THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues



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THE CYPRUS REVIEW

A Journal of Social, Economic and Political Issues

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NOTES FOR CONTRIBUTORS

The Cyprus Review is an international bi-annual refereed journal which publishes articles on a range of areas in the social sciences including primarily Anthropology, Business Administration, Economics, History, International Relations, Politics, Psychology, Public Administration and Sociology, and secondarily, Geography, Demography, Law and Social Welfare, pertinent to Cyprus. As such it aims to provide a forum for discussion on salient issues relating to the latter. The journal was first published in 1989 and has since received the support of many scholars internationally.

Articles should be original and should not be under consideration elsewhere.

Submission Procedure:

Manuscripts should be sent to the Editors, *The Cyprus Review,* University of Nicosia,
46 Makedonitissas Avenue, P.O. Box 24005, 1700 Nicosia, Cyprus.

Formatting Requirements:

(i) Articles should range between 6000-9000 words.

(ii) Manuscripts should be typed on one side of A4 double-spaced; submitted in four hard copies together with a CD or 3.5 inch disk compatible with Microsoft Word saved as rich text format. Manuscripts can be forwarded electronically (saved as an attachment) to: cy_review@unic.ac.cy

Pages should be numbered consecutively.

The Cyprus Review uses British spelling, '-ise' endings (e.g. 'organise' and 'organisation'.

As manuscripts are sent out anonymously for editorial evaluation, the author's name should appear on a separate covering page. The author's full academic address and a brief biographical paragraph (approximately 60-100 words) detailing current affiliation and areas of research interest and publications should also be included.

Manuscripts and disks will **not** be returned.

(iii) An abstract of no more than 150 words should be included on a separate page together with keywords to define the article's content (maximum 10 words).

(iv) Headings should appear as follows:
Title left aligned, title case, bold, e.g.

International Peace-making in Cyprus

Subheadings:
I. Left aligned, title case, bold.
II. Left-align, title case, bold, italics.
III. Left align, title case, italics.

(v) Quotations must correspond to the original source in wording, spelling and punctuation. Any alternations to the original should be noted (e.g. use of ellipses to indicate omitted information; editorial brackets to indicate author's additions to quotations). Quotation marks (" ") are to be used to denote direct quotes and inverted commas (' ') to denote a quote within a quotation.

(vi) Footnotes should be used to provide additional comments and discussion or for reference purposes (see vii below) and should be numbered consecutively in the text. Acknowledgements and references to grants should appear within the footnotes.

(vii) References: As *The Cyprus Review* is a multi-disciplinary journal, either of the following formats are acceptable for references to source material in the text:
a) surname, date and page number format (i.e. McDonald, 1986, p. 185) OR
b) footnote references.
Full references should adhere to the following format:
Books, monographs:
James, A. (1990) *Peacekeeping in International Politics*. London: Macmillan.
Multi-author volumes:
Foley, C. and Scobie, W.I. (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Starpod, CA: Hoover Institution Press.

Articles and chapters in books:
Jacovides, A.J. (1977) 'The Cyprus Problem and the United Nations' in Attalides, M. (ed.), *Cyprus Reviewed.* Nicosia: Jus Cypri Association, pp. 13-68.
Journal articles:
McDonald, R. (1986) 'Cyprus: The Gulf Widens', *The World Today*, Vol. 40, No. 11, p. 185.

(viii) Dates should appear as follows: 3 October 1931; 1980s; twentieth century. One to ten should appear as written and above ten in numbers (11, 12 etc.)

(ix) Tables and figures should be included in the text and be numbered consecutively with titles.

(x) **Essays and Research Notes**. Essays on subjects relating to Cyprus should be unreferenced and range between 2000-4000 words in length. Research Notes should be in the region of 5000 words.

(xi) **Bibliography: Research and Publications on Cyprus:** new books, articles, book chapters, documents and PhDs are published annually in the Spring issue of the journal.

(xii) **Book Reviews** are normally 2000 words maximum in length. Headings should appear as follows: Title, author, publisher, place, date, number of pages, ISBN registration, e.g. *Cyprus and International Politics*, Essays by Van Coufoudakis, Intercollege Press (Nicosia, 2007) 306 pp. ISBN: 978-9963-634-45-3. The reviewer's name should appear at the end of the review plus a brief biographical paragraph (60-100 words). Guidance notes are available for book reviewers. This section also hosts reviews of publications in Greek and Turkish to help facilitate cross-linguistic referencing and research awareness. Alongside attention to the specificities of the locality the journal deals with, there is also a geographical aspect to the section's broadening of scope. It strives to review publications of thematic relevance to Cyprus studies, even if the focus of the works is not necessarily Cyprus *per se*. The editors hope to enable the opening up of new avenues of intervention by Cyprus scholars in wider academic debates (as well as the awareness of such intervention amongst Cyprus-focused researchers). Suggestions for publications that should be featured in the section are welcomed and can be sent to bookreviews.tcr@unic.ac.cy.

(xiii) Each author will receive two complimentary copies of the issue in which their paper appears in addition to a pdf to use for additional reprints.

(xiv) Articles submitted to the journal should be unpublished material and must not be reproduced for one year following publication in *The Cyprus Review*.

DISCLAIMER

The views expressed in the articles and reviews published in this journal are those of the authors and do not necessarily represent the views of the University of Nicosia, the Advisory Board, International Advisory Board, or the Editors.

Indexing: The contents of The Cyprus Review are now indexed in the following publications: Bulletin Signalitiques en Sciences, Humanities et Sociales; International Bibliography of the Social Sciences; PAIS-Public Affairs Information Service; Sociological Abstracts; Social Planning, Policy and Development Abstracts and Reviews: Peace Research Abstracts Journal; ICSSR Journal of Abstracts and Reviews; Sociology and Social Anthropology; International Bibliography of Periodical Literature; International Bibliography of Book Reviews; International Political Science Abstracts; EMBASE, Compendex, Geobase and Scopus and other derivative products such as Mosby Yearbooks. In addition, TCR is available internationally via terminals accessing the Dialog, BRS and Data-Star data bases.

The Cyprus Review is disseminated via EBSCO, in their international research database service and subscription network of academic journals. It is assigned to EBSCO's EconLit database with full text.

Dear Reader,

With this issue, *The Cyprus Review* celebrates its 20th anniversary. This is a significant achievement for a small and specialised journal. Over these two decades, the journal has established itself as a critical publication for any researcher studying Cypriot-related issues in the social sciences and humanities.

The tireless efforts of the many people that have worked for the journal over the years are commemorated in an introduction to this issue by the man who founded the *Review* and still "presides" over it as Managing Editor, Nicos Peristianis. We all owe a great debt of gratitude to him for recognising the need for such a journal, especially when its commercial viability was less than certain.

Like the institution it is affiliated with, the *Review* has matured. Just as Intercollege transformed itself into the University of Nicosia, a great deal of effort is being made to refine and upgrade the standards of the journal. Several changes have been implemented recently which, in our view, have raised the quality and academic standing of it.

In 2007, the journal became part of EBSCO's International Research Database Service. This licences the full text content of over 8,000 well-known periodicals and databases, and has thus broadened our distribution and availability considerably. The *Review* is also under evaluation for listing in the most extensively-used citation tool in academia globally, the Social Sciences Citation Index (SSCI), which is expected to widen these even more, as well as to raise the profile of the journal.

The supervision of the quality of the journal has also been enhanced by reforming the editorial board. In essence we have divided it into two. One part is composed of local academics. At the same time, we have also introduced an international advisory board, thus assuring the expertise and commitment of many of the leading local and international scholars to the journal.

The editorial team has also been extended to include an editor (currently Olga Demetriou) specifically designated to oversee, and broaden the scope of, the book review section. Recognising the importance of publications in languages other than English to research on Cyprus, the book reviews section will be hosting reviews of publications in Greek and Turkish – a step that we hope will also help facilitate cross-linguistic referencing and research awareness (see relevant section xii, p. 5, for more information).

Guest editors are also invited on a regular basis to bring in their expertise and contacts for special themed issues. For example, this year's Fall issue, which will be edited by Heinz-Jürgen Axt and Phedon Nicolaides, will be dedicated to the first five years of Cypriot membership in the European Union. Following on from this, the Fall 2010 issue will be edited by Costas Constantinou and will look at 60 years of Cypriot independence.

We have also taken the opportunity in this anniversary edition to introduce further changes which hopefully improve the calibre and the level of service this journal provides to you, the reader.

The first change is purely cosmetic – a new cover. More substantially, to ease reading fonts have also been changed. In terms of content, from now on every Spring issue will contain a Research and Publications Section. This will be a list of publications, including books, academic articles, book chapters, documents, occasional papers and PhDs published over the previous year. (Any overlooked publications from the year before will also be listed in a separate section). To begin, this issue strives to list all academic publications on Cyprus since 2006. We hope that this will serve as a valuable asset for any researcher on Cyprus. However, for it to succeed we need your input as well. If you would like to draw our attention to a new publication, or would like to notify us of an omission, we can be contacted at bookreviews.tcr@unic.ac.cy. A related special feature in this 20th anniversary issue is a list of all articles published in *The Cyprus Review* since its debut in Spring 1989.

The Commentary section has now been renamed 'Essays and Research Notes' and will include contributions in the range of 2,000-5,000 words. The aim is to facilitate the publication of scholarly and well-informed articles that lack the length or theoretical complexity of full-length articles but may nevertheless contribute to an ongoing or emerging debate or lay the foundations for new research.

We would like to thank the members of both the editorial and the international advisory board for the valuable input, ideas and criticism during the lively debate over the future changes and improvements we have introduced. We would also like to thank those who had the imagination to envision a journal that would, 20 years later, serve as a critical reference source for the academic community working in, and on, Cyprus. Most of all, we would like to thank you, the reader, and hope you continue to follow the twists and turns of the history, society, economy and politics of this small, troubled but stimulating and fascinating island.

The Editorial Team

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20TH ANNIVERSARY ISSUE

BOOK REVIEWS

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KEITH WEBB (died of cancer - 14 March 2008) He had wide intellectual interests from philosophy and methodology of social science to nationalism and conflict studies and published in all these areas. He was the mainstay in developing conflict studies at the University of Kent and latterly at the University of Nicosia. Dr Webb was an inspiring teacher.

Introduction

The first issue of *The Cyprus Review* was published twenty years ago, in the Spring of 1989. Those were times of extensive social change in Cyprus, involving processes which were set off since Independence, in 1960. The post-colonial era was marked by rapid economic development and modernisation which gradually transformed life on the island, with higher rates of urbanisation, growing affluence, but also alterations in social institutions, mores and values; it is no wonder that the Cyprus Social Research Centre, constituting the first attempt to understand the changing social world, was founded in the late sixties. Parallel to these developments were increasing political strains, leading to the conflicts of 1963 and 1974 – which split the island into two, and gave a new turn to social change, with the displacement (or forced urbanisation) of thousands of refugees, the growth of new economic domains, the mass entry of women into the labour market, and so on.

What were the causes which led to conflict and the division of the island? For the first time perhaps, official nationalist ideologies were questioned. Whereas in the past explanatory accounts of national(ist) phenomena relied heavily on primordialist and perennialist premises, which largely utilised nationalism's own categories of analysis, there was a gradual shift to more modernist approaches, which saw such phenomena as social constructions, whose existence had to be explained by reference to social dynamics. Similarly, the social scientific perspective was increasingly made use of in studying a range of other social phenomena preoccupying Cypriots in those turbulent years.

The Cyprus Review's declared aims, as expressed by the introductory note of the editors, were to foster the production of scholarly research and knowledge, and to bring together, in a comprehensive review, papers on Cypriot social, political and economic issues. The *Review* also hoped to provide an open forum of debate which would engage "scholars and critical observers". The discourse aimed for would go beyond "official, ideologically motivated or emotional viewpoints", to produce more "objective" and "dispassionate" analyses.

Much has changed since the journal's inception. Cypriot society has become more diverse and complex, but also more open and democratic. Knowledge producing institutions – universities and research centres, – many of which were born or were taking their first steps in the eighties, are by now older and stronger. Conferences, seminars and symposia through which scholarly dialogue is facilitated, are nowadays much more frequent. Globalisation and the entry of the Republic of Cyprus in the European Union are giving a further push to developments in these directions.

The editorial team of the *Review* has tried to encourage the publication of papers covering many of these changes, while also maintaining and upgrading the journal's quality. Some of the recent and upcoming improvements are outlined in the editorial team's message in this issue. But a word must be said about the editors themselves, as well as all those who have supported the *Review* in different ways, throughout the years.

A special mention must be made of John Harvey, who was co-editor with me in the early years of the *Review;* John is now confined at home with ailing health but he played a vital role in laying the journal's foundations. Also to Christina McRoy, assistant editor, who for many years has been the driving force of the journal, pushing all processes and details that get the review to the printer. Appreciation must also be expressed to Hubert Faustmann, editor in chief, James Ker-Lindsay, Craig Webster and Olga Demetriou, our current editors, for their endeavours in soliciting articles and ensuring that the *Review* maintains and enhances its calibre. I also wish to thank everyone who has served the journal on the advisory editorial board. In addition, a huge debt of gratitude is owed to the large number of unnamed referees who have willingly given their time and expertise to review articles 'blind' for the journal. It is fitting that we take this opportunity to thank them all for their loyal support.

This issue includes an article by Maria Hadjipavlou who contributed to the inaugural issue of the *Review* in 1989, as well as an essay by Zenon Stavrinides who published an article ten years ago, in 1999, questioning whether a compromise settlement in Cyprus (was) still possible - to revisit the some perennial issue presently.

In conclusion, a substantial contribution to the paper by Keith Webb and A.J.R. Groom has been written by Keith Webb despite being seriously ill. He died on 14 March 2008 and the paper was completed by his co-author, A.J.R. Groom. Between 2001 and 2007 Keith Webb was Professor at the Department of International Relations Intercollege/University of Nicosia and was also a member of the advisory editorial board of *The Cyprus Review* journal until his death. We are pleased to be able to publish Keith's last piece of writing in this anniversary issue as a tribute to him.

NICOS PERISTIANIS

Articles

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NUMBER 1

The Discourse of Refugee Trauma: Epistemologies of the Displaced, the State, and Mental Health Practitioners

Anna M. Agathangelou and Kyle D. Killian

Abstract

This paper explores the discourse of refugee trauma, analysing ways the displaced, the state, and mental health practitioners think about displacement and other war traumas. Narratives were obtained via in-depth qualitative interviews with displaced Greek Cypriots, newspaper accounts and press releases by elected officials, and through an examination of assumptions and practices of the traditional, medical model. Following a discussion of a range of epistemologies regarding the meaning of displacement, the authors offer a systemic epistemology for practitioners and activists interested in an alternative to the current ontology of fear and insecurity dominating our everyday institutions and social relations. In deconstructing the narratives of traumatisation, the authors suggest that dichotomous, essentialised, and atomistic understandings of self and other, displacement, nation, and health sustain in place "unhealthy" conditions that precipitate further traumatisation. Instead of pills and ethno-nationalist interpretations, the therapeutic witnessing of family dialogues around trauma is suggested for the facilitation of a process that relinquishes the desire to set it "right" and makes room for listening to our restless dead about another mode of living, a current struggle for peace, truth and justice.

Keywords: epistemologies, refugee, trauma, discourse, displacement, affect, systemic, mental health

Introduction

20 July 2008. From a Nicosian veranda, the Turkish flag can be seen burning brightly on the Pentadactylos Mountains commemorating what many in northern Cyprus view as the Turkish "peace operation" on the island thirty-four years ago. While the north-south buffer zone has opened, allowing Greek and Turkish Cypriots to move back and forth, barbed wire and UN troops remain on this segregated island. On 24 April 2004, the north and south communities of Cyprus held a referendum to decide whether or not to accept the Annan plan. Leading up to the crucial vote, the Greek-Cypriot political leadership did one of two things: went on television, tearfully imploring citizens to vote "no", or, alternately, sat silently, waiting for a socio-political firestorm to subside. Both the vociferous debates, and strategic silences, speak volumes about the tensions and the futures that were denied them on both sides of the divide. In each of these

communities, "remains" of the series of violences perpetrated upon their bodies persist. For instance, it may be argued that the north, unable to mourn past losses, has been structured in a manner that sustains in place representations of subjects who need to right past wrongs (i.e. by focusing on the chosen trauma). In the south there is a community that refuses to forget (e.g. I DO NOT FORGET) and has yet to commemorate fully what has repeatedly been called the catastrophe that has become so integral to our lives. The Annan Plan Referendum reopened old wounds, fears, and experiences of violence, including foregone and irreproducible orientations toward the future in both the north and south associated with the conflicts of 1955-1959, 1963, 1964, 1967, and 1974. Many of us carry memories, some our own and some intergenerationally transmitted, and frequently there are disjunctures between inherited collective memories and the personal experiences we ourselves have lived – the memories as articulated in the public domain and those in our most intimate places.

This paper engages with the narratives of the displaced (i.e. the refugee) in order to rigorously interrogate the methods and the kinds of political claims that can be mobilised on behalf of the displaced (refugees, those in enclaves, the dead, and the missing) in the political present. This paper is not an accounting of the displacements and other losses in order to remember and rework historical trauma. As both communities albeit in differential ways try to address violences such as conflict and war and their aftermath, it is crucial to think about it anew with justice instead of calling for fundamentalist revenge or even a commitment to memory of the past without accounting for the ways this "past" itself consolidates our own capacity to embody and engage in living, current struggles for peace, truth and justice. We pose the question of the Cypriot series of displacements as ongoing struggles, a judgement on the forces that animate such displacements while countering alternative memories, the contours of which outline still to be realised alternatives to violence (i.e. continued displacements and violations including the exploitation, the torturing and killing of peoples all in the name of capitalist colonial development and neoliberal projects). In this paper, we are more concerned with the contemporary possibilities of transformation and the ways such possibilities are still tethered to this past of displacement as violence and death. So, questions for us here are the following: what are the epistemological and political questions in writing histories of the present without squarely engaging the problem of life orientations and visions embodied within them? What are the stories about the displaced, (i.e. the refugee to just name one), that continues to inform who we are today – a present in which violence and terror is not contained and/or gone, a present in which persons are daily stripped of their energies as they are violated, a present informed and mediated by ongoing violence?

In this paper, specifically we ask: 1) What traumatic narratives and epistemologies do the state, refugees themselves, and mental health practitioners draw upon and to what consequence regarding redress with justice? 2) Who or what benefits from public re-productions of feelings such as hypermasculine impotentilisation, bereavement, loss, or anger? 3) What kinds of interventions, therapeutic and otherwise, can improve the quality of life within conflict-war-torn communities? To answer these questions, we explore the narratives that emerged from twenty-five

ethnographic interviews and focus groups conducted with Greek-Cypriot refugee families in 2002, 2004, and 2006, and newspaper accounts of statements made by the Greek-Cypriot political leadership. In addition, we engage some narratives that emerged out of a mixed village in the north where we were able to talk to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots still living there. After discussing the theoretical assumptions that guide this article, we present the narratives of refugees and the state, critique linear-causal-nationalist-developmentalist epistemologies, and then offer up systemically informed alternatives to traditional, medical model treatments and practices with displaced peoples.

Epistemologies of Trauma: (Neo) Colonialisms Anew?

> "Haunting is a constituent element of modern social life. It is neither premodern superstition nor individual psychosis; it is a generalizable social phenomenon of great importance. To study social life one must confront the ghostly aspects of it"
>
> (Gordon, 1997)

Since "the end of the 1980s, 'trauma' projects appear ... alongside food, health and shelter interventions" (Bracken and Petty, 1998, p. 1) which has led to the emergence of trauma treatment programmes as if to "tame the unimaginable" (James, 2004, p. 131). As more and more of the language of trauma becomes part of the vernacular by being more accessible, familiar, and normalised in the society (i.e. stress, anxiety, trauma), violences such as warfare waged against civilians unimaginable in the scale of their brutality are less challenged (Bracken and Petty, 1998, p. 1). Challenging such violences becomes even more difficult when the discourse of trauma becomes an organising modality that motivates new forms of technocratic practices. Examples of such practices include the restructuring of states and humanitarian apparatuses designed to manage newly articulated categories of states and people within a social field, i.e. "failed states", "states in crisis", "victims of human rights' violations", victims of war especially with the War on Terror and the brutalities in the Balkans (Agathangelou, 2000), in order to alleviate the suffering of victims and transform their experiences, identity, and "political subjectivity" (Aretxaga, 1997). However, such practices themselves may engender other kinds of violences that reassert social power asymmetries, which inform acts and policies leading to the killing of working class, black and other racialised subjects, and women and children (Agathangelou, 2009). The series of state and other humanitarian projects, which secure in place these power dynamics, require us to ask questions that reject the notion that these asymmetrical social relations are just "business as usual".

With the end of the Cold War, many of these state and humanitarian regimes have asserted their power involving new technologies that would legitimise their interventions in those sites which are undergoing post-conflict reconstruction and/or are desiring to "fit" into the nations of civilisation and integrating themselves in regions like the European Union. In relationship to those states in "crisis", these technologies of governance enable the unfolding of a series of intervention practices such as social rehabilitation and economic change (James, 2003). These

practices are, as James (*ibid.*) claims, reminiscent of what Foucault refers to as bio-power: "techniques of power present at every level of the social body and utilized by very diverse institutions (the family and the army, schools and the police, individual medicine and the administration of collective bodies), operated in the sphere of economic processes, their development, and the forces working to sustain them" (Foucault, 1990, 141). Similarly, discourses of trauma could themselves also be methods of securing and making possible global-power practices (Agathangelou, Bassichis, and Spira 2008; James, 2003; Povinelli, 2000; Basu, 2004) especially for those sites seeking to become "more civilised", their conflict-ridden genes expunged, and to become more competent and accountable to their citizens (James 2004, p. 131). Such demands and practices in the global realm depend extensively, however, on specific epistemologies that are guided by a transcendental politics of relations, including class, gender, sexuality and justice, and also politics that draw on discourses and forces with a continuous historical, colonial logic. For instance, much of the experience of violence, such as displacement and suffering, is appropriated or alienated from the subject and transformed (Das, 1995; Kleinman and Kleinman, 1991) into a series of documentations that articulate persons, families and whole nations into "victims", "killers", etc. (see *Calling the Ghosts* – a film made in 1996; Mandami 1996; Povinelli 2002). Much of this documentation also becomes part of seeking funding and political capital in order to promote persons, families, ethnic groups and nations' institutional security within the international system of states even as they promote the "protection" and "security" of their citizens (Agathangelou, 2009, 2000; James, 2003; Agathangelou and Spira, 2007). While such political contestations are part and parcel of structures and institutional and personal formations, one may ask what are the criteria that make some traumas more legitimate than others and/or more urgent than others? What is at stake in centralising some traumas over others and what does it really do for us politically if we can begin any kind of interrogation of political projects by merely focusing on the "suffering of others" instead of the violent conditions and social relations that make possible their political subjectivity, including their suffering? How do such engagements and political recognitions draw on historical violations such as warfare, exploitation, oppression and also existential denials, and for what purpose?

Gender, sexuality, class, race and (re)production were explicit factors in the mode of violence in Cyprus during and after the many years of conflict both covert and overt since 1960 when the island won its independence from the British colonisers. As the state began its integration in the international structure, many enduring problems remained, such as the accomplishment of a workable Cypriot state, the transformation of dependent subjects/workers to "free" workers within this newly formed state, and the build-up of bureaucratic institutions to facilitate these processes. To this series of questions, the viability of the state, the "conflicts" and the Turkish "peace operation" and/or what has come to be articulated and consolidated temporally in 1960, 1963, 1967, and 1974 as the Cyprus question, provided the appearance of an ethnic problem instead of the many displacements and its contingent traumas, the constant shifts unfolding and the alternative imaginaries defined in conjunction with that violence and its "freezing" (i.e. biomedically reducing

relations) as a form of transformation.

Violence (and more specifically here displacement) can be understood within a context of the formation of a modern state and its contingent epistemic notions about its own power, social order, and health. In the past two decades, an important body of feminist theory has emerged that examines the complicity of nationalism with gender and sexual hierarchies (McClintock, 1995; Anthias and Yuval Davis, 1989; Kandiyoti, 1994; Suàrez-Orozco, 2000; Aretxaga, 2001; Wilce, 2004). McClintock has critiqued extensively how the nation is constructed in terms of familial and domestic metaphors and how "woman" represents the symbolic site, as well as a boundary marker of the nation as "home" and "family". Kandiyoti (1994, p. 382) argues that the project of nationalism draws upon the idea of woman as associated with the private sphere, thus, connecting the nation/community with "selfless mother/devout wife":

> "The very language of nationalism singles out women as the symbolic repository of group identity. As Anderson points out, nationalism describes its object using either the vocabulary of kinship (motherland, patria) or home (heimat) in order to denote something to which one is 'naturally' tied. Nationness is thus equated with gender, parentage, skin color – all those things that are not chosen and by virtue of their inevitability, elicit selfless attachment with sacrifice. The association of women with the private domain reinforces the merging of the nation/community with the selfless mother/devout wife" (p. 382).

According to Kandiyoti, the nation-state presumes that women biologically reproduce national collectivities and embody a nostalgic communal past and tradition (Gopinath, 1997, p. 488). In collapsing women with "home" and "nation" and, in turn, feminising and domesticating that space which is also understood as one of purity and sacred spirituality (*ibid.*, p. 468), nationalist projects end up naturalising women's productive activity. Simultaneously, this dichotomous/essentialised understanding of women as biological reproducers merges models of sexual reproduction (biological and natural) with those of cultural production (social). According to these conceptualisations, membership in the nation is prioritised and it is gained through biology. Of course, this understanding is gendered and ethnicised and further naturalises and heterosexualises the (re)production of the nation by expecting women to produce and attend to the children and men to attend to work. In sum, it silences, with a series of violent interventions, the struggles and labour of producing a home, a family and a nation. Those outside these frameworks (e.g. other ethno-nationalist groups, migrants and workers) cannot achieve membership (Agathangelou, 2004; Trimikliniotis, 2004), the suggestion being that their productive activity does not contribute toward the reproduction of the nation-state, or more specifically, the social relations that constitute it. Thus, their experiences of violation within the borders of the nation can, and with difficulty, be described and articulated as moments of violence. In not examining and disrupting the understanding that the nation imagines itself as a stable and fixed, biological and heterosexual hypermasculine entity (Agathangelou and Ling, 2009; Alexander, 1997; Gopinath, 1997) we end up further producing other kinds of violence. By

imagining that the nation is the "mother", the state is the patriarchal father, and the majority of the people are the children of this union, one can then imagine how some of these children must be sacrificed for the purposes of the national and now the transnationalised/neoliberalised development of Cyprus (Agathangelou, 2006; Robinson, 2004).[1] Nevertheless, this sacrifice is ridden with a major paradox: while the state prefers and works to incorporate productive and "healthy" subjects into a burgeoning international bourgeoisie that consequently could enable its reproduction, its dominant practices and laws depend on violence, including the displacement and their asymmetrical effects within its territory. Engaging with these violences and their mourning practices, could possibly provide insights into other orientations and possibilities of whose recalcitrance and registered defeats (i.e. traumas) could enable us to trace the openings of the "past" to those of the present for an altered vision constituted out of the damaged and defiled livelihoods within Cyprus. What must be "remembered", therefore, is that what make the present are a "composite of present formations" (*ibid*., p. 180) and the pasts from which those have emerged. Thus, such a remembering requires a memory of the displacement, dispossession, of the struggles and conflicts and, of course, those alternatives that have not been realised due to these violent shifts.

Much of the work on memory and trauma that has emerged lately has focused on "remembering" as well as the ways this process is transmitted across generations (Leys, 2000; Caruth, 1996). The study of trauma developed first within medicine and then through the emerging field of psychoanalysis and was intensified and expanded throughout a number of other disciplines in the twentieth century. According to Ruth Leys, trauma refers to "a surgical wound, conceived on the model of a rupture of the skin or protective envelope of the body resulting in a catastrophic global reaction in the entire organism" (2000, p. 19). Although there is disagreement about the methods through which trauma is experienced and remembered, trauma is generally defined as an overwhelmingly life-threatening experience, accompanied by feelings of extreme fright and helplessness. The major epistemological assumptions that guide much of this work are remembering to forget and/or remembering and memorialising the event by adding to the community's knowledge. In *Trauma: A Genealogy* Ruth Leys substantiates that many of the therapeutic approaches to treating survivors of trauma operate within a paradigm that valorises remembrance. Genealogically tracing this development from the era of Freud and Pierre Janet she argues that traumatic memory has become a dominant theoretical approach to our understanding of contemporary trauma discourse (Herman, 1992; Felman and Laub, 1992). Drawing on Pierre Janet, who assumes an epistemology of linearity – a dichotomisation of ordinary and traumatic

1 Arguing that transnationalisation is a defining feature of globalisation, Robinson states that the rise of global production is changing the relation between production and territoriality. "The relationship between nation-states, economic institutions, and social structures becomes modified as each national economy is reorganized and integrated into the new global production system" (p. 34). Robinson further argues that the globalisation of production "provides the basis for the transnationalisation of classes" as well as the transnationalisation of the state into "the transnational state apparatus" (Robinson, 2004, p. 34).

memories – Herman argues that "traumatic memories are not encoded in the brain like normal memories. Unlike traumatic memories, the ordinary memories of adults form a verbal, linear narrative that is assimilated into an ongoing life story" (Herman, 1992, p. 37). Traumatic memories, however, freeze in a timeless state and await cues in the environment to trigger sensory and motoric impulses. As Pierre Janet suggests, it is crucial to lead the "traumatized patients" to convert their traumatic memories into narratives by telling a story:

> "Normal memory, like all psychological phenomena, is an action; essentially it is the action of telling a story ... A situation has not been ... fully assimilated until we have achieved, not merely an outward reaction through our movements, but also an inward reaction through the words we address to ourselves, through the organization of the recital of the event to others and to ourselves, and through the putting of this recital in its place as one of the chapters in our personal history" (Janet cited in Herman, 1992, p. 37).

