacle, which they have failed to overcome. This serves to illustrate the inevitable connection between such resolutions and the two sides' views of the United Nations' peacemaking operation. Far from viewing it as neutral, both sides have been aware that the Greek Cypriot side has far more support than the Turkish-Cypriot side. Greek-Cypriot negotiating positions have generally been

vindicated by the General Assembly and the Security Council, whereas the Turkish-Cypriot positions have rarely been vindicated; but the fact that they are recognised as a disputant in the conflict has been of significant benefit to the Turkish-Cypriot community with respect to the entity it has tried to establish, and to the formulation of its objectives. Yet this also has had certain negative consequences, in that it has led to a perception of bias amongst the Turkish-Cypriot side as to the intentions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary General and his representatives. When their positions become untenable in the light of international condemnation through United Nations resolutions, the Turkish-Cypriot side has frequently rejected the United Nations' right to comment on Turkish-Cypriot positions as a whole. For the Greek-Cypriot side, the failure of the Security Council to implement its resolutions has been indicative of the great power interests in the region which have weakened the consensus they have received in the United Nations.

With the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish rejection of the Galo Plaza report it was clear that even in the midst of peacemaking, conflict was endemic. While traditional theoretical approaches to negotiation recognise that both conflict and co-operation must exist for negotiations to succeed, approaches to mediation have tended to view the process as being separate to the conflict under discussion. Yet from the perspective which an examination of the peacemaking efforts in Cyprus provides, it seems that peacemaking itself became a forum for the conflict to continue.

With the start of the intercommunal talks in the late 1960s, similar tendencies can still be traced. Because of the failure of Plaza, the Secretary General was very careful not to become involved in the issues of the dispute, but rather to fulfil his role of good offices merely by helping on procedural matters and with the practicalities of negotiation. The fact that this was the case was viewed as a victory for the Turkish-Cypriot side, as they had managed to keep the involvement of the United Nations, which they viewed as biased against them, to the minimum of good offices. Even so, conflict still arose over procedural and practical matters. When the intercommunal talks began, difficulties arose over the venue for the talks. The Turkish-Cypriot side wanted them to occur in a 'neutral venue' away from the direct attentions of the Secretary General, whereas the Greek-Cypriot side would have been happier had they been 'in the international spotlight.'<sup>13</sup> For the Greek-Cypriot side, particularly Makarios, both defeats were bitter failures because they had viewed the direct intervention of the Secretary General and his representatives, backed by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as a form of leverage which could be used in their favour.

When discussions began in Vienna in 1975 between the two sides, similar dynamics were evident, and have provided a constant thread throughout the protracted negotiations. Procedural issues such as venues, the presentation of proposals and maps by both sides, the nature of the process of discussion and the level of involvement of the Secretary General and his representatives have been constant



sources of competition between the two sides. The impact of United Nations' resolutions became doubly significant after the Turkish invasion of 1974 as the Greek-Cypriot side realised the value of the internationalisation - through the peacemaking process-of the dispute as a means to place the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish side under pressure, first over the issue of the US arms embargo against Turkey in the mid-to-late 1970s, and then over human rights issues and Turkish-Cypriot intransigence at the negotiating table in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish-Cypriot side's response to this was to refuse to negotiate under such pressure in an effort to persuade the Greek-Cypriot side that such a tactic was counter-productive and merely made the Turkish-Cypriot position less flexible. As a consequence, once more, the peacemaking operation became drawn into the issues of the dispute. The Greek-Cypriot side has continued to view their ability to receive support in the General Assembly and Security Council as a means to create pressure for the opposition, but have also increasingly been aware of the abstract nature of such pressure.

From the Vienna talks to the failure of several rounds of talks between Denktash and President Kyprianou in New York in the mid-1980s, the two sides' views of United Nations' peacemaking remained similarly conflictual and the Secretary General and his representatives continued to be forced to tread a very fine line between making a decisive input to the ideas in circulation and merely operating at a procedural level. The general tendency was that the Greek-Cypriot side would endeavour to move the talks deeper into the framework provided by the Secretary General and Security Council resolutions, while at the same time searching for alternative methods for the implementation of such resolutions. The Turkish-Cypriot sides objectives were the reverse: indeed Denktash frequently called for the talks to be moved away from the United Nations peacemaking operational environs to direct talks between the two sides. This was clearly motivated by a perception that this would empower the Turkish-Cypriot side with respect to their positions, once more indicating the tendency to view the United Nations operation as part of the conflict environment.

By the 1990s and the discussions over the confidence building measures, (CBMs) the culmination of the struggle between the two sides over the mode, means, and procedure of United Nations peacemaking was reached when the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, for the first time since Galo Plaza was able to give his own proposals and suggestions in order to move the process forward. While this was probably against the wishes of the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish sides, the level of international pressure for a solution on them was substantial. Perhaps there was an element of miscalculation on their part, in that they perceived that negotiations were taking place with respect to the CBMs, rather than a holistic package for settlement. The result of this more dynamic United Nations involvement was that the Secretary General was forced to try ever more coercive methods to bring the sides to agreement, and was ultimately forced, because of the personal

level of commitment and the investment he had in progress, to lay the blame directly on the Turkish-Cypriot side for intransigence and for defying the wishes of the international community. In this, though, he also compromised the impartiality and validity of his mission of good offices,<sup>14</sup> and may have compromised this for future Secretaries General.

The events of 1996/97 on both a regional and on a local level have aptly illustrated the dangers of such an approach to mediation and negotiation. Had the two sides been committed to a compromise solution, and had they been willing to take the political and personal risks associated with making concessions, a solution may have been reached before now. It is rational to assume that the two sides' approach to the process of peacemaking has been derived from their conflictual relations with each before the United Nations arrived in Cyprus. It must be asked what the Secretary General or the Security Council can do about this problem. Yet it seems not really to be their problem in many ways, as the basic assumption that two sides accept mediation or good offices in order to find a solution is fair: the problem lies in the two sides' perceptions of what they can achieve in the negotiation scenario in terms of their initial objectives. With respect to this, it appears that both sides, but particularly the Turkish-Cypriot side, must accept a higher degree of initiative in terms of ideas and procedure from the mediator, the Secretary General or his representatives, or the protracted stalemate will continue indefinitely.

