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Articles and chapters in books:
Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed*. Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, pp. 13-68.
Journal articles:
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Articles

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Creating a New Identity: From the Secular Turkish Cypriot to the Muslim Turk of Cyprus

Michalis N. Michael

Abstract

The purpose of this paper is to analyse the recent and noted effort to empower the religious framework in Turkish Cypriot education. The main argument of this paper concerns the question of whether this effort must be analysed as a new effort of ' Turkifying' the Turkish Cypriot community and not ' Islamifying' it. The term 'new' applies since the first procedure to ' Turkify' the community, according to the connotation of the term Turk that equates it to nation, is considered to have occurred in the late nineteenth century. Over a century later, the term Turk seems to also include the religious element, as opposed to the corresponding term after the creation of the modern Turkish nation. This change and the transition from the secular Turk to the Muslim Turk, a change that comes about in Turkey after the dominance of AKP, tries to penetrate the Turkish Cypriot community, turning the Turkish Cypriot into a Muslim Turk of Cyprus. However, what one should examine carefully are the peculiarities of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially in relation to religion, and, therefore, the difficulty to identify the average Turkish Cypriot with the term Muslim Turk of Cyprus.

Keywords: Turkish Cypriots, education system, religion and education, identity

The complexity of Cyprus' history, both before and after its independence, has been and still is the main difficulty in an effort to interpret the developments on a historical and political level. To add to this complexity, it appears that the educational system on the island, and the ideology or ideologies that influence it at times, is an even more complicated matter. Evidence of this complexity is the fact that in 1960, with the independence of Cyprus, a state was created that had no notion of a national educational system but was well acquainted with a communal system of education.[1] A state was constructed which did not have a Ministry of Education and a unified

1 Cyprus became an independent state and the colonial period, which began in 1878 when the island was transferred from the jurisdiction of the Sublime Porte to the British, ended. For the colonial period in Cyprus, see: G. Hill (1972) *A History of Cyprus*, Vols. 3 and 4, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press; G.S. Georghallides (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus, 1918–1926: With a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule*, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre; R. Katsiaounis (1996) *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the*

educational system, but rather two separate systems under the supervision of the Community Assemblies, the Greek Communal Chamber and the Turkish Communal Chamber. In compliance with article 87 of the Constitution, each Community Assembly was responsible for all educational matters of the community.[2] Therefore, in this framework, two different worlds were developed on the island through education.[3] The key ideology and the ruling class in each community had the ability to reproduce and be legitimised on a collective level. During the British period, education was developed on the basis of ethnic and religious diversity; however, when the efforts to establish a public educational system were intensified after the island gained independence, it probably played a leading role in assimilating the controversy between the Greekness and the Turkishness of the Cypriots.[4]

But where the Turkish Cypriot community feels particularly disturbed is in its concern over the provisions of the Constitution, especially after 1960 when Turkish Cypriot education came under the absolute control of the Turkish Cypriot community and the ideological powers that dominate it.[5] Thus, the Turkish Cypriot educational system developed and operated under the powerful influence of the realities in Turkey, notably in relation to the educational and ideological framework that was formed after the establishment of the Turkish state.[6] The Turkish Cypriot educational system, in essence, continued its connection with the Turkish educational system, and its curriculum was prepared within the context of the Turkish syllabus.[7] Taking into consideration these facts, it should be alluded to that every change in Turkey, in ideological and other levels, was transferred to the Turkish Cypriot community. And so, after the rise of the Justice and Development Party (*Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi – AKP*) to power, the growing role of religion in relation to the political and ideological developments in Turkey created new standards that introduced the Turkish Cypriot community to a new course. This course, generally where the

Second Half of the Nineteenth Century, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre; A. Varnava (2009) *British Imperialism in Cyprus, 1878–1915. The Inconsequential Possession*, Manchester: Manchester University Press.

2 *Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus* (1960) Nicosia, p. 41 [in Greek]. For the Turkish Communal Chamber (*Türk Cemaat Meclisi*) and educational matters, see: H. Cicioğlu (2000) 'Kuzey Kıbrıs Türk Cumhuriyeti ve Eğitim' ['Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' and Education], *Ankara Üniversitesi Eğitim Bilimleri Fakültesi Dergisi*, Vol. 16, No. 2, p. 217.

3 See: S. Photiou (2005) *Segregated Education in Cyprus between 1920 and 1935*, PhD Dissertation, University Park, PA: Pennsylvania State University Press.

4 A. Pollis (1973) 'Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 5, No. 4, p. 589.

5 A. Suha (1973) 'Turkish Education in Cyprus', in Th. Papadopoullos and M. Christodoulou (eds), *Proceedings of the First Cyprological Conference*, Nicosia: Etaireia Kypriakon Spoudon, Vol. 3, Part 1, p. 363.

6 For an overview of the Turkish Cypriot education system and structure, see: H. Cicioğlu (2000) 'Kuzey Kıbrıs', *op. cit.*, pp. 209–224.

7 T. Atalay (2005) 'Öğretmen ve Müfredat Ekseninde KKTC'de Örgün Din Öğretimi' [The Teacher and the Formal Religious Education in 'Northern Cyprus's' Curriculum Axis], *Değerler Eğitimi Dergisi*, Vol. 2, No. 7/8, p. 15.

educational system is concerned, is related to the formation of a new Turkish identity, an important component of which, and to the contrary with the past, is religious faith.

The fundamental purpose of this article is to analyse the question of whether the recent and noted effort to empower the religious framework in Turkish Cypriot education is a new effort of 'Turkifying' the Turkish Cypriot community and not simply 'Islamifying' it. This paper argues that the 'new effort of Turkifying' applies since the first procedure to 'Turkify' the community, in harmony with the connotation of the term Turk that equates it to nation, is considered to have materialised in the late nineteenth century.[8] Over a century later, the term Turk seems to also include the religious element, as opposed to the corresponding term after the formation of the modern Turkish nation. This change and the transition from the secular Turk to the Sunni Muslim Turk, which comes into being in Turkey after the dominance of AKP, tries to penetrate the Turkish Cypriot community, reshaping the Turkish Cypriot into a Muslim Turk of Cyprus. Be that as it may, what should be examined carefully are the peculiarities of the Turkish Cypriot community, especially in relation to religion, and in consequence the difficulty to identify the average Turkish Cypriot with the term Muslim Turk of Cyprus.

After the formation of the Turkish nation and the formulation of a national educational system in Turkey, the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots was passed down to the community on a collective level through the educational system, which was oriented towards the Turkish educational system. In this framework, not only was the complete dominion of the military and the Kemalist understanding of national powers, which dominated Turkish internal politics until the rise to power of AKP, not questioned, but it was also empowered by the existence of a Turkish Cypriot community from which those social and political powers that could formulate an internal Turkish Cypriot policy were either absent or successfully excluded. Amongst the Turkish Cypriots, the powers that were established were those that were imposed as the sole solution for the survival of the community; that is a complete dependence on Turkey, the motherland. In other words, the politico-military status quo in Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership managed to hold the Turkish Cypriot community outside of time and, more importantly, they stopped any development that could lead to the questioning of their policy in Cyprus, incorporating the Turkish Cypriot community into the Turkish nation.[9] In this framework of development, Turkish nationalism, as it was formulated in the Kemalist framework, along with the realities on the island, led to the establishment of Turkish nationalism as the dominant axis of the Turkish Cypriot educational system.[10]

8 A. Nevzat (2005) *Nationalism amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, PhD Dissertation, University of Oulu, Oulu.

9 S. Anagnostopoulou (2004) *Tourkikos Eksihronismos. Islam kai Tourkokyprioi sti Daidalodi Poreia tou Kemalismou* [Turkish Modernity. Islam and Turkish Cypriots in the Labyrinthine Course of Kemalism], Athens: Vivliorama, p. 217.

10 A. Güneyli (2013) 'Kıbrıs'ın Kuzeyindeki Eğitimin ve Ders Kitaplarının Eleştirel Değerlendirilmesi' [Critical Evaluation of the North of Cyprus Education and Texbooks], *Eleştirel Pedagoji*, Vol. 5, No. 26, p. 23. The

The Turkish national state and the Kemalist understanding of Turkishness were based on degrading the religious faith as the factor to define Turkish identity, and in its place, the defining element of Turkishness became the Turkish nation and the cultural elements of the Turkish people. Not only was religion not considered a primary element of Turkish national identity, an element of the nation that is, but it was considered by Kemalism as a factor that would impede progress and the modernisation of the nation and the state.[11] As a result, the newly-constituted Turkish nation proceeded to a reformation whose goal was to remove society from the strict religious framework of the Ottoman period. This included banning the Caliphate, closing mosques, Sufi orders, banning the fez and adopting the western hat.[12] Intrinsically, after enforcement of this secularising reformation in the newly-constituted Turkish nation by Mustafa Kemal, the Islamic ideas and institutions that were related to religion stopped being the legalising element of politics, and particularly where the educational system is concerned, the analysts note that it was separated from every form of religious influence and effect.[13] Although religious education continued to exist, the control of the state over all the religious and educational matters was strong. The abandonment of the Arabic alphabet and the adoption of the Latin, along with the cleansing of the language of any Arabic and Persian influences constituted one of the most important moves, which was automatically connected to education, that contributed to the removal from the religious framework. In essence, a reformation was attempted, and a new orientation for the Turkish nation was created.[14]

On that account, the basis for the Kemalist understanding of national state and to a great degree of the Turkish national state has been the enforcement and the protection of its secular character, a value that was considered the cornerstone of Turkey's westernisation. Secularism was a basic principle of Kemalism whose importance was not reduced to separating the state from Church but expanded to the conflict between the powers that sought the westernising of the country with powers affiliated with the dominant role of religion and its role in formulating politics. For a long period, the Kemalist power of Turkey kept and was kept from the above principle, discouraging any public expression of religious feelings from the citizens, believing that this would undermine the secularity of the state – a basic Kemalist principle – and would lead to the development of dynamics that would not be *Western* or *European*. With this in mind, the

integration of the Turkish Cypriot identity into a Turkish national identity is shown by the fact that until the changes of 2004, in history books in the Turkish Cypriot educational system, the community was downgraded as part of the Turkish nation, and the history of Cyprus was devalued as a chapter of Turkish history. Y. Papadakis (2008) *History Education in Divided Cyprus: A Comparison of Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Schoolbooks on the 'History of Cyprus'*, Nicosia: PRIO Report, 2/2008, p. 13.

11 S. Anagnostopoulou (2004) *Tourkikos Eksihronismos* [Turkish Modernity.], *op. cit.*, p. 54.

12 E.J. Zurcher (2004) *Turkey: A Modern History*, London: I.B. Tauris, p. 173.

13 H. Yavuz (2009) *Secularism and Muslim Democracy in Turkey*, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, p. 26.

14 A. Kazamias (1966) *Education and the Quest for Modernity in Turkey*, London: G. Allen and Unwin, p. 187.

main goal of the Turkish educational system during the Kemalist era was to fashion a clean national state and a national identity free of religion.[15] The period of the Turkish-Islamic synthesis that began during the 80s must be analysed as a period in which Islam began to degrade the secular character of the Turkish state. As a result of these new relations between the state and Islam, even the term secular as a term that describes the Turkish state, does not seem correct, since neither the state, nor politics have become non-religious.[16]

The Turkish Cypriot community, which had already begun to distance itself from Islam from the mid-nineteenth century to the early twentieth century, as it operated in the British colonial but modern framework, seemed to be ready to embrace the basic principles of Kemalism, especially in relation to secularism and westernisation.[17] The assistance of the British administration, the annulment of Ottoman institutions and practices on the island, the effort to formulate a more up-to-date educational system in the standards of modern nations of the era and the introduction of the island into the world of the colonies of a western country, these were elements that reinforced the efforts of the Kemalists to remove the community from the strict religious framework of the Ottoman period. Therefore, after the establishment of the modern Turkish nation in 1923 and the secularising reformations of Mustafa Kemal, the Turkish Cypriot community seemed to enter a course of intense removal from the strict religious framework. The application of the Kemalist reforms to the Turkish Cypriot community, for example, the adoption of the Latin alphabet, appeared to weaken religion and favour the emergence of secular elements.[18] Simultaneously, the previous decades of British modern administration on the island – Cyprus was transferred to the British administration in 1878 – and the loss of power of the religious institutions debilitated the religious feelings of the Turkish Cypriots. In that sense, the Turkish Cypriot secularism has two roots: the British modernity framework and the Kemalist secularism.

In this structure, the Turkish Cypriot educational system operated as part of the broader secular character of education in Turkey. Turkish Cypriot education, in the framework of its *national mission*, highlighted as one of its leading characteristics *the conservation of the national conscience of the person and the safeguard of devotion to concepts such as Ataturk's nationalism* ....[19] For this reason, the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots concerned their secularity and their involvement with Turkey as the origin of the population. Not only was the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots

15 H. Yavuz (2003) *Islamic Political Identity in Turkey*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 48.

16 A. Davison (2003) 'Turkey, a "Secular" State? The Challenge of Description', *South Atlantic Quarterly*, Vol. 102, No. 2/3, p. 342.

17 A. Nevzat and M. Hatay (2009) 'Politics, Society and the Decline of Islam in Cyprus: From the Ottoman Era to the Twenty First Century', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 45, No. 6, p. 919.

18 H.M. Ateşin (1996) *Kıbrıs'ta İslâmî Kimlik Dâvâsi* [Islamic Identity Case in Cyprus], İstanbul: Marifet Yayınları, p. 276.

19 H.S. Yaratan (1998) 'Education in the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus"', in K. Grothusen, S. Winfried and P. Zervakis (eds), *Zypern* [Cyprus], Göttingen: Vandenhoeck and Ruprecht, p. 611.

not related to their religiousness, but, on the contrary, it was also related to the lack of this religiousness and the undermining of the religious element. Many times, expressly where education is concerned not counting the support of secularity instead of religiousness, it appears that Turkish Cypriot educators were even more zealous than the educators in Turkey.[20] Undermining religion and weakening religious institutions, which was happening in Turkey, also concerned the Turkish Cypriot community, where relevant developments were transferred.[21]

It is worth emphasising a particularity of the Turkish Cypriot community in relation to religion. While the community is recorded as a Muslim community, in essence it had already distanced from Islam in the middle of the nineteenth century in a process during which religion played a decreasing role in everyday life.[22] Despite the Turkish-Islamic synthesis (*Türk-İslam sentezi*) of Turkey in the 80s, the Turkish Cypriot community remained, and possibly still remains, intensely secular, and as recent research demonstrates, Turkish Cypriots are perhaps the most secular Muslim group in the world. It is characteristic that while at some point religious lessons were introduced to the syllabus at Turkish schools, the Turkish Cypriot community did not include such lessons in its syllabus, thus making a substantial differentiation.[23] According to research conducted among the Turkish Cypriots, today the vast majority do not belong to organised religious orders. They do not follow a religious way of life, and they do not believe that religious institutions can provide solutions to individual problems. It is characteristic that only 7.9% go to the mosque for Friday prayer and only 1.3% have mentioned that they might go to the mosque more than once a week.[24] The same research has demonstrated that the Turkish Cypriots consider religious faith as a completely personal matter and that they do not look positively on a legislative or organised religious activity.[25]

The fact that the Turkish Cypriot educational system developed and operated in the framework that was defined by Kemalist secularism and Turkish nationalism resulted in an essential differentiation from the corresponding Greek Cypriot educational system. This distinction concerned the complete elimination of the religious element from education and the immersion of a particular progressiveness amongst the Turkish Cypriot teachers and professors. This progressiveness was expressed with the participation of important associations and guilds of Turkish Cypriot educators in mobilisations of reaction against nationalism and religious conservatism.[26] As opposed to the Turkish

20 A. Nevzat and M. Hatay (2009) 'Politics, Society and the Decline', *op. cit.*, p. 919.
21 H.M. Ateşin (1996) *Kıbrıs'ta İslâmî* [Islamic Identity], *op. cit.*, p. 281.
22 A. Nevzat and M. Hatay (2009) 'Politics, Society and the Decline', *op. cit.*, p. 912.
23 T. Atalay (2005) 'Öğretmen ve Müfredat' [Teachers and Curriculum], *op. cit.*, p. 15.
24 B. Yeşilada (2009) 'Islam and the Turkish Cypriots', *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 56.
25 B. Yeşilada, P. Noordijk and C. Webster (2009) 'Religiosity and Social Values of the Cypriots', *Social Compass*, Vol. 56, No. 1, p. 21.
26 See, for instance, the reactions of the KTÖEOS (Kıbrıs Türk Orta Eğitim Öğretmenler Sendikası – Turkish Cypriot Secondary Education Teachers' Union) and KTÖS (Kıbrıs Türk Öğretmenler Sendikası – Turkish

Cypriot educators, in the Greek Cypriot case, the role of the Church was and remains important, perpetuating a religious and political conservatism among Greek Cypriot teachers and educators. Important associations of Greek Cypriot educators express conservatism in many cases and obscurantism of an education that remains linked to religiousness and the nationalism that is expressed by the ecclesiastic institution on the island.[27] Indicative of this differentiation is the fact that it is often noted by officials from Turkey that north Cyprus needs more mosques and more religious education to compensate for the links that exist between the Greek Cypriot community and the Church of Cyprus in the south.

Changes in Turkey: Islam as a Component of the National Identity

Radical transformations, often at a speed that makes an understanding of them more difficult, and changes to the ideological framework are the main characteristics of the transitional period that Turkey entered after the rise of AKP to power. Political Islam in Turkey is a complex evolutionary process, which under no circumstances should be perceived as static. Analysts note that during the 80s, the Turkish nation used Islam, emphasising Islamic values, in an effort to promote faith in its citizens, who have various origins, and to maintain the territorial integrity of the country. The Turkish-Islamic synthesis became the official ideology of the state elite since that period and played an important role in the rise of a kind of Turkish Islamism in Turkey.[28] During Kenan Evren's period, Sunni Islam was conceived as an important tool for the promotion of social and political stability in the country.[29] It is characteristic that Turgut Özal has been the first Turkish Prime Minister to make the pilgrimage to Mecca during his premiership. Important Islamic institutions were supported, while through various decisions, the framework to legitimise religion was given.[30] Therefore, during and after the 80s, political Islam in Turkey was legitimised in a social, cultural, economic and political field.

Cypriot Teachers' Union) regarding the compulsory religious education in Turkey and Cyprus.

27 M.N. Michael (2007) 'Ethnothriskeytiki Ellinki kai Tourkiki Paideia stin Kypro' [Ethno-religious Greek and Turkish Education in Cyprus], *Historica*, Vol. 24, No. 46, pp. 43–64. See also: P. Persianis (1978) *Church and State in Cyprus Education: The Contribution of the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus to Cyprus Education during the British Administration (1878–1960)*, Nicosia: Violaris.

28 M. Şen (2010) 'Transformation of Turkish Islamism and the Rise of the Justice and Development Party', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 61.

29 *Ibid.*, p. 67.

30 H. Yavuz (2003) *Islamic Political Identity*, *op. cit.*, p. 75. For education matters during this period, see: N. Moudouros (2012) *O Metashimatismos tis Tourkias. Apo tin Kemaliki Kyriarhia ston Islamiko Neofileleytherismo* [The Transformation of Turkey: From the Kemalist Prevalence to the Islamic Neoliberalism], Athens: Alexandreia, p. 203.

Today, political Islam is represented by AKP and Tayyip Erdogan. Above all, it is the carrier of a Turkish and not only Islamic transformation, which does not appear to be based on an absolute rupture with the nationalistic Kemalist ideology but instead combines it with religiousness. In this framework, and since the first electoral victory of the AKP, its political leaders promote the 'Islamic way of life' in Turkish society.[31] The current administration in Turkey understands religiousness as a *national element* that is not opposed to the modernisation of the country whilst recent works mention that religiosity is a sound measure of conservatism in Turkey.[32] It is noteworthy that in the government agenda after the 2002 elections, AKP noted that its educational policy targets the better legislation of religious education, always in the framework of a secular state in an effort to maintain the cultural values of Turks.[33] At present, political Islam in Turkey has managed to maintain religious faith, Islam, as an element of Turkishness, subverting the Kemalist ideology which degraded the importance of religion and religious identity. It is characteristic that Turkey's President Abdullah Gül, debunking the essence of *Kemalist secularity* and disconnecting it completely from *westernization*, has said in the past that the representatives of classic Kemalism are

> '... antireligious. They are not secular elite. They want to create another religion, the atheism. It is the seculars who are not tolerant and who want to impose their lifestyle here. They do these for the sake of the Western world, but if you look at Western countries, none of them is like this'.[34]

In this manner, Abdullah Gül gave the message that the power of westernisation of the country could be Islam itself, something that in previous decades had not only seemed impossible but also contradictory. The current administration in Turkey, in other words, seeks the transformation of the Kemalist Turkish state into a state with a powerful Islamic ideological framework.[35]

In the course of the Kemalist ideology from 1923 onwards, the term *Turk* replaces the term *Muslim*, and religious faith is no longer the primary element that defined the identity of the citizens of the Turkish state.[36] In the process of enforcing political Islam as the dominant political power in modern Turkey, the term Turk is combined with the term Muslim. In this framework of change, education is of primary importance, especially where the consolidation of a new national identity is concerned, an identity whose components are Islam and the religious identity of Turkish citizens. Furthermore, recent studies reveal that the Turkish public has become more

31 N.B. Criss (2010) 'Dismantling Turkey: The Will of the People?', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 45.

32 B.A. Yeşilada and P. Noordijk (2010) 'Changing Values in Turkey: Religiosity and Tolerance in Comparative Perspective', *Turkish Studies*, Vol. 11, No. 1, p. 10.

33 A. Şaşmaz (2013) 'To Which Direction Does the Education Policy of AK Parti Change?', *Insight Turkey*, Vol. 2, No. 2, pp. 40–47.

34 S. Peterson (1998) 'Can Miniskirts and Veils Walk Amid Mosques?', *The Christian Science Monitor International*, 20 January.

35 S. Anagnostopoulou (2004) *Tourkikos Eksihronismos* [Turkish Modernity.], *op. cit.*, p. 90.

36 T. Bora (2002) 'Ordu ve Milliyetçilik' [Army and Nationalism], *Birikim*, Vol. 160/161, p. 58.

conservative during the period from 1995 to 2005.[37] Analysts note that one of the overriding forces assisting the formation and politicisation of the new Islamic framework in Turkey is religious education.[38] In an effort to understand the changes that are attempted in relation to Turkish Cypriot education, it is necessary to outline the politics of AKP in the matter of education in Turkey itself. Relevant research into the subject demonstrates the gradual change in relation to education in AKP's agenda. While educational issues were not a main priority in AKP's agenda, it seems that from 2007 onward, education is placed as a core priority in AKP's policy; while up to 2011, specific changes in the legislative framework established education along with its contents as a basic part of governing the country.[39]

The importance of education in relation to the change in the ideological framework is especially apparent from the fact that a public debate on the possible threat to the secularity of the Turkish nation by political Islam was principally focused on the matter of education and the use of the Islamic scarf.[40] Moreover, since that period, the educational policy of the nation was directly and intensely related to two pillars: first, the creation of a new Turkish identity whose content would be defined by religious cultural values, that is Islam and second, the connection between education and economic and developmental policy.[41]

In this framework, the increase of students attending religious types of schools (Imam-Hatip) and the introduction of selective courses of religious content in public education, such as courses entitled 'The Qur'an' and 'The Life of the Prophet', were promoted.[42] More specifically, according to accusations of Turkish educators, the government of AKP seems to be pursuing the increase of students in the Imam-Hatip types of schools at the expense of secular public schools. Additionally, 2004's legislation allows the entrance of Imam-Hatip alumni into higher education institutions, while the governing party appears to be favouring the appointment of Imam-Hatip alumni to various government departments and institutions.[43] Imam-Hatip schools were formed in 1923, and before the dominance of political Islam in Turkey, they consisted of an effort to control the

37 B.A. Yeşilada and P. Noordijk (2010) 'Changing Values in Turkey', *op. cit.*, p. 24.

38 H. Yavuz (2003) *Islamic Political Identity*, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

39 A. Şaşmaz (2013) 'To Which Direction', *op. cit.*, pp. 40–47. It is worth mentioning that under the AKP government, the main debate over secularism focused almost exclusively on religious education and the headscarf issue. See: H. Yavuz (2009) *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

40 H. Yavuz (2009) *Secularism and Muslim Democracy*, *op. cit.*, p. 163.

41 For the connection of the economy with education see: K. İnal and G. Akkaymak (2012) (eds), *Neoliberal Transformation of Education in Turkey: Political and Ideological Analysis of Educational Reforms in the Age of AKP*, New York: Palgrave Macmillan.

42 According to data given by the Turkish authorities, between 2001 and 2010, the number of registered students in Quran courses tripled. See: A. Yildiz (2013) 'Türkiye'de Yetişkin Eğitiminin Dönüşümü. Halk Eğitiminden Yaşam Boyu Öğrenmeye' [Transformation of Adult Education in Turkey. From Popular Education to Life Long Learning], *Eleştirel Pedagoji*, Vol. 5, No. 26, p. 11.

43 A. Rabasa and F.S. Larrabee (2008) *The Rise of Political Islam in Turkey*, Santa Monica: Rand, p. 19.

state with a religious type of education.[44] During the period when secular Kemalism was applied to Imam-Hatip schools, the schools were even threatened with extinction, and when they later continued to operate, a group of regulations and legislations encouraged secular education and discouraged enrolment in the Imam-Hatips. When the Turko-Islamic composition of the 80s appeared to create a problem in relation to intense Islamic activity, the coup d'état of 1997 came as an effort to weaken Islam. Under these circumstances, one of the most important blows to Islam was the establishment of various regulations that aimed at making it more difficult to enrol alumni of religious schools in higher education.[45] Today with the rise of AKP to power, it seems that the opposite logic is developing. New laws encourage enrolment in Imam-Hatip types of schools and discourage enrolment in secular types of public schools. Analysts believe that this change in relation to the Imam-Hatips, and more specifically their conversion to normal middle education schools along with the possibilities offered to their alumni, are one of the most important channels of cultural transformation of Turkish society from the strict secularity of the Kemalist framework to the rise of the Muslim element of identity. These schools have operated as a space from which a dynamic Islamic class of intellectuals and entrepreneurs has risen.[46]

In relation to the neoliberal policy of the ruling party in Turkey and the role of religion, it is perhaps important to note that historically religion and its representatives, a typically conservative space, cultivate a lifestyle whose chief characteristic is compromise. In Islam, because there is no organised Church, as is the case with Christianity, and because the political coexists or is often part of the religious, this compromise is even more intense, and it is undoubtedly more acceptable. Within this way of thinking, any possible reaction seems to be a counteraction against the religious framework. Hence, every political reaction contains an element of a lack of faith on a religious level. As recent research has demonstrated, Islam and the development of an intense religiousness in Turkish society ultimately operate as the framework of acceptance and consolidation of the neoliberal policies on an economic and political level.[47] Following criticism of the new educational policy of the Turkish government, the new educational system is oriented to prepare students for a competitive economy, and the textbooks published after 2005 reflect a neoliberal language and agenda.[48] What is more, the AKP administration is accused of making the language of economics dominant in educational literature and practices since it came to power in Turkey.[49]

44 M.K. Coskun and B. Senturk (2012) 'The Growth of Islamic Education in Turkey: The AKP's Policies toward Imam-Hatip Schools', in K. İnal and G. Akkaymak (eds), *Neoliberal Transformation*, *op. cit.*, p. 166.

45 N. Moudouros (2012) *O Metashimatismos* [The Transformation of Turkey], *op. cit.*, p. 227.

46 H. Yavuz (2003) *Islamic Political Identity*, *op. cit.*, p. 122.

47 N. Moudouros (2012) *O Metashimatismos* [The Transformation of Turkey], *op. cit.*, p. 304.

48 H. Koşar-Altınyelken and G. Akkaymak (2012) 'Curriculum Change in Turkey: Some Critical Reflections', in K. İnal and G. Akkaymak (eds), *Neoliberal Transformation*, *op. cit.*, p. 67.

49 K. İnal (2012) 'The Educational Politics of the AKP: The Collapse of Public Education in Turkey', in K. İnal and G. Akkaymak (eds), *Neoliberal Transformation*, *op. cit.*, p. 21.

A New Era: Islam and Turkish Cypriot Education

In the new framework of the last decade in Turkey and especially after 2008, the changes that are attempted in the Turkish Cypriot educational system on behalf of Turkey are primarily concerned with the penetration of an Islamic religiousness and the abandonment of the strict Kemalist secularity. According to publications of Turkish Cypriot educators, vis-à-vis the changes promoted in the Turkish Cypriot educational system, these concern the formation of a framework similar to Turkey.[50] Despite the fact that it has generated a lot of reaction regarding the danger of Islamifying society, this policy of the Turkish government should not, in the opinion of this author, be seen as an effort to 'Islamify' the Turkish Cypriots; rather it should be regarded as an effort to 'Turkify' them. As the secularity of Turkish nationalism after 1923 gradually tried to integrate the Turkish Cypriots into the Turkish nation, whose central identifying element was secularity, in the same manner, religiousness or rather the religious dimension of Turkishness re-introduces the Turkish Cypriots into the Muslim Turkish nation.

This process, therefore, differs from the previous one since it corresponds to the new connotation of the term Turk, which is defined, or at least there is an effort to explain it, by the political Islam that is in power. This Turkifying regards the Turkish Cypriots first and above all as Muslim Turks, an integral part of the Turkish nation. It is characteristic that the term Turkish Cypriot is used as little as possible by officials of the Turkish government. It seems, then, that the government of AKP tries through the institutions that it controls, religious and otherwise, to promote among the Turkish Cypriots the term Muslim Turks of Cyprus instead of Turkish Cypriots. This development is especially important if one considers that the Turkish Cypriots still insist on calling themselves Cypriot Turks – Turkish Cypriots (Kıbrıslı Türk) rather than using the term Turk of Cyprus (Kıbrıs Türkü).

All the interventions and developments that originate from the Turkish government and are carried out in a religious framework in relation to the Turkish Cypriot community seek to change the identity of the Turkish Cypriots in a renewal of the effort to Turkify them. Rather like the attention focused after the end of the Ottoman period and the founding of the Republic of Turkey, emphasis is firmly placed on the Turkish nation when defining the Turkish Cypriots in relation to the nation, or rather defining them as an integral part of the nation. Likewise, with the rise of AKP in power, there is an effort to foreground the religious dimension of the national identity and the definition of the Turkish Cypriots as an integral part of a Muslim Turkish nation.

In this framework and regardless of changes that originated with the Turkish government, the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots should be defined if not completely, then at least to some degree by religion, which seeks to be dominant in the Turkish Cypriot community in much the same way as it is in Turkey. This is realised despite the fact that, as mentioned before, the Turkish

50 T. Gökçebel (2013) 'AKP'nin Kıbrıs Politikası' [AKP's Cyprus Policy], *Eleştirel Pedagoji*, Vol. 5, No. 26, pp. 32–35.

Cypriot community is one in which religion plays a very small role. After the rise of AKP to power, an attempt was initiated to forge a new reality in relation to Islam in the Turkish Cypriot community and highlight Islam as a component of the new emerging political framework. An intense public discussion about the necessity of religious education began within the community with diverging views. Religious officials announced that the operation of religious schools on the island is necessary since there are no schools to prepare the clergy. Talip Atalay, the religious affairs official, advocated the operation of religious schools, underlining the fact that relevant laws do not restrict the operation of such schools, and he proceeded to note that in reality the operation of religious schools is a necessity for Cyprus.[51]

Educators' unions as well as a large section of the community reacted intensely in an effort to stop the operation of religious schools, while religion-related agents and the new administration in Turkey announced their support of this possibility. The reaction of the Turkish Cypriots brings to the fore that basically, the policy of AKP in relation to the community and especially in regard to education, aims to gradually integrate the community into the newly defined Muslim Turkish nation.[52] It is characteristic that the union KTÖS openly accuses the Turkish government of promoting religious education in Cyprus in the context of an organised scheme that threatens the existence of the Turkish Cypriot community. The union notes that the identity, the culture and the understanding of religion plus the quality of life of the Turkish Cypriot community is in danger because of changes promoted by the Turkish government that aim to transform the Turkish Cypriots into religious people,[53] and the union's General Secretary noted that this equates to an attack on Cyprus.[54] To demonstrate the reaction of the educators' unions, it should be noted that a lawsuit was apparently filed on behalf of KTÖS and KTOEÖS against the Turkish Cypriot Minister of Education and the relevant authority of Technical and Training Education. As reported in a relevant publication, the unions accuse the authorities of promoting harmful changes in the Turkish Cypriot community.[55]

Undeterred by these reactions, within a short period of time, various religious educational institutions began operating in Cyprus with economic support, largely from Turkey. It was decided to create a theological school in the University of Near East as well as a theological school in the

51 'Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın İmam Yetiştirmeye İhtiyacı Yok' [No Need for Imam Training in 'Northern Cyprus'], see: *BIA Haber Merkezi*, 15 November 2011.

52 T. Gökçebel (2013) 'AKP'nin Kıbrıs Politikası' [AKP's Cyprus Policy], *op. cit.*, p. 35.

53 For statements by the Secretary of KTÖS Burak Maviş, see: 'Ada Bilim Eğitim Vakfı, AKP'nin Üzerinden Yayılma Projenin Bir Ürünüdür' [The Island Science Education Foundation is a Product of the AKP's Project for Spreading from Above], Newspaper *GazeddaKıbrıs*, 2 January 2014.

54 'Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın İmam Yetiştirmeye İhtiyacı Yok' [No Need for Imam Training in 'Northern Cyprus'], see: *BIA Haber Merkezi*, 15 November 2011.

55 'İlahiyat Koleji'yle "Suni İslam Modeli" Dayatılıyor' [With the Theology College the 'Sunni Islamic Model' is Imposed], see: Newspaper *Havadis Online*, 17 January 2014 [last entry: 5 June 2014]. See also the article written by KTOEÖS chairman, T. Gökçebel (2013) 'AKP'nin Kıbrıs Politikası' [AKP's Cyprus Policy], *op. cit.*, pp. 30–35.

area of Mia Milia, while the operation of an Imam Hatip school as a department of Haspolat Endüstri Meslek Lisesi (Haspolat Industrial Vocational High School) was also decided. The most important transformation, however, was the decision to turn the religion course into a compulsory course in education together with the organising and initiating of courses on the Qur'an, in which students can participate. There was also a change in the Ministry, since a new department was established, the Department of Islamic and Theological Affairs.

The Theological School (*İlahiyat Fakültesi*) of the Near East University (*Yakın Doğu Üniversitesi*), the first of its kind to open in the Turkish Cypriot community, commenced operation during the 2011–2012 academic year and seeks, as claimed in information given by the University,

> 'to bring up highly qualified individuals who are specialists in their fields to become religious officials and religious teachers, to facilitate the internalization of national, religious, spiritual, moral and cultural values and to keep these values alive, to bring up strong minded youth to support and contribute to the development of Turkish Republic and Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'.[56]

Quintessentially, the faculty, apart from the practical goal of creating religion specialists has, according to the University, also been transformed into the connecting link between Turkey and Turkish Cypriots, on the basis of the religious – which is also the national – identity. Characteristic of the supportive effort to convince students to attend this particular faculty is the fact that all students are given a scholarship to aid with their studies,[57] while at the beginning of the faculty's operation, it was announced by the Dean of the University that on the grounds of the University, the largest mosque in Cyprus would be erected in a nearby area.[58]

As far as the Theological School in the Mia Milia area (*Hala Sultan İlahiyat Koleji*) is concerned, its foundation stone was placed on 20 July 2012, and it was announced that a mosque would also be erected there to serve the area as well as the students of the School.[59] In this school, religious matters will be taught in addition to the Qur'an, and lessons on Arabic will be available. According to articles in the Turkish Cypriot press, the operation of the School was received positively in Turkey, while it was recorded as an event that would lift all the obstacles from operating religious schools in Cyprus.[60] The construction of the complex and the mosque were

56 Available at: http://www.neu.edu.tr/tr/node/1363 [last entry: 12 May 2014].

57 H. Özder (2013) 'Kıbrıs Türk Eğitim Sistemine AKP İlgisi' [The Interest of AKP to the Turkish Cypriot Education System], *Eleştirel Pedagoji*, Vol. 5, No. 26, p. 28.

58 'YDÜ: Ülkenin En Büyük Camisini Yapacağız' [YDÜ: We'll Built the Biggest Mosque in the Country], Newspaper *Kıbrıs Postası*, 27 April 2012.

59 'Hala Sultan İlahiyat Koleji Resmen Açıldı' [Hala Sultan Theological College Officially Opened], Newspaper *Gündem Kıbrıs*, 27 September 2013.

60 'KKTC'de Yıllardır Açılmaması için her türlü engel Çıkarılan İmam Hatip Lisesi Nihayet Açıldı' [Imam Hatip

received favourably in the Turkish press, while statements made by the Deputy Prime Minister, BeKir Atalay, affirmed that this feat connects the Turkish Cypriot community to Turkey.[61]

The building of new mosques, usually even larger than the existing, is another way to affect the secular identity of the Turkish Cypriots and to transform the area, in the words of the Turkish Prime Minister, into a Turkish Muslim country. The Turkish Cypriot groups that reacted intensely to the creation of new mosques point out that there are already 193 mosques in the occupied areas, while there are only 162 schools.[62] Over and above this they make accusations about the large number of Mosques that have been built on the island during the last decade – a Mosque in each village, has been noted – moreover, a new need has arisen, that of staffing these mosques with clergy. Consequently, as a result of this prerequisite, the discussion for the operation of religious schools on the island has also increased.[63]

In relation to the compulsory teaching of the religion course in public education, it is observed that in 2009, despite the intense reaction of the Turkish Cypriot educators' unions, it was nonetheless established as a compulsory course from the fourth to the eighth grade.[64] From information provided, this compulsory religious instruction covers religion, culture and ethics and focuses primarily on Islam. Attendance is compulsory for all students, while non-Muslims may be exempted from attendance after a request by their guardians. At higher levels, the religion course is a selective course. In the framework of promoting religious education, an Imam Hatip school began operating as a department of the professional high school *Haspolat Endüstri Meslek Lisesi*. In this particular school, students were registered from a specific area of Nicosia. And according to accusations by the teacher's unions, while this particular high school is connected to a technical school in Turkey, in Cyprus it promotes religious education.[65]

A number of important articles in the Turkish Cypriot press concern statements mainly from educators about the organisation of religious holidays for students in Turkey through the Turkish embassy. As claimed in these statements, Imams living in Cyprus approach Turkish Cypriot families to convince them to allow their children to participate in summer camps in Turkey. In

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Secondary School finally opened after a long struggle against many obstacles preventing its opening in the 'TRNC'], see: *Dünya Bülteni Haber Portalı*, 27 September 2013 [last entry: 5 June 2014].

61 'İlk İmam Hatip Lisesi Açıldı' [First Religious Vocational High School Opened], Newspaper *Yeniçağ*, 29 September 2013.

62 T. Gökçebel (2013) 'AKP'nin Kıbrıs Politikası' [AKP's Cyprus Policy], *op. cit.*, p. 35.

63 'Kuzey Kıbrıs'ın İmam Yetiştirmeye İhtiyacı Yok' [No Need for Imam Training in 'Northern Cyprus'], see: *BIA Haber Merkezi*, 15 November 2011.

64 A. Dayioğlu (2013) 'Aleviler, Zorunlu Din Dersleri, "Cemevi ve Kültür Kompleksi"' [Alevis, Compulsory Religious Education ,'Cemevi and Culture Complex'], Newspaper *Yeni Düzen*, 29 December 2013.

65 For statements by the Chairman of the KTOEÖS, Tahir Gökçebel, see: 'Haspolat Endüstri Meslek Lisesi'ne "İmam Hatip Bölümü" Açılıyor' [The Haspolat Industrial Vocational High School Opens an 'Imam Hatip Department'], Newspaper *Kıbrıs Postası*, 14 November 2011.

keeping with the statements, the children there are taught religious lessons besides lessons about the Qur'an on a daily basis.[66] This development created a strong reaction from Turkish Cypriot educators and their unions. In their statements, they mentioned that the Turkish Cypriot community is a secular community and any education should come from educators and not from clergy.[67]

All of the above evidences the fact that after 2007, a process of enhancing the Islamic element as part of its identity began in the Turkish Cypriot community. This process is especially intense concerning educational matters, and it combines changes in the educational system and an increase of religious spaces. Notwithstanding the reaction from some educators as well as from sections of society, it seems that these changes will be permanent. In conclusion, in the face of the obvious analyses of an Islamifying agenda, the essence of AKP's policy and its effort to empower religiousness among the Turkish Cypriot community through education is a renewal of the endeavour to Turkify the community on a political level and a re-introduction of the community to the larger national group – the Muslim Turkish nation. Although this Turkifying will establish Turkey's policy in relation to the community as accepted and indisputable, it will simultaneously establish economic development, and an understanding of the neoliberal reality as a natural course. And more importantly, it will categorise any Turkish Cypriot reaction to this new reality as a sign of a lack of faith and, that being the case, as a sign of the absence of their Turkishness.

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Accounting in Cyprus during Late Ottoman and Early British Rule, 1840 to 1918

Andrekos Varnava, Peter Clarke

Abstract

Compared to many developed countries in the former British Empire, little has been written about the accounting history of the Mediterranean island of Cyprus. This article attempts to fill this void. It focuses on the transition in accounting practice from the last four decades of Ottoman rule to the first four decades of British rule. The main focus is on the significant influences on the development of accounting practice on the island during the four decades from the start of the British occupation and administration in 1878, ending with the Great War in 1918. This period constitutes the 'source phase' of the theory proposed by McKinnon (1986), and therefore the beginning of modern accounting practice in both the public and private sectors. Like other studies on the history of accounting in various states, this paper argues that the practice of accounting evolved in response to political, economic, legal, social and military changes and challenges.

Keywords: Ottoman Cyprus, British Cyprus, Colonial development, economy, accounting practice

Introduction

British influence in its former Empire has been enormous and can be described, for example, in social, cultural, political, military, legislative and economic terms. In recent times, various accounting scholars have investigated aspects of this colonial imprint. Initially, much of this literature has explored the emergence of accounting practice primarily in the Anglo-American context (for example, Macdonald, 1984; Miranti, 1986; Willmott, 1986; Walker, 1991; Lee, 1995) as well as in former colonies of the British Empire (Carnegie, 1993; Chua and Poullaos, 1993, 1998 and 2002; Carnegie and Parker, 1999; Kim, 2004; Sian, 2006; Dyball, Chua and Poullaos, 2006; Dyball, Poullaos and Chua, 2007). More recently, Poullaos and Sian (2010) traced the formation of professional accountancy bodies in selected colonial outposts, within the context of the empire experience. The British influence on accounting practise in Cyprus has, however, remained largely unexplored by historians.

In 1878 Cyprus came under British occupation and administration, it was then annexed in 1914, and subsequently it became a Crown Colony from 1925, until granted independence in 1960. Thus, Cyprus, together with Gibraltar, Ireland and Malta, is one of the few former European colonies of the British Empire. To date, only four articles have been published on the accounting history of Cyprus in the English language and each will be briefly mentioned in chronological

order of publication. The first article succinctly described the export of British company legislation and its accounting requirements to some Commonwealth countries, including Cyprus (Walton, 1986). The next article outlined some developments in accounting on the island during the lengthy period from its early civilisation to more modern times (Clarke, 2011). More recently, Clarke and Varnava (2013) described the various factors which influenced accounting practice in Cyprus from the end of the Great War until Cypriot independence in 1960. Finally, there is a biographical paper outlining the life of Nevvar Hickmet, who was the first Cypriot to qualify as a member of the prestigious Institute of Chartered Accountants in England and Wales in 1937 (Clarke, 2013).