Similarly to Freudian psychoanalysis, Bessel van der Kolk, Onno van der Hart, Janet Herman, Caruth, and others argue that through a narrative action the survivor can process and know fully what took place. Through telling "the story of the trauma again ... completely, in depth and in detail ... Out of fragmented components of frozen imagery and sensation, the survivor slowly reassembles an organized, detailed, verbal account, oriented in time and historical context" (Herman 1992, p. 175). It is only then that the survivor would no longer suffer "from the reappearance of traumatic memories in the form of flashbacks, behavioural re-enactments, and so on. Instead the story can be told, the person can look back at what happened; he has given it a place in his life history, his autobiography, and thereby in the whole of his personality" (van der Kolk and van der Hart, 1991, p.176). Much of this work is useful in the sense that it centralises agency by arguing that once memory is "converted" into a narrative form then the person is able to "own" control and master his own story in a "flexible" manner (*ibid.*, p. 178). However, as Leys (2000, p. 109) argues, this epistemological approach is ridden with an "entrenched commitment to the redemptive authority of history ... even if the victim of trauma could be cured without obtaining historical insight into the origins of their distress, such a cure would not be morally acceptable". Leys argues that it becomes crucial, for these theorists, that the person who experiences violence bears witness to her experience because "telling the truth has not merely a personal therapeutic but a public or collective value as well. It is because personal testimony concerning the past is inherently political and collective that the narration of the remembered trauma is so important" (*ibid.*). Hence, bearing witness is not just about the person but it also becomes important for the restoration of the social order (Leys, 2000, p. 109 citing Herman, 1992, p. 1). Ley's problematisation of these works highlights that much of the literature on trauma remains epistemologically circumscribed within the modernity projects. As Kaplan (2005, p. 68) states "trauma and modernity are inherently intertwined". She proceeds to ask a series of crucial questions that we think may enable us to ask questions that could engage with the "shocks" produced through different modernisation projects. What symptoms can be found on our bodies and lives that can

point to the shocks registered, and perhaps, negotiated and controlled? How did cultures manage to not "know" the history they had participated in? How are we seduced into remembering mere privatised fragments? (p. 69).

In Cyprus, violence comes in different forms, some emerging out of different development and governance projects (i.e. development of the sovereign state; even in its newer and more neoliberal form; nationalisms; imprisoning people during the junta; relegating people into refugee camps and enclaves). Thus, we locate memory and trauma within contemporary economies of violence such as displacement, enclaving, killing, and the dynamics of naming "trauma" and its valuation. Following Spillers (2003) we begin engaging the narratives of Cypriots and of state political leadership to show the link of trauma, the role of the family in Cyprus with regards to engaging and "dealing" with the displacement, and the methods that health practitioners deploy to appeal to the "national family". More so, we are interested in showing systematically how the time of the present is still ridden, constituted and made possible with violence and trauma or, as Spillers calls it, "death" which is re-enacted and transmitted generationally.

> "Even though the captive flesh/body has been 'liberated,' and no one need pretend that even the quotation marks do not matter, dominant symbolic activity, the ruling episteme that releases the dynamics of naming and valuation, remains grounded in originating metaphors of captivity and mutilation so that it is as if neither time nor history, nor historiography or its topics, show movement, as the human subject is 'murdered' over and over again by the passions of a bloodless and anonymous archaism, showing itself in endless disguise" (Spillers, 2003, p. 208).

In drawing on the narratives of Cypriots we proceed to show that the traumas of the past (and the struggle to remember and to engage with the losses, direct and/or inherited) are not over. They continue today, and the referendum marked it once more as the "sore spot". That moment recentralised again that the ravages of colonisation are not over. The decolonisation of Cyprus (i.e. liberation from the British Empire) did not seal the past and its incompleteness. Rather, colonial episteme such as patriarchal rule, racialised logics (i.e. the Greek is superior and belongs to the West whereas the Turk is the "sick man of Europe"; ultimately, Greeks and Turks are "ethnic" groups whose whole history is marked with conflict and violence; the Cypriot failed state[s]) still dominate many of their practices and activities and much of the valuation of the "other" both within and between the two communities and internationally. The dominant ruling episteme of subordination and mutilation of themselves and of each other are ultimately not over either. Such an episteme becomes mobilised at "opportune moments" to make political claims for projects that could sanctify them in the demonisation of the other, and even in their sacrifice for the nationalist and formation of state family. Furthermore, such political claims sustain in place these displacements and relations of violence, and above all, they lock in them again and again those possibilities that defy notions that the dominant social formations are not the only possibilities. We read the stories people carry about violence – the conscious horror of terror, traumas and death

that allows us to hold the destruction (i.e. material, ecological, corporeal, psychic) long enough and in constellation with the ongoing traumas of our moment – as *refusals to mourn and move on*. Such readings can enable us to imagine ongoing movements (in an Epicurean sense) that link us in the present with those who still suffer in our communities, and those who died in struggle for our communities.

Bodies in Pain: Enduring, and Carrying, Nationalist Injuries

> "The mind that attempted to repair – to compensate for the trauma becomes the trauma itself. The mind, in other words, becomes the patient's cumulative – in fact, accumulating – trauma" (Phillips, 1997, p. 102)

Cyprus won its independence from the British in 1960 and the elites of the Greek and Turkish ethnic communities worked together towards consolidating their power in Cyprus. Three years later, however, this national project of progress, democracy, and development did not resemble the form it had taken in Western Europe. Producing a common "national fantasy" was impossible because the nationalisms of both communities had originated elsewhere and their goals, values, interests, and agents conflicted due to historical political relations and their location in the formation of the international order. In Cyprus, the leadership whose interest was to make the process of two "national fantasies", the Greek and the Turkish, local circulated "images, narratives, monuments, and sites" and "personal/collective consciousness" (Berlant quoted in Elley and Grigor Suny, 1996), stories which ultimately entailed a series of violences and violations. In December 1963 a major crisis between the Greek and Turkish Cypriots erupted when Makarios III, the Archbishop and Primate of the autocephalous Cypriot Orthodox Church and first President of the Republic of Cyprus, proposed constitutional amendments to improve the functionality of the Cypriot state. After the rejection of the constitutional amendments by the Turkish-Cypriot community the situation escalated resulting in severe fighting between extremists from both sides, which lasted throughout 1963 and 1964. Turkish Cypriots, either of their own volition or by force, began retreating from isolated rural areas and villages into enclaves, often giving up their land and houses for security from enemy extremists. In 1974, when the Greek junta invaded, the military of Cyprus (re)organised socio-political and economic power on the island by trying to kill President Makarios and imprisoning and threatening the lives of Turkish Cypriots and Greek-Cypriot men who belonged to parties on the left (communists and socialists). Turkey, claiming its role as guarantor for the Turkish-Cypriot minority, militarily invaded to protect the Turkish ethnic minority from the Greek junta. A firm military presence was established by Turkey which remains on the island even today. Other kinds of violence were sexual violations, and the killing of many on both sides. Such types of violence as embodied through displacement (forced and/or otherwise) were many in Cyprus and yet, this article does not claim to "recover" all these moments. On the contrary, on drawing on the narratives of Cypriots we also engage in tracing their regrets and traumas – in story telling, as feelings and as *modes of analysis*. Through these stories, it seems that

regret and trauma produce a structure that is simultaneously stable and dynamic, which fills us with a set of fictional possibilities or alternatives.

As Cho (2008) states in her experimental piece describing the violence that Korean women experienced transnationally, many years have passed and "thoughts are absented of words that would make any sense to you (or to me, for that matter)", and yet the wounds remain open and the two states in north and south Cyprus still find the language to articulate the "catastrophe" that continues to segregate the island. Its thrust of DO NOT FORGET is not only a way of redressing the violence and displacements that have occurred but it is also an orientation that simultaneously draws on the body as method in gendered, racialised, sexualised and classed ways. The state's attempt to deal with the trauma that "shocked" its power acknowledges at least implicitly that the conflict and series of displacements including the use of gendered and sexualised forms of torture and terror was intended to destroy the productivity and (re) productivity of persons (i.e. Greek-Cypriots); to rupture the social bonds between the direct target of violence and his or her family and community through the use of physical pain, threats, and other coercive acts, and while desiring "healthy" subjects it also paradoxically, through a series of enactments of dominant practices and laws, redirects people to a mourning process that consequently, could possibly heal them. Yet, the many stories themselves become a living witness to the incessant call in codifying people as national subjects, always the potential subjects of nationalist sacrifice, while at the same time calling for a project that could sanctify them in the demonisation of the other.

Scarry (1985) suggests, that power and productivity were stripped from the targets of violence and transferred to the torturer(s), and to the Greek junta apparatus as a whole as it sought to consolidate its hold over the nation. The efficacy of violence used in Cyprus during this period, however, lay beyond its use against the "body" in the short-term. The forms of torture perpetrated were effective in controlling social space and the subjectivity of their targets over time. Beyond the initial attempt to extract legitimacy and power from victims' physical bodies through the use of pain, the purpose of these horrific acts was to inculcate what Patterson (1982) has described as the "social death" of the victim and "natal alienation" from his or her social network of accountability through the violation of moral norms. In this respect, the psychosocial sequelae of torture effects and leaves their traces on the individual psyche or self over time, on the extended family and all the associated communities.

Several Cypriots whom we interviewed prompted an understanding, albeit with contradictions, of the mechanisms by which national belonging is internalised in the process of their own constitution as national subjects. They brought up the issue of how the past, and more specifically, the violations they suffered at the hands of the "enemy", cannot be forgotten.[2] A 30-year-old, middle-class Greek-Cypriot female had this to say about the relations between Greek and Turkish Cypriots:

2 The concept "enemy" must be unpacked. Within an ethno-national imaginary, "enemy" is being understood as anybody who is outside the biological continuation of a specific ethno-nationalism.

> "It is *they* who invaded us, who invaded our lands, and our homes. We cannot forget their violence and just go on as if nothing happened. If we forget our lands, it means that we forget our past and our ancestors who fought for us to even [be] here."

Unpacking this short segment of a narrative in order to understand the epistemologies that inform its constitution, we are confronted with a series of complicated issues: a stringing together of a complex commission of violence, including the invasion of land (either through forced relocation; withdrawal; relocation with compensation during for instance, the Ottoman Empire) and home. The relocation, the loss of and/or withdrawal from lands cannot be forgotten because that would mean shutting out both the past and our ancestors who made our lives possible, including those relations of the land and home. In emphasising the connection between Greek Cypriots and their ancestors who fought against the invading enemy, the narrator pushes to locate herself in this larger collective national project that ultimately demands that the "loss" be not forgotten. Yet, this narrative within a larger context that is informed by a collective ethno-nationalist story presumes a subject whose major project is making political claims (i.e. documenting through story telling) about the violence that the other (i.e. the Turk) committed upon herself, national territory and above all on one's home. It is not that the collective ethno-national story is not intertwined with the personal but that the narrator seems to be expected, at least partially, to tell of the ethno-national violence, and to provide a proof that requires essentialising oneself as a national subject (i.e. being and constituting oneself as Greek Cypriot).

The complexity here is also the way one is expected to detach oneself from his/her own personal memories and experiences of violence, such as the uprooting of all social relations, including the relation of self with land and home[3] to tell the story from the logic of the executioner of the violence (even one's ethno-nation). In story telling, there seems to be an articulation and a recitation of an archive of violence (i.e. how the other used all military hardware at his disposal to displace the Greek Cypriot from his home, his land, and above all, rid him of his political power). Such story telling – with a beginning, a middle, and an end – requires a complete re-orientation of one's life about the other, including the production of abstract facts that can be claimed in the story to contain and even gloss over the traces of not merely the injuries of relocation, conflict and war but also connection and collective. Relocation, conflict, war, and the injuries become the evidence to consolidate a story about the ethnic other, the hyper-masculine violator, and above all, the one who stole property from him in the form of land and home. Indeed, this kind of memory seems to albeit contradictorily collude with a nationalist project that desires to preserve a fixed past.

Read how a 35-year-old, middle-class, displaced male Greek Cypriot tells of the wounds of the nation:

> "Our nation has been wounded since 1974. Our people and our lands are lost in the hands of the Turks. As long as our missing [kin] is not given to us and our lands are not returned

3 This foreclosure violently expels the struggles which are not always about inside/outside racial (i.e., ethnic) relations, but also about the ways these struggles are mediated through class, gender, sexuality, etc.

> to us there is no way that this conflict can be resolved. Our duty is to have back what we lost and have been waiting for [over] the last 27 years."

In this narrative, this Greek Cypriot draws upon collective memory to talk about the victimisation of the nation and individual wounds through the loss of land, property, and people. Implicit in his narrative is the actual event of displacement even though he does not name it. His narrative of displacement ultimately names the crime that gives rise to the compulsion to prove, and primarily the desire to decide a-priori, what the resolution of it would entail. It ends up foreclosing, albeit contradictorily, the possibility of naming that violence destroys people's lives, communities, and also the complex and frequent asymmetrical struggles embodied within them, which no law or legislation can dutifully and cathartically resolve.

Conceptualising the conflict within the two Cypriot communities as a moment of injury and stealing of one's people and land may be a "useful" strategy in that it can potentially explain, in the short term, one's pain and displacement. However, the effect of such a narrative is problematic. It presumes that a kind of hetero-masculine power has been lost in the theft of property, land, and disruption of intimate relations, and thus, the only way to "heal" and "resolve" conflict is by restoring one's property and land, and to demand compensation for lost members of the nation-state. It also avoids thinking that displacement is not only a consequence of war, but a central strategy in the formation of global power, including the shaping of national projects and state relations which are themselves ridden with contradictions, especially in moments of war and conflict, ethnic, gendered and class relations.

A 55-year-old working-class man living in a refugee settlement in Cyprus shared another narrative that linked self and nation, both in injured and traumatised states:

> "Do you see this box [indicates a shoe box]? In it is what keeps us going. I have pills for falling asleep, pills for my stomach, pills for when I get anxious. I also have papers from the doctors stating that my nerves are 'shattered'. These pills are a symbol for the ways the state and other institutions deal with problems. We have been under this constant, low-level pressure for the last thirty years. Every time you turn on the TV or read the newspaper you wait to hear if the politicians have come up with a solution. You end up wondering if they are interested in a solution."

Epistemologically, this man's narrative gestures to the "shock" that shattered him and the nation-state. His "shock"[4] or what this man claims to be his trauma seems to be a much more intertwined question. It is about giving but also *withdrawing sense* and imagination from a

4 According to Leys (2000) "modern understanding of trauma began with the work of the British physician John Erichsen, who during the 1860s identified the trauma syndrome in victims suffering from the fright of railway accidents and attributed the distress to shock or concussion of the spine. Claiming that the traumatic syndrome constituted a distinct disease entity, ... Berlin neurologist Paul Oppeneheim subsequently gave it the name "traumatic neurosis" and ascribed the symptoms to undetectable organic changes in the brain"(p. 3).

problem that continues to "shatter" one's nerves, and basically, one's health. He first shares his insight about the interests of the state in "resolving" the "Cyprus Problem", and also proceeds to argue that this same state "entombs sense and imagination" within the violence and the problem that remains unresolved on the tables of the state/states. He seems to be aware that his individual prescription for pills and the documentations registering his trauma by the medical establishment (i.e. he has mental problems) are really a form of securing the problem in place by making it knowable and easily accessible medically. Here, the trauma of the self and what makes the Greek Cypriot is contained through the "pills". The dependence on them by this man is registered as the "shattered" nerves, an image perhaps, of the exaggerated cuts of the neo-colonial restructurings and internal tensions in which decolonised nations like Cyprus have yielded to disillusionment with the new dispensation. More so, the shattered nerves, the wounded body of this man, seem to be linked to the cuts and the wounds of the (post) colonial nation. This man as well as the nation sustains the trauma as it emerges through the unsettling moment of gaining sovereign independence from Britain and the further displacements to buttress it in place. It seems that this political trauma(s) propel(s) this man to seek comfort in belonging to an ethnic group which eventually, banishes him from what he has a right to claim as his own: his struggles and his life. Ultimately, the trauma seems to be compounded here as the man regretfully expresses as the state's unmitigated tragedy: the multiplicity of possibilities, the multiplicity being curtailed through the orientation of a state that seeks an anterior future.

This linear sequence, with a beginning and end, is embodied in the logic of the executioner of a modern project (i.e. formation of a modern state; formation of an archive of violence that proves the truth of the violence and the injury) and is really about a larger societal crisis: How does one deal with a national "unresolved" problem by transforming the politics of nationalism and specifically at the moment when global forces push for national and other social and political changes to respond to global production? How does one draw upon the creativity of one's communities while deliberating publicly on the crisis, including the memories of "loss" and damage?

The earlier narrative of the man prescribed the pills starts to point to a critique of the state's approach to social relations and the violence that constitutes it. The man argues that no sacrifice can be deemed crucial enough for any formation, including the constitution of a modern and better state (i.e. in this case, the Republic of Cyprus). The process of identifying the "loss" as a way of legitimately locating the subject in an ethnic-national-state is a violent process itself. It makes invisible the "loss" that is infinite in any struggle, including conflict and war, the withdrawal of imagination in understanding the series of violences, and ultimately the denial to be "unable" to name and/or understand that his story is one fragment among many of a larger story about social relations. The "shattered" nerves of this man point to a disarticulation of himself as a subject, a mark of disruption of self-determination (i.e. unmaking of the subject) but also a kind of traumatic disruption of the nation. What are the political stakes in a project that suffocates and banishes

multiplicity and, ultimately, shatters those subjects who are supposed to sexually reproduce it with their sweat, life, and above all their dreams? What political stakes can such shattered subjects have in a society that they come to perceive as disinterested, as withdrawing its resources from their possibility, including the majority's development and well-being?

The National Family and its Tragic (T) errors[5]

As the man with "shattered nerves" problematises simultaneously the epistemological concern regarding the constitution of the individual under the condition of displacement (i.e. who am I?) and also the political concern of the construction of socio-political agency (i.e. what is being done, and what can be done) when the state and the medical establishment "fix" their responses, we also want to problematise narratological and political fixities and argue that immutable traumas that anchor personal and national history do not exist but are rather constituted as such with material asymmetrical effects on different peoples' bodies and lives. This is elaborated further by Greek Cypriots during interviews, narrated to us through stories, about the nation and themselves as in the making (incomplete postcolonial subjects; failed states). The catachresis (i.e. not quite sovereign as for instance, British subjects) as a moment and event may not be able to be as easily introjected into nationalist projects as it seeps through and merges with that which is non-desirable (i.e. other ways of life and in relation with others).

Often the narratives focus on the central theme of losing one's home, property, and losing family members but sometimes the stories veered into a different kind of "loss". A 57-year-old working-class man reported the following experience:

> "That Monday morning, when the junta took over, six men clothed in army uniform knocked loudly on my house front door. My nine-year-old daughter opened the door and summoned me when they began interrogating her about the guns that her dad possessed. Two of the soldiers ran to the stairs, the other two ran to the kitchen and the other two guarded the front door. They searched everywhere for guns, and finding nothing, pushed me to their landrover to take me to the station to question me about who has the guns in the village. During the interrogations they beat me and they demanded I tell them the secrets. *What* secrets? On Friday morning, following another beating, the husband of one [of] my cousins, a member of EOKA B, after beating me, summoned me into the yard and with a gun beating me on my back asked me to dig my grave for our Saturday execution ... On Saturday morning, when Turkey forced itself on the island they gave us guns and asked us: 'Brothers, we have to unify and fight our enemy'. I threw away the gun and said: 'Yesterday, we were the enemies of the nation, and today we are your brothers?'"

This narrative of "loss" is complicated when it disrupts the familiar notion of an Us (insiders) and Them (outsiders), as when violence is committed on "us" by members of our own community.

5 We credit this idea to Bulent Diken.

The "us" and "them" descriptions narrowly punctuate communities of which we are part. This narrative, this man's painful ethnic liminality throws into relief the rhetoric of Greekness which gained ascendancy by manufacturing an ideology of the *future anterior* where the only legitimate history for the Cypriot citizen was a history that began with a Greek past and followed that past's determined history into the future foretold. Moreover, as this narrative highlights, the national formation is not itself empty of violence even after decolonisation. Its formation is made possible through a series of displacements and violent interventions. For instance, while stress and anxieties are frequently indicators of experiences of violence and coercion at the hands of a perpetrating enemy, traumatic stress (Agathangelou and Killian, 2002; Loizos and Constantinou, 2007) can also communicate a "betrayal of trust":

> "trauma takes place when the very powers that we are convinced will protect us and give us security become our tormentors: when the community of which we considered ourselves members turns against us or when our family is no longer a source of refuge but a site of danger ... This can be devastating because who we are, or who we think we may be, depends very closely on the social context in which we place and find ourselves. Our existence relies not only on our personal survival as individual beings but also, in a very profound sense, on the continuance of the social order that gives our existence meaning and dignity: family, friend, political community, beliefs" (Edkins, 2003, p. 4).

Nationalist power can be manifested in our relatives, dressed in army uniforms and bearing arms, bursting into our homes looking for guns that could be used against their righteous cause (i.e. a universalist colonisation nevertheless, even when it is not a Eurocentric one). It seems that Greek nationalism emerges at the conjuncture of universalist (sovereign nation state), racialised, and classed (i.e. ethnicity collapsing into one and the same class ultimately mediating the racialised and classed frustrations of different elites within Cyprus) impulses (i.e. Greek over the Turkish nationalism). This man's narrative deconstructs the biological argument that the state repeatedly expects its citizens to swallow: that blood, in the familial and ethno-nationalist sense, is thicker than water. The fact that it was the spouse of his cousin who asked him to dig his grave pushes us to rethink the nationalist project, as "we are all in it together, equally, and in solidarity with each other". It turns out that while sometimes blood is thicker than ethno-nationalism, sometimes it is not; they could not be brothers today, because yesterday the *left* hand was the enemy of the *right*, metaphorically speaking.

Another 40-year-old working-class man, Kostas, shared the following story regarding a different kind of pain: the pain that one experiences when a fellow soldier is being killed and he is so terrified for his life that he is paralysed and unable to do anything.

> "Kostas: I still wake up at night with nightmares. When the Turkish military started bombing Ayios Pavlos our lieutenant, a Greek man of the extreme right shouted to us to leave.
>
> First author: Really? Didn't he demand that you stay and fight Turkey? Didn't he consider running to escape to be anti-patriotic?

> Kostas: No, he realised that we did not have the military strength to fight Turkey, which was using cutting edge NATO weaponry. We started running, running, and running. In our attempt to escape some of us were injured. One of them was a member of my platoon, Yiorgos. He tried to climb the fences, but was shot and did not make it. If somebody saw him and moved him, he could have been saved but everybody was running to save himself."

This process of externalising is prevalent in the face of violence and brutality. Kostas mentions that if "somebody" had seen Yiorgos and moved him in time, he could have been saved. Kostas was in the platoon himself, and yet, his fear of being hit by gunfire prevented him from protecting Yiorgos. His feeling about the disappearance of Yiorgos and his explanation is informed by an understanding of masculine power that focuses on one's ability to protect others. His inability to be a "man" and protect his fellow soldier, and his survival in contrast to a comrade's death, sustain feelings of pain and guilt that inform his relations today. Unable to locate himself in that moment of pure violence where he was running to escape the bullets while some of his brothers were trampled to death, he is found again reciting a story that is supposed to sanctify him of that destructive event. This incessant back and forth between the moment of violence which exposes the limits of identification and the qualification of the event as a destruction of the nation is crucial for those of us who are interested in examining the ontological difference between a *destruction and a legal proof of violence*. Moreover, this moment also marks the contours of the Greek-Cypriot nationalism at the current historical moment in which the masses do not participate equally: Some are the heady political lieutenants, the head of the national body politic who give the orders, and others are the foot soldiers, the armed bodies of the national project who can become the *fodder of a conflict and war* anytime.

(National) Families and "Missing" Murmurs and Trembles

our
"missing"
everywhere

khaki and cold metal
hard triggers wrapped
in soft youth
and innocence

The ripper, in zealous love
screams the goal
that sound, like metal tearing itself apart
extinguishing life and hope

On those grounds
ancestral and our own
the red stain spreads

The ground murmurs, trembles
Vibrates with the screams
"run Run RUN"
But my feet are two great stones
Wet with blood and urine

Doors and alleyways are choked
Waves of "us" are still running
Rope sinks into wrists
Faces
frozen, pale
like yellow sheets
And so many belts
piled on our school floor
What are we learning today

How did I make it out of there?

This poem, recited by the authors, intimates that the material sites of violence are not merely derived from the time and space in which they 'took place'. This poem punctuates how 'sites of trauma' are complexly related to the material sites of violence within specific social environments. Indeed, these sites are reconstituted by the violence itself, and landscapes of violence, horror, and other kinds of traumas become memorial markers. Even in its despair and horror, this poem brings together processes that tie the subject's identity to multiple registers and landscapes that consolidate the trauma, in its fleshy and complex materiality, as that which mediates between these multiple registers and dimensions to give a place to an event that cannot be contained. The moment and event itself rather murmurs, trembles and even screams displacement of a certainty of self, place, memory and even the different registers of expression (i.e. the personal narration, information extraction for the purpose of public testimony).[6] So, if the trauma itself changes and transforms the subject, his/her place, and his/her memory, how do we listen to the stories that people tell of their experience of violence/displacement? How do these stories also reveal the methods "conditions of trauma within biopolitics [that] facilitate, develop, submerge, or redirect capacities"? (Clough and Halley, 2007, p. 282). Below, we first read the narratives of Cypriots to see how they describe and articulate displacements. Second, we review which displacements become centralised as uncertain and/or urgent and how. Realising that none of the narratives we write below are "complete" accounts of what took place in Cyprus, but rather fragments of larger and

6 It is important for us to recognise that even narrations are much more complex than we understand them. For instance, how does a person who experienced displacement and violence (their "unmaking") push in their description of it to speak up and even use the instruments of the state that may come to argue that the "speech" itself of trauma and/of pain is inappropriate?

many more stories that we are juxtaposing, we nevertheless try to work with these partial renditions to articulate a history of displacement, family, sexual relations, conflict, war, and bodies. We suggest that in doing so (i.e. pointing here to a method of redress and justice), we could explore the broader political aspirations about "settlement" by focusing on what is at stake in the Cyprus problem and its contingent conflicts including the ways identities of participants are structured.

A 53-year-old woman who lost her husband in the war shared the following story with us:

> "After the war subsided, for many nights I would wake up at 2:00 a.m. in the morning and check if my husband had come back. He never returned to me. I would check if the kids and my parents were sleeping and then I would get out of my pyjamas and dress up quickly and run to the church. I would just sit there talking to the icons and waiting for them to reply, answering whether my husband was alive and when he was to come back."

This woman narrates her struggle and the ways in which she was mediating her pain. One may find this ritual of running to a space to petition God and saints as reproducing the patriarchal authority of another institution: the church, and perhaps it is so. In this assumed sacred space, the "woman" brings to God and the saints her questions about what is considered a major loss – that of her husband and the father of her children. However, "fleeing" from the public space of the state whose politics do not deal adequately with the violence, to the sacred and spiritual one of the church is also a way of asserting one's agency regarding one's life and future possibilities especially in a context that demands the presence and (re)covering (an emphasis here on the covering) of the bodies of the missing in order to "mourn" the loss of the loved ones. Nevertheless, the family, who decides to intervene to manage the uncontrolled "feelings about her" loss, deems her approach problematic.

> "When my family discovered these escapades they took me to a psychiatrist who immediately prescribed me tons of pills. He didn't ask a thing about what it means to live without a partner in a community where everybody looks down on you if you do not have a husband; the community pities you if you are raising your kids on your own."

Unpacking here the dominant episteme that guides the decision of the family to take her to a psychiatrist reveals how this institution itself participates as a governance mechanism (Foucault) through the use of trauma. Through this narrative the woman also intervenes to disrupt dominant discourses that circulate regarding home and ethnos as fixed and secure social locations, irrespective of one's positionality and power within those structures. The normative "truths" inscribed within these discourses inform how people, bodies, and social problems are very often to be approached irrespective of their power in the social politic. Going to church and speaking to the icons may be a paradoxical activity that announces – that finally reveals the nationalist/familial (t)errors in this woman's life – the loss that the nation wants to appropriate long enough to prove its own "loss" of power internationally to another state, that of Turkey. Indeed, this intervention itself by the family also seems to be an intervention that changes social problems (i.e. conflict, violence, displacements) into problems that need to be managed.