### **The Final Question**

In the light of the above analysis, the question still remains: what did the two sides feel that they would gain from United Nations' mediation or good offices and why did they attempt to draw the third party into the political issues of the conflict? In the answer to this question lies a significant proposition about the concepts associated with theoretical approaches to peacemaking. It appears from the analysis of the interaction of the disputants with the United Nations' peacemaking operation that they viewed it as one of the following. Firstly, the United Nations' peacemaking operation was viewed as an agent of legitimation for the respective international and internal positions of both sides, and then as an agent of the legitimisation of their negotiating positions. From this leads the proposition that both sides were searching for an ally which would reinforce their positions and aid them in their quest for their objectives. As a result, there has been little voluntary movement from their initial objectives, especially on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot side. If the United Nations has been viewed as an agent of empowerment or disempowerment, this indicates that one or both sides had little intention of a compromise, but instead intended to minimise the concessions which a final solution would require them to make. The consequences of this has been that the *status quo* has become preferable to both sides, than to further concessions and a resultant solution.

The United Nations' peacemaking operation has also become viewed as an agent of internationalisation, particularly in view of the direct link between Security

Council and General Assembly resolutions and the negotiating positions of the Greek-Cypriot side, which such resolutions have tended to support. Yet in some ways this has also been counterproductive and has prompted the Turkish-Cypriot side to move towards ever growing levels of intransigence. The disputants may have been motivated to accept a peacemaking mission because of their view that it was a device through which time could be gained for reorganisation. But it was more likely that the Greek-Cypriot side in particular saw it as strengthening their hand against Turkish intervention, particularly in 1964. The logic of this was that with United Nations' involvement in the search for a solution, it would be very difficult for Turkey to find a sufficient excuse to intervene. This held true but Turkey was to find sufficient justification, as far as Turkish policy makers were concerned, in the actions of the Greek junta in 1974. Mediation was also viewed by both sides as being potentially coercive and in support of one side or other. The Galo Plaza affair illustrates this in that the Turkish-Cypriot side was determined that the mediator would not be allowed to make his own suggestions, as they were afraid of the 'weight' of his words. The Greek-Cypriot side was determined, and has been ever since that the reverse would hold. This was clearly because they considered such an intervention as strongly in their favour.

It appears that overall, the views of the two sides of peacemaking have evolved into a perception that it was a relatively cost free method of continuing the struggle for concessions from the opposition while avoiding making the costly concessions entailed in a possible compromise solution. For the Turkish-Cypriot side, the continuation of the peacemaking mission has been detrimental to their cause: they would have been happy if the peacemaking operation had lapsed and recognition of their entity had begun to accrue. Yet for the Greek-Cypriot side, the protracted negotiations had the added benefit of preventing this from occurring while keeping their positions on the issue fresh in the minds of the international community.

The characterisation of the peacemaking process in Cyprus as being prompted by a fear of losing and yet also containing an element of fear with respect to making concessions, appears to be accurate. The most significant insight provided by this statement lies in its redirection of the foci of analysis with respect to peacemaking away from the traditional assessment of the role, resources, and skills of the third party, to an analysis of the objectives of the disputants in the light of the fact that they may actually not view the conflict as being over. Negotiating out of fear, but fearing to negotiate has led to a situation in which mediation and negotiation became part of the conflict environment, resulting in the failure of significant and protracted efforts to bring peace to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, the violent events of 1996 in Cyprus, and the stand off between Greece and Turkey were predictable, as the *status quo* was just an illusion of stability; none of the underlying issues had been addressed or resolved. Perhaps now the time is ripe for a reassessment by both sides in the conflict of its approach to the United Nations' peacemaking operation, rather than a reassessment of the operation itself. An understanding that both sides have viewed the peacemaking operation as part

of the conflict environment may lead to a new approach to negotiation by both parties, which in itself may give rise to a solution.

### Notes

1. For a critique of this vision, see John Burton: *Conflict and Communication*, London: Macmillan, 1969. Burton himself admitted that the framework he had suggested was unlikely to become operational.

2. See, for example, T. Princen: *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, Princeton UP, 1992.

3. For the debates revolving around techniques of mediation see Allesbrook, M.: *Prototypes of Peacemaking*, Chicago; London: St James Press, 1986, Assefa, H.: *Mediation of Civil Wars*, London: Westview Press, 1987, Bailey, Sydney Dawson: *How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946-1964*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Vol. 1 & 2, 1982, Bendahmane, D.B.: *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, Centre for Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Services Institute, US dep. of State, 1986, Bercovitch, J and Rubin, J.Z.: *Mediation in IR: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992, Burton, J.: *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict: a Handbook*, Lanham, London: UP of America, 1987, Evans, G.: *Cooperating for Peace*, Allen and Unwin, 1993, Jabri, V.: *Mediating Conflict Decision-making and Western Intervention in Namibia*, Manchester University Press, 1990, Lall, AS (ed.): *Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation*, New York; Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985, Mitchell, C.R.: *The Structure of International Conflict*, London: Macmillan, 1981, Miall, H.: *The Peacemakers*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992, Sandole, D.J.D. and Sandole Staroste, I (eds): *Conflict Management and Problem Solving*, Frances Pinter, 1987, Sandole, D.J.D. and Sandole Staroste, I (eds): *Conflict Management and Problem Solving*, Frances Pinter, 1987, Skjelsbaek: 'The United Nations Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes', *Journal of Peace Research*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, vol. 28, no.1, February 1991, Wall, JA: 'Mediation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, vol. 25 no.1, March 1981, Webb, K: "Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars", *Paradigms*, Canterbury: UKC International Relations Society, vol. 9, no.2, Winter 1995, 1994, Young, O.R.: *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton UP, 1967, Zartmann I and Berman, MR: *The Practical Negotiator*, New Haven; London: Yale UP, 1982.