This article aims to add to the little literature on the history of accounting in Cyprus, by covering the late Ottoman and early British periods of rule, therefore the period from the 1840s until the end of the Great War. Exploring change in accounting practice over time offers an alternative approach with which to discuss the economic and social developments of any country. Specifically, this article addresses two issues: the transition in accounting practice from Ottoman rule (c. 1840) through the four decades of British rule (1878–1918); and the significant factors which either hindered or encouraged the development of accounting practice on the island during that time, particularly the British period. Hence, the focus will be on the changes that took place in the last decades of Ottoman rule and the subsequent context of Cyprus as a British 'inconsequential possession'. Given this orientation, in relation to accounting literature, this article supports the findings of Tinker (1980, 1991), Neu (2000), and Davie (2005) regarding the non-neutrality of accounting within a colonial context.

Most accounting historians accept that accounting is an evolutionary social technique. This viewpoint requires an appropriate 'conceptual framework' to examine the phenomenon under investigation. Over the years various researchers have adopted different approaches to investigate (financial and managerial) accounting history and, perhaps understandably, there is no consensus regarding which approach is more appropriate than others. For example, Napier argues that there are three approaches but these are not exhaustive. The first approach represents understanding the past, which focuses on the analysis of original accounting records and events, but this approach may suffer from the 'danger of premature generalisation ... which could potentially lead to deceptive conclusions' (Napier, 1989, p. 239). The second approach is to locate accounting in its socio-historical context. The late Professor Anthony Hopwood (1983 and 1987) argued that the dynamics of accounting history must be studied in its social and organisational context so as to identify the preconditions for change, the underlying pressures and influences and the process of such change. The third approach, namely, the new positivism approach relies on the use of empirical data to test theories and predict future accounting practice but this is difficult to apply in exploratory historical studies.

Jill McKinnon's (1986) theoretical framework, based on social systems theory, helps to explain the accounting transition in Cyprus from Ottoman to British rule. Her framework views the

accounting system as one of the social systems of a country, which operates within a political, cultural and economic context. As a result the accounting system is affected and affects other social systems, and the process is interactive and interconnected. This perspective acknowledges that accounting information is a human invention; that practice of accounting in any country does not exist in a vacuum but, rather, is contingent on a variety of political, economic, legal and social factors that influences its development (Zeff, 1971). The development of accounting practice in Cyprus does not deviate from this orientation. The methodology adopted in this paper is to trace, through primary and secondary sources, the development of accounting practice in Cyprus commencing in the last decades of Ottoman rule (c. 1840) through to the four decades of British occupation and administration (1878–1918). The sources are scarce, since there is a lack of company records, mostly consisting of government correspondence, memoranda and report. The article is structured as follows. The next section outlines the Ottoman context, which includes a consideration of the Ottoman Commercial Code. The article then focusses on the period of British occupation and administration using a chronological-analytical framework to contextualise how (i) Cyprus as an 'inconsequential possession'; (ii) the administrative system in Cyprus; (iii) changes in education; (iv) the creation of savings banks and the co-operative movement; and (v) the Great War, all played a pivotal role in the development of accounting practice in Cyprus.

The Ottoman Context

The Ottoman context is vital in understanding any issue or theme for the early period of British rule of Cyprus. There is a significant difference between Cyprus and most other British colonial possessions, with the exception of Egypt and the mandates in the Middle East, and that is that the island came under British control after being under Ottoman rule for some 300 years. This transition was recently explored by Burrows and Cobbin (2011) in relation to Mesopotamia/Iraq, but it is important to note that Iraq emerged as a British League of Nations Mandate after World War I until 1931 and then obtained 'independence', and accordingly started out on its path towards becoming a nation-state as a part of the British Empire. In addition, Brock and Richardson (2013) discuss the development of the accounting profession in Palestine, which was also a British Mandate, although for longer, from 1922 to 1948. In contrast to both studies, Cyprus was occupied much earlier and did not achieve political independence until much later, in 1960, and the local accountancy profession did not emerge in Cyprus until 1961, when the Institute of Certified Public Accountants of Cyprus was founded. Although there are significant differences between the three cases there were also obvious similarities, such as the certain continuities from the Ottoman period. Consequently, this article focuses on the earliest period possible in the life of a colonial possession, the point at which a colony (or in the case of Cyprus an overseas possession without the responsibility of sovereignty) transitioned from the rule of one imperial power to another.

There are different views about the nature of Ottoman rule of Cyprus, but a recent book attempts to bridge the differences between various ethnocentric studies and those that use strict historical methodology (Michael, Kappler and Gavriel, 2009; Aymes (2014). During the nineteenth century, the Ottoman government, in order to secure its territorial integrity against expansionist European powers and internal movements desiring autonomy or independence, embarked upon the *Tanzimat* (reorganisation). This started in 1839 and introduced socio-economic changes, which included restructuring of government institutions and efforts to renew the financial system (Quataert, 2000; Saygili and Cabuk, 2012). In 1840 the Ottoman government undertook the reorganisation of the finance system according to the French model and also introduced the first Ottoman paper banknotes. This did not mean that the age-old problems of dealing with different currencies, and therefore varying exchange rates, was particularly resolved (Pamuk, 2000, pp. 205–211), instead it continued to pose dilemmas and add to the workloads of accountants. Then in 1850 the Ottoman Empire introduced the *Ottoman Commercial Code*, again based on the French (Napoleonic) commercial code which had been adopted in a number of European countries during the early nineteenth century (McLeay, 1999). The Code was in keeping with the Ottoman Empire's efforts to redress its perceived decline by 'copying' various Western European initiatives. Gaspard Amirayan, a Barrister and the Assistant King's Advocate in Cyprus during British rule, noted that many commentators believed that the *Ottoman Commercial Code* was directly copied from the French Commercial Code, but he noted that there were points of divergence which could be attributed to accident or design since the Ottoman text of the Code indicated that modifications were made 'as was thought necessary to bring those provisions in harmony with the circumstances of the Ottoman Empire' (Amirayan, 1906, p. vi).

The *Ottoman Commercial Code* provided, inter alia, for the formation of business partnerships and also corporations (*Societe Anonyme)*, which corresponded to, but predated, the English limited liability company. However, unlike the variety of partnerships that could be created through registration with the Commercial Courts, a corporation could only be formed by prior Imperial Decree (Amirayan, 1906). It should be appreciated that this was capable of being a cumbersome process and open to failure. Some of the provisions of this *Ottoman Commercial Code* had important implications for the practice of accounting. Nonetheless, these provisions should not be considered to be unique to the Ottoman Empire or Cyprus because the French Commercial Code had been adopted in a number of European countries during the early nineteenth century (McLeay, 1999). The Code required that:

- Every trader had to record on a daily basis details of transactions, bills of exchange payable and receivable and maintain an inventory showing on an annual basis moveable property, debts and assets (Articles 3 and 4).
- The (accounting) books could not contain any blanks, obliterations or writing between the lines. At the start of each year, an officer of the Commercial Court would number

the pages and mark them at the end of the year, but the officer was not allowed 'whatsoever to read a single word' (Article 5).

- Only books which were kept in conformity with the legislation could be admitted as evidence in disputes arising between traders (Article 8).
- If a trader became bankrupt, then within three days of the cessation of payments, a declaration of bankruptcy had to be made and accompanied by the presentation of the balance sheet which would be certified as true, and signed and dated by the debtor.

The above accounting provisions required that basic accounting records be maintained so as to assist in the resolution of conflicts over debts between traders and also to facilitate bankruptcy proceedings.

Regardless, the Ottoman government did not strongly enforce the Commercial Code because it conflicted with the Islamic principles (Güvemli and Güvemli, 2006). There was no need for traders to maintain accounting records or prepare 'accounts' for the purpose of income tax assessment – an income tax on trading profits did not exist. A *verghi* (property) tax was assessed, theoretically, in proportion to an individual's actual income but this was assessed by the tax collector (done by the village head, the *mukhtar*) according to the estimated financial capacity of the person and it was commonly assessed at a fixed amount according to the nature of the business. Obviously, the level of subjectivity involved in this type of tax assessment facilitated corruption, favouritism and extortion. This taxation system continued during the early years of British rule, with the British being far more thorough in collection (Katsiaounis, 1996). But in 1906, the British abolished it and its disappearance, was (unsurprisingly) 'hailed with delight by the inhabitants' (Orr, 1918, p. 86). Indeed income tax, as it now applies, was not introduced to Cyprus until 1941 and the relevant legislation required that appeals against income tax assessments had to be supported by the submission of accounts by the assessed person and the inspector of taxes also had the right of access to all accounting books of the trader (Clarke, 2011; Clarke and Varnava, 2013).

The role of accounting should then be viewed within the context of the economic fabric of the society in which it existed. Hadjianastasis (2009) among others noted that under Ottoman rule the economy of Cyprus was mostly dependent upon agriculture. When viewed from a Eurocentric perspective, the Ottoman Empire was deficient in economic management and Cyprus was a neglected outpost. Thus, Luke (1965, p. 222), quoting from a consular letter, dated 1867, which stated that 'nothing whatever is spent on the improvements of the country, no roads are constructed, no bridges thrown across the winter torrents (and there are) other instances of a careless or vicious administration'. Some years later, Sir Charles Orr, the Chief Secretary of the Cyprus colonial government during the time of the Great War was equally critical in stating that 'at the time of British occupation Cyprus possessed no harbours, no railways, and only one road,

twenty six miles in length, which connected the port of Larnaca with the capital [Nicosia]' and he concluded that 'agriculture [was] languishing, trade and commerce underdeveloped, [with] a general state of paralysis prevailing' on the island (Orr, 1918, pp. 66 and 172). But, a few successful and long-standing businesses were established during this period, such as the steamship, travel and forwarding, and insurance and banking agencies, Mantovani and Sons in 1856, Pierides in 1860 and Francoudi and Stephanou in 1895, and the import-export businesses of N.P. Lanitis and Company and Dickram Ouzounian and Company in 1895 (see Keshishian, 1985, pp. 1, 10, 12, 249, 256), together with the Imperial Ottoman Bank in 1864, but there was little evidence of a general need for accounting information over and above the procedures for double-entry accounting.

Given the economic condition of the island, there was little need for accounting records in domestic enterprises except in the case of resolving disputes with creditors. Admittedly, those traders that did not maintain adequate accounting records were at greater risk of theft and error by their employees and agents. But, there was no legislation in force requiring commercial enterprises to prepare accounting reports for shareholders or to submit 'accounts' for income tax purposes. Indeed, such developments would initially occur during the 1920s and thereafter. So, the underdeveloped state of accounting, in terms of book-keeping skills around the mid-nineteenth century reflected the needs of Cypriot society – a society that was agricultural and impoverished.

There is another important aspect in the context of the accounting transition from Ottoman to early British rule, namely, the method used to record various accounting transactions. Napier (2009) stresses two particular features of accounting practice in the Ottoman Empire which differed from the English practice of double-entry book-keeping. The first distinguishing feature is the '*Merdiban*' (ladder) method. The *Merdiban* method recorded information in the form of a table with overall totals at the top of the page and then more detailed breakdowns of these totals in parallel columns lower down, with various entries having the appearance of 'stairs' or the rungs of a ladder. The second distinguishing feature of Ottoman accounting is the use of *siyakat*. Yayla (2011) explains that *siyakat* is a calligraphy type with no definite script or punctuation marks – this provided a form of confidentiality – and this aspect had to be learned through a master-apprentice relationship. The use of *siyakat* in Ottoman accounting documents means that they can be read only by those who have studied this writing style and have some familiarity with other languages. Güvemli (2012) also notes that the Ottoman accounting entries were recorded from right to left in contrast to British (and western) double-entry book-keeping which uses writing from left to right. Thus, it is not surprising that Toraman and Ogreten (2013) found in their study that the internal accounting records of the business were significantly different compared to a contemporary western double-entry system. Related to this is the fact that the first book on double-entry book-keeping, specifically written for users in the Ottoman Empire, was published in 1830 (Ozbirecikli, Aslan and Odabus, 2008). Subsequently, the compulsory switch (for State accounting) to a double-entry book-keeping system was imposed by decree in 1880. State departments were forced to give up an accounting system which had been in use for nearly 600

years, and replace it with a double-entry book-keeping system which had been developed in another civilisation (Güvemli and Güvemli, 2006). The decree was made two years after administration of the island of Cyprus was granted to Britain.

After three centuries of Ottoman rule it was perceived, especially among the Cypriot Orthodox-Christian community, who represented about three-quarters of the island's population in the 1881 Census, that British 'administration' would bring immediate economic, political and social benefits (Varnava, 2009, pp. 157–158). An English-language newspaper in Cyprus at the time commented: 'although Cyprus has enjoyed little more than a month of English protection, a wonderful change has already taken place. At the port of Larnaca, restaurants, inns, ship-chandlers, and stores of every description have sprung up like magic' (*Cyprus: Weekly Journal*, 1878, p. 1). In order to understand the continuities and discontinuities in the transition from Ottoman to British rule, it is now necessary to more fully explore the early period of British rule of the island and how this impacted on the development of accounting practice.

Cyprus as an 'inconsequential possession' (c. 1878–1918)

It is important to explain why the British occupied Cyprus and the role that the island played within the British imperial system. British rule was based on the so-called Anglo-Turkish Convention signed on 4 June 1878, one week before the Congress of Berlin, and which was put into effect when the first British troops landed and raised the British flag in Nicosia on 12 July (Varnava, 2009, pp. 1, 93–97). The Conservative prime minister, Benjamin Disraeli, concluded a secret alliance with the Ottomans before the Congress met whereby Britain was allowed to 'occupy and administer' Cyprus in exchange for defending the Ottoman Empire against the Russians. The Ottomans retained sovereignty of the island, while the British planned to convert it into a 'place of arms' – a strategic military base from which British interests in the Ottoman Empire and beyond could be protected from Russia, and interests in the Suez Canal could also be protected. The perceived economic value of Cyprus was also an important consideration (Varnava, 2009). Some British commentators claimed Cyprus would be a source of boundless wealth and opportunity. For example, Robert Hamilton Lang, Britain's acting vice-consul since 1861, thought that Cyprus would become 'an oasis in the surrounding desert of unenlightened administrations' (Lang, 1878a, p. 199) and that in a 'few years the people of Cyprus will be the most favoured nation in the world' (Lang, 1878b, p. 329). As revealed by Lee (1931, p. 241), Colonel Robert Home of the war office intelligence department, when evaluating other possible Mediterranean acquisitions, argued that 'commercially, the island is admirably adapted for becoming a depot for English manufacturers and the trade into Syria and Asia Minor' and he also argued, in a somewhat evangelical tone, that if the occupation of Cyprus was a success then it would 'do more to convince eastern nations of the value of civilization, and the benefits of good government than anything else'.

But the reality of the island's actual strategic and economic value was somewhat different. Within weeks of the occupation the British government faced criticism over the selection from

both the Liberal opposition and leading radical newspapers and a serious crisis as the heat and pestiferous environment began to harm the health of the 10,000 strong British and Indian occupational forces. Although rejecting the criticism the government acted, conceding by its actions that the island was not suitable as a place to hold troops when it reduced the garrison to a mere few hundred and decided to build a hill station at Troodos for the remaining forces and government officials for the summer months (Varnava, 2005). Meanwhile three years before Egypt was occupied (which for years was claimed by successive British governments to be a temporary measure), the Conservative government that had occupied Cyprus announced that it would not be developing the silted harbour of Famagusta because the vicinity was too unhealthy and the local government had more important local priorities to spend its revenue. Wider imperial priorities were important in understanding the subsequent inconsequence of Cyprus. The British occupation of Egypt, albeit supposedly temporary, consequently made redundant the spending of money and time to redevelop Famagusta Harbour into a naval base. In 1879 the Russians threatened British interests in India with their diplomacy in Afghanistan, leading to the Second Anglo-Afghan War, so the Russians had bypassed the earlier areas of concern in Western Asia. Moreover, the necessity for the British to occupy Egypt in 1882 indicated how Cyprus was not the stronghold against threats to British interests in that country, and British priorities in the region began to revolve more and more on Egypt. Indeed the garrison in Cyprus, which had been increased in the first few years after the occupation of Egypt, was again reduced to a few hundred by 1894 (Varnava, 2009, pp. 205–208).

The initial British expectation of the economic value of Cyprus was also misplaced. During the first decade of British administration, there was little attempt to develop Cyprus into a commercial base and Famagusta harbour was not merely unsuitable for naval purposes but also for serious trade, while the ports at Limassol and Larnaca were open road-steads exposed to high winds and strong waves. Various other projects, both public and private, were proposed, but no major ones were pursued (Varnava, 2009, pp. 107–111, 132–134). In relation to private enterprise there was no significant involvement by financial institutions, companies or multinational enterprises in economic development during the early years of British administration. With proper reflection, if any British official had been sent to Cyprus before the decision to 'administer' it, they would have reported that in its current state the island would not have been capable of producing revenue to cover a British bureaucracy (which should have been assumed to be more expensive than an Ottoman) and providing for the development of the island. Wolseley, the first high commissioner, realised this and left the island a mere year into his appointment (Varnava, 2009, pp. 113–117).

Following Varnava (2009), Cyprus became an 'inconsequential possession' because the island lacked the strategic advantage, political importance and economic value initially desired. This does not mean that Cyprus was any different to the many other British colonies and overseas possessions, but it did not have the same value as other Mediterranean possessions, such as Malta

and Gibraltar.

British Liberals (as well as naval experts, see Martin, 1879) had always questioned the wisdom of occupying Cyprus and had identified it not only as inconsequential but as a burden on the British taxpayer (see Varnava, 2009, chapter 4). But during the Liberal government (and later the Coalition during the war) from 1907 this questioning went much further. It became set in the minds of most senior ministers that Britain should cede Cyprus to Greece in order to obtain other advantages. Indeed for Foreign Secretary Edward Grey, Cyprus was (in 1908) 'of no use to us and the Convention respecting it an anachronism and encumbrance, I would therefore give the island away in return for any better arrangements we could obtain. Indeed bargain or no bargain we should be better without Cyprus' (Varnava, 2009, p. 249). This resulted in proposals, led by First lord of the Admiralty, Winston Churchill, to cede the island to Greece in 1912 in order to obtain the naval upper-hand in the Mediterranean against Austria (Britain would obtain the naval use of the island of Cephalonia). Subsequently, there followed the failed official offer to cede Cyprus to Greece in October 1915 in exchange for Greece immediately entering the war (Varnava, 2009, chapter 8). The efforts to cede Cyprus to Greece would not have transpired had Cyprus been a vital strategic British possession. Varnava (2009, pp. 261–265) agreed with Meyer (1962, pp. 7–8) who noted that the rejection of Cyprus by Greece meant that it had joined 'England and Turkey on the list of nations whose interest in Aphrodite's isle could be termed less than vibrant'.

The 'temporary' nature of the British administration also impacted upon all areas of the development of the island. According to the Cyprus Convention, Britain's occupation was provisional and conditional. It has been suggested that the 'temporary' nature of the British occupation of Cyprus discouraged private and public investment in the island's economy, as there was no guarantee that such investment would be recovered in the event that the British evacuated it (Hill, 1952; Adams, 1964).

But the main reason for the lack of public and private investment was the requirement that Cypriot revenue pay an annual 'tribute' in respect of the defaulted Ottoman Crimean War Loan, which it (and France) had guaranteed. The amount of the annual tribute was eventually agreed at a fixed, annual payment at £92,799, although it could have been much lower had the rate of exchange of 1881 been taken in that year when the rate was agreed and not that of 1878 (Varnava, 2009, pp. 129–132), resulting in a subsequent Governor of the island, Ronald Storrs, claiming that the calculation was made with 'all that scrupulous exactitude characteristic of faked accounts' (Storrs, 1937, p. 489). Clearly, with total revenue from Cyprus reaching about £150,000–£200,000 per annum, then if payment of the annual tribute was required, important infrastructural and development works could not be undertaken. As Varnava (2009, pp. 129–132) noted the tribute came first in all matters pertaining to finance and reducing expenditure in Cyprus was a cornerstone of British policy. Writing at the turn of the twentieth century, a member of the Cyprus Legislative Council described the annual tribute as 'the heavy millstone round our neck [which] stopped all progress in the Island and which has prevented the carrying out of such

measures as would promote the welfare of the Island' (Chacalli, 1902, pp. 42–43). In simple terms, a significant portion of tax revenue in Cyprus was transferred to the British Treasury, with no gain for the island and this continued, admittedly with some reduction in 1907, until 1927. Thus, under the first years of British rule the engine of economic development – public and private investment in worthwhile capital projects – was not activated.

Serious government investment on development projects did not occur until the Colonial Secretary, Joseph Chamberlain (1895–1903) attempted to invest in hitherto neglected backwaters of the British Empire. His aim in Cyprus was to lift its 'inconsequence' by increasing agricultural production and exports by investing in various works through a £314,000 loan under the 1899 Colonial Loans Act: £60,000 for irrigation; £124,000 for Famagusta harbour; and £130,000 for a railway from Famagusta to Nicosia (Varnava 2009, pp. 139–145). These infrastructure projects stimulated growth in agricultural production and trade and brought increased prosperity to the people of the island. In turn, this additional government spending fuelled a demand for individuals well versed in book-keeping both within and outside the government sector. Aligned to this improved prosperity was the growth in population with the official census of population for 1881, 1891, 1901 and 1911 showing a significant rise in population, from 186,173, to 209,286, to 237,023 and 274,108 respectively. The rising population generated growth in commercial/accounting occupations, as reflected in the dramatic increase in the number of clerks from 282 in 1901 to 1,218 in 1911, and bank employees from a mere 11 in 1901 to 57 in 1911, as well as 25 as bankers or brokers. This upturn in the private sector was reflected, albeit to a lesser extent, in the government sector, with the civil service growing from 769 employees in 1901 to 847 in 1911 (Census of 1901 and 1911). This development will be discussed further later in this article in connection with the establishment of savings banks and the co-operative movement.

The Administrative System in Cyprus

The nature of the British occupation of the island placed various limitations on the administration, such as the retention of numerous Ottoman laws, including the Ottoman Commercial Code of 1850, and this was compounded by the island being a backwater because of little development and reform, except to the judiciary. Prior to the start of World War I, aspects of the Ottoman Commercial Code were being replaced through the passing of other laws. More broadly in the British Empire there had been a push to facilitate imperial co-operation and harmonising laws was taken up at both the 1907 and 1911 Imperial Conferences in London. In 1911 it was agreed that it was in the best interests of the Empire that there should be more uniformity throughout its centres and dependencies in the law of companies (Graham, 1929). The (UK) Companies Act of 1862, which was amended in 1900 and 1907, and then consolidated in 1908, was introduced to all British overseas possessions by 1917 except for Bermuda, Gibraltar, Malta, Newfoundland, the Seychelles, Egypt and Cyprus. Of these, Bermuda, Gibraltar and Malta were pivotal naval bases for the Empire and possessed little other advantages. In addition, all of

these territories, with the exception of Egypt had relatively small populations and trade was not the main purpose behind British imperialism in them. In the case of Cyprus, such legislation was only introduced after World War I, largely because of Cyprus' inconsequential nature: neither a trading centre, nor a strategic asset. Cyprus was left out of the process of transferral of commercial law, along with those other possessions listed, reflecting both the inconsequential nature of Cyprus' place within the British imperial system and the slow development of accounting.

Sir Charles Orr (1918, p. 177), the Chief Secretary in Cyprus from 1911 to 1917, claimed that in order to establish a British model of government, the services of a trained bureaucracy was necessary and he suggested that 'not a sparrow can fall to the ground without a report of the circumstances – probably in triplicate – eventually appearing on the table of the Chief Secretary to the Government, and being submitted to the High Commissioner for his information'. Part of this bureaucracy included the services of (English-speaking) administrators, some of whom needed to be well-versed with basic transaction-recording systems – admittedly primitive in that the records maintained reflected cash receipts and cash payments. The British transaction-recording system was based on the double-entry accounting system, supplemented by the use of the English language rather than the Ottoman *Merdiban* (Stairs) system which relied on Arabic text.

Soon after taking administrative control of the island, the British appointed their first Auditor General in February 1879 (Rokopou, 2002). The British focus on accounting systems and accountability was highlighted by the publication in the *Cyprus Gazette* (and in some local newspapers) of audited financial statements of government activities since, under the Constitution of 1882, the preparation and auditing of government accounts was mandatory. For instance, under the Municipal Councils' Ordinance (1882) the 'accounts' of the various municipal authorities were published at regular and frequent intervals, typically for a six-month period. They were produced in a timely fashion as, for example, the 'accounts' for the Nicosia district for the six months ended 31 December, 1887, which were published in the *Cyprus Gazette* on 22 February, 1888. The timeliness of these publications was facilitated by the nature of the financial disclosure – a 'Statement of Receipts and Expenditure' – what would be referred to in modern times as a statement of cash receipts and cash payments. These statements were basic in that they contained less than 10 items of receipts and 10 items of expenditure, together with the opening and closing (cash) balance on the account. A balance sheet was not published. A reasonable explanation for this omission is that the balance sheet was largely irrelevant for a municipal authority whose transactions consisted mainly of tax receipts and various items of cash expenditure of a current nature. Indeed, if there were capital expenditure items they were treated for reporting purposes as being current in nature. The 'accounts' were audited by two persons – usually one Greek Cypriot and one Turkish Cypriot. The typical auditors' report was worded as follows: 'We certify that we have examined the accounts ... and that the above is a correct statement of its receipts and expenditure during the (6-month) period' (*Cyprus Gazette*, 24 February, 1888, p. 1121). The

maintenance of all these financial records required individuals properly trained in basic accounting techniques, together with knowledge of the English language. It is interesting to note that accounting frauds occurred. A case in point was in 1896 when the cashier/accountant in the Public Works Department, a Mr Griffin, was charged with embezzlement. The High Commissioner wrote that in the 'course of the enquiry into the charges, the accounts of the department were found to be in such a state of confusion that it was impossible to say how much of the deficiency was due to fraud, and how much to muddle' (see CO 67/98/6463, CO 67/98/6444, No. 61, and CO 67/98/7413, No. 70). It is likely that the unfavourable publicity of such frauds emphasised the necessity of book-keeping skills and the job opportunities for such clerks who spoke English.

Yet the government's cost-cutting efforts saw accounting staff reduced, negatively impacting upon the development of accounting in the island. During the nineteenth century the main department in the Cyprus colonial bureaucracy, after the Treasury, that required skilled accounting was the General Engineer's Department (later renamed the Public Works Department). Samuel Brown headed this department from 1880–1889 and did great work under trying financial circumstances, planning and constructing the road network, piers at Larnaca and Limassol, and the redevelopment of Kyrenia Harbour (Varnava, 2009, pp. 134–139). But Brown came into conflict with the high commissioner, Henry Bulwer, when the latter wanted to reduce Brown's budget to a mere £10,000 a year, primarily by merging the roles of the accountant and draughtsman, with the latter doing both jobs, resulting in a saving of over £200 a year. Brown objected citing that his department was already spread thin; undertaking tasks that Bulwer did not even give them credit for. Brown explained that it was unwise to merge the roles of the accountant, who belonged to the clerical staff, with that of the draughtsman, who belonged to the technical branch. Brown and the superintendent of works were constantly travelling across the island, leaving the draughtsman to superintend the workmen, workshops and the works on buildings and roads in Nicosia, while he was also often sent into the interior of the district to make surveys. But the Colonial Office supported Bulwer. Quite clearly, the pressures of keeping to the tough budget negatively impacted upon the accounting function, which was the first in line to be cut, as it was clearly assumed that a draughtsman could 'do sums', and so there was little encouragement for accountants (See CO 67/44/2481; CO 67/46/11126; Varnava, 2009, pp. 137–138).

When Brown left the island, accounting in the Public Works Department took a further turn for the worse. As mentioned above, in March 1896, Mr Griffin, the cashier and accountant in the Public Works Department, was charged with embezzlement. Cheques upon the bank account were drawn upon the signature of the officer in charge, a Mr Cunningham. On 13 March, Walter Sendell, the high commissioner, subsequently informed Joseph Chamberlain, the Colonial Secretary of the enquiry into the charges and on 14 March Sendall reported to Chamberlain that Griffin had been committed to stand trial, yet wanted Cunningham treated leniently because he had 'no capacity whatever for accounts'. Cunningham had worked for Brown as his Superintendent of Works, a position he was 'well suited' to, but when Brown left, he 'lapsed into

the position of responsible head of a spending department, rather than to have been selected for it on account of any special fitness'. Sendall wanted to keep him for practical work (See CO 67/98/6463, CO 67/98/6444, No. 61, and CO 67/98/7413, No. 70). The fact remains that Cyprus obviously lacked the ability to attract someone of the quality of Brown, and did not have local talent to turn to in relation to accounting. If Cunningham had the accounting skills, he would have detected the frauds committed and at the very least limited their extent. This is partly the responsibility of the government for failing to acknowledge the importance of accounting skills, and partly owing to the lack of education in the island to allow people to acquire accounting skills.

Changes in Education

Under Ottoman occupation, very little money was spent in Cyprus on education and school participation rates were low. For example, Orr (1918) discloses that official education reports for 1879 indicated that only about 5% of those aged between 5 and 15 years received any formal schooling. However, after 1878, the British soon began to reform the (elementary) school system by providing, not only public funds, but also specifying the curriculum subjects to be taught which included mathematics, geography, singing, calligraphy and gymnastics, with the full course lasting six years. In 1905 it was noted that the elementary schools of Cyprus had made great strides since the days when a 'chaotic state of affairs' prevailed (Board of Education, 1905). Nevertheless, according to the census of 1911, three-quarters of the population of the island was totally illiterate (Census, 1911).

Around the turn of the twentieth century, it was obvious to many Cypriots that there were good employment opportunities in government for those who possessed book-keeping skills, together with the knowledge of the English language. The realisation that these two skills could be an important means to social mobility has also been described in other British possessions around that time, for example, in Ireland (Clarke, 2008) and Australia (Craig *et al*., 2004). Book-keeping skills can be described as a 'badge of class distinction' but, in more practical terms, they cannot be stolen like moveable possessions, they have permanency in the sense that they are not subject to wastage, and they are easily portable to different locations. Around this time commercial subjects were added to their curriculum of schools in Cyprus. The English School, founded by Canon Newham in 1900, had a curriculum that focused on modern languages and commercial subjects, such as shorthand, typewriting and book-keeping, with its students being prepared for the Cyprus Government service and for commercial careers (Orr, 1918, p. 134). Four other schools emerged before World War I, specifically geared towards commercial education which included and highlighted book-keeping / accounting subjects.

The American Academy in Larnaca was founded by two missionaries, Reverend Walter McCarroll and his wife, of the Reformed Presbyterian Church of North America. They secured permission to open a secondary school for boys and, in 1908, they founded the American Academy in Larnaca (Damala, 2008). The school 'was established for the training of native

workers for the evangelization of their own people' (Reformed Presbyterian Church, 1911, p. 56). This objective would be achieved by obtaining commercial jobs in local firms which would provide the necessary interaction to facilitate the evangelisation of fellow workers. Like this, book-keeping/accounting knowledge would be used as an indirect route for the evangelisation process within Cypriot organisations. By the 1920s the graduates of the American Academy were obtaining positions throughout the British Empire, such as Nicolas Michaelides, a graduate of 1923, who obtained a job as a clerk in Western Africa with a yearly salary of £240 (and accommodation) because of his efficient knowledge of 'commercial branches' developed at the Academy (Damala, 2008, p. 29). The prospectus of the American Academy at that time indicated that instruction in book-keeping and accounting was well imbedded in the curriculum. For instance, in order for students to enter the second year of the programme, students had to pass written examinations in Pitman's *Primer of Book-keeping*, pages 1 to 100, and admission to the third year required passing exams on the entire Pitman book. There were two periods devoted to book-keeping in the first year and three periods in the second, third and fourth years; two periods in both the third and fourth year for Commercial Correspondence; and two periods of typewriting in the fourth year (Damala, 2008). Another school which would excel at teaching commercial subjects in Larnaca was the Pancyprian Lyceum, which was founded in 1911. Another school, the Mitsis Trade School, was founded in 1912 at Lemythou by the benefactor, Demosthenes Mitsis. The purpose of the school, which admitted only male students, was to provide a solid training in trade and the general language of studying and instructing was English. The Mitsis School had a reputation for high quality teaching and its graduates found jobs with relative ease, especially in the civil service of Cyprus (Lemythou, website, 2013).

The Turkish Lyceum in Nicosia was also important in the teaching of book-keeping/accounting around the turn of the twentieth century. For example, its curriculum for 1905–1906 included book-keeping procedures (*kitabet*) and in 1910–1911 accounting (*muhasabe*) was also taught (Oksuzoglu, 2008). The availability of the study of the book-keeping discipline in this school during the 1905–1906 academic year is interesting since this predates the teaching of this subject at either the American Academy or the Pancyprian Lyceum. Indeed one of the early book-keeping teachers at the American Academy in 1927–1928 is listed as 'A. Faik' and he was described as a graduate of the Turkish Lyceum and also a graduate of the La Salle Extension University (Damala, 2008). The La Salle Extension University was a distance-education institution based in Chicago, which provided a wide range of correspondence courses in business and had extensive courses in book-keeping and accounting (La Salle Extension University, 1922).

The Creation of Savings Banks and the Co-Operative Movement

The links between investment, job opportunities, education, and more money, in relation to earnings, savings and borrowing, are obvious. During Ottoman rule the only bank on the island was the Imperial Ottoman Bank, a joint venture of British and French interests, which opened a

branch in Larnaca in 1864. Although Cyprus was overwhelmingly an agricultural country, with 70% of total exports representing agricultural produce in the late 1880s, the Bank provided little finance to the Cypriot peasants who were in constant need of funds. Phylaktis (1988, p. 418) noted 'crops were subject to the vagaries of the weather and Cyprus suffered regularly from droughts. Furthermore, the corn was ground by water-mills, so that in a time of drought there was not only scarcity of water, but also of bread. The peasants, in addition, were burdened with tithes on all agricultural produce'.

The first local banking institution was established in January 1899 as the Nicosia Savings Bank (subsequently renamed as the Bank of Cyprus) by a group of Greek Cypriot political elites, including the prominent local lawyer Ioannis Economides, who was also a member of the Legislative Council and the doctor Antonios Theodotou. Its first Board of Directors consisted of 11 local merchants, two medical doctors, a teacher, a lawyer and a merchant's clerk but there was a notable absence of formally designated accountants (Bank of Cyprus, 2010). Based on the Italian Popular banks, this institution aimed to mobilise the savings of the small depositors which included weavers, shopkeepers, teachers, clerks and housewives. The bank was well-managed; general meetings at which directors were elected and dividends approved, were announced in the local press and balance sheets were published twice a year. The early auditors of the Bank were a commission agent and a merchant's clerk. Following the example of the Nicosia Savings Bank, other savings banks were established in Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca within a few years and the government, subsequently, set up its own savings banks in each of the six principal towns in 1903 (Phylaktis, 1988). The establishment of the savings banks and growth in depositors, created greater awareness of the basic principles of accountability through the publication of financial statements which were also audited and were routinely published in the local papers. In addition, the growth of savings banks necessitated the employment of clerks with basic accounting skills.

The creation of savings banks was followed by the establishment of co-operative societies, which also necessitated the employment of skilled accounting staff. Wolff (1910) indicates that towards the end of the nineteenth century, there was a remarkable advance and extension of the practice of co-operative credit, not only in the British colonies, but in other countries such as Germany, Finland, Italy and Belgium. Indeed, in his review of such developments, Wolff (1910, p. viii), somewhat sarcastically comments that 'even Cyprus is moving on the same tract'. A subsequent study on co-operative banks around the world (Herrick and Ingalls, 1914) reports that the first cooperative bank in Cyprus was established in December (1909) in the small village of Lefkoniko, under the name of Lefkoniko Savings Bank. We know from other sources (Bank of Cyprus, 2010) that this bank was formed under the initiative of Mr. Economides, who was born in the region and was President of the Nicosia Savings Bank. Wolff (1910, pp. 413–414) describes the Lefkonico bank as having 'a careful election of members ... a managing committee, a council of inspection and unlimited liability'. The feature of unlimited liability of the members for the debts of the society is particularly significant. Co-operative societies were owned and managed by their

members only and their main activity was to accept deposits by, and grant loans to, their members (Argyridou-Dimitriou and Kanaris, 2012). So, in order to prevent the risk of financial collapse, these would have to be properly managed by individuals with appropriate accounting knowledge.

Very soon, similar co-operative societies were set up in other villages and these became regulated in 1914 when the Co-operative Credit Societies Law was passed. This legislation further confirmed the need for accounting information as every society had to 'make available its latest balance sheet and any report of the auditors open to inspection free of charge at all reasonable times at the registered address of the society' and the 'registrar shall audit or cause to be audited by some person authorised by him ... the accounts of every registered society once at least in every year' and the audit shall include 'an examination of overdue debts, if any, and a valuation of the assets and liabilities of the society'. The emphasis on the Balance Sheet – the statement of financial position – while common to that era, was understandable since the legislation provided that the 'liability of each member of a society for the debts of the society shall be unlimited' (Co-operative Credit Societies Law, 1914). With each member's exposure to unlimited liability for the debts of the society, it was important that the solvency of each society was properly revealed by the publication of the society's balance sheet. Although, it may well be that many members did not fully understand the potential adverse implications of this 'unlimited liability' provision but it would have stimulated discussion about the legal implications of basic accounting matters among members. In consequence, the development of savings banks banking and co-operative movement was a further step in the process of developing accounting practices.

The Great War

When the Ottoman government entered World War I on the side of the Germany, Britain declared war on the Ottoman Empire and within days annexed Cyprus. During this period the island enjoyed its first economic boom under British rule. The geographical location of Cyprus and the fact that its primary industry was agriculture made it a convenient base from which the Allied forces in the Near and Middle East could draw supplies and the Cyprus government implemented policies that increased the production of cereals and other food-stuffs. However, one war-related issue highlights the difficulty, at that time, of recruiting clerks with appropriate accounting skills: the formation and administration of the allotment scheme of the Cypriot (or Macedonian) Mule Corps.

In summer 1916 the Cyprus government and the military authorities established the Cyprus Mule Corps and some 10,000 Cypriots served in it, first in Salonica, and after the armistice, in Istanbul and Chanak, between 1916 and 1920. The Cyprus government played a pivotal role in the establishment and running of the mule corps, including the distribution of money allotted to the dependents of muleteers. The scheme, which was a major theme of recruiting, allowed muleteers to allot a certain amount (up to 60%) of their wage of three pounds sterling and twelve shillings per month, to their dependents. Since the man going was usually either married, and therefore

solely responsible for his wife and children, or the eldest son, and that being so, partly (although sometimes solely) responsible for maintaining his parents and siblings, the allotment scheme was a significant inducement for the vast majority of the men who volunteered. Allotment schemes were usually run by the military, and this was the first time that it was the responsibility of a colonial government. This would have tested the best of any colonial treasuries, let alone a disadvantaged one such as that found in Cyprus (see National Archives, War Office 405/1 and State Archives Nicosia, Secretariat Archive 1/722/1916).

Indeed this was the case, since the Cypriot government and its civil service, which were administering the scheme, struggled too (see National Archives, War Office 405/1 and State Archives Nicosia, Secretariat Archive 1/722/1916). The difficulties in implementing the allotment scheme were due to two factors. First, the civil administration and the military authorities could not agree on a scheme and its implementation. Second, and more importantly for the purposes of this paper, the Cypriot treasury lacked enough qualified staff with accounting skills to undertake this important task. Hence, in March 1917 the Treasurer informed the Chief Secretary that they needed a better trained staff to operate the allotment scheme to reduce the elementary accounting and book-keeping mistakes which had been made (see National Archives, War Office 405/1 and State Archives Nicosia, Secretariat Archive 1/722/1916).

Additionally, the wages of the members of the Cyprus Mule Corps – both because of the allotment scheme or simply the money they brought back with them – meant more money in the island and, that being the case, a greater need for accounting skills and more work for accountants. The fact that there was more money was evidenced by the massive increase in total deposits in both local and foreign banks and co-operatives in Cyprus from 137,261 in 1915 to 446,366 in 1920, an increase of 225%. That the war, both in relation to the exporting of commodities but also the Cyprus Mule Corps wages played a role in this is supported by the fact that this pattern was repeated in World War II, when there were even more Cypriots serving in the British armed forces, with an even greater increase occurring from 2,038,729 in deposits in 1938 increasing to a massive 9,840,186 in 1946, an increase of 383% (Phylaktis, 1988). That there was a correlation between the increased money and the demand for accounting skills was verified by the increased careers in the field relating to accounting from the 1911 Census to the 1921 Census, because in the 1921 Census there were 204 people registered as bankers or brokers (including their employees), while in 1911 there had been a mere 82 (Census of 1911).

Conclusion

This article has explored two important issues in relation to the accounting history of Cyprus: the transition from Ottoman (c. 1850–1878) to British rule (1878–1918) in order to identify the changes in the development of accounting practices under these differing imperial systems; and secondly and most chiefly, the nature of those changes and what influenced them and vice versa.

This has meant that the period in focus, the 1850s until the end of the Great War, constituted the 'source phase' of the theory proposed by McKinnon (1986), and therefore the beginning of accounting practice in both the public and private sectors. This signifies that there was little accounting practised in the island by comparison with other British overseas possessions, especially those where company law had been introduced, largely because there was little necessity, yet the article has shown that the demand for accounting did increase with the turn of the century because of the development of Cypriot economic opportunities under British rule.

There was a growing demand for accounting skills in Cyprus from the 1850s under Ottoman rule. This was largely due to the absence of industry and trade, as well as government regulation. The lack of accounting makes the period important when compared to the increased demand after the British arrival, and especially at the turn of the century. Also important was the *Merdiban* transaction recording system used under Ottoman rule, because this was replaced by double-entry accounting during the British occupation.

The history of accounting practice must be viewed in the context that Cyprus was a small island and became an 'inconsequential possession'. When Joseph Chamberlain became Colonial Secretary significant investment was made in infrastructure development. These works generated jobs and money, resulting in the formation of savings and co-operative banks, which required staff with accounting skills. Commercial organisations remained of a small size; there was little company legislation necessitating accounting information, and an absence of equity markets. In effect, in an accounting sense, the Cypriot economy, during the period of British rule (1878–1918), primarily called for book-keepers to satisfy basic accounting needs. The lack of accounting skills in the island, especially in the civil service, was felt during the Great War when the Cypriot government undertook to implement a complicated and large allotment scheme for Cypriot muleteers. Significant progress in terms of the growth in accounting practice, the presence of professional accountancy firms and, ultimately, the formation of a local accountancy profession and the introduction of accounting standards would only take place in a time period beyond the scope of this paper (see Clarke and Varnava, 2013), that is to say, during the inter-war years.

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The Northern Cypriot Dream – Turkish Immigration 1974–1980

Helge Jensehaugen[1]

Abstract

After the division of Cyprus in 1974 into a Greek Cypriot south and a Turkish Cypriot north, approximately 30,000 immigrants from Turkey moved to north Cyprus. The period between 1974 and 1980 is the time during which these immigrants arrived in northern Cyprus, and may be referred to as the first wave of immigration. This article seeks primarily to answer the question: Why did they immigrate to northern Cyprus? There are a lot of misperceptions about the movement of so many people from Turkey to north Cyprus; therefore it is important that this study creates an accurate and much-needed debate. In short, the first wave of immigration should be viewed as a result of the employment of state mechanisms as well as traditional pull factors: work opportunities, and a need for labour in north Cyprus. Once in northern Cyprus, these immigrants received housing, land, and aid plus help with other necessities such as food and supplies.