Though given to heal, the "pills" choke the screaming and crying about the husband's death, ultimately, the disaster experience(s) that she has suffered. This set of experiences have now become intertwined with the medical institution, whose goal is to identify and treat symptoms; the doctor through his interventions abstracts the patient's personal experience from those social structures and relations that made it possible at the outset. These institutions' (i.e. the state, the medical institution, and the family) interventions seem to shift the ground of understanding the violence and displacement. Instead of sustaining it within the social realm and, therefore, within the context that enables its emergence, the state, the family, the medical establishment and particular bodies shift the sociality to a relation of management: perhaps the social problems will go away, especially if they are displaced themselves to issues like the recovering of bodies, the losses of property and land, their quintessential qualities, trauma emerging out of the disappearance of people, and their bodies can be wiped out once the bodies or the bones are recovered (Uludağ, 2005; Yakinthou, 2008).[7]

Loizos and Constantinou (2007, pp. 99-100) argue that the 'refugee condition' is mediated by other factors such as human mortality. We argue that this "tendency to attribute death to 'the refugee condition' (*prosphygia*) and 'stress' (*angkos*)" is not merely about integrating the "more rationalist bio-medical arguments, if they are offered them, for they are a health-conscious group of people" but rather how these models also become normative approaches (governance/management approaches) to other and more difficult questions. Loizos and Constantinou (2007, p. 100) argue that refugees' "explanation of first recourse is to point to the stresses of refugee life [which] ... is consistent with other aspects of their cognitive-affective outlooks". We argue that this perspective is informed by dominant presumptions about loss, nationalism, bodies, conflict, etc., that emerge long before the 'refugee condition' that demand that when people are out of equilibrium, they have to be brought back to it in order for them to feel "normal" – integrated well-enough into the social order. Prescribing pills is also a method of bio-political governance in a Foucauldian sense. It seems here that the family's, the medical establishment's, and the state's discourses about "healthy lives" regarding its ethnic citizens have worked, once more, to position women of "missing" spouses as fragmented and ultimately, diseased bodies. Above all, what we see with this narration is the struggle of this Cypriot woman to speak of the pain of herself/family "unmaking" by placing the story at the very heart of a patriarchal and virile nationalism. Similarly to the state, the family imbues those gendered traumatised bodies, displacing the effects of the punctual trauma, that is, the war and the loss of her husband and relocates it as a non-punctual event, natural and inevitable,[8] and perceives it merely as an organisational issue to be managed. The psychic violence

7 Ironically, the sociality of the problem of the missing and the displacement of peoples from their communities is rendered a statistical and measurable issue that could help the state and other institutions assess the damage that has been committed and thereby, establish the ways the state is supposed to perform.

8 Victoria Burrows (2004) engages with trauma theory and critically argues that it still operates within an epistemological framework that privileges whiteness. She argues that racism is "one of the major traumas of the

of this gendered and racialised (i.e. what we have come to articulate as ethnic) violence itself may also crystallise in particular moments, as – the moment when this woman becomes conscious of her "difference" (i.e. she is basically fragmented and with mental problems) – a deviation from the healthy psychic norm which demands familial and other interventions such as that of the psychiatrist in order to contain those symptoms like intrusive flashbacks, hypervigilance, and depression. More so, it seems that the experience of the (t)errors of the state and the family intersect in the daily and often naturalised experience of gender, class and other punctual traumatic events (Hirsch, 1992-1993). Of course, here we need to point out that the consciousness around the family's trauma is not merely an illustration of the blind spots of nationalism, although they certainly repeat some of its (t)errors, first in moving to displace the sociality of problems such as a spatial organisation and the cultural formations it sustains, such as war to a governance issue of "control" and "management" of the effects of violence (i.e. prescribing their daughter pills as if the effects of violence would simply disappear once she takes them irrespective of whether the "bones" of those missing family members would be located and found).

In narrating this story, this working class Greek-Cypriot woman questions the clinical or medical model that assumes that disease is a "malfunction of systems and organs" of individual patients that can be "fixed" through the intervention of health practitioners. In this case, for the psychiatrist the major concern is the symptom rather than the larger conditions creating violence. This model of health, and the responses by family members and the professional communities, are clearly linearly deterministic, showcasing past causes and their effects without much attention to important, current, and larger systemic contextual factors (Loizos, 1988, 2007). Perhaps, these different communities' internalisation of the ontology of security and stability makes this response possible, and yet, this approach also prompts the emergence of more violence through the governance of social problems as management issues (i.e. the production of victimisation-as-collective-memory in the nation's historical mythos displaces the intra gender and class violence as inter-ethnicised us and them violence). Thus, this series of displacements (e.g. disappearance of one's partner, fragmenting of families through the killing of their family members, reorganisation of bodies, their activities, and their relations, prescription of drugs, spatial (re) organisations, epistemic violence of containing the violence as individual and private without a gender, a race, and/or class) are fundamental factors of how the nation and its contingent understanding of home,

twentieth century" and trauma theory has to acknowledge and examine instead of accepting whiteness as a normative category. Thus, she moves on to suggest that we urgently need "a comprehensive remapping of trauma theory that is not white-centric and gender blind" (p. 17). Engaging Dominick LaCapra's distinction between structural and historical traumas, she suggests that the "foundational" nature of the historical trauma of slavery, although historical, comes to act as structural and thus, it is imperative that we examine this relation more closely: "Until the daily occurrence of racial trauma becomes an important part of trauma theory, it will be addressing neither the structural nor the historical traumas of the twentieth century, nor will it provide a viable theoretical paradigm for the twenty-first" (p. 19).

people's bodies and lives, are being constituted as problems to be contained and managed.

During a conjoint interview with a family (mother, son, wife, and two grandchildren) whose father and grandfather were missing in the 1974 war, the son Nicos began telling us that he feels "angry all the time":

> "I was only seven years old. I remember a lot of things from the village. The major thing I remember is when the Turkish Cypriots asked my father and the other seven men to stay behind. I do not know [why] but every time I think of that scene I get *really* angry. My anger comes out though the most in the soccer field. Last year, I became enraged because this guy was trying to say that the goal was not "legit". I grabbed him and hit his head on the fence. Would have kept on hitting him, but my team mates stopped me.
> Interviewer: When do you find yourself being angry?
> Nicos: When I think that somebody is committing an injustice on me. Sometimes, they may not be, but if I think they are, I do get really angry.
> Mother: [starts to wheeze and gasp for breath] My son, let's not talk about this anger."

Nicos' mother, 60 years old, talked to us about the traumatic events she had experienced:

> "I lost my husband, my father, and our house. I am very sad for my father, he did not know much about politics [the political situation nationally, and more specifically, divisions between the right and the left in their village]. He did not bother anybody. Being in a field and having Turks surrounding you and not knowing what will happen to you was very painful ... they [the government] gave us a house – is that help? They gave it to everybody, those who still have their husbands and those who do not. My problem is that everybody does not understand me – my husband and my father are still missing. I used to beat up my kids and throw away the food and not let them eat. Why did nothing happen to the ones who created this havoc, while I lost my husband?"

The pain that Nicos carries, his symptoms (explosions of rage), and the somatic symptoms exhibited by his mother (e.g. laboured breathing, hyperventilation, trembling, stomach complaints, etc.) are manifestations of "unprocessed", and/or what we call here foreclosed struggles pointing to alternative tracks of human and social unfolding. In a context that emphasises the importance of intact and nuclear families, displaced families[9] who have missing or dead family members feel out of step with normative social relations, and marked as somehow inadequate. The ensuing embarrassment and shame represent further displacements (i.e. traumatisations) that are generated in a context that, for the longest time, shied away from providing support in processing and understanding the pain beyond its hyper-virile nationalist-man-hood imaginary as if both of these groups cannot belong to the human race simultaneously.

9 For an in-depth analysis of trauma and well-being study of displaced and non-displaced Cypriots see Agathangelou and Killian (2002). See also Loizos (2008) for an extensive analysis of health of refugees from Argaki.

There has been a changed response to the missing/martyrs issue in Cyprus since 2004 (Yakinthou, 2008; Uludağ, 2005). For a prolonged period, the issue for both the Republic of Cyprus and the 'Turkish Republic of North Cyprus', was the rabbit they pull out of their hats to rekindle ethno-nationalist feelings toward each side. Abstracting the pain of the displaced, hijacking trauma, and waving it around like a flag was also a way the conflict and its contingent violences were inflated to what we call the "normal" condition cultivated with displaced, refugees and other up-rooted and pained subjects.

In the case of Nicos this galvanisation and restoring the flame of ethno-nationalism continues today on both sides of the divide. Crossing the buffer zone this summer and walking into the neighbourhoods where Turkish Cypriots captured Nicos' father, we talked to a group of Greek and Turkish Cypriots from his village. This is what they had to say:

> "He came to the village and he was demanding to find his father. What happened to him? Who took him and what did they do with him? We were scared for him in the village – we do not want to talk about politics again. We just want to live happily with each other (four Turkish-Cypriot men and women of working-class background who also speak Greek). We just want peace."

Similarly, this is what some Greek Cypriots (three working-class women in their sixties, from the same village, who also speak Turkish) had to say:

> "I do not think he should go to the village again. Why should he be putting himself in danger especially when the Turkish Cypriots think that he is stirring up trouble? Does he want to get killed? We cannot bring his father and grandfather back. They are gone. If we really want to live peacefully with each other we cannot stir trouble again.
> First Author: What do you mean?
> Women: Well, perhaps the Turkish Cypriots killed them. So, what can we do now? Are we going to bring them back? Excavating these issues does not create peace, but more war. We are afraid for him."

These narratives are all guided once more by an ontology of fear, anxiety, and passive resistance as if the silence about the disappearances of people is not a political intervention. More so, these narratives articulate and we argue mobilise anxieties and fears about the "repetition of violence" and the instigation of war that, ultimately, demand a response. How does one gesture to these narratives as attempts to express accumulated and collective racialised, class, gendered unspeakable traumas? As Cho (2008) argues when speaking about the Korean diaspora, "an unspeakable trauma does not die out with the person who first experienced it. Rather, it takes on a life of its own, emerging from the spaces where secrets are concealed" (p. 22). In Cyprus, and we experienced this first hand, such anxiety and fear were mobilised during the 2004 referendum and were incorporated into a dominant ethno-nationalist narrative which chooses to erect itself on the social divisions of class, gender, sexuality, and race by sustaining in place the Greek "us" and Turks "them" political dichotomisations. Such dominant discursive regimes, embodied through the state, the

medical establishment, the market, the educational and media structures, redirect us to fixing the past instead of loosening from it the fluid possibilities that do not foundationally depend on the death of many for a security of the few. Pausing and remembering the force of the accumulated and collective traumas is a way to consider the sort of relations we want and are willing to live and work for.

Perhaps Nicos' mother talks of the innocence of her father because she thinks, as a member of the left herself, that her husband, a member of the right, played a role in the coup that immediately preceded the invasion. The tensions between the intra-racial/ethnic right and left Greek-Cypriot parties regarding the Greek junta coup are still informing the ways that discourses and possibilities unfold. Whether those on the right who supported the assassins of the communists, the socialists and Turkish Cypriots are themselves considered assassins remains an open question. Whether those on the left still "remember to forget" and how is still a festering question, a material fragment, if you will, in Cypriot relations. We know that these issues are festering questions still, especially when we look at the unfolding of different moments. During and/or after the Annan plan the political leadership moved to effect the political landscape of Cyprus (i.e. the hegemonic resounding of NO to the referendum, and the loss of the centre liberal party in the Republic of Cyprus with the counter-hegemonic election of the communist party). This tension must be continually reassessed and reconfigured as the social relations in Cyprus shift and become restructured. The ambiguity of this moment is engendered not only by the uncertainty of the guilt of Nicos' mother but also of his own affects (he tells us that when he sees injustices on the soccer field that he rages and he beats up people in defence of justice). Are there still injustices in the Republic of Cyprus even when the north and the south do not rule together? *Who* are those who continue to generate injustice to him, his family, and his society?

Sexualized (T)errors and Displacements

Much of the discourse around the missing and its contingent traumas is introjected into the ethno-hyper-muscular-virile-nationalist discourses and practices and centralises on the bodies of women. It seems that those bodies in trauma are mobilised to cite the injuries of the nation/the state but without accounting for "the uneven distribution of exposure to and security from trauma and the directions and intensities of violence within those distributions" (Clough and Halley, 2007, p. 282). The way in which we read the narratives above and below points to how the articulation of the national family itself as injured, facilitates, develops, submerges and/or redirects capacities and exposes some bodies to further insecurities, traumas and "intensities of violence" (Clough and Halley, 2007, p. 282).

Epistemologically, the naturalisation and even displacement of socially constructed beliefs or modes of being as transhistorical and immutable, plays a crucial role in certain forms of racialised, gendered, and classed trauma, like those depicted in *the narratives of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, which ultimately, enable the reproduction of social structures that hold different people and their*

own visions of life subordinated. Perhaps, the fear of speaking up by those living in Cyprus is really the fear that the same series of violations are ready to explode on their bodies again and again at any moment, which brings us back to the point that there is a passive acceptance of a peace that is not really peace, and of bodies that although they seem secure, stable, and whole, are not really. The assertion that Nicos should not return to the village and demand explanations enables yet another unfolding of "displacement".

Similarly, in relation to the narratives around the loss of the missing, the Greek-Cypriot women we interviewed in Cyprus in 1993, 1995, and 2002 did not volunteer any information about sexual violence against Greek or Turkish-Cypriot women during the 1974 war. When the first author broached the topic, they expressed concern that discussing such violence might endanger themselves or those who had been attacked. A 50-year-old Greek-Cypriot working-class woman who originally came from a mixed village said:

> "What's the point of bringing up the past? We were all, both women and men, incarcerated in two rooms in our village. The women were put in one room and the men in another. One night several Turks and Turkish Cypriots showed up and grabbed four women. Some of the mothers were pulling their daughters by their arms and screaming and shouting at the soldiers. The soldiers, pointing guns at the daughters, angrily told the mothers to let them go. You know what happened after that. You know (gesturing to a woman who is sitting two doors down)? She is married now with children but she still carries the 'weight'. Do you understand what I mean?" (Interviewee 24, 1993, p. 5, cited in Agathangelou, 2000).[10]

Despite framing the violence by expressing hesitation to talk about it, the trauma of specific bodies here that are "still carrying the weight" comes to present an alarming relation that troubles the ethno-virile-hyper-muscular-nationalist discourse of "protection". Simultaneously, this narration of sexual trauma facilitates the reorganisation of bodies to "shut up" about such uneven distributions of violence: specific bodies were raped and those bodies are still with us – a reminder that the shelter of domestic life is a myth dissolved along with the entire domestic sovereignty/economy of the Republic of Cyprus. The collapse of the boundaries of family/familiar relations and ethnic relations dissolves and such bodies are obliged to seek refuge not in national/familiar contexts but perhaps, even in direct confrontation with them and their dominant stories.

Another 62-year-old Greek-Cypriot woman said the following when asked about her experiences of trauma during the 1974 war:

> "My husband was killed in our village and I wore a black dress once they killed him.
> First author: Who killed him?
> The Turks. These same men closed me in a bathroom and there was another woman from my village whose daughter was raped in front of her and they killed her father in front of

10 See Agathangelou (2000).

> her. Then they came for me while I was in the bathroom in this one house ... they captured us and held us for three and a half months. When I asked for this friend of mine, a Turkish Cypriot, he came and brought me tea. I joked to him: 'You brought me the tea of death', and he responded: 'You are lucky because they were planning to kill you ... but the Red Cross can take you to the south now'."

In the above narrative, this Greek-Cypriot woman testifies that Turks killed her husband in her village. Simultaneously, a Turkish Cypriot protected her. This narration disrupts the dominant understanding that ***all*** are equal under the eyes of the state. Even when her own construction of the story is still based on the "loss" of her husband and can be introjected into the ethnic-virile-hyper-muscular-nationalist narrative, she still disrupts it by juxtaposing the Turk that killed her husband and the Turk that protected her. The discourse is still patriarchal and yet, it contains an alternative, marginalised story that is subversive to the familiar/family/ethnic/nationalist one: the us and them (Turk and Turkish Cypriot) and also the idea that national and domestic space can be safe havens. Her narration could (and it has within dominant discourses) be introjected into those practices that consolidate and manage different populations: the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots' bodies have longer claim to Cypriot sovereignty/sovereignties and thus, are legitimate heirs of Cyprus whereas the Turk of Turkey does not.[11] For instance, despite the collapse of the intact national and domestic family, the collapse and violation of heterosexual relations (i.e. men and women separated by war) and disruption of virile-hyper-muscular-ethno-nationalism(s), the Republic of Cyprus operates to shift these displacements and violences by metaphorising the traumas and drawing on them to re-make anew the Cypriot family, the domestic site, and body economies and spaces. It accomplishes this by marking the traumas in a way that facilitates its sovereign power within the international community/order: by marking Turkey, as the former brutal invader and still the implacable enemy of Greek Cypriots, and, especially, of women. For example, several pronouncements by the state of Cyprus centralise the discourse of rape against women under the category of "ethnic cleansing":

> "The atrocities of the Turkish army included wholesale and repeated rapes of women of all ages, systematic torture, savage and humiliating treatment of hundreds of people, including children, women and pensioners during their detention by the Turkish forces, as well as looting and robbery on an extensive scale, by Turkish troops and Turkish Cypriots" (cited in Agathangelou 2000; www.kypros.org/Cyprus_Problem/overview.html).

This intervention by the state is a governance "management" practice that includes efforts to both recover *and* forget the 1974 war rapes of Greek women. Remembering sexual violence against women is articulated as a metonym for ethno-national power and it is a method to draw upon

11 See for instance, around the discussions of Turkey as a "foreign coloniser". This discussion deems a longer and much more complex engagement that we do not have space to discuss here.

international resources for "health". In this fashion, ethno-nationalist discourses subordinate gender and ethnicity to an idealised masculinised ethno-national group. As institutions in other contexts, the state of the Republic of Cyprus shows signs of "progressive intentions" (Anderson, 1983). It raises the issue of rapes during national wars but only to demonstrate its "good" victim status internationally. As with Anderson's approach to nationalism, the Greek-Cypriot state fails to acknowledge that women's bodies become sites of domination in the constitution of any ethno-nationalism, and that the elite powers of postcolonial states objectify them. The Greek Cypriot ignores that the individual testimonies of rapes are not mere fodder for proof of violence for and/or against the dominant national history. In fact, women who are interested in being raised to the witness stand to testify are doing so to stop such atrocious experiences before, during, and after war (*Calling the Ghosts* depicts such a public intervention).

Writing these traumatic relations points to the disruption and displacements of how the social relations and rituals of daily life are fundamentally altered. These narratives form a picture of a state, of different subjects and bodies, grappling with displacements today. They also point to the ways in which writing itself can be introjected into managing traumatised populations by acting as a humanising and feminised practice to the hyper-muscular-ethnic-virile-nationalist establishment rather than *an antagonist* one in an intimate relation between a political economy and a politics that seeks to manage the trauma of Cypriots, their injured economies and states in the process of remaking and realigning them with worldwide shifts. This writing is an intervention to disrupt these dominant economies of trauma, state relations, ethnic and sexual relations. It is a struggle to push ourselves to look at the "fictions" that we hear including those produced daily as the truth. Through the writing of this article we want to systematically make connections out of those resonant and troubling places, fragments, bodies, traumas, memories and relations that are non-redeemable by any means, by any progressive ethno-racialised-project. A project and a narrative which is busy figuring out its newer practices to organise and facilitate other relations – other redefinitional approaches, thereby engendering the kind of historic action(s) we associate with the heroic/muscular/virile/ethno-racialised-national protective agency of the state, the domestic family, and the hetero-patriarch.

Writing in this way enables us to ask questions of these shifts in governance and of the troubling places, fragments, bodies, traumas, and memories. It allows us to recognise that what the reproduction of social relations could entail, and how the trauma itself would be mobilised – including the specificity of those relations as imagined even by the state – is an open question. It is an open question in the sense that even out of a memory of dispossession, coercion, killing and disappointments, alternative possibilities can flow to defy the dominant notions that the only viable social formations are those whose constitution depends intensely on violence. Thus, our approach to displacement and trauma requires more than just what we call "identitarian blaming" (i.e. it is the Greek and the Turk's fault/fold, it is the state's fold/fault; it is the women's fault/fold; it is the bourgeoisie's fault); rather, we must begin to think in terms of relations occurring simultaneously to "metastasize" in its many forms of violence and not merely the killing of bodies,

the loss of virility, the loss of national and other power in a capitalist-patriarchal context. We began this intervention (production) of a countermemory by not arguing that trauma is an indicator of displacement and violence of family, social, or bodily relations, which it is, but also by gleaning together the structural material formations of those violences including the narratives to show that alternative memories that trouble these dominant epistemologies arise out of the past and in conjunction with the displacements of every subsequent present and demand the centralisation of the struggle of, and against, a system that wants to colonise everything and everybody including imaginaries. These are still questions for those who are interested in developing a political ground adequate for responses to (neo) colonialisms.

What, for instance, if "displacements" are not what happened just in 1958, 1963, 1964, 1967 and 1974 but they are also shaping the formation of the present right now as the partitions have opened and as Cypriots of all ethnic backgrounds attempt to deliberate a future together in the European Union, and as Cypriots participate in the further privatisation of their "homes" and their states? What, if "peace" as discussed above in our narrative with Greek and Turkish Cypriots, can be as uneasy and oppressive as war? "Peace", as it is institutionalised is not an easy "home" to which we return and it does not take away the doubts we harbour about our social relations. Thus, as the narratives from these women and men put forward, returning home and finding the disappeared people as an essential feature of "peace" is impossible to come to terms with for communities displaced by war and structural violence, such as exploitation, oppression, and even ontological annihilation (Agathangelou, 2009). The series of conflicts and war in Cyprus, necessitated by larger forces such as neo-liberal capital – all in the name of progress and development of a modern nation-state and market – is intricately tied to the ways in which market and state driven structures of "white but not quite" supremacy racialise particular bodies and deem them expendable "cannon fodder" at moments of conflict, war, and even in more "peaceful" periods. Racialised and gendered violence seem to be integral to the functioning of the international political economy, not an exception. What is required to counter such social structures? We argue that it is first a process of anamnesis, that is, a recuperation of the historical and fundamentally the arbitrary nature of categories of understanding including the "*taking over" of struggles*.

The Productive Capacities of Technologies of Displacement

the missing
the way loss seeps
into neck hollows
and curls at temples
sits between front teeth
cavity
empty and waiting
for mourning to open
(Suheir Hammad, 2001)

Hammad argues that "the loss" does not go away. It sits there like a cavity waiting for mourning to open, perhaps, the conscious horror of conflict and war, which seems to be "safeguarded" in a configuration of ongoing present violences and losses. In an article published by BBC News, there is a picture of Marios Kouloumas, who was 10 years old when his father disappeared, juxtaposed with a photograph of three women who are holding photos of their missing sons, husbands, and brothers. One of those women, Kouloumas states, is "my mother at a demonstration of the relatives". He goes on to say that "we always ask about the fate of our people and we will never stop" (Rainsford, 2006).[12] Similarly, this article presents a series of images and evidences to give "life" to the social problem they are addressing: the excavation of bones and the gleaning together of the missing of Cyprus. According to John Tagg, photography is one of the technologies that is central to the management techniques of man, a technology that is productive of subjects.

> "Whatever the claims of the traditional evaluations of such photographic 'records', whatever the pretensions of the 'humane' and documentary tradition, we must see them now in relation to the 'small' historical problems with which Foucault concerns himself: problems of the entry of the individual into the field of knowledge, of the entry of the individual description, of the cross-examination and the file. It is in what he calls these 'ignoble' archives that Foucault sees the emergence of that modern" (Willse, 2008, pp. 241-242 citing Tagg, 1993).

We argue that technology is productive of the displacement of social problems but also of its intervention to produce the subject of trauma anew. It is "a tool taken up by the [health worker] in support of the central, intersubjective tasks" (Willse, 2008, pp. 241-242). Willse (*ibid*., p. 242) who studies technologies such as the Management Information Systems programme used by the US to "deal" with homeless populations engages with social work and argues that:

> "Social work is always already technologized. The use of technology in social work neither enhances nor degrades a core or true practice of the service provider, but rather, the act of service provision is a set of technical operations for the disciplining of the subject. Recognizing this moves us toward an understanding of technology as productive, or constitutive. Here I do not mean to fall into technological reductionism or social constructivism, but to point to the indistinguishability of the technological and the social when we think both in terms of the organization of matter toward its openness to intervention ... the interdisciplinary field of surveillance studies usefully takes up the productive capacities of the social and technological. While this literature often picks up on anticapitalist technophobic themes, it also draws attention to what information technologies of surveillance create and make possible, not simply what they corrupt."

12 Sarah Rainsford (21 November 2006) 'Bones of Cyprus missing unearthed'. UK: BBC News. Available from [http://news.bbc.co.uk/2/hi/europe/6166560.stm], accessed 10 March 2008.

Similarly, we argue that the desire to use the technology of the DNA now to access the missing peoples could be a displacement of the larger social problem (i.e. the life and death of people within sovereign states) and also constitutive of something anew. Willse (*ibid.*, p. 243), following Foucault, argues that in this moment there needs to be a new technology that facilitates the formation of new subjects with a focus on the "resources and life chances in arenas of health, education, employment, consumption and civic life". Similarly, we are also arguing that through this disciplinary management (i.e. the psychodynamic model of case management) and control more enclosures are thrown open. This tool is directed "at the human subject, the body and soul of that subject, and its relationship to other subjects in space" as opposed to "biopolitics, [which] seek ... to regulate the social or collective processes of life, death and productivity across a population" (Foucault, 1978, p. 139; See also Foucault, 2003, pp. 239-264). "Together, discipline and biopolitics function to bring biological objects and processes into political and economic calculation; discipline does so by addressing the animal body of individualized man whereas biopolitics does so by addressing the species body of the total population" (Willse, 2008, pp.243).

Drawing on DNA to locate the bones of the missing, the state depends on the medical establishment. This is how Cypriots struggle, contest and engage this new form of discipline and biopolitisation that seeks to regulate processes of life, death, productivity, etc. A 50-year-old Greek-Cypriot woman shared the following about her missing husband:

> "The years are passing very fast. I am still waiting for him. Now, he has 5 grandchildren and I want him to see how they are beautiful like him. He is going to come. They did not find his bones after my sons gave their DNA. I feel as nobody cares and nobody knows of our pain and suffering behind closed doors. The black clothes I am wearing represent the blackness of my heart."

Saturated with the logics of management, control, and even internalised colonisation, these subjects struggle to puncture the displacements on the collective, familial, and also bodily relations while recognising that such technological penetrations do not leave behind "winners". The medical establishment takes DNA as "a tool" and uses it to participate in "intersubjective tasks" while promising "closure" about the problem of the missing. Its viability at this moment depends, and "function(s) at the level of a population organized by a socio-technical apparatus of [state] agencies, social policies, service providers, databases and networks. The surplus created by [DNA programs] is a ... population ... biopolitics manages the population by organizing the biological species as a population plane of intervention ... This is not a population as a representation of 'the people', but rather a plane of intervention formed from the raw material [of missing and other Cypriots] that draws bodies back into itself" (Willse, 2008, p. 245). While numerous Cypriots celebrated the testing of DNA to ascertain who was killed during the many displacements in Cyprus and to determine whether someone is dead or missing as a strategy of moving forward, many others challenge and/or say no to this drawing out of raw bodily matter because they are perhaps refusing to become the living surplus of the remnants of the series of conflicts and war in Cyprus and are

even perhaps resisting another kind of familiar "displacement" in their everyday routinised lives. Giving DNA as the united Nations and the state expects to help "put to bed" the issue of the missing does not eradicate the displacements that people are facing daily, especially if they are struggling to make ends meet (Sant Cassia, 2005; Yakinthou, 2008; Saoulli, 2007). Indeed, the penetration of this newer productive governance technology seems to be about incorporating and encrypting the Cypriots as specific populations and Cyprus "for governance and as governance" (Willse, 2008, p. 247) within the new emerging international order rather than transforming them into weapons of mass discussion.

The Greek-Cypriot leadership's recent position regarding those involved in bi-communal projects opens the space to ask once again, "why these particular narratives, and why now?" Collapsing bi-communal bridge-building efforts with the Annan Plan, the political leadership announced, "that anyone who had received money to support this plan should publicly commit suicide to serve as an example to others" (See Drousiotis 2005 for this statement by Pittokopitis). Such public appeals or "public figurations" of trauma document a crisis within the Cypriot context and politics: an ideological conflict between different nationalisms (e.g. mono-nationalism, bi-nationalism, trans-nationalism) and the emerging sense of a Europe without borders, with which every citizen of Cyprus is expected to join. The political leadership attempts to offer this translation of the country's crisis by appealing to a long-standing, and sometimes valid, narrative of external powers or agents (i.e. the US, the UN, and the EU) who are involving themselves via funding for bi-communal initiatives. The leadership in this case points to the fact that many of the persons involved in bi-communal programmes and activities also supported the Annan Plan (Christou, 2006; *Cyprus Mail*, 30 October, p. 13) as evidence of a betrayal, or heresy to the national cause, punishable by the cardinal sin of self-murder.

These claims silence further the structural complicity of the political leadership in sustaining in place the socioeconomic and political inequalities between different communities in Cyprus including the displacement of their struggles for just communities where violence is not the constitutive element of social relations. In essence, the state is obfuscating and mythologizing the political economy of conflict and division within the island while trying to signal the money interests behind any plan. This is a new layer of meaning which draws upon a plethora of easily recognisable symbols in which to code its nationalist politics and traumas, simultaneously harnessing a politics of re-traumatisation while repressing any meaningful, critical, therapeutic, or public examinations of the effects of struggle: *travmata*. The state's discourse erases and/or marginalises the fact that violations and violences are not mere results of external "superpowers" and imperialists like the United States and its contingent agents like the United Nations – which they are – but they are also the results of local alliances and complicities with such powers to push and sustain in place, albeit contradictorily, power structures and regimes and their contingent (dis)eases. Finally, the integration of Cyprus in Europe challenges the narrowly punctuated ethno-nationalisms and problematises their homogeneity, so much so that it drives us to engage once more the coping mechanisms of national and individual traumas crucial in the co-creation of a

new imaginary, necessitated by the larger process of globalisation and the entry of Cyprus into the "new" Europe. For instance, the humanitarian intervention since 2004 "by the United Nations' (UN) Committee for Missing Persons (CMP) in locating and exhuming bodies buried in mass graves all over the island" (Yakinthou, 2008, p. 15) though ridden with tensions (as stated previously) has reopened inquiry about the violence of nationalist powers and their contingent interests. More so, this inquiry has pushed to the surface the struggles, violences and affects such as pain in the formation of communities. Shifts in epistemological understandings are beginning to happen as a result of the work of these communities and also from a series of legal cases such as those of Christofis Pashas and Charalambos Palmas against the Republic of Cyprus "for withholding information on the whereabouts of their missing loved ones" (Yakinthou, 2008, p. 16) and the case of Varnavas a.o.v. Turkey "regarding its responsibility to assist resolution of the missing persons issue in Cyprus" (*ibid.*). Thus, it is timely to turn these discourses and other critical ones into weapons of mass discussion about the ways our communities are formed and shaped. Let us conclude with a discussion of the epistemologies and the positionality of mental health practitioners themselves.