4. Modelski argues that there are two basic conditions for a settlement in an intra state war; they are stalemate and a rearrangement of resources. Stalemate can be achieved by international action, George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War' in Rosenau, James Nathan (ed.): *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p.143-4. Henry Kissinger believed that only a war without victory or defeat could contain the seeds of a settlement. During the October War between Israel and Egypt in 1973, he constantly switched his sup-

port from side to side in order to exhaust them, leaving them little choice but to negotiate. John G. Stoessinger: *Why Nations Go to War*, St. Martins Press: New York, 6th edition, 1992, pp.165-6.

5. T Princen, *op.cit.*, p.9. Princen has also made a useful distinction between the various types of mediator and their methodology. He describes a mediator with no interests a neutral mediator, and one with indirect interests, a principal mediator. If there are direct interests, then the third party becomes a disputant. For the principal mediator, there are three main bargaining dynamics Firstly, the mediator can bargain directly with a disputant to strike a side deal. Secondly, it can force concessions from one side by making a coalition with the other. Thirdly, it can make a three way deal, firstly with one disputants' who then makes a deal with the other. However, for the principal mediator, its own interests are always pre-eminent. For the neutral mediator, bargaining is out of the question as it functions only to change and facilitate the disputants continuing interaction. The intermediaries basis of influence is firstly, the ability to reconfigure a bargain, secondly to make proposals and finally to be able to pool information. The principal-neutral framework suggests that as conflicts evolve over a period of time, they can best be approached by using a combination of intermediaries, the neutral mediator being useful for starting talks, the principal to effect a cease-fire, the neutral to convene preliminary negotiations which can then be wrapped up by the principal, *ibid.*, pp.25-41.

6. It must not be forgotten, however, that such views may be inaccurate and subject to misperception.

7. For example, John Burton assumes that the bargaining positions of the adversaries are not modified or restrained by the introduction of United Nations peace-making. J. Burton, "The History of Conflict Resolution", J. Burton and Azar, E.A.: *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, p.156.

8. A.J.R. Groom and K. Webb (1987) define empowerment as the following: "Empowerment may be defined as a third party activity of conferring power on a weaker party in a conflict perceived as asymmetric with the aim of making the weaker party a 'realistic' negotiating power". A.J.R. Groom and Webb, Keith: "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict", *International Interactions*, vol.13.no.3. This also raises the issue of disempowerment of the stronger side rather than empowerment of the weaker. It may be more effective to actually disempower both sides, although it is likely that reducing (and increasing) power may be very difficult to achieve.

9. There are some indications in some of the literature relevant to this debate. For example J.A. Wall: "Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 25 no.1, March 1981, p.162.

10. R. Denktash, Interview with the author (18 January 1996). Denktash stated that he had been told by the United Kingdom and U.S. representatives that he should not worry as they would interpret the text of the Security Council resolution-

this, he stated, was a serious mistake. Also see M. Moran: *Sovereignty Divided: How the Turkish-Cypriots were deprived of their Constitutional Rights*, Cyprus Research and Publishing Centre, (Research Series no.17.), Nicosia, December 1995, p.11. Moran claims that had the Turkish side, the United Kingdom and the US got the resolution that they wanted, serious doubt would have been thrown on the legitimacy of Makarios' government. See also D.S. Bitsios, : *The Vulnerable Republic*, 2nd. edition, Institute for Balkan Studies: Salonica, 1975, p.148, for an account of the backstage manoeuvring which led to the adoption of the resolution. However, Charles Gaulkin, United Nations Press Officer, (interview with the author), stated somewhat contradictorily that the United Nations could not get involved in changing the status of the Republic. Charles Goulkin, Spokesman of UNFICYP, 1985-1991, 1995, 30 January, 1996

11. See S/5950.

12. H. Assefa, *op. cit.*, p.15. Assefa argues that this may provide a reason why the United Nations should not become involved in such situations. George Modelski argues that the mere opening of talks benefits the insurgents as it confers on them legitimacy and equality. George Modelski, *op. cit.*, p.131.

13. See, for example, *Cyprus Mail*, April 10, 1968, p.1. and p.4. At the end of April, Kuchuk stated that the United Nations could not help find a settlement, but could help bring the two sides together. *Cyprus Mail*, April 30, 1968, p.1.

14. Edward Newman: "Cyprus and the United Nations Secretary-General", *The Cyprus Review*, Intercollege, Nicosia, vol.7, no. 2, Fall 1995, p.88. Newman argues that as a consequence of the association of the Secretary-General with the ostracism of the Turkish-Cypriot side, his classical and innocuous third party role of good offices may be compromised.

# DRUG AND ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN CYPRUS

**Michael J. Maranda**

Are Cypriots drinking more? The official statistics on alcohol consumption published in *World Drink Trends 1993* show a dangerous upward trend in alcohol consumption for Cyprus. Based on these statistics, Cyprus is facing a serious alcohol problem. But are these figures correct? In the present study, the official statistics regarding alcohol consumption will be examined.

Alcohol is widely available in Cyprus. Grocery stores as well as bars and restaurants in both communities sell alcohol. Locally manufactured alcohol is very inexpensive. Additionally, in Greek-Cypriot rural communities home manufactured wine is produced, as well as a very potent distilled spirit known as *zivania* (*zivania* is similar to the Italian distilled spirit known as *grappa*). Despite the ubiquitous presence of alcoholic beverages, public intoxication is not readily apparent, i.e., one does not see drunks on the streets or at public gatherings. Those few individuals who appear to be intoxicated are usually foreigners.