Keywords: immigration, Turkey, north Cyprus, settlers, Turkish Cypriots, refugees

Introduction

When Cyprus was divided in 1974, the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community, with the help of Turkish authorities, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus.[2] In addition to the relatively high number of casualties and missing persons, a population vacuum was created through the vast numbers of internally displaced persons. UNHCR estimated that there were circa 240,000 internally displaced as a result of the division of the island, of which approximately 180,000 were Greek Cypriots who moved south, and 60,000 were Turkish Cypriots who went north.[3] This obviously resulted in a vast amount of abandoned moveable and

1 This article is based on my master's thesis: H. Jensehaugen (2013) 'The Northern Cypriot Dream: The First Wave of Immigration from Turkey to North Cyprus – 1974–1980'. Unpublished Master Thesis from the University of Oslo.

2 H.A. Richter (2010) *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus, 1878–2009*, Mainz and Ruhpolding: Franz Philipp Rutzen, p. 202; C. Ramm (2009) 'Turkish Cypriots, Turkish "Settlers" and (Trans)National Identities between Turkish Nationalism, Cypriotism and Europe'. Unpublished Doctoral Thesis, Ruhr University, Bochum.

3 Author's e-mail correspondence with Ishak, UNHCR Representation in Cyprus, 18 April 2011; H.A. Richter (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 14.

immovable property on both sides of the divide. It is in this context that the Turkish government and the leaders of the Turkish Cypriot community identified the need to fill this vacuum and, recognising the possibility of utilising and exploiting the forsaken Greek Cypriot property, initiated a policy of encouraging people from Turkey to move to northern Cyprus. The period 1974 to 1980,[4] which may be denoted as the first wave of immigration as the period is enchased by the division of Cyprus in 1974 and the *coup d'état* in Turkey in 1980, may be distinguished from later waves of immigration, which were of a less centrally organised nature but have also resulted in a great influx of immigrants from Turkey. Studying solely the incorporation of Turkish immigrants in north Cyprus,[5] this article seeks to answer the following questions: Why did Turkish people immigrate to northern Cyprus? Why were the immigrants from Turkey needed in north Cyprus in this period? And lastly, was the first wave of immigration successful in contributing to both an economic and political independence from the Greek Cypriot south?

The subject of Turkish immigration to northern Cyprus is a highly politicised one, and brings forth strong emotions and opinions on both sides of the divide. The fact that Turkey was so involved in the immigration process has led many to apply the term 'settler' to describe the mainland Turks who came to northern Cyprus after 1974. The anthropologist Rebecca Bryant, who has written extensively on the Turkish Cypriot people and northern Cyprus, argues that the immigrants, or *göçmenler* [6] in Turkish, who arrived during this period 'do not resemble settlers in other colonial nationalist projects such as Israel ... and quite a few knew little about Cyprus when they arrived'.[7] Not only were many unable to locate Cyprus on a map prior to arriving, but they often had no other option than to leave their homes and villages in Turkey, for various reasons mentioned later. They were, however, given houses and land upon arrival and, in most cases, citizenship to the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC)[8] (and became citizens of the Turkish

4 After the *coup d'état* in Turkey on 12 September 1980, migration to northern Cyprus halted for a few years. Martial law was put in place following the coup and it became difficult for ordinary Turks to obtain a passport, and the permission to leave the country. Thus, 1980 marks the end of the first wave of Turkish immigration to north Cyprus.

5 Due to the spatial limits of this article, it seeks only to study the actual incorporation of immigrants from Turkey during the limited time period of 1974–1980, and will therefore not study conditions and events in Turkey at the time or look in detail at other regional examples of similar phenomena. These are certainly subjects in need of in-depth study and should be themes of other articles and further research.

6 The Turkish word *göçmen* refers both to immigrants and refugees/displaced persons. A. Gürel (2012) *Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife: Report 4: Turkish Cypriot Legal Framework*, PRIO Report 4/2012, p. 18.

7 R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2012) *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*, Istanbul: TESEV, p. 27.

8 Although terms for the northern part of the island are referred to in this essay as the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (TFSC) from 1975, or the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) from 1983, it is acknowledged

Republic of Northern Cyprus after its unilateral declaration of independence in 1983), either immediately upon arrival or later. During the first wave of immigration, approximately 25,000 immigrants from Turkey were given citizenship of the TFSC.[9] This led many, especially in the south, to look on them as colonisers whose objective was to take advantage of the Turkish Cypriots and forever change the demographics of the island. From the 1990s and 2000s this view has gained influence in the north as well, and there is an increasing fear among the Turkish Cypriots that they are being 'outnumbered by immigrants from Turkey'.[10] But this view is based more on later immigration waves than on the first wave.

Although it is clear that the Turkish immigrants came as part of a deliberate policy to consolidate Turkish Cypriot control over northern Cyprus and ensure economic self-sufficiency from the Greek Cypriots, many of the Turkish immigrants came to northern Cyprus on their own initiative, something both senior researcher at PRIO Mete Hatay and this research have shown.[11] The fact that the Turkish Cypriot authorities offered deserted Greek Cypriot 'land, houses and livestock to villagers who would migrate to Cyprus' was, unquestionably, a major factor involved when they made the decision to move there.[12] Therefore, whether the immigrants came on their own initiative or not, which is subject to nuances and debates, the Turkish Cypriot administration had a clear incorporation policy designed to increase the population of the north and utilise abandoned Greek Cypriot-owned land.

Professor John McGarry, in his article '"Demographic engineering": the state-directed movement of ethnic groups as a technique of conflict regulation', has examined the ways in which states can encourage or force the movement of an ethnic group to another region: that is 'demographically engineer' an area. 'Agents' are, according to McGarry, given advantages such as housing, work and/or land.[13] They are provided for in a new location because they 'are intended to perform a function on behalf of the state.'[14] McGarry claims that '[a]gents are settled in particular

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that neither the TFSC nor the TRNC were or are recognised by the international community except Turkey.

9 R. Bryant (2010) *The Past in Pieces: Belonging in the New Cyprus*, Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, p. 43.

10 R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 27; M. Hatay (2007) *Is the Turkish Cypriot Population Shrinking?: An Overview of the Ethno Demography of Cyprus in the Light of the Preliminary Results of the 2006 Turkish Cypriot Census*. PRIO Report 2/2007.

11 M. Hatay (2005) *Beyond Numbers: An Inquiry into the Political Integration of the Turkish 'Settlers' in Northern Cyprus*, PRIO Report 4/2005, p. 13; H. Jensehaugen (2013), *op. cit.*

12 K.K. Fosshagen (2008) *Island of Conjecture: State Modalities and Historical Trajectories in Cyprus*, Bergen: University of Bergen, p. 209.

13 J. McGarry (1998) '"Demographic Engineering": The State-directed Movement of Ethnic Groups as a Technique of Conflict Regulation', *Ethnic and Racial Studies*, Vol. 21, No. 4, London: Routledge, p. 619.

14 *Ibid.*, pp. 614–615, 619.

regions to consolidate the state's control of the area and its resources' and in that way are used as demographic facts on the ground in order to solidify the state's control over a disputed area.[15]

People may also simply move on their own initiative through ordinary push-pull factors, such as socio-economic considerations. At the same time, McGarry argues that '[p]olitical authorities can manipulate push-pull factors' in a way that hides forced or encouraged movement behind a veil of seemingly normal economic or social factors.[16] In the case of north Cyprus, promises of a better life, through the provision of housing and land, certainly contributed to the considerable extent and number of immigrants in this period. There was a need in northern Cyprus for the Turkish Cypriots to cement their control over their new territorial acquisitions.[17] There were also significant agricultural resources, which were unexploited due to the flight of Greek Cypriots following the war that needed to be taken care of. This was a clear incentive to settle 'agents'.

Developments in Northern Cyprus 1974–1980

As with any area involved in a war, the Turkish intervention of July and August 1974 had significant negative impacts on the political, social and economic development of northern Cyprus. Although north Cyprus, which consisted of 36% of the island, possessed fertile lands and the most developed tourist areas of Cyprus, it was the hardest hit economically. This was largely attributed to a population that was too small to fully take advantage of the economic potential of the north, but also a result of trade restrictions due to the illegality of the division of the island. Consequently, after 1974, the political, social and economic structures of northern Cyprus were increasingly influenced from Turkey.[18] It was in this context of close co-operation with Turkey, that the first wave of immigration was made possible.

The relocation of populations between north and south was largely completed by the end of 1974 as people on both sides had fled because of the war. However, most of those remaining on the 'wrong' side of the Buffer Zone were transferred after August 1975. The Vienna III Agreement had been concluded on 2 August 1975 between Denktaş as representative of the Turkish Cypriot community and Glafcos Clerides as representative of the Greek Cypriots.[19] The Turkish Cypriots, in contrast to what Vienna III actually stated, interpreted the agreement as a population exchange and referred to it 'as the "1975 Vienna Population Exchange Agreement" or the "Voluntary Re-

15 *Ibid.*, p. 616.
16 *Ibid.*, pp. 617, 619.
17 *Ibid.*, pp. 629–630.
18 H.A. Richter (2010), *op. cit.*, pp. 199–200; B. Morvaridi (1993b) 'Social Structure and Social Change' in C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, p. 266.
19 Z.M. Necatigil (1989) *The Cyprus Question and the Turkish Position in International Law*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, p. 128.

Grouping of Population Agreement".[20] The great majority of Turkish Cypriots who found themselves in southern Cyprus following the war took up the offer as stated in the agreement, to move north. As a result, after about two months only 130 Turkish Cypriots remained in the south. On the other hand, the Greek Cypriot population in northern Cyprus dwindled at a slower pace (in 1978 there were still 1,600 Greek Cypriots living in north Cyprus).[21]

The Turkish Cypriot's erroneous reading of the agreement was due to their principle view on the solution to the Cyprus conflict, namely that 'bizonality is the *key* [their italics] parameter of a settlement'.[22] Therefore, as a consequence of the agreement, both the north and the south of the island were more or less completely ethnically cleansed by 1975. The Turkish Cypriot interpretation of the Vienna III Agreement was a major element in their desire to turn Cyprus into a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation.[23] For the Turkish Cypriots, the idea of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation would consist of two strictly geographically and ethnically separated autonomous states, unified politically as a Federal Republic of Cyprus.[24] Polemics over what a future federation may consist of aside, one major point that was left out of the inter-communal discussions altogether was the issue of the Turkish immigrants who had moved, and continued to move, to northern Cyprus following the Turkish intervention in 1974.

The increasing presence of immigrants from mainland Turkey augmented the sense, outside of the north, that Turkey was colonialising northern Cyprus. Renaming villages, in addition to turning churches into mosques, was a part of the desire to 'Turkify' the north and create 'an "ethnic democracy" only for Turks'.[25] Furthermore, it was part of the policy of achieving cultural and political independence from the Greek Cypriots. Another means to reaching this goal was the removal and eradication of symbols and elements of Greek and Greek Cypriot culture and history, and replacing them with Turkish ones, such as statues of Kemal Atatürk.[26] These policies appear to have been steps towards creating a wholly independent 'Turkified' Turkish Cypriot state, rather than a Federal Cypriot Republic. 'The main strategy of Turkification was to convince the newcomer Turks from Turkey ... and the Turkish Cypriots ... that this is a Turkish place, both in

20 A. Gürel and K. Özersay (2006) *The Politics of Property in Cyprus: Conflicting Appeals to 'Bizonality' and 'Human Rights' by the Two Cypriot Communities*, PRIO Report 3/2006, p. 18.

21 *Ibid.*, pp. 17–18; 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 873.

22 A. Gürel and K. Özersay (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 15; J. Ker-Lindsay (2011) *The Cyprus Problem: What Everyone Needs to Know*, Oxford: Oxford University Press, pp. 78–79.

23 H.A. Richter (2010), *op. cit.*, pp. 203–204.

24 J. Ker-Lindsay (2011), *op. cit.*, pp. 78–79; C. Ramm (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 195.

25 C. Ramm, (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 208.

26 C.P. Ioannides (1991) *In Turkey's Image: The Transformation of Occupied Cyprus into a Turkish Province*, New Rochelle: Catatzas, p. 184; M. Jansen (2005) *War and Cultural Heritage: Cyprus after the 1974 Turkish Invasion*, Minnesota Mediterranean and East European Monographs, No. 14, Minneapolis: Minnesota University Press.

the present and for a future that is detached from the past.'[27] Cyprus was being transformed into two geographically and culturally separated parts.[28]

The immigration policy, and its cultural implications, did not receive exclusively positive reactions from the Turkish Cypriots. In effect, the former Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriot Fazıl Kutçuk claimed that the immigrants 'had sectarian conflicts among them ... lived away from each other because of blood feuds and who belonged to two different faiths', and was for that reason highly sceptical of their arrival.[29] There was, and remains to be, a sense among Turkish Cypriots that they themselves are 'Turks, but they have developed a culture with its own norms, values and belief systems', which has increasingly become threatened by the influx of immigrants from the more traditional and religious areas of Turkey.[30] Due to these cultural differences, after the initial Turkish Cypriot enthusiasm for the Turkish immigrants slowly faded, there developed an identity distinction between Turkish Cypriots and immigrants from Turkey specific to the class and social standing of the mainland Turks.[31] What is more, on account of the mostly humble background of the immigrants, they were often looked down upon by the Turkish Cypriots. Those who emigrated from Turkey were generally disadvantaged, both economically and socially.[32] The immigrants, for the most part, were poor labourers or farmers predominantly from areas of Turkey where few work opportunities existed or where entire villages and towns were being uprooted because of large development projects, such as the construction of major dams or highways.[33] The social anthropologist Dr Yael Navaro-Yashin, writing about the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus, claims that increasingly with time '[c]onflict with "Greek Cypriots" did not preoccupy or worry them [the Turkish Cypriots] as much as their everyday experiences of living with settlers from Turkey', but as previously mentioned, this became a more prevalent and pressing issue from the 1990s onwards.[34]

The area in which the developments in northern Cyprus were mostly controlled and influenced by Turkey was the economy. During the civil war period of 1963–1974, the Turkish

27 A. Göker (2012) 'Senses of Belonging and "Belongings" and Making "Home" Away from Home', in R. Bryant and Y. Papadakis (eds.), *Cyprus and the Politics of Memory: History, Community and Conflict*, London / New York: IB Tauris, p. 132.

28 K. Kyle (1997) *Cyprus: In Search of Peace*, London: Minority Rights Group International, p. 19.

29 C. Hitchens (1984) *Cyprus*, London: Quartet books, p. 111.

30 B. Morvaridi (1993b) 'Social Structure and Social Change', *op. cit.*, p. 266.

31 *Ibid*; C. Ramm (2009) *op. cit.*, pp. 305–306. The discussion about how the Turkish immigrants are perceived by the Turkish Cypriots is beyond the scope of this article but it is an interesting phenomenon, which became a particularly important and heated issue from the 1990s onwards.

32 Author's private audio-recorded interview with H. Atun conducted on 22 February 2013.

33 R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 27; M. Hatay (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 12; Interview with H. Atun.

34 Y. Navaro-Yashin (2006) 'De-ethnicizing the Ethnography of Cyprus: Political and Social Conflict between Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey', in Y. Papadakis, N. Peristianis and G. Welz (eds), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History and an Island in Conflict*, Bloomington and Indianapolis: Indiana University Press, p. 87.

Cypriots mainly lived in enclaves beyond the reach of the Cyprus government, and were therefore hardly involved in the politics and economy of the state. The length of the period in which they were absent from government meant that they were to a large extent inexperienced in the fields of public and economic management.[35] As a result, although in control of fertile and agriculturally opportune areas after the Turkish intervention in 1974, 'the Turkish Cypriots had to start from very little when Northern Cyprus claimed its own boundaries ... and installed its own government'.[36] Many of the sectors of the northern Cypriot economy were underemployed due to the population vacuum created by the forced exodus of circa 180,000 Greek Cypriots. Further, the economic situation was characterised by high inflation rates, rising cost of living and labour unrest.[37] According to Hakkı Atun, north Cyprus' first Minister of Housing and Rehabilitation, there were three main economic objectives for the Turkish Cypriot authorities in this period, namely 'to direct the economy, to make best use of the idle factors of production, [and] to prepare the way to planned economy'.[38] Paradoxically, with the agricultural potential of north Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots were to a large degree dependent on imported food from Turkey. Despite having resource potential, northern Cyprus' economic development was slow. The reason for this discrepancy is probably ascribed to inefficient policies. It may, however, also be explained by the lack of international recognition and the consequent embargo on north Cyprus. Turkey attempted to save the damaged northern Cypriot economy by contributing to funding the budget, giving aid and sending experts and not least immigrants, who could fill the thin workforce.[39]

Turkish Immigration

Because of the large exodus of Greek Cypriots and a much smaller influx of Turkish Cypriots, north Cyprus experienced a net loss of circa 120,000 inhabitants.[40] As a consequence the authorities in northern Cyprus concluded a 'co-operation and development project' with Turkey.[41]

35 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 81; Author's private audio-recorded interview with K. Atakol conducted on 12 March 2013.

36 M.E. Olgun (1993) 'Economic Overview', in C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, Huntington: The Eothen Press, pp. 271–272.

37 C. Ramm (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 201; C.H. Dodd (1993) 'From Federated State to Republic', in C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, pp. 111-112; 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 1564; 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 905.

38 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89.

39 C. Ramm (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 207; Interview with K. Atakol; Author's private audio-recorded interview with V. Çelik conducted on 11 March 2013; Interview with H. Atun; Author's private interview with Onurhan conducted on 18 April 2013.

40 E-mail correspondence with N. Ishak.

41 H. Atun (2007) 'Kıbrıs'ta Göçmenlerin İskanı' [Settlement of Immigrants in Cyprus], Rapor 6, Uluslararası Kıbrıs Araştırmaları Kongresi için, 24–26 Ekim 2007 [Report for the 6th International Congress on Cyprus Studies, 24–26 October 2007], pp. 383–397: Document in the possession of Hakkı Arun.

This agreement aimed at facilitating the incorporation of the 90,000 or more refugees and immigrants that entered north Cyprus in the period from 1974 to 1980. Between 30,000 and 45,000 of these were immigrants from Turkey,[42] and were of various ethnic, linguistic and geographic backgrounds.[43]

The large majority of the migrants who went to north Cyprus in the first wave of immigration were from the following regions: the Trabzon province in the East Black Sea sub-region; the Samsun province of the West Black Sea sub-region; the Konya province of the Central Anatolia region; the Adana, Antalya and Mersin provinces of the Mediterranean region; the Diyarbakır province of the South eastern Anatolian region; and the Muş province of the Eastern Anatolian region.[44] This corresponds with where the bulk of those who emigrated within Turkey and those who moved abroad came from. Moreover, the ethnic make-up of the Turkish emigrants was heterogeneous. They hailed from many different backgrounds. Among the most common ethnic and linguistic groups in the first wave of immigration were Turkish, Yörük, Laz – a people from the East Black Sea sub-region; and Kurdish.[45]

For the new Turkish Cypriot political entity in northern Cyprus, one of the main economic objectives was 'to make best use of the idle factors of production'.[46] One of the most important aspects of taking advantage of idle resources was encouraging immigration from Turkey. Nonetheless, the first task was the resettlement of Turkish Cypriots who moved to northern Cyprus from the south side following the 1974 war. From 20 July 1974 until the end of 1975, more than half of all Turkish Cypriots were displaced as a result of the war. Many of them moved north, with the aid of UNFICYP, after the signing of the Vienna III Agreement on 2 August 1975, as stipulated in the agreement's first article.[47] The Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south were understandably the group to consider foremost as regards the use of resources that were suddenly in Turkish Cypriot hands after the division of the island. More importantly, this group was crucial

42 There remains a great degree of uncertainty about the exact number of immigrants that came to north Cyprus in this period, and there are no confirmed figures. The numbers often vary according to which sources one reads.

43 H. Atun (2007), 'Kıbrıs'ta Göçmenlerin İskanı' [Settlement of Immigrants in Cyprus], *op. cit.*

44 M. Hatay (2005), *op. cit.*, p. 12; B. Morvaridi (1993a) 'Demographic Change, Resettlement and Resource Use', in C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, p. 228.

45 B. Ekenoglu (2012) 'Ethnic Identity Formation of the Kurdish Immigrants in North Cyprus: Analyzing Ethnic Identity as Social Identity and the Effects of Social Otherization in North', Unpublished Master Thesis from University of Amsterdam, p. 7; C.P. Ioannides (1991), *op. cit.*, pp. 36–39.

46 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89.

47 A. Gürel, M. Hatay and C. Yakinthou (2012) *Displacement in Cyprus: Consequences of Civil and Military Strife. Report 5: An Overview of Events and Perceptions*, PRIO Report 5/2012, p. 11; A. Gürel and K. Özersay (2006) *op. cit.*, pp. 11–20; United Nations Security Council, 'Interim Report of the Secretary-General Pursuant to Security Council Resolution 370 (1975)'. UN Document S/11789, 5 August 1975. Source found on United Nations' 'Documents' website, 15 February 2006, available at [http://daccess-dds-ny.un.org/doc/UNDOC/GEN/N75/151/45/PDF/N7515145.pdf?OpenElement], accessed on 3 November 2013.

for the creation of a Turkish Cypriot political entity. In effect, article 32, number 2 of the 'constitution' of the 'Turkish Federated State of Cyprus' specifies that '[r]efugees shall have priority in the distribution of land'.[48]

In consequence, a ministry with the main objective of housing the internally displaced Turkish Cypriots, and relocating immigrants from Turkey, was set up following the division of the island. On the authority of Hakkı Atun and Tamer Gazioglu, Chief of Resources, Inventory and Statistics Section in Atun's department, there was a concise methodology used in the process of resettling Turkish Cypriots from southern Cyprus and settling immigrants from Turkey.[49] Comparing the process with the exchange of population between Greece and Turkey in the 1920s, Atun argued, in a personal interview, that the case of northern Cyprus 'was much more orderly and scientific'.[50] It involved preparing a list of all the properties and land that Turkish Cypriots had left in the south. Furthermore,

> '[t]he same survey was carried out for each empty settlement in the north, and the number and type of the existing houses, shops and workshops and the amount and type of agricultural resources, existing infrastructure and means of communications and degree of accessibility was found out.'[51]

The large exodus of people from the north compared to a much smaller influx meant that 'the land and settlements, houses and villages, even parts of towns were empty. So we had to house these empty settlements, and we had to irrigate and look after the land', stated Atun.[52]

Initially, it was widely believed that resettlement and movement to the north was only a temporary measure that would be reversed once the situation on the island calmed down again, and a solution to the conflict was found. This had partially been the case during previous periods of civil strife.[53] So, many saw the movement to the north purely as an interim situation. Gazioglu admitted that even at the administrative level, many believed it was only temporary.[54] As a result, 'no title deeds were given and people never spent even one penny to paint, [or] to repair the homes that they were living in, because they thought "this does not belong to me, why should I invest money in it? I might be thrown away one day"'.[55] As time went on, and a solution was still not reached, ownership rights were eventually given to those Turkish Cypriots who had abandoned

48 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 36.
49 Interview with H. Atun; Author's private audio-recorded interview with T. Gazioğlu conducted on 21 February 2013.
50 Interview with H. Atun.
51 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89.
52 Interview with H. Atun.
53 R. Bryant (2012) *op. cit.*, p. 9.
54 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
55 *Ibid.*

properties in the south and moved north. Political pressure and dissatisfaction from the refugee population resulted in the Resettlement, Land Distribution, and Equivalent Property Law (*İTEM* Law) for the handing over of such ownership rights.[56] The law was passed on 3 August 1977. Its aim was to make legal the policies carried out in between 20 July 1974 and 3 August 1977 in relation to the 'provision of land, equipment, livestock and loans to those in the agricultural sectors' and 'provision, in accordance with family size, of adequate social housing and essential household goods' to both refugees and immigrants.[57] Thus, the law was both retroactive and proactive.

The Turkish Cypriots refugees who had been allocated properties in the north were then given ownership rights and therein the right to sell and pass on their new properties in accordance with the *İTEM* Law. With the definitive possessory certificates, showing that the properties awarded to the displaced persons legally belonged to them, the Turkish Cypriot refugees 'started to repair their houses ... to upgrade them, to paint them ... to add a new room next to it'.[58] In parallel to and following the resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees, immigrants from Turkey were settled in northern Cyprus using a similar methodology.

By 9 September 1974, less than a month after the completion of Turkey's second intervention in Cyprus, 'Turkish mainland authorities announced that 5,000 farm workers were to be sent to Cyprus as 'seasonal workers' to look after the abandoned farms and orchards.'[59] The Minister of Defence and Foreign Affairs of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus at the time, Vedat Çelik, insisted that contrary to widespread belief, it was the Turkish Cypriot authorities that demanded the importation of a labour force from Turkey. As stated by him, the Turkish authorities did not promote the immigration of mainlanders.[60] Nevertheless, they were vital in order to carry out the migration process. With vast amounts of land compared to population size, the Turkish Cypriot authorities needed to make up for the loss through the importation of labour from mainland Turkey. In the calls for labour that were communicated to villages in Turkey, it was specified that people were needed to improve the economy of the region, especially within the agricultural sector.[61] Çelik argued that 'we had to bring in [a] labour force from Turkey because ... although we now consider ourselves to be populated, then we were very, very under-populated and we couldn't

56 Commonly referred to as the *İTEM* Law: *İskan, Topraklandırma ve Eşdeğer Mal Yasası* in Turkish.

57 Interview with T. Gazioğlu; Interview with H. Atun; A. Gürel (2012), *op. cit.*, pp. 23–24.

58 Interview with T. Gazioğlu; Author's private audio-recorded interview with A. Gürel conducted on 21 February 2013.

59 C. Hitchens (1984), *op. cit*, p. 105.

60 Interview with V. Çelik.

61 Türkiye Cumhuriyeti İl Toprak ve İskan Müdürlüğü [The Turkish Republic Provincial Land and Housing Directorate], 'Duyuru Antalya Valiliğinden' [Announcement from the Antalya Governorship], 3 April 1975: Document in the possession of Mustafa Yeşil.

cope with the agricultural requirements at the time.'[62]

Immigrants who came in the first wave of arrivals lived in a total of 87 locations. At the time there were three cities and towns and 200 villages in northern Cyprus, meaning that nearly half of all villages, towns and cities were used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey. All four districts: Kyrenia, Famagusta, Nicosia, and Larnaca, that fell within the de-facto 'borders' of northern Cyprus, were used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey. On the whole, the immigrants were provided with houses and land in villages and towns that were on the periphery, and well away from the major cities and towns. The villages of Liveras/Sadrazamköy, in the Kyrenia district, and Rizokarpasso/Dipkarpaz, in the Famagusta district, are the best examples of this practice. Notably, villages in close proximity to the main cities were not used to house the immigrants. The villages and towns of Gerolakkos/Alayköy, Mia Milia/Haspolat, Neo Chorio/Minareliköy, Palaikythro/Balıkesir, and Kythrea/Değirmenlik, on the outskirts of Nicosia, and Ekgomi/Tuzla, Stylloi/Mutluyaka, Agios Sergios/Yeni Boğaziçi, and Liminia/Mormenekşe, surrounding Famagusta, are exceptions in this regard. None of the major cities, with the notable exception of Famagusta, housed immigrants. The majority of the 87 locations were mixed. That is, their inhabitants consisted of the original Turkish Cypriot population plus Turkish Cypriot refugees and immigrants from Turkey (and, in a very small number of cases in the Karpasia Peninsula, the original Greek Cypriot inhabitants). However, there were only a few villages that were entirely occupied by immigrants from the mainland. The most peripheral area of north Cyprus, the Karpasia Peninsula, was widely used for housing immigrants from Turkey, and became inhabited mostly by these newcomers. The cities and towns that were vital for citrus production, such as Morphou/Güzelyurt and Varosha/Maraş, a suburb of Famagusta, were essentially used for the settlement of immigrants. Another important trend was that villages along the northern coast of Cyprus, particularly west of Kyrenia, housed immigrants from the Black Sea region of Turkey.[63]

Those who came as part of '[t]he systematic settlement policy pursued by Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot government' were a part of both a political and economic deliberation.[64] The political aspect involved increasing the population of north Cyprus, and the consolidation of an independent Turkish Cypriot entity in the north. The economic aspects of the policy took in those aspirations of reaching the same goal: independence from the Greek Cypriots in the south through economic self-sufficiency. Conspicuously, most of the immigrants in the first wave were farmers

62 Interview with V. Çelik.

63 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 873; 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89; A. Gürel, M. Hatay, N. Trimikliniotis, O. Demetriou, R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2013), *Internal Displacement in Cyprus: Mapping the Consequences of Civil and Military Strife. Internal Displacement in Cyprus*, PRIO Cyprus Centre, 30 September 2011, available at [http://www.prio-cyprus-displacement.net/default.asp?id=245], accessed on 21 May 2013.

64 C. Ramm (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 215.

sent to northern Cyprus in order to cultivate the fertile agricultural lands that were deserted through the exodus of Greek Cypriots. In northern Cyprus the Turkish immigrants were issued with dwelling, land and agricultural equipment according to their family size.[65] The large number of immigrants, totalling between 30,000 and 45,000 that arrived in northern Cyprus within a seven-year period, from 1974 until 1980, gives perspective to the haste with which the resettlement was carried out.[66] Atun specifies that the authorities had to be quick and timely in the immigration process because 'there were gardens in need of irrigation, land waiting to be cultivated and fruit trees that needed to be picked'.[67] For these reasons there was an urgent need for sufficient labour from Turkey to undertake the necessary work.

In addition to the labour immigration, there was a group of Turkish soldiers who had settled in north Cyprus following the 1974 war. They had either participated in the Turkish intervention of 1974 or had been part of the Turkish military contingent stationed in Cyprus in compliance with the Treaty of Alliance of 1960. Moreover, the families of soldiers who had lost their lives in the intervention were also invited to move to north Cyprus. They were assigned land, housing, immovable property, and citizenship by the Turkish Cypriot authorities and were often cited as proof that Turkey was 'Turkifying' northern Cyprus through militarisation. In truth, relatively few soldiers and veterans moved to north Cyprus following the war.[68] The primary goal of the immigration, at least in the beginning, was arguably to rebuild the economy and enable unused land to be cultivated.

While it may be true that later immigration led to widespread discrimination and xenophobia against Turkish immigrants, initially it appears that the Turkish Cypriots generally greeted them with open arms. The first immigrants of the 1970s were mostly seen as saviours – viewed as both an extension and the representatives of Turkey. In the opinion of most immigrants, politicians and officials interviewed,[69] they had saved the Turkish Cypriots from perceived inevitable destruction and annihilation. Yusuf Suiçmez, who came to northern Cyprus towards the end of 1975, remembers the reception and sentiments they encountered from the Turkish Cypriots when they met. He recalls that 'they [the Turkish Cypriots] were very respectful to the Turks [immigrants]'.[70] There may also have been a feeling of appreciation and admiration for the Turkish immigrants, and a realisation that 'they came here, they shared their lives with you and

65 *Ibid*., pp. 216–218; M. Hatay (2005), *op. cit*., p. 12.

66 The number of immigrants in this seven-year period lies between 30,000 and 45,000 depending on the source. It is difficult to know the exact number, as it has not been affirmed and recorded.

67 H. Atun (2007) 'Kıbrıs'ta Göçmenlerin İskanı' [Settlement of Immigrants in Cyprus], *op. cit*., p. 387.

68 R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2012), *op. cit*., p. 27; M. Hatay (2005), *op. cit*., p. 11; C.P. Ioannides (1991) *op. cit*., pp. 163–165; R. Bryant (2010), *op. cit*., p. 20.

69 Interview with H. Atun; Author's private audio-recorded interview with Y. Suiçmez conducted 15 February 2013; Interview with V. Çelik; Interview with K. Atakol.

70 Interview with Y. Suiçmez.

they contributed to the economy, they contributed to the security, they contributed to ... social life'.[71] Atun concurred, and commended the Turkish Cypriot population because, in his words, 'nobody complained that we brought the people from Turkey'.[72]

Mustafa Yeşil, who immigrated to north Cyprus in this period, recounted a festival that had been arranged for the inward bound immigrants at the port city of Famagusta, the customary port of entry for the immigrants, in celebration of their arrival to northern Cyprus.[73] They were met with music and a barbeque party, at which '[t]hey sacrificed the lamb, and they played the drums and horns'.[74] This hints of an enthusiasm and appreciation for their new countrymen who were essential players in their quick economic recovery strategy and were viewed as a crucial helping hand for the Turkish Cypriots and their new political entity.

Conversely, the immigrants were not necessarily skilled or suited for the jobs that were short of labour, such as citrus husbandry.[75] One of the problems was that the Cypriot climate was notably different from that of the places in Turkey where the majority of immigrants came from. Most of the immigrants interviewed described the weather and heat in Cyprus as fiery and cited the lack of water as a huge problem for farming on the island. The fruits and vegetables cultivated in Cyprus were often unlike those grown in Turkey and particularly those around the Black Sea region.[76] Consequently, the authorities sent officials from 'the agricultural ministry ... to teach them [the immigrants] ... how to cultivate' the crops that they were unfamiliar with and explain their points of origin.[77]

Foremost, there was a need for a labour force, particularly within the field of citrus growing, which was the main produce of the northern part of Cyprus. In 1977 agricultural goods constituted 77.5% of all exports, while citrus fruits alone amounted to 65.7% of agricultural exports.[78] In some cases, even if immigrants were settled in villages distanced well away from the nearest citrus fields, they were transported long distances daily to harvest the crop in areas such as Morphou/Güzelyurt or on the outskirts of Famagusta, as this clearly was the most important product.[79] Kadir Yel, who immigrated to northern Cyprus in 1976 at the age of eight, recounted

71 Interview with V. Çelik.
72 Interview with H. Atun.
73 Author's private audio-recorded interview with M. Yeşil conducted on 8 April 2013.
74 Interview with M. Yeşil.
75 C. Hitchens (1984), *op. cit.*, p. 109.
76 Interview with H. Atun; Author's private audio-recorded interview with **Ç**ağlayan family conducted on 17 February 2013; Interview with M. Yeşil; Interview with Y. Suiçmez; Author's private audio-recorded interview with **Ç**akır family conducted on 17 February 2013.
77 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89; Interview with **Ç**ağlayan family; Interview with M. Yeşil; Interview with Y. Suiçmez; Interview with **Ç**akır family.
78 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 905.
79 Interview with **Ç**akır family.

that every weekend they travelled over 100 kilometres from his village, Komikebir/Büyük Konuk in the Karpasia Peninsula, to the citrus fields of Morphou/Güzelyurt to pick fruits. This was not an uncommon practice, and Yel's story does not appear to be exceptional. In north Cyprus agricultural production, in general, and citrus production, in particular, used out-dated methods and relied heavily on labour.[80]

Incorporation of the Immigrants and Refugees

In order for the settlement process to proceed as smoothly as possible, the authorities initiated a programme of settlement assistance. Each village, or groups of villages in some cases, were assigned one or two *iskan rehberi* (or housing guide(s)) who took care of those who were resettled from the south along with those who were settled from Turkey. The *iskan rehberi* arrived in villages that were intended for settlement and prepared the houses and land for the arrival of refugees and immigrants. Once the villages were inhabited and people had settled in, the guides lived in the villages amongst those who had moved there, and provided assistance with anything that was required. Sometimes these guides stayed for up to two years in the village to make sure that the transition was smooth for those who had relocated there. It also demonstrated that the people were not stranded or forgotten by the authorities, as explained by Tamer Gazioğlu, who, in 1974, was an *iskan rehberi* in Agios Epiktitos/Çatalköy, in the Kyrenia district of north Cyprus (a village mainly inhabited by Turkish Cypriot refugees, and not used for the settlement of immigrants from Turkey).[81]

Other than the *iskan rehberi* who lived in the villages with the settled immigrants and refugees, Gazioğlu stated that 'we were sparing houses for teachers and sending teachers from [the] centre to there to live and they were living [in] those houses ... In larger villages we were allocating houses to the police families'.[82] This reveals the permanence of the settlement project and the goal of creating a durable and stable community for both the Turkish Cypriot refugees and the immigrants from Turkey.

In 1975, before the Vienna III Agreement between north and south Cyprus had been concluded, 'statistics of the empty houses in villages, or empty villages ... and empty neighbourhoods of villages' were gathered and prepared for the settlement of both Turkish Cypriot refugees and Turkish immigrants.[83] Lists were drawn up to classify the size of the properties, the number of rooms, the furniture, and other goods left in the houses so that the allocation of housing was done in a fair and just manner in accordance with family size. In contrast to the case of the

80 Author's private audio-recorded interview with K. Yel conducted on 8 April 2013; Interview with Çakır family.
81 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
82 *Ibid*; A. Gürel, M. Hatay, N. Trimikliniotis, O. Demetriou, R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2013), *op. cit.*
83 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.

immigrants from Turkey who were due to arrive, the authorities, more or less knew beforehand which villages were to be provided for the displaced Turkish Cypriots who were either waiting in the south to transfer or in the British Sovereign Bases, Akrotiri and Dhekelia.[84] 'The villages they [the Turkish Cypriot refugees] were going to be located was known and ... how many houses is going to be need[ed] was also known', thus it was easier to prepare these villages and houses for the Turkish Cypriot refugees.[85] Indeed, according to Bryant,

> 'the Turkish Cypriot administration resettled Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south as villages, hence as communities, and indeed appears to have taken some effort to guarantee that the villages in which they resettled in some way resembled their own.'[86]

In this way, villages and/or neighbourhoods of villages that were not assigned to arriving refugees could be mapped out and lists prepared for immigrants from Turkey coming to the island. By and large, villages that were easily accessible and closer to town centres were intended for the refugees from the south. Villages far from the centre, for instance the Karpasia Peninsula, which were harder to access, were largely set aside for the immigrants from Turkey as the Turkish Cypriots did not want to reside in isolated locations. Thus, it may be claimed that the authorities were more sensitive to complaints from Turkish Cypriots, and gave them priority in the settlement process.[87] Nevertheless, it did occur that some immigrants were dissatisfied with the location they had been allocated and the house or land that had been assigned to them, and as a result they were moved elsewhere and given a different home. Gazioğlu recalls one such situation:

> 'we entered in Turunçlu [Strongylos] ... it was a mixed village before. And we ... went there and repaired the houses, upgraded them for regular living. And we took a small group of villagers from Turkey ... to move there ... And one or two, maybe they were like leaders ... they said: "We don't want to [be] located in these houses, they are old", because the good houses were located by the ... Turkish-Cypriots living there ... And we had not enough good houses there, and the houses that we wanted to locate them in, they didn't want ... And what happened? We were moving ... "This village ... Kurudere [Mousoulita] ... we didn't have allocated anybody there yet, let's try this village." ... And we allocated them in this village [instead].'[88]

Suiçmez tells of a similar experience, as an immigrant:

> 'At first they settled us on [the] mountain ... Mersinlik [Flamoudi] ... they [had] told us that we would be settled in Değirmenlik [Kythrea] ... but they sent us to another place. My father, also

84 *Ibid.*
85 *Ibid.*
86 R. Bryant (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 13.
87 Interview with T. Gazioğlu; R. Bryant and C. Yakinthou (2012), *op. cit.*, p. 27.
88 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.