As a Way of Conclusion: Moving from Control and Governance to Tracing Possibilities for Transformation

What do the narratives shared by displaced families say about traditional models of conceptualising, and treating, trauma? Clearly the refugee phenomenon is not ensconced exclusively in the domain of psychology. Refugeedom intersects political (including domestic and foreign policies), religious, ethnic, sociological, financial, and ecological dimensions (e.g. where refugee housing is constructed, etc.) (Papadopoulos, 2001). What approach takes into account these dimensions, and permits helping professionals to also locate themselves in the context of the service systems in which they belong? We argue that a politico-economic, systemic approach that also accounts for the constitutive aspects of trauma and subjects is most appropriate. As Papadopoulos (2001) asserts, "systemic approaches are useful in working with refugees because they can sharpen the professionals' epistemological sensitivity and inform them about the interaction of the various narratives that each one of these systems uses to express itself" (p. 406).

Many, though certainly not all displaced peoples, experience chronic anxiety, panic attacks, and myriad somatic complaints when facing the intractable stresses of not knowing the fate of a loved one and not being able to return to their homes. Such symptoms can be quite distressing, and the persons experiencing them, or their immediate family, appeal to doctors and psychiatrists for medication to treat the symptoms. For approximately 20% of displaced persons, such indicators may be only the tip of the proverbial iceberg of ongoing-traumatic stress. As described by one interviewee, a psychiatrist operating from the medical model may prescribe pills for outward physical signs without asking about the larger familial, community, and sociohistorical contexts of the person's distress (Greek-Cypriot refugee, 45 years old, working class). This

individualisation, or atomisation, of patients/clients' experiences makes the medical model a useful epistemological tool especially in contexts and at moments when the treatment of events and approaches to civic problems becomes atomised.

Even when a clinical diagnosis of traumatic stress can be accurately made, albeit within the individualistic medical model,[13] there is a gap between a "post traumatic stress disorder" (PTSD) approach to refugees and the lived experience of refugee families (Weine *et al.*, 2004). While many Cypriot refugees appear to exhibit symptoms of PTSD (Agathangelou and Killian, 2002), few Cypriot refugees view their experiences within a framework of diagnostic criteria, PTSD treatment, or a clinical/medical model of trauma and recovery. One Greek-Cypriot male, for example, who scored significantly above the "clinical cut-off score" required for a diagnosis of PTSD, denied that war traumas played any role in his current state and situation. Conversations with this man revealed that he had experienced a range of severe traumatic episodes, including interrogations and beatings while imprisoned by Greek Cypriots, plus threats to his life, digging his own grave, and searching cemeteries for his missing, now confirmed dead brother. His chronic anxiety, anger, foreshortened sense of future, inability to hold a job, and a host of other problems and symptoms readily indicated a PTSD-like syndrome, but he and his family discounted any such *clinical* interpretations. In a context where family is the focal point (Killian and Agathangelou, 2005), family members are more likely to see the manifestations and costs of war trauma through a family lens (Weine *et al.*, 1997). We concur with Weine *et al.*, (2004) that for displaced peoples whose homes and communities have been ripped from them, family could be one of the social institutions, albeit with many contradictions, for making claims about social relations within our communities. We want to go further and argue that other public institutions can be just as crucial (e.g. one's party, the state, and/or non-profit organisation). What then are the options for transforming trauma other than through pills and diagnoses?

Instead of handing out prescriptions of medicine, helping professionals can provide opportunities for trauma survivors to express their pain, fear and anger at the perpetrators, the state, or even at mental health service agents and agencies and to also engage more with the (t)erroristic practices of different registers (i.e. the state, the family, the medical establishment, the relation of the state with international organisations). A focus group of refugees did in fact state that rather than expecting Cypriots to self-identify clinical needs and then get up and go to the offices of mental health professionals, the professionals could visit the communities in an outreach

13 Post-Traumatic Stress Disorder (PTSD) is a problematic DSM-IV diagnostic category because the stresses associated with an unresolved event producing profound discontinuity (e.g. losing one's home and all possessions), or an ongoing experience, such as socio-cultural oppression and discrimination (e.g. such as that experienced by displaced or politically persecuted peoples, or ethnic minorities), represent continuous conditions or circumstances, and this situation combined with the possibility of vivid flashbacks, raises the question of whether the symptoms can be designated as occurring "after" or "post" an event(s) still happening now.

capacity and facilitate large group discussions there, basically creating the possibility of inquiring into those grey areas of social relations (i.e. healthy modes of living) and to disrupt the idea of them being "damaged goods". As the family is central to Cypriots, creating spaces in community settings where extended family members can discuss the vast changes that conflict, war, and even global changes have now brought and are bringing to their family system would be a more appropriate approach. Topics of discussion at such meetings might include the difficulties associated with losing one's continuity with the past through displacement from one's home, possessions, and community (Agathangelou and Killian, 2002; Zetter, 1999); the dissonance encountered at the nexus of the ethno-nationalist push to "NOT forget", the personal prohibitions of "I don't want to talk about it" or "I cannot burden my family with the terrible things only I experienced", and the familial injunctions, often from the next generation, of "Don't talk about the past/the war". It is hoped that such an outreach would create spaces for *therapeutic witnessing* (Papadopoulos, 1996, 1998). In the context of "ordinary conversations" about unpleasant experiences of destructiveness, a therapist is present to listen with minimal facilitation as a "human witness", allowing persons to thaw trauma and reconnect various parts of their personal and collective narratives (Papadopoulos, 1998, p. 472). When people come together and engage in "ordinary" dialogue about events and experiences – both the ordinary and extraordinary – they can begin the process of regenerating a sense of trust, and in some circumstances shed what is often an illusory isolation in their traumatic experiences including that their "disappointed hope" may be productive of an alternative "setting" of alternative relations. It is through this process that the therapist comes together as a member of the community/ties s/he is part of, to collectively participate in the process of working with memory to loosen the fluid possibilities and fluid alternatives from the becoming of the past that point to other worlds other than the dominant ones.

What constitutes a transformative, just process? One research participant wrote on the last page of our questionnaire for the 2002 study, "Thank you – I feel better now", indicating a degree of appreciation for having been able to share a part of her experience of the war. Telling our stories, in public or private spheres, can be therapeutic at the personal and larger systemic levels, and such communication challenges the ontology of fear and insecurity guiding modern politics, including the need to legally prove – and in the logic of the executioner – the violence that the executioner(s) have committed. Hence, a distinction of proof and witness becomes significant as an entry point into a struggle and transformative process. Articulating intertwined sets of events which disrupted one's positionality within multiple communities, including their systems of thought and imagination, may be crucial toward a shift of one's ontological grounding. Even when speaking publicly does not provide "emotional or personal transformation" (Cvetkovich, 2003, p. 2), our reticence and hesitation to question the social status quo carry their own costs in our lives and communities.

Researchers like James Pennebaker (Cohn *et al.,* 2004; Ramirez-Esparza and Pennebaker, 2006; Pennebaker and Seagal, 1999) have examined the relationship between written disclosure (under secure and predictable conditions) of traumatic events and consequent physiological and

psychological change. They found that participants in their study who chose to write about traumas showed an improvement in immunological functioning, greater reduction in subjective distress, and fewer health centre visits than participants who wrote about trivial events. Furthermore, participants who included both "facts" and emotions around those "facts" were able to experience fewer health problems than those who included only the "facts." Brown and Heimberg (2001) evaluated Pennebaker's paradigm by focusing on the trauma of rape, arguing that the participants who included "the facts" and the emotions surrounding those facts in their writings experienced less severe symptoms of dysphoria and social anxiety. Thus, an alternative to simple medication or psychotherapy's "talking cure" might be the *writing* and/or story telling cure.

In what contexts can the "writing cure" be effective? A recent study suggests that emotionally disclosing writers accrue measurable benefits even in cyberspace. Sheese, Brown and Graziano (2004) found that e-mail implementation of Pennebaker's emotional disclosure paradigm of writing about one's trauma was an effective tool for enhancing health outcomes when compared to an email-based control group. This study's findings suggest that opportunities for processing traumatic experiences could be provided to persons who would not be accessible otherwise[14] (persons in rural areas, with little or no public/educational access to computers/internet), though it would be more likely to target younger populations – those having access to and comfort with computers, and those with the ability to purchase connectivity. Even so, the idea of being able to provide therapeutic benefits via the Internet without public testimonials or traditional one-on-one psychotherapy in an office is exciting and worthy of further exploration, especially in a context where therapy is still considered with suspicion.

Finally, the helping professionals' own tendency to subscribe to the discourse of refugee trauma may not be all that helpful. How prevalent is traumatic stress in refugees? Twenty-eight years after the war, 22% of a sample of Greek-Cypriot refugees appeared to be suffering from traumatic stress symptoms (Agathangelou and Killian, 2002). This finding is consistent with other studies of refugees and trauma survivors (Johnson and Thompson, 2008). In studies of Cambodian refugees, Gong-Guy (1987) found 16% and Clarke *et al.,* (1999) found 22% were diagnosable with PTSD twelve and fifteen years, respectively, after their displacement. In a study of Bosnian refugees, Thulesius and Hakansson (1999) found a PTSD prevalence of 18%. The literature, therefore, suggests that as many as four out of five of survivors of war trauma in general (and 78% of Cypriot refugees, in particular) do not develop PTSD. In addition, while Loizos and Constantinou (2007) found a possible link between refugee status and a greater probability of cardiovascular illness and depressive illness in displaced Cypriots, the relative wellness of Cypriot refugees when compared with the 'demographic shock' victims of post-socialist Europe between 1989 and 1995 suggests that refugees are not rife with disease and disorder, but frequently demonstrate good health outcomes. These findings speak to resilience, an alternative to the

14 In rural communities, story telling and conversation can be useful starting points for public dialogue.

dominant discourse of traumatisation. While older age and female gender are risk variables for developing PTSD after exposure to war trauma, other factors such as social support, family solidarity, and education may serve as protective factors following displacement (Agathangelou and Killian, 2002; Johnson and Thompson, 2008). Is there room for a discourse of resilience in refugeedom?

As Papadopoulos (2001) posits,

> "the wider social discourse around refugee trauma: pervades our whole social fabric. The media, politicians, and the general public have been saturated by the trauma discourse to the extent that all assume that, more or less, all refugees are 'traumatized'. The word 'trauma' ... tends to mobilize people ... politicians take various forms of action (from offering aid to ordering military action) when faced with the movement of massive proportions of 'traumatized' population" (p. 409).

It is crucial for mental health practitioners to recognise the ways in which they relate and engage with subjects. This process is itself one of intersubjective relations and thus, practices such as reflexive positioning, and close examination of the ways health practitioners use tools (such as subscription to the refugee trauma narrative) may become productive in a way that does not kill people. In fact, there are times when trauma precipitates positive growth or a kind of rejuvenation or renewal (Salter and Stallard, 2004; Tedeschi *et al.,* 1998). Tedeschi and Calhoun (2004) state that, "reports of growth experiences in the aftermath of traumatic events far outnumber reports of psychiatric disorders" (p. 58). The changes include new possibilities for one's life, a greater sense of personal strength, spiritual development, greater appreciation for life, and relationships that are not constituted only through violence. Engaging the negative connotation of trauma in this paper has pointed to the role of violence as a central technology for, and of, governance and how the static retelling of an event by the state encourages an entrenchment, a "refusal to mourn and move on" that fixes in place the past or nostalgises it. However, this "refusal to mourn and move on" may not be exactly the same refusal for everyone; a refusal by those who embody the effects of violence may be an ongoing struggle to re-establish community and to imagine other futures, albeit those that at times require quite discomfiting conversations within and between the two communities. Our talking and writing about the *productive aspects* of trauma, especially in a larger social context where ample support has been present – or if interrupted, has been effectively reconstituted – is an attempt to examine closely those composites of our present communities and use these examinations as weapons of public deliberations about alternative embodiments and practices frequently marginalised by international organisations, the market, the state and their technologies of governance. While many therapeutic approaches, focused on pure utility, may intentionally or unintentionally support the political status quo, other systemic approaches such as narrative therapy (see White and Epston, 1990; Sluzki, 1992) and inquiry encourage therapists to make visible these dominant discursive strands and to release space for those subaltern families' and communities' practices as ongoing struggles of viability and vitality. Practitioners, guided by a

systemic approach, acknowledge and engage larger social and political systems and go beyond being agents of social control and governance to becoming agents of social transformation who work collectively to trace transformable just forms of life (Killian, 2002). It is hoped that our narratives of refugeedom and trauma can move from being a touchstone measuring our patriotism, and a tool for maintaining rigid dichotomies of us and them and galvanising ethno nationalist discourses against the Other, and become weapons of social deliberation and struggle that generate just worlds.

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Trans-Border Crossings: Cypriot Women's 'Liberation' and the Margins

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Abstract

Out of the 191 million people living outside their countries of origin in 2005, 95 million were women. In Cyprus more than one-third of all migrant workers are 'domestic workers'. This article focuses on female domestic workers only and specifically on those who work in the households of professional women in both communities. The analysis is based on a qualitative research carried out in 2007 and 2008. Despite the fact that professional women ('madams') are economically independent and have taken on the role of second bread-winner in their households, the sexual division of domestic labour and the value system that sustain the patriarchal structures have still remained intact. Thus, Cypriot women's 'liberation' is enabled through the migrant women's engagement in their households. The migrant women that were interviewed experienced exploitation, abuses, violations of contracts, fear of expulsion, overwork, and violence, but also they developed agency, social networking and assertiveness. A joint struggle is proposed, based on gender consciousness, female solidarity and inter-dependence so that real liberation and social change may be attained. The stakes are different for each person but all connect to the desire for an alternative world of 'real liberation' from patriarchal structures, racism, sexism, and capitalist exploitation.

Keywords: female migrant domestic workers, Cypriot women, 'liberation', exploitation, abuse, racism, women's solidarity.

The Rise in Female Migration – Feminisation of Migration

The end of the twentieth century and the beginning of the twenty-first have been called the "Age of Migration", a fact that has drawn the attention of national governments, non-governmental and international organisations and scholars. Centres for Migration Studies have also been established in many universities. A joint report by the United Nations Agency for Population Funds and the

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International Organisation of Migration (UNFPA-IOM) found, in 2006, that women make up half of all migrants. From estimates of 191 million people living outside their countries of origin in 2005, 95 million were women. Included in these figures is an estimate of 13.5 million refugees representing 7% of the world's migrant stock (Ayres and Barber, 2006). According to UN estimates Europe had 64 million migrants in 2005, accounting for one-third of all international migrants and almost 9% of the total population of Europe. The European Commission estimated the non-nationals living in the 25 EU member states to be 25 million which amounts to almost 5.5% of their total population. The countries with the largest non-national populations were Germany, France, Spain, the United Kingdom and Italy.[1] In recent years the highest levels of net migration have occurred in the Southern European countries including the Republic of Cyprus, where it stood at 2.72% in 2005.

Gender issues and the current '*feminisation of migration*' have become a major point of attention due to the changes in the global production and reproduction process. According to Anthias and Lazarides "gender does not mean women but the latter must be given special attention since it is their contribution to migration processes that are still largely ignored" (Anthias and Lazaridis, 2000, p. 5). The labour market is gendered in the sense that domestic work, caring for the elderly and the sex industry are associated with female workers, whereas other sectors such as construction, agriculture and the hotel industry are linked with men. This gendered division has implications that impact on wage differences as well (Agathangelou, 2004; Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002).

Yet, there is still not enough reliable information about women as migrants. Equal numbers statistically do not necessarily imply equality of treatment. Women have fewer opportunities than men for legal migration; many women become irregular migrants with concomitant lack of support and exposure to risk; they are more vulnerable than men to violence and exploitation, and their needs for health care, including reproductive health care are not always likely to be met. They also have fewer opportunities for social integration and political participation and none of the 22 receiving states studied in the report has gender-sensitive migration policies (UNFPA-IOM, 2006).

Gender has been identified as a critical issue in circular migration, i.e. migration that follows a cycle whereby migrant workers emigrate repeatedly for a few years at a time for employment purposes, always keeping their country of origin as a home-base, and sending remittances back home (Ellis, Conway, and Bailey, 2006; Yeoh and Khoo, 1998). In north and south Cyprus migrant women from Sri Lanka, India, the Philippines, Turkey, Bulgaria, Turkmenistan and Tajikistan have worked in different places prior to coming to Cyprus as is shown from the data of the interviews in this research. One of the important factors in the escalation of migration as a

1 For details on the flow of migration see: Ayres and Barber (2006).

social, political and economic phenomenon is global changes (Ehrenreich and Hochschild, 2002). The end of the Cold War led to massive population movements to Europe and elsewhere as well as inter-ethnic conflicts in a number of regions. Displacement, according to Anthias, has created "the most powerful image for the modern world in arguments about transnationalism and globalization ... Transactional migration to Cyprus, particularly by women from the Philippines, Sri Lanka and Eastern Europe, has created a migrant workforce" (Anthias, 2006, pp. 179-180). In addition, the creation of new free trade areas leads to movements of labour – whether or not this is intended by the governments concerned (Agathangelou, 2004). As mentioned above, migrant women form the majority in movements as diverse as those of Cape Verdians to Italy, Filipinos to the Middle East, Thais to Japan, Sri Lankans to Cyprus, and Albanians to Greece.

Different theories have been proposed for the study of migration. An integrative model which uses three levels of analysis has been proposed: the macro level which focuses on the relations between the sending and receiving nation-states; the middle-level which focuses on groups and organisations through which the persons and families negotiate the migration routes; and the micro-level which focuses on the particular person when migration choices are based on individual stories, social identities and sources of support. Recent studies have emphasised migrant women as individuals who decide autonomously to migrate and even take initiatives for their families (Oishi, 2002; Maratou-Alibrandi and Papatsani, 2007).

Some scholars have supported the view that women who migrate alone in search of employment and do not follow the traditional pattern of accompanying male family members become emancipated and empowered. In addition, they claim that the act of migration can also stimulate change in women migrants themselves and in the societies which send and receive them. "In the process women's migration can become a force for removing existing gender imbalances and inequities, and for changing underlying conditions so that new imbalances and inequities do not arise" (UNFPA-IOM, 2006). This is part of the liberal approach which constructs emancipation on the basis of multiplicity of choice, without deeply delving into the power frames of such 'choice'. Apart from the benefits, however, there are many costs such as the additional responsibilities and emotional stress they experience in support of their families back home. The loss of qualified and professional women in the countries of origin creates a "brain drain" and the failure of the receiving countries to recognise these talents lead to "brain waste".

It might seem that the 'emancipation premise' that is the view that migrant women become liberated from traditional norms and behaviours is only a theoretical assumption, strictly speaking, based on liberal premises of choice and feminist emancipation. However, this is not the case since due to 'feminisation of migration' it is ascertained that migrant women are being recruited in two areas: domestic work, where they have responsibility to maintain households in mostly affluent homes, and in the industries of caring for the elderly and the sex industry. All of these are associated with female work and are marked by exploitation both from employers and agencies which recruit (or even kidnap) them. Thus the liberal claim is restrictive and ignores the capitalist, racialised and patriarchal power relations. These women from the 'margins' are constructed by their employers as

both members of the household and alien subjects who pollute our culture (Anthias, 2006; Agathangelou, 2004). Agathangelou reminds us that "the upper owning class draws upon racist and sexist mythologies that 'white but not quite' and also 'black' women's labour is natural so that it can be sold cheaply" (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 70). Anthias, too, stresses the important role of the media and political and state representations which contribute to these constructions of domestic workers as "local constructions within families, neighbourhoods, and communities" (Anthias, 2006, p. 180). Migrant women often have no choice but to submit to this exploitation so that they can send remittances home and support family, elderly and children. Also, back at home the patriarchal structures do not change and the husband/father re-asserts his authority and refuses to nurture and care for the children: "I found that migrant mothers indeed provide care from thousands of miles away, whereas fathers continue to reject the responsibility of nurturing children" (Salazar Parrenas, 2005, p. 7). The labour of these women is extracted at minimum cost to the affluent employer who can then send the labourer home and the host-country is never burdened with responsibilities to educate the women's children, or provide healthcare when the women become older (Hondagneu-Sotelo, 2001).

Another concern is the kind of contribution migration might actually make to development since money is often spent on luxury goods, dowries, buying housing rather than on productive investments thus reinforcing capitalist consumerism. In some cases, it is argued, the increased flow of money has led to inflation in the sending countries thus disadvantaging non-migrant families. Some scholars point out that since the migrants generally come from the middle strata rather than the poorest groups in the areas of origin, remittances often exacerbate social inequality, and lead to increased concentration of land ownership in certain countries. The migration of educated persons from less developed countries means a temporary downward social mobility with regard to legal status (Anthias, 2000). Most migrant women do not know their rights – one reason being that they were raised in patriarchal systems where women have low status, learn to be submissive and are accustomed to traditions that curb women's rights and voices (Maratou-Alipranti, 1999; Symeonidou, 2002; Tsatsoglu and Maratou-Alipranti, 2003).

Background and Methodology

On Sundays and holidays the major squares and parks of the main cities in the Republic of Cyprus are filled with migrant workers – men and women from different parts of the world. In divided Nicosia, a few yards away are the barbed wires and the crossing check points that, since 2003, have enabled contact between people north and south of the island. When some of the female migrant workers in Nicosia were asked about the history of ceasefire lines, barbed wires and check-points they were not only unaware of the local politics but were also uninterested in knowing. They meet in these locations near the Green line on their days off to connect with friends, make telephone calls to their families back home or to shop. Some cook their favourite ethnic foods while others simply sit and relax. Greek Cypriots are hardly seen in such places. The locals simply drive by as if

these people are invisible. The presence, however, of migrants and others in the Republic of Cyprus – whether legal or illegal – is a reality and constitutes a multi-ethnic underclass which provides cheap labour for the locals.

The migrant workers (*metanastes*) have all crossed trans-nationally to seek employment that would ensure a better life than the one back home while at the same time they serve the global economy with cheap labour. Agathangelou (2004) informs us that female migrants leave their country as a result of several forces. Some do so when "the states mediate the relations between the global and local markets in order to facilitate the movement of cheap labour" (2004, p. 79). Another driving factor is "the desire of the upper middle classes to hire reproductive labour cheaply as well as the structural circumstances within which the female migrant worker finds herself" *(ibid)*. As a result of economic development in the Republic of Cyprus an increase in the service economy, tourism and construction industry meant that new labour was needed, especially from the 1990s onwards (Trimikliniotis and Pantelides, 2003; Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006). According to the latest figures of the Ministry of Interior of the Republic of Cyprus as of March 2009 there were 29,000 registered domestic workers out of a total of 67,000 legal migrants from non-European Union countries and 74,000 migrants from EU countries with permanent residency.

Due to the construction boom which began in the north of Cyprus after the rejection of the Annan Plan in 2004 – most of it on Greek Cypriot refugees' land – Turkish and Bulgarian Turks migrated into this part of the island and have been employed in this sector and other services (hotels, restaurants). The migrant workers perform all those jobs the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots stopped doing due to social mobility and better paid work, as earlier research by Trimikliniotis and Pantelides (2003) has shown. Women, as mentioned above, form the majority among migrant workers in Cyprus and more specifically in the area of female domestic work. In the Republic of Cyprus these women are not addressed by their names but by their country of origin or by their colour: "i shrilankeza mou" (my woman from Sri Lanka), "i filipineza mou" (my own Filipino woman), or "mavroula mou" (my little black one). All designations indicate mastery, power over, control and subordination. "Greek and Turkish Cypriot women of the upper and middle-class seem to equate true femininity with unbridled control over women's labour from other peripheral economies" (Agathangelou, 2004, p. 80).

Qualitative Interviewing

The research on migrant domestic workers in the south was undertaken with the help of Katherine Scully, a graduate from Yale University. We used in-depth semi-structured personal interviews with female migrant domestic workers employed in the homes of Greek Cypriot professional middle-class women. We also spoke to representatives from NGOs and officials in the Ministry of Interior and Labour and Social Insurance of the Republic of Cyprus. These interviews were conducted mostly in English, and in three instances we had small groups of migrant women

– two groups of Sri Lankan women and one of Filipinas. These women frequent local parks in the major towns of Nicosia, Limassol and Larnaca on Sundays and holidays. We interviewed twenty domestic workers from Sri Lanka, fourteen from the Philippines and two from India. We selected them randomly and through contacts of their friends. Their ages ranged from 22 to 50 years old. All of the women had high school education and six of them had college education. All but one lived in the house in which they were employed. The husbands of three of the women from Sri Lanka followed them after two years, breaking the traditional pattern of sending countries whereby wives would follow their husbands. Most of them were part of the 'circular' migration pattern, and had previously worked in Hong Kong, Singapore, Korea, Lebanon and Kuwait.

For the interviews carried out in northern Cyprus in the Turkish Cypriot community we adapted the same semi-structured questionnaire. Women were contacted in the Turkish language by two Turkish Cypriot female students, Pembe Bilen and Ziba Sertbay, and a post graduate researcher, Dogus Derya who translated and transcribed the interviews in English (Dr. Biran Mertan a psychologist, helped with the contacts in the north). The interviewees, from various regions of Turkey, Bulgaria, Takjistan, and Kurdistan, totalled twenty-two and their ages ranged from 26 to 45 years old. They were all married and live with their families in the cities of Nicosia, Famagusta and Kyrenia. Unlike in the south, none stayed in the houses of their employers. Three of them were illiterate and ten had not finished elementary school while eight had secondary school education and only one had college education. This is a major difference compared to the female migrants interviewed in the south who were all educated, some with college degrees.

In both communities the major issues we studied included the procedures the women used to come to Cyprus; their working conditions; the treatment they experienced by their 'madam or 'hanım' in the family where they worked; their salary status; awareness of their rights as migrant labourers; solidarity with other workers, agency and networking; and how their lives might improve back home. We also asked whether they knew about the Cyprus conflict and if their 'madams' showed interest in their home country.

Migrants from non-European countries entering the Republic on a work permit are rarely allowed to stay long enough to acquire citizenship and those who desperately need to, resort to marrying elderly Greek Cypriot men to enable them to bring their children or simply to acquire citizenship status. According to Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla (2006) immigration to Cyprus "matches the characteristics of the guest-worker system, with immigrant labour undergoing official recruitment on the basis of a strict system of quotas of work visas, to be allocated to specific sectors of employment and employers ... partly because of the temporary dimension of their stay in Cyprus, migrant workers have never been considered as settlers in the country" (p. 7). Thus, when their visa expires they have to return home. Today, EU country citizens are given priority over non-western or third country nationals and cuts are currently instituted to visas for domestic workers from Asian countries, and preference is given to Rumanian, Bulgarian or Polish citizens who have no limitations on residence and employment terms.

Racism and Exploitation

Even though the issue of gendering migration in the Republic of Cyprus has attracted research attention, sensitisation of society at large has not yet occurred (Trimikliniotis, 1999; 2001; Trimikliniotis and Pantelides, 2003; Kadir, 2001; Lenz, 2006; Agathangelou, 2004; Trimikliniotis and Fulias-Souroulla, 2006; Anthias, 2000; Panayiotopoulos, 2005). One of the major findings in our research indicates that racism is the primary issue in ordering the lives, opportunities, and experiences of female migrant domestic workers in both southern and northern Cyprus. Because of the way these domestic workers are constructed by their employers and the media – their colour, the way they dress and being different – many experience discrimination, overwork and exclusion. Clarisa from the Philippines, aged 24 and college educated, who had worked in South Korea prior to coming to the Republic of Cyprus said: "I think the factory work in Korea was easier than housework in Cyprus. In Korea I worked in the factory for twelve hours and it was easy work. Here, I feel I work twenty-four hours and nobody cares. In the streets I feel racism and I am often approached for sex" (she showed us the bodily gestures men use when they try to buy sex from these women, and calling out the amount of money they will pay them). "Being approached for sex is horrible. Yes, we are poor but we do not want that ... it is so humiliating". Sexual harassment is a frequent complaint of many female migrants in the south who said that they did not feel safe walking in side streets in the cities on their own.

Age sometimes becomes an issue because a number of Sri Lankan and Filipina women look much younger than their passport date of birth indicates so the employers often doubt the validity of their documents and start harassing them to tell the truth about their age. But as one Sri Lankan widow with two children back home told us, "if God is inside you, you stay good-looking outside, it is a God's gift". She did not know how to convince her employer that she was telling the truth. The looks of these women are racialised and sexualised and their bodies become sites for exploitation. There are, of course, other cases where in the migrant workers' experience, racism is such a powerful influence that migrant women have deliberately changed their age on their passports in order to better their chances of employment.

According to KISA (Movement for Equality, Support and Anti-racism) – a non-governmental organisation – the number of female migrant domestic workers in Cyprus has increased because the maximum duration of stay for non-EU citizens has been shortened from six years to four years since Cyprus became a member state of the EU. In the past if someone stayed longer than the six-year period they were afforded additional rights: a fact that was regarded as a 'problem' by the state officials. Currently, if a non-EU citizen in the Republic of Cyprus stays beyond the four-year maximum then s/he is considered illegal and must leave. This is one way of demotivating migrants of non-EU countries from wanting to come to the Republic of Cyprus.