## **The Published Statistics**

Reliable statistics on alcohol consumption are available for the areas under the control of the Republic of Cyprus. Data for the present study, unless otherwise indicated, is taken from *World Drink Trends 1993*. According to the authors of this publication, data for Cyprus is rated as very reliable. Moreover, the effect of extraneous variables such as tourism and home production for the Cypriot data is considered by the authors to be negligible. This publication, which is printed annually, is a compilation of information on alcohol consumption and production for about 50 countries. Almost all of Europe is included in the 1993 edition. (Malta and micro-states such as San Marino, however, are not included). A major area of the world that has not been included in this edition is sub-Saharan Africa. Except for South Africa, no data from sub-Saharan Africa has been included.

The publication provides useful comparisons among states on the basis of per capita consumption. In 1991, Cyprus ranked nineteenth world-wide in total alcohol consumption and third in consumption of distilled spirits (brandy, *zivania*, ouzo etc.). Cyprus ranked twenty second in beer consumption and twenty third in wine consumption. What is more disturbing is that the overall trend in total alcohol consumption over the last eleven years (i.e., from 1980 to 1991) has been upwards. Over the same period, alcohol consumption in Western Europe declined by 15.9%

and in Eastern Europe (the Soviet Union was not included in this statistic because of lack of data) by the same proportion. For the European Community the decline was 15.0%.

### **Adjustments for New Population Estimates**

Recently, however, the Department of Statistics and Research of the Republic of Cyprus has revised some of their estimates for alcohol consumption based upon new population figures for Cyprus. The rates of per capita consumption are now lower than those indicated in *World Drink Trends 1993*. In some cases, due to rounding, the new values reported are the same as those previously reported, (see *Table 1* which shows per capita alcohol consumption in Cyprus from 1981 to 1993 and is based on the revised figures). Although, the value for distilled spirits for 1991 remains the same (3.3 litres), its relevant rank in consumption may have dropped from third to fourth. Czechoslovakia, the country which ranked fourth in 1991, also has a per capita consumption of 3.3 litres of pure alcohol for distilled spirits. Consequently, from the data available, one can not tell if the relative rank for Cyprus has changed from third to fourth. For beer, Cyprus moved from twenty second to twenty third and for wine from twenty third to twenty fourth. In absolute terms the value for beer changed from 54.7 litres of beer per capita to 53.2 and for wine from 12.6 to 11.6. The picture for total alcohol consumption is less clear. In absolute terms, the value has changed from 7.5 litres to 7.4 of pure alcohol. It is unclear, however, if its rank relative to other countries has changed *World Drink Trends 1993* presents its consumption figures only to the first decimal place. Consequently, it lists three countries with the value of 17.4-Ireland ranked twentieth, United Kingdom ranked twenty first and Finland ranked twenty second. Therefore, Cyprus could be the twentieth, twenty first or twenty second country in total alcohol consumption or could remain the nineteenth.

Even with the revised data, the upward trend in alcohol consumption remains. From 1980 to 1991, total alcohol consumption increased in Cyprus by 57% litres, i.e., from 4.7 litres of pure alcohol per capita in 1980 to 7.4 in 1991 (see *Table 1*). During this period, only Brazil (176.9%) and Cuba (63.6%) had greater proportional increases in alcohol consumption. Data, though, for both Brazil and Cuba is classified as less reliable, suggesting that some of their increase could be spurious, i.e., a product of data error. As stated previously, both Western and Eastern Europe experienced a decline during this period in contrast to Cyprus.



**Table 1: ALCOHOL CONSUMPTION IN CYPRUS**  
**Per Capita**  
**1980 To 1993**

| Year | Distilled<br>Spirits<br>Litres<br>Pure Alcohol | Beer<br>Litres | Wine<br>Litres | Total<br>Litres<br>Pure Alcohol |
|------|--|----------------|----------------|---------------------------------|
| 1980 | 2,0  | 32,6           | 9,3            | 4,7                             |
| 1981 | 2,1  | 34,8           | 10,1           | 5,1                             |
| 1982 | 2,1  | 36,6           | 11,1           | 5,3                             |
| 1983 | 2,3  | 39,4           | 11,1           | 5,6                             |
| 1984 | 2,3  | 39,4           | 11,1           | 5,7                             |
| 1985 | 2,4  | 42,0           | 11,9           | 5,9                             |
| 1986 | 2,6  | 44,5           | 11,9           | 6,3                             |
| 1987 | 2,7  | 46,7           | 13,2           | 6,6                             |
| 1988 | 3,0  | 50,5           | 13,7           | 7,2                             |
| 1989 | 3,0  | 53,9           | 13,5           | 7,3                             |
| 1990 | 3,1  | 56,3           | 13,3           | 7,5                             |
| 1991 | 3,3  | 53,2           | 11,6           | 7,4                             |
| 1992 | 3,8  | 61,8           | 13,8           | 8,5                             |
| 1993 | 3,4  | 53,8           | 12,8           | 7,6                             |

*Note: Distilled spirits and total are expressed in litres of pure alcohol. Beer and wine are expressed as litres of the appropriate beverage. Total alcohol for the years 1989 were calculated using the conversion factors for beer and wine for Cyprus used by the Productschap voor Gedistilleerde Dranken of the Netherlands, i.e. 0,05 for beer and 0,12 for wine.*

*Source: World Drink Trends 1993, p. 40 and the Dept. of Statistics and Research.*

### **The Impact of Tourists**

It should be noted, however, that the total alcohol consumption for Cyprus declined from 1990 to 1991 by about two tenths of a litre of pure alcohol, i.e., from 7.7 litres of pure alcohol to 7.5. This decrease was due to a decline in beer and wine consumption. Consumption of distilled spirits, in contrast, showed a slight increase during this period. This reduction in consumption could be due to the downturn in the Cyprus economy due to the Gulf War. More importantly, some of the decline in consumption may be the result of a reduction in consumption by tourists. Moreover, the decrease in tourism probably accounts for the down turn in the economy, since tourism is such a large industry in Cyprus. Interestingly, there was no decrease in

consumption of distilled spirits, instead it increased. This suggests that, if the consumption by the tourists is not negligible for the overall consumption of alcohol beverages as has been assumed, it appears to be negligible for distilled spirits. This data tend to confirm anecdotal reports that Greek-Cypriots are drinkers of brandy and ouzo.