> other people, they objected and they wanted to see the place that [was] promised and they came to Değirmenlik [Kythrea].'[89]

It seems that, although the authorities were more inclined to give the Turkish Cypriot refugees precedence in the settlement process, complaints from immigrants, in particular from village heads or similar leader figures, could affect the settlement of such groups. Some even threatened to return to Turkey unless they were given better houses.[90]

Like the Turkish Cypriot refugees, the immigrants from Turkey were also allocated land and housing in keeping with the size of their family. Hence, the list of property was compared with the list of families arriving from Turkey and the properties in question were categorised according to size and capacity. Each available village for settlement was divided into groups of houses standardised by size. The groups were then assigned a letter to denote its category, for example 'A' for the larger houses, plus a number within that group. The family list was subsequently grouped according to size, and each family was given the corresponding letter indicating its category.[91] Upon arrival at the village, each family picked a number within its group category and was allocated a house, 'like a lottery'.[92]

Contrary to the Turkish Cypriots, whose houses were generally ready to move into immediately, the immigrants from Turkey normally had to spend some time in temporary accommodation in Famagusta, the port of arrival, before being transferred to the villages from which they could choose a house. The length of time spent in Famagusta varied from case to case. Sometimes villages were ready for immigrants to transfer to within one or two nights after their arrival in northern Cyprus. In other cases, families spent up to a month living in a school dormitory or similar temporary housing in the port city. There were also some families who did not have to spend any time in Famagusta as they were moved directly to their assigned village. In those instances, other family members or people from the same village in Turkey had settled earlier in a location where other houses were available to move into. All the same, such instances appear to be the exception, and the rule seems to be that at least some nights were spent in temporary housing. While in Famagusta the immigrants were provided with all their meals, and they were taken care of until the villages for settlement were ready.[93]

Apart from houses being awarded to the immigrants there was also a specific policy involved in meting out farmland to the arriving families. Like housing, land was distributed according to the size of the family. On average 153 *dönüms* of dry farmland was dispersed to families of five. But,

89 Interview with Y. Suiçmez.
90 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
91 *Ibid.*
92 *Ibid.*
93 Interview with Y. Suiçmez; Interview with M. Yeşil; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Çakır family; Interview with K. Yel.

farmland that produced higher yields, such as citrus orchards, potato fields and vegetable fields, was divided into smaller plots. The Ministry of Resettlement, as it was renamed in 1976, equated 153 *dönüms* of dry farmland with 15 *dönüms* of citrus orchards and/or 12 *dönüms* of potato and vegetable fields. In many cases land of this size was not available for distribution, so where there were differences between 153 *dönüms* and the amount of land actually offered to a family, compensation was made through other goods or property, such as extra livestock or a shop or credit to be used in the co-operatives.[94] In the words of Atun, those who did not receive the amount of land that was the norm, 'were subsidized, they were reinforced by animals, [banana, olive or carob] trees.'[95]

Regardless, as reported by Professor Behrooz Morvaridi, the norm of 153 *dönüms*, or the equivalent of other farmland, did not always apply, and he claims that 'each village had a norm determined by the Ministry [of Resettlement]'.[96] After the *İTEM* Law was passed in 1977, land ownership was standardised to a large degree. Turkish Cypriots who had lived in northern Cyprus prior to the division, and who had less than 80 *dönüms* of land were given additional land in order to balance the land distribution across both the new and the old inhabitants of north Cyprus.[97]

In addition to these policies of land distribution, each village had co-operatives that had stored the '[l]ivestock, wheat, barley, tractors and other equipment left behind by the fleeing Greek Cypriots', which they allotted to those in need of such goods.[98] That said, there was not enough equipment and livestock left behind. In many cases the animals that had been abandoned by the Greek Cypriots had dispersed or were unaccounted for as a result of the war. In order to make up for the losses and provide sufficient livestock, sheep were imported from Anatolia by the thousands. Furthermore, cows were purchased and brought in from the Netherlands.[99] Another key area of need was money to buy crops so that the agricultural labourers could carry out their work. The co-operative system provided the farmers with credit, which 'financed them to grow ... their crops, to sell them, and then pay back'.[100]

'[T]here was an urgent need to maintain and protect certain types of agricultural resources like orchards, greenhouses and especially vast citrus orchards ... before they could be allocated to the people.'[101] The norm was to allocate land and housing immediately. However, in cases where land was vital for the economic sustainability of north Cyprus, such as the examples listed above, co-

94 B. Morvaridi (1993a), *op. cit.*, pp. 223–225; Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
95 Interview with H. Atun.
96 B. Morvaridi (1993a), *op. cit.*, p. 225.
97 *Ibid.*
98 *Ibid.*
99 Interview with H. Atun.
100 *Ibid.*
101 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89.

operatives and public enterprises were established 'for the maintenance and management of these resources'.[102] Once the production of essential goods and products was back on course, the authorities 'transferred all the production units ... to private companies, or to private people.'[103] Atun and Gazioğlu proudly asserted that the setting up of a Turkish Cypriot political entity was a kind of social experiment.[104]

Because it took some time to settle in to new homes and villages, the authorities provided meals and food until the immigrants could provide for themselves.[105] In this respect, the villages were equipped with a 'moveable kitchen from Red Crescent', which cooked and prepared meals for the inhabitants.[106] Furthermore, while preparing the villages and houses for newcomers, equipment and furniture were utilised from the unoccupied Greek Cypriot homes. These goods and properties were stored in what were colloquially referred to as 'loot depots', or *ganimet ambarları* in Turkish, and the *iskan rehberi* were responsible for redistributing these goods according to the needs and sizes of families.[107] As Bryant argues, this policy of looting abandoned Greek Cypriot homes following the war 'was normalized, even naturalized, by assimilating property to a new "national" territory'.[108] Stealing Greek Cypriot property, both moveable and immovable, was, the Turkish Cypriots claimed, an eye-for-an-eye argumentation, legitimised by pointing to similar policies by the Greek Cypriots following the creation of Turkish Cypriot enclaves in the mid-1960s.[109]

Food depots were set up in and around groups of villages as well, from where the inhabitants could collect rice, pasta and other food and household goods in exchange for the ration cards they had been given. Usually, people were granted ration cards for one year, which they could use to obtain staple foods every day in order to cope while they were trying to work the land and kick-start agricultural production. Some, however, reported that food was still received using ration cards almost two years later. Generally in these cases the hitches proved to be part of the initial wave of immigrants. As it was a pioneering project, it took time for the system to operate smoothly and it typically took longer for the first immigrants to be settled than it did for those who came later.[110]

Added to the settlement offices in the various villages and groups of villages there was a central *levazım*, or supply office located in the 'capital', Nicosia, which provided 'refrigerators ... necessary equipment to use [in] their houses. Cooking units, ... washing machines if they existed. All kinds

102 *Ibid.*
103 Interview with E. Onurhan.
104 Interview with T. Gazioğlu; Interview with H. Atun.
105 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
106 Interview with H. Atun.
107 R. Bryant (2010), *op. cit.*, p. 144.
108 *Ibid.*
109 *Ibid.*, pp. 143–144.
110 Interview with M. Yeşil.

of apparatus necessary in the houses'.[111] A few years later, when the settlement process was running more or less smoothly, the *iskan rehberi* pulled out of the villages and the number of settlement offices was reduced to only the largest cities and towns: Famagusta, Nicosia, Kyrenia, Morphou/Güzelyurt and Trikomo/İskele.[112]

Most of the villages were mixed in the sense that they comprised of the original Turkish Cypriot inhabitants, Turkish Cypriot refugees from the south and Turkish immigrants from different regions in Turkey. As well as attempting to keep villages more or less intact when relocating them in northern Cyprus, the authorities aimed at moving people to villages that they believed resembled the places that the immigrants had come from in Turkey. Atun confirmed that this was largely how it was organised. For instance, 'the people from ... Black Sea area, were settled along the coast. Not all of them, but most of them'.[113]

Although there is little evidence of widespread conflicts between the Turkish Cypriot population and the Turkish immigrants in Cyprus, there were some cultural differences and difficulties in terms of adaptation for the immigrants in their new setting. Cyprus was more developed and modern than the places where most of the immigrants originated. Many were unaccustomed to Western toilets (known as *à la franka* toilets in Turkish), and luxuries such as bathtubs and contemporary kitchens equipped with modern electric or gas stoves.[114] Gazioğlu, who remembers receiving a number of complaints from Turkish immigrants regarding their houses, recounted an instance: '[t]he houses ... was not according to their ... social and economic situations and their daily living standards.'[115] In certain cases it was a challenge to convince the immigrants that they had been given adequate housing, but some still grumbled about being handed incomplete or inadequate homes. Gazioğlu went on to recount other situations in which families from mainland Turkey complained to the authorities about being given a house without a kitchen because the house lacked a wood-burning iron stove, which was what they used to cook their food in at home in Turkey. He also recalls seeing bathtubs used as troughs for animal feed because the people that had been given homes furnished with bathtubs had never seen the like before and did not know of its conventional use. He also remembers having visited numerous families who converted their *à la franka* toilets into squat toilets (known as *à la turka* toilets in Turkish).[116]

Such observations and memories led Gazioğlu to conclude that 'they [the Turkish immigrants] were ... very far back compared with our [Turkish Cypriots'] social lives. They were more ... conservatives.'[117] It was not easy for the immigrants from Turkey 'where styles of work and living are

111 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
112 *Ibid.*
113 Interview with H. Atun.
114 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
115 *Ibid.*
116 *Ibid.*
117 *Ibid.*

quite different in some important respects from those of the Turkish Cypriots'.[118] Following their initial enthusiasm for the resettlement programme with the Turkish Cypriots, the immigrants, besides being treated contrarily by the government – as the example below illustrates in their different treatment regarding title deeds – later faced discrimination from the population at large.[119]

While Turkish Cypriot refugees were given title deeds following ownership rights granted under the *İTEM* Law, which came into effect in 1977, immigrants from Turkey were not allowed the same rights. This was, arguably, because the Turkish Cypriot administration wanted to prevent the Turkish immigrants from selling properties and moving back to Turkey.[120] The disparity in treatment between the two groups understandably led to resentment among the immigrants. The restrictions on land ownership meant, both in theory and in practice, that those from Turkey had secondary status in comparison to the Turkish Cypriot refugees and the Turkish Cypriot residents in northern Cyprus. The combination of having to adjust to new surroundings and a new way of life, and not receiving the same privileges as the Turkish Cypriot refugees, often placed the Turkish immigrants in a more testing situation than the population at large.[121] Northern Cyprus, it was argued, 'needed people to exploit the resources ... and to establish a proper administration'.[122] '[W]e were afraid lest they sold it [the property] and run back to Turkey. Because we needed them for the production, they came here. We needed the labour force.'[123]

Atun reveals the importance of Turkish assistance in this process of resettling both Turkish Cypriot refugees and the immigrants from Turkey:

> '[M]y Ministry, Housing and Rehabilitation, got almost one third of the [total state] budget and it was all sent from Turkey. We repaired the houses; we financed the people to buy tractors, to buy crops. So the Turkish Agricultural Bank, or Türkiye Ziraat Bankası, financed this. And ... in a way, we borrowed this money from Turkey ... but eventually we didn't pay it back. So it was, in a way, a donation from Turkey.'[124]

He continued to underline Turkey's crucial role for the Turkish Cypriots in stating that 'the role of Turkey in this [process], financially, technically, was very effective and was very necessary'.[125] Without Turkey, the resettlement of Turkish Cypriot refugees and the settlement of Turkish

118 B. Morvaridi (1993a), *op. cit.*, p. 234.
119 B. Morvaridi (1993b), *op. cit.*, p. 266; Y. Navaro-Yashin (2006), *op. cit.*, p. 87.
120 C. Ramm (2009), *op. cit.*, p. 218.
121 Interview with H. Atun; Interview with T. Gazioğlu.
122 A.J.R. Groom (1993) 'The Process of Negotiation: 1974–1993', in C.H. Dodd (ed.), *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, Huntingdon: The Eothen Press, p. 20.
123 Interview with V. Çelik.
124 Interview with H. Atun.
125 *Ibid.*

immigrants would likely not be possible. Furthermore, the setting up of a Turkish Cypriot 'state' in northern Cyprus would undoubtedly border the impossible without Turkish assistance.

Was It a Success?

Both at the time, and retrospectively, many have questioned whether the immigration process was a success or not. When Gazioğlu was asked what he thought was the biggest mistake made by the government in the resettlement process, he responded: 'allocating land to the people from Turkey in Famagusta, Maraş [Varosha]'.[126] This response is commensurate with the criticism mentioned earlier that the immigrants were not necessarily qualified for the tasks they came to the island to perform. There were difficulties for them in adapting to life in the island compared to the life they were used to in Turkey. The example of Varosha/Maraş – a suburb of Famagusta, the second largest city in northern Cyprus – demonstrates this specifically. Only the very first wave of immigrants was settled in this area because it later proved to be problematic for both a future settlement to the Cyprus conflict and because of overproduction and a subsequent deterioration of the agricultural land.[127]

Approximately 3,000 Turkish immigrants were settled in Varosha/Maraş. They were mainly employed to work in the citrus orchards and later with greenhouse farming, after the water became salinized due to over-use. The interesting thing is that many of those who settled in this urban centre – on the fringe of citrus orchards – were Yörüks. They are a semi-nomadic people from the Mersin and Antalya provinces of Turkey, many of whom were used to living in tents and travelling around with their herded animals.[128] Upon arrival in Famagusta, some of them described it as being 'like New York'.[129] Some were overwhelmed by the profound transformation that greeted them and they returned to Turkey, while others refused to live in the apartments given to them, and moved into tents in the citrus orchards.[130]

It was not unusual for immigrants to return to Turkey because their experiences in northern Cyprus did not reflect their expectations, or what they claimed they were promised by the authorities.[131] Yusuf Suiçmez maintained that a person from his village in Turkey, who moved to

126 Interview with T. Gazioğlu.

127 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 332.

128 Interview with M. Yeşil; Author's private audio-recorded interview with M. Hatay conducted on 15 February; 8 April 2013; R. Kasaba (2009) *A Moveable Empire: Ottoman Nomads, Migrants and Refugees*, Seattle/London: University of Washington Press, p. 21.

129 Interview with M. Yeşil.

130 *Ibid.*

131 Interview with Y. Suiçmez; Interview with Çağlayan family; Interview with Çakır family; Interview with T. Gazioğlu; Interview with M. Yeşil; Author's private audio-recorded interview with H. Suiçmez conducted on 16 February 2013.

north Cyprus at the same time as the Suiçmez family, went back to Turkey and 'killed the *kaymakam* [the governor of the provincial district]' because 'they lied to them' about what would await them in northern Cyprus.[132] Many myths surrounded the expectations of north Cyprus and the opportunities such a move would present. Many were in turn disappointed.

In response to the question as to whether mistakes were made in the immigration process, Onurhan responded that 'it could be organized better ... [We] had to fill in a gap very rapidly.'[133] The haste with which people were needed seemed to be the biggest challenge in the process, and he held that '[i]t was probably not very regulated at that time'.[134] Although this may be true, the large group of immigrants who moved to northern Cyprus in this seven-year period were resettled in their villages and houses and land were distributed relatively quickly and effectively. Atun insisted that 'the amount of 30,000 [Turkish immigrants in the first wave of immigration] was more or less calculated', however, he also alleged that the immigration process was 'done in a very hasty manner'.[135]

Priority was given to the goal of the 'creation of employment as quickly as possible and the direction of people to production', thereby kick-starting the immigrants' personal economy together with the economy of the new state.[136] From 1975 to 1980 there was an average growth of Gross Domestic Product (GDP) of 18.75%, with highs of 62.2% in 1975 and 31.3% in 1976. Likewise, every sector of the economy experienced notable growth in this period,[137] and such growth 'may be attributed to efficient utilization of human and natural resources'.[138] Over and above the economic improvements, north Cyprus experienced great social developments too.[139] Thus, coupled with the Turkish Cypriot refugees who were resettled in the north, the immigrants from Turkey directly contributed to the economic growth and social developments of the new Turkish Cypriot political entity created following the 1974 war. Yet politically, northern Cyprus became more isolated and condemned internationally as a result of the immigration from Turkey. The Fourth Geneva Convention of 1949 and its 1977 amendment deem settlement policies in occupied territories illegal. In Professor McGarry's terms the state manipulated push-pull factors were, therefore, unlawful by international law. This deepened the quagmire of isolation for the new Turkish Cypriot state, and the question of the Turkish immigration remains one of the most heated and deadlocked subjects in the Cyprus talks.[140]

132 Interview with Y. Suiçmez.
133 Interview with E. Onurhan.
134 *Ibid.*
135 Interview with H. Atun. As previously stated, the number 30,000 is far from confirmed, and numbers vary between 30,000 and 45,000.
136 'TRNC' Archive Doc. No. 89.
137 *Ibid.*, No. 343.
138 *Ibid.*
139 *Ibid.*, No. 1564.
140 J. Ker-Lindsay (2011) *op. cit.*, p. 88; J. McGarry (1998), *op. cit.*, p. 619.

Conclusion

Following the war in 1974, and in the context of a population vacuum, Turkish immigrants came to north Cyprus through a combination of normal and engineered pull-factors. In the seven-year period from the division of the island in 1974, until the end of the first wave of immigration from Turkey in 1980, the physical division between north and south Cyprus developed into a social, economic and political dissolution between the two communities. The immigrants from Turkey were, it was argued by the authorities, needed in order to work towards a Turkish Cypriot goal of economic self-sufficiency and political independence.

The population vacuum in north Cyprus following the division of the island and the exodus of the Greek Cypriots brought with it a lack of labour within most sectors of the northern Cypriot economy. It was therefore possible for the immigrants from Turkey to obtain work immediately on arrival to the island. Furthermore, immigrants from Turkey were promised housing, land and other immovable property in north Cyprus. In that way pull-factors were manipulated, in accordance with McGarry's theories, in order to appeal to immigrants from Turkey. For that reason it was a relatively easy choice for most of those who emigrated from Turkey. People who had moved to northern Cyprus in this period also encouraged family members back in Turkey to emigrate. In this manner the immigration process, through traditional and manipulated pull-factors, was kept alive by the authorities and those who had already moved.

While the Turkish Cypriot refugees were usually resettled in villages and towns near the cities and in other central locations, the immigrants from Turkey were ordinarily settled in more peripheral areas, such as the Karpasia Peninsula. Having said that, there were more central areas, for instance in and around Morphou/Güzelyurt and Famagusta, which were used to settle people from Turkey. This was largely because of the citrus fields that existed there. Even in those cases where people were settled in areas far away from the citrus fields, immigrants travelled long distances daily in order to pick fruits. These examples illustrate that immigration from Turkey was first and foremost intended to fill the labour shortage within certain economic fields, particularly within citrus and other agricultural production, making them 'agents', in that sense, in the words of McGarry.

Contrarily, the fact that many of the immigrants who came to north Cyprus from Turkey were not necessarily skilled in agricultural production, where they were put to work, was counter-productive. As a result, the authorities identified the need to send officials from the Ministry of Agriculture, Natural Resources and Energy to teach the newcomers how to grow and pick the fruits and vegetables. In so doing the immigrants could focus on working the land and kick-starting agricultural production, which was arguably the primary goal of encouraging them to move to north Cyprus in the first place.

It may be questioned whether the first wave of immigration was a success. The degree of success, however, depends on whose and what perspective is taken. The labour shortage that characterised northern Cyprus following the division of the island was, for instance, largely solved

by the first wave of immigration. In consequence, the new state could take advantage of the natural resources available, particularly the citrus fields. However, in some cases, as with Varosha/Maraş, irresponsible overproduction deteriorated the agricultural land. This consequence also falls in line with the notion that the first wave of immigration took place too quickly, with too many immigrants in too short a time span. Although Atun claimed that the number of immigrants was more or less calculated, it was clear that the challenges that this immigration process would lead to were not necessarily foreseen or thought out. For example, the fact that not all refugees from south Cyprus were resettled in northern Cyprus prior to settling immigrants from Turkey posed a challenge. Turkish Cypriot refugees were given priority and were normally given the better housing and land in more central locations than the immigrants from Turkey. This sometimes led to resentment among the immigrants.

Although some of the Turkish immigrants left, the majority of them stayed in north Cyprus and presumably improved their lives and personal economy. Moreover, they were arguably decisive in improving the economy of northern Cyprus, which experienced an average growth in gross domestic product of nearly 20% as well as growth in practically all sectors of the economy. The realisation that there was a need for labour from Turkey created an initial enthusiasm for their arrival, as vividly illustrated by the welcoming ceremonies recounted by some of the interviewed immigrants.

The first wave of immigration from Turkey to north Cyprus from 1974 to 1980 in some ways fits Professor John McGarry's theory of 'demographic engineering'. His basic argument is that 'agents' move, or are moved, in such a process. Such movements often occur following a war or in the context of crisis. 'Agents' are meant to play a consolidating role, solidifying the state's control over a specific area or region. On this account, 'agents' are normally enticed to move by promises of housing and land. This was certainly the case with the immigrants from Turkey, who were not only promised a house, land and work in north Cyprus, but were also lured by notions and presentations of northern Cyprus as a form of dreamland with great opportunities and possibilities. The immigrants from Turkey were necessary in north Cyprus in order to ensure Turkish Cypriot economic and political independence and self-sufficiency from the Greek Cypriots.

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The Application of Discourse Ethics as an Approach in Revisiting Cultural Understandings in Cypriot History Education

Irene Dieronitou

Abstract

This paper provides an examination of the parallel efforts undertaken by the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities of Cyprus in order to revise their history curricula. Although the high nationalistic discourses which were elected to address the way in which history was taught in the two communities has come under considerable revision, both groups still have a long way to go before a totally 'critical' and 'apolitical' space is reached wherein they locate their approaches to history. By delving into the historical and current geopolitical background of Cyprus, this paper argues that the two communities share many commonalities that form the basis upon which an ethically communicative and discursive space may be developed for inter-communal dialogue via history teaching.

Keywords: history school textbooks, reconciliation agendas, discourse ethics, critical theory, inter-communal dialogue

Introduction

Processes of globalisation such as economic, political, technological and cultural progression have challenged the authority of the nation-state, hence notions of citizenship. Post-modern 'social-interactionist' approaches to identity have further assisted in developing cultural awareness by reviewing our cultural understanding of the 'other', which is no longer considered to be a fixed construction. To be specific, identity constructions as well as cultural depictions are being reshaped in the sense that they are in flux due to ever changing socio-political circumstances along with wider global forces.

However, this paper neither intends to explore the array of global forces and directions conducive to constructions and reconstructions of citizenship identities, nor does it enquire into post-modern approaches to racial discrimination, ethnocentrism, or analyse multicultural education. Instead, this paper attempts to examine future prospects and possibilities of Greek Cypriot history curricula addressed in a Habermasian communicative discourse.

The communicative properties upon which discourse ethics are founded and thoroughly examined in a later section, may well drive Greek Cypriot citizens to become more tolerant toward

their counterpart Turkish Cypriot 'others'. When recalling Hicks (1980) views concerning cultural awareness and teaching materials, it may be argued that if the 'cultural other' is represented as being devoid of ethnocentric or national nuances, then a more level playing field may present itself where exchanges in conversation about culturally friendly and tolerant societies is likely. As Hicks put it:

> 'All teaching materials that deal in any way with images of the world bring with them a set of attitudes and assumptions, explicit or implicit, conscious or unconscious, which are based on broader cultural perspectives. These perspectives tend to be ethnocentric, i.e. they generally measure other cultures and groups against the norms of one's own, or racist in that one's own culture is considered to be superior and thus, by definition, others are inferior' (p. 3).

Some of the reasons for focusing on processes undertaken by the two communities to revise their history curricula are mainly because the subject of history contributes more to the discussion of values through teaching. In Cyprus and its motherland Greece, where most of the teaching books introduced by the Greek Cypriot educational system come from, the subject of history has been the principle means by which traditional values such as national and religious ideals have been instilled, and the sense of belonging to a national and cultural community has been achieved (Massialas and Flouris, 1994; Pashiardis, 2007). In addition, although the subject of history is regarded as a key lesson which aims at developing a critical mind, understanding and judgement, it is at the same time loaded with ethno-religious biases (Trimikliniotis, 2004). It is also the belief of some commentators that the historical texts no longer typify a fixed set of meanings and values, but represent rather an 'open text', merely providing cues that push readers to discern the codes, recognise the author's point of view or make inferences and construct meaning (Grossman, 2001; Jenkins, 1991).

While there is ample academic research on how 'otherness' is represented in history textbooks in Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot schools, this article does not aim to reproduce this premise. The most important contribution of this study is the examination and analysis of the recent parallel educational directions and politics undertaken by the two communities in order to achieve a reconciliatory approach in education in terms of history textbook revisions. In fulfilling this aim, discursive and communicative properties of Habermas' discourse ethics are used as the theoretical frame which can be utilised by history teachers of both communities to liberate their historical discourses from the essentialist and monolithic approaches, as well as dismantle the long-standing power relationships entrenched in schools' history textbooks.

Though recent years have seen the production of some non-ethnocentric textbooks (AHDR, 2003; Stradling, 2003; Council of Europe and Makriyianni, 2005; The American Historical Association, 2014), plus some supranational initiatives aimed at monitoring and eradicating national stereotyping in school textbooks in areas of conflict (UNESCO, 1949; Council of Europe, 2004; Joint Committee on Education and Science, 2008), there is still a great deal to be done to disrupt and undermine the basis of essentialist and politically and socially exclusionist

ethnocentric ideology. Notwithstanding the recent educational reform efforts brought about by both communities of Cyprus to revise their history curricula it would be a mistake to perceive the formation as well as the production of education policies and textbooks as simply the work of state bureaucrats who impose the official state version of reality and truth. For as Hamilakis (2003) notes:

> 'The national project in education, is not simply a matter of state imposition. The boundaries on what constitutes state and nonstate initiatives seem to blur. The pressures by social actors, the media, and other mechanisms can express, but also determine, public approval or disapproval and may lead to radical changes. Textbooks, and the debates surrounding them, can be seen as a reflection of wider attitudes and mentalities, but also as a strong ideological mechanism for the production and reproduction of these mentalities' (pp. 43–44).

It is possible, therefore, to argue that non-state initiatives such as teachers' discourses and practices play a vital role in interpreting education policies when it comes to redirecting them into the reconciliatory agenda. Before moving on to demonstrate and analyse the properties of discourse ethics, the section which follows delineates the recent geopolitical realities of the country, which in turn, is reflected in terms of the parallel educational directions of both communities.

Historical and Current Geopolitical Background

Amidst other countries of the Middle East, Cyprus constitutes an interesting case where particular attention must be placed on the direction of its education and how it relates to the cultural 'other'. In conjunction with other former British colonial countries, Cyprus provides a unique case because even though people from the two ethnically divided communities have, since April 2003, been able to cross the temporary 'border' that separates them officially, the island is still under ceasefire and no settlement has been reached despite four decades of negotiations.

By examining the island's contemporary history, it is possible to detect two landmarks associated with the production and reproduction of certain cultural assumptions. Their origin can be traced back to the British colonial rule, 1878–1960, and exacerbated afterwards in the wake of the Turkish invasion of the island in 1974.

It is widely documented that the British, for administrative reasons, evolved a policy of indirect rule on the island which embraced a system of governance developed in some of their other colonies. Under this system – often called 'Protectorates' or 'Trucial States' – the government of small and large areas was left in the hands of traditional rulers, who gained prestige as well as the stability and protection afforded by the Pax Britannica at the cost of losing control of taxation and their external affairs (The American Historical Association, 2014). Parallel to the indirect policy, the British charted a divide-and-rule course of action. By adopting this strategy, the British broke up existing power structures and sought to prevent smaller power groups from linking up. This being the case, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot religious differences were captured by the

British in nationalist terms (Easton, 1964) and stood against any effort pursued by Greek Cypriots to unite with their motherland Greece. As a result, the British transformed the apolitical elements between Muslims and Orthodox into highly politicised and ethnically divided ideals via indirect policy (Worsley and Kitromilides, 1979). For the most part what triggered the inter-communal controversies was the British policy which, as stated by some scholars, applied a criminal policy by using the principle of millet dating from the Ottoman era. According to Constantinides (2013), by seeking to emphasise the role of the confessional and ethno-religious communities, the millet system reinforced the confrontational logic between them rather than introducing the ideological component of political liberalism that would treat Cypriots as citizens, as witnessed in current democracies of the West. Hence, the millet system resulted in more inter-communal separation on the basis of ethnic and religious affiliation. What is more, another contested area of British liberal policy was the way in which education was formed. By fostering a separate Greek and Turkish identity respectively, the British allowed a divisive educational system to emerge which undermined the development of a common Cypriot civil identity and further nurtured an increased national awareness of the Greek Cypriots, and likewise that of the Turkish Cypriots later.

Over and above that, an extreme national sentiment was developing among the Greek Cypriots due to socio-economic factors. Consistent with some accounts, the British colonial rule had facilitated the modernisation of the economy at that time, and in consequence, a Greek Cypriot mercantile class with a high European orientation flourished (Morag, 2004). On the other hand the Turkish Cypriots being a less economically and socially developed community were excluded from the new found prosperity and subsequently the gap between the two communities continued to widen after Cyprus' independence in 1960. Many scholars have repeatedly stressed that by the 1960s the discourse of Cypriot identity had almost been eclipsed (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Papadakis *et al*., 2006). Despite the fact that the year 1960 had marked the end of British colonial rule and inaugurated a new constitutional era for Cyprus, the country was still inhabited by 'Greeks' and 'Turks' who maintained separated educational systems that undermined the very existence of the State which they were meant to serve. During the period of interethnic strife that persisted from 1963 to 1967, the Greek Cypriot education system reinforced a nationalistic ideology by catering only for the ideological needs of Greek Cypriots. But by 1967, interethnic strife had ceased and the political situation started to become more stable. As an outcome of this political stability, the two sides gradually began to negotiate but talks were soon corrupted by the military Junta which came to power in Greece and revived the Greek Cypriot pro-union factions. As a result, on 15 July 1974, intra-ethnic strife between the Greek Cypriots culminated in the coup against Archbishop Makarios, the then president of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC). The coup was initiated by the Greek government and EOKA B[1] – an armed

1 EOKA B was established in 1971. Its aim was to create the conditions that would lead to the union of Cyprus

organisation that had its roots in the National Organisation of Greek Cypriot Fighters (EOKA) and unleashed the first wave of anti-British violence in their demands for union with Greece in 1955. It should be noted that at the time, and in the year 1958, Turkish Cypriots, in response to the formation of EOKA, set up their own armed group called TMT (Turkish Resistance Organisation). Therefore, while armed confrontations between EOKA and TMT abated after 1967, the aforementioned intra-ethnic conflict gave way to the coup in 1974, the ramifications of which resulted in the Turkish invasion of northern Cyprus five days later. The magnitude of the latter has impacted upon every part of life in Cyprus, particularly the economy, the education system and the society. The events of the invasion had profound effects on the nation which later empowered an emerging array of cultural patterns that in effect have infiltrated organisational and societal values. There is a prominent discourse on materialism coupled with a 'work ethic' which grew after the disaster of 1974; an expansion termed 'the Cyprus Miracle' (Christodoulou, 1992; Mavratsas, 1997). The RoC, having witnessed a 14-year period of unstable existence, managed to recover economically in a relatively short time. The reclamation of the Cyprus economy is attributed to the hard-working spirit of its people (Christou, 2006; Georgiades, 2006). Mavratsas (1997) draws an interesting socio-cultural analysis on the effects of the invasion events on Greek Cypriot economic and political culture. He views the 'corporatization' of Greek Cypriot politics, brought about by the tragic events of 1974, as an impediment to the 'rationalization and modernization of the political culture and ethos of the Republic of Cyprus' (p. 285). The notion of 'corporatization' can be explained in terms of how internal politics have been carried out to enable Greek Cypriots to cope with the economic uncertainty that emanated from the invasion. Thus, the notion of 'corporatism' of Greek Cypriot politics in conjunction with the notion of 'over-politicization' denotes political practices which are initiated and shouldered by organised interest groups who avoid controversies while aiming to build consensus between a wide spectrum of political forces and interests seeking compromise wherever possible. Undoubtedly, the development of corporatism in some respect has proved productive for the Greek Cypriot economy as the institutionalisation of procedures for achieving collective agreements in labour and industrial relations, has removed Cyprus from the list of so-called Third World countries. Nevertheless, the culture of 'corporatism' has been criticised in that it stifles critical independent thinking (Mavratsas, 1997), and has become the source of another cultural norm – the so called 'nepotism' or 'favouritism' standard. The latter has arisen from a general reluctance by Greek Cypriot people to question accepted dogmas and to express individual opinions, with an implicit

with Greece. The leader of EOKA B, Georgios Grivas, adjudged Archbishop Makarios to be responsible for the Zürich and London Agreement which Grivas regarded as highly unfavourable to Greek Cypriots, and to be treason. As a result, those EOKA members who supported Makarios did not join EOKA B but rather fought them. Whereas EOKA (1955–1959) were viewed by the majority of Greek Cypriots as anti-colonialist freedom fighters, EOKA-B did not have the overwhelming support of the Greek Cypriot population.

acceptance that only social groups and organised interests are legitimate socio-political actors (Mavratsas, 1997; Georgiades, 2006). This, in effect, reinforces politicisation within society as individuals promote their interests through the established channels. In other words, 'over-politicization' as well as 'favouritism' can be perceived as cultural trends founded upon the premise that nothing is accomplished unless you know 'somebody' who is in a position of power or belongs to an organised political group. This susceptibility to unjust practices of favouritism and nepotism in Cypriot culture is reflected in the majority of organisational domains within the Greek Cypriot society, including education in the form of undeserving appointments, promotions and privileged employment transfers.

From the 1990s onwards when the RoC applied for European membership, attitudes began to change between the two communities. A recurring issue stressed by many scholars has been the shift of political orientation from the polarity of Hellenism to Cypriotism (Peristianis, 2006; Kasbarian, 2013; Papadakis *et al*., 2006; Iliopoulou and Karathanasis, 2014; Karatsioli, 2014a). The movement towards the development of a 'third way' – a common civic identity which embraces both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots – has been the outcome of a range of recent geopolitical events taking place within the past decade.

The first major step to facilitate the process of developing a sense of Cypriotness was in April 2003 when the unrecognised TRNC (Turkish Republic of North Cyprus)[2] announced the unilateral partial lifting of obstacles to crossing the Green Line. This movement led to some significant changes regarding the interaction of the two communities. Many Greek Cypriots visit the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot state, and thus, they contribute to the improvement of its economy. At the same time, Turkish Cypriots are employed and offered places for study in the government controlled area of the south.

Briefly, since the opening of the Ledra Palace barricade, the reunification of the Cyprus economy is still at stake with a number of sociologists, politicians, academics and economists, stressing a variety of possibilities and opportunities deemed likely to result in the aftermath of the reunification of the island. Ever since Cyprus became a member of the European Union in May 2004 and adopted the euro as its national currency in January 2008, the search for a solution to the long-standing unresolved political problem has continued to concern international organisations. Their interest in the reunification has brought to the forefront the need for social cohesion and has triggered an emphasis on reviewing citizenship identities. Consequently, their involvement has been decisive in facilitating the effort for an identity reconstruction process. Pioneers from the UN and other American-based institutions have been collaborating in the context of 'Civil Society Dialogue' which aims to energise and re-mobilise peace builders across the dividing line and seeks to structure dialogue sessions, the objective of which is to envision and

2 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) in this article, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

design their future worlds. Examples of these efforts have been the structured dialogue sessions organised for business people and entrepreneurs who wish to understand how the current political impasse harms both communities on the island regarding the domain of business (Laouris *et al*., 2008). Another case concerns the cooperative effort of environmentalists who seek to treat the environment of Cyprus as a whole and not one divided by invisible political lines (Famagusta Revival Report, 2008).

A significantly different activity generated by the partial lifting of obstacles in 2003 is the grassroots activism that involved a shared activity between the two communities built on the premise of a common socio-political framework as a reaction to the rejection of the 'Annan Plan' and the disappointment towards the institutionalised bi-communal activism (Iliopoulou and Karathanasis, 2014). The grassroots activism is an example of how new generations from both sides of the divide went beyond bi-communalism to adopt a 'communal identity' which could possibly address most of their societal and political issues. By and large, these are not simply the outcome of a hostile historical past, but can be viewed generally as products of the devastating effects of globalisation. And so, grassroots activism and the activities deriving from it such as public, political and cultural events, may well contribute to the youth's wider awareness of the bigger global picture so that a political bottom-up activity might kick-start negotiations regarding the Cyprus problem with top-down approaches to it. The wider global picture predominantly concerns the economic and energy global orders which are currently posing further demands on the Cyprus economy in order to rebuild its economy and lay strong foundations to maximise prospects for competing in the global energy market. Apart from this challenge, Cyprus is currently on a correction path following an international €10 billion bailout and a Memorandum which has forced authorities to implement structural reforms within a defined timeframe. The Cypriot economic crisis was largely caused by Cypriot bank speculation on the Greek public debt by purchasing the risk from the European centre (Karatsioli, 2014b). Thus, the so-called economic miracle and prosperity experienced by the Greek Cypriot community in the aftermath of the 1974 invasion, is now subverted by the bail-in measure imposed by the Euro Group and has resulted in the 'monetary blocus' of Cyprus and the lockout of its economy from global transactions enforcing the austerity package. The upshot of the domino effect from the economic crisis has meant greater unemployment and the privatisation of semi-governmental institutions, together with the restructuring of public policy and the welfare system.

The economic crisis experienced and witnessed by the RoC in the recent past is not new to the island. Partitioned Cyprus has known another major crisis in the last ten years: the 1999–2001 Turkish Cypriot crisis which ended in 2004 and hitherto experienced substantial economic growth until 2009. Although it is beyond the scope of this article to analyse the actual triggers of the Turkish Cypriot crisis, it is important to highlight the prospects and implications for peace potentialities. An interesting point has been made by Karatsioli (2014b), who states that the crisis of the two communities has transformed the identity and imaginary of the state. Given the current

economic downgrade and the experienced disappointment of both their motherlands, the same author raises the question as to whether there is a prospect of peace for the two communities.

Many scholars see the economic crisis as an opportunity for the two communities to be reconciled for they share the conviction that a reunified economy is likely to foster considerable opportunities for both sides. While it should not only advance the Cyprus tourist sector further, it should enhance the island's geostrategic position as well, taking also into consideration the recent hydrocarbons discovery within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ). But, these opportunities can only succeed if the two communities learn to work beyond bi-communalism (Mullen *et al*., 2014; Theophanous and Tirkides, 2006).

It seems that along with the economic challenges, there is at play the globalisation of energy demands. It is acknowledged extensively that the oil industry is not only being reshaped by globalisation but at the same time it is challenged by it. More specifically, this can be reflected in the rapid integration of two recent economy players, India and China with the world economy. In other words, the two countries representing one-third of the world's entire population are becoming progressively interconnected with the global economy. This, in turn, means growing trade, increased industrial production and consequently a massive rise in energy use. Globalisation is also driving the emergence of a second global energy business; that of liquefied natural gas (LNG). This has led to the integration of regional natural gas markets. Basically, the major driving forces of this trend are lower LNG costs, more spot trade and increased needs. Moreover, although the Middle East has a key role to play in LNG exports, any significant constraints on its international trade may alter this picture (Yergin, 2013; Bradshaw, 2010; Aune *et al*., 2009).

A forthcoming key energy player of the Middle East is Cyprus. In July 2012, a Memorandum of understanding (MoU) was signed between Cyprus, the US-based Noble Energy and its Israel partners with a view to seeking investors jointly for an LNG plant. According to the Minister of Energy and Commerce of the RoC, the island of Cyprus should be able to begin LNG exports by 2022 (Hydrocarbons Cyprus, 2014) with an optional extension of one to three years. In theory, Cyprus is entering an era of becoming a vital contender in the energy stakes. The geostrategic position of the island is now about to be heightened even more due to the recent hydrocarbons discovery within its EEZ. Moreover, Cyprus must play a vibrant role in bringing together neighbouring countries on the joint exploration process. Worth noting is that the current government, along with other international figures, tends to combine the exploitation of hydrocarbons with the resolution of the Cyprus problem to facilitate overcoming the economic crisis. Consistent with the opinion of most experts the discovery of hydrocarbons could serve as a catalyst for Cyprus' economic development (Mullen *et al*., 2014). President Anastasiades reiterates the position that natural gas belongs to all citizens of the RoC and that if, through a solution, the state becomes a federal administration, then natural gas will belong to the citizens of the federal state. Politicians and experts are determined to turn the economic crisis into an opportunity and they remain steadfast in the conviction that the economic developments along with those in the

energy sector have upgraded and garnered international interest and attention in Cyprus and the wider region. Therefore, from the perspective of a cultural understanding, energy should not be a source of conflict but rather serve as a catalytic agent towards the resolution of conflicts and regional integration.

The Discourse Ethics of Habermas and the Reconciliatory Agenda

Given the political and economic realities highlighted in the previous section, we may come to the same conclusion as Firillas (2008) in his eloquent statement:

> 'The post-1974 situation has paradoxically liberated the Greek Cypriots from their Turkish Cypriot compatriots, increasingly from Ankara's hold, and fundamentally from Greece. It is this independence that should be preserved and bolstered, and should guide Greek-Cypriot negotiators. It must not be based on blind nationalism but on the recognition that post-1974 there are new realities in the government controlled south, and these have shaped Greek-Cypriot society, politics and self-perception, and these should be understood well if the Greek Cypriot national interest is to be expressed best. Because it is time that we distinguish Greek-Cypriot national interest from that of the Republic of Cyprus circa 1960, and come up with some new slogans' (p. 2).

As far as Greek Cypriot education is concerned, in order to override the old 'slogans' which the state has purposefully used in the Greek Cypriot history curricula since 1960, a new framework needs to be employed in the repertoires of history teachers. If we are to disrupt and undermine the basis of the essentialist and politically and socially exclusionist ethnocentric ideology alluded to in the above quotation, we should, as Hamilakis (2003) notes, pay more attention to education procedures and critique the 'doxa'[3] projected in school textbooks. The fluid nature of identities may well be negotiated, framed and reframed by a communicative discourse such as that pioneered by Habermas.

Much of the theory of Habermas draws on 'critical theory' which is tied to an 'emancipatory interest' in that the latter seeks to free individuals from domination and oppression. The rationale for drawing on Habermas' theory rests on its emancipatory character. A contention held by this study is that history teachers can become eligible to free themselves from external control as well as from the 'distinctive regimes of truth' (Foucault, 1980) by employing Habermas' theory into their everyday teaching, and by claiming an 'ethically discursive' awareness in a Habermasian sense.

The basic assumption underlying Habermas' theory (1990) is that qualifying the validity of moral norms can be done in a manner analogous to the justification of facts. Rudimentary to his hypothesis is the idea that the validity of a moral norm cannot be justified in the mind of an

3 The term 'doxa' used in the text originates from Ancient Greek δόξα, which means 'taken for granted beliefs', or implies to what Foucault calls 'regimes of truth'.

isolated individual reflecting on the world. Instead, the validity is somewhat justified only intersubjectively, in a dialectic discourse, in a process of argumentation between individuals. Claims to truth, in other words, depend on the mutual understanding achieved by individuals in an argument. Communication of this type came to be labelled 'communicative action' by Habermas, which he contrasts with what he calls 'strategic action' as in the latter case 'one actor seeks to *influence* the behaviour of another by means of the threat of sanctions or the prospect of gratification in order to *cause* the interaction to continue as the first actor desires' (p. 58). In developing his argument further, Habermas (1993) coined the principle of 'universalization' which he extracts from the notion of 'ideal role taking' (p. 129). According to Habermas, the principle of universalisation requires 'a universal exchange of roles' so that none of the actors affected will be constrained to adopt the perspectives of all others in the exchange of reason, hence a process of what he calls 'deliberation' is achieved where all actors involved in a dialogue justify the correctness of their decision. In addition to these principles, Habermas employs the concept of 'the moral point of view' as a prerequisite in the process of a cooperative search for truth. The 'moral point of view' as formulated by Habermas (1990), arises out of the multiple perspectives of those affected by a norm under consideration where 'nothing coerces anyone except the force of the better argument' (p. 198). The essence of the moral point of view lies in the fact that it is not the sole property of an individual subject but the property of a community of interlocutors seeking to define 'what is equally good for all' (Habermas, 1993, p. 151). What underlies his theory is a sense of solidarity inducing participants in argumentation 'to become aware of their membership in an unlimited communication community' (*ibid*., p. 154).

As already noted, the partial lifting of travel restrictions across the Green Line in 2003, has offered several opportunities for contacts to take place between the two communities. Education has not remained unaffected by this landmark in the reconciliatory milieu. The fact that decisions to change history textbooks were initiated in both communities by the new elected Leftist governments are worthy of mention. The Turkish Cypriots were the first to instigate the revision of their history textbooks as the Republican Turkish Party rose to power in 2004, whereas the Leftist political party AKEL came into power in 2008 in the RoC.

The Turkish Cypriot school textbooks in use until 2004 had followed the logic of ethnic nationalism (Karahassan and Zembylas, 2006; Papadakis, 2008, 2014; Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Psaltis *et al*., 2011; Demetriou, 2014) and were produced during periods when the Right monopolised power over the Turkish Cypriot side and held the political aspiration of the *de facto* partition of Cyprus. The dominant discourse of these books is a national one which presents the history of Cyprus as nothing but a part of Turkish history and follows a narrative of how Turkish Cypriots suffered a great deal from the Greeks and Greek Cypriots. In a recent examination of the old Turkish Cypriot school textbooks by Papadakis (2014) he evidences the nationalistic rhetoric prevalent in both elementary and secondary textbooks. More particularly, he notes that these books present Cyprus as being connected to 'Anatolia' from a historical-geographical, strategic and

economic perspective, while Cyprus has no significance at all for Greece, either from a historical or from a strategic perspective. In addition he remarks that the Ottomans are presented as having come to Cyprus in order to save the Greek Cypriots from Venetian cruelty. Moreover, Papadakis notices that the Greeks are always referred to as 'Rums' and depicted as barbarians who behaved ungratefully toward their Ottoman saviours and who had betrayed the gracious Ottoman tolerance. A remarkable note by the same scholar, is that the most prominent period documented is 1963–1974, which is depicted as a continuous barbaric assault of 'Rums' against the 'Turks' in Cyprus; all part of a plan. He notices that this trend is followed in all Turkish Cypriot school textbooks which document that the 'Rums' displayed such savagery and barbarism the world has seldom seen. It is also widely documented that the events of 1974 are described in all Turkish Cypriot school textbooks as the 'Happy peace operation' when the 'Heroic Turkish Army' came to safeguard the 'Turks of Cyprus' and remained ever since (Papadakis *et al*., 2006; Papadakis, 2008, 2014; Halil-Ibrahim, 2013). Overall, the suffering documented in Turkish Cypriot school textbooks of the 'Turks of Cyprus' at the hands of the 'Rums', serves to preserve the national sentiments and sovereignty of the Turks, reproducing a general trend that is followed by societies which are divided by ethno-national conflicts. According to Papadakis (2014), history in these terms is used to propagate both a narrative focusing on the suffering of the nation and to legitimate its political goals.

However, the paradigm shift emanating from the 2003 election victory of the left-wing CTP (Republican Turkish Party), gave way to a radical approach to history and immediately called for a complete change of the old history textbooks. Since then, many scholars share the conviction that the newly revised textbooks offer a more balanced view of Cypriot history, devoid of prejudiced attitudes against Greek Cypriots (Karahassan and Zembylas, 2006; Papadakis, 2008, 2014; Psaltis *et al*., 2011). A representative example of this paradigmatic shift is that the Ottoman conquer is no longer demonstrated as a process for defending the Turkish Cypriots from suffering at the hands of the Greek Cypriots, but rather, it is now clearly documented that the Ottomans conquered Cyprus because of its strategic position. Overall, the new textbooks reveal that a great deal of effort has been put in to erase biased material.