The exploitation that migrant women undergo is also a product of the racist Cypriot understanding of separate 'appropriate' roles, rights, and the position of foreign women. The vast majority of migrant domestic workers in Cyprus live and work under unfavourable conditions,

many of them viewed as the "slaves". Furthermore, there is a high percentage of women who live and work under conditions which violate the normal understanding of human rights and human dignity. In the south almost all domestic workers live-in, and the 'house', like the patriarchal, capitalist state, becomes a structure of oppression and domination as the house, according to Dubisch (1983) quoted in Vassiliadou (2004), is highly symbolic, "a place of cleanliness and purity as opposed to the street which is dirty ... and a place of sexual impurity" (Vassiliadou, 2004, p. 53).

One young Filipino woman regretted coming to Cyprus. She thought that Cyprus, being part of Europe, would treat her much better than other places she had worked before, but she discovered that European membership did not necessarily mean the implementation of European values, laws and principles. Her employer does not keep to the terms of the contract, and within the same salary she is asked to clean two large houses instead of one as per the agreement. In the Philippines, she was a teacher of mathematics in a high school but lost her job because of high unemployment. Her work day starts at seven in the morning and finishes at eight in the evening with one hour's rest. Her 'madam' always complains that she does not clean every corner thoroughly because she notices dust, "which I cannot prevent as it comes through the open windows", Ester said in despair.

According to KISA the exploitation of migrant domestic workers is multi-faced. They are exploited and vulnerable at every step along the way – from their home countries and Cyprus. This includes the requirement for women to pay for and undergo expensive 'training' to acquire the skills necessary to be a domestic worker in Cyprus. These women come to Cyprus through official or unofficial agencies which demand heavy fees. Agencies operate in both the sending and receiving countries. Domestic workers come to Cyprus because they face grave financial hardship in their home countries; however, these women have already accumulated a debt even before arriving in the host country. The agencies inform them that if they come to Cyprus they will earn a lot of money and be able to help their families, so they invest in the trip. Some of them sell their property or secure hefty loans in order to pay the agencies' fees but when they arrive in Cyprus the reality they discover is quite different. Ultimately, the women are compelled to accept abuse. They are overworked but remain silent out of fear of losing their jobs. Many are reluctant to return at the end of four years because they have not earned enough money to compensate for the enormous investment they made in the first place. In addition, others arrive from conflict areas and find that Cyprus is a more secure place to stay and the standard of living is also much better. Therefore, they continue to live in Cyprus, illegally cleaning houses here and there under fear of expulsion. The main problem they face, apart from their low salaries which are discussed below, are difficulties in extending their work permit.

Salary Issue

Although all female domestic workers receive a salary which is greater than the salary available to them in their home countries, it is a fraction of the salary a Greek Cypriot would receive for the same amount of labour. In some cases, employers refuse to pay the full salary guaranteed in the

contract. The current salary is between €282 to €300 per month plus social security. Only in one case out of the thirty-six women we interviewed did the domestic worker receive €450, and this was because she did not live-in but rented a room with friends. This woman, a Sri Lankan aged 28, had been in Cyprus for two and a half years and worked for a 'madam' with two children aged 9 years and 8 months. She looked after the children in addition to cooking and cleaning the house until 8 p.m. Prior to coming to Cyprus she had finished high school, completed one year of college, and had been employed as a domestic worker in Lebanon and Kuwait since she was aged 20. Another woman from Sri Lanka who worked 13 hours a day asked the 'madam' for a raise. 'Madam' not only refused her request but accusingly stated that she did not "move fast enough, you are slow, that is why".

There have been many complaints about the low salary scales and the Cyprus government will need to review its policies to make the domestic work sector attractive to EU nationals though this might face resistance from employers. Occasionally, a few of these women resort to other practices in their free time in order to earn more money, such as selling sex or cleaning other houses, and in both they risk arrest and deportation if brought to the attention of authorities. Regrettably, their employers do not question the conditions which lead these women to engage in such acts and society at large readily condemns them and the media portray them as immoral and "dirty". Moreover, the local press sensationalises incidents like these and accuses the 'victims' of undermining the 'morality codes' of the Greek Cypriot community. It rarely seems to occur to the journalists to investigate and condemn the 'demand' side of sex work. An example of this was in November 2008 when a group of young domestic workers were arrested in Larnaca on charges of 'selling sex' in their free time. The press (print and TV) characterised them as 'whores' and demanded their immediate deportation so as not to tarnish the reputation of the Cypriot households in which they were employed.

Some domestic workers informed us that they were not allowed a private life: their employers were said to check their outings and discourage the formation of intimate relations (e.g. having boyfriends) because if they became pregnant, as a result, they would work less and demand health rights. There are 'madams' who do not supply soap or shampoo or washing powder so the women have to buy these items from their salary. They feel very upset and angry about this because they want to save their money. Many have expectations that their salaries will increase, especially if they work well and their employer is satisfied but this does not always happen.

Living Standards

Standards of living vary from one case to another. An employer who does not respect or allow normal or healthy living standards will not normally face any consequences. Although most employers meet basic requirements, there have been cases reported by our interviewees of employers who would not permit their housemaid to leave the house, to rest, or eat sufficient amounts of food. Most housemaids eat after the family has finished their meal or they are requested

to take their food in their room. Often, they are not allowed to cook their own ethnic food because "it smells badly". There are a few 'madams', however, who invite their housemaids to sit at the table with the family but only if there are no guests. Many of them gather on Sundays in their friends' rented flat and together they cook their ethnic dishes and spend their time pleasantly listening to their own ethnic music or watching a film from their country. This is their way of keeping the connection with their home country and family. It also shows that there are no appropriate places for entertainment and social interaction for live-in domestic workers.

Although employment contracts establish a normal seven-hour work-day, most employers require somewhere between 10 and 13 hours of work a day. As employers face few consequences for violating the terms of the contract, the numbers of hours that domestic workers must work is, practically, at the discretion of the employer. A majority of the domestic workers, whom we interviewed, expressed a willingness to work overtime but resented the fact that their extra work was not compensated for by an increase in over-time wages. Furthermore, the majority felt like second-class citizens and believed their hard labour was degraded and undervalued by the other women they serve. It seems, as Agathangelou also noted, that Greek and Turkish Cypriot 'madams' and 'hanıms' seem to equate 'true femininity' with unbridled control over women's labour from the 'margins'.

Cherry, a young Filipino aged 23 years old, worked for a family in which both 'madam and sir' had their own business. They had two children, aged four and one whom Cherry looks after. In violation of the contract, she worked 13 hours a day, and when she complained about it she was told: "you are not a Cypriot to deserve more". This response reveals not only racism but also the 'madam's' class politics as it is gendered and racialised. Through her comment, the 'madam' constitutes herself as the powerful one who hires a 'migrant domestic worker to serve her'.

> "In the morning every day at 7 o'clock I go upstairs and help get the children ready, then feed them. The four-year old goes to nursery and when the one-year old sleeps I start to clean the whole house ... I clean very carefully because madam wants everything to shine. She always complains and I feel scared when she becomes very angry and I want to leave but I had spent so much money coming here, I cannot. I came here to earn money. I finish work at eight o'clock at night and I am exhausted. I think I am going crazy. Sometimes, my body hurts so much ... I work 13 hours and she gives me only 150 Cyprus pounds. If I complain she tells me 'you are not a Cypriot to pay you to work only seven hours'. Madam knows this is illegal but she also knows that I am afraid to do anything about it. I am a single mother with one child back home and I send all the money I earn."

Cherry feels trapped despite the injustice and bad treatment she receives from her well-to-do madam who receives services at very exploitative rates. As Agathangelou (2004) said, the idea of women as servants is based on the assumption that women's labour is a 'natural resource'. "It is perceived as just a 'natural' extension of femininity, a 'natural' extension of race (i.e. the perception that these women are docile, etc.), thereby not costing the same as men's labour" (p. 83).

A Sri Lankan interviewee, Shandra, told us that she had such a heavy workload that after many days of scrubbing, her muscles would spasm and freeze, and her hands would cramp into curled fists, forcing her to pry her fingers open each morning. She never eats with the family, but always alone in the kitchen. Many of these women suffer bodily injuries due to heavy housework – climbing up on ladders to clean high dirty windows and cellars. In other circumstances these 'madams' would call someone from a cleaning company to do this job and pay extra money. These women are treated according to a patriarchal, hierarchical understanding of dominant and subordinate relationships. As long as the professional middle and upper class 'madams' do not question their roles in reproducing the system within a world structure that draws upon ideologies of nature versus culture to further profit generation, the prevailing system will remain intact (*ibid.*).

Emotional and Sexual Abuse

Very few domestic workers found relative comfort with their employer, and would consider using words such as "kind" or "nice" to describe their 'madam' who gave them gifts occasionally. (We found this to apply more with reference to the Turkish Cypriot 'hanıms' as will be shown below). Others, however, reported living in a constant state of psychological fear, with a 'madam' who would unpredictably scream, threaten deportation, or physically attack them. One interviewee told us that she suffered so much mental abuse that she began to have 'out of body experiences', describing her state as, "physically I am present, but mentally I am absent". Another interviewee reported experiencing crushing depression each morning, when she awoke, moaning, "Oh my god, it's morning again, and then madam is going to yell at me again". A third feared that she had developed a heart condition: that her employer's threats of deportation caused such acute panic attacks, she feared her health was permanently affected. Some religious Sri Lankans viewed their ordeals as "maybe a trial from God" and refrained from complaining. These professional 'madams' use 'power' over these female workers in the same way that men and the system control them. In turn, the 'madams' objectify and commodify the domestic workers. The 'madams' seem to reproduce the very system that subjugates them but are often unaware of the implications.

In addition to emotional abuse from the 'madams', some of the domestic workers reported incidences of sexual harassment from male employers. Some had repeated offers of money for sexual favours, while others reported attempted rapes. The embarrassment and social stigma surrounding sexual abuse suggests that actual incidences are probably much higher than those reported, as in the case of Rashini, aged 40 years old from Sri Lanka, who worked as a domestic worker for a doctor's family. The 'madam' was a lawyer.

> "At first all was good though I had to work long hours. I got attached to the children and it was a kind of consolation for me not to think about my daughters and son all the time. Then something terrible happened. 'Sir' started coming to my room late at night, and asking me for sex. I was shocked and of course I refused but he would not stop. Weeks went by

> and I decided to talk to madam. She started shouting at me that I was telling her lies and that I was imagining things. She not only did not believe me but the next day she threw me out of the house. I was sick for days and then I could not go back to my country. I needed to work and send money, my husband had no job. I told nobody about it out of fear. So I started cleaning houses here and there. A good madam helped me find houses to clean. I stay in a basement with three other Sri Lankans. Every time I see a policeman I get so scared." (Rashini, 2004)

Rashini, after three years of working as an illegal migrant, left Cyprus in 2006 because her health was deteriorating and she was taking all kinds of anti-depressant pills. She never revealed the name of her employer. The 'madam' with not a second thought dismissed Rashini without fear of any ramifications or lack of compensation, but instead viewed her as a 'bad woman' who tried to mar her husband's reputation. Hence, the 'madam' tries to seemingly protect both the patriarchal male authority and her own marriage while reproducing the very system that leads to dysfunctional relationships. This is one example of similar stories we heard from female migrant women in the south who constitute part of the global restructuring of economies to generate more profit for less cost. All of these avenues of exploitation derive from an ingrained racism, and classicism which causes the Cypriot employer to view the female migrant worker as "unequal", or an object of property thereby allowing the employers who do not perceive their actions as discriminatory and unfair, to treat the employee profoundly "unequally": to pay the employee unequally, to extract unequal amounts of labour, to expect sexual favours, and so on (Agathangelou, 2004). None of the domestic workers we interviewed in the northern part of Cyprus complained about sexual harassment but only of emotional abuse.

Agency and Networking

Of course, the female domestic workers are not only 'victims' of global economy and of their 'madams' but some of them also find ways to exhibit agency and to assert their rights as well as set up networks and small makeshift ethnic 'businesses'. Azita, from Sri Lanka, is 44 years of age, well-educated, and used to work for the army in her country. When she first came to Cyprus she worked in a doctor's house in Paphos in the western part of the island. The family had a large house and she also had to clean the doctor's office. The doctor would often corner her and offer her money to have sex with him. He would explicitly cite her low wages in order to make his offer more enticing, but she resisted. She told us that she "used her brain" and would make obstacles for him until his wife returned from work. She could not stand it for long so she spoke to a female lawyer and the doctor was charged with sexual harassment and was denied a further permit to employ any other migrant female worker again. Azita, not only knew her rights and how her dignity was violated, but also challenged the patriarchal and racialised system. She was later employed at a household in Nicosia where both 'madam' and 'sir' were overly demanding and verbally abusive. "The parents beat the children and the children were abusive to me. I could not stand it and left".

The third family she now works for is "good, stable and I am happy to work for them. They respect me as a human being". She told us of many other cases of domestic workers from Sri Lanka and India who are sexually abused but are too ashamed, fearful or powerless to report it. She cited her intelligence, maturity and experience as tools that helped her escape the aggression of her two previous employers and she seemed unscathed, describing it without any particular emotional attachment. Still, she was not satisfied with her meagre salary. As she was talking to us she divided up, into thirty days, her salary of CY£150 to reveal that domestic workers receive only CY£5 (about €8 / US$12) for more than eight-hour's work per day. To complement her salary Azita conducts a little business in the recreation park on Sundays, cooking and selling ethnic food.

Domestic workers also create their own support and networking systems. For instance, some of the women were well-informed and knew their own rights and would ask for legal advice. Others created support groups, shared their experiences and helped each other. The older Sri Lankan women would lend support to newcomers and brief them on general Cypriot working conditions, their rights, and where to ask for help.

The Filipino women are more organised than the others and often contact their local honorary Consul for help. One of the Greek Cypriot daily newspapers, '*Politis*', publishes a special supplement now and then about Filipino life and news in Cyprus, in an effort to make their presence visible. In addition, KISA organises a 'rainbow festival' annually which is dedicated to the cultures and presence of migrant workers in Cyprus, and offers an opportunity for Cypriots to get to know the different 'others' as well as appreciate and enjoy multi-ethnic performances, ethnic cuisine and culture.

On the issue of the migrant women's awareness of the Cyprus conflict, almost all knew nothing about the issues involved or why the United Nations Peace Keeping force has been in Cyprus. None of the women we interviewed had crossed to the north yet. They tended to stay together and create their own closed communities. The Republic of Cyprus has not really created structures or places for them to spend their free time in a respectful and enjoyable environment despite demands by local NGOs, nor have 'madams' asked their housemaids about the political situation in their own countries, such as the conflict in Sri Lanka or the problems in India or the Philippines. Only during the devastating tsunami did the Cypriots become mobilised to send financial aid. The major focus and interest for the migrant women is economics, while for the Cypriot middle-class professional women it is their 'liberation' from household duties and child care, which ignores the fact that they themselves are the products of patriarchal, phalocentric ideologies and a global neoliberal system.

The Experience North of the Green Line

The Turkish Cypriot community which made up 18% of the total Cypriot population prior to 1974 is today overwhelmed with the influx of many thousands of predominantly Turks from Turkey – which largely constitutes the 'settler problem' (there are many categories of 'settlers') –

and many Turkish Cypriots talk of becoming a minority in their own community. The exact number of these settlers/migrants is not known, as numbers are politicised (Hatay, 2005). Similarly to the south there are different groupings of workers, some with work permits and others who are non-registered workers. An attempt was made to ascertain the number of migrant female domestic workers but a clear classification for the different categories of immigrants could not be found. The migrant female women that we interviewed came from Turkey (Arab, and Kurdish origin), Bulgaria and Tajikistan.

The procedures used to come to northern Cyprus differ from the ones used by the female migrants in the Republic of Cyprus. The Turkish female migrants do not use any agencies. The majority follow their husbands, brothers or friends who arrived before. Some of the Bulgarian Turks first travelled to Turkey but could not find work there. Later, after they heard that the construction business in northern Cyprus was thriving, they came to the island. According to the 'social network' theory the majority of these workers used the information passed on by friends, relatives or neighbours to explore working opportunities, as in the case of Sebile and her family:

> "It was my brother who came first fifteen years ago and lives in LefkoKa with his wife and he told me to come and work here. He found me this job. He told me there was this couple that was trying to find a trustful woman who would take care of their children. My brother and Hanım (madam) work together. When I arrived hanım got me a 'work permit' and registered me to the responsible authority. I do not know my rights but if I am in trouble I will inform my brother. He knows how to solve problems. They are nice people and treat me very well and sometimes we have coffee together ... I have friends who go to work as domestic workers in other countries and most of them suffered badly and returned to Bulgaria. It is a pity to work like an animal in order to live like a human being" (Sebile, 2007).

Sebile, aged 39, married with one child, is aware of global migration problems, and the exploitation and mental abuse that many of her friends have experienced. She considers herself lucky because she has her brother to take care of her problems since he knows the system. Thus, the gendered roles and dependency relations continue to be reproduced in the patriarchal new environment, reinforcing the continuation of gender roles and disproving the claim that female migration challenges gender imbalances (UNFPA Report, 2006). In similar pattern to the Filipina and Sri Lankan domestic workers in the south, the Bulgarian Turks also seem to stick together to help each other and form their own community. Münever and her family came to the island in 2006 through connections and friends who had become citizens of the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC)' and they knew how to use the system. So, when Münever and her family arrived, they established links with the Bulgarian Turkish community which helped them to integrate:

> "Actually we have Bulgarian Turks who have been living in Cyprus since 1999 and they helped me find a job. They are Bulgarian citizens but they also took the TRNC citizenship.

> The woman who helped me find a job was a neighbour of my relatives in Bulgaria. At the beginning we stayed at their house and we moved to our house after my husband and I earned the required money to rent a house. I have no working license [and] I am an unregistered worker. If the government registers me, it will force me to pay taxes. I don't want this. I cannot give the money I earn with difficulty to the authorities ... you should not tell anyone but I am an illegal worker ..."

Münever is aware of her obligations toward the system but is prepared to take risks because her financial needs are more urgent. We interviewed other women like her who are illegal, with no working permits and live in fear of being discovered. Fatma, who is 37 years old, is an Arab Turk. She is illiterate and cleans the homes of Turkish Cypriot professional women. She told us:

> "We are not citizens. We have been living here since 1993 but could not be citizens. I don't know why. My husband said we had to file an application in order to be citizens. We did two years ago and the officials told us we have to work five more years after our official application. I hope when we become citizens the government will provide services for my disabled children".

Fatma has five children, the eldest is a boy of 14 and the others are girls – two of them are severely disabled. Her son takes care of the girls when Fatma works. Her illiteracy keeps her dependent on others which makes her life difficult and because of this she wants to educate her children. This is an additional reason for coming to Cyprus:

> "I really want to educate my children because if you are illiterate you have to suffer like me ... I took my disabled daughter to the hospital, waited there for long hours, but nobody called our name. I went to a nurse and asked her why and she pointed to a board, which she read to me saying, 'please take a number to see the doctor'. If I were literate I could read it and take a number. I spent too much time at the hospital for nothing, you understand me?"

The interviewees, like those in the Republic of Cyprus, all mentioned that they came to north Cyprus to make a better life for themselves and their children, especially the Bulgarian Turkish women who claimed that they suffered a great deal due to racism under the Bulgarian government,

> "they put great pressure on us, simply because we were Turkish. They forced us to change our names. They did bad things to us. We were not allowed to speak our language but I have to say even those times were better than today. The economic situation was better."

Some of the Turkish migrant women had difficulties in adjusting to the Turkish Cypriot culture – food, lifestyle and customs. Sebile said:

> "I do not know how to say it but I have not adapted to the Turkish Cypriot way of life. They speak loudly, for example. I think they like to tell naughty jokes, especially jokes about sexual issues which make me so embarrassed, they are too modern for us".

When some of the 'hanıms' have guests they call the domestic workers to help serve and clean the house, but never to cook for them, for as Emine said:

> "I never cook for the hanıms, our food is different from theirs. Our meals are too hot for them, you know, we use a lot of pepper and other spices. Turkish Cypriots are like Europeans. I only go there to clean."

Emine experiences a clash of cultures, and norms as well as a social distance defined by race, class and gender. Thus the 'hanım', who seeks her own 'liberation' from housework, objectifies and constructs the 'migrant woman' as the 'other', someone who is there to serve her and provide her labour for a 'clean home' at a very low cost.

In north Cyprus not one of the domestic workers lives in their employers' house unlike those in the south. It is not a custom in the north. One explanation put forward could be that these domestic workers come to the north with their families; secondly, Turkish Cypriot women do not like to have a 'stranger' live-in, thus they have a different understanding from Greek Cypriot women of 'home and private space'; and thirdly, because of economic reasons, the domestic workers make more money as a family than as individuals. They take care of the children, clean the houses or care for the elderly persons and "when hanım finishes her job and comes home she finds a clean house and all in order then we leave". They believe that they 'liberate' the 'hanıms' from housework and child care so that they can promote their career and form better relations with their husbands. Consequently, like in the south, the patriarchal structures and sexual division of labour remain intact too.

Salaries and Working Conditions

Unlike the domestic workers in the south most of our interviewees in the north seemed content with their salaries and the working conditions. They did not have to send money back home since they lived with their families and their husbands were also in work. They were employed mostly in the construction industry or as road workers. Fatihe, who is aged 39 and illiterate with three children, found that most of the 'hanıms' are 'nice persons' and asserted:

> "if they do not like my cleaning, they kindly warn me and ask me to clean better. They don't shout at me like the crazy woman in Gönyeli who shouted at me and was obsessed with the hygiene of the kitchen. She made me cry so I left her. I tell you, I can never work for people who forget that I am a human being as they are. I have dignity; it is a matter of honour."

Fatihe, developed such a close relationship with one of the 'hanıms' who asked her whether she wanted more children and when she replied that she did not, the 'hanım', who is a pharmacist, talked to her about contraception and the pill:

> "She gave me some pills and told me those pills prevent pregnancy and I should use one every day if I do not want any more children. She is a wise woman and helps me whenever I need her. So, I listened to her and started taking these pills. I do not know how to say it, I am a little bit shy ... but you know my husband refuses to use any protection, which means the pill will save my life. I am so pleased; I kept this as my secret and did not tell my husband."

Due to the fact that many interviewees were illiterate and came from 'traditional' social backgrounds they had no information about reproductive rights and their sexuality was controlled by men. They told us that they were embarrassed to discuss issues of sex, reproductive health or sexuality. These issues were taboo for them. When they heard Turkish Cypriot women talking about such issues they felt shy and uncomfortable. Whereas for women in western countries the pill was part of the sexual revolution and helped women have control over their bodies and reproductive rights, for many of the female Turkish or Bulgarian Turkish migrants these were unspoken issues. Apart from these cultural differences between Turkish Cypriot women and the migrant domestic workers there are differences in the standard of education, class, race, and lifestyle.

Their working day is usually eight hours, but they do not work on Sundays or holidays. However, they have 'double work' because after their paid work they continue their unpaid work in their own home. It is the 'hanıms' who arrange the working hours for them according to their needs, unlike the south where the domestic workers have a fixed contract which shows a different arrangement of social work. Ayşe, who is 33 years old and has four children said:

> "I start work at seven o'clock in the morning and my work finishes at five in the afternoon. I work eight hours per day. I clean three houses per week. I have rest breaks and eat my lunch. I get the minimum wage because I am illegal. One of the hanıms has her own business with her sister".

Ayşe, unlike other Bulgarian Turks, wants to return to Bulgaria after she and her husband save enough money. Others do not want to return to Turkey, like Fatma, who has 14 siblings in Hatay and sometimes they call her to go back but she refuses, thinking of the difficulties and hard times despite the fact that she finds life in the north expensive:

> "I do not want to return because I will have to work in the fields and fruit gardens there all day. It is much easier to clean people's houses. I will never go back. If we buy a house in Lefkoşa, our life will be much better ... Houses are too expensive here; we don't have enough money yet. My husband has a car but we don't use it because fuel is expensive."

The migrant domestic workers find life very expensive in northern Cyprus as part of the global capitalist restructuring. Yet compared to the life they had prior to coming to north Cyprus they would still prefer to stay and nurture their dream of buying a house one day and becoming part of the capitalist consumerist class. There are some who admitted to us that they feel lonely and long for a sense of community and appropriate places for entertainment. They find Turkish Cypriots very individualistic and distant. Emine, like others said, "sometimes I feel abandoned and want to cry loudly ... I know there are other women like me but I don't know personally anyone in this part of the city".

As in the south, many of these women do not feel integrated in the local society and experience racism, sexism and discrimination. A few of the Bulgarian Turkish women complained that they work 'like slaves' to make ends meet. Others from Tajikistan find certain 'hanıms' arrogant. They

humiliate them or treat them 'like dogs'. But others felt satisfied with their salary in comparison to what it was like in their home country. Some earn 70 Turkish Liras (TL), i.e. €35, a day cleaning three houses, with the exception of ironing laundry for which they are paid extra. In Bulgaria, they said, a female worker is paid 200TL per month (€100) on average and they wondered how they could live on so little money. Though their incentive for coming to northern Cyprus was to earn money, some stressed the psychological isolation stating that "we feel we are in 'exile' even though they [locals] speak the same language and have the same religion".

Rights and the Cyprus Conflict

No-one we interviewed in northern Cyprus knew their rights or even understood what the concept of 'rights' entailed. Most of the Turkish domestic workers did not know where the Turkish Embassy was in case they needed any help. Most of them said that if they were to face any problems or get into any trouble they would go to their husbands or brothers. None of the women spoke of organising or becoming involved in an association. On occasions some of the employers asked about their families and offered help or a Ramadan basket (goods given as charity on specific religious days). Others showed no interest in them.

Following a similar pattern to the south, the majority of domestic workers in the north did not know anything about the Cyprus conflict either. Only the Bulgarian Turkish women had heard that "the Christians and Moslems of Cyprus did not get along and that the Greeks dominated the Turkish Cypriots as did the Bulgarians to the Turks". Some Bulgarians had crossed to the south and commented that the Greek part is more developed and rich but they would not like to work for Greek 'madams' because "they have a different religion and a different language". Most of them were not interested in politics because "politicians ruin people's lives". Sebile did not care because: "I am not a Cypriot, I don't have to think about the Cyprus problem. If I continue to live here I may start to worry but now I don't want to" The 'hanıms' never talked to them about the conflict, but they sometimes heard related items about it on TV, which they found 'boring'. It is not surprising that the Cyprus conflict is an irrelevant issue to the migrant workers on both sides but an every day issue for the Cypriots. In fact the Cyprus conflict trumps all other serious social issues such as women's rights, racism, exploitation of migrants, discrimination, and sex trafficking. Some work has been done in the last few years but much more needs to be produced so as to sensitise the societies at large.

Concluding Remarks

The female migrant domestic workers in both parts of Cyprus experience problems and challenges as do migrant women in many other European countries.[2] Following the pattern found in the rest

2 [See: www.FeMiPol.uni-frankfurt.de].

of Southern Europe, women enter the Republic of Cyprus as domestic workers and in the northern part of Cyprus they arrive with their families under various residence statuses.

The female domestic workers in northern Cyprus do not use the same procedures to enter the country nor do they have any training prior to arriving as do many domestic workers in the Republic of Cyprus who all come via agencies and require work permits. In the north, all the interviewees arrived with their families, but laws and regulations appear ambiguous and are mostly not observed. Most of them said that in addition to coming to Cyprus for economic reasons their aim was to also educate their children in Turkish Cypriot schools. As the Cypriot women acquire higher education and become part of the financial markets, the need for employing other women to take care of their household increases since the structures and gender roles remain intact. The migrant women's cheap labour replaces the state obligation for child care, welfare for the elderly and flexible working hours for mothers.

The issues concerning migrant women in Cyprus and elsewhere are pressing for two reasons. Firstly, they are important regarding the protection of human rights and democracy. Secondly, the treatment of migrant workers – taking female domestic workers into account – will certainly, and indeed already has, brought a profound change to the social fabric of many societies including the Cypriot society where we noted an increase in mixed marriages with Cypriot men or women. In the south mixed marriages reached 24% in 2004 and 20% in 2006, and in the north they are more than 15%. One other pressing issue is to inform migrants of their rights and resources, legal and structural. According to KISA most of the migrants readily admit that they do not know their rights and they rely on their employers or agencies to tell them. Similarly, the domestic workers in the north are not informed either and rely on their husbands or male relatives. Their own agency is thus undermined by patriarchy and the hierarchical structures as well as sexual division of labour. Many female migrants in both the south and north feared that if they filed a complaint their employers would ask for their deportation which shows that although the laws exist they are not used. Cypriots need to acknowledge that the migration flow has been beneficial to both sides of the island in that migrants undertake tasks undesirable to Cypriots due to social upward mobility and thus they contribute to the local economies.

From the analysis of our data it is apparent that the argument put forward by the neo-liberal approach that the migration process can be a means of empowerment for migrant women does not seem to be so; the majority remain vulnerable, their labour objectified, and racialised (Abraham, 2002). Empowerment should mean knowledge of their rights as human beings and as workers in the global economy. Training and seminars should, therefore, be organised for this purpose.

While the presence and employment of female migrant domestic workers has relieved Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot professional women of their household duties, and allowed them the time and psychological space to pursue their own career and personal advancement, no transformation of gender relations has simultaneously occurred. In the Republic of Cyprus, domestic workers have been bringing up the new generation of children who sometimes treat their carers as 'servants or slaves', thus adopting gendered and racialised behaviour. And there is a high

probability of them perpetuating this practice in their adult life if left unchecked. This is also a result of the very slow adjustment of the Greek and Turkish Cypriot male mentality with regard to their sharing of responsibilities in the private sphere (Peristianis and Kokkinou, 2008).