, Data for 1992 and 1993 is available from the Department of Statistics and Research. Consumption in all three categories in 1992 exceeded their values for 1990, continuing the upward trend. Consumption of distilled spirits in 1992 reached 3.8 litres of pure alcohol per capita. Nevertheless in 1993, all three categories showed a decline. Beer and wine dropped below their values for 1991; wine dropped below its value for 1989. Distilled spirits, however, only dropped to 3.4 litres of pure alcohol. There was only a modest decline in tourism in 1993, so a reduction in tourism cannot account for most of the reduction. The number of tourists for 1993, although 7.5% less than for 1992, was still sizeable since it was more than a quarter of million greater than the number of tourists who visited Cyprus in 1990. A general down turn in the economy as well as the imposition of new taxes are other factors that may have affected the alcohol consumption during this period.

Clearly, the impact of tourism on alcohol consumption is not negligible, as is stated in *World Drink Trends 1993*. The decrease in consumption in 1991 which was due, at least in part, to the decline in the number of tourists, caused by the Gulf War, suggests this. Nevertheless, there was no decrease in consumption of distilled spirits at this time. As stated previously, this suggests that the consumption by the tourists is not negligible for overall consumption of alcoholic beverages as has been assumed, but it can be considered negligible for distilled spirits. Furthermore, the data for consumption of distilled spirits makes no allowance for home manufacturing of distilled spirits which still goes on in villages. It is generally believed that the home distillation of spirits is on the decline. Nonetheless, the impact of tourist consumption on the estimate of the total amount of distilled spirits consumed by Cypriots may be, at least partially, offset by the home manufacturing of distilled spirits which is not included in the estimate. Additionally, members of the British forces, the Greek force and United Nations forces, are entitled to purchase duty free liquor. It is believed that small numbers of these duty free bottles pass into the general population. Although the amount is small, it helps to mitigate the impact of tourist consumption during 1991 which indicates that the consumption of these beverages is impacted by the number of tourists. Upon closer inspection, the consumption of wine appears somewhat erratic, i.e., it has not been increasing steadily. For example from 1988 to 1989 when tourism increased by 24% from the previous year, wine consumption decreased slightly. In contrast, the consumption of beer has been steadily increasing along with the increase in the number of tourists. It is probably reasonable to conclude that the consumption figures for both beer and wine consumption are strongly affected by tourists consuming these bev-

erages. Still, factors other than tourism are probably also significantly influencing the estimates for wine consumption. Given that no license is required for the manufacture of wine and no special tax is levied on domestically produced wine, it is possible that the estimates for the home manufacture of wine may be inaccurate, which may account for the erratic pattern in the consumption data.

If tourism does significantly impact upon the consumption of alcohol, then how much of the consumption of alcohol beverages is due to the consumption by the tourists? Unfortunately, this cannot be answered with the available data. However, if the available data on tourism are examined, a feeling for the magnitude of the impact of tourist consumption can be obtained. If one takes, for example, the number of tourists for 1992, a record year and multiplies this by the average length of stay (1,255 days) and divides the result by 365 to annualise the value, an additional 68,185 people are added to the population—an increase of 11% to the total population. Most of these additional people are adults and therefore more likely to drink alcoholic beverages than children. If we assume that 90% of the tourists are over the age of 15 years, then it is like adding 13% to the population of over 15 years, then it is also like adding 13% to the population 15 years and older. Furthermore, most of the tourists are on holiday (some are in Cyprus for business) and thus, more likely to drink. Tourist consumption could, therefore account for 10% to 30% of the consumption of beer and wine. Even at the higher rate, there would still be an increase in the per capita consumption of alcohol due to the increase in consumption of distilled spirits.

The only data that appears to question the high rate of consumption of distilled spirits are anecdotal reports of the clandestine shipping of brandy into the occupied areas. How much brandy from areas under the direct control of the Republic of Cyprus enters the occupied areas is unknown. If significant amounts of brandy are transferred then this would alter the consumption patterns that were discussed above.

Although per capita alcohol consumption cannot be automatically converted into alcohol abuse, the relatively high rate of consumption of distilled spirits combined with a general upward trend in alcohol consumption is alarming. Furthermore, it is not simply the amount of alcohol consumed that determines alcohol abuse, but the quality drunk. For example, in the later stages of alcoholism it may take relatively modest amounts to become inebriated. Also, a moderate drinker who drinks and drives while he is under the influence (i.e., his driving is impaired) can be considered as an abuser of alcohol.

Another factor to be considered is the impact the tourists have on consumption by Cypriots. We do know that there is a higher concentration of drinking establishments in tourist areas. This increased availability and presence of alcohol probably encourages Cypriots to drink or at least makes it easier for them to drink. Moreover, a textbook on tourism (Macintosh and Goeldner, 1990, p. 192) observes that:

On a national basis, people of a particular country can have their lives changed by tourism, particularly if there are large numbers of tourists in proportion to the indigenous population. Visitors may influence ways of dressing, consumption patterns, desire for products used by tourists, sexual freedoms, and a broadening outlook on the world.

Additionally, the text (*ibid.*) notes that: "Extensive tourism development can bring undesirable social effects such as an increased prostitution, gambling, drunkenness (*sic*), rowdyism, unwanted noise, congestion, and other excesses."