Likewise were the conditions generated for revising Greek Cypriot textbooks but the reactions by different stakeholders varied and the outcome has not been as effective as in the Turkish Cypriot side. The presidential elections in the Greek Cypriot southern part on 24 February 2008 were decisive regarding the country's educational and political future. For the first time Cyprus would be governed under the presidency of a communist leader. The Greek Cypriot communist party leader, Dimitris Christofias, took a firm stand on the issue of education reform and reunification once he had won the island's presidency. It was unprecedented that in the post-invasion era, Greek and Turkish communities would be headed by leaders who were willing to reach a settlement for the Cyprus problem. The left-wing president then announced to the Press, the media and the public, the fundamental pillars of Greek Cypriot education that would be promoted from September 2008. At that juncture, with the start of the new academic year, the

Minister of Education distributed a circular to all state schools to outline two principle aims: the development of innovation and creativity in schools and the cultivation of a culture of peaceful coexistence, mutual respect and cooperation between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots (MOEC, 2008b). The circular received a good number of reactions from the Church, some teachers and politicians accusing the Minister of derogating the nation's Hellenic identity (Evripidou, 2008). The Minister's response was that history textbooks had remained virtually unchanged for decades, notwithstanding modern history teaching practices being implemented in the rest of Europe. He also gave his assurance that all school textbooks would be revised based on historical truth and accuracy by a committee of experts that had yet to be created. In order to make his argument more sound he expressed the view that 'My personal commitment firstly as a scientist and then as a minister, is that there is nothing like the truth' (Evripidou, 2008). Noteworthy is the response from the Archbishop to the Minister's declaration concerning the revision of history textbooks:

> 'Why do we want to create new programmes of study, and so on? We were pupils once and we were also taught history. Does this mean that the history we were taught was false?' (Evripidou, *Cyprus Mail*, 2008).

The president had mentioned among other things that in order for reconciliation to be achieved it was vital that education should seek the 'reinstatement of the truth' and the elimination of the falsification of history (MOEC, 2008b). It is believed that the search for the truth behind the events concerning the Greek coup that triggered the Turkish invasion of 1974 will contribute to the rehabilitation of trust between the two communities (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Papadakis, 2008; Evripidou, 2008). The president's suggestion was founded on the conviction held by many anthropologists and sociologists of the country, that most of the textbooks produced on the island in the humanities and social sciences area, and particularly the history textbooks of both the Greek and Turkish sides, gave a distorted picture of Cyprus' past (Makriyianni and Psaltis, 2007; Papadakis 2008; Council of Europe and Makriyianni, 2005). It should be noted that the president's declarations prompted many disputes, controversies and reactions. The Greek Cypriot ethnic nationalist right-wing party and the Democrat party were not only wary of the revision of the history textbooks but they also expressed offensive responses regarding the president's determination to rectify the omissions on Cyprus' history and past. Hitherto, Greek Cypriot history textbooks have remained unchanged in terms of their highly nationalistic content, despite other fragmented efforts to revise curricula in lower secondary education and the newly imported textbooks from Greece in 2009. All textbooks are still embroidered with a nationalistic discourse of antagonism and animosity and reproduce the general framework as well as basic principles of the dominant model of the history of Greece which, on the authority of Papadakis (2014), posits the following three key periods: ancient Greece, medieval Greece (the glorious Byzantine Empire) and modern Greece. Even in the history textbooks about the History of Cyprus, which are written

by the Greek Cypriot Pedagogical Institute, the history of Cyprus is merely presented as an extension of the history of Greece. In addition to this monolithic narrative, all Greek Cypriot history curricula, as well as literature curricula, emphasise the concept of 'loss' as experienced by the Greeks and Greek Cypriots in many facets of their suffering by the Turks. Demetriou (2014), writes about the concept of loss which dominates the Greek Cypriot curricula and reproduces sentiments of collective refugee-hood which, in turn, gives rise to the use of highly nationalistic slogans such as the one most recognised: 'I don't forget and I struggle'. As specified by the same author, the concept of loss enables an approach that focuses on nuances and differentiations of experience that fracture rather than unify collectivities. History and literature curricula, therefore, need to employ a new rhetoric that will evoke new slogans which do not produce shared or privatised experiences of 'loss', but celebrate and build on those shared lives of the two communities that were lost in vain. Rather than grieving for an imaginary loss, young generations may well start to envision and visualise their imaginary future. A core argument of this paper is that the production and reproduction of the 'imaginary loss' in formal and informal curricula, may prove to have detrimental effects on young mind-sets because it inhibits further the process towards the adoption of a unified national identity.

From a Conflicting and Biased History to a 'Shared History of Conflict' via Discourse Ethics

Given the historical and current economic and educational realities of the two communities, it is feasible to argue that the two communities share an array of commonalities but in order to unmask them a communicative discourse needs to be employed in their approaches to history. The 'multiperspectivity' approach to history teaching coined by the Council of Europe (2004) and later employed by many research scholars of history teaching, does not suffice as it offers approaches only on the basis of constructivism. More particularly, scholars of the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (2003) place teacher understanding about knowledge and learning on a continuum by distinguishing between the positivist/realist standpoint and the relativist/postmodernist perspective at the two ends of the spectrum with an emphasis on constructivism which is placed in the middle. The argument put forward by this article is that apart from constructivism there is at least one shade of grey between the two extremes and that is 'critical theory', upon which the discourse ethics of Habermas are founded. The latter is tied to an 'emancipatory interest' and could open up a cultural space through which educational professionals and students arrive at a shared recognition; that living with difference is a necessary condition in the realisation process that all of humanity is affected by the same global issues. Constructivist approaches view knowledge as something to be constructed at the interface of the subject and object of knowledge and the teachers' role in this approach is to train students how to enact the inquiry-based process of aiming for objectivity even if it can never be totally achieved due to our subjective knowledge limitations (Psaltis *et al*., 2011). However, in taking the constructivist

paradigm a step further, 'critical theory' is a school of thought that stresses the reflective assessment and critique of society and culture by seeking to liberate human beings from the circumstances that enslave them (Horkheimer, 1982).

That being so, history teachers from both communities may well employ the premises of Habermas' communicative discourse in their everyday practicum, such as the principle of 'universalisation' which requires 'a universal exchange of roles' rather than employing only superficially the multiperspectivity approach compounded to other constructivist activities. In cases where fragments in history textbooks manifest or allude to the 'victim metaphor', teachers may engage their students in role exchange activities by acting as 'critical theorists' to transform the discourse of the 'victim metaphor' into an emancipatory narrative. In doing so, the grief that both communities have suffered equally from their respective nationalist circles is made visible, together with the fact that both groups had set up their corresponding armed struggles as well. Hence, the *taksim* struggle was organised as a counter movement to Greek Cypriot *enosis*. Keeping in mind such discussion, students would then consider all of the consequences that stemmed from both counter movements and question the 'victim metaphor' which is viewed from the vantage point of the speaker's side. Understanding should bring awareness to the fore that *inter*-ethnic strife has brought about *intra*-ethnic strife, with EOKA killing left-wing Greeks, and TMT killing left-wing Turks. Likewise, it could be stressed through critical theory student activities that both communities equally bear the consequences generated by the British colonial policies of 'indirect rule' as well as 'divide and rule'. Also, by undertaking role exchange activities the students may become familiar with the reasons that prompted the formation of the armed organisations, EOKA and TMT, which led to the exacerbation of inter-ethnic conflicts and gave rise to the violence which began in 1963 and lasted until 1967.[4] In regard to these events, teachers may well employ the principle of 'deliberation'; capture student interest and involve them in a moral dialogue in order to understand the period between 1963–1967 when Turkish Cypriots bore most of the costs in terms of casualties. This is comparable with the Greek Cypriot refugee case in 1974 when the

4 Prior to the inter-ethnic conflict noted here, it should be mentioned that the first wave of massive intercommunal violence arose during the Greco–Turkish talks in 1958 which led to the Zurich and London agreements. Turkey dictated the course of diplomacy over Cyprus while the British and the Greek Cypriots continued to claw at one another in the island. The purpose of the Turks was to block any deal between Britain and the Greek Cypriots which would open the door to *enosis*. For this purpose they had two weapons: The first was diplomatic pressure on Britain; the second was violent action in Cyprus to show that the Turkish Cypriots could not be ignored and to prove that coexistence in the island between Greeks and Turks was impossible without partition. Fighting between Greek and Turkish Cypriots followed in the aftermath of demonstrations which accompanied the opening of the United Nations debate on Cyprus in December 1957. The debate set in motion a resolution which was a partial political victory for the Greeks. It expressed the hope for further negotiations 'with a view to having the right of self-determination applied in the case of the people of Cyprus'. But it was passed without the two-third majority needed to enforce it as a recommendation.

Greek Cypriots were the ones to pay the highest price.

In terms of the narratives used by both communities, a critique elucidated by Papadakis *et al.* (2006), exposed how certain accounts tend to divide communities. This drove the authors to conclude that the experience of suffering in Cyprus has officially become sharply divided to the point where terms such as 'the dead', 'the missing' or 'the refugees' refer only to those of the speaker's side. That being in case, in order for this division to be resolved, history teachers need to turn their attention to the Habermasian 'moral point of view' and engage their students in a retrospective dialogue concerning all of the refugees, including those missing and dead that happened to exist as inhabitants on the island. Teachers should join together and engage with their students to discuss what the two communities have lost by not interacting with each other rather than talking over issues of past memories and loss. The exemplars represented in this section are nothing but a snapshot of what the two communities share in common. Thus, by moralising the teaching of history in Habermasian terms, students may well become aware 'of their membership in an unlimited communication community' (Habermas, 1993, p. 154). History teachers of both communities should also locate their discourse on a framework which encompasses all recent economic and political realities that the two communities are facing. In making this clear, students should recognise that both communities have been through economic crises, and to some extent, these crises might be explained not only in terms of the overall European and global crisis, but part of the blame may be apportioned to their 'motherlands' and the detrimental effects caused to both communities by the way they have managed capital. By presenting such current realities to students, the teachers' argument should not be a coercive one with political nuances and deliberations. Nothing should force the discourse except the force of a better argument that may lead interlocutors to define what is equally good for all.

Not only do Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot teachers need to be aware of current global and national forces posing great pressure on the reunification of the country, but they should be conscious of the consequences that their practice might incur for all members of the Cypriot community as well as for humanity at large.

The Way Forward

This article has sought to examine the parallel efforts undertaken by the two communities in order to revise their history curricula. The high nationalistic discourses elected to address the way history was taught in the two communities has come under considerable revision, yet both communities have a long way to go before reaching a totally 'critical' and 'apolitical' space in which they locate their approaches to history. The so-called 'multiperspectivity' agenda founded on the constructivist paradigm is hitherto only superficially applied. It is not sufficient to merely let the students discover and construct knowledge without engaging them in a symmetrical discourse to examine and re-examine their already biased assumptions by taking the 'others' standpoint. Even if some history teachers persevere with teaching history simply for the sake of 'multiperspectivity' there will always

be students who, as 'free, democratic and autonomous [European] citizens' (MOEC, 1996, p. 17) will seek to challenge and question the truthfulness and objectivity of the historical events being taught. By the same token, there will be teachers who, as active European citizens in a yet divided island, will either engage in a 'reflexive', 'intersubjective' and 'non-coercive' dialogue, or they will just ignore the moral dispositions of teaching and follow a mechanistic history teaching in order to be sure that the requirement of the exam-centred system is met.

Given the historical and current economic and geopolitical background of Cyprus, this article has argued that both communities have been subjected to post-colonial realities that must rethink and revise their national identities and place them under the umbrella of a re-unified identity. It should be a characteristic that encompasses not only the historical narratives of their respective motherlands but also their 'shared history of conflict'. It should not be a dispute about nations and states who have struggled to maintain their sovereignties, but about two states that are now being subjected to wider global and political realities, and therefore in a process of state rehabilitation after being subjected to parallel colonial and national forces. The finding of this study suggests that the overall reunification, reconciliation and re-rapprochement project needs to be deconstructed and reconstructed to enable it to become whole once more by replacing the empty political abstraction required so that the bi-communal mistrust is minimised. In order to achieve this we need an 'apolitical', communicative and ethically discursive space in education where Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities will 'de-legitimize' their respective political positions in such a way that future citizens will start to develop a critical approach toward their future bi-communal 'other'.

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The Placement of Cypriot Embassies and Embassy Staff: Power, the EU, and Overseas Cypriots

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Abstract

The intention of the paper is to gain an understanding of the nature and logic of investments by the Republic of Cyprus in embassies and staff for embassies abroad. A statistical model with 179 countries has been used to determine whether attributes thought to be linked with the allocation of resources for foreign policy, are consistent with actual allocations in 2012. The statistical model demonstrates that power and European Union membership play a substantial role in the allocation of Cypriot resources for embassies abroad. Moreover, the statistical models indicate that Commonwealth membership plays no role whatsoever in the allocation of resources in embassies abroad, although there are mixed outcomes for some of the other attributes hypothesised to be linked with the allocation of embassies and human resources overseas. The findings of interviews also give additional insight into other aspects of the allocation of embassies and resources.

Keywords: foreign policy, Cyprus problem, embassies, overseas Cypriots, diplomacy

Introduction

Embassies are important to states, for security, the economy, democracy, and the conduct of foreign policy (Dorman, 2011). Because few countries in the world have the resources to establish an embassy in every country in the world, states allocate embassies based upon some sort of logic and not a random allocation pattern. For the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the decision of where to place its diplomatic resources is an interesting proposition that has been investigated in Webster (2001a). What is curious is that Cyprus, relative to its size, has a considerable number of embassies abroad. For example, Estonia, a country with about four hundred thousand people more than Cyprus, has fifteen fewer embassies than Cyprus with forty-seven. And Iceland, a country with less than half of the RoC's population has only sixteen embassies. So, as a country with a small population, it seems that its investment in embassies abroad is disproportionate to its size, when compared to some other small countries, almost definitely in response to the Cyprus problem and the need for the RoC to ensure substantial external support to solve the Cyprus problem. It is the intent of this research to investigate the logic and the background to the investment of resources that are made available in Cyprus for embassies abroad.

In this research, the authors explore the logic used in terms of allocation of Cypriot embassies and embassy staff overseas. To do this, two different yet complimentary methods are employed. A

rigorous statistical model is used which is an improvement on the model used by Webster (2001a), incorporating an additional dependent variable as well as new independent variables. Furthermore, interviews are carried out with people who are knowledgeable about Cypriot foreign policy with the aim of pursuing and assimilating the perceptions of the role of the embassy and the ways in which the bureaucratic processes function within the foreign policy establishment in order to gain an understanding of how embassies and human resources are allocated for the RoC.

What follows is a full investigation of the nature and logic of the RoC's allocation of resources abroad for embassies. The study begins with a literature review, which focuses on the literature relating to the allocation of embassies abroad for the RoC and other countries. The authors examine previous models with the intention to build an improved model to that which has been prepared previously; one that gives more insight into the allocation of resources for embassies by the RoC. The authors then perform a series of statistical tests, to clarify which arguments for the allocation of resources seem to be supported by the empirical findings. Following on from this, the authors consider the findings of interviews to detect whether the interviews can shed further light into the RoC's allocation of resources for its foreign policy. The authors then integrate and compare the results of the two different approaches to the question of the allocation of diplomatic resources abroad for the RoC. To end with, the authors integrate the information to illustrate what has been learned and how the research can be improved in order to become more proficient in their understanding of the foreign policy of the RoC in the future.

Embassy Location in the Literature

While embassies play a vital role in the practice of foreign policy, little research has been undertaken to date to investigate the role of embassies in foreign policy. However, in recent years some authors have placed the embassy at the centre of their research (see, for example, Hocking and Lee, 2006; Guenova, 2012; Samokhvalov, 2013). In terms of probing the placement of embassies and the logic of their placement, there is some research that has been done (Webster, 2001a, 2001b, 2001c and Webster and Ivanov, 2007, 2008). What is noteworthy of the research on the placement of embassies is that secondary data is utilised to explore the notion of why countries invest in embassies in other countries. Overall, the findings of the research on the topic exemplify that states generally invest in powerful countries and countries that are nearby. But there are other features that seem to influence the investment in embassies, in some cases, as the literature illustrates.

In the most comprehensive work on this topic, Webster (2001b) performed logistic regression for five Commonwealth countries (Australia, Bangladesh, Canada, Cyprus and Kenya) to determine if Commonwealth membership plays a role in the placement of embassies and high commissions[1] abroad. In this earlier research, the dependent variable was the presence of an

1 A 'high commission' is an embassy of one Commonwealth member in another Commonwealth member country.

embassy in another country for the five Commonwealth countries considered for the analysis. Explanatory variables used to quantify how these five countries would measure the value of dyadic relationships with other countries were; power, geography and Commonwealth membership. The findings of this research highlighted the importance of power and geography in the allocation of embassies and high commissions abroad, while the Commonwealth membership seemed to play a role only for Kenya. The findings support the notion that countries tend to place embassies in countries that are powerful and nearby. Therefore, the conclusions emphasised that realist and geopolitical approaches seem to underscore the placement of embassies abroad for most countries, although there were indications that some cultural aspects might also be important. Webster (2001c) did similar work on Canada and the outcomes for this particular country showed that the measure of power and membership in the Francophonie were the variables best correlated to the allocation of Canadian embassies.

In a later work, Webster and Ivanov (2007) explored the considerations that seem to play a role in the location of embassies abroad for Romania and Bulgaria. Due to the political and social similarities of Romania and Bulgaria (aspiring EU members at the time, Communist legacy, and Orthodox Christian populations), the authors expected that the countries would likewise have comparisons in their foreign policy too, as expressed in where they place embassies. By setting the existence of a Romanian or Bulgarian embassy in a country as the dependent variable, the research team used five independent variables in order to investigate the logic by which Romania and Bulgaria allocated their embassies abroad; power, Balkan states, Orthodoxy, European Union (EU) member states and Communist legacy. The model managed to predict correctly about 88% of the placement of the Bulgarian and the Romanian embassies. What was interesting to discover was that despite their political and social similarities, Bulgaria and Romania located their embassies using a slightly different logic. Romania located embassies strategically so that communications with EU members and powerful states were facilitated, whereas Bulgaria appeared to locate embassies in those countries with a Communist legacy, in powerful states and those with an Orthodox population. Moreover, Romania did not seem to favour embassies in Orthodox Christian countries. The common element between the two countries was that neither of them seemed to favour countries in the Balkan Peninsula and both countries favoured embassies placed in powerful states.

In another work focusing only on Cyprus, Webster (2001a) investigated the placement of Cypriot embassies using secondary data and explored the possible concerns that might be correlated with the placement of Cyprus' embassies abroad. Power, EU membership, Middle East region countries, Christian Orthodoxy and British Commonwealth membership were set as the independent variables to be explored in this way. The logistic regressions demonstrated that Cyprus allocates its embassies in powerful countries as well as in EU countries and correctly classified 87% of the placements of embassies for 149 countries. The findings emphasised that countries located in the Middle East region and countries with Christian Orthodox population,

were more likely to host a Cypriot embassy. This Cyprus-specific work exemplified that the presence of a Cyprus embassy abroad was linked first and foremost with power, EU membership, location, and Orthodox civilisation.

The research, as a whole, has illustrated that countries place embassies consistently in the most powerful countries in the world. Yet, there are other features that also seem to play a role in the placement of embassies for many countries. So, to examine how particular countries disseminate their embassies abroad, a general model using power as an independent variable to condition the likelihood of the placement of embassies should be used in conjunction with attributes designed with the particular strategic, cultural, economic, and historical concerns of a country in mind.

The previous research on the allocation of embassies plays a major role in guiding this research to enable us to better understand how the RoC disseminates its embassies abroad. The former work on embassies used only one approach – logistic regressions using secondary data – in order to observe how countries disseminate embassies. Thus, in this work, interviews with people with knowledge of Cypriot foreign policy are used to supplement the use of secondary data.

In terms of improving upon the statistical model used previously to indicate how Cyprus disseminates its embassies abroad, there are several progressions that this investigation includes to develop the earlier work. First, additional independent variables are added in order to properly model the possible influences upon the placement of Cypriot embassies abroad (trade relationships, Non-Aligned Movement, and overseas Cypriots). Second, two different measures of power are employed, as Gross Domestic Product (GDP) or Gross National Product (GNP) measures may largely reflect a purely economic vision of the power of countries. Third, two different dependent variables are used; one a dichotomous variable determining whether an embassy is placed in a particular country or not, and another to denote the size of the embassy. The use of an improved statistical model with new independent variables, an additional dependent variable, and a new measure of power, should assist in shedding more light into the logic behind the dissemination of embassies and resources abroad.

Statistical Model and Data

Consistent with previous research (Webster, 2001a), multiple regressions are used to investigate the statistical correlates of Cypriot embassies abroad, with many of the same variables being used. That said, in certain cases, some variations and improvements have been made to the model used by Webster (2001a). Table 1 summarises the concepts and how these concepts have been operationalised in the analysis.

Table 1: Concepts, Operationalisation, and Hypothesised Relationships

Concept	Measure (Level of Measurement)	Hypothesised Relationship with the Dependent Variable (Cyprus Embassies)
Embassy	Presence of embassy (nominal), Number of civil servants stationed in an embassy abroad (interval)	NA
Power	GDP (interval) and Composite Index of National Capabilities (CINC) (ratio)	Positive
EU member	EU member (nominal)	Positive
Commonwealth member	Commonwealth member (nominal)	Positive
Non-Aligned Movement member	Non-Aligned Movement member (nominal)	Positive
Proximity	Middle East countries (nominal)	Positive
Trade	Trade partners (nominal)	Positive
Orthodox Population	Per cent of population adhering to Orthodox Christianity (ratio)	Positive
Overseas Cypriots	Overseas Cypriots (nominal)	Positive
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	Organisation Member (nominal)	Positive

Dependent Variables: Embassies and the Number of Civil Servants

The purpose of this analysis is to learn about the dissemination of the Cypriot state's resources abroad. To do this, two different dependent variables are used to measure the importance of the dyad between the Cypriot state and another state, one variable indicates the presence of an embassy and the other specifies the number of civil servants sent to Cypriot embassies abroad. Having two different dependent variables enables the research to envision the Cypriot investment abroad in an embassy as measured in a dichotomous way and at the interval-level, showing a variation in the amount of resources dedicated to particular missions abroad. Though Webster (2001a) in his earlier work was not able to access the number of civil servants working in Cypriot embassies abroad, such data became available for this research.

The presence of an embassy in a country is measured at the nominal level – those countries with a Cypriot embassy are coded with '1' to denote presence of an embassy in the country whereas '0' is used for those without an embassy. The number of civil servants sent to embassies abroad is

measured at the interval-level. The RoC operates forty-five embassies abroad (Holy See and Palestine are excluded). The information gathered refers to embassies operating in 2012 and to the number of civil servants sent to embassies during that same year, based on data supplied from the Cypriot Ministry of Foreign Affairs. There are 179 countries in the analysis.

Independent Variables

Power

For this work, two different indicators of power are used, GDP and the Correlates of War project's Composite Index of National Capability (hereafter CINC). The use of GDP as an independent variable is consistent with the method of quantifying power used by Webster (2001a). While measuring the size of an economy is one method of measuring the power of a country, there are, arguably, better ways available. CINC is a standard indicator of the 'power' of countries and is often used by International Relations scholars. It calculates the amount of power that a country has in the international system, as a percentage of all the power that is available in the system, as explained by Singer, Bremer, and Stuckey (1972). In contrast to GDP, it focuses on concepts that are more salient to the perception of true state power (Heckman, 2009). Thus, it is composed of an average of percentages of world totals of six different sub indicators (total population, urban population, iron and steel production, primary energy consumption, military expenditure, and military personnel). As opposed to using the GDP of countries to model how powerful countries are, CINC takes economic, demographic, and military factors into account.

In this analysis, the authors use both GDP and CINC. The GDP data were compiled by the International Monetary Fund for 2011 and are reported in US dollars. Due to the Syrian civil war, the data used for Syria are for 2010. According to these data, the five most powerful countries in the world are the USA, China, Japan, Germany and France. The CINC data are derived from the Correlates of War official website (using version 4.0 of the National Material Capabilities dataset) and are for 2007 (data are available only from 1816–2007). As specified by the data, the five most powerful countries in the world are China, USA, India, Japan and Russia. So while the two indicators for power are different, there appears to be significant overlap. In both cases, a natural log of the GDP and CINC indicators of power were used, as the irregular distribution of the data would otherwise cause serious statistical problems in the analysis.

Additionally, it may be considered that permanent members of the UN's Security Council can be judged the measure of powerful states, since their impact is qualitatively greater based upon holding a permanent seat in the Council. In order to test this proposition, a correlation was run to test how different these two measures of power are relative to permanent members of the Security Council. The data show high levels of correlation (r=.673 for GDP and r=.687 for CINC). What the data suggest are that much of the variation of power in the analysis is explained by the

permanent members of the Security Council. Nonetheless, for collinearity concerns, placing the nominal indicator for these Security Council members in a regression with one of the other measures of power would create significant insurmountable technical problems in multiple regressions.

EU Members

It may be expected that EU members will be more likely to host Cypriot embassies and be appointed with more staff than non-EU members. There are 27 members in the EU included in the dataset.[2] The concept is measured at the nominal level; the EU members are coded with '1' while non-members are coded with '0', consistent with previous research on Cyprus (Webster, 2001a).

Commonwealth of Nations

It is expected that Cyprus would prefer to allocate its embassies and high commissions in Commonwealth member countries. Currently, there are 54 member countries in the Commonwealth from which 50 are included in the dataset (Nauru, St Christopher, St Lucia and, St Vincent and the Grenadines are excluded due to other missing data). The concept of the Commonwealth of Nations is designated at the nominal level. The country-members of the Commonwealth are denoted with '1' whereas '0' represents non-members, consistent with previous research on Cyprus (Webster, 2001a).

Non-Aligned Movement

It is expected that Cyprus will have a bias in favour of Non-Aligned Movement (NAM) members. The reason is that historically, Cyprus played an active role in the NAM. Today, the movement counts 120 members and 17 observers. The data come from the official website of the Sixteenth Summit of the Non-Aligned Movement (NAM). The concept of the Non-Aligned Movement is designated at the nominal level. The country-members are denoted with '1' while '0' represents non-members. Although this variable is an innovation that was not incorporated into the research by Webster (2001a), it is incorporated into the analysis to determine whether historical and current links with other countries via the NAM play a role in conditioning the consideration for where Cypriot embassies should be located.

2 As data were for 2012, only those members of the EU at the time were noted as being members.

Proximity (Middle East Region)

It is anticipated that Cyprus will seek to have representation and more staff in countries of the Middle East region. Currently, 19 countries are reported as 'Middle East countries', in the CIA's World Fact Book list (CIA's World Factbook official website, 2012a). For this analysis, the Middle East countries are coded with '1' while the remaining countries of the world are coded with '0' (the concept is measured at the nominal level). This variable is incorporated to be consistent with previous research on Cyprus (Webster, 2001a).

Trade

There is the expectation that those countries with which Cyprus maintains significant trade relationships will lead to a favouring in terms of the allocations of embassies and diplomatic resources.. The data were supplied by the Cypriot Ministry of Commerce, Industry and Tourism official website and are for 2011. Several countries are denoted as major trading partners and are divided into 6 groups; the EU group, the Middle and Near East group, the other Asian countries group, the other European countries group, the North America group and the rest of the world group. The EU group is by far the most important market area for Cyprus. On a country basis, the major markets during 2010 were Greece, Germany, the United Kingdom, Italy, Israel, Lebanon, China, Russia, India and the Netherlands. The data, which are reported in Euros, are available only for each group of countries and not for each country separately. For example, although it is indicated that for 2011 almost €358 million of the Cypriot domestic exports were absorbed by the EU group, the share of each EU country-member in this total is not available. For this reasoning, the concept of trade uses an indicator at the nominal level instead of the ratio level. As a consequence, the countries in which the RoC has significant trade relationships are coded with '1' while '0' is used to denote the countries that Cyprus does not maintain any significant trade relationships. Despite data limitations, a nominal figure is used, expanding upon the model used in Webster's (2001a) research.

Culture (Orthodoxy)

Countries with large Orthodox populations, it is anticipated, will be more likely to host a Cypriot embassy and more staff, as Webster (2001a) discovered in his research. The data were found in the CIA's World Fact Book and from the Russian Orthodox Church of Three Saints official website (2012b). For the purpose of this analysis, the concept of Christian Orthodoxy includes all its regional forms (e.g. Greek Orthodox, Russian Orthodox, Serbian Orthodox, and Ukrainian Orthodox). Coptic Christians are also classified as Orthodox Christians. The concept is measured at the ratio level representing the percentage of the population adhering to Orthodoxy. The code '0' is used to denote the countries that have no significant Orthodox Christian population. This

variable is incorporated to be consistent with previous research (Webster, 2001a) on Cyprus.

Overseas Cypriots

Cyprus, it is expected, will choose to place embassies and send more staff to countries with a significant number of overseas Cypriots. For the purpose of this analysis, the concept is measured at the nominal level and the data used come from the Service of Overseas and Repatriated Cypriots. The countries that host overseas Cypriots are coded with '1' while the rest are coded with '0'. During the data collection a problem with the conceptualisation of the term 'overseas Cypriots' occurred. What proved difficult to clarify is the question of 'up until what generation is a person still considered an overseas Cypriot?' According to a contact in the Service of Overseas and Repatriated Cypriots, the term 'overseas Cypriots' is defined broadly; thus, overseas Cypriots are not only those that hold a Cypriot passport but also those who have a Cypriot origin. This variable is an innovation that was not incorporated into the research by Webster (2001a) but it is incorporated into the analysis to determine whether the location of significant numbers of 'overseas Cypriots' conditions the political consideration as to where Cypriot embassies should be located.

Islamic Countries

To close, it is anticipated that Cyprus places value on influencing Islamic states so as to counter the influence of Turkey. The intention of this in foreign policy was to specifically counter the influence of Turkey in its attempt to seek recognition of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', specifically among countries with large Muslim populations. This variable is a novelty that was not incorporated into the research by Webster (2001a) and it is incorporated into this analysis to ascertain whether the favouring of Islamic countries takes place, using a dummy variable to indicate those countries that are members of the Organisation of Islamic Cooperation.

Statistical Findings

Before performing statistical tests bivariate correlations were performed with the independent variables used in the analysis. The correlations showed that all the factors, with the exception of Commonwealth members, Non-Aligned Movement, and Organisation of Islamic Cooperation are positively associated with the presence of Cypriot embassies. The factors that are the best correlated with the presence of a Cypriot embassy abroad are the EU members, the major trading partners, the powerful countries, the presence of overseas Cypriots, and measures of power. While Orthodoxy and Middle East countries seem to have a positive but weak relationship with the presence of a Cypriot embassy abroad, Commonwealth member countries and Non-Aligned Movement members have a negative relationship. The correlations are shown in Table 2.

Additional correlations illustrate that the CINC and GDP data are almost identical in a statistical sense (r=.866), meaning that they are positively correlated and very similar.

Table 2: Pearson Correlations (Cyprus Embassies and Number of Employees)

	Cyprus Embassies	Cyprus Embassies Number of Employees
Cyprus Embassies	1	.277**
Cyprus embassies number of employees	.277**	1
GDP 2012	.313**	.093
Composite Index of National Capabilities	.304**	.080
EU members	.529**	.266**
Commonwealth member	-.209**	-.064
Non-Aligned Movement member	-.359**	-.164*
Proximity/Middle East	.208**	-.003
Trade	.430**	.077
Orthodox Population	.135	.004
Overseas Cypriots	.335**	.087
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	-.077	-.072
Security Council Members	.293**	.099

** Correlation is significant at the 0.01 level (2-tailed)

* Correlation is significant at the 0.05 level (2-tailed)

Presence of Cypriot Embassies Abroad

Logistic regressions were run using CINC in one case and GDP in the other to measure power in multiple regressions to determine which independent variables had an impact upon the dichotomous dependent variable. In both cases, the variable indicating power was logged. Table 3 illustrates the findings from the regression using a logged version of GDP as the indicator of power.

The outcome of the analysis suggests that the logistic regression predicts nearly 90% of the allocations of embassies (while guessing that no countries have a Cypriot embassy would be correct about 75% of the time). The analysis illustrates that power, EU membership, proximity, and the presence of Orthodox populations seem to be best linked with Cypriot embassies abroad. However, it also seems that there is some reason to believe that Non-Aligned Movement membership and the presence of overseas Cypriot populations are also linked with diplomatic representations, although the statistics do not elucidate such a definitive relationship

Table 3: Logistic Regression (Dependent Variable Presence of Embassy)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Power (log GDP)	1.023	.245	17.430	1	.000	2.782
EU member	4.382	.996	19.371	1	.000	79.982
Commonwealth member	-.317	.849	.139	1	.709	.728
Non-Aligned Movement member	1.364	.847	2.591	1	.108	3.912
Proximity / Middle East	1.976	.868	5.185	1	.023	7.215
Trade	.389	.694	.313	1	.576	1.475
Orthodox Population	.031	.014	4.658	1	.031	1.031
Overseas Cypriots	1.517	.963	2.483	1	.115	4.559
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	.133	.816	.026	1	.871	1.142
Constant	-15.393	3.371	20.847	1	.000	.000

Classification Table

			Predicted		
			Cyprus Embassies		
	Observed		0	1	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Cyprus Embassies	0	126	9	93.3
		1	11	33	75.0
	Overall Percentage				88.8

a. The cut value is .500

In another regression using the logged CINC data as the indicator for power (See Table 4 below), the findings are quite similar to those using the logged GDP, although there are some noteworthy differences. First, while the predictability of the data are almost identical, using a logged version of the CINC data for the indicator for power suggests that the allocation of Cypriot embassies abroad is only linked with power, EU membership, the Middle East, and Overseas Cypriots.

Table 4: Logistic Regression (Dependent Variable Presence of Embassy)

	B	S.E.	Wald	df	Sig.	Exp(B)
Power (log CINC)	1.010	.253	15.958	1	.000	2.744
EU member	4.838	1.070	20.435	1	.000	126.156
Commonwealth member	-.298	.868	.118	1	.732	.743
Non-Aligned Movement member	.546	.816	.448	1	.503	1.727
Proximity / Middle East	2.198	.881	6.218	1	.013	9.004
Trade	.593	.719	.680	1	.410	1.809
Orthodox Population	.015	.013	1.344	1	.246	1.015
Overseas Cypriots	2.140	1.030	4.321	1	.038	8.501
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	.051	.820	.004	1	.950	1.053
Constant	3.142	1.446	4.723	1	.030	23.149

Classification Table

			Predicted		
			Cyprus Embassies		
	Observed		0	1	Percentage Correct
Step 1	Cyprus Embassies	0	125	9	93.3
		1	11	334	75.6
	Overall Percentage				88.8

a. The cut value is .500

What is common between regressions using either the GNP-based measure of power or the CINC measure of power is that the outcomes all agree that allocations of embassies are linked with power, EU membership and locations in the Middle East region. They are also in agreement in that Commonwealth membership, trade, and membership in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation have no relationship to the allocation of Cypriot embassies abroad. That means that the findings of the relationship of Cypriot embassies and Non-Aligned Members, Orthodox populations, and overseas Cypriots are not definitive and that any relationships for these factors are largely the artefact of whichever indicator of power is used.

Number of Civil Servants Sent to Embassies Abroad

Before analysing the data it is important to mention two anomalies during 2012 which affected the data. Since March 2011, Syria has been embroiled in civil war, forcing the Cypriot ambassador and embassy staff to abandon Damascus. As a result, for 2012, the data entries regarding the number of civil servants sent to the Cypriot embassy in Damascus are zero. In addition, due to the Cypriot Presidency of the Council of the EU, the number of civil servants sent to the Cypriot embassy in Brussels was significantly increased, reaching one hundred people in staff. As a consequence these two cases were removed from the data, as they are unique cases in terms of allocation of staffing and reflect nothing regarding the general hypothesised systematic nature of workforce allocations.

Two OLS regressions were run (one using CINC and one using GDP) as the indicator of power. In both instances, the data for the indicators of power were logged. The output for the regression using GDP as a measure of power is shown in Table 5 and the findings for the regression using CINC are almost identical. In the case of logged GDP as the indicator for power, the resulting Adjusted R-squared value is .542, whereas in the other regression using the logged CINC score as the measure of power, it is .549. The findings for both regressions show that there is an indication that power, EU membership, trade partners, and the presence of overseas Cypriots (either measured with CINC or GDP) play a role in the number of civil servants sent to Cypriot embassies abroad. There is no evidence in either of the regressions that Commonwealth membership, Non-Aligned Movement membership, presence in the Middle East or membership in the Organisation for Islamic Cooperation matter at all in the allocation of employees to Cypriot embassies abroad. The significance levels received for the data on Orthodox populations are suggestive that there is some slight favouring, although by any statistically meaningful interpretation it would be rejected that Orthodoxy is linked with the systematic allocation of manpower in embassies.

Interviews

In order to gain a better understanding of the issue, four interviews were held to determine what other factors apart from those explored in the quantitative analysis would explain more about the

nature and logic of the Cypriot state's investment in diplomatic resources. Using a convenience sample, four interviews took place among a mixture of practitioners and scholars dealing with Cypriot foreign policy issues. The intention of the convenience sample was to gather insight into the process of the allocation of embassies from the perspective of the government of Cyprus. Of the four interviews, two of those interviewed were academics with knowledge of the foreign affairs and foreign policy of the RoC. The third interview was with a retired ambassador who has substantial experience within the foreign policy establishment of the RoC. The fourth interview was with a person who currently works in a position of considerable responsibility at the Ministry of Foreign Affairs in the RoC.

Table 5: OLS Regression (Dependent Variable Number of Civil Servants)

	B	S.E.	B Standardized	t	Sig.
Constant	-1.235	.493		-2.503	.013
Power (log GDP)	.110	.043	.169	2.566	.011
EU member	1.357	.269	.314	5.039	.000
Commonwealth member	.189	.191	.056	.989	.324
Non-Aligned Movement member	.121	.216	.039	.563	.574
Proximity / Middle East	.278	.303	.053	.917	.361
Trade	1.214	.258	.299	4.697	.000
Orthodox Population	.006	.004	.082	1.451	.149
Overseas Cypriots	1.837	.330	.319	5.565	.000
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	.025	.193	.008	.131	.896

The intention of the interviews was to gather knowledge from those who had studied Cypriot foreign policy in theory and who had been experienced in the bureaucracies involved in foreign policy for the RoC. It was anticipated that there would be biases from the respondents based on their experiences and knowledge. The predictions were that those interviewees with only a theoretical knowledge of the making of foreign policy may overestimate the intentional and systematic nature of decision-making in the crafting of foreign policy, and likewise it was expected that those interviewed with substantial experience in the Byzantine foreign policy establishment may over-stress the administrative complexities of decision-making.

The interviewees were asked to respond to five questions on the placement and function of Cypriot embassies abroad. Although the subjects to be discussed were decided *a priori*, the structure of the interviews (open-ended questions) gave both the researcher and interviewees the freedom to change the order and their stories (Müller, 2008). Interviewees were asked to comment on the purpose for the RoC to have embassies abroad, the factors that are the most important in terms of placing embassies abroad, the reasons why some Cypriot embassies have more staff than others, and finally, the types of considerations that should be taken into account if Cyprus decides to open a new embassy. At the end of the interviews, an additional question was posed to discuss countries that should be favoured with a Cypriot embassy. Overall, the interviews proceeded without major problems and the respondents were willing to answer every question.

All four interviewees seemed to be in agreement regarding the general purposes for the RoC to have embassies abroad. They indicated that a Cypriot embassy abroad aims to represent the RoC abroad. As stated by one respondent, embassies are embedded in the foreign relations of each country and form an integral and essential part of their foreign policy. Respondents indicated that national interests also appear to be related to the placement of several Cypriot embassies abroad. In terms of defining the national interest, the Cyprus problem was mentioned topmost on the list by respondents while the economy was frequently mentioned also. Trade relationships, enterprises and tourism were included in the concept of economy, as the respondents explained it. The presence of overseas Cypriots and cultural links were also noted in responses by two interviewees in order to address the question on the purposes for the RoC to have Cypriot embassies abroad.

When asked about the specific placements of Cypriot embassies abroad, the interviews indicated that historical contingency and historical legacy lay behind the Cypriot Government's choice to place an embassy in a particular country. Nevertheless, all those interviewed appeared to agree that not only objective but also subjective factors too, could determine the Government's choice to place a Cypriot embassy in a specific country instead of another. It was heavily underlined as well that subjective factors, in terms of governmental preferences and ideological and sentimental reasons, can be evidenced in the placement of Cypriot embassies in Egypt, India, Yugoslavia and Cuba. The first three embassies exemplify the close relations between Archbishop Makarios III, Nasser, Nehru and Tito, whereas the latest placement of embassy, in Cuba, undoubtedly reflects something about President Christofias' ideological background.

Several factors are classified as 'objectives'; the overriding priority being the Cyprus problem. As mentioned in one interview, Cyprus may choose to place embassies in countries that constitute the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP). Furthermore, the level of relations between one country and the RoC is also crucial for the placement of a Cypriot embassy abroad; political relationships, the presence of overseas Cypriots, trade relationships, together with economic, tourist and cultural links (Orthodoxy, archaeology/excavations), consistent with the 'level of relations' concept. The interviews also highlighted that EU membership is another important factor in the placement of a Cypriot embassy abroad. Another aspect frequently

mentioned was the influence of a country on the international arena and its ability to define the global political processes, for example as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council. Other confirmed determinants were proximity, 'geopolitical reasons', and Commonwealth and the Non-Aligned Movement membership.

Although in the first two questions the responses in the interviews were very similar on most points, this does not seem to apply to the third question in which those interviewed were asked about the size of staff in different embassies. Only one of those interviewed emphasised the role of subjectivity in this. As he stated, 'politics are always behind decisions', implying therefore, a higher propensity to subjectivity when the Cypriot Government is to define the number of civil servants sent to Cypriot embassies abroad; there are cases where an average diplomat is sent to a 'good' embassy while at the same time an excellent diplomat might find himself in a 'bad' embassy. A heavy workload was considered by one of those interviewed as a reason to explain why some Cypriot embassies are more staffed than others; it should be taken for granted, one said, that the Cypriot embassy in Washington should need more staff than the Cypriot embassy in Kenya. He also referred to the role of the Cypriot community. As maintained by one interviewee, the presence of overseas Cypriots and national interests seem to govern the number of civil servants sent abroad. Another remarked that the level of relations between Cyprus and a certain country might probably answer the question as to why some Cypriot embassies are more staffed than others; while during 2012, he said, the Cypriot Government decided to send eight civil servants to the embassy in Greece, but at the same time it sent only five to China. This, he continued, should not be surprising; although Greece neither maintains a decisive role in world affairs nor does it influence the global political process, its extremely close relationship with Cyprus has rendered Greece a country of crucial standing for Cyprus. Of course, he added, no one should ignore the determinative role that powerful countries play in the number of civil servants sent to Cypriot embassies abroad.

In the fourth question (regarding considerations to be taken into account when allocating resources for embassies), two of those interviewed adopted a critical attitude whereas the other two repeated the reasons they put forward to answer the previous questions. In the opinion of one of those interviewed, national interests should define the allocation of Cypriot embassies abroad, although the interviewee noted the weakness of the Cypriot government to clearly determine its national interests. Today, one interviewee stated, the answer to the question of where the Cypriot Government would place its next embassy is based more on 'who governs' (Minister of Foreign Affairs, Director General, Diplomats) and less on 'which are the country's current national interests'. He also stressed the beneficial effects that an embassy in an unfriendly country might have on the island's foreign policy. Using the same critical tone, one of the respondents disapproved of the way Cyprus allocates its embassies abroad. In his view, possible future alliances, the challenges in Europe and the surrounding area, as well as national interests should be taken into account if Cyprus decides to open a new embassy abroad. Another respondent considered the

following should be taken into account if Cyprus decides to open a new embassy abroad: the need to communicate and to promote the island; national interests; ideological and sentimental reasons; historical legacy; geopolitical reasons; heavy workload; a large Cypriot community, and the political significance of a country. On the authority of one other respondent, the Cypriot Government should consider financial issues before it decides to open a new embassy abroad, since embassies entail substantial costs.