Many domestic workers receive unequal and exploitative treatment from the 'madams/hanıms' whose 'liberation' is facilitated through these very same women whom they often mistreat and abuse, having constructed them as both members of the household and as 'alien subjects'. Many of these professional women adopt a racist attitude, perceiving their domestic workers as inferior and being at the 'margin' – there to serve them so that they have it all – a career, a clean house, children taken care of and a relaxed husband. Hence, the hierarchical, patriarchal system is recreated within the madam-domestic worker relationship. The 'madams' do not seem to recognise that had it not been for these women they would not have been able to promote their professional careers, have a clean home and their children cared for, as well as travel and develop their autonomy. Both 'madams' and the domestic workers need to become aware of how the patriarchal and global capitalist processes are obstacles to their true 'emancipation'. They should struggle to cease being victims of such conditions, be they at the state or the public and domestic sites in male dominated Cyprus. A joint struggle is proposed here based on gender and class consciousness, female solidarity and the acknowledgement of inter-dependence. The stakes are different for each group of women but all connect to the desire which needs to be cultivated for an alternative world of 'real liberation' from patriarchal structures, racism, sexism, and capitalist exploitation. Of course, more research needs to be undertaken in order to become more informed about similarities and differences of the conditions of female domestic workers in divided Cyprus so that a better understanding may be gleaned of the struggles for social changes and what this might entail.

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Settlements in Unended Conflicts: The Case of Cyprus

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Abstract

Cyprus is an unended conflict despite many intercommunal negotiations and the best efforts of the international community. The paper begins with a brief overview of the nature of settlements, followed by a synopsis of the recent history of the Cyprus conflict. The brunt of the paper is an analysis of contemporary Cyprus concentrating on the period since the Annan Plan, ending with the current intercommunal negotiations. The emphasis is on the difficulties in arriving at a settlement which help to explain why this protracted conflict remains neither settled nor resolved.

Keywords: Protracted conflict, conflict settlement, Cyprus conflict, United Nations, European Union

Introduction

Since the Turkish military intervention of 1974 there have been numerous international diplomatic initiatives aimed at restoring the unity of Cyprus. All have failed. The most recent was the Annan Plan, which was accepted by the Turkish Cypriots but rejected, by a large majority, by the Greek Cypriots. A new effort began on 3 September 2008 and is still in progress. The original premise of this paper was that settlement was progressively more unlikely because, with increasing interaction between individuals, enterprises and institutions in the two communities across the Green Line and abroad, the need for a settlement had declined and with it the imperative for a formal agreement. There is not a hurting stalemate sufficient to induce the parties to take a risk which may explain why there is no movement towards a settlement when, to an outside observer, there appears no insuperable impediment to one. The paper begins with a short discussion of the nature of settlements, followed by a brief synopsis of the recent history of Cyprus. The brunt of the paper is a discussion of a situation in which life is relatively comfortable for both communities but there still hangs over them unfinished business of a potentially catastrophic nature while at the same time the barriers do not seem to be inherently insurmountable.

1 Keith Webb made a substantial contribution to this paper despite being seriously ill. He died on 14 March 2008. He will be remembered as a true scholar and gentleman. For this reason not all the references are complete or in place for which understanding is requested in the circumstances.

The Nature of Settlements

What do we mean by a 'settlement' in violent conflict? In common parlance, it is an agreement which in some way is accepted by two or more parties. Once a settlement is achieved, the dispute between the parties is considered to be at an end. In reality, of course, there are often issues that remain but these are not considered germane or reason for the continuance of violent conflict. A degree of acceptance is given by both or all parties. Here we identify four modes of settlement, which are not, however, necessarily mutually exclusive, in the sense that there can be overlap. The typology is, therefore, an heuristic device rather than a strict classification.

The first type of settlement to which we draw attention is what we term a 'unilateral *Diktat*'. In these cases settlement and the end of violent conflict is imposed by the stronger party, usually as the result of an outright victory. In short, the victor determines the nature of the settlement and imposes it on the loser. It is rare, however, that the loser has no power whatsoever since victors usually need some local cooperation in order to govern and in so doing have to confer power on indigenous bodies. Examples of this are the settlements initially imposed on Germany and Japan in the occupation following the Second World War. A variant of this is the total destruction of the enemy. Fortunately, even with such a genocidal intention and behaviour, it is rarely possible wholly to destroy the enemy although the Romans had a good try in their victory over Carthage.

The second type of settlement is what can be termed a 'negotiated settlement'. This is a far more common form, and will usually involve compromise. Examples would include the Northern Ireland settlement or the constitutional trifurcation that characterises the settlement between the Walloons and the Flemish in Belgium. This kind of settlement is often marked by two features. First, external parties are frequently involved. These may be either first-track or second-track actors, or often, some combination of the two. In the Northern Irish case external first-track actors included the British government, the Irish government, and the United States while there were numerous second-track interventions ranging from fact-finding missions to actual attempts to facilitate or mediate. Secondly, negotiated settlements will often take many years to achieve and may be accompanied, in a bicommunal context, by considerable violence. This mode of settlement is that which has been adopted by the international community in the case of Cyprus.

The third type of 'settlement' is what we term a 'stasis' settlement. In this case the actual physical violent conflict has ended, and in the case of Cyprus it seems unlikely to be resumed, but no actual agreement has occurred. Instead, there is an implicit acceptance of the situation in spite of the rhetoric and smoke. There are agreements and acceptances by the parties on small issues, there is a conversation between the parties, but the major issues remain unresolved. It is this kind of 'unended settlement' that we identify as pertinent to Cyprus.

Finally, there is the possibility of a 'full resolution' of the conflict. In such a situation all the parties to the dispute have taken a full part in the peace process and consider, on a basis of full knowledge and without any manifest or structural coercion, that their interests have been met and their values fulfilled. The parties to the dispute are those who hold a veto power. If they are not

satisfied, then they will have to be coerced or they will wreck the agreement thus obviating a resolution. If, however, they give their accord then a new set of relationships develops between the parties, which may be close or distant, which is self-sustaining without coercion. The long process of Franco-German conflict resolution from Churchill's Zurich speech in 1946 to the Charter of Paris and the reunification of Germany at the beginning of the 1990s demonstrates that resolution is possible even in conflicts that last for decades.

In our initial thoughts the third kind of settlement was apposite with respect to Cyprus and we felt that there would not be a fully fledged settlement – by which we mean a re-unification of the island under an agreed constitution within the common state, probably accompanied by de-militarization – since the constant small accommodations removed the irritants which would have led to negotiations and a full settlement. While there has been some accommodation – such as the opening of crossings between north and south – these are not of a sufficient order to move the situation. Only in the last few months have the 'technical committees' proposed by the UN got off the ground and the high level talks, following the Greek Cypriot elections, have given signs of more than a ritual round of negotiations. Nevertheless, the resounding rejection of the Annan Plan by the Greek Cypriots suggests that the going is not likely to be easy.

A Brief Background to the Cyprus Conflict

Cyprus has been invaded and conquered many times. At no time prior to 1960 had it ever been truly autonomous. While always culturally a Hellenistic island, there have always been other cultural incursions of which the most obvious one is Ottoman. At present some 18% of the island's population is culturally Turkish and Muslim, while the vast numerical majority is culturally Greek and Orthodox. In the past the two communities lived together, but largely separately. Even in mixed villages there were separate cafés, a church and a mosque, two languages neither of which was *lingua franca* for the other community (English was for the elites) and there was virtually no intermarriage. Only to a limited degree were they Cypriots since their prime sense of identity was derived from their respective 'motherlands' – Greece and Turkey – although recent surveys suggest that this has changed significantly in the Greek Cypriot community.[2]

However, rather than go back into the depths of time, let the story begin in 1878 when Britain leased Cyprus from the declining Ottoman Empire. This effectively gave Britain naval control of the whole Mediterranean and protected the recently acquired Suez Canal. It also gave Britain a *place d'armes* from which to support the Ottomans against Russian incursions. Britain continued to administer Cyprus until it was annexed in the First World War and in 1925 became a British Crown Colony, which was recognised in the Treaty of Lausanne. It retained this status until 1960 when Cyprus achieved independence.

2 See Hubert Faustmann (2008) 'Aspects of Political Culture in Cyprus' in James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), *The Government and Politics of Cyprus*. London: Peter Lang, p. 21.

The Turkish Cypriots were always less keen on an end to British colonial rule than were the Greek Cypriots. First, they feared being dominated by the numerical Greek majority, and secondly, for some Greek Cypriot activists, the British departure was linked to *enosis* or union with Greece. In this case, rather than being a minority on a small island, the Turkish Cypriots would be an even smaller minority within a much larger country. The radical demand for *enosis* emerged effectively in 1931 and was a constant if not always dominant theme up to 1960. The cultural relationship between Greece and Cyprus was always an asymmetrical one. While Greek Cypriots looked to Greece and particularly Athens as the centre of Greek culture, the Greeks viewed Cypriots very much as country cousins. The Turkish Cypriots, a smaller and poorer community, did not at that time demonstrate such strong ties towards the Kemalist state.

During the Second World War, Greek Cypriots supported the British, especially after Greece was invaded and occupied while Turkey, on the other hand, was neutral. The British retention of the island after the Second World War led to the formation of EOKA, a militant and violent guerrilla organisation fighting for *enosis*. This led, in its turn, to the formation of the TMT, a Turkish Cypriot military group organised to combat EOKA. One consequence of this was a vastly increased British military involvement in Cyprus, with mounting levels of violence. Two factors enhanced the EOKA campaign. First, decolonisation, particularly of the British and French empires was gathering pace, encouraged by the UN and the US. Secondly, the mountainous terrain of Cyprus made it, for a while, effective guerrilla country, but by 1956 the British had it under control and the violence moved to the towns. In spite of the small population of Cyprus – or more specifically the Greek Cypriots – it was a colonial war that could not be won politically even if it could be controlled militarily at some cost. After long negotiations in Zurich and London, independence was granted in 1960. However, it was a form of independence that neither Greek nor Turkish Cypriots wanted. It was imposed upon them by Greece, Turkey and Britain.[3]

While, because of their numerical majority, the Greek Cypriots had the predominant role, safeguards were built into the constitution for the protection of the Turkish Cypriots. The Vice-President was a Turkish Cypriot, and there were certain embedded Turkish Cypriot vetoes. There were three guarantor Powers – Greece, Turkey and Britain. The British kept two Sovereign Base Areas for British military use, one outside Larnaca and the other outside Limassol. The new President was the towering figure of Archbishop Makarios, who in 1963 instigated thirteen amendments to the constitution which led to immediate communal violence due to their rejection by the Turkish Cypriots. In effect the proposed amendments would have nullified the Turkish Cypriot safeguards. British forces came out of their bases and maintained a relative peace until a United Nations force arrived and took over.[4] But communal violence continued and a substantial

3 For an analysis of the period until independence in 1960, see John Reddaway (1987) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson; Nancy Crawshaw (1978) *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece*. London: Allen and Unwin.

4 James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crises, 1963-4*. Mannheim: Bibliopolis.

number of Turkish Cypriots (about half the community) were incarcerated in enclaves covering some 3% of the island's surface in very difficult conditions and unable to exercise any substantial freedom of movement. This induced a real sense of trauma in the Turkish Cypriot community.

Equally traumatic for the Greek Cypriots was the Turkish military intervention in northern Cyprus in 1974. This occurred in response to the military coup against President Makarios led by Nicos Sampson with the backing of the Greek military Junta in Athens. Makarios fled abroad and Turkey intervened in Cyprus in two waves eventually controlling nearly one-third of the island. Sampson, an extremely violent man, was well-known for his hatred of Turks, and was the last person that Turkish Cypriots and Turkey would have wanted to see in power. Turkey, citing its rights under the Treaty of Guarantee, had little alternative but to act. In 1974 and 1975 there was a period of what would later be called ethnic cleansing, finalised by an exchange of populations under the supervision of the UN so that, in essence these were now two separate monoethnic regions. The Green Line became a buffer zone patrolled by the UN peacekeeping force. In addition to some 40,000 Turkish troops in northern Cyprus, a large number of 'settlers' were brought in by Turkey, drawn by the promise of jobs, land, and houses. Much of the land and houses in north Cyprus that went to the Turkish Cypriots from the south and the Turkish incomers, were previously owned by Greek Cypriots, a point that remains contentious between the parties today. However, it is often forgotten that Turkish Cypriots lost land and property in the south. Only recently has the Green Line become porous allowing Greek Cypriots to go to the north and Turkish Cypriots to go to the south. While both communities have taken advantage of this changed situation, they have not done as much as might have been anticipated. However, the presence of some 9,000 Turkish Cypriot workers in the south is not insignificant.

In November 1983 Rauf Denktash, the Turkish Cypriot leader, proclaimed the 'Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus'. This entity is recognised only by Turkey. In all other international spheres the Greek Cypriots seized the legal and sovereign entity which is called the Republic of Cyprus. Since 1964, Cyprus has meant the Republic of Cyprus as controlled by the Greek Cypriots, an asset which they have always been assiduous to protect. This has proved to be a major stumbling block in all the negotiations since that time.

Many of the issues that prevent settlement were reinforced or established at this time such as that of the 'refugees'. For Greek Cypriots the term 'refugee' refers to those who were driven out by the Turks and Turkish Cypriots. The term summons up the vision of desperately poor people living under the threat of violence in wretched conditions. But Greek Cypriot refugees are nothing like this. Most have decent jobs, houses and many are still receiving government pensions. Likewise Turkish Cypriot refugees have found their place in the north. Both communities suffered greatly in the process of the exchange of populations which were in some regards the final stage of the Treaty of Lausanne. A further problem is land. The settlers and the Turkish Cypriots appropriated much Greek Cypriot land and Turkish Cypriots lost some of their land too. This is not an insuperable problem since legally acceptable ownership arrangements and various forms of compensation can be built into a settlement. A third issue is the 'missing persons', that is those

Greek and Turkish Cypriots who disappeared during the hostilities of 1974. Recently progress has been made on this issue and a number of them have been identified by their DNA. A fourth issue is security. This is again a declining issue. It is almost inconceivable that Turkey would invade the south, particularly since Cyprus has become a member of the European Union and Turkey is negotiating to join the Union. A symbol of this is perhaps the progressive de-mining of the buffer zone. Indeed, the European Union has just granted a further four million euros to advance the process, which is to be conducted under the auspices of the United Nations. But probably the most contentious issue is that of sovereignty and state structure since it raises the issue of whether, on re-unification, the state is to be a unitary state, a federated state or a confederal one. This is about power and power-sharing. To what degree would the Turkish Cypriots have a veto with respect to the numerical majority and what does this mean in terms of effective participation? In 1963 Makarios' thirteen points revision of the constitution of the 1960 treaty sought substantially to attenuate if not eliminate entirely the Turkish Cypriot veto. Both the 1960 constitution and the Annan Plan gave Turkish Cypriots more representation and power than was warranted if their numbers were the only issue. In effect it largely accepted the Turkish Cypriot position that the question was not one of minority rights but a partnership between two (equal) communities.

In this brief outline four other issues ought to be raised beginning with the unprecedented economic growth of the island since 1974. While it is probably going a little too far to describe Cyprus as a peasant society between the two world wars – major industries were agriculture, fishing and mining – it could not be described as a developed society. But after 1974 both communities made tremendous economic progress, though significantly more so in the south than the north. The north was subsidised by Turkey, largely because it was cut off from direct links with the outside world, in effect by measures taken by the Greek Cypriot government of the Republic of Cyprus. The south displayed great entrepreneurship to become a prosperous society. In all the main cities (Nicosia, Larnaca, Limassol, Paphos) the major shops of the West can be found and there are some flourishing industries, especially offshore banking among other financial services. Tourism is perhaps the major industry, accounting for some 20% of GDP and is a constant theme in the local press. Agriculture, which has great symbolic importance in Cyprus, now accounts for only about 4% of GNP. In the recent enlargement of the European Union, Cyprus ranked second in terms of GDP of the ten new members and it has an enviably low rate of unemployment.[5]

The second major recent development was the accession to the EU. This was seen by the Cyprus Government as important in a number of ways. First, there was a security perception. While it is almost inconceivable that Turkey would invade the south, membership of the EU was seen as an extra layer of security. It also gave Cyprus the right of veto over Turkey's accession talks, though the threat of a veto is probably more important than the veto itself. The second factor was the economic aspect. Entry into the EU was expected to enlarge access to markets. The third aspect

5 It is too early to assess the effects of the economic and financial crisis in Cyprus.

was that membership gave Cyprus a seat at the top table in Europe and thus more influence than it had previously enjoyed. In other ways, of course, the conditions of the *acquis communautaire* reined in some of the proclivities of Cyprus. The integration of Cyprus with Europe has been further deepened now that Cyprus has joined the Eurozone.

The third major recent development was the Annan Plan and its rejection by the Greek Cypriots.[6] The Annan Plan was only the last of many UN attempts to broker a settlement between the two parties. Many other external actors have made attempts to heal the breach, such as the United States, Britain, the EU, and numerous other state and non-state actors. All have failed and stasis remains. The problem is that the longer stasis prevails, the more institutionalised the division becomes thereby making a settlement more difficult and less likely.

A fourth, but to date largely unregarded element in recent Cypriot developments, is the increasing cosmopolitanism of the society. Put another way, the dilution of Cypriot identity is underway. With the ultimate rejection of *enosis* following the failed 1974 coup, there emerged among Greek Cypriots an emphasis on 'Cypriotness' which was different from 'Greekness'. The first source, and perhaps the less important, is the impact of the 'Charlies', that is those Cypriots who have worked abroad, sometimes for many years, in Britain, the United States, South Africa or Australia, who return with broader perspectives and usually more money than the indigenous population. While they retain their traditional family ties there is, nonetheless, a certain tension. In the north the same tensions exist, but to a lesser degree. There a major strain persists between the indigenous Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish immigrants and army. The second source of change concerns immigration. There are various estimates of how many non-indigenous people are working in Cyprus, largely because there are a lot of illegal and seasonal workers. Leaving aside the tourists and holiday makers, some estimates are as high as one-third of the population for Greek Cyprus and rather less for north Cyprus. Without them the economy would be in dire straits. In the major towns the cafés, hotels, restaurants, car washes and the like are almost all entirely dependent on imported labour. One of the driving forces of the Cypriot economy, more so in the south than the north, but this is changing, is the building industry. Everywhere, but particularly in the coastal areas, there are buildings going up. Added to this, are the 'retirees'. These are mostly British (some 10,000) but other nationalities as well, drawn by the climate and the cheaper cost of living. Hence there are British, Bangladeshis, Russians, Sri Lankans, Philippinos, Moldovans, Serbs, Lebanese and a host of other nationalities. The common language is English, as it is among many Cypriots returning from working abroad. This would not be as true in the small villages, but much of commerce and trade is conducted in English. Most of these incomers are apolitical and have no vote, except in local and European elections for EU nationals, and have little interest in Greek or Turkish Cypriot politics, and hence have no interest in whether there is a

6 See A.J.R. Groom (2007) 'No End in Sight in Cyprus', *The International History Review*, Vol. XXIX, No. 4.

settlement except, perhaps, the owners of 'dodgy' property in the north. While there may be no direct relationship on the settlement issue, the sheer numbers are steadily changing the nature of Cypriot society. Under EU legislation, after a number of years of residence these immigrants have the same rights as the indigenous population and could in the future become an important political as well as economic and cultural force.

PROBLEMS IN REACHING A SETTLEMENT TO THE CYPRUS CONFLICT IN THE FORESEEABLE FUTURE[7]

The Egocentricity of Local Power

Cyprus is a small island which in the past has been in a strategic location. The British retain control over the two military Sovereign Base Areas which can be used in emergencies, such as the Lebanese crises, but in the main they are listening and monitoring bases. The importance of Cyprus has shrunk both strategically and as an object of interest to external actors, with the exception of Turkey. Yet the divided nature of the society dominates political discourse on the island among the political elite and the media. To take one day as an example (9August 2007) in the Greek Cypriot press – *Alithia:* "The Turks Prefer Tassos"; *Machi:* "Turkish Cypriots making Threats over Oil Reserves": *Politis:* "41 tanks for National Guard"; *Simerini:* "Turkish Threats Heighten over Petrol". The communal divide dominates all other issues, but no progress is made to resolve it.

Added to this, the communal divide gives the parochial political elite, with its propensity for populist antics, a status on the world stage that they would not have if the island were united. Cyprus is very small. Nevertheless, barely a day goes by without some foreign dignitary visiting the island – from Poland, Bulgaria, Belgium, the United States – meeting with the President or the Foreign Minister and making anodyne statements to the effect that the international community must help to solve the 'Cyprus Problem'. If it were not for the communal divide, how else could the political elite get taken seriously by some of the top world decision-makers? It may be going too far to say that the political elite *enjoy* the communal divide but they certainly exploit it to enhance their personal status and the importance of the island in world politics. There are benefits to the communal divide. These are enhanced by the use of both communities, and especially the Greek Cypriots, of a clear and valued identity as 'victims'. To be sure they are victims, and often because

7 For an analysis of the various attempts to negotiate a settlement, see Oliver Richmond (1998) *Mediating in Cyprus: The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations.* London: Frank Cass; Joseph S. Joseph (1997) *Ethnic Conflict and International Politics.* Houndmills: Macmillan; Clement Dodd (ed.) (1993), *Cyprus The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus.* Huntingdon: The Eothen Press; John Koumoulides (ed.) (1986) *Cyprus in Transition 1960-1985.* London: Trigraph.

of their own doing, but, given the current state of the conflict, it is a well-worn, almost cosy, rhetoric which is often resorted to as an argument to plead for a special status which others must respect, acknowledge and do something to alleviate. The Greek Cypriots, in particular, have got such moaning to a fine art. This is not to say, however, that Cyprus does not have a special status.

Costas Constantinou has rightly pointed to Cypriot 'states of exception' and comments,

> "... that not much is normal with the state of Cyprus. The Republic of Cyprus (RoC) was intended to function as a state of exception from its very inception; an exception to the principle of self-determination, an exception to the withdrawal of colonial armies, an exception to independence from the 'motherlands' and an exception to the unfettered exercise of sovereignty."

Cyprus is, therefore, far "... from an idealised western norm that was never instituted, a norm promising – yet not delivering – genuine self-governance, sovereign authority and state equality."[8] Harry Anastasiou shows how this special status has persisted and bedevils the position of Cyprus in the EU since it was

> "... the first EU member country that was ethnically divided; that was represented at EU level exclusively by members of one of the rival ethnic communities; that was partially occupied by the military forces of an EU candidate state; that had the institutional means to apply the *acquis communautaire* in one part of its territory but not in another; that had a cease-fire line and a buffer zone manned by UN peacekeepers; and that had one portion of its citizens deprived of the right to their property and residence and another portion of its citizens deprived of the right of access to and participation in the EU economy and EU political institutions. Moreover, Cyprus was the only EU member where its major ethnic communities recognise EU law while simultaneously rejecting each other's law; where its major ethnic communities accept the legitimacy of the EU while rejecting each other's legitimacy within their own shared island."[9]

In addition to this, the 'TRNC' is a pathfinder and a precedent for others whether it be Kosovo, Abhazia or South Ossetia.

While there can be little contention that, as Cypriots claim, Cyprus is different, there is much contention over why this is so. The Greek Cypriots have what many find an annoying tendency to blame others – anyone but themselves, be it Britain, the 'motherland', the UN, the EU – for their predicament. They are the eternal victims who need to be cherished and succoured because of their exceptional status and victimhood. Moreover, they have a split personality. No one can deny that the economic recovery of the south after the *de facto* partition of 1974-5 was truly remarkable – initiative, flair, imagination, determination, courage, hard work, sacrifice – but these

8 Costas M. Constantinou (2008) 'On the Cypriot States of Exception', *International Political Sociology*, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 145.

9 Harry Anastasiou (2009) 'Cyprus as the EU Anomaly', *Global Society*, Vol. 23, No. 2, p. 131.

are precisely the characteristics that are lacking in the Greek Cypriot approach to their political situation aided and abetted, it must be added, by a like obduracy by the Turkish Cypriots on many an occasion – hence the egocentricity of local power.

The Hurting Stalemate

According to both theory and practice, realistic negotiations towards a settlement are more likely to occur where there is a 'hurting stalemate'. A hurting stalemate is defined as a situation where both sides are suffering, there is little chance of either winning or losing and there is no escape from the problem. If we take the Israeli-Palestinian conflict as an example, there is little doubt that the Israelis have the upper hand militarily and economically, but there is little chance of them winning in the long run. What will transpire is a long-term running sore for the Israelis as they attempt to repress Palestinian aspirations. At some time, as the hurting stalemate digs deeper, they will have to negotiate and compromise with those Palestinian parties that hold a veto. Hamas is a current case in point, or elsewhere, the Taliban.

The problem in Cyprus is that there is no hurting stalemate. In spite of all the rhetoric both Greek and Turkish Cypriots are doing rather well, with the Greek Cypriots leading the way but the Turkish Cypriots are developing fast. If the embargo on the *de facto* state is ever lifted so that the Turkish Cypriots have direct and free access to the rest of the world the gap will close even faster. There are pockets of traditional peasantry, but these are lessening with generational change. In the past there was tremendous loyalty to the village, and this still remains with respect to the older generation, but it is not shared by the younger generation – most young Greek Cypriots do not share their village culture and would not want to exchange it for their lives in the big towns where there is opportunity, education and money, compared with the monotony of the rural village. This change is exemplified by the recent coming to power of Turkish and Greek Cypriot leaders who are young in comparison with their predecessors.

All these societal changes suggest that there is no hurting stalemate. Things are getting better as far as security and the economy are concerned, and there is a relaxation and perhaps a *de facto* acceptance of the situation. This would not be admitted publicly, but there is no imperative to compromise and settle. Indeed, Greek Cypriots have been heard to say that a settlement would just cost them too much financially. Whether this is true or not (and it probably is given the realities of turning promises of aid into money spent), it is the perception that is important.

Entrapment

In a 1971 UNITAR paper Frank Edmead introduced the idea of 'entrapment' into the conflict analysis literature.[10] 'Entrapment' basically means that individuals, usually leaders, put themselves

10 Frank Edmead (1971) *Analysis and Prediction in International Mediation.* New York: UNITAR.

into a position from which it is difficult for them to move even though there are good reasons that they should do so. A common line of argument is that "we have lost so many lives that to compromise now will mean all those lives have been wasted. For the sake of the dead we must continue". In Cyprus the entrapment situation takes an additional form. For decades the political elite in both the 'TRNC', under the leadership of Rauf Denktash, and the Republic of Cyprus, under a variety of leaderships, have been putting out messages of 'no compromise'. Only when Denktash left office were the Turkish Cypriots more flexible, as in the referendum on the Annan Plan. But in the Republic the leadership was in a situation where it could not go back without repudiation of all it had been saying for decades even if, which is doubtful, it had wanted to under President Papadopoulos. In such a situation a new action policy is blocked by declaratory policy. Moreover, there is a temptation not only to look at the public declaratory policy of the adversary, rather than its possible action policy, but to see one's own policy not in terms of the public rhetoric but the more hidden 'real' action policy of what is thinkable, but unsaid. Like is not being compared with like. Entrapment is when there is no easy escape from declaratory policy which tends to nip any nascent change of action policy in the bud.

Two before One?

There have been many analyses as to why the overwhelming majority of the Greek Cypriot people, led by their President, rejected the Annan Plan. To the rest of the world they turned down the best that the international community could offer. After all, the Greek Cypriots would receive substantial territory, almost all the Turkish Army would eventually leave Cyprus, a host of thorny issues would be resolved regarding property and the like, the international community, and especially the EU, would support and protect the agreement and their security, financial aid was promised and they would seize the moral high ground. On the other hand, they would lose a grievance and their status and identity as victims. They would be obliged to share *their* island, as they see it, with Turks on a partnership basis so that Cyprus would not be Hellenic in a pure sense. This partnership would be with people with whom they did not share or want to share an identity. There had never been a shared governance except fitfully from 1960-1963. There was a lack of shared socio-cultural and economic ties. Moreover, they had to make their major concessions immediately on signing the Annan Accord whereas some of the changes dearest to them would only come years later and depend upon others fulfilling, to the letter and in the spirit, the clauses of the Agreement.

The debate was essentially between those who would rather preserve a national conception of Hellenism and those who, while not denying Hellenistic values, saw them in a cosmopolitan European light. If an Hellenic island was not possible in a partnership state then perhaps an Hellenic Republic in the south was preferable to a partnership state. Half a loaf is better than none. Greek Cypriots were and remain torn between a cosmopolitan economic and social system and a nationalistic political system, and the latter won. They remain caught between a modern national

state and a cosmopolitan post-modern European entity. The past defeated the future upon which they have embarked so enthusiastically in many ways in non-political spheres.

Here We Go Again?

It was always on the cards that following the Greek Cypriot elections for President on 24 February 2008 that there would be an attempt once again to bring the leaders of the two communities together to see if the new political situation gave enough leeway to enable negotiations to start once again. In fact, with the victory of Demetris Christofias, there are more than ritual grounds for hope that some progress at least might be made. Mr Christofias received 53.36% of the votes as against 46.64% which went to his Conservative opponent Ioannis Kasoulides. The former President Tassos Papadopoulos had already been eliminated in the first round. In the second round Tassos Papadopoulos gave his support to Demetris Christofias and this raises an interesting political conundrum.