With the large number of tourists visiting Cyprus, it seems likely that the behaviour of these tourists has some influence on Cypriot drinking patterns. For example, bars and pubs (i.e., an establishment whose primary purpose is the drinking of alcoholic beverages) appear to be a foreign import. They are particularly prevalent in tourist areas. Not only are they found in large hotels, they also exist as separate establishments in these areas. In villages outside of tourist areas, bars generally do not exist. Drinking in public in these areas occurs in restaurants and coffee houses. Although heavy drinking can and does take place in these restaurants, the drinking is usually accompanied by quantities of food that mitigate the effects of the alcohol. The availability of bars in Cyprus provides a venue where drinking is the primary activity, if not the sole activity, exercised while socialising. A bar changes the context of drinking from an activity carried out in concert with activities (e.g., eating, dancing or entertainment) to one where drinking is central. Moreover, bars are beginning to appear in large villages outside the tourist areas. Unfortunately, the influence of the tourists on Cypriot drinking cannot be estimated.

### **Survey Results**

It is generally believed that, although the per capita consumption is relatively high, consumption of alcohol in Cyprus is more evenly distributed throughout the population than is the case with other countries. In other words, most people drink some alcohol rather than a few people drinking a lot. Furthermore, it appears to be the common wisdom that excessive drinkers do not exist in Cyprus. A telephone survey using a sample of individuals 18 years and older was conducted by the author during the fall of 1994. Surprisingly, fewer drinkers were found than were expected, based upon general discussions with relevant individuals and anecdotal information. Most likely, many individuals who answered 'no' to the question concerning lifetime drinking either drink occasionally or are not currently drinking, but drank in the past. Often a person who drinks only on special occasions will answer 'no' to this type of question. Unfortunately, the interviewers were not trained to challenge a 'no' response on this question; the data was simply recorded as stated.

Of the 601 people interviewed, about half (302) stated that they never drank al-

coholic beverages. Those that said they had drunk alcoholic beverages were asked if they had drunk any alcoholic beverages within the last 12 months. About 90% (271 out of 299) answered 'yes'. A little more than a fifth (23%) of those who reported that they drank alcohol within the last 12 months, indicated that they drank alcoholic beverages daily. This data suggest that there is more diversity in the frequency of drinking than is generally acknowledged.

Not surprisingly, beer is more popular than wine- 61% said they usually consume wine, while 84% reported that they usually consume beer. Concerning distilled spirits, 39% reported that they usually consume brandy, 28% whiskey, 26% ouzo and only 3% *zivania*. Moreover, not only does a greater proportion of the population drink beer than wine, but beer tends to be consumed in greater quantities than wine. About two-thirds (66%) of those who drink wine reported that on average during the last 12 months, when they drank wine, they drank the equivalent of one or two glasses (standard measure for wine) of wine per occasion. In contrast, less than half (46%) of beer drinkers reported that they drank the equivalent of one or two glasses of beer (standard measure for beer) per occasion. About a sixth (17%) of beer drinkers reported that they drank the equivalent of more than six glasses of beer per occasion, while only 4% of wine drinkers reported they drank the equivalent of more than six glasses of wine per occasion.

When asked if they had within the last 12 months drunk the equivalent of five or more drinks of wine, beer, brandy or *ouzo* or mixed drinks for other distilled spirits, more than two-thirds (68%) of those who drank within the last 12 months said they did. Moreover, 6% of those who drank five or more drinks reported that they did this daily and 4% two or three times a week. (The caveat mentioned earlier about inferring alcoholism from the amount of alcohol consumed should be kept in mind). Those that drank heavily tended to drink brandy or beer rather than wine.

#### **Data from the Turkish-Cypriot Community**

Although the data on the Turkish-Cypriot community is more sparse than that for the Greek-Cypriot community, a similar picture emerges. During the summer of 1994 an article entitled "Are we becoming alcoholics?" appeared in the Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Kibris*. According to the article the consumption of imported alcoholic beverages increased by 107% in 1992 compared to 1991; making 1992 a record year for the importation of alcoholic beverages. The consumption of domestic alcoholic drinks also increased during this period, but by only 12.7%. In 1992, the two most heavily imported alcoholic beverages (in terms of money) were whiskey and beer. *Raki* (a Turkish drink that is the equivalent to *ouzo*) was number three.

#### **Conclusion**

Alcoholism and alcohol abuse are not the only consequences of excessive alcohol use. Although moderate use of alcohol may have positive benefits on health,

excessive use can result in various health problems such as cirrhosis of the liver. For example, in the United States, the use of alcohol by pregnant women is the leading preventable cause of mental retardation in children. Moreover, excessive use of alcohol is implicated in heart disease and some forms of cancer. At present there is no evidence that there is a high rate of cirrhosis of the liver in Cyprus. Nor would one expect a high rate, since the high levels of alcohol consumption in Cyprus are relatively recent. Unfortunately, there is no data available in Cyprus on the impact of alcohol on other health problems.

In conclusion, based on an analysis of the available data, the actual consumption levels for Cyprus are not as high as those published in *World Drink Trends*. Revised population estimates, as well as the consumption by tourists suggest that the per capita consumption is less than what has been published. Unfortunately, the impact of tourist consumption cannot be calculated from the available data. Consequently, revised figures that take into account this factor, as well as the new population estimates cannot be generated. Despite these difficulties in estimation, a dangerous upward trend in alcohol consumption still exists. Additionally, the behaviour of tourists could be influencing Cypriot drinking patterns and may account in part for the increase in alcohol consumption by Cypriots.

Moreover, if the upward trend continues, Cyprus will soon face problems related to alcohol use. (The decline in overall alcohol consumption from 1992 to 1993 is not necessarily indicative of either a decline or a stabilisation in alcohol consumption). At present, there is no evidence to suggest that alcoholism and related ailments are serious problems in Cyprus. What little data there is, suggests that alcoholism is currently a modest problem directly affecting small numbers of people. Nevertheless, the recent high levels of consumption of distilled spirits is quite high and may be a harbinger of a future increase in alcoholism and alcohol related problems. If alcohol consumption levels continue to rise, Cyprus most certainly will face a severe problem of alcoholism. The government needs to increase its prevention efforts concerning alcohol abuse. Clearly, there is a need to educate the public concerning the effects of alcohol. A campaign to discourage excessive drinking is needed.