Finally, a wide variety of responses were advanced for the last question regarding the countries that ought to be considered for a Cypriot embassy. Three of those interviewed agreed on the importance of having embassies in Japan, and two mentioned placing an embassy in Canada as well. Other countries that were mentioned as important places to have embassies were Senegal, Saudi Arabia, Argentina, Nigeria, Sri Lanka and the Philippines. One respondent stated that he felt it would be better if Cyprus did not open a new embassy, but instead approved additional staff for Cypriot embassies in China, Russia, and Brussels plus the Permanent Mission to the Council of Europe in Strasbourg.

Conclusions

There is interesting information to be gleaned from integrating and comparing the findings of the statistical analysis and the interviews. Table 6 summarises the concepts and the outcomes using different methods. The results of the statistical analysis illuminate that when correlations are performed, all the factors, with the exception of Commonwealth members and Non-Aligned Movement, appear to be generally positive when linked with the presence of Cypriot embassies abroad and allocation of resources abroad. Power, EU membership and the presence of overseas Cypriots are consistently demonstrated to be associated with embassy placements and the allocation of human resources abroad. The findings illustrate that Commonwealth and Non-Aligned Movement membership play no role at all in the placement of Cypriot embassies abroad and human resources abroad.

The discoveries from the interviews seem to square well with the statistical findings, in many ways. Firstly, as the interviews supported and the statistical analysis illustrate, it is rather easy for someone to identify the crucial role that the Cyprus problem plays in the Cypriot foreign policy and in the placement and function of Cypriot embassies abroad. Three of the hypotheses tested in the statistical analysis (power, EU members and proximity) were linked with the need of the RoC to settle the Cyprus problem, as the interviews made reference to repeatedly. As it has been arguably maintained, the Cypriot Government, in order to achieve the reunification of the island would seek to have representation and an increased staff in powerful, Middle East countries, and EU member-states; all three hypotheses were confirmed. In the same manner the four interviewees based nearly all their answers on the need to promote and settle the Cyprus problem. The statistical analysis as well as the results from the interviews indicates that powerful countries and EU member-states may not only contribute to the settlement of the Cyprus problem but they can also

help with the promotion of other national interests too. Directly associated with the second similarity is the important role that trade seems to play in the placement and function of Cypriot embassies abroad. While the statistical analysis shows that trade does seem to condition the allocation of diplomatic resources in a consistent way, the interviews affirm that there is and should be, more stress placed upon those countries in which Cyprus maintains significant trade relationships.

Table 6: Relationships of Concepts and Findings Using Different Methods

Concept	Embassy allocations (regressions)	Staff allocations (regressions)	Embassies (interviews)
Power	Positive	Positive	Positive
EU member	Positive	Positive	Positive
Commonwealth member	No Relationship	No Relationship	Positive
Non-Aligned Movement member	Mixed Results	No Relationship	Positive
Proximity (Middle East countries)	Positive	No Relationship	Positive
Trade	No Relationship	Positive	Positive
Culture (Orthodoxy)	Mixed Results	No Relationship	Positive
Overseas Cypriots	Mixed Results	Positive	Positive
Organisation of Islamic Cooperation	No Relationship	No Relationship	Not Mentioned
Permanent Security Council Members	Not Fully Tested	Not Fully Tested	Positive
Subjectivity	Not Tested	Not Tested	Positive

What is notable about the statistical analysis is that it has been based exclusively on the rational actor approach, as defined by Allison and Zelikow (1999) (Webster and Ivanov, 2007). Thus, the analyst perceived the way that states act based mainly on the Rational Actor Model. In line with such an approach, Cyprus, as the basic unit of analysis seeks to place and staff embassies

in countries that would mainly promote and ensure its national interests. Weighing the pros and cons of each country, the Cypriot Government makes eventually the most value-maximising choice and places an embassy in a country that can promote and ensure its national interests as much as possible (Allison and Zelikow, 1999). Interviews provided supplementary explanations for the Cypriot Government's decision to place and staff embassies in certain countries, including bureaucratic politics and governmental/personal preferences. So, in order to explain the decision of the Cypriot Government to favour certain countries with Cypriot embassies and more staff, the analyst needs to confirm who is involved in the decision-making and implementation process. On that account, governmental preferences and ideological and sentimental reasons may determine not only the Government's choice to place a Cypriot embassy in one country instead of another, but also define the level of human resources it will devote to it. The absence of the concept of 'subjectivity' from the statistical analysis was the result of a weakness of the quantitative method to measure and indicate the independent variable of 'subjectivity' even though, to some extent, this was modelled into the equation by adding variables that would impact upon the subjective perceptions of the value of relationships with another country.

GDP and CINC were both used in the statistical analysis to measure the independent variable of power. According to interviews, the significance of a country in international relations and its participation and central role in peripheral organisations (e.g. as a permanent member of the United Nations Security Council) could probably place it at the top of powerful countries. That being the case, it seems that interviews suggest a more political view in order to define the concept of 'powerful countries', in contrast to the quantitative measures that utilised largely economic indicators to signify it. Apart from powerful countries, culture has also been indicated differently in the approaches used. Although the interviewees used Orthodoxy in order to denote the concept of culture, archaeological excavations were also used to describe it. Therefore, not only countries with high Orthodox populations but countries which Cyprus maintains significant links via archaeological cooperation are likely to host a Cypriot embassy as well.

The advantage of using a statistical model in conjunction with interviews illustrates that there is a great deal of overlap in the findings and there is an interesting composite picture that appears, regarding the nature of the foreign policy of Cyprus. Although there is an overlap in what is thought to be true by those interviewed in terms of what is linked with allocating resources for embassies, the statistical analysis shows that the speculation by those interviewed does not seem to be embodied in empirical ways that are detectable by the statistical analysis. While some influence may be taking place in the bureaucratic or governmental process, it is not apparent that the preferences become embodied in ways that are measurable to an analyst on the outside of the organisations allocating resources.

Nonetheless, there are some weaknesses in the research and some suggestions for future investigations. In the first instance, the research is mainly characterised by its static nature, hence, by its inability to indicate changes happening over time. Regardless, the interviews remedied this

to some degree, because in the discussions with interviewees they were able to speak about change. Future research should look at interviewing people who were involved in the decisions to open and close embassies or shift human resources; this would give greater insight into how the values of relationships with other countries are weighed in the changes in resources allocated in foreign policy in Cyprus. A further limitation relates to the number of the hypotheses, the variables and the indicators that were tested. Although a simple model managed to predict correctly about 88% of the placement and staff of Cypriot embassies abroad (by using a few independent variables), there are more independent variables that could be adopted to make the model stronger. While interviews added 'subjectivity' as a consideration in the analysis, it is unclear how this might be incorporated into a statistical analysis of the allocation of embassies. The small sample size used in the interviews is also another constraint. An increase in the number of interviews would contribute a more in-depth understanding of the topic, especially if those consulted were involved in the decision-making process in the shift of resources to different embassies or the opening/closing of an embassy. One other improvement to consider in future efforts is to delve into the reciprocity of embassies, as the game of diplomacy may be viewed as an interactive game between states. In addition, future interviews should make a point of asking which countries or classifications of countries would not be considered under the current circumstances as this would allow respondents to deal with the case of Turkey and other countries or classes of countries that decision-makers in Cyprus would not envision hosting a Cypriot embassy.

This research contributes further to the understanding of the foreign policy of the RoC. Despite the fact that many of the conclusions are comparable to the findings of Webster (2001a), the authors believe that the improved model plus the increased/improved variables used, and the addition of interviews, have added to the richness of the knowledge on the topic. It has been demonstrated that with limited resources, Cyprus places and staffs its embassies abroad consistent with realist principles and concerns about integrating into the EU. But, it also has been shown that other factors such as overseas Cypriots and proximity play an unfailing role in the allocation of embassies and resources abroad too.

To conclude, this research has made a modest contribution to the understanding of the processes and logic behind the foreign policy of the RoC. The interviews and statistical analysis underscore that the priorities for the Cypriot state's foreign policy include the use of diplomatic channels to find a favourable solution to the Cyprus problem and to integrate Cyprus into the community of countries in the EU. What is also intriguing is that there is considerable evidence that the State works in ways to continue a relationship with overseas Cypriots – something that may be of sentimental interest but of questionable political value. Yet, while many things seem to influence the allocation of resources for Cypriot foreign policy, some appear to be commitments and concerns that only remain on paper and do not translate into meaningful allocations of resources.

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Essay and Research Notes

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Solving the Cyprus Problem: An Evolutionary Approach

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For too many years Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) and Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs) have been trying hard, under the auspices of the United Nations (UN), to solve the Cyprus problem and reunite their beautiful island (strategically located in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea) under a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. But regardless of the various efforts by successive Secretaries-General of the UN and their representatives, and of the international community in general, to assist both the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities reach an everlasting agreement to resolve the problem, no substantial result has so far been produced. The most significant effort by the UN to find a solution to the problem culminated in 2004 with the Annan Plan (named after the former UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan). This Plan, presented to both communities in separate referenda, was accepted by the T/C community but rejected by the G/C people as non-viable. Following the Annan Plan debacle, the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in its totality became a full member of the European Union (EU) as of 1 May 2004. That said, the implementation of the European Law (Acquis Communautaire) was temporarily suspended in the northern part of the island, which is controlled by the T/Cs under the umbrella of the non-recognised 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)'. In 2008, after four years of stagnation, the current UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-moon made a decision to renew the UN efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem by inviting both sides to a new round of negotiations. The dialogue, almost six years later, is still ongoing, albeit with some interruptions but the parleys have yielded little or no result. This stalemate, however, is due to the huge gap in the positions of both sides on the core issues under discussion. Namely, the maximum concessions that one side is ready to make on the current chapters of arbitration at the negotiating table do not meet the minimum requirements which the other side is ready to accept, and vice-versa. In the short term, because of the aforementioned (non) developments, the outcome to any impartial observer is that there is no sign of light at the end of the tunnel for the Cyprus problem.

Yet why have all these rounds of negotiations to solve the Cyprus problem failed? Presumably because, via this protracted consultation process, G/Cs and T/Cs have always put the cart before the horse. In other words, instead of eradicating the causes for a non-solution, thus creating the

1 An earlier version of this essay is available at [www.kiatipis.org/writers/ch/christos.yiangou/2013-04-23_solving.the.cyprus.problem.an.evolutionary.approach.pdf].

necessary conditions for the implementation of a viable solution (i.e. trust, confidence, proven record of political, economic and cultural collaboration between the two Cypriot communities, cultivation of common interests, willingness for a change of the current *status quo*) prior to any substantial negotiation for a comprehensive solution, the two Cypriot communities have continuously attempted to negotiate a solution before these conditions were put in place. Thus, the failure!

It would seem evident from the above that a new approach is needed to assist in solving the Cyprus problem, an approach that should aim at cultivating the bi-communal socio-political and cultural ground before any comprehensive solution is negotiated and agreed. That is, rather than trying to pre-maturely reach a comprehensive solution to the problem in a single stage, the G/Cs and T/Cs could attempt to reach a solution by adopting an evolutionary (or a step-by-step) approach. A gradual approach could offer the two Cypriot communities the opportunity to fulfil their negotiating interests by creating trust and confidence concurrently; something quintessential for a future comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus problem based on a new future revised plan by the UN.

The Cyprus Problem

The Cyprus problem is the result of a protracted conflict between the RoC – a full member of the EU – and Turkey over the Turkish occupied northern part of Cyprus. Even though the ethnic nature of this problem involves the Turkish and the Greek communities, the international complications extend beyond the boundaries of the island of Cyprus itself and primarily include the guarantor powers of the RoC (Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom (UK)) the United States of America (USA), the UN, and the EU.

More specifically, since the inter-communal hostilities broke out in December 1963, three-and-a-half years after Cyprus gained its independence from Britain under a bi-communal, power-sharing constitution, the territory of Cyprus has essentially been divided between the Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities making up its society ratio – re population division – of 78:18 with the remaining 4% made up by the three minority communities: the Latins, Maronites and Armenians. On 20 July 1974, following a military *coup d'état* (instigated by the Greek junta and executed by nationalists from the then Cypriot National Guard) against the then President of the RoC, Archbishop Makarios, Turkey invaded the island and occupied the northern part of internationally recognised Cyprus. This triggered the exodus of an overwhelming majority of G/Cs from the northern part to inhabit the land in the southern part of the country and transferred the T/C community from the southern to the northern part. In 1983, nine years after the Turkish invasion (formally disapproved by the UN Security Council), the T/C community, unilaterally declared independence in the northern area, forming the 'TRNC', a sovereign entity that still lacks international recognition with the exception of Turkey with whom the 'TRNC' maintains full diplomatic relations. Also, a Buffer Zone (the Green Line), created by the UN to avoid inter-

communal tensions and hostilities, has been retained since 1974. This zone still separates the Greek Cypriot-controlled south from the Turkish Cypriot-controlled north.

Since 1977 the two communities and the guarantor countries have committed themselves to finding a peaceful solution to the Cyprus problem in the form of a bi-communal, bi-zonal (or bi-regional) federation based on *political equality*, through a negotiating process under the auspices of the UN. Endless rounds of talks have been undertaken by successive leaders of both communities with no fruitful outcome, despite encouragement and advice by the UN plus other international bodies and major international powers. Today, Cyprus still remains divided between an unrecognised 'TRNC' in the north and a recognised RoC in the south, each with its own ethnic community, government and state administrations.

A Protracted Problem

Why has the Cyprus problem not been solved yet? This is certainly NOT because the two communities have been traditionally deprived of constructive ideas, plans and proposals to solve the said problem. On the contrary, since 1977 the UN have literally bombarded the G/Cs and the T/Cs with many imaginative ideas, plans and proposals that could, in principle, help the two sides to reach a balanced agreement of forming a united RoC based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality*. But, for different reasons, it seems that the two Cypriot communities have so far been unable to grasp the various opportunities that have been given to them and resolve the Cyprus problem in a realistic and mutually acceptable manner.

By and large it appears that the fundamental reason why the Cyprus problem has not been solved is the traditional lack of political will by both sides to find a balanced comprehensive solution that can address the current needs and interests of both sides. For instance, this absence of political will is evidenced by the fact that irrespective of time running against the interests of the two sides, thus far depriving them of many opportunities for common development and prosperity, they are still, after decades, resilient to such a solution.

The seemingly non-existent political will to find a solution to the problem is, nonetheless, a result of the current state of mistrust that survives between the two Cypriot communities to form a common state. Lack of trust is marked in the way each side perceives (or misperceives) the other's public statements and official negotiating positions. Roughly 22 years ago, the then UN Secretary-General Boutros Boutros-Ghali in his report to the UN Security Council of his mission of good offices in Cyprus, dated 19 November 1992 (S/24830), described the position of the two communities in relation to the then UN 'set of ideas' to solve the Cyprus problem as follows: He rightly observed that there was a 'deep crisis of confidence between the two sides' which made it 'difficult to envisage any successful outcome to the talks for as long as this situation prevails' (para. 63), and simultaneously suggested the implementation of a series of Confidence Building Measures (CBMs).

The lack of trust is directly related to the fact that, rightly or wrongly, both the G/Cs and the T/Cs are afraid of one another. The G/Cs are afraid that – via a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality* – the T/Cs will one day find a pretext to secede from the new Federal State and eventually de jure divide the island into two states and the T/Cs are afraid that the G/Cs will one day find a pretext to dominate them.

This common fear (or phobia to a large extent) which has so far resulted in the failure by both sides to reach a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem based on a bi-communal, bi-zonal federation with *political equality*, emanates from five basic reasons as follows:

First of all it is the continuous presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus. Even though this presence has created a feeling of security within the majority of the T/C community it has still produced the opposite result within the G/C population. The fact that Turkey continues to maintain a heavily equipped army in Cyprus – a member state of the EU – gives rise to fear and alarm within the G/C people and deprives them of the chance to see any good intentions by Turkey to facilitate a solution of the Cyprus problem. This insecurity factor played an important role in leading the G/C community to vote 'no' for the Annan Plan in 2004.

Secondly, it is a conflicting historical past exacerbated by the historical involvement in this problem of the two 'motherlands' namely, Turkey and Greece. This past has been perceived and explained by every side's overwhelming majority in a subjective and opposing manner. Indeed, as Zenon Stavrinides, a professor of philosophy, has eloquently argued:

> '... the two Cypriot communities in their vast majorities, give very different explanations of the character of the Cyprus problem, how it came about, and what would be a just and viable settlement of it; and further, the two communities dismiss with disdain each other's accounts as untrue, insincere and self-serving ... each of the communities harbours a huge trauma for which it blames the injustices committed by the other side, and it wants to secure at the negotiating table concessions from the other side to remove, as far as possible, the injustices ... The Greek Cypriots in their large majority believe that the central core of the problem – the "essence of the problem" as they often say – is the terrible wrong done to them by the ... Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974 which resulted in probably more than 3,000 dead and 1,400 missing persons, as well as other victims of inhuman mistreatment and widespread rape. The continuing occupation of the northern part of the island by the Turkish army, in blatant breach of international law and morality ... [and] the displacement of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and properties in the north, the *de facto* partitioning of the island, the illegal immigration of tens of thousands of people from Turkey intended to change the demographic composition of the island, and so on ...
>
> On the other side of the territorial and social divide, the Turkish Cypriot community in their large majority, take the view – which is also the standard view of Turkey's officialdom and the media – that the Cyprus problem ... broke out in December 1963, when Greek Cypriots, failing to intimidate them into accepting changes to the bi-communal constitutional order as a prelude to bring about enosis, attacked them with groups of armed irregulars. Turkish Cypriots, in their

> thousands, were forced to leave their homes in isolated or mixed villages and move in fear of their safety to enclaves defended by a few hundreds of Turkish troops and their own poorly armed irregulars ... The Turkish Cypriot community's experience of living as "second-class citizens" in enclaves left a deep trauma and had a formative influence on the collective mind of all those who went through it ... Turkish Cypriots have had to exist without a recognised state, without an international accepted government which was capable of speaking for them in the family of nations as an equal member ...'[2]

In addition, the trust gap between the two sides further widened in the aftermath of the Annan Plan referenda: a traumatic experience on both sides of the divide after the T/Cs voted 'yes' to the Plan and the G/Cs voted 'no'. In the T/C minds the G/C 'no vote' to the specific plan seemed a condemnation of a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality*.

Thirdly, it is a reality that strong and influential ruling economic, political and religious elites on both sides oppose a bizonal, bicommunal federal solution based on political equality. These elites believe, rightly or wrongly (and predominantly, I must add, on the G/C side) that the political and socio-economic cost of a solution based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality* outweighs the various benefits that such a solution might yield for their respective communities and, therefore, oppose it. Moreover, there appears to be fear and phobia by certain political, economic and religious elites on both sides that an alteration of the current *status quo*, via a solution, may potentially endanger their subjective political and economic interests. These elites have apparently seen their political, economic and social status rising in the wake of the 1974 tragic events and they are possibly convinced that any solution of the Cyprus problem might endanger all the benefits that they have accrued since 1974. In this respect it might be the case with further analysis that the self-same elites believe they are benefiting more, politically and economically, from a non-solution rather than from a solution. Therefore, these elites opt for the continuation of the *status quo* as a 'second best solution' and to this end they are able to cultivate a similar view within public opinion on both sides by using various mass media and educational means and tools.

Fourthly, it is also a fact that both G/Cs and T/Cs have not been educated to become citizens of a Federal State. The influential political elites of both sides seem to have refrained from educating Cypriot students and citizens as to what it means to be a citizen of a federal state as opposed to being a member of an ethnic community. This, for example, is why a recent initiative by Anastasiades' Administration to upgrade the lesson of 'Federation' within G/C high schools was confronted with disdain and strong objection by many G/C political and economic elites. Textbooks, in both G/C and T/C primary and secondary schools, seem to be still biased and non-objective, to a lesser or larger extent, in the way they portray the 'other side' and the island's historical past.

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2 Z. Stavrinides (2009) '*Dementia Cypria:* On the Social Psychological Environment of the Intercommunal Negotiations', *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 175–186.

Last of all, it is the absence of bold leadership by both sides. That is, throughout their protracted political ordeal, both G/Cs and T/Cs have been deprived of enlightened leaders – perhaps only with the exception of former President George Vassiliou – who might be able to inspire the two communities and persuade them that the benefits of a unified Cyprus outweigh those of a divided country. Up to now there appears to be no leaders on either side of the divide who can pinpoint a way to peace and reconciliation that both communities would be willing to follow.

Based on the above it is, in my opinion, futile to keep trying to find a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem before eradicating the five primary reasons outlined which have nurtured the dispute for so many years. In any event, in order to achieve this it is necessary to reverse the causality chain via an out-of-the box approach, based on breakthrough thinking. This, I believe, can be achieved by an evolutionary approach.

The Evolutionary Approach

To be more specific, after substantial preparation and consultation with all interested parties, the UN Secretary-General ought to call an International Conference convoking the participation of: the three Guarantor powers of the RoC (i.e. Greece, Turkey and the UK), the EU, the five permanent members of the UN, and the two Cypriot communities. The said Conference should aim at leading the two communities to a Provisional Agreement for an evolutionary solution of the Cyprus problem. Such an Agreement should incorporate a preamble which will, inter alia, include the *Joint Declaration* agreed between the leaders of the two sides on 11 February 2014 and which delineates and reaffirms the general framework of the end goal of both sides, explicitly, the adoption of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federal state based on political equality. Moreover, within the said preamble the two communities should commit themselves to refraining from actions that would change the demographic character or would distort the population balance on the island. In addition, a clause may perhaps be included in the Agreement that empowers the UN Secretary-General to monitor its implementation and rebuke any party that *justifiably* violates and/or breaches the said Agreement at any time. Finally, this Provisional Agreement should incorporate a five to ten-year road-map (or until the final status of Turkey's relation with the EU is decided). Within this road-map both G/Cs and T/Cs might *concurrently* implement a series of substantial Confidence Building Measures (CBMs). On the one hand such measures would engage them in a creative, constructive and trustful political, economic, military and cultural collaboration, and on the other hand would satisfy each side's core negotiating interests. The goal of CBMs would be to gradually eradicate the five primary causes detailed above that have cultivated the Cyprus problem over many years. An indicative list of five *substantial* CBMs might be the following:

First, return by Turkey of the fenced-off section of the Turkish occupied city of Famagusta to the administration of the UN and subsequently to its legal G/C

inhabitants in return for a RoC legitimate approval of the opening of the port of the said city and the Tymbou (Ercan) Turkish Cypriot airport (essentially via a commonly accepted implementation of the EU direct trade regulation).

In particular, a large section of the city of Famagusta in the northern part of Cyprus was captured by the Turkish invading forces in August 1974. That section of Famagusta (named Varosha) was then sealed off and still remains uninhabited – a ghost place – under the direct control of the Turkish military. In consequence, the RoC has, since 1974, declared the ports and airports in the occupied areas as closed because it cannot exercise its full control over them. In this respect, direct flights to northern Cyprus and the trade traffic through Tymbou airport and Famagusta port respectively, are considered illegal by the RoC and the EU. A regulation, however, permitting direct trade between the T/Cs and the EU – thus in essence permitting the opening of the Famagusta port and Tymbou airport – is now in the hands of the European Parliament and the European Council. The said regulation has been vetoed by the government of the RoC since 2004 on the grounds that a possible implementation of this regulation – based on its current wording – would amount to recognition of the unilaterally-declared 'TRNC'. The return of Varosha to the UN and subsequently to the city's legal inhabitants, combined with the approval by the RoC (via a commonly agreed legal wording) of the aforementioned EU direct trade regulation for the opening of Tymbou airport and the port of Famagusta for use by both Cypriot communities – ideally both co-managed by T/Cs and G/Cs under the auspices of the EU – could be a decisive and very beneficial CBM for the two sides to agree on.

The opening and rebuilding of Varosha becomes even more necessary now because of the latest financial and economic crisis that has developed in Cyprus and has dramatically hit the G/Cs to a large extent but also indirectly affected the T/Cs to a lesser degree. This crisis has led the previous and current governments of the RoC to resort to applying for financial assistance to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM); an international organisation located in Luxembourg which provides financial assistance to members of the euro zone in financial difficulty. After several months of negotiations between Cyprus and the Troika (i.e. the International Monetary Fund, the European Central Bank and the European Commission), a €10 billion bailout was announced on 25 March 2013 by the Troika in return for the RoC's agreement on harsh austerity and government restructuring measures. Because of this crisis the Republic's economy is expected to pass through years of recessions resulting in high levels of unemployment and increasing poverty amongst the G/Cs. In addition, the T/Cs will be negatively affected too by this situation. For many decades the T/C community has benefited much by the RoC's booming economy. For instance, in the last decade or so many T/Cs have been working in the south of the island and a good number of G/Cs have been shopping in the northern part. Also, the T/Cs have historically enjoyed many social benefits from the RoC such as free medical care and electricity.

Undoubtedly, the opening of Varosha might well be the prime mover for rejuvenating the Cypriot economy and the creation of economic growth to the benefit of both communities. A

report, prepared by former President of the RoC, George Vassiliou and his team of consultants, indicates that 'a Resettlement of displaced persons in Varosha ... will lead to speeding up the growth of the economy, creating a huge demand for construction and other services'.[3]

> *Secondly, the creation by the UN, with the approval of the RoC, of a bi-communal Steering Committee that should discuss the future of hydrocarbon reserves (i.e. natural gas) recently discovered in the RoC's Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ) in return for Turkey's avoidance of any threats and actions against the RoC's legal right to exploit the island's EEZ.*

A recent Royal Bank of Scotland (RBS) investor report has suggested that Cyprus 'is sitting on huge reserves of natural gas and potentially oil reserves too'. As the report claims, 'Initial gas reserves discovered [in Cyprus Republic's EEZ] are likely worth 300 per cent of [the country's] GDP. This could rise to 2,950 per cent GDP ... the Island sits on potentially huge energy wealth in excess of 600 billion euros ... Cyprus will become geopolitically important for gas pipeline routes.' Judging by various estimations by Cypriot officials and international companies, the country could have an injection of more than €1 billion annually after 2020, lasting for several decades, an amount around 6% of its current GDP, a substantial number in analogy to other gas producing states.[4]

Regardless of the above-mentioned report, G/Cs and T/Cs vehemently disagree on how they should allocate the wealth that will stem from the exploitation of Cyprus' hydrocarbon reserves. The RoC justly argues that it has every legal and sovereign right, under international law, to drill for oil and gas and that any future prosperity deriving from such venture will be fairly distributed to both Cypriot communities. In this regard the RoC, in 2008, signed its first hydrocarbon exploration contract with US Noble Energy (a company also currently activated in Israel's EEZ) – for offshore block 12 (adjacent to Israel's EEZ). A most recent exploratory drilling conducted by Noble revealed an estimate of gross mean resources of circa 5 trillion cubic feet of natural gas in block 12. Moreover, in early 2013 the RoC signed contracts with the Italian-Korean ENI/KOGAS consortium for hydrocarbons exploration in blocks 2, 3 and 9 in the EEZ of Cyprus. Just recently, ENI/KOGAS began the first test drills in block 9 and have planned a series of other exploratory drillings over the next 18 months. In addition, on 6 February 2013 the RoC signed hydrocarbon exploration contacts with French TOTAL for blocks 10 and 11.

Based on the above developments the RoC has also recently reaffirmed its intention to either build in the future a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal on the island's southern shore where natural gas could be loaded on to ships and exported, or to build a floating natural gas liquefaction plant (FLNG). The creation of the LNG terminal is contingent on the quantities of gas that will be discovered by ENI/KOGAS in the blocks of its jurisdiction over the next 1.5 years or so.

3 G. Vassiliou *et al.*, (2003) 'The Economics of the Solution Based on the Annan Plan', Working Paper, mimeo, Nicosia.

4 *Natural Gas Europe's website* 'Cyprus Natural Gas Sector Sails on Fast', 4 February 2013.

Having said that, the quantities so far discovered by NOBLE do not provide viability for such a project and in order for this terminal to be feasible, additional confirmed quantities of gas are needed in the near future by ENI/KOGAS. If, eventually, there are insufficient quantities to build a LNG then the RoC could decide on the second best option, which is the creation of a FLNG. As the Chairman of the Cyprus Hydrocarbon Company, Toula Onoufriou, recently said, Cyprus could begin to export liquefied natural gas to Europe in 2022.

Furthermore the RoC seems to be concentrating on exporting Cyprus gas, recently discovered at the Aphrodite field in offshore block 12, via a pipeline to existing infrastructures in Egypt which are currently operating well below capacity.

Simultaneously the RoC is seriously keeping in mind the possibility to promote a tri-partite joint project (Israel, Cyprus and Greece) on a pipeline to transfer natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean Israeli offshore fields to Europe via Cyprus and Greece.

What the RoC has so far ruled out is any possibility of exporting its natural gas via a pipeline connecting the Cyprus EEZ with Turkey without a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus Problem. Indeed the existence of the Cyprus problem has until now obstructed the RoC and Turkey from engaging into a fruitful dialogue on how Turkey and the RoC might collaborate in order for the island to have an unhindered and full exploitation of the country's natural gas wealth.

This is the reason why Turkey and the T/Cs have protested strongly against the RoC's energy search, branding it as 'illegal' and beginning their own exploratory missions not only on the non-recognised 'TRNC' but also in blocks in the Cyprus Republic's EEZ. More specifically, both Turkey and the T/Cs regard this exploration as one involving the exercise of sovereign rights at the international level which, they maintain, the G/Cs and T/Cs jointly possess. Furthermore, Turkey would ideally be interested in connecting the RoC's EEZ with Turkey via a pipeline even before a comprehensive solution. According to a recent report by the Peace Research Institute Oslo (PRIO), 'Turkey is likely to respond to exploration activities in the areas that the Turkish Cypriots intend to explore and which overlap with most of the blocks in Cyprus Republic's EEZ. Turkey could do so even more aggressively, in response to any exploration in Sea Blocks 1, 4, 5, 6 and 7 (which have not yet been licensed by the Cyprus Republic), which Turkey claims partly fall within its own continental shelf.' Related to this, Turkey has recently started shutting out of Turkey energy investment international companies like the Italian ENI involved in the Cyprus hydrocarbon exploration process.[5] Moreover, a recent new flagrant violation by Turkey of the RoC's sovereign rights in its EEZ by the Turkish research vessel 'Barbaros' has led President Nicos Anastasiades to suspend his participation in the inter-communal meetings with the Turkish Cypriot leader Derviş Eroğlu. In brief, the said vessel has begun carrying out surveys in Block 3 in line with a NAVTEX

5 A. Gürel, F. Mullen and H. Tzimitras, '*The Cyprus Hydrocarbons Issue: Context, Positions and Future Scenarios*', PRIO Cyprus Centre, PCC Report 1/2013.

(Navigational Telex) issued by Turkey in October, 2014. Accordingly Turkey has reserved a large swathe inside the island's EEZ for seismic surveys from 20 October to 30 December.

The island's hydrocarbon reserves bonanza becomes even more perplexed since it directly involves the interests of the consortium of Noble Energy (that also include Delek and Anver companies from Israel) and the state of Israel too. In light of the recent discoveries of natural gas in sea-plot 12, Noble Energy consortium (expected to be the first company to commercialise Cypriot natural gas) has seemingly taken the decision to advance with plans to process the output of offshore gas field 12 in the RoC's EEZ and of the Tamar natural gas field offshore Israel, where Noble is also activated to Egyptian LNGs via a pipeline starting from Tamar.

Over and beyond this, Israel's decision on how to export its natural gas will, inter alia, depend on the future status of its relationship with Turkey and Israel's current standing with Cyprus and Greece. To be precise, a conceivable improvement in the relations between Israel and Turkey would understandably induce Israel to seriously consider the possibility of distributing all, or almost all, of its exported natural gas to Europe from a pipeline starting from Israel's EEZ, crossing the RoC's EEZ and reaching Europe via Turkey. Moreover, at the time of writing, Israel is also seriously considering the possibility to promote the tri-partite joint pipeline project (Israel, Cyprus and Greece) alluded to earlier.

Based on the above, and even though the international community seems to support the right of the RoC to explore for oil and gas, it nevertheless expects hydrocarbon revenues to be fairly shared between the two Cypriot communities in the context of a settlement before or ideally after the solution of the Cyprus problem. In this regard the UN, the EU, the USA and others have asked the Greek and Turkish sides to refrain from future political and military actions that might endanger tranquillity in the RoC's EEZ.

All of the raised domestic and international variables affecting the hydrocarbon reserves of Cyprus make up a Gordian knot for both G/Cs and T/Cs that perhaps may only be cut by the formation of a 'Cyprus Hydrocarbon Reserves Steering Committee'; a group set up by the UN *with the approval of the RoC* and comprised of G/C and T/C experts in the field. The purpose of this committee would be to synthesise all relevant inter-communal conflicting interests in a constructive and collaborative manner with the aim of recommending to the leaderships of both Cypriot communities the best possible ways of exploiting Cypriot hydrocarbon wealth for the benefit of not just the two Cypriot communities but of the other regional states and private actors it concerns (i.e. Israel, Greece, Turkey, Noble Energy and ENI/KOGAS). This group, among other things, might: *First*, make a cost-benefit analysis of the current available options in exporting natural gas from Cyprus, which in all probability may be either the creation of a pipeline to transfer natural gas from the Eastern Mediterranean Israeli offshore fields to Europe via Cyprus and Greece as described above or the creation of a pipeline starting from the RoC's EEZ plot 12 (or ideally from Leviathan in Israel if the said country wishes) and reaching Turkey by crossing either the RoC's EEZ or its shore. Afterward, the said committee could reach a universally accepted conclusion as to the best option to be selected, without excluding the possibility of choosing both

options if necessary (the possibility to build in the future a Liquefied Natural Gas (LNG) terminal on the island's southern shore could also be studied in the future). *Secondly*, create a bi-communal 'Oil and Natural Gas Fund' that will save, invest and proportionally allocate promptly to both Cypriot communities – before or after any comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem takes place – any profits accrued as a result of the exploitation of Cyprus' natural resources. In response to the creation of the above tabled committee, Turkey should commit itself to refrain from future action that might violate the RoC's sovereign rights in its EEZ.

The engagement of both interested parties into a committee of this type should no doubt help to alleviate the suspicions of the international community who fear that the discovery of natural gas in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea could constitute a continuous source of regional political anomaly and military conflict in the region.

Thirdly, implementation by Turkey of the 'Ankara Protocol' in return for a de-freezing by the RoC of the six negotiating chapters of Turkish accession negotiations that the RoC has been blocking since 2009.

Turkey began accession negotiations with the EU on 3 October 2005. However, the accession talks have since been affected by a number of domestic (slowdown in Turkish reform process) and external problems (the Cyprus issue). Due to these setbacks, the talks came to a halt in December 2006. During that year the EU member states decided not to open eight chapters in Turkey's accession negotiations and to suspend the conclusion of the remaining chapters in process on the grounds that Turkey had failed to fulfil its responsibilities stemming from the 'Additional Protocol' (or 'Ankara Protocol') to the Association Agreement, which stipulates that Turkey must open its ports and airports to Greek Cypriot ships and planes. In December 2009, the RoC blocked another six chapters of Turkish accession negotiations, arguing that Turkey needs to first normalise relations with Cyprus by implementing the 'Ankara Protocol'. Turkey has been rejecting this action on the premise that it would indirectly connote the recognition of the RoC. Without doubt, the implementation of the Ankara Protocol from the Turkish side in return for the RoC's decision to de freeze the six chapters of Turkish Accession negotiations, blocked since 2009, plus the other 8 blocked by the EU as described above, should impact positively on the efforts by all interested parties to solve the Cyprus problem. The initiative could inevitably lead to a normalisation of the bilateral relations between Turkey and the RoC; something which would reflect positively on the negotiating atmosphere between the two Cypriot communities.

Fourthly, gradual withdrawal of the Turkish troops from northern Cyprus and approval by Turkey of a de-mining of the island in return for a gradual reduction of the RoC's National Guard.

It is not possible to give an accurate number of military personnel serving in northern Cyprus due to conflicting public sources of information but its seems that there are an estimated 30,000 regular troops of the Turkish Army serving in northern Cyprus at any given time. To this number we

should add the Turkish Cypriot Security Force, a military and security force of the 'TRNC' estimated at approximately 9,000 strong, primarily made up of conscripted T/C males between the ages of 20 and 40. It is a combined armed force, with land, air and naval elements. The Greek military contingent on the island (about 1,000 men) is supplemented by the RoC's National Guard of 12,000 active and 75,000 reserves. Air reinforcement of the Turkish troops can be effected, if necessary, within hours. All of the Greek, Turkish, Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot forces are equipped with modern weaponry making Cyprus one of the most militarised areas in the world, in terms of ratio of troops to civilian population. This creates enormous insecurity within the G/C and T/C communities.[6] In fact no military presence on the island is essentially justified given the fact that the RoC is a member of the EU, Turkey is currently negotiating to become a member of the EU, and both Greece and Turkey are NATO allies. The presence of the Turkish army in Cyprus appears not to be in the interest of the country itself. As US Vice-President Joe Biden said before an audience of Harvard scholars '... they [Turkey] have no interest to have troops remaining on Cyprus. None, whatsoever'.[7] It is therefore vital that a planned and combined reduction of troops in the northern and southern part of Cyprus is effected under the Provisional Agreement discussed above, with the supervision of the UN.

Furthermore, the UN estimates that Cyprus still has some 15,000 land mines covering an area of two million square metres in the Buffer Zone and the surrounding land. UN Peacekeepers have successfully cleared 73 minefields to date, which included some 27,000 mines. The peacekeeping operation seems to have been denied access by the Turkish army to the mined areas within the Buffer Zone (separating the northern occupied part of the island with the southern part). Additionally, since January 2011, the UN has suspended its de-mining operations because the two sides have failed to reach an agreement on de-mining outside the Buffer Zone.[8] The Turkish army ought to allow the UN access to mined areas within the Zone and both G/Cs and T/Cs should reach an agreement on de-mining outside the Zone. A gradual reduction of Turkish and Greek troops in Cyprus combined with a gradual de-mining of the island will undeniably reduce insecurity within the two Cypriot communities.

Finally, the G/Cs and T/Cs ought to continue and intensify their current cultural and educational exchanges, under the UN's supervision in order to help their respective societies to understand each other.

The goal of these exchanges is to motivate co-operation between G/C and T/C professionals, students, and community leaders through bi-communal activities, to encourage the participants to work together in order to break down barriers and find practical solutions to island-wide concerns,

6 Electronic Library of Congress, Country Studies, Turkey, Cyprus.
7 Electronic *Cyprus Mail*, 6 October 2014.
8 United Nations Security Council Resolution 2135, 30 January 2014.

create opportunities for island-wide collaborations between G/C and T/C communities, foster a sustainable island-wide network of leaders, students and professionals active in bi-communal efforts and develop a cadre of trained individuals from both communities who can make positive contributions to Cyprus' development.[9] The capacity for such exchanges should gradually cultivate the bi-communal psychological and social ground necessary for the future bi-communal approval and implementation of a comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem. A fine example of the importance of inter-communal cultural and educational collaboration is the very productive work that has until now been undertaken by a bi-communal committee – of 10 Greek and Turkish Cypriots – established five years ago to protect and preserve the rich cultural heritage of Cyprus. This committee has at present restored several places of worship plus monuments on both sides of the divide and dozens more projects are in the pipeline. This has helped to build vital trust and co-operation for more ambitious plans including the urgent restoration of the Apostolos Andreas monastery in the Karpas peninsula together with work on the Othello Tower in the walled city of Famagusta. 'The road to where we are now has not been a bed of roses', said Takis Hadjidemetriou, the head of the Greek Cypriot half of the Technical Committee on Cultural Heritage in Cyprus. He continued: 'We started by accusing each other and using propaganda against each other. At the end of the day all this evolved into cooperation, a joint effort, common heritage and culture and of course looking ahead to our shared future.'[10]

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Unquestionably, the potential implementation of the CBMs outlined earlier could gradually eradicate the causes of the Cyprus problem as described. In other words: the gradual withdrawal of the Turkish army from Cyprus would inevitably boost a Greek Cypriot feeling of security; the everyday collaboration between the two sides on various socio-political issues should cultivate mutual empathy and therefore induce each side to look upon their historical past in an objective and understanding manner; the political, economic and religious elites on both sides that are currently opposing a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation based on *political equality* would most likely reverse their positions after they start to reap the benefits of an evolutionary solution and G/Cs and T/Cs – via collaboration – would gradually come to understand and appreciate the benefits of being citizens of a future united federal state as opposed to being members of an ethnic group in a divided country; finally the osmosis of all the above could give rise to a new generation of enlightened leaders in the two communities who could potentially lead Cyprus to a better future.

9 UNDP Cyprus Portal.

10 Electronic *Cyprus Mail*, 24 November 2013.

An all-win Approach

In unison, such an approach should point G/Cs and T/Cs in the direction of an all-win situation along with the international players involved in this protracted dispute.

A signing of the Provisional Agreement is expected to be highly beneficial for both G/Cs and T/Cs. The G/Cs would be able to: maintain the internationally recognised RoC and reclaim, for first time since 1974, an important piece of now occupied land (Varosha) plus reap the economic and financial benefits (i.e. influx of foreign direct investment plus job creation and so on) that would inevitably result from the reconstruction of this land; experience conditions of tranquillity in the RoC's EEZ and as a consequence make the exploitation of the island's relevant hydrocarbon reserves easier, safer and more lucrative; gain semi-recognition of the RoC by Turkey; save a vast amount of money from the gradual demilitarisation of the Republic's National Guard, and develop confidence with their T/C compatriots – something quintessential for a future comprehensive solution of the Cyprus problem.

Likewise the T/Cs, in return for their signing of the Provisional Agreement would earn the following: the lifting of their so called 'economic and political embargo' by the opening of Famagusta port and Tymbou airport (under the auspices and legality of the EU); reap the economic and financial benefits of the reconstruction of Famagusta; proportionally enjoy the remunerations of the exploitation of the RoC's hydrocarbon reserves; indirectly receive reaffirmation by the RoC that they are politically equal with the G/Cs; make huge monetary savings from the gradual demilitarisation of Cyprus, and develop business confidence with their G/C compatriots. Moreover, the two communities would, jointly and separately, benefit substantially by pursuing business with the now vibrant economy of Turkey.

What is more, both Turkey and Greece can benefit enormously from the signing of such an interim agreement. On the one hand, Turkey could, inter alia: enjoy a boost in its efforts to become a member of the EU; save a good sum of money from the gradual withdrawal of its troops from Cyprus and improve its relations with Greece markedly, hence creating the necessary conditions for solving the Aegean political and economic differences with Greece (differences that involve a set of interrelated issues between Greece and Turkey over sovereignty and related rights in the area of the Aegean Sea). And, on the other hand, Greece could, among other things: further improve its bilateral political and economic relations with Turkey as well as locating a solution to the Aegean differences revealed above that could allow Greece to exploit the full potential of its EEZ.

The UK should also be quite eager to see a major initiative in resolving the Cyprus problem. Being the third guarantor power of Cyprus, and maintaining sovereign bases on the island since the country's independence in 1960, Britain too has a vested interest in realising a rapprochement between the G/C and T/C communities that could lead to a gradual solution of the problem. Provided that the current status of the bases would be safeguarded Britain would obviously like to see a bone of contention between Turkey and the EU – that is the Cyprus problem – removed.

The EU should also be very positive with the signing of a Provisional Agreement between

the two Cypriot communities since this would essentially be the beginning of the end of a complicated situation that became an EU problem since the RoC's accession to the EU in 2004. The fact that Cyprus became a member of the EU prior to a solution of the Cyprus problem has left Turkey hostage to the RoC's veto on any future accession of Turkey to this Union. Occasionally, this has resulted in much friction between a member state (Cyprus Republic) and a candidate state for membership (Turkey) and such friction has triggered problems in the dialogue between the EU and NATO. The EU–NATO strategic cooperation remains expressly blocked because of mutual vetoes by the RoC in the EU and Turkey in NATO. The agenda of the regularly scheduled joint meetings of the North Atlantic Council (NAC) and the Political and Security Committee of the EU (PSC) are generally void of any new items and can only legitimately discuss the Berlin Plus operation in Bosnia. Questions of imminent concern, such as the fight against terrorism and energy security, cannot be tackled. A Provisional Agreement between the T/Cs and G/Cs would not only allow Turkey to reinvigorate its bid for membership in the EU but would also permit both Cyprus and Turkey to respectively lift the mutual vetoes discussed earlier, thus enabling the dialogue between NATO and the EU to progress.