Mr Papadopoulos had owed his victory, in the previous presidential election, in part to the support that he received from AKEL, Mr Christofias' party, which is, of course, a communist party. Likewise it was the last minute switch of AKEL which helped President Papadopoulos to swing the Greek Cypriot electorate to vote against the Annan Plan. This was therefore an unusual alliance of a nationalistic Conservative with a Communist. To make matters more complex, the Greek Cypriot Communist party, AKEL, had always maintained reasonable working relations with Turkish Cypriot trade unions. So why did AKEL change its mind in 2004 at the last minute and join President Papadopoulos in rejecting the Annan Plan thus sealing its fate? This is one of the issues which the Greek Cypriot rumour-mongering industry is so good at exploiting. No-one really seems to know. And what is more, despite their differences over the Cyprus problem in the first round of the presidential election, why should Papadopoulos turn round and then support the AKEL candidate and not the conservative former foreign minister Mr Kasoulides? The question therefore remains whether or not Greek Cypriots want an Hellenic state in the Republic of Cyprus as it presently exists or whether they are still looking for a process of reunification for both parts of the island. The political stalemate after the Greek Cypriot rejection remained throughout the period in office of President Papadopoulos but two issue areas provided an element of movement – the opening of the partition between the north and south and the interaction between Cyprus and the EU.

The opening of the crossing point is now an established element in the political, economic and social life of the island. While 64% of all Cypriots are positive about the opening, nevertheless, 24.2% are suspicious and 11.8% view it as a negative development. Of the island's population, 20.1% have not crossed the divide and out of that percentage, 54.3% have not done so as a matter of principle. On the other hand, more than half the island's population, in fact 56%, have crossed the divide more than five times. While Turkish Cypriots are more likely to cross than are Greek Cypriots, this is no surprise given the general difficulties for Turkish Cypriots to travel and they are

also able to enjoy the more sophisticated facilities available in the south.[11] A study of the economic impact of the opening of the crossing point made in May 2007 was that Greek Cypriots were contributing something like 100 million Cyprus pounds (approximately €171 million) a year to the economy of the north which is equivalent to 15% of its GDP. This input came mainly from spending by Greek Cypriots in the north, wages paid to Turkish Cypriot workers in the south and crossings by tourists from the south.[12] The figures of goods and services traded from the north to the south in 2007 amounted to €705,500.[13]

Behind these figures, however, lies a cat and mouse game. The strategy of President Papadopoulos seemed to be to welcome inter-community trade including that from the north which would then become a transfer to a third country. At the same time the government in the south remained adamantly opposed to any direct trade or communication between the north and third countries. The Turkish Cypriots were thus obliged to go through Turkey or export their products via the south. However, by going through the south they were directly in the EU with no, or little, further restriction – a not inconsiderable advantage. Papadopoulos' strategy appeared therefore to be to inveigle the north into the southern economy – a policy of absorption by stealth and without a political settlement. These considerations induced the Turkish Cypriots to put a brake on inter-communal trade which they saw as a potential trap to obviate a political settlement.

Generally speaking there has not been a flood in either direction across the Green Line once the novelty effect had worn off. Individuals cross the divide if they have a reason to do so but many do not have such a reason once they have satisfied their curiosity. Of all Cypriots, 63.1% are positive about coexistence and 54.1% are positive about forgiveness with the Turkish Cypriots to the fore. The Greek Cypriots, on the other hand, are prominent in the 42.4% of all Cypriots who are willing to endorse the prospect of reconciliation. Nevertheless, 31.1% of the islanders do not feel that this is a likely prospect while 24.5% are more optimistic and consider that such a reconciliation might be possible. On the other hand, some 38.8% of the Cypriots, especially Greek Cypriots, feel that closure has been arrived at in relations in the island whereas 33.8%, especially Turkish Cypriots, feel that the situation is still open, while 27.5% are not sure.[14] What is evident is that 72% of the Greek Cypriots feel safer by being in the EU.[15] All of this tends to suggest that the divide remains in both the psycho-social and practical senses, although its opening has facilitated some alleviation of the economic condition of the Turkish Cypriots.

11 A. Sitas, D. Latif and N. Loizou (2007) *Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus in the Post-Referendum Period*. Nicosia: PRIO Cyprus Centre, p. 9.

12 *Cyprus News*, Issue No. 213, May 2007, p. 1.

13 *Cyprus News*, Issue No. 226, June 2008.

14 A. Sitas, D. Latif, N. Loizou, *op. cit.*, pp. 9-10, 23.

15 *Cyprus News*, Issue No. 215, July 2007.

There are two major institutional frameworks within which the Cyprus question is being played out – the United Nations and the European Union.[16] Both now have an extended experience of all the vagaries and detail of the Cyprus conflict and it is interesting to note that they have not played to their ostensible strengths. It is the United Nations which is, after all, a state-centric Westphalian organisation that has shown greater flexibility by organising meetings between the two communities. By acting at the community level it has therefore sidestepped the difficult issue of the accepted international asymmetries between the two parties from a legal point of view. On the other hand, the European Union, which is after all a post-modern organisation not so wedded to the Westphalian framework, has displayed more rigidity in its approach to the status of the parties. Perhaps this is because the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot entities both aspire to be modern states which fit less easily into the cosmopolitan multilateralism of the EU. This may therefore be the moment for the EU to begin to behave less in terms of a Westphalian system and more in terms of a cosmopolitanism which will link unity with diversity. It has singularly failed hitherto so to do.

Harry Anastasiou argues cogently that the EU has "... unwittingly entrenched the Cyprus problem".[17] Since the entry into the EU of the Republic and the rejection of the Annan Plan, the EU has been faced by a Greek Cypriot party that argues from the legal basis of an internationally recognised state which is a full member of the EU. The Republic of Cyprus has played this card *à l'outrance*. The Turkish Cypriots, however, have insisted that they have the moral high ground since they accepted the Annan Plan and that the question is therefore essentially a political one so that they, too, can enjoy the benefits of membership of the EU which they see as their right. Faced with this dilemma the EU has chosen consistently to play by the legal book. The chickens of accepting Cyprus as a member without a settlement of the problem have come home to roost. President Papadopoulos refused to play the EU game causing the EU Commissioner for Enlargement at the time, Günter Verheugen, to state bluntly, "I have been cheated by the Greek Cypriot government", a view widely shared in the international community.[18] Since 2004 the Turkish Cypriots have been the victims of this 'cheating' on a tacit understanding about resolving the Cyprus problem. Nevertheless it was for the Greek Cypriots to express their views and to reject the imposition of another unwanted settlement on them, as had been done in 1960. In any case an imposition would have been difficult to achieve and counter-productive. It would merely have stoked the fires of Hellenic nationalism.

16 See Thomas Diez (ed.) (2002) *The European Union and Cyprus: Modern Conflict, Postmodern Union*. Manchester: Manchester University Press and James Ker-Lindsay (2005) *EU Accession and United Nations Peacekeeping*. Basingstoke: Palgrave.

17 Anastasiou *op. cit.*, p. 134.

18 Quoted by Gerald Butt on *BBC News 24*, 24.iv.04.

Anastasiou makes a telling point when he states that the Republic of Cyprus is an interim institution.[19] Whatever is agreed it will not be the 1960 Constitution and the Republic of Cyprus as it was known then or is known now. Moreover, if there is no settlement and the Republic of Cyprus becomes, in effect, an Hellenic state whose writ does not run in the north of the island, then the international community, and especially those principally concerned, will have to take this into account both politically and legally.

The EU could use its regional policy and committee to accept the two Cypriot communities as the United Nations has done and then to extend this more generally. There are elements of both the *acquis communautaire* and also of the Annan Plan that could be applied to the northern part of Cyprus especially as the whole island is deemed to be a member of the EU. What is now the 'TRNC' could become either a region in a bi-regional state for many purposes or the 'TRNC' could be a European territory, as is Gibraltar, to which some of the *acquis* is applied but which has derogations for other parts. Another idea might be if the EU played the role of the federal authority in Cyprus pending its establishment. This would imply a Europeanisation of the Turkish Cypriot entity which, after all, is the intended future goal when the whole island effectively becomes part of the EU. As the Turkish Cypriot entity becomes more involved in the European Union, it may well be able to then initiate, if necessary unilaterally, some of the provisions of the Annan Plan such as the return of territory to Greek Cypriot administration or a reduction of the Turkish army garrison. A more radical strategy would be to turn the situation on its head by increasing the degree of hurt that is felt by the Greek Cypriots who, after all, are the party that rejected the Annan Plan. However, this may have a nationalist backlash and could easily get out of control.

But the most likely solution remains more of the same. The Greek Cypriots will be content with half a loaf in the form of a national, modern, Westphalian type, Hellenic state and the situation of the Turkish Cypriots will gradually alleviate as the cosmopolitan framework of the EU begins to permeate ever more deeply through the barriers that have kept them separate since 1963 and more especially, since 1974. After all, bloody secession has received a degree of legitimacy in the imposition of the independence of Kosovo which sets a precedent. Turkish Cypriots have clearly demonstrated their wish to be part of a wider European community and it is increasingly difficult to deny them. Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots have lived together, but separately, for generations and still appear to wish to do so. The European Union is a wider framework within which to facilitate this process.

Following the election of President Christofias in February 2008, meetings with the Turkish Cypriot President Mehmet Ali Talat led to some serious preliminary negotiations under UN auspices. Six working groups were established concerned with governance and power-sharing, EU matters, security and guarantees, territory, property and economic issues. In addition, there were seven technical committees which dealt with crime, commerce, cultural heritage, crisis

19 Anastasiou, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

management, humanitarian issues, health and the environment.[20] These progressed sufficiently well for a secure hotline to be set up and for the announcement on July 25, 2008 that the outcome of fully-fledged negotiations, if successful, will be put to separate simultaneous referenda.

What that outcome will be depends on whether the Turkish Cypriots remain committed to the idea of a single Cyprus and whether the Greek Cypriots are willing to embrace it. It is a time for commitment, not bargaining. If there is a commitment, then an agreement will follow. This means that the Turkish Cypriots will have to revisit the Annan Plan and the Greek Cypriots recognise that it cannot be ignored even if much has happened in Cyprus, the EU and beyond in the last four years. Annan turned over all the stones to see what was underneath. There is little need for new knowledge, it is a time for decision or stasis will continue. If stasis it shall be, then there is no war or violence but the situation will remain formally unended and the problem will fade away like the proverbial old soldier as the Republic becomes more Hellenic and the Turkish Cypriots are accommodated whether in Turkey, in the EU framework or on their own. It is, therefore, indeed a time for commitment.

20 *Cyprus News*, Issue No. 223, March 2008

The February 2008 Presidential Election in the Republic of Cyprus: The Context, Dynamics and Outcome in Perspective

Giorgos Charalambous*

Abstract

This paper studies the context, procedure and outcome of the February 2008 presidential election in the Republic of Cyprus. It primarily analyses the dynamics between the main actors that took part in the contestation of executive power; that is, the five main political parties and the campaigns of the three main candidates. It further outlines the effects of the main issues on the structure of political competition and preliminarily assesses the connection between the social and political level. While an element of surprise exists, there appears to be a pattern based on the behavioural aspects of the election that does not deviate from the diachronic culture of Cypriot political competition. The paper is divided into five sections: an introduction and outline of the paper's rationale; a delineation of the election's background and context; an analysis of the campaign period; an assessment of the results; and a conclusion on the absence or recurrence of those election-related characteristics that have been observed before.

Keywords: Cyprus, elections, 2008, parties, political competition, election campaigns, election results

Introduction

Voters form opinions in response to debates between competing elites and a new majority is formed in favour of policy change in one direction or another. In the Cypriot polity, by way of its nature as a presidential system of government, presidential elections have the potential to constitute turning points in political competition as well as policy making. Firstly, as first order elections, they directly give shape to government-opposition dynamics and constitute the main points in time where party goals and strategies stand out.[1] Secondly, they are contested in such a

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way – through two rounds – which allows for tactical change within the race's time frame as well as change in initial inter- and intra-party agreements. Thirdly, their process resolves the toughest policy decisions (including foreign policy, which in Cyprus involves negotiations of the Cyprus problem), naturally dealt with by the executive more directly and with more constitutional power, than by the House of Representatives.

Although the literature on party structure and forms of electoral competition in the Republic of Cyprus is neither extensive nor comparatively argued, it does point towards common observations of Cypriot party-political culture and how parties and individuals contest power, form alliances, and implement policy. A strong bi-polarity – especially during elections – between left and right, which touches the very core of Cypriot society and economy, is combined with a significant degree of fragmentation whereby parties and various political and social groups appear to be taking conflicting attitudes towards one another during the inter-electoral phase (Christophorou, 2008). Consensus politics do prevail but mostly in the process of deciding on policy (see Charalambous, 2008, conclusion) and forming government (see Christophorou, 2008, p. 97; Faustmann, 2008, pp. 27-28; Mavratsas, 2003, pp. 184-192). Programmatic convergence is unspecified but even its absence is not likely to affect the executive's stability, determine its survival or deprive the president of his own personal stigma (Christophorou, 2008, p. 95; Ker-Lindsay, 2006).

Party membership is very high in comparative terms (Bosco and Morlino, 2006, table 1), votes predominantly reflect partisan identity, as parties maintain an ability to penetrate their own electorate organisationally (*ibid.*, pp. 335-336) and long-term volatility is at very low levels, similar only to those of Malta (Caramani, 2006, table 2). These various observations between scholars who have studied Cypriot politics, are summarised acutely – if not also slightly overstated in comparative terms – by what Mavratsas (2003) has called the culture of 'clientelistic corporatism' and serve as a starting assumption or multi-layered hypothesis to be tested through an analysis of the 2008 Presidential elections.[2]

This paper aims to make a two-fold contribution. Firstly, it attempts to trace and explain the main actors' decisions before and during the campaign and relate them to the election results. Secondly, the paper asks if and how developments and political dynamics before and during the elections have produced changes in the way political contestation operates in the Republic of Cyprus and in the political landscape that has arisen in the election's aftermath. In effect, it attempts to explain if and which of the features long inhabiting Cypriot politics made their presence in this election as well.

1 First order elections are generally the most salient in the eyes of parties and the public. These are normally electoral contests for executive office. The most important distinction between the two types of elections is that in second order elections 'there is less at stake as compared to first-order elections' (see Reif, 1985).

2 See especially Mavratsas (2003, pp. 136-152).

Political Dynamics Leading to the Elections

A delineation of the political dynamics in the few years preceding the February presidential election allows us to set the background and context of political competition within which the election was contested. Five main parameters can be applied to this election's context that did not come in direct contrast to the contextual factors that conditioned the nature of previous elections but did give a very particular shape to the dynamics of political competition since both actors (their number and character) and issues (their significance and partly their nature) meant that no easy prediction could be made, either with regard to the campaign itself or the government that was to emerge.

'Rejectionism' and Cleavage Based Politics

It was not the first time that an intense and partly opposition-manufactured belief of a 'rejectionist' being in government, contributed to the shape of electoral dynamics.[3] Yet, the way that this came about, initially forming a new cleavage in Cypriot society and politics, seems to be unprecedented. The new historical context of the Cyprus Problem, as reshaped in the Annan Plan and post-Annan Plan period, which saw a failed referendum and a socially dividing campaign around it, brought to the surface an additional underlying reason for social and political antagonism.[4] This essentially revolved between those who called for a rejection of the Plan (the President and the centre parties supporting him; DIKO, EDEK and the Ecologists, as well as the newly formed EVROKO), those who called for a positive vote (the official line of right-wing DISY) and those who were unsure but eventually tilted towards a 'soft no' (the communist party, AKEL) (see Ioannou, 2008; Trimikliniotis, 2006). As a result of the referendum new political formations and alliances materialised, while at the societal level as well, people's relations were affected (Faustmann, 2008, p. 35).

Yet, a rejectionism/anti-rejectionism dichotomy at the media level materialised in the year leading to the February 2008 election. DISY's 'pro-rapprochement and pro-flexibility' strategy of the past decade but also its official acceptance of the Annan Plan's unsuitability – on the basis of the people's verdict in 2004 – converted the tri-polarity into a seemingly two-way disagreement between three main candidates. Within the context of the then ensuing presidential campaign, Ioannis Kasoulides and Dimitris Christofias – that is, right and left but both 'flexible' – were targeting a common electorate on a crucial issue dimension – the 'soft no' and 'yes' voters.

3 A previous election was decided by the desire to bury the Gali Set of Ideas and DIKO leader Spyros Kyprianou's policy on the Cyprus problem was the driving factor of the informal co-operation between left (AKEL) and right (DISY) in the mid 1980s.

4 For the politics of referendum and parties' views of referendum pledges as a resource to broaden their electoral appeal especially with regard to ethno-national issues see Sussman, 2006.

Five Main Parties and the Potential to Shape Political Competition

This was the first time, where political competition involved five main parties. As in the past, all parties chose to support one candidate or another and actively participate in the presidential race. EVROKO, the party that was formed when a number of DISY leading members split and joined forces with the nationalist right-wing New Horizons, was (in the 2006 parliamentary elections) now a political actor with 5% of the vote. If we follow widespread agreement that "the core of any party system is constituted by the structure of competition for control of the executive" and that "the parties which count are those that are involved in or have an impact on that competition" (Mair, 2006, p. 65), then the presence of EVROKO makes the structure of competition different than in the last two presidential elections.

If EVROKO's voters are attributed a minimum degree of vote consolidation then both the first and second round of the election could theoretically be determined by their behaviour and in the first instance by their leadership's strategy.[5] In the 2006 parliamentary elections, data from polls showed that EVROKO lost only 2.3% from those who voted for the two parties that later formed it and final results revealed that it managed to attract a substantial number of voters from DISY (Panagopoulos, 2006, table 3 and pp. 14-15). In addition, this was the very first election since 1974, where the right wing was represented by two parties of a strong or at least pivotal following. However, amid an electoral system and a cleavage structure that favour established political parties, the above facts under no circumstances implied certainty that the EVROKO's leadership could direct its voters to its preferred choice.

The EU as an Outside Arm

Cyprus was now a member of the European Union and presidential elections became a more direct concern for European elites. Cypriot electoral competition and each party's strategy now involved an additional set of issues whose shape and salience depended on EU developments. The election essentially became a two-level game. The opposition was provided with an additional weapon in its propaganda against the government and between the parties that comprised it, and the government could be judged on another template of measurement for its own record. Both of these effects became evident during the election campaign: 1) Kasoulides' slogans and efforts to portray a Europeanist attitude can be thought of as being much stronger than any other presidential candidate – surely also because he was currently serving as an MEP – and the attacks on AKEL for being Eurosceptic were used more extensively; 2) The fact that Cyprus had entered

5 The terms cohesion and consolidation are not used interchangeably although they are similar. Vote consolidation is a quantifiable term which measures the percentage of voters who retain their partisan preference or follow the party's suggestion from one election to another. Cohesion may be thought of as a more sociological and non-quantifiable term, which denotes agreement over a choice made by the party leadership.

the EU, coupled with the significance placed on the EU's role in the Cyprus problem, by all domestic political elites, played a negative role for Papadopoulos. The EU now constituted a key player in a potential solution of the Cyprus problem and Papadopoulos had established a poor reputation in European circles, both national and inter-governmental, since he carried with him the image of 'inflexibility' on the Cyprus problem.[6]

AKEL's own Nomination

The most important particularity of this election was AKEL's fielding of its own candidate. AKEL General Secretary Dimitris Christofias' nomination was endowed with a powerful symbolic appeal, since this was the first break with the party's tradition of not nominating its own candidate in the country's presidential elections. Ideologically, patience until the party or its leader could gather the necessary momentum seemed to be operating, whereas strategically, there is a good case to be made that the party was cautious of placing decision-making power in the hands of the right, especially after the latter grouped under DISY. This tradition is carefully grounded in the Marxist-Leninist theory of alliances, as well as theorised by Bulgarian communist leader Georgi Dimitrov and intertwined with the Marxist Leninist theory of the stages of struggle. The party, for instance, identifies various possible stages of struggle, such as an anti-fascist one, an anti-imperialistic one, and a stage of liberation from colonialism or one of socialist transformation (AKEL, 2002, p. 1). Upon such ideological rationale and based on a line existing since 1926 in the KKK (Cyprus Communist Party, AKEL's predecessor), AKEL curved its policy of alliances in the early 1940s, immediately after its establishment (thus running in the municipal elections of 1943 in alliance with other forces). It re-phrased its policy in 1962, under conditions of independence and formalised into an electoral coalition in 1991 under the name AKEL – Left – New Forces, repeating that the priority of the party in this first stage of struggle was to solve the Cyprus problem and reunite the country (AKEL, 1962, pp. 2-4; 2001, pp. 27, 42; 2002, pp. 1-4).

The matter of election tactics has since been discussed at each successive election, always based on the initial ideological considerations (interview, 27 February 2009). In 2002, for example, during the process of considering the then upcoming elections, it was clear that AKEL ascribed importance to the electability of the presidential candidate, as well as to his ability to maintain unity among 'the democratic, progressive forces', including DIKO and EDEK (AKEL, 2002, p. 7). In similar vein this rationale was there in 1982 as well, when AKEL supported Spyros Kyprianou, the DIKO leader at that time. In effect, independent of the results that AKEL's own nomination could produce, the February elections essentially were a party-strategy-crossing-point

6 For the negative perception of Tassos Papadopoulos by the international media, indicatively see (*EurActiv*, 2005, 2008; *Guardian*, 2003). For a summary of the USA's, UK's and EU's negative perception of Papadopoulos see a pro-Papadopoulos article by Spanish foreign Minister Miguel Angel Moratinos (2008) and EU Enlargement Commissioner Verheugen's statement to the European Parliament (2004).

for both AKEL and its competitors. Yet, the tactic of alliances was not abandoned; the choice given to party branches by the leadership, during the decision-making phase was one of continuing the tripartite alliance with DIKO and EDEK under the nomination of Christofias or under the nomination of Papadopoulos. Since the ideological/theoretical basis of 1962 did not change, the communist candidacy signalled less potential for systemic change or conscious alteration in AKEL's relational distance within the party system. The presentation of Christofias did not signify a drive for socialism but simply a position in favour of AKEL playing a much more decisive role within the coalition.

With the advent of 2007, a feeling of political agitation surfaced within and on behalf of AKEL, about various aspects of government policy. At that time a careful strategy was being crafted with the party opening an official discussion with all party branches and concluding it at the Party Congress three months later. Dissatisfaction manifested itself in a variety of concerns, i.e. on the Cyprus problem, the possible fortune of the party under a second Papadopoulos government, the question of how the votes lost by the party's negative stance on the Annan Plan referendum would be regained, and the lack of benefits for social groups represented by the party (phone interview, 25 October 2008; interview, 27 February 2009). It seems that government participation by itself as a multi-faceted issue, had already given rise to a kind of internal confusion not experienced before: "that the party had for the first time officially participated in government, led to greater expectations and in turn to disappointments not witnessed until then" (phone interview, 25 October 2008).

At the same time, the more sloganesque and media-driven disagreement, which eventually formed the main reason for presenting Christofias as a candidate, was Papadopoulos' tactic on the Cyprus problem.[7] According to the interviewees from AKEL, this was also the main concern of the leadership bodies, when discussion with regard to the elections started in early 2007 (interview, 27 February 2009). The tradition of the broad political front, led by a centre politician, was meaningful so long as there was, more or less, agreement on the line and tactics for pursuing a solution of the Cyprus problem. It was a failure to agree with the organised centre (DIKO and EDEK) that had led to the nomination of a moderate figure, Giorgos Vasiliou, in 1988 (see Hadjikyriakos and Christophorou, 1996, pp. 117-121, 141-143). Indicative of this may be that the problem also appeared to exist within the ranks of the party as well, with members and officials, many of whom (both 'No' and 'Yes' voters) perceived the president's Cyprus problem approach as dangerous and unfruitful (phone interview, 25 October 2008; interview, 27 February 2009).

The decision to nominate Christofias was taken in July 2007 following an intra-party dialogue where all party branches were presented with a choice of either continuing support for Papadopoulos or nominating Christofias. The results (80% in favour of Christofias) were

7 For examples, see KYPE (2007) and Christofias (2007). Christofias himself noted repeatedly that disagreement stemmed from Papadopoulos' tactics and not his programmatic positions.

considered by the Central Committee, which also voted in favour of Christofias' nomination by 85 to 12 (and three abstentions) and carried its choice to the July Congress where it was approved by 94%. By suggesting the Christofias candidacy, the Central Committee did not simply follow the clear result of the debate in the base groups of the party in so far as such debate can be influential towards the direction chosen by the leadership. It also chose to adopt tactics which did not involve a hard choice in terms of party goals (see Muller and Strom, 1999).

Firstly, a party candidacy was the choice most suited for avoiding an exchange between votes and policy making. The party's vote share had decreased after the 2004 Annan Plan Referendum, evident in both the European election of 2004 and the Parliamentary election of 2006.[8] Nevertheless, AKEL attempted to differentiate itself from the other forces which voted 'No', arguably in an attempt to ease the burden it carried as "the key factor in the balance between the forces of the status quo and the forces of its transcendence". Yet it was trapped in 'a lose-lose' situation because of a dilemma: it could continue further and alienate those who felt betrayed by the leadership's approach in supporting Papadopoulos or it could leave the tri-partite alliance and lose significant institutional capacity which secured clientelistic influence, attracted or maintained favour based voters, and kept policy making away from DISY (Ioannou, 2008, pp. 17-18). In return for the most secure approach in terms of policy making, vote consolidation could be significantly endangered since continuation of support for Papadopoulos was by now more clearly not in line with the party's policy aims.

Christofias' nomination served to revive the party organisationally, and to remind its base for the first time that cohesion, loyalty and mobilisation were now being requested in the name of what the party alone believes is right; and also to attract votes that no previous or other leader of AKEL seemed able to. His popularity was very high in both substantial and comparative terms. If we follow Bosco and Morlino's (2006, p. 256) argument that the mode of competition in Cyprus is distinguished "by party tactics designed to maintain the party's previous voters, acquire other electors who voted for a party within the same ideological block and regain the party voters who abstained in the previous election", then Christofias' candidacy surely appeared capable to achieve this.

The Campaign

First Round

Three candidate-centred campaigns, by right-wing, DISY MEP, Ioannis Kasoulides, left-wing, AKEL General Secretary, Dimitris Christofias, and President, ex-DIKO leader, Tassos Papadopoulos began simultaneously around mid-July 2007. Compared to parliamentary elections,

8 AKEL's 2001 parliamentary vote of 34.7% dropped to 31.1% in the parliamentary election of 2006. In the first European election of 2004, three months after the Annan Plan referendum, the party polled 27.9%.

the targeted electorate was naturally not as determinate, primarily because each campaign was highly personalised.

Campaigns were professionalised and very costly,[9] while spin doctors from Greece were allowed their say in everything.[10] If, and to what extent, spin doctors altered pre-determined policy programmatic positions, can only be speculated on the basis of each party's ideological consistency and organisational involvement in the campaign. Although campaigns were given the stigma of personas rather than parties – in terms of 'image merchandising' – individual entrepreneurs affiliated to the parties and/or candidates were an important source of financial support. Although the management of the campaign was a closed affair, limited to the parties supporting each candidate plus the candidates themselves and the spin-doctors, variations in terms of control by the parties did exist as we will see later.

The absence of an objective media coverage of the three candidates' electoral pledges has been a result of the majority of the media (TV channels and newspapers especially) supporting one of the candidates without any self-imposed or legal constraints.[11] As a consequence and in addition to the work already executed by spin-doctors, each candidate's image revolved mainly around one or two general issues at the most. Christofia's main focal point, apart from his popular personality, was his declared, more flexible and stronger effort to solve the Cyprus problem with the opening of direct initiatives on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus. His endorsement of 'anthropocentric' policies also gained momentum amidst an establishment where powerful media sought an end to the Papadopoulos presidency. Within such a context and through careful image communication, something that could have otherwise been presented as a communist threat to the economy was positively advertised.

The phobia of AKEL within what it always perceived, a society with very economically powerful, anti-communist elites, combined with an awareness of the statistical composition of its electorate (and membership) manifested itself into a very broadly targeted course of action in terms of electoral campaigning.[12] Essentially, however, Christofias' tactics did not differ substantially from

9 The estimated nominal expenses for publicity in the major media during the four months preceding the election amounted to €4.4 million (Christophorou, 2008b, p. 226).

10 It should not be inferred that the increasing use of spin-doctors in Cyprus is either a cause or a reaction to political party decline. As a first step it should be established if, and to what extent, it has been membership issues (Morlino and Bosco, 2006) that have triggered more campaign and organisational professionalisation (Christophorou, 2006).

11 Cypriot media seem to be inclined both towards confirming the beliefs of consumers through editorials and through influencing political outcomes. In this vein, they are biased in as far as their editorials selectively omit information and highlight details that are favourable or unfavourable to a particular issue. A historical review of such pattern of behaviour by the main Cypriot media during election time, is given by Ierodiakonou, (2003, pp. 126-177). For the above, commonly used definition of media bias, see Andina Diaz, forthcoming.

12 See AKEL's (1996) own analysis of Cyprus' class structure. Characteristic of the campaign's broad target were the slogan 'For both employees and entrepreneurship' and photographs of Christofias pictured with the Pope.

AKEL's own campaigns in the past two decades whose established strategy was well beyond identifying solely with the workers and the lower classes. It extended its appeal, as Adam Przeworski says, by promising to struggle "not for objectives specific to workers as a collectivity – those that constitute the public goods for workers as a class – but only those which workers share as individuals with members of other classes. Workers were thus not mobilised as 'workers' but as 'consumers', 'taxpayers', 'rural' or 'urban dwellers', 'parents', 'the poor', 'the people', etc" (Przeworski, 1980, p. 43).[13]

The projected strong points of Kasoulides were his anti-partitocratic mentality, his Europeanist profile and in direct relation to these, his connections and appeal to European leaders that could assist in the negotiations of the Cyprus problem.[14] Papadopoulos' campaign underlined that he was 'a choice of trust' and gave immense emphasis on his Cyprus problem policy and its achievements (for example by publicising a 17-page booklet focused on this issue and more specifically the Annan Plan – see Papadopoulos, 2008). To defend arguments about Papadopoulos' bad reputation in Europe, his team prepared a course of reminders, including the successful, unanimous decision of the European Council to impose measures against Turkey due to its denial to fulfil its obligations *vis a vis* the Republic of Cyprus and the many exchanged visits between Cyprus and other EU member countries.