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**Dean Acheson, *The Cold War Years*, by Douglas Brinkley, Yale University Press, 1992.**

As serious and concerted efforts are being made for the solution of the Cyprus problem it is useful to be reminded that a large part of its virtual intractability can be traced to its Cold War roots: to the mentality and fears, the suspicions, animosities and unscrupulousness that characterised that war, and by the mentality described by the term "political realism" or *Realpolitik*.

This perspective and a lot of the details behind it are described both implicitly and at times explicitly in a book written for a different purpose, a political biography of the American diplomat Dean Acheson who played a large role in Cyprus developments in the critical year 1964, and whose stamp on the Cyprus problem can be discerned in most subsequent developments.

Dean Acheson was under-secretary of state in Roosevelt's last and Truman's first administration. He became secretary of state under Truman's second administration in 1949-1953. He was one of the architects of both the Truman Doctrine that committed the United States to supporting anti-communist regimes everywhere in the world, starting with Greece and Turkey, and also of the policy of containment of the Soviet Union through the Atlantic Alliance or Nato.

In a chapter bearing the title *Repairing cracks in Nato, 1964-67*, this well-researched work devotes ten highly illuminating pages to the Cyprus question. It relates that after the bloody events of 1963-64 in Cyprus, under-secretary of state George Ball asked the then retired Dean Acheson to undertake quiet mediation, primarily with Athens and Ankara, over the Cyprus conflict. He realised that Acheson, more than most in Washington, understood the dangers to the Nato alliance from a Greco-Turkish war.

The author states that President Makarios ignited a crisis by proposing thirteen amendments to the Cyprus constitution in 1964, aimed at limiting Turkish Cypriot participation in government. Intercommunal violence ensued, followed by a cease-fire under a British peace-keeping force, but by the end of January 1964, despite President Johnson's warnings to Makarios, local skirmishes grew in intensity. The Western leaders wanted to send in an all-Nato force of 10,000 men but Makarios, fearing the participation of Turkey, insisted on a United Nations force.

The United States, suspicious of Makarios' flirtations with Moscow and fearing that it would soon have a "Mediterranean Cuba" on its hands, wanted to keep the Cyprus problem within the western alliance where both Greece and Turkey belonged, and it suggested a meeting of these two countries at Camp David early in 1964 for the resolution of the Cyprus problem in the absence of the Cypriots.

Makarios with the assistance of the UN secretary general U Thant managed, however, to steer the meeting to neutral Geneva in Switzerland under UN auspices with Dean Acheson as an important but unofficial mediator. President Makarios was very unhappy with Acheson's role. He correctly perceived, writes Douglas Brinkley, that the ultimate

goal of the United States was to dissolve the Republic of Cyprus.

The *Acheson Plan* for Cyprus tried to do just that. According to the author, it provided Greece with the long-desired *enosis* and created adequate guarantees for Turkish political rights and for the strategic concerns on the island as well. It also safeguarded US interests in the region. But to accomplish this feat, the *Acheson Plan* had to ignore the Cypriots.

Makarios managed to carry the Greek government with him in rejecting the Plan. Acheson's venom against Makarios could not be concealed. He regarded Makarios as a treacherous religious fanatic, probably an early version of Ayatollah Homeini, "a political priest with considerable fits of demagoguery and ruthlessness."

Disheartened and personally offended by the failure of his plan and his mediation, after the violent incidents at *Kokkina* and the Turkish bombing of that area in August 1964, Acheson felt that it was time to return to Washington, where he would do whatever he could to prevent Cyprus from becoming "a Russian Mediterranean satellite."

Acheson was happy to be home. He wrote to an old Yale classmate, "Alice [his wife] and I got back from Geneva where we spent two months in the worst rat race I have ever been in, trying to deny Greeks and Turks their historic recreation of killing one another."

It is difficult not to agree with the author's conclusion on the *Acheson Plan*. He describes it as a paradigm of great-power pressure in the arena of small-power diplomacy that would remain the basis for all negotiations over Cyprus for the next ten years. "Acheson's proposals, disregarding as they did a small, troublesome and deeply divided state and its leaders, were a classic example of *Realpolitik*, which has no place for the hopes and aspirations of a powerless and divided people."

What lessons can we derive about the present and the future from the encounter between Acheson and Cyprus? It is obvious that Acheson was operating in the material and mental framework of the Cold War with its brutal political realities and consequent realism. Turkey itself has put into practice the harsh imperatives of the Cold War mentality with exceptional ferocity and callousness or at the very least, with extreme lack of proportionality in its response. It carried out a brutal form of ethnic cleansing, some say, aided and abetted and definitely tolerated by the great powers.

One should be allowed to hope without being accused of moralising romanticism that in a post Cold War world where global inter-dependence erodes the "hard shell" of the state and where the national interest is redefined accordingly and where private and public morality cannot be so easily separated, the mistakes and excesses of the Cold War and their consequences can be addressed in a more humane way.

The Achesons and the Kissingers of this world should be relegated to the unpleasant past where they belong. Even in Douglas Brinkley's sympathetic political biography, one can discern that Dean Acheson, despite his great experience and abilities, was ill-suited to provide a fair solution to the Cyprus problem. Besides his Cold War mentality, he was a man of limited tolerance who gives one the impression that he would like the persistent opponents of his views not just refuted but even personally destroyed. His

political stances as he grew older were too illiberal for an erstwhile Democrat who worked with Roosevelt, as can be seen from his support of both Rhodesian white separatists and South African apartheid racists in the late sixties.

Unless the powers that be manage to transcend the Cold War ways of *Realpolitik*, the ways of Acheson and Kissinger, the world will continue to be cruel and amoral and, as far as Cyprus is concerned, its problem will continue to be patched up but not really resolved.