Similarly, the USA should welcome an evolutionary solution to the Cyprus problem for this initiative could bring Greece and Turkey closer together and consequently reduce friction in the southeast flank of NATO. In addition, an evolutionary solution may enable the USA to assist the interested parties to design a new strategy in exploiting hydrocarbon reserves in the Eastern Mediterranean Sea to the benefit of all public and private players involved in this venture. Moreover, a strategic collaboration between Greece, Turkey, Israel, Greek Cypriots, and Turkish Cypriots could dramatically reinforce US efforts to contain state and other sources of terrorism in the Middle East like the Islamic State of Iraq and Syria (ISIS), a Sunni, extremist, jihadist rebel group based in Iraq and Syria, where it controls territory, and operates elsewhere in the Middle East and Asia as well.

To conclude, the UN would be receptive to the fact that after countless efforts the G/Cs and T/Cs might eventually reach a modus operandi to gradually eradicate their longstanding differences. The UN has, for several decades, invested time, money and energy in solving the Cyprus problem and any breakthrough in negotiations would, of course, be favourably accepted by the organisation. And, especially since a development of this sort may potentially alleviate future friction in the UN Security Council on the Cyprus question amid the five Permanent Members (USA, UK, France, China and Russia) that comprise the UN body.

Moving Forward

Cyprus is a beautiful island and a very attractive tourist destination. Every year millions of tourists from all over the world visit Cyprus in order to: enjoy the country's bright sunshine and fantastic beaches; to admire the island's unique archaeological sites, to sample the Cypriot tasty cuisine and to appreciate Cypriot hospitality. Yet this wonderful picture hides a rough historical past between

the two main Cypriot communities. Unfortunately the years of fear, mistrust, hatred, separation, violence, stereotyping, misusing of national symbols and selective use of historical memory have deterred the G/Cs and T/Cs from coming together.

In spite of everything, the two Cypriot communities need to free themselves from this past, resolve the Cyprus problem and move to the future with determination, imagination and confidence in order to commonly build a new prosperous Cyprus. But, so that Cypriots can achieve all of the above they must view the Cyprus problem from an out-of-the box, non-conventional, perspective. They need to adopt a different thinking pattern and find new solutions that will remove the 'baggage' from the problem area. As Albert Einstein once framed it agreeably 'We cannot solve a problem with the baggage of thinking that created it.'

After endless abortive efforts by all interested parties to find a comprehensive solution to the problem it seems that time is now ripe to approach the solution from a different thinking pattern – namely, from an evolutionary point of view. Adopting this approach in everyday collaboration between the G/Cs and T/Cs on high and low policy issues, based on a non-zero sum game, may be extremely productive. Such teamwork may enable the two communities to eradicate the sources that fashioned the Cyprus problem. Moreover, via this solution, both Cypriot communities could, in stages, quench their basic negotiating interests but also create a baggage of trust that would help them to renegotiate in the future with a fresher angle; a comprehensive settlement of the problem within the framework of a future plan by the UN, again based on a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with *political equality*. Perhaps only through this type of approach will the Cypriots ever be able to reunite their island and as a result construct the conditions for an everlasting peace and prosperity in this small but significant country in the turbulent Eastern Mediterranean region.

The Intercommunal Negotiations in Cyprus: Searching for Two One-sided 'Just' Solutions

Zenon Stavrinides*

Introduction

Can the Cyprus problem, which has been festering in Cypriot society throughout the lifetimes of most Greek and Turkish Cypriots now alive, ever be resolved? The answer that immediately suggests itself to a student of the Cyprus problem is simple: it all depends! If the basis of the solution and the UN-sponsored negotiations aimed at achieving it stay as they have done for nearly 40 years, and if the beliefs, attitudes and calculations of the negotiating parties persist, then the Cyprus problem will remain at an *impasse*, and relations between the parties to the dispute will remain indefinitely in a state of unfriendly immobilism. If, on the other hand, there is substantial change in the basis and methodology of the solution, or if the factors determining the thinking of the negotiating sides are modified as a result of changes within Cypriot society or outside it, then it is possible – just possible – that the dispute can be resolved to the satisfaction of the majority of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, and consequently a new state of affairs may begin on the island and in its relations with Turkey, Greece and the European Union. Such changes would be welcome to many Cypriots in the two communities and unwelcome to many, perhaps very many, others.

In this paper I will attempt to identify some of the main features of the negotiating process, and also the goals which each of the two sides has tried to reach during a dozen or so rounds of negotiations held since 1975. The thesis of this paper, put bluntly, is that each side to the negotiations and the community it represents aims to achieve, under the banner of a 'just solution', a set of constitutional, political and economic arrangements which reflect its own ideas of justice, legitimate interests, security needs and wishes, with scant regard for the ideas, interests, needs and wishes of the other side. Failing to achieve its aims through negotiations and associated diplomacy, each community uses its power and influence to refute the claims and interests of the other community in order to undermine its chances for raising its political status, welfare and potential for social fulfilment, and neither side realises that its decisions and policies, and its manner of justifying them publicly, have the double effect of inflicting cruelty on the other community and also of making its own people complicit to this cruelty.

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* Some of the material of this essay was embodied in my paper 'The Role of "Invaluable Assets"' which was included in the volume *Resolving Cyprus: New Approaches to Conflict Resolution*, edited by James Ker-Lindsay (I.B. Tauris, 2015).

The Parties to the Negotiations and the Parties to the Dispute

Before going any further, it would be useful to provide some clarification of the ideas of *the parties to the Cyprus negotiations* and *the parties to the Cyprus problem*, since they appear to be very similar.

It is natural to think of the two parties to the Cyprus negotiations as the Greek and Turkish communities, since the principal negotiators are the leaders of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively. However, it would be wrong to present the two communities as the only parties to the problem, the only disputants. Surely, Greek Cypriots, under the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, form one of the main parties to the dispute, and the government and politicians of the Republic, as indeed numerous civil society organisations, exploit every opportunity and expend great energy to publicise all over the world the great injustice that was done to them by Turkey and to call for a 'just' settlement of the Cyprus problem. The 'official' Greek Cypriot formulation of the Cyprus problem is that Turkey invaded the independent state of Cyprus in 1974 'in violation of international law' (this last point is heavily emphasised) causing several thousand deaths and around 180,000 Greek Cypriots to flee their homes and properties in the north, and that Ankara remains responsible for the military occupation of the north and all its manifold consequences, including mass emigration of people from Turkey. Thus, for Greek Cypriots, the real culprit and adversary is Turkey. Turkey is obviously a party to the dispute, and its officials never miss an opportunity to accuse Greek Cypriots for all kinds of crimes and offenses against Turkish Cypriots, of whose constitutional rights and security, under the 1960 treaties, the Republic of Turkey was and remains guarantor. Indeed, on a number of occasions Turkish officials express demands which they expect Greek Cypriots to accept if a solution is to be reached.

However, Turkey will not agree to be part of any negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus, which in any case it does not recognise (Turks usually refer to the Republic as 'the Greek Cypriot administration' or even 'the Greek Cypriot side'). Thus, as far as Turkey is concerned, the side that negotiates with Greek Cypriots can only be the Turkish Cypriot community, the 'co-founder' (as it is claimed) of the original bicommunal republic, which was established in 1960 and collapsed under the impact of the intercommunal hostilities which broke out in December 1963. Turkish Cypriots are, of course, a recognised party to the dispute, and the international community constantly hears and takes account of their grievances and demands. They had themselves been greatly hurt by the clashes of 1963–1964 and suffered from insecurity and isolation until 1974. Turkish Cypriots understand and appreciate that the Turkish government in Ankara firmly controls the integrity, security and (at least in broad terms) the political life of northern Cyprus, where the great majority of Turkish Cypriots live and work, and that, without that control and the regular Turkish subvention to their administration, the community could revert to their pre-1974 condition, especially as most Greek Cypriots do not acknowledge the community's claim to live as a separate political entity. So the Turkish government remains, with the keen or reluctant consent of most Turkish Cypriots and their political class, an integral part of the political organisation of

the Turkish Cypriot community and its ability to be independent and safe from Greek Cypriots. The Republic of Turkey, then, is not an external power to the dispute, but it is part and parcel of one of the parties to the dispute, even though the Turkish 'side' in the negotiations is represented by the elected Turkish Cypriot leader. Naturally, any solution that the Turkish Cypriot leader may be willing to accept in the negotiations with the Greek Cypriot leader would need to be approved by the Turkish government.

The position of Greece on the Cyprus problem is not symmetrical to that of Turkey. From 1964 to 1974, successive Greek governments (including the military Junta of 1967–1974) had strong views on a Cyprus settlement, but President Makarios always managed to curtail their influence. However, since 1974, Greece has confined its role, very largely, to that of a supporter and adviser of the Republic of Cyprus. Even before the economic crisis that hit Greece in 2008, Greek politicians had an erratic interest in Cyprus. Both major Greek parties – PASOK and New Democracy – were disappointed when the Greek Cypriot population voted by a large majority against the UN Plan for a comprehensive settlement on 24 April 2004. Once the Republic of Cyprus joined the European Union on 1 May 2004, most Greek politicians felt that they had discharged their obligations to their kith and kin, and they were not going to accept any further obligations towards them beyond supplying officers to the Greek Cypriot National Guard together with a small contingent of their own troops provided for by the Treaty of Alliance of 1960. Greek diplomacy offers consistent but lukewarm support to Greek Cypriot efforts to 'enlighten' foreign governments and world opinion on the injustice Turkey inflicted on a small island republic, but they are not able, or even much interested, to influence the detailed policies of the Cyprus Republic. The Greek Cypriot people – many of whom have never trusted the Greek political establishment – understand and accept this fact.

Greek and Turkish Cypriot Aims in the Intercommunal Negotiations

Greek Cypriots have never been happy to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots for a settlement in Cyprus, as that may be thought to imply that they accept that the Cyprus problem is an *intercommunal* dispute. As Greek Cypriot politicians declared repeatedly, the 'essence' of the Cyprus problem was Turkey's invasion and occupation of Cypriot territory, and the tragic consequences flowing from that fact. It would have been better if Greek Cypriots could negotiate with Turkey, for it was the real violator of Cyprus' sovereignty and the rights of its people. But even that would not be entirely correct: violations of international law, or crimes of any kind, cannot be settled through *negotiations* between the victim and the culprit, especially as negotiations can only result in a compromise which inevitably favours the stronger party. For Greek Cypriots a 'just' solution of the Cyprus problem, a *really* 'just' solution, is one which cancels all the effects of a supremely illegal and unjust act, and restores the Cyprus Republic to the *status quo ante* – in which case, if there are still outstanding differences between the government and the Turkish Cypriot community, they could be settled through internal negotiations. In the collective

consciousness of the Greek Cypriot people, their idea of a 'just' solution is tantamount to the following beliefs:

(1) The Turkish army deployed some 35,000–40,000 troops to invade Cyprus in July–August 1974, causing the death of some 3,000 Greek Cypriots and the expulsion of 180,000 Greek Cypriots from the homes and properties in the northern part of the island. So all Turkish troops, whose presence violates Cypriot sovereignty, should leave the island as soon as possible. This is the main Greek Cypriot demand (to which some Greek Cypriots add that all troops from Greece should also leave).

(2) Following the invasion, Turkey sent many thousands of illegal settlers to Turkish-occupied 'north Cyprus', who by the beginning of 2014 had formed the bulk of the population in 'the occupied areas' (settlers together with their offspring are estimated to be about 200,000 people, whereas indigenous Turkish Cypriots have reduced to about 100,000). So Greek Cypriots demand that all Turkish settlers and their offspring (with the possible exception of those who have married Turkish Cypriots) should be repatriated.

(3) All Greek Cypriots who lived in the north until 1974 and fled in the wake of the Turkish military operations should have the right to return to their former homes, together with their offspring, and take possession of their properties under conditions of safety.

(4) The Turkish occupation of the north breached the human rights of Greek Cypriots (and, it is sometimes added, rather disingenuously, Turkish Cypriots). Greek Cypriots demand that all Cypriot citizens, whatever their ethnic character and heritage, should be able to enjoy, under any political settlement, the whole range of the universally acknowledged human rights and fundamental freedoms, including the three freedoms of movement, settlement and property ownership over the whole island. (Greek Cypriots have long been convinced that the three freedoms are firmly and unqualifiedly entrenched in the Treaty of Rome and the European *acquis communautaire*, and they get annoyed when anyone suggests to them that the EU does accept derogations from the *acquis* if there are compelling reasons of public policy, as it actually did in the case of Finland's Swedish-speaking Åland Islands.)

(5) Turkey invoked the Treaty of Guarantee to invade and bring disaster to Cyprus. Greek Cypriots demand that, in future, Cyprus must have new and credible international guarantees for its security, independence and sovereignty against external aggression, and such guarantees should prohibit any unilateral right of intervention by any particular country, and more especially Turkey.

(6) The division of the island should be ended, and the Republic of Cyprus should be reunited under a new democratic constitution embracing both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Most Greek Cypriots – certainly most politicians – demand that any future

political settlement should secure the unity of Cypriot territory, society, people, economy and state institutions.

(7) Given the importance that most Greek Cypriots attach to the reunification of Cyprus, the idea that the Cyprus settlement should take the form of a bizonal, bicommunal federation is regarded as a painful concession made by Archbishop Makarios in February 1977 under conditions of dire necessity, which has been endorsed by all his successors to the presidency. However, it is often stated that that concession was made on the strict understanding that the Turkish side agree to territorial adjustments such that the area under Turkish administration would be reduced from the present 37% of the total territory of the Republic to something closer to the proportion of Turkish Cypriots to the total population of Cyprus, perhaps 25%, and in any case under 30%. To make the inherent unfairness of bizonality more tolerable, the Greek side insist that the modern city of Famagusta and the market town of Morphou, along with several villages originally populated mainly by Greek Cypriots should be included in the territory to be administered by Greek Cypriot authorities.

It is evident from the preceding considerations that Greek Cypriots conceive the Cyprus problem as a set of wrongs and injustices inflicted on their island and its people by the Turkish invasion and occupation of Cyprus. Therefore, any 'just' settlement requires the departure of the Turkish army and the wiping out of the effects of the invasion so that Cyprus, with its rights and rightful interests restored, should move forward to something like the pre-1974 past, with one significant difference: the government, parliament, civil service and other institutions of what would unavoidably be a bicommunal federal state would include both Greek and Turkish Cypriot officials, but in that case Greek Cypriot officials would need to form the majority and have a preponderant influence in the federation.

Many Greek Cypriots – probably most – appreciate that they are not going to obtain through negotiations all the things they lost to the force of Turkish arms, especially as the international community has not been particularly supportive of their claims. Greek Cypriots themselves, even in their wildest flights of anti-realism, have never considered conducting an armed struggle to expel the Turkish army from the island. What they would ideally like to see is the international community matching its commitment to international law with a sufficiently strong will to secure its compliance, if necessary by imposing strong sanctions on, or even by using force against, Turkey. However, the UN Security Council has never expressed the willingness to condemn the Turkish invasion and occupation, and *a fortiori* it has never considered invoking Chapter VII of the UN Charter against Turkey. Again, no foreign country has offered to wage war against Turkey, or even to terminate its diplomatic and economic relations with the culprit in order to exert some pressure on it to yield to Greek Cypriot demands. Neither recourse to international arbitration nor appeal to the International Court of Justice are realistic options, especially as the former is unacceptable to Greek Cypriots and the latter to Turks. So what is left to do? 'Friendly' governments have

advised Greek Cypriots many times to pursue negotiations with Turkish Cypriots, adding that during the course of the negotiations they would bend their efforts to exert pressure on the Turkish government to induce the Turkish Cypriot leadership to make significant concessions, thereby making an 'honourable compromise' possible. In these circumstances successive Greek Cypriot leaders and the political class reckoned that their least bad option was to negotiate with Turkish Cypriots, if only to show the world that the other community – and the Turkish government that pulled the strings – was the unreasonable side that refused 'just' Greek Cypriot claims based on international law, human rights conventions and (since Cyprus joined the EU) the *acquis communautaire*; in which case the international community, and more especially the EU, would have to put some meaningful pressure on Turkey to mend its ways. Thus, for Greek Cypriots the intercommunal negotiations are considered pretty much as *the continuation of diplomacy by other means aimed at a 'just' solution*, and such a solution is thought to entail the restoration of their rights under international and EU law.

Every Greek Cypriot claim and argument is countered by an opposite claim and argument from the Turkish party to the dispute. The Turkish position, like the Greek position, is couched in terms of rights and international law, which express the very different Turkish notion of a 'just' solution. The Turkish Cypriot community (and Turkey) argue as follows:

(1) The Turkish 'peace operation' of 20 July 1974 was entirely legal as it was based on the Treaty of Guarantee, signed by the two communities, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom in 1960, and incorporated in the Cyprus constitution. This Treaty guaranteed the independence, integrity, security and the constitution of the Republic of Cyprus and it was only activated when the Greek Cypriot National Guard, under its Greek officers, conducted a *coup d' état* to overthrow Archbishop Makarios' government and bring about the union of the island with Greece. Turkish Cypriots – and the Turkish government backstage and sometimes centre stage – demand that the Treaty remain in force indefinitely to guarantee any new arrangements that may be established, and the Turkish troops should stay as long as they are necessary for the security of Turkish Cypriot citizens in their own state. After all, if the Turkish troops withdraw and the Turkish guarantees are invalidated, why should the Greek side, free from *force majeure*, stick to the 'painful concession' of a bizonal federation, involving a continuous stretch of land for the Turkish Cypriot community? And why should Turkish Cypriots agree to be less safe and secure following any new settlement than they are at present?

(2) The settlers came to Cyprus after 1974 to help develop the Turkish Cypriot economy, and many of those stayed on and became citizens of what they call the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' (often referred to by the initials 'TRNC'), in accordance with Turkish Cypriot government policy. Thus, Turkish Cypriots (even people who do not want any further emigration from Turkey) insist that under a future settlement Turkish-born citizens of the 'TRNC' should retain the right to live in their own state for as long as they wish.

(3) Turkish Cypriots cannot be forced to leave the houses and properties they are currently occupying and be made 'refugees for a third time in a lifetime'; that would be inhuman. Greek Cypriot property rights are recognised, but their implementation will for the most part take the form of compensation or exchange with Turkish Cypriot properties left behind in the south (indeed such properties have already been occupied by Greek Cypriots in many cases, or compulsorily acquired by the Greek Cypriot government to build roads, schools and housing estates for refugees.)

(4) Some Greek Cypriots may be allowed to come to the north, but not so many as to water down the preponderance and cohesion of the Turkish Cypriot population, its security and its control of land and other resources. Furthermore, Greek Cypriot returnees should not be able to participate in elections for representative bodies in the north because they could exercise considerable political influence, which would disturb the purpose and effectiveness of these bodies.

(5) The division of the island cannot be completely eliminated, as the Turkish Cypriot people have exercised their right to self-determination to establish the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus' ('TRNC') and participate in its democratic institutions. Greek Cypriots should recognise the 'TRNC', or if they do not, they should at least accept that any future federal arrangement should be a partnership of two equal constituent states, one of which will be, in effect, the 'TRNC'. The political equality of the two states should be expressed by the principle that no state can impose its will on another, and no community can prevail over the other. This means, among other things, that each of the two communities should participate effectively in the central government of the federation, and although the Turkish Cypriot community might not enjoy numerical equality to the larger Greek Cypriot community, it should be over-represented (in effect it should enjoy something like approximate equality, what mathematicians call *adequality*.)

The long and the short of the Turkish conception of a 'just' solution to the Cyprus problem is that it is a constitutional arrangement which approximates the current state of affairs established on the ground, comprising two more or less mono-ethnic states linked together by a loose federal structure in which the states are represented with equal authority. According to various surveys, a majority in the Turkish Cypriot community would ideally like to acquire international recognition for the 'TRNC', reasoning that once this happened it would end the isolation of the Turkish Cypriot people from the rest of the world, it would enable them to attract investments and develop their tourist and hospitality industries, and in due course obtain foreign earnings which could provide them with the basis for a strong economy and high living standards.

However, the UN, the EU and many individual countries have made it clear to Turkish Cypriots that they will never gain *de jure* recognition for the 'TRNC'. So an internationally

recognised status could be achieved by the Turkish Cypriot community only through their amalgamation with the Greek Cypriot community in an internationally recognised federation. Rauf Denktash, the one and only paramount leader the Turkish Cypriot community had from February 1973 until May 2005, articulated the common Turkish Cypriot/Turkish line by arguing that, as there existed in Cyprus two separate, independent and democratic states, the Greek Cypriot state recognised by the entire international community except Turkey, and the 'TRNC' recognised only by Turkey, the principal matters requiring negotiation were (a) mutual recognition of these states on the basis of complete equality, and then (b) the delineation of the border between the two states (which would result in an unspecified amount of territory being handed by the 'TRNC' over to the Greek Cypriot state), and (c) the formation of the loose link between them which could handle, again under conditions of equality, a limited set of matters of joint concern, including currency and foreign relations. The common Turkish Cypriot/Turkish position was predicated on the wish to preserve the advantages created by the Turkish invasion for Turkish Cypriots, including safeguarding their security, the prevalence of the 'Turkishness' of the north by denying Greek Cypriots the use of their homes and properties they lost in 1974, as well as the general right to own property and establish residence in the north.

An impartial student of the Cyprus problem may find in the demands made by Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively some elements which are sophistical (e.g. various distortion of international and European law) and even downright cruel (e.g. the Greek Cypriot demand that long-standing Turkish-born residents of the northern territory be repatriated, and the Turkish Cypriot insistence that Greek Cypriots should remain unable to return to their homes in the north, even though Greek Cypriot negotiators have hinted that only a small proportion of the refugees would actually choose to do so). However, it is clear to independent observers and well-meaning foreign diplomats that the majorities of the two communities hold fast to antithetical conceptions of a 'just' solution to the Cyprus problem which arise from their respective social memories of victimhood and, in many cases, from personal experiences of trauma and deeply felt injustice, as well as racial prejudices and illusions encouraged by official propaganda. It is evident that *no* political settlement can accommodate *all* that Greek Cypriots consider essential for the restoration of justice and *all* that Turkish Cypriots consider essential for the protection of their legitimate rights.

Nevertheless, politicians in both communities promise their own peoples that justice and time are on their side and call on the other side to the dispute to recognise that their policies are wrong and must be changed. It is unlikely that sophisticated Greek and Turkish Cypriots believe that such calls have any practical effect at all, though they are unwilling to raise any public objections when politicians – most of them men and women of modest intelligence – call publicly on the international community or the EU to snap out of their indifference and take practical measures to put pressure on the other side to yield to the demands of justice and international law. Probably most politicians believe that, given the existence of a negotiating process – sometimes

active, sometimes dormant – and the expectation that one day the Cyprus problem may have to be settled through this process, the affirmation of the official maximalist position (the conception of a *completely* 'just' solution) may have the effect of overwhelming the opponent and inducing him to yield more than he would otherwise do. It is the policy of trying *to maximize the minimum level of gains for which one's side will settle in the negotiations* (this is similar to what is called in game theory 'maximin'). The obvious retort is that if one side pushes its demands to an exorbitant degree, the other side will have no motive to yield, and third parties will throw their hands in the air in desperation and say 'let them sort it out themselves'. In any case, the two parties to the dispute approach the negotiations with initial positions which express their respective (and antithetical) conceptions of a 'just' solution.

Maximalists and Moderates in the Two Communities

Given the incompatibility between the sets of ideas held by the great majority of Greek Cypriots and those held by the great majority of Turkish Cypriots as to what constitutes a completely 'just' solution to the Cyprus problem, it has long seemed difficult for foreign diplomats and other third parties to see how the gap between the parties could be bridged in any negotiations free of external coercion. Successive Secretaries-General of the UN and their officials asked the two sides to explain their ideas for a negotiated settlement and, since they wanted to appear impartial 'honest brokers', they made no public comment on the justice or reasonableness of the ideas themselves. The UN confined its public comments to encouraging the two sides to make concessions to each other and in order to take something back from each other. The slight improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey since the late 1990s encouraged international diplomats to pay visits to Athens and Ankara to persuade them to prevail upon their respective kith and kin in Cyprus to engage in 'give and take' during the negotiations. This proved not at all easy as each side considered its own demands entirely just and the other side's demands unfair, selfish and invidious. Indeed, not a few Greek Cypriots give vent to great irritation every time UN and foreign officials urge the two sides to engage in 'give and take'. How can the victim be asked to give away some of the things that the culprit failed to usurp so that the culprit can give back some of the things he did usurp!

Despite the consensus among Greek Cypriots as to what constitutes a completely 'just' solution to the Cyprus problem, Greek Cypriot politicians and opinion leaders, as well as ordinary citizens, sometimes quietly express different views as to whether they should not be willing to lower their sights and deviate from their official goals in order to give negotiations a chance of success and to encourage the Turkish side to modify its hard stance. Many Greek Cypriot politicians have long realised that they can never get through uncoerced negotiations 100% of what they want for their own people, and they suggest with some diffidence that they would have to be 'imaginative' and 'flexible' in the negotiations if the other side is prepared to reciprocate. It is

possible that a solution that is *tolerable* but 'viable' (an interesting term of art in the Greek Cypriot political vocabulary) can be achieved if the UN and the EU can persuade the Turks to respond positively to some concessions, in which case the possibility should be pursued. However, they make it clear that, if any settlement package is to be acceptable, it must give Greek Cypriots (to put the point very roughly) 90% or perhaps 80% of the elements which constitute a 'just' settlement. A sell-out would simply be humiliating and unacceptable to their people.

The '90 percenter' grouping (as it may be called, without taking the term too seriously) includes the DIKO party, originally led by Spyros Kyprianou and later by Tassos Papadopoulos, Marios Garoyian and currently Nicolas Papadopoulos, the social democratic EDEK party, now led by Yiannakis Omirou, EVROKO and a number of smaller political groups. The '90 percenters', for example, accept that Cyprus will not be a unitary republic but a federation, and the majoritarian principle will have to be considerably restricted and qualified to enable the Turkish Cypriot community to exercise more than proportional influence in political decision-making. But, the '90 percenters' are considered too unrealistic by another group of Greek Cypriot politicians in that their demands cannot be achieved, given the weak diplomatic, political and economic resources available to the Republic of Cyprus.

The second grouping takes the line that, if the Cyprus problem remains unsolved long enough, the *de facto* division of the island will be cemented and accepted by the world, beginning with a number of Islamic states. The reasoning is that, once the 'TRNC' begins to receive recognition from foreign countries, the Turkish side will have even less incentive to make any concessions on territory, let alone on the rights and freedoms of Greek Cypriots who had lost their homes and properties in the north. In light of this reasoning, the second group argues that the Greek Cypriot side should be willing to settle, reluctantly to be sure, for a federal arrangement that gives their community 70% or 60% of the elements of a really 'just' solution (for example, maybe small contingents of Turkish and Greek troops could remain on the island for a fixed period, and perhaps not all Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return to their former homes and properties in what would remain a Turkish-administered, federated state in the north. This second grouping of politicians, the '70 percenters' as it may be called, includes the Democratic Rally (DISY), founded by Glafkos Clerides, and later led by Nicos Anastassiades and currently by Averof Neophytou, the left-wing AKEL, whose previous leader, Demetris Christofias, was elected President of the Cyprus Republic in 2008, and the tiny party of the United Democrats, founded by George Vassiliou. This grouping thinks of themselves as moderates or realists, and considers the '90 percenters' as maximalists or anti-realists. The '90 percenters' often accuse '70 percenters' as being defeatists, while the latter retort that the former group have their heads in the clouds. (Despite the changing nature of the Cyprus problem since the 1940s, there were, during all successive phases, ill-tempered quarrels between maximalists and realists/moderates!)

However, as long as the Turkish Cypriot side in the negotiations is unwilling to accept the

sharing of the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus in exchange for substantial concessions to Greek Cypriots on the issues of territorial adjustments, the restoration of lost properties and the right to residence that are sufficient to satisfy even the relatively moderate and more realistic '70 percenter' grouping, this grouping and the maximalist or '90 percenter' grouping make common cause in vociferously blaming the Turkish Cypriot leaders and their masters in Ankara of intransigence. Nonetheless, when proposals or informal ideas are presented to the two communities for a compromise settlement by UN Secretaries-General – as happened with Kurt Waldheim in 1981, Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1984–1986, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992 and Kofi Annan in 2002–2004 – unpleasant disagreements break out in the Greek Cypriot community between maximalists and moderates.

The Turkish Cypriot community, too, has its '90 percenters' as well as its '70 percenters'. Greek Cypriots considered Rauf Denktash as the personification of intransigence, a man who made exorbitant demands and offered very little in return, and in that judgment several foreign diplomats and UN personnel privately concurred. In 2005 'presidential' elections were held in the 'TRNC' in which Mehmet Ali Talat, the president of the Republican Turkish Party, emerged as the winner. Greek Cypriots thought that Talat was a '70 percenter', and some may have hoped that he could yield much more to Greek Cypriot demands. In fact when Talat came to power, he found that Tassos Papadopoulos, the president of the Cyprus Republic, was not keen to negotiate with him; the latter had been hoping (in vain as it turned out) that the EU would put direct pressure on Turkey – the real power on the Turkish Cypriot side – to make unilateral concessions in order to improve its own prospects of accession to the EU. The '90 percenter', Papadopoulos, was blamed by many Greek Cypriots for his unwillingness to reasonably compromise with '70 percenter' Talat. In the following presidential elections of the Republic of Cyprus in February 2008, Papadopoulos lost to '70 percenter' Demetris Christofias of AKEL. So, when Talat and Christofias started negotiations (the former supported by the Turkish government, the latter supported by DISY and more vaguely by the Greek government), observers asked if the two kindred spirits of moderation could cobble together a compromise solution to the Cyprus problem which would be judged to be not-intolerably-unjust by the majorities in the Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities.

The answer is that between spring 2008 and May 2010 (when Talat lost the 'TRNC' presidency to Dervish Eroglu, the leader of the '90 percenter' National Unity Party) no settlement was found. However, some significant progress towards a settlement was achieved, some of whose (compromise) elements provoked nasty reactions from the maximalists in the two communities. It is interesting to take a brief look at the sorts of arrangements which proved tentatively reachable when a moderate Greek Cypriot leader and a moderate Turkish Cypriot leader met together and accepted the need to back down from their initial divergent ideas of what would be an ideally 'just' settlement. From what can be gleaned by occasional press leaks, the two sides' views more or less converged on several matters, but they diverged on others:

Governance

- The Greek Cypriot community and the Turkish Cypriot community would elect together, i.e. as a single electoral body, a Greek Cypriot chief official and a Turkish Cypriot chief official for a 5-year term, but the votes of one community for the official of the other community would be weighted appropriately, as a result of which the Turkish Cypriot community would have an equal degree of influence on the election of the Greek Cypriot, as the much larger Greek Cypriot electorate would have on the election of the Turkish Cypriot chief official. The chief officials so elected would serve as President and Vice President of the Federation on a rotating basis. The Greek Cypriot official would serve as President for a total of 40 months while the Turkish Cypriot official would be Vice President, and for the rest of the 20-month period the roles would be reversed.
- The federal Council of Ministers would consist of 6 Greek Cypriots and 3 Turkish Cypriots. All decisions would require at least one vote from a minister from each community.
- The federal legislature would comprise two chambers: the Senate, consisting of an equal number of officials representing the two states, and the House of Representatives, where the Greek and Turkish communities would be represented at a ratio of 70:30. A certain proportion of Turkish Cypriot representatives would be necessary to approve of any proposal.
- A considerable convergence was reached between the two sides on the division of powers between the government and legislature of the federation. The Greek Cypriot side wanted as strong a central government as possible, whereas the Turkish Cypriot side claimed for itself the freedom to seek and enter into international agreements.
- The federal courts would consist of an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriot judges, plus a foreign judge would sit on the bench only in cases where Greek and Turkish Cypriot could not reach a majority decision.

Citizenship

The number of Turkish settlers who could stay on the island after the settlement would be limited to about 50,000, and it would include Turks who came a long time ago and have laid roots in the Turkish Cypriot community or have married indigenous Cypriots.

Property

The two sides agreed that property claims would be settled by one of three procedures: restitution, exchange or sale. The Greek side wanted the original owner to have the first choice, whereas the Turkish side wanted to give priority to the wishes of the current user of the property. However, it seemed that the two sides came close to a compromise which would give priority to the current user if the property had been developed since 1974 and its added value was higher than the original value; in all other cases, the first choice would belong to the original owner. This compromise concerned natural persons and not legal persons or institutions like the Greek Orthodox Church.

Territory

The two sides maintained their differences: the Greek Cypriot side wanted the Greek state of the federation to recover as much territory as possible, so that the maximum number of Greek Cypriot refugees would be able to return to their properties under Greek Cypriot administration. The Turkish side appeared reluctant to force current residents to leave their homes, neighbourhoods and areas. However, the territorial treatment of the Annan Plan seemed broadly acceptable to the Turkish side.

EU – Economic Affairs

The views of both sides converged on the respective responsibilities and competencies of the federal authorities and the state authorities in applying EU directives and legislation. However, the Turkish side wanted permanent derogations from certain elements of European directives and legislation which were likely to undermine or water down the bizonality of the federation. The Greek side was unhappy with all derogations from rules which in their view offered protection to Greek Cypriot rights and interests. But, it did show understanding for Turkish Cypriot fears that given Greek Cypriot financial strength and technical know-how (that was before the deep and dramatic crisis which struck the Greek Cypriot economy in 2009), the Turkish Cypriot economy needed special safeguards.

Security and Guarantees

The two sides expressed different positions on security and guarantees, and in any case the various issues could never be resolved without negotiations or a conference involving the Turkish government. Naturally, Greek Cypriots would not accept any arrangements similar to those provided under the Treaty of Guarantee of 1960, while Turkish Cypriots – and not only Turkey – wanted to retain or at least update the security arrangements which would continue to give Turkey a guarantor role. The Greek Cypriot side hinted that it could accept a new Treaty giving powers of guarantee and intervention, if and when security is breached, to a group of countries and institutions – mainly the EU – in which Turkey could take part, but it rejected out of hand the unilateral right of intervention by any single country, and *a fortiori* Turkey.

As was indicated, Christofias received bitter and noisy criticisms from '90 percenters' in the Greek Cypriot community – mainly from DIKO and EDEK, which had ministers in his government – while Talat had to take criticism from the National Unity Party and other maximalist political forces, including former 'TRNC' leader Rauf Denkash. Under the impact of maximalist criticisms, both leaders lost their popularity. DIKO and EDEK were particularly incensed at the principle of a rotating presidency and in due course left the Christofias government. In the Turkish Cypriot community, the National Unity Party, organisations of Turkish settlers who stood to be repatriated and Turkish Cypriots who feared the loss of their current homes and properties expressed vehement opposition against Talat. Quite clearly, two '70 percenter' leaders, representing two communities which contained large '90 percenter' groups, could not negotiate

further concessions with each other, even if they were privately willing to do so. There were and still are, in both communities, '50 percenters' and people who put aside their individual interests and give priority to reconciliation (or 'rapprochement') between the two communities and the achievement of an honourable compromise settlement which will mark a new and more hopeful course in the life of Cyprus; but they are too few and politically weak to contest elections and to influence policies.

When maximalist Dervish Eroglu won the Turkish Cypriot presidential elections in May 2010, the question arose whether he accepted the concessions made by Talat. All the evidence suggested that he did not accepted the principle of electing the President and Vice President of the federation on the basis of a single electoral roll with weighted vote in favour of Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, it was not clear whether he accepted the principle of a bicommunal, bizonal federation, especially as his party had long argued for a solution of two states linked together under a weak government, with minimal territorial adjustments in favour of Greek Cypriots. Yet his election was followed by a two-year long round of negotiations with Christofias, which, however, did not lead to any appreciable convergences of views. By the beginning of summer 2012, when the Republic of Cyprus took on the presidency of the European Council and the negotiations were suspended, the situation (as it appeared in leaks to the media) was as follows:

	Greek Cypriot (GC) position	**Turkish Cypriot (TC) position**
Governance	The GC community and the TC community will elect together a GC chief official and a TC chief official for a 5-year term, but the votes of the TC electorate will be weighted so that they will have a greater proportion of influence in the election of the GC than the much larger GC electorate will have in the election of the TC chief official. The chief officials elected will serve as President and Vice President on a rotating basis. The GC official will serve as President for a total of 40 months and the TC official for 20 months.	Initially the election of the GC and TC chief officers will be elected by the electorates of the respective communities. Subsequently the two communities will be asked to decide in separate referendums whether they wish to adopt the cross-voting system proposed by the GC side.
Citizenship (and the question of settlers from Turkey)	The number of Turkish settlers who can stay on the island after the settlement will be severely restricted and governed mainly by humanitarian considerations (e.g. they have married indigenous Cypriots).	All foreign-born persons who acquired 'TRNC' citizenship in accordance with established procedures will have a right of abode and full citizenship rights in Cyprus.

Property	The legal owner of immovable property in the TC state (or GC state) of the federation will have the first choice on what happens to their property. The ('TRNC'-based) Immovable Property Commission which will be set up by the two sides will only have an advisory role.	The current user has rights on the property he holds. The ('TRNC'-based) Immovable Property Commission must have the final say on which one among the original and the current holder has priority to a given property. It is proposed to arrange a mass exchange of properties owned by GCs who lived in the north and TCs who lived in the south so as to limit significantly the return of GCs in the north and maintain bizonality.
Territory	Territorial adjustments should favour the GC state of the federation so that the large majority of GC refugees should be able to return to their properties under GC administration. The lands to be returned should include Famagusta, Morphou in the north-west of the island and the area of Karpasia.	The return of land will have to be discussed at the final stage of negotiations. Public statements made by TC politicians suggest that it is unlikely that Morphou will be brought under GC administration and that Karpasia will definitely remain part of the TC state of the federation.

Invaluable Assets of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot Communities

Why are the parties to the Cyprus dispute unwilling to make further concessions to each other in order to produce a balanced and workable compromise settlement which – as UN officials and foreign diplomats never tire of saying – would be in the interests of both communities? What is it that prevents Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot (and Turkish) politicians and opinion leaders, including the most moderate among them, from arguing for the need to make further concessions to the other side so as to meet them half way? For the sake of an honourable settlement (which, of course, would not be a completely 'just' solution from the standpoint of either of the two communities)? The answer, or, at any rate, part of the answer, is that, despite all the things that the two communities have lost or are currently deprived of and whose full or partial acquisition through the negotiating process is integral to their conceptions of a 'just' solution, none of the communities is destitute or desperately unhappy by any means. Each of the parties to the dispute possesses a number of significant political, economic and social assets which it perceives as essential to its own identity, security and dynamism, and so it regards them as vital and invaluable assets. As a result each refuses to give them up in negotiations, even though this inevitably leads the process to an *impasse*. Both parties to the dispute have drawn in their minds and in their internal debates what are sometimes called 'red lines', separating the matters they are reluctantly willing to negotiate from those which they are determined to refuse to negotiate; and they have placed what they

consider their invaluable assets beyond these lines. Yet, what is an invaluable asset for one party is regarded by the other party as something to which they have 'just' claims. The idea will become clearer once we look at the Greek Cypriot invaluable assets (*GInvAss* for short), and then the Turkish Cypriot – and Turkish – invaluable assets (*TInvAss*).

For the Greek Cypriot community the main *GInvAss* in their possession are the following:

GInvAss 1: Greek Cypriots own and control the internationally recognised Republic of Cyprus, to the exclusion of Turkish Cypriots. The Republic is a modern state, older than several of the new states set up by decolonised peoples; it is a member of the UN, the EU and many other international organisations; it has political, diplomatic and economic relations with many other states and organisations, and it has a voice and the ability to argue for its interests in the international arena. Indeed, most Greek Cypriot politicians made their careers by occupying positions in the Cypriot state and learning to talk and sometimes to act in support of the interests of the Republic. Until the financial crisis which occurred in 2009 and struck first the banking sector and then the general economy, the Republic of Cyprus was a successful state – an imperfect liberal democracy – with a strong civil society, good living standards and high levels of literacy and health. Greek Cypriots are unwilling to surrender their control of the Republic to the Turkish Cypriot community (for all the vague references to 'political equality' contained in UN documents) much less to see the Republic of Cyprus dissolved and replaced by an entirely new two-state system of governance with a doubtful future. For Greek Cypriots the Republic of Cyprus is the political basis of their corporate existence as one of the recognised and respected peoples of the world. If the Republic of Cyprus were dissolved in favour of a two-state polity and then the new polity collapsed, Greek Cypriots could not go back to the Republic and would have no international protection against the designs of Turkey which (as they perceive them) aim at their subjugation, the extinction of their political identity and the ultimate control of their island. So, although Greek Cypriots do want to achieve what they consider a 'just' solution, or a close approximation of that, they are mindful of the risks they are taking in a union with Turkish Cypriots, and so if the worst came to the worst, they want to be able to *minimize the maximum loss they will sustain* (in the terminology of game theory, to 'minimax').

GInvAss 2: Greek Cypriots have had, until the banking and financial crisis that broke out in 2009, a thriving economy – a striking testimony to their educational standards, diligence and entrepreneurial talents – based on tourism and legal and financial services. A year before the crisis the economy was strong enough for the Republic of Cyprus to be admitted to the Economic and Monetary Union. The crisis brought levels of unemployment and poverty which the younger generation had never known – but all was not lost! Explorations were carried out some distance from the Cyprus' eastern and southern shores, within its Exclusive Economic Zone (EEZ), by reputable foreign companies under contract to the Cyprus government which indicated the presence of large deposits of hydrocarbons, comprising mainly natural gas and smaller deposits of

liquid oil. The Turkish government was incensed by the initiatives taken by the Cyprus government with the support of all political parties and organisations, because Turkey had long claimed that (1) islands like Cyprus and the Dodecanese did not have their own EEZs, (2) Turkey was a large country with a long coastline and it is entitled to divide the Eastern Mediterranean basin with Egypt and the countries on the Eastern shores of the Middle East land mass, and (3) there was no legitimate state known as the Republic of Cyprus, but only two national communities with equal status. Turkey made hostile noises, issued threats, and sent its air force and navy to harass engineers and workers on offshore platforms, and more recently sent an exploratory vessel into the Cypriot EEZ. The fact was that Greek Cypriots, for all their anxieties about Turkey's intentions, did not buckle or yield at all. Indeed, Greek Cypriots concluded agreements with Greece, Egypt and Israel for the demarcation of their respective EEZs, and approached companies from the United States, Italy, Korea and other powerful countries to tender for contracts to extract and exploit natural gas and to invest in the construction of a Liquefied Natural Gas terminal in Cyprus. Turkish Cypriots, prompted by Turkey, said they would undertake their own explorations in 'their' EEZ, but Greek Cypriots, since they could not stop them, protested but basically ignored them. The position of the Cyprus government is that after the conclusion of a negotiated settlement and the establishment of a federation, the revenues from natural gas and oil will be used for the benefit of all Cypriots – but not before.

The linkage between *GInvAss 1* and *GInvAss 2* is all too clear. There is a deep conviction among Greek Cypriots that their legitimate political, economic and social interests are connected with, and indeed presuppose the maintenance of, the Republic of Cyprus and its continued ability to freely pursue diplomatic, economic, commercial and financial goals and activities in the international arena. If Turkey is ever able to dissolve the Republic or extinguish such international credibility as it possesses, Greek Cypriots will become hostage to the will of Ankara.

GInvAss 3: The Republic of Cyprus became a full member of the European Union on 1 May 2004 after several years of accession negotiations. Up to the crisis of 2009, the strength of the Greek Cypriot economy, the Republic's capacity to introduce and implement all the reforms required by the EU, and the diplomatic skills of some of the politicians and state officials and their allies in Greece were constantly tested, especially in view of vehement opposition and threats from Turkey – which had its own EU aspirations – and also the scepticism from a number of important EU members. Greek Cypriots believed, and Turks feared, that the Republic could use its enhanced diplomatic clout to persuade the EU to extract substantial concessions from Turkey in return for being allowed to start its own accession negotiations with the EU in December 2004. The EU did not oblige Greek Cypriots by applying any serious pressure on Turkey – and for that matter neither did Greece – but nevertheless Greek Cypriots succeeded in creating a vague linkage between Turkey's progress in its EU negotiations and progress towards a Cyprus settlement. If this linkage did not exist, Europe would have heard even less about the Cyprus problem. During the years when the Cyprus government engaged in accession talks with the EU, Turkey expressed its

opposition to the Republic's membership, ranging from legalistic arguments derived from certain provisions in the 1960 Accords to blatant threats of unspecified menaces against the Republic. The EU accepted Cyprus, but made some provisions for trade between Turkish-held north Cyprus – which was recognised as an integral part of the Republic – and other EU countries. The Cyprus government did everything it could to stop *direct* trade between ports and the airport situated in 'the areas not controlled by the Cyprus Republic' and the EU for fear that it may imply recognition of the 'TRNC' authorities. Many Turkish Cypriots feel very aggrieved of this fact, but Greek Cypriots want to exclude any suggestion of foreign acknowledgement of a Turkish Cypriot *state* in the north.

As regards Turkish Cypriots, when they reflect on their present unsatisfactory condition and compare it with their sufferings and deprivations in the pre-1974 period, they realise they are much better now and that they have acquired a number of invaluable assets which they are determined not to give up, no matter what is offered to them in exchange.

Turkish Cypriot (and Turkish) invaluable assets may be indicated as follows:

TInvAss 1: Turkish Cypriots have a continuous stretch of territory in the north of Cyprus containing ports and a functioning airport which is, in some sense, 'their' land, the homeland of their community and also a large group of Turkish settlers, some well-integrated, others not. The community is determined never to go back to being a set of pools of Turkish villages and hamlets spread all over Cyprus, which could pass as a minority in a Greek Cyprus. There will always be a northern Cyprus for Turkish Cypriots, and any Greek Cypriots who may be allowed back into their former homes and properties following an agreement will have to be a small minority which would not be able to exercise any serious influence on the institutions of northern Cyprus, including its economy.

TInvAss 2: The 'TRNC' is an organised state, if not a particularly successful one. It has a president who is generally respected by the Turkish Cypriot community and is regarded with some respect by foreign officials; it has a fairly effective government, a parliament and a legal system, courts, police, a conscript army, an administrative machinery; it organises public utilities, social services, health services, schools and a higher education sector, cultural activities, festivals and other institutions. The 'TRNC' is not, of course, recognised officially by any government other than Turkey's, but it is not ignored either. In fact, after decades of official isolation, the existence of the 'TRNC' was recognised by the 57-state Organisation of Islamic Cooperation as the 'Turkish Cypriot State', and this is significant for Turkish Cypriots. Denktash, Talat and more recently Eroglu all had meetings with American and European statesmen, as well as senior UN officials. Turkish Cypriots just do not believe that their elected leaders and the democratic procedures by which they have been elevated to high office are not being taken seriously by foreign statesmen. If there is going to be a settlement in the form of a bicommunal, bizonal federation, Turkish Cypriots believe that (in the vague expression they are fond of using) 'it must be based on present realities';

that is, the 'TRNC' is going to be, in practice if not perhaps explicitly, one of the founding states of the Cyprus federal republic. The continued existence of the 'TRNC', with its existing basic provisions, must be part of any new federal polity that may be set up, if and when the negotiating process leads to a settlement, because, for Turkish Cypriots, it is a symbol and a guarantee of their distinct identity, their dignity as a community with a history of deprivation, struggle and some achievement, and the expression of their collective personality and will.

TInvAss 3: The Turkish Cypriot community is not at present economically self-supporting, and so it cannot survive without substantial economic assistance from Turkey, but nevertheless, it has long believed that the natural beauty and resources of northern Cyprus and its dynamic and enterprising population will provide the foundations of economic self-sufficiency based on tourism, agriculture, higher education and light industries, if and when a political settlement occurs. The discovery of hydrocarbon deposits off the southern and eastern coasts of Cyprus makes many Turkish Cypriots look forward to the time when they can exploit similar deposits off their northern shores. Turkish Cypriots want the freedom and opportunity to mobilise the economic resources of 'their' land and develop a thriving economy which is entirely under their control. Any future cooperation between themselves and Greek Cypriots is possible once it is agreed that Greek Cypriot investors and business people will not have too large a share of the economy of north Cyprus or too great an influence on its commercial and employment practices.

TInvAss 4: Since 1974, Turkish Cypriots no longer fear any aggressive or humiliating actions by Greek Cypriots, even though Greek Cypriots are deeply aggrieved by the losses of 1974 and theoretically they have a motive to attack and destroy the Turkish Cypriot state. The reason is that the 'TRNC' is controlled and protected by the Turkish armed forces and the Turkish Cypriot conscript army, and Greek Cypriots would never contemplate attacking because Turkey would be prepared to use its forces in retaliation. Turkish Cypriots are entirely safe, and they believe that the presence of Turkish troops provides an absolutely credible deterrence against any organised attempts from the south to 'liberate' the north or any harassment from Greek Cypriot hotheads. Turkish Cypriots and Turkey insist that Turkish guarantees for the integrity and security of the Turkish Cypriot community and their institutions in the north should remain in force indefinitely. There is no evidence that Turkish Cypriots (or Turkey for that matter) wish to see a new outbreak of hostilities if a bicommunal bizonal federal settlement that meets with their approval is put in place. However, since they suspect that any such settlement will leave many Greek Cypriots unhappy and in some cases in an aggrieved and aggressive mood, the settlement may break down in deadlock and even bloodshed, as did the 1960 settlement, which left the Turkish Cypriot community unprotected – they suffered around 250 dead in 1963–1964 – and the Republic of Cyprus in Greek hands. The Turkish Cypriot community, as indeed Turkey, insists on retaining the vital asset of continued Turkish security guarantees and an effective security machinery to protect the community and its state. Whatever advantages Turkish Cypriots stand

to lose from the break-up of the projected federation, they do not want to risk losing human lives and a secure Turkish Cypriot state in the north. This is their version of the policy to minimise the maximum losses they could suffer under a worst-case scenario (to 'minimax').

The various *GInvAss* and *TInvAss* identified above, in so far as they are held to be non-negotiable by the communities that cherish them, place severe limitations on the prospects of the negotiating process. After all, the very purpose of the negotiations is to create for each side the opportunity to obtain from the other side, through the method of give-and-take, benefits that it believes its opponents had deprived them by unjust means, like violence or unscrupulous diplomacy. The more assets one side declares non-negotiable and the less one is willing to give up, the less one is going to be able to take from the other side. The clash between one side's demands and the other side's unwillingness to negotiate invaluable assets can be made clear by means of a table.

GC Demands	**Clash with *TInvAss***
Repatriation of Turkish settlers and return of Greek Cypriot refugees (and their descendants) to their homes and properties. Freedom of movement, residence and property ownership for all Greek Cypriots, and political rights (including rights to participate in elections) for those who wish to live in the north.	*TInvAss 1*: A continuous stretch of territory completely dominated and administered by a compact and coherent Turkish Cypriot community (and the Turkish settler element).
The bicommunal, bizonal federation will come about as a result of the constitutional development of the Republic of Cyprus. The 'TRNC' will not be given any retrospective authority as a state equal in status to the Republic of Cyprus.	*TInvAss 2*: The 'TRNC' must remain in effect one of the two founding, constituent states of the projected bicommunal, bizonal federation.
The rules of the settlement should secure the unity of the territory, society, the people, the economy and state institutions of the federal polity.	*TInvAss 3*: An economy in the north which is controlled by the Turkish Cypriot community and Turkey, able to withstand any pressures from the larger and wealthier Greek Cypriot community.
Any new settlement should *exclude* any Turkish (or Greek or British) security guarantees, and *a fortiori* any unilateral right of intervention by any single power.	*TInvAss 4*: The maintenance of Turkish security guarantees and (most probably) the actual presence of Turkish deterrent troops.

TC Demands	**Clash with *GInvAss***
Political equality between the two communities and constituent states, rotating presidency, over-representation of Turkish Cypriot officials in federal bodies, approximate equality ('adequality') of influence between the two communities on federal affairs.	*GInvAss 1*: Maintenance of the Republic of Cyprus – the expression of collective Greek Cypriot identity and personality – and exercise of control, or preponderant influence, by Greek Cypriot officials in all federal institutions.
A substantial (probably higher than just proportional) slice of the natural resources (including the EEZ) of Cyprus, and foreign economic and technical aid to develop a prosperous economy for the Turkish Cypriot community.	*GInvAss 2*: Development of a thriving economy (before the crisis and again in the near future when the natural gas will be extracted, processed and exported) which supports high living standards and social welfare programmes.
The establishment of principles and policies which will be supportive of Turkey's efforts to join the EU (e.g. until Turkey becomes full member, its citizens should enjoy the rights and privileges of EU citizens).	*GInvAss 3*: EU membership which gives the Republic of Cyprus some voice and influence in the councils of EU, including influence on the conditions for Turkish accession.

The conclusion that emerges from the proceeding discussion is that as long as each of the two communities seeks to achieve from *uncoerced* negotiations what it regards as a just settlement embodying its rights or legitimate interests which, however, happen to clash with what the other community regards as its own vital and invaluable assets, it is hard to see how these negotiations can lead to an agreed settlement, even if both sides happen to be led at the same time by '70 percenter' leaders. The politicians in the two communities recognise that the negotiations have long reached an *impasse*. So do ordinary people in the two communities who indicate in successive opinion surveys that they do not expect a settlement to arise from the negotiations (and this shows they do not believe the EU is going to put pressure on Turkey to yield in order to join the EU). Yet Greek and Turkish Cypriots do not go out into the streets in mass demonstrations to demand that their leaders make more concessions for the sake of a settlement – e.g. to take up a '50 percenter' position – or adopt a different approach.

Epilogue

What options are left for the two communities when, first, they realise that they cannot obtain sufficient concessions from the other side to reach what from their very different standpoints constitute 'just' solutions, and second, they are not willing to give up their invaluable assets as that would jeopardise their identity and security? Will they go to war? None of the parties to the Cyprus dispute has ever considered war and none of them believes the other party will wage war to force total victory. Will the parties agree to go to arbitration? This is out of the question as the

Greek community – in fact all Greek Cypriot political forces fear the repetition of the UN Plan of 2004, when the UN Secretary-General Kofi Annan used his own discretion to fill the gaps left in the incomplete draft agreement, and produced what most Greek Cypriots regarded as an intolerably unfair document. Perhaps an international conference made up of the two communities, the three guarantor powers, the UN Security Council and representatives of the EU? Such conference has been suggested from time to time in the spirit of speculation, but it has no chance of success if the principal parties to the dispute do not agree on all the main issues. So, if the two parties are not going to negotiate away their invaluable assets – and this much can be taken for granted in any foreseeable circumstances – are there any alternatives to the current negotiating procedure in which each of the two sides seeks a one-sided 'just' solution, thereby making a stalemate inevitable?

The answer that suggests itself may appear surprising at first sight. The two communities – most of whose peoples have lived in a divided Cyprus for the whole of their lives and have become accustomed to enjoying the assets and tolerating the inherent frustrations and anxieties – appear to have developed an indifference to the present situation and, further, a kind of positive attitude to it. Former President Tassos Papadopoulos, whose government orchestrated the 'No' vote to the UN Plan in April 2004, probably spoke for the majority of his people when he said that the existing state of affairs was 'the second best' situation to a 'viable' solution (read 'just' solution, as Papadopoulos was a '90 percenter' politician). In the Turkish Cypriot community, given that according to successive opinion polls more people want a two-state solution than a bizonal federation, it seems very likely that while they would like to improve their living conditions and make their community a part of the EU, they are unwilling to give up their institutions, customary practices and independence from Greek Cypriots. For them, too, the present situation is 'the second best', as their daily life, political loyalties, expectations and aspirations accord with the facts of power on the ground in the north.

Every day hundreds of Greek and Turkish Cypriots go through the crossing points in Nicosia to visit friends, or shop in stores, or eat in restaurants, or just take a stroll on the other side, and then go 'back home'. Even if they do not often say so, Greek and Turkish Cypriots appear to consider it their *destiny* to live in a divided Cyprus (at least they know that their destiny is not to live in a united Cyprus), and they feel a sense of pride and self-respect, even a heroic feeling, for having withstood the deprivations and frustrations and refused the superficial attractions of an 'unjust' solution. Once you see a state of affairs as your destiny, you accept it, and further you may get to see it as something good, something that brings out your inner strengths, something that steels your will and character, and you begin to love it. This is what some philosophers have called *amor fati*, 'the love of one's destiny'. One can reflect on an aphorism by Nietzsche in his book *Gay Science*, section 276:

> 'I want to learn more and more to see as beautiful what is necessary in things; then I shall be one of those who make things beautiful. *Amor fati*: let that be my love henceforth! I do not want to

> wage war against what is ugly. I do not want to accuse; I do not even want to accuse those who accuse.'

The last sentence of the aphorism most definitely does not apply to Greek and Turkish Cypriot politicians and officials, since they have long been expert players in what the UN Secretary-General Ban Ki-Moon has called 'the blame game'. Both sides accuse the other of practising injustice and showing ill will and bad faith in the negotiations, but the UN does not seem to agree, at least in public. In any case, there is some pleasure to be had by accusing your opponent for injustice because that makes you feel that you speak for your people and it gives you the right to be proud of leading a people who have suffered injustice for decades without breaking down.

One thing that politicians and officials in each of the communities do regularly is to accuse the other and talk up their state and its invaluable assets. Another thing they do is to devise and apply 'strategies' (as they call their silly political and diplomatic manoeuvres) to undermine the authority of the institutions of the other community and restrict its opportunities for economic and social development and action in the European and wider arenas. Both sides' strategies are pretty ineffective, in the sense that they do not have any significant impact on the way the other community plans and lives its corporate life, other than confirm in their collective consciousness the untrustworthiness and unworthiness of its opponents. Each community studies the other side's strategy and closely follows its activities, but the fact of the matter is that both communities have reached a point where they have no reason to deviate from their chosen courses. Thus each community's assets, goals and practical means of promoting these goals are more or less balanced by the other community's assets, goals and practical means. A kind of static equilibrium has been reached between the two communities – not unlike a Nash Equilibrium – which the two communities have come to accept, if only silently, as the state of peaceful non-solution of the Cyprus problem. If a guess is in order in this connection, it may be said that the Cyprus problem will most probably not be solved – at least not in the foreseeable future – but its insolubility will be absorbed in the social cultures, self-images and daily frustrations of the two communities.

Book Reviews

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The Archbishops of Cyprus in the Modern Age: The Changing Role of the Archbishop–Ethnarch, Their Identities and Politics

Edited by Andrekos Varnava and Michalis N. Michael
Cambridge Scholars Publishing (Newcastle upon Tyne, UK, 2013), xiii+331 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-4438-4926-6

This book results from the collaborative efforts of seven experts on Cypriot history and religion (Andrekos Varnava, Michalis N. Michael, Sia Anagnostopoulou, Kyprianos D. Louis, Irene Pophaides, Alexis Rappas, and Theoharis Stavrides) coming together to present an overview of the personalities and administrations of the Archbishops of Cyprus, from Chrysanthos who straddled the eighteenth and nineteenth centuries (1767–1810), to Chrysostomos who died in 2006. The putting together, for the first time of a political and religious analysis of all the modern era Ethnarch–Archbishops allows the distinctively different philosophies of the Church's administrations to emerge more clearly; and the authors wish to critique the different personalities, as they pursued various goals according to the widely different political and economic climates of their times. The editors begin their work, noting that too often studies of the Ethnarchs emanating from Cypriot standpoints have taken too monolithically favourable a view of their subject, too apologetically referential, and too nationalistic in tone. The foreword notes that: 'This book is not an attack on the Church of Cyprus nor is it anti Church of Cyprus; in fact, on the contrary, it seeks to restore the historical record, and offer the Church a starting point from which to reassess its past and move forward' (p. xi). The editors note how the figure of Makarios III dominates the continuing imagination about what the Cypriot Archbishopric represents, perhaps too much so, and they seek to move away from this towards a larger focus on continuities and discontinuities across the last three centuries. Placing their study against the backdrop of an 'almost royalist' sense in much Cypriot writing that the Ethnarch–Archbishop is the 'God-given ruler' and protector (indeed almost definer) of the nation's core identity, they pose an alternative thesis that the historical record itself will show a more nuanced view, of different political and religious figures struggling to combine multiple roles in widely differing circumstances. Taking ten case studies from the eighteenth century to the near present, the book opens with a review, by both editors, of recent Cypriot historiography that treats the issue of the Ethnarchs, noting in the main how the authorial *tendenz* has been the support of the nationalist cause using the Ethnarch figure as a potent symbol. This book's macro thesis is that pre-1900 the Ethnarchs truly defended the island as a whole. Since then the institution has often been subverted to the cause of a: 'chauvinist brand

of Cypriot Hellenism'. They ask whether in the future, a time that more urgently than ever needs reconciliation between the divided factions of the island, the Ethnarch can truly play the role of Reconciler once again.

Theoharis Stavrides' opening study on Chrysanthos, the eighteenth-century Ethnarch, begins with the paradox that while his rule is generally characterised as a 'dark period' for a Church mercilessly oppressed by Ottoman forces, it actually was a Golden Age, of political power, financial stability and cultural excellence in Cyprus. Chrysanthos gained from the *Sublime Porte* the right to direct appeal, thus circumventing any local Ottoman Governor. In Church circles his indefatigable educational work, building of schools, and stressing the education of the clergy, allied with his insistence on the status of Cypriot Autocephaly (in his hands tantamount to conferring a Patriarchal status for the Church) all raised the Orthodox Church of the island in international renown. The case study of how the Archbishop secured the dismissal of the corrupt Governor Hac› Baki demonstrates just how ruthless the Ottoman tax gathering system was. Although they won their case for extortion at trial in Constantinople, all the extorted monies (from three episcopal sees that had the right to levy taxes on the Christians of the island) were declared forfeit to the *Sublime Porte*; in addition to which the Church had to pay all the costs: 'Their political victory was a financial disaster', Stavrides notes (p. 29).

Michalis N. Michael's chapter on Kyprianos (1810–1821) depicts a very famous figure who overlapped with the Greek wars of independence. He is popularly seen today as Ethno-martyr. Michael notes how he sought to overthrow Ottoman rule, for an independence that retained the structures of political power the Ottomans themselves had established (using the Archbishopric as the political overlord of the Christians). He himself has been installed as Archbishop uncanonically by the *Sublime Porte*, while the old Archbishop was still alive (albeit very old and ineffectual). His administration was characterised by a careful attempt to preserve the peace and *status quo* on the island; despite subsequent attempts to enrol him posthumously in the cause of Greek freedom. The machinations of the brutal Ottoman Governor of this time, Küçük Mehmed, are shown to have been based in a sustained attempt to dismantle the wealthy middle class of Cypriot Christian, resulting in his own self-enrichment. Mehmed had the robes of office for the successors already prepared at the very executions of Kyprianos and his leading clergy.

The same author's study of Panaretos (1827–1840) also draws out the extent to which the main dangers to the Archbishop under Ottoman rule came from subordinate clergy with an eye to their own political advancement through the payment of bribes and manipulation of political contacts. Panaretos was forced into monastic seclusion in 1840 and Ioannikios, the Sultan's favoured candidate, and that of a large section of rich Cypriot laity, assumed office. We do not receive a review of the latter's career. Kyprianos D. Louis then reviews the career of Makarios I (1854–1865) setting him in the context of major changes to the governance system of the Ottoman empire that were then in process, the so-called Tanzimat reforms. Makarios invested extensively in education, and worked consistently to develop good relations between Christians

and Muslims. Andrekos Varnava's chapter on Sophronios III (1865–1900) defines him as the transitional figure par excellence, between the old style and new era Ethnarchs of Cyprus. His administration is regarded as one of the most significant of all the moderns because of its extensive duration, and his successful occupation of the transition from the death of the Ottoman empire to British administrative rule. The *Illustrated London News* of August 1878 carried a fine lithograph of him blessing the Union Jack flag in Nicosia (reproduced p. 143). A quiet, highly educated and reverent man, Sophronios defined the Ethnarch's role as that of working collaboratively with the established state power; thus he made no calls for independence from the British, or for *Enosis* with Greece. For such reasons, Varnava argues, he has been extensively passed over in silence in modern accounts.

His successor Kyrillos II (1909–1916) was a marked contrast; highly nationalistic and politically strident. Andrekos Varnava and Irene Pophaides, in a joint article designate him the: 'first Greek nationalist Archbishop of Cyprus' (p. 148), and a 'Greek brawler' (p. 175). His administration positioned the Church almost as a political opposition party to the British, it is suggested. Using the British political reforms intended to introduce greater representation to the island's Turkish and Christian subjects, Kyrillos pushed heavily for a Greek nationalist presence in the assemblies, and subverted the cultural programmes encouraged by the British, for similar ends. The study criticises him as a kind of symbol providing a nationalistic and *Enosistic* 'archetype' for almost all of his successors.

Irene Pophaides also offers a study on Kyrillos III (1916–1933) which portrays a political figure of much vacillation. His pro-British stand of his early years as a bishop turned to anti-British positions after the 1920's. If his *Enosis* agenda was not extensively developed intellectually, it was existent nonetheless, and Pophaides presents him as perhaps being more concerned with ensuring, whatever came of British rule, the Archbishopric would be at the enduring centre of Cypriot life. Alexis Rappas' study of Leondios (1933–1947) presents a figure: 'more of a prelate than a national leader' (p. 237) whose abdication from nationalist politics, or any strong *Enosis* programme, alienated the island's wealthy elite from his side. His overarching desire to keep the Church out of politics fell apart in the rising strength of right and leftist factions then dividing the Cyprus community – a reflection of the wider issues concerning the rise of Fascism and Communism in Europe at the time.

Sia Anagnostopoulou's chapter on Makarios III is, as one would expect, one of the more extensive essays, dealing with a highly complex and politically major figure in twentieth-century political affairs. The treatment of the events of the Coup which overthrew him shows Makarios employing the brilliant political skills that accompanied his entire career. The coup (given the fact that he had survived it) was denounced from exile as not a Cypriot business at all, but a movement led by 'outside factions' (p. 287). Makarios, even in exile managed to present himself as Ethnarch, the symbolic core of Cyprus' independence and democratic values. Makarios' triumphant return to Cyprus, after the fall of the Greek Colonel's Junta in 1974, is argued to have cemented an agenda

of Cypriot nationalism cut free from *Enosis* agendas. Nationalism in this renewed form was presented as the pure form of democracy, for which Cyprus had paid a sacrificial price (the Turkish invasion of the north). Henceforth, so the Makarian agenda read, the Archbishops would stand as the guarantee of this form of democracy, and Makarios' issuing of an 'Absolution' to those Cypriots who were caught up in the errors of the *Enosis* revolt, served to underline this concept as a factor in 'keeping the peace'.

The final study, again by Andrekos Varnava, on Chrysostomos I (1997–2006) ends the book with an account of a man who found Makarios III: 'a hard act to follow'. His rule was complicated after 2000 by a fall down his palace steps, and after 2005 a long coma induced by Alzheimer's disease. He was removed from office on the grounds of ill health in 2006. His active period saw an administration that strongly resisted any federal solution to the Cyprus problem, and insisted on the: 'liberation of every corner of our occupied country' (p. 305). Varnava concludes that the Archbishop did not really believe in any reconciliation talks, merely for the international community to impose a solution (one that he favoured) on the Turkish state, and effect the withdrawal of troops, subject to guarantees of rights and protections for resident peoples. Although he was actively engaged in local politics, in every way he could use his influence, overall that influence had strict limits. He was side-lined progressively by the international community leaders, and his long illness took him, and his office, largely out of the arena.

Overall this is a very fine, historically nuanced book, which balances in a very refreshing way the religious, cultural, political and historical aspects of the study of Cyprus' life, seen through the lens of its Church leaders from the eighteenth century to the near present. It is very well presented, replete with first class sources, and useful bibliographies. The editors and authors are all to be highly congratulated on an important and illuminating work.

JOHN ANTHONY MCGUCKIN

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The Cyprus Crisis: Examining the Role of the British and American Governments during 1974

Andreas Constandinos
Plymouth Press (Plymouth, Devon, 2012), 407 pp.
ISBN: 978-1-84102-312-0

The events of summer 1974 in Cyprus triggered the publication of dozens of books which all have one thing in common: they believe in conspiracies. According to them Henry Kissinger was the 'villain of the story' who was not only behind the coup d'état against Makarios but also behind the Turkish intervention/invasion. In 2009 Andreas Constandinos published the following book:

Andreas Constandinos *America, Britain and the Cyprus Crisis of 1974: Calculated Conspiracy or Foreign Policy Failure?* (Central Milton Keynes: AuthorHouse, 2009), 426 pp.

In it he examined these conspiratorial myths and rightly refuted them. In 2012 he republished this book under the title shown in the heading of this review. The new title and subtitle create the impression that the 2012 edition is a fresh book, but except for the two different titles, a foreword by Zenon Stavrinides and the use of endnotes instead of footnotes as in the first edition, the two books are identical. I had reviewed that book in 2010 in German in the journal THETIS, and I have translated some of those points, which are still valid, in this review.

The author clearly carves out the differences in American foreign policy towards Cyprus in the 1960s and 1970s. In the 1960s the USA aspired towards a partition of the island in order to dispose of a Communist menace once and for all. So, the picture of Makarios as a Castro in a cassock of the Mediterranean belongs to the Johnson years. Kissinger did not consider Makarios as a threat to American interests. Why the author calls Kissinger a product of the Weimar Republic is a mystery, because Kissinger was born in 1923.

The first conspiratorial myth which the author disproves is that Washington was behind the coup against Makarios. He describes quite rightly how Kissinger cast Boyatt's warnings to the wind because he considered the facts mentioned by Boyatt as insignificant. Kissinger was preoccupied with world politics and was not interested in Cyprus as long as Cyprus did not disturb his activities on this level. He wanted to keep his options open until the very last moment. Besides that, Kissinger did not have the slightest idea about the conditions in Cyprus. The author believes that the failure of the American secret services and Kissinger's totally incorrect assessment of Ioannidis were the main reason for the coup. Without any doubt this is also right but the decisive point for the interpretation is in this case the 'foreign factors' in Greek politics. Ioanidis,

too, like all Greek politicians before him, abided by the maxim τι θέλει ο ξένος παράγοντας; [what does the foreign factor want?]. Since Kissinger did make clear the wishes of the American 'factor' Ioannidis interpreted this silence as a kind of affirmation, as the green light for his course. The same complies with Turkish politics. Kissinger's neglect of the warnings and his non-interference in early summer 1974 led to the catastrophe. A clear intervention in time would most probably have stopped Ioannidis.

Constandinos refutes the second myth, too, that the Americans colluded with the Turks during the intervention/invasion. Bur he also shows that Kissinger, out of geo-political reasons, considered Turkey more important than Greece. In order not to disturb the good understanding with Eçevit he did not counter him as Johnson had done in 1964. Indeed he sent Sisco with empty hands on a mission impossible to prevent the intervention. This inevitably led to the catastrophe.

Constandinos put an end to the two main myths connected with the events in 1974 which deserves applause. But he is not immune to hawk others, for instance, that the CIA was behind the coup of 21 April 1967 and that the so-called Akritas plan was a real plan. The book, which is primarily based on American and British sources, is the policy of these two states. The Turkish and Greek sides appear only when they are reflected by these sources. Such an interpretation is almost a tradition in the historiography dealing with this topic. The motives of the protagonists on the Greek and Turkish political scene are covered only indirectly in what often leads to misinterpretations.

An account reconstructing events almost totally out of the sources is desirable and courageous but it is always in danger of drowning in the flood. Therefore it makes sense to include secondary literature in the language that one knows. The greater context is better understood and lines of interpretations become more visible.

Both volumes contain a huge identical bibliography exclusively with English titles. There are no Greek or German titles despite the fact that the author has full command of both languages. This is especially regrettable because the author did not consult the memoirs of former protagonists such as those of Prime Minister Adamantios Androutsopoulos, Admiral Petros Arapakis, the leading diplomat Dimitrios Bitsios, the Chief of the Greek General Staff Grigorios Bonanos and the Ambassadors Nikos Kranidiotis and Konstantinos Panagiotakos. Even English language memoirs escaped the author's attention, namely, the reminiscences of Ambassadors Carl Barkman and Zeki Kuneralp. A bit bewildering is the fact that the memoirs of Margaret and Andreas Papandreou are not mentioned either.

All of the above was stated when I reviewed the first book. At that time I expressed surprise that the author did not take into consideration the numerous articles on the 1974 events published in THETIS, some of which are in English. But now that the second book is an expanded edition – as we are told by Zenon Stavrinides – one could expect that new literature would be included, for example, my *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus 1878–2009* or my *Geschichte der Insel Zypern* [History of the Island of Cyprus], Band IV, 1 and 2: 1965–1977. But apparently the author

follows the principle: Quod non est in lingua britannica/americana non est in mundo [If it is not found in the British/American tongue it is not in the world].

HEINZ A. RICHTER

Britain and the Greek Civil War, 1944–1949 British Imperialism, Public Opinion and the Coming of the Cold War

John Sakkas
Harrassowitz Verlag (Germany, 2013), 149 pp/28 illust.
ISBN: 978-3-447-06718-8

The Greek civil war holds a significant place in the history of twentieth-century Europe for many reasons. Firstly, it was Europe's bloodiest conflict in the second half of the 1940s; secondly, it marked a turning point in the Cold War; and lastly, it showed how Greece had become an 'apple of discord' for both American and Soviet involvement in Greek affairs which led to even more complexity in the country's post-war politics. Yet despite its significance, only a limited number of studies have been carried out on the subject of this era. After the troubled period of the 1950s and 1960s, a time dominated by extreme conservatism, anti-communism and nationalist paroxysms, it was difficult to access material sources and this made it nearly impossible to conduct scholarly research, so that older politically-charged interpretations and accounts went mostly unchallenged. However, in the past two decades a new historiographical current has developed as regards the civil war in Greece and new evaluations and debates have emerged that shed fresh light on conventional supposition.

Britain and the Greek Civil War, 1944–1949 draws upon the author's doctoral dissertation and provides a welcome addition to studies on that period in Greek history. John Sakkas takes up a novel approach that does not focus solely on Greek politics, whether they are national or local, nor does it centre simply on British policy in Greece. 'On the contrary', the author states that 'it deals with the profound impact the Greek question had upon the British public and the labour movement, in particular, from Churchill's military intervention in December 1944 to the end of the civil war in 1949. The chief aim of this study is to analyse the response of the British people to the official policy in Greece, to relate it to contemporary attitudes and concerns, and to assess the various ways in which the coming of the Cold War affected critics of British foreign policy both in the Labour Party and the trade union movement' (p. 10).

Sakkas begins by outlining the main goal of his study and the factors that induced him to choose this specific period. After offering a discussion on public opinion and following the specific course of action for 'measuring' opinion on 'political issues' as suggested by American historian Lee Benson, he adopts it in his own account of British public opinion from December 1944 to October 1949. Sakkas identifies three main types of events, broadly defined as: a) sequences of

relevant governmental decisions, b) actions taken by agents to shape opinion, and c) events contributing to significant changes in the historical situation. These three points underpin the narrative framework, and Sakkas selects five distinct types of opinion indicators for the study: a) editorials, reports and articles published by influential newspapers and journals that represented different political perspectives, b) debates in Parliament and the Labour Party and TUC conferences, c) resolutions issued by political organisations, trade unions, party constituencies and pressure groups, d) the expression of opinions by well-known figures (writers, artists, intellectuals), and e) public opinion polling and correspondence in the press. All of these are useful means for understanding what the British public thought regarding its country's policies on Greece and its political leaders who played an influential role in Greek affairs (Churchill, Bevin) (p. 15).

In chapter 1 the author attempts to establish patterns and trends by explaining the ways in which the British government impacted Greek affairs and the latter's traditional dependency on the UK. Through a brief overview of Greek–British relations starting in the nineteenth century and leading up to World War II, Sakkas focuses on how Greece played a part in British imperial strategies largely through anti-communist activities. A paper dated 11 August 1945, which circulated in the Cabinet, is indicative of this state of affairs: '... we must maintain our position in Greece as a part of our Middle East policy, and that unless it is asserted and settled it may have a bad effect on the whole of our Middle East position' (p. 24). The situation in Greece generated, or rather led to the deterioration of, Attlee–Bevin relations to an even greater extent than ever before.

Chapters 2 and 3 discuss public reactions in Britain to the *Dekemvriana*; the December events of 1944, in which bloody conflicts broke out in the centre of Athens between the Greek leftist forces, comprised of the Communist Party of Greece (KKE) and the EAM/ELAS forces, and the British Army, which was supported by the Greek Government, the city police and Georgios Grivas' far-right Organisation X. Churchill's policy on Greece is pertinent because it marked the first direct military intervention against a resistance movement and it took place six months before the war in Europe ended. The purpose was multifarious: to contain and if possible eliminate the left-wing mass resistance movement, to restore the Greek monarchy backed by a right-wing government and hence safeguard what was still considered to be a major strategic life-line to the oilfields of the Middle East and to India. By closely examining the statements made in the British press, Sakkas is able to present a vivid account of the coverage of those bloody incidents. Of great importance is the fact that during the fighting, strict military censorship was imposed on all correspondence, a reflection of the determined attempts to protect British policy in Greece. On many occasions, the military would even substitute one descriptive word for another with the sole aim of vindicating British policies. Regardless, the fighting sparked notable opposition and brought about a range of opinions in Britain as it dominated politics and the press. Sakkas presents an impressive analytical account of each of the newspapers he examines and closely analyses their editorials, thus revealing the differences of opinion in British society that in the end led to harsh criticism of Churchill by both political parties and trade unions.

Chapter 4 deals with the way the Greek question was perceived in Britain in 1945–1947 by journalists, politicians and the public. The chapter vividly demonstrates the attitudes and debates that were generated by the British press in response to Greek affairs, as well as their impact upon people's political attitudes. One of the key points of contention between the Labour Party and some British newspapers was the former's decision to support the proclamation of Greek elections in 1946. The situation was already tense, because in July of 1945, when the Labour Party came to power, there were high hopes for radical change and proposals were made for the adoption of a socialist agenda. Nonetheless, many Labour supporters felt betrayed because Bevin, the Foreign Secretary, made a statement in the House of Commons on 20 August 1945 assuring the continuation of British imperial policy on Greece. Conservatives and Liberals were so relieved that even Eden congratulated Bevin on his decision. In fact, until 1951 Bevin was in complete agreement with his senior officials as regards anti-Soviet policies and the defence of Britain's imperial and global roles, and this raises a series of questions, perhaps the most noteworthy of which concerns the factors that shaped the Labour Party's decision to adopt a policy that was in direct conflict with the leftist agenda and socialist principles. Instrumental in this policy was Bevin himself, as he ignored the position of the Labour Party and the communist left in terms of British policy.

Chapters 5 and 6 concentrate on the strong opposition to Bevin's policies among members of the Parliamentary Labour Party (PLP), which according to general sentiment lacked socialist beliefs. Sakkas carefully constructs a Cold War analytical framework and draws parallels with policies adopted by Britain in other regions, such as in Spain, where Britain maintained diplomatic relations with the Franco regime, or in Indo-China and Indonesia, where it defended imperial interests (both French and Dutch). Following the Truman Doctrine, in 1947 British policy began shifting closer to that of the American administration and became increasingly hostile to the Soviet Union. This policy, as voiced by the British government and Bevin in particular, created vigorous opposition within the PLP and eventually gave rise to a splintering of the party. By mid-1948, the majority of critics had accepted the main lines of 'Bevinism' which supported the Anglo–American alliance and a common struggle against communism and the Soviet Union.

The last chapter of the book is devoted to the League for Democracy in Greece (LDG), which was founded in 1945 as a platform for campaigning for change in British policy as regards Greece and for justice for the Greek left-wing resistance. Its work was supported by left-wing MPs, trade unionists and other figures. Conversely, after the proclamation of the Truman Doctrine, which radically altered the political environment, the LDG adapted to the new reality since it had been characterised as anti-leftist because of its decisions. As Greece began to fall from the British agenda, the priorities of the LDG also shifted. Although it never refrained from calling on the British to withdraw from Greece, its policy was limited to explaining its causes, trying to mitigate the persecution being carried out and provide relief to the victims of those policies, and pleading for a negotiated peace; none of their efforts, however, produced momentous results.

This short book by John Sakkas is an important addition to the literature on the Greek civil war, British politics and the politics of the Labour Party in particular, and it also raises a series of crucial questions in relation to the interactions between communism/socialism and imperialism. The author makes extensive use of both primary and secondary sources, making the book an indispensable source and reference study for those interested in British and Greek political history.

NIKOS CHRISTOFIS

Glafkos Clerides: The Path of a Country

NIYAZI KIZILYÜREK
Rimal Publications (Nicosia, 2008), 278 pp.
ISBN-10:996361034X

Some books deal with theory or recount history but this book seems to be largely the transcript of a long conversation between Niyazi Kizilyürek and Glafkos Clerides. Because it is so simple, different, and unique, it is a tad difficult in some ways to criticise. It does not pretend to be a true scholarly work that investigates and analyses politics or history but is, for all intents and purposes, merely a conversation with one of the most important and influential people in the Republic of Cyprus. What it is, essentially, is an autobiography of Glafkos Clerides that was developed via interviews between the author and the former president between 2005 and 2006.

Yet, it is not just the transcripts of some interviews. There are some bonus materials such as a few key clippings from newspapers and a number of photographs of Glafkos Clerides. The prints are rather interesting in that they are not purely the formal shots that one usually sees from state events but they include a fascinating collection of pictures of him as a child as well as from various private events and moments in his life. I suspect that the pictures are private photographs from the archives of the former president, although I could not find a reference to the sources of the pictures. Another added feature is a summarisation of each section in the book, so that the reader can skim over those parts that may be of less interest than other sections.

The book is divided into six parts that generally flow in a chronological manner, although the last section is mainly a discussion of the future of the Republic of Cyprus and the resolution of the Cyprus problem. Each segment begins with a short summary of the part; in addition to which the sub-divisions of each part to the book also have short summaries too. In Part I, there is a dialogue of the early life of Glafkos Clerides, dealing with his childhood, education, internment as a Prisoner of War, his marriage, and return to Cyprus. In Part II, there is a debate of the formation of the Republic of Cyprus and his involvement in the process and involvement with Archbishop Makarios. Part III explores the early days of the Republic from the early 60s to the mid-70s. Part IV concentrates on Glafkos Clerides' involvement with politics from the mid-70s until 1993. Part V is the former president's reflections on his activities during his presidency and his attempts to reconcile relationships with Turkish Cypriots. Part VI is a discussion of the Annan Plan together with musings upon future plans that might solve the Cyprus problem, with much debate on the subject of federation, confederation, and the alternatives.

While the book is so different and while readers may sometimes be sceptical of some of the things that are reported by the former president, there are many details that are thought-provoking or shocking. For me, there is an engaging fact that I had neither heard of before nor imagined. Glafkos Clerides reported that because his mother could not lactate properly, the parents had him suckle from a goat, rather than find a wet-nurse (p. 18). This information is the sort of snippet that can help a person revive a conversation at a cocktail party. Much of the information is not particularly abhorrent or interesting [for example that Dr Kutchuk was a heavy drinker (p. 123) or that Glafkos Clerides bought the tickets and brought Rauf Denktash's family to the airport to get them out of Cyprus in 1964 (pp. 118–119)]. But the recounting of the details and occurrences may assist many readers in acquiring a more colourful understanding of the political history of Cyprus.

But there are quite shocking moments and attitudes that are found in the book. For me, the most disturbing moment is the rather blasé way in which the author and Mr Clerides discuss the manner in which Tassos Papadopoulos was caught making preparations to kill Turkish Cypriots in the event of an invasion in 1964 (p. 107). To me, the intention of ethnic cleansing/genocide/mass killing is a horrific thing to skim over relatively quickly and treat in a fairly nonchalant way. Also discussed is the incident in which Rauf Denktash reported during his 1967 arrest that Tassos Papadopoulos and Spyros Kyprianou declared that they thought Rauf Denktash should be executed. Glafkos Clerides disputes that claim (p. 121), stating that no one spoke of execution but instead discussed where he should be detained.

There are many people who should benefit from reading the book. Although most academics and casual readers would not find the book particularly useful, someone with background knowledge of Cypriot history and politics should definitely find valuable information in the work. If a person has knowledge of Cypriot politics and history, it probably would be a good book to look at, as it adds colour and details to what many people may already know. However, if a person is new to Cypriot politics and history, it might be a little hard to follow, although there are added features which make it more understandable to a newcomer to Cypriot politics and history.

Further, there are two other major features in the book that make the publication accessible for those people who are not very knowledgeable about Cypriot history or politics. One feature is a number of appendices that have been added which provide background information for those readers who would welcome the supportive facts. The appendices present biographies of major players in the politics of Cyprus during the period under discussion, background on political organisations (i.e. EOKA, DISY, DIKO and so on), and background on key proposals regarding the Cyprus problem (i.e. Akritas Plan and Annan Plan). The other helpful aid is the frequent use of footnotes to give brief definitions or add information regarding people or concepts that may not be familiar to a person who has not lived in Cyprus for a long time or lacks background knowledge of the Cyprus problem. An example of its usefulness is the footnote (p. 229) that informs the reader of what a Mukhtar is. Moreover, another footnote gives a short biography, informing the reader of who Henry Kissinger is (p. 151).

One major criticism of the book is that the interviews took place following the rejection of the Annan Plan in the Republic of Cyprus; so much of the debate is set at a timeframe following the defeat. The historical backdrop of the failure of the Annan Plan is one that serves as a setting for the book and plays a large role in the context of the conversations, which explains why Tassos Papadopoulos is referred to quite frequently. Another major criticism of the book is its format. As the transcripts of an interview, most readers will be unaccustomed to this sort of style of reading. It does read rather like an exercise in eavesdropping (although the two men were fully aware, I presume, of the intention to use the material) and many may feel less comfortable with this style of reading as opposed to the more academic prose that many of us are used to. The advantage, though, is that there is probably less editing and the reader has fuller access to the words of the former president, taken directly (more or less) from his mouth.

All-in-all, this is a useful and interesting read. It contributes a great deal of insight into Glafkos Clerides and how he perceived the Cyprus problem and the likely solutions to the problem. Unfortunately, the section in which he mentions his detainment as a Prisoner of War, his escape, and eventual recapture are less detailed than I would have liked. I assume that many readers would have liked to know more about the escape and recapture, even if it has hardly anything to do with Cypriot political history. Even though the book is a little unorthodox in style, the attempt to make it accessible to those without a strong background in Cypriot political history is appreciated and largely successful. Despite the fact that Mr Clerides died in November 2013, a great deal has been written about him and will continue to inform researchers and historians for years to come. This book is a useful addition to any library. It gives insight into how Mr Clerides perceived his role in the formation of the Republic of Cyprus and his attempts to solve the Cyprus problem.

Craig Webster

Books available for Review

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Wells, L., Stylianou-Lambert, T. and Philippou, N. (eds) (2014) *Photography and Cyprus: Time, Place and Identity*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris.

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

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