All of which does not mean that a realistic and mutually concessionary solution should not be actively pursued by both parties in Cyprus today. As ever, the first move for a civilised way out has to be made by Turkey. **Sofronis Sofroniou.**

***Riding with the Lion: In Search of Mystical Christianity***, by Kyriacos C. Markides (New York: Viking Penguin, 1994), 369pp.

That there is a book in English which attempts to describe and analyze the mystical orientation of the Eastern Orthodox faith, both historically and in its present manifestation, simultaneously comparing and contrasting it to other belief systems, is of itself a rare find. This is a book the student of philosophy or theology might find worth reading, although any person remotely interested in questions of truth or faith, would certainly find it appealing.

Markides begins the book with a visit into his Maine home on a picturesque winter day. He succinctly reviews his three previous works (*The Magus of Strovolos*, *Homage to the Sun*, and *Fire in the Heart*) which had centred on his encounters with the life of the "Daskalos" of Cyprus. He also mentions the work of *Erevna* (a nonprofit research foundation) which caused a parting of the ways for the protagonists mentioned in his previous works.

Markides next takes us to the New York Open Center, in Soho, where he led a workshop entitled, "Consciousness, Spirituality and Healing: A Western Path." This serves to further familiarize the reader with Markides' thoughts on esoteric teachings.

By the third chapter, the reader is engrossed in thoughts on elementals, discourse on spirit, soul and body, the authenticity of masters or gurus, and the powers to heal, to name a few. For those unfamiliar with his previous works, Markides requires the reader to put the book down for a spell, in order to digest these concepts.

One must appreciate Markides' talent for dropping names within his anecdotal style. He mentions his appreciation of Thoreau's love of the Maine woods, and puts just enough of the familiar Jungian and Freudian rhetoric in so as to please those wondering where to place psychoanalysis in the search for answers on spirituality. He suggests where we might look further in philosophy or theology (e.g., with David Ray Griffin and Huston Smith), all in the spirit of the good professor. Perhaps one of his strongest suggestions for further reading would be the works of the Russian sociologist, Pitirim Alexandrovich Sorokin, most probably best-known as the man invited to Harvard to begin the sociology

department there (via Minnesota), but who wrote a four-volume opus entitled, *Social and Cultural Dynamics*<sup>1</sup>. Markides also mentions the prolific non-medical healing power of the Brazilian *Arigo*<sup>2</sup>.

The crux of the book are the chapters devoted to his pilgrimage to Mt. Athos during Holy Week in 1991. His encounters with Father Maximos and Father Vasilios reveal the simplistic beauty of the faith through, among other things, the powerful effects of prayer and the practice of succumbing to the will of God. These chapters are a must-read for those who contemplate a visit to the Holy Mountain (for he outlines not only the logistics of getting there, but also what one might want to take with him), and a must-read for the half of the human population forbidden from ever visiting this world, women.

Markides' accounts of the dreams and 'visits' to Lesbos (in the town of Thermi) of Saint Irene, Saint Raphael, and Saint Nicholas, which occurred in the late 1950s, is one of the many marvelous contemporary phenomena explored in the book<sup>3</sup>. Greeks all over Greece had also reported being affected by the saints. Hundreds of Cypriots, likewise, have claimed that Saint Raphael has healed them<sup>4</sup>. An interesting radio recording Markides cites, about a taxi driver's encounter with the three saints on a late night drive toward Limassol, certainly piques one's interest. Needless to say, the experience transformed the taxi driver's life. A rather cynical brother-in-law of Markides, who lived most of his life in London, once remarked, "I don't know of a single Englishman who either saw Saint Raphael, or Saint Nicholas or all the other saints that the Greeks keep seeing . . . . Do the Greeks, perhaps, have a monopoly on the saints?" (p. 331.) A question well put as representative of the many doubters Markides reckoned would exist among his readers.

Markides satisfactorily addresses skeptics and cynics, who one would have to guess outnumber those who follow his work in total belief. He stresses that as an academic, he aims merely to document the smorgasbord of extraordinary experiences which abound, and lets the reader know in no uncertain terms that while many a professor might dismiss any recognition of the mysteries of life as unscholarly, he is at peace in his work, knowing that many people have written to him and expressed their accounts of similar occurrences. It could even be argued that Markides' work may be placed in the Weberian tradition of the sociology of religion. Weber, like Markides, was fully aware of the existence of "religious virtuosi," i.e., people who are closer to God (or the Gods) and are more aware of supernatural experiences. Unlike Marx and other thinkers influenced by the Enlightenment, Weber had no intention of dismissing or *ever* ridiculing religious experience.

Another interesting phenomenon which Orthodox fathers have written about and Markides discusses is the *sa/os*, the "fool for Christ," who renounces all material possessions, wanders the land, and becomes a worker for the Holy Spirit. A *sa/os*, according to Markides' research, is capable of "prophecy, clairvoyance and *even* teleportation." (p. 323) One such *sa/os*, Charalambis Papyianne, of Kalamata, Greece, died in 1974.

In his final chapter, entitled, "Lifting the Veil," Markides beautifully sums up how modern civilization's rational and analytical thinking has undoubtedly cast aside the spiritual. It is unfortunate that mainstream religion has, for the most part, made people feel that the Church is concerned with primarily "ethical rules for social and political action." (p. 352.) But today, there are those experiences out there, unexplained by any rational means, yet very real to the individuals affected and thus a part of what is reality for some. For if a person experiences the miracle which saved his life, or the life of a loved one, who dares to rationalize in the wake of the consequence?

Markides concludes by stating that the diversity that modern civilization and education affords has its merits, in that it is through exposure to the many belief systems of the world that mankind becomes, as Demos states in the book, "more understanding and accepting of others who worship God in different, and from our point of view, strange ways." (p. 357.) It is, however, time for a more advanced process of thinking on the mysteries amidst, in that they, too, may be key to our search of truth through faith. The question remains: Must the study of human existence include the element of mystery, or must it be reduced to a "system" whose dynamics can be known with full certainty? **Valerie Michaels Mavratsas**

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