With regard to internal governance, Papadopoulos was advertised as a man who keeps his promises (e.g. the slogan 'we said it, we did it'). As a senior figure of the Papadopoulos campaign team said "(our) campaign was anchored in the positive advertising of the government's achievements"; examples of such achievements were "the successful induction of Cyprus into the Eurozone, the good state of the economy (with a budget surplus), high social services and the establishment of the 'Citizen Services Centre" (email correspondence, January 2009). There was very limited focus on negative advertising of its competitors' positions and past. With regard to the Christofias candidacy especially, the Papadopoulos team appeared very respectful towards AKEL voters, presumably in an attempt to win over as many of them as possible and counterbalance the lack of vote consolidation that was apparent within DIKO and EDEK (Drousiotis, 2007).

On the Cyprus problem, there was apparent convergence between left and right. For instance, a major commonality between the approaches of Christofias and Kasoulides lay in blaming the incumbent President for contributing to turning the Cyprus problem, "from one of invasion and occupation against the Cypriot people, to an issue of Turkish-Cypriot isolation". Naturally, neither Christofias nor Kasoulides followed the tactic of glorifying past policy choices. In this vein, the overturning of Papadopoulos' lead in the election race was attempted through transcending the

13 Przeworski's (1980) thesis is pre-occupied with tactics and rhetoric employed by socialist parties in expanding their class focus. What seems to be true for the socialist parties of the 1980s is still a relevant point for AKEL, as a self labelled Marxist-Leninist party.

14 See, for example, his introductory remarks in his speech at the official electoral congress of DISY (*Simerini*, 2008). On the EU issue, Kasoulides was consistently ranked first among the three candidates (RIK, 2008; ANT1, 2008).

Yes/No divide of the Annan Plan that gave Papadopoulos the upper hand by the nature of the referendum's result.[15]

Common ground with AKEL led DISY to simultaneously hint at possible support for Christofias in case of defeat in the first round; nevertheless, this was not based on an official party decision and can be interpreted as a strategic move to portray the Kasoulides side as primarily interested in the common supra-partisan, good. By extension, DISY's strategy involved more intense criticism against Papadopoulos, rather than Christofias.[16] According to two Kasoulides' campaign team members, this strategy was based on a three-fold logic: firstly, DISY's ultimate and projected goal was to oust Papadopoulos from government; secondly, he was an easier target; and thirdly, undermining the incumbent on the Cyprus problem consequently damaged Christofias who supported him for four years (phone interview, 5 December 2008; interview, 27 March, 2009).

Programmatically, there continued a concurrent deep-rooted ideological differentiation, characteristic of parliamentary elections. In economic policy, this differentiation was less so, but Christofias' differences with Kasoulides were also those which essentially separated their respective parties' groups in the European Parliament. Indicatively, Christofias supported the Cost of Living Allowance (COLA or ATA) and paid significant attention to industrial policy where it was argued that a balance should be sought between the secondary and tertiary industries. The main difference with the rhetoric of the Kasoulides programme was the emphasis on an 'anthropocentric' (and not market oriented) economic policy; a multi-sided and multi-level policy of higher social spending; and a 'mixed economy' which incorporated the co-existence of private, public and cooperative initiatives, while reinforcing the competitiveness of the latter.[17] Kasoulides focused on a small and flexible state, plus market competition and high-skilled workers, and appeared encouraging on the prospects of investing the reserves of the Social Security Fund. At the same time, certain programmatic positions of DISY were not included in Kasoulides' programme. Indicatively, the division of capital in semi-governmental organisations in shares was dropped, in agreement with the party (interview, 20 April 2009) – arguably, an ideological part of DISY's proposals, existing since 2003.

As expected the left-right cleavage on social policy was clearer with Christofias proposing a number of state provisions (for single-mothers and low-income pensioners, plus an Easter state provision on a permanent basis and provisions to student-members of multi-member families) and

15 According to surveys, Papadopoulos was judged to be more acceptable, in comparison to the other two candidates, regarding policy on the Cyprus problem (RIK, 2008; 2007).

16 The '153 + 1 points' (essentially alleged loop holes in Papadopoulos' policies), crafted by Kasoulides' campaigners is a good example (Kasoulides, 2008b).

17 The term 'mixed economy', unlike in most other European countries where it is a shared term, is tied in Cypriot political life to the tradition of AKEL and thereby it can serve, more easily than elsewhere, as a campaign catch-word. Similarly, the term 'anthropocentric' is used in the fashion of image merchandising and has a long tradition in AKEL's rhetoric under Christofias.

a stop to neo-liberal policies including the abandonment of the policy for the extension of the retirement age and the reduction in working time – without a decrease in wages – as a means to fight unemployment (Christofias, 2008, pp. 60-67). Kasoulides' social provision policies were substantially more limited in extent, yet considerable in regard to the variety of under-privileged social groups targeted. His proposed provisions for assistance in relation to the first residence of people were constrained by conditions such as membership in a multi-member family and an annual family income of no more than €18,000. These were cross cut by flexibility arguments for young employees, and the reliance on companies for the provision of certain benefits and the promotion of life-long learning (Kasoulides, 2008, p. 68).

Papadopoulos' social policy proposals can be seen as marginally on the left side of the political spectrum but limited in ideological analysis. In general, Papadopoulos called for a rise in basic and lower pensions, provisions for dependents, new couples, the disabled, soldiers, and multi-member families. The incorporation of specific amounts and numbers in all of the intended social provisions was projected as an indication of the responsible governance of Papadopoulos and it was argued that his proposals were the only ones that had undergone costing (interview, 7 February 2009).

Towards the end of 2007, Papadopoulos' candidacy appeared less secure. Considering that it was being increasingly delegitimised, it is logical to assume that the extensive social benefits announced by the government in the final months of 2007 were aimed at driving economic outcomes that voters would find desirable. According to the most widely used models, the degree to which the incumbent manipulates the economy should be negatively correlated with its political security going into the election (Schultz, 1995). Firstly, a third package of social cohesion, worth €114 million and affecting more than 100,000 citizens, was announced in July. Secondly, a series of social policy measures was successively passed by the Ministerial Council between October and December of 2007. These included the expansion of motherhood benefits, various lump sums to pensioners, an increase in child benefits for multi-member families, a decrease in the consumption tax of heating oil, and assistance to quadriplegics and enclaved persons. Thirdly, the 2007 budget as approved by the Ministerial Council – now composed of Ministers from DIKO, EDEK and EVROKO – involved an 11% increase in social spending as well as a reallocation of most spending money to those ministries related with social policies (Ministry of Finance, 2007).

The EU issue was dealt with in the most strategic of manners, especially by AKEL. For the secretary of a party with clearly radical positions on the current shape of the EU's political character, as well as a recently established organisational mechanism to assist in the formulation and dissemination of AKEL's policy on the EU, the focus on the EU was limited in radicalism and reduced to declaring an insistence on the prevention of anti-popular, neo-liberal and conservative policies. The focus, therefore, was on the candidate government's proposed utilisation of EU membership to fix the domestic problems, rather than on its determination (as declared by AKEL in the last European election) to contribute to the overall change in the EU's existing policies or challenge the EU's leading circles (see AKEL, 2004, introduction). Christofias'

disadvantage can be illustrated in his electoral programme – in contrast to that of Kasoulides – by the absence of references to developments in EU policies or the character of recent Treaties.

AKEL, rather than attacking DISY's strong front or protracting its deeply-rooted disagreements on EU Treaties, mainly concentrated on defending its general European policy (not so much its own specific positions) and branding the Kasoulides and DISY voting patterns in the European Parliament as socially insensitive and contradictive to their intended appeal.

Kasoulides' ongoing term as an MEP did provide him with the benefit of knowing and pointing out certain procedural lacunae, concerning the presence of Cyprus in Brussels that in turn addressed proposals, i.e. the upgrade of the Cypriot permanent representation in Brussels, its links with Cypriot MEPs, and the projection of clear positions on behalf of the government on issues like the reform of the 'Common Agricultural Policy' and Community funding (Kasoulides, 2008, pp. 14-16).

Despite the fact that Cypriot politicians have grown much more aware of European affairs and developments, in addition to developing their expertise on the impact of the EU on Cyprus (see Katsourides, 2003), the discussion on Europe, while labelled a fundamental issue, did not reach high levels of sophisticated argument, but primarily served as a complementary subject to that of the Cyprus problem, and remained entrenched in left-right polemics. This may be ascribed to Kasoulides' team for generalising and beautifying a pro-European attitude and to Christofias' fear of raising suspicions about Eurosceptic tendencies.[18]

In the past, DIKO had managed to elect its own candidate thrice without heavy organisational work, and again it constituted only one supporting part of the centre's (and its former leader's) candidacy, which relied also on the active support of EDEK and EVROKO, as well as on the President's own circle of friends that his government brought to power (see Christophorou, 2008b, p. 222). The social democratic EDEK's main strategy was one of full alignment alongside the position of Papadopoulos, with the aim of eventually becoming a key government player in the event of a win; especially as AKEL had left the coalition. Perhaps for the first time, EDEK had a much better reason and a clearly planned benefit by standing decisively against AKEL in the presidential election, than simply its (former leader Vassos Lissarides') strategy of invariable hostility. Yet, in this election – as in previous ones where Lissarides was no longer party leader – it can be said that a sceptical attitude towards AKEL appears to have been a constant attempt to prevent close identification with, and subsequently 'vote stealing' by, the communists.

From the perspective of an actor-centred model, three campaigns were interacting with five parties; a reciprocal action that ran smoothly only in the case of AKEL, where the campaign team was organically linked to the party. The Papadopoulos central campaign and the internal tensions it was facing due to conflicts between the coordinator and the party leaderships, as well as the

18 In every single interview Christofias gave, as a candidate for the presidency, he was asked about allegations against AKEL being a Eurosceptic party.

decision of the campaign to accord overt emphasis on the 'hard No' aspect (which the results showed to be based on a misreading of the 76% 'No' to the Annan Plan; see later), were directly related to each supporting unit's input in the campaign. Indicatively, the appointment of Giorgos Lillikas (former AKEL minister and MP) as head of the Papadopoulos team did not find DIKO in agreement, because fundamentally, as one senior figure put it, "(we considered) Lillikas to be a cause of cohesion of AKEL voters around Christofias" (interview, 15 April 2009). After a discussion which lasted throughout the Christmas holiday period, Lillikas' role was later shared between four representatives (Lillikas himself, and one representative from each of the following: DIKO, EDEK and EVROKO). Furthermore, AKEL, according to the above DIKO senior figure, traced this weakness and focused on it by referring to the Papadopoulos candidacy through the name of Giorgos Lillikas. In general, as suggested by a statement later issued by the party, there was an intense belief in DIKO that it should have played a more prominent part in the campaign (Chatzicostas, 2008).

In the Papadopoulos campaign, what was also witnessed – on the basis of the polls – was a 'complacency effect'. The specific tactic looked beyond the first round, thinking that its 'real challenge' was to achieve a head start in the formation of second round partnerships. According to a senior figure of DIKO and the Papadopoulos campaign team, "this issue was never put on the table". Even more important, however, is the fact that within the Papadopoulos camp, full trust of the polls undertaken seemed to exist: "even on the night of the election, on our way to TV stations, we were told that we were in the lead" (interview, 15 April 2009). Considering that this specific election was intensely over-polled with more than fifty polls taking place over 9 months and all showing that Papadopoulos was in the lead, the worry about possibly not going through to the second round became a detail that was overlooked amidst other procedural problems that were emerging during the campaign.

Similarly, the case of the Kasoulides campaign itself showed that the programmatic party competition evident in the country's parliamentary election was largely submersed in personalised politics. The dynamics between the Kasoulides campaign and DISY involved the DISY Chairman, Nicos Anastasiades, being accused of undermining the Kasoulides candidacy on various occasions by writing him off and working for the Christofias candidacy even prior to the first round. Nevertheless, beyond this, the Kasoulides campaign team ran parallel to the mobilisation of DISY until Christmas, "when the two were eventually unified" (interview, 27 March 2009). Numerically speaking, more non-partisans were involved in projecting Kasoulides than in the other two campaigns. Indeed, his campaign's initial momentum was arguably established on the borderline – if not outside – of DISY's sphere of influence with the social movement of KYPROS 21 [CYPRUS 21], and played a major part in both the organisation of the campaign and the construction of the election programme.[19]

19 Members of KYPROS 21 participated in the various committees, which drafted Kasoulides' electoral programme.

Second Round

On 18 February 2008, after the exclusion of incumbent president, Tassos Papadopoulos, there was an immediate adjustment on behalf of the two remaining candidates and their teams (Christofias and Kasoulides). Such adjustment primarily involved bargaining between each candidate and DIKO. Characteristic of the situation are the words of a Kasoulides' campaign team member: "On the night of the first round, there was a phone call, which started with 'when are we going to meet', rather than with, 'are we going to meet at all?' " (interview, 27 March 2009).

The two candidates became more accommodating towards DIKO and EDEK, in terms of reassurances on the Cyprus problem policy and of ministry promises. As contrary as this may appear towards the image and propaganda of an anti-partitocratic campaign, Kasoulides' rewards – according to both newspaper reports of the time and interviewees from DIKO and DISY – were bigger than those offered by Christofias and AKEL (Drousiotis, 2008; interview, 27 March 2009; interview 15 April 2009). EDEK chose Christofias immediately after the first round and within three days, DIKO and the small green party 'Ecologists/Environmentalists', although more divided, vowed support for Christofias as well.

Once Papadopoulos was out of the race, EDEK's immediate decision to support Christofias implied a strategy crafted before the first round results.[20] An interviewee from EDEK was explicit that such a direction, "although not officially decided, was given by the leadership since September 2008" (interview, 23 April 2009). More importantly, beyond the assumption that EDEK's decision was pre-determined, two main scenarios can be contemplated in regard to the strategic thinking behind it. Firstly, that any identification with DISY (even through abstention), would prove damaging in terms of membership discipline. Secondly, that more consistency in relation to the party's label as a left party obliged EDEK's leadership to support 'the B Plan' that was programmatically and ideologically closest to its own positions.

The decision of DIKO to support Christofias in the second round was one of the most important events of the whole campaign. DIKO appeared deeply unsure over what AKEL had been doing for the centre for decades. There was a preliminary decision by the General Secretariat of the party to support Kasoulides which was then overturned. The reasons behind the shift may be difficult to disentangle from other considerations at the time and more historical factors. Nevertheless, interviewees from DIKO confirmed what a series of newspaper articles argued: that the overturning of the initial decision was largely due to the fact that, DIKO officials known to be aligned with Tassos Papadopoulos, eventually supported Christofias. In the words of a DIKO figure and Tassos Papadopoulos campaign team member, "our primary concern was for the candidate whom we supported to be elected ... if Tassos was to vote for Christofias, then what would we do ... the party would be split" (interview, 15 April 2009). Surveys, according to the same

20 After a unanimous vote in EDEK's Political Bureau, the Central Committee voted in favour of the Christofias candidacy; with 109 members voting in favour, five voting against, and two abstaining.

interviewee, did play a role as they showed that two-thirds of DIKO's voters had already chosen one of the two candidates, leaving one-third to be determined by the party. The result was that even those officials initially suggesting Kasoulides, preferred to maintain unity and ally with the candidate who seemed more electable in terms of the dynamic he was able to secure from DIKO voters.

The second round campaign soon took shape on existing and agreed patterns of cooperation with only EVROKO giving its voters the choice of 'voting according to will'. In the absence of an up-to-date performance for either candidate (unlike in the case of the incumbent) it was attempted to affect voters' evaluations based on long-term partisan and ideological predispositions and the cues provided by party leaders (see Butt, 2006). The week before the second round saw a very antagonistic climate between the left and right at party, media and especially support base level (e.g. via emails and telephone messages). Moreover, it was largely representatives of the campaigns who took part in the debates, rather than people with the sole authority of the party figure.

Since both candidates supported a fast, effective and flexible solution to the Cyprus problem, this issue remained silent in the second round. This fact echoes the claim that either both candidates were hesitant to repeat pro-flexibility arguments on the Cyprus problem in the face of having to secure the support of 'rejectionist' or 'sceptical' voters from the centre. It was the first time that political competition – as shaped in the post-Annan Plan period – led to a de-specification of this matter. Rather, it was substituted by noise around its cleavage-based connotations; that is, patriotism versus nationalism, 'Greekness' versus 'Cypriotness' and 'proper flexibility' versus 'Turkish-friendly approaches'.

Left-right antagonism was reflected in more than one issue parameter of political competition but it was especially DISY's approach which was anchored in a wholly ideological front since numerically it was lacking the support that Christofias had secured from EDEK and DIKO. It was estimated, according to interviewees, that EDEK's and EVROKO's official support would not determine the result as cohesion levels in these two parties were not high enough (interview, 27 March 2009). It was, therefore, DIKO's 'casting vote' that the Kasoulides campaign team targeted in the second round, which may partly explain the choice of issues that were emphasised during this short period.

First and foremost was the issue of educational reform where Christofias proposed a reorientation "of education away from ethnocentrism and towards the multi-cultural conception of the world and the respect of others" (Christofias, 2008, pp. 81 and 83) and argued that his government would eventually change the mentality of education and especially re-evaluate the content of history textbooks.[21] The second (almost twin but non-policy) issue was that of

21 Educational reform as such was not a new issue or one addressed by Christofias alone. On the whole it involves non-political changes as well. Presumably, such statements could serve as an excuse for AKEL's four-year support of the President.

Christian orthodoxy and the church's role. During the second week, the Kasoulides team undermined the Christian beliefs of AKEL and Christofias and urged the Archbishop to support Kasoulides (*Philelefθheros,* 2008).

The third main issue of the second week was the European Union, especially the fact that AKEL is a member of only a small grouping in the European Parliament (GUE/NGL). From this a case was made to discredit other aspects of Christofias' programme such as his proposed attempt to secure the backing of EU elite circles for his Cyprus problem policy. In the space separating the first and second rounds a difference in strategies would likely be anticipated between those of DISY against the European policy of Papadopoulos and against the European policy of Christofias. Damaging reputations through accusations on badly handled relations turned into a more ideological discrediting of insufficient relations and ideology-based outsider behaviour; the latter is anchored to an established inter-party competition issue (for examples, see *Simerini,* 2008b; *Simerini,* 2008c; *Simerini,* 2008d).

In all three of the issues above and despite the partly supra-partisan label of the appeal of each side, campaigning in favour of specific platforms went hand in hand with targeting voters of a particular social identity. Political competition was conducive to cleavage-based polemics, even if it did not spawn them consciously. Polemics on these three dimensions included appeals to groups traditionally opposing each other in society. At the same time, however, the three issues mainly originate from the left-right cleavage – unlike in other European countries whereby distinct cleavages are formed over them – but also transcend them in contemporary Cypriot politics. Education reform and the content of history books is a sensitive matter for centre-right and rightist voters, and for movements and parties who connect it to their broader ideological values of ethnocentrism and nationalism. Similarly, religion and the church are subjects which touch upon a large number of Cypriots and while they cut across partisan orientations, church-state and left-right divisions are highly connected (see Panayiotou, 1999, pp. 564-574). From the mid-1990s Europe has been employed as a strategic electoral weapon by all the main parties, yet a Eurosceptic/Euroenthusiast divide has existed between left and right for decades, with the former being supportive of cooperation with the USSR, until this was not an option.

The contention of three interviewees from the Kasoulides campaign team that "there was a lack of coordination between the DISY leadership and the Kasoulides' team" (although a different degree was ascribed by each) is indicative of DISY's potentially more reserved attitude, had it been able to guide the campaign through a mechanism exclusively appointed and controlled by the party (phone interview, 5 December, 2008; interview, 27 March 2009; interview, 20 April 2009).[22]

22 DISY leader, Nicos Anastasiades did not make a TV appearance between the first and second rounds.

Analysis of the Outcome and its Determinants

Table 1 (p. 114) presents the results of the two election rounds. Kasoulides was the winner of the first round and Christofias of the overall election. Papadopoulos left the race early and against all poll predictions.[23] Despite the significance of the election, the abstention level was high in both rounds and actually increased slightly between the two rounds. From the Papadopoulos voters only 9% abstained in the second round, while most first-round non-voters were followed by second-round abstentions (Sigma, 2008). Considering that the electoral behaviour of the first-round losers was homogeneous enough to determine the result, there can be no objection to the fact that the eventual win of one candidate over another was determined by, and susceptible to, electoral alliances decided upon within a week. An electoral agreement of a different form or composition must be considered as enough to change the final result.

The second round difference between Christofias and Kasoulides was 7%. Although Christofias was the undisputed winner, when each candidate's final results are compared against the vote share of his supporting parties (table 1, third column) it is evident that it was Kasoulides who managed to surpass his partisan following more comfortably. He also secured the biggest percentage of those voters who formed their preference in the last week and month before the election (Sigma, 2008), although the indecisive vote was not homogeneous enough to affect the final result.

AKEL has always been viewed the most cohesive party. Its long-term consolidation vote suggests that it is more successful than other parties in winning long-term loyalty by instilling in its supporters a political identity which expresses the party's side in the country's cleavage structure. Therefore, a response to the question, 'How does one explain Christofias' win?' must be historical in nature. Surely, as Christophorou (2008b) suggests, a fundamental assumption, as developed by Panebianco (1988), is that parties' successes and failures "can be explained by the course they follow to establish themselves and gain legitimacy, as well as their capacity to adapt to changes in society". This has been illustrated by AKEL's continued electoral success and once again confirmed by the tactic employed during the last election (also see Charalambous, 2007). At the same time, it is still justifiable to focus equally on the conditions that shape the tactics of each party to begin with.

The context itself may yield unsolvable dilemmas or offer the opportunity for unconventional differentiation during the process of dealing with the doubts in question. Therefore, beyond an analysis of electoral tactics and election dynamics, the elaboration on Christofias' win can constructively begin with larger questions: would the first communist president ever be elected in the EU, if Cypriot cleavages and their manifestations had not been different to those in the rest of the EU? Had the Cyprus problem or the bi-communal history of Cyprus been absent from the island, would Christofias, and by extension AKEL, be as successful, electorally?

23 An informative website posting all relevant public opinion polls is [http://www.cypruselections.org].

Table 1: Results of Presidential Elections (three main candidates/in percentages)

Candidate	1st Round Result	Difference from supporting parties' vote share (in 2006)	2nd Round Result
Christofias	33.3	0.4	53.4
Kasoulides	33.5	1.1	46.6
Papadopoulos	31.8	-2.9	N/A

Source: Own compilation of data from Sigma (2008) and data provided by Christophoros Christophorou.
Notes: For first round – Abstentions: 10.4%; Invalid: 1.7%; Blank: 1.0%.
For second round – Abstentions: 9.2%; Invalid: 2.3%; Blank: 1.7%
For Christofias the supporting parties of the first round were: AKEL and EDH and for the second round were: AKEL, EDH, DIKO, EDEK and Ecologists/Environmentalists.
For Papadopoulos the (first round) supporting parties were: EDEK, DIKO, Ecologists and EVROKO.
For Kasoulides the supporting parties in both rounds were: DISY, KEP and EVRODH.

Another important question, inextricably related to the Cypriot incumbent government's ability to maintain its advantage is how do the detailed results reveal the reasons behind the defeat of Papadopoulos in the first round? What – based on exit polls (table 2) – should primarily be considered as a failure for the incumbent are the divisions over the candidacy of Papadopoulos within his supporting parties and their eventual incapacity to gather the necessary momentum around their proposed entrant. To this end, the three supporting parties' and particularly EDEK's traditional lack of strong organisational capacity and dynamic mobilisation mechanisms compared with the two bigger parties, must have proven decisive. Six per cent of DIKO voters, 21% of EVROKO's voters and an amazing 26% of EDEK voters went to Christofias. The electoral behaviour of EDEK's voters in this election and their mobility towards AKEL especially must have also acted as a counter-weight to the communist party's 10% loss towards Papadopoulos. Be that as it may, EDEK's incapacity to convince its voters continued into the second round – as the Kasoulides campaign team had predicted on the basis of polls – with 26% either voting against their leadership's official endorsement or abstaining. This suggests that it was not merely due to the persona of Papadopoulos that EDEK's lack of vote consolidation arose; the greater ideological heterogeneity among EDEK's voters must not be forgotten (Hadjikyriakos and Christophorou, 1996, p. 20).

Table 2: Cross Party/Candidate Movement in the 2008 Presidential Elections (first round compared with 2006 vote)

First round (Presidential Election 2008)

Parl. Elections 2006	Christofias	Kasoulides	Papadopoulos
AKEL (Christofias)	86.4 per cent	1.7 per cent	10 per cent
DISY (Kasoulides)	2.2 per cent	87.1 per cent	8 per cent
DIKO (Papadopoulos)	6.4 per cent	4.1 per cent	86.9 per cent
EDEK (Papadopoulos)	25.7 per cent	7.1 per cent	64.6 per cent
EVROKO* (Papadopoulos)	0 per cent	21.4 per cent	73.2 per cent
EDH (Christofias)	40 per cent	40 per cent	6.7 per cent
Ecologists (Papadopoulos)	39.4 per cent	29.4 per cent	35.3 per cent

Note: The figures are taken directly from the exit poll sample and do not include corrections, although these are minor.
*During the polling period, the percentage of voters who declared that they had voted for EVROKO was systematically lower than this party's actual percentage in the 2006 parliamentary election. The same phenomenon was observed in the exit poll. See later, for the methodological aspect of this issue.
Source: Sigma (2008)-European University Cyprus/own compilation – the sample of this exit poll was 2163 people.

In addition to organisational inadequacies, there have arisen academic claims about a faulty methodology in electoral surveying, later reinforced by the substantial difference of the final results from all pre-electoral surveys conducted. Although all surveys incorporated a 2.5%-3.5% statistical fault – essentially bigger than the difference between the first and the second candidate – their average result is much different than that of the final election. According to mathematician Giorgos Smirlis (2008), the surveys portrayed an exaggerated result for Papadopoulos and an underestimated one for Kasoulides because of: non-representative sampling (as it was mostly housewives responding to the phone surveys); a faulty response by those voters in favour of a candidate other than the one supported by their own party (in this case, Papadopoulos' overestimation was caused mostly by EVROKO voters); the omission of the vote from abroad; and a faulty response of citizens who were afraid to express their intention to vote a non-incumbent. Considering the lead that Papadopoulos had in all surveys, Smirlis' argument that a 'bandwagon effect' may have been set off is more than reasonable. The incumbent's failure to reach the second round is then of even greater significance because in the absence of a 'bandwagon effect' the so called 'soft vote', might plausibly have chosen another candidate and Papadopoulos' final

result might, therefore, have been even smaller; or, the strategy of his campaign might have changed.

Furthermore, the bipolarity of the electoral body was also reconfirmed in the election. In the first round, Christofias and Kasoulides lost around 2.0% to each other compared to the 2006 parliamentary election (table 2). In the interval between the first and second rounds, the movement of these two candidates was a minor 1.5% from Christofias to Kasoulides and vice versa 2.5% (Sigma, 2008). When these two figures are compounded, a very small section of the electorate, voting for one of the two polls can be thought to be unconstrained by its side on the left-right cleavage or their party-political preference. The system's electoral logic thus continues to be reconfirmed by the larger, systemic consequences of the vote. DISY was the party most harmed by the political developments of the post-referendum period. Thereafter, its successful replacement of historic leader and permanent candidate for the presidency Glafkos Clerides, with someone who proved equally capable of running against the organisational power of AKEL and an incumbent government which had at its disposal various clientelistic mechanisms, was tantamount to passing a crucial electoral test.

EVROKO's move of not dictating a choice to its voters in the second round did not deter the crashing majority of its voters from positioning themselves against the communist candidate. Only 15% of EVROKO's voters seem to have abstained while 71.1% chose Kasoulides (table 2). In spite of the recent divides within the Cypriot right, the element of bipolarity is, therefore, not diluted. Additionally, the actual result of the first round inhibited the attempt of EVROKO's leadership to establish a strong partisan identity.

Lastly, one paradox related to the Cyprus problem deserves to be highlighted. Considering on the one hand the positions and especially the rhetoric of EDEK and DIKO in the 2004 referendum and beyond, and on the other hand AKEL's distinctive stance as a supporter of the 'soft no', it may appear as a paradox that all three parties lost a substantial number of their votes to a candidate who represents a clearly different position from their own on the Cyprus problem. A logical hypothesis would be that the approach of EDEK, DIKO and AKEL on the Cyprus issue did not impose a constraint on their voters. A version of this hypothesis was empirically tested by Webster (2005), who reports that political party preference plays no apparent role in conditioning preferences for a structure to a solution: "It seems that, despite all the differences that the parties have regarding the Annan Plan and various other political issues, these play no role in conditioning the preferences for a solution among supporters". According to the exit-polls, Papadopoulos was voted by only 40% of 'No' voters in the Annan Plan referendum and 5% of the 'Yes', Christofias by 35% of 'No' voters and 34% of 'Yes' voters and Kasoulides by 24% of 'No' voters and 62% of 'Yes' (Konstantinides, 2008). Votes in the presidential election seem to be equally, if not mostly, conditioned by partisan and/or ideological identity (which may be partly fed by a culture of party patronage/clientelism) rather than by the Cyprus problem policy of each candidate.

Conclusions

The most important feature of this election was the win of the Communist party candidate, (although more than one passing investigator has doubted the 'communism' in AKEL's practice) (Dunphy and Bale, 2007; March and Mudde, 2005). And while the prevailing pattern of partial alternation continues – that is, one party holding the presidency each time, but previous office holders/supporters retaining control over ministries and parliament – the fact that a new party (AKEL) arrived in presidential office, leads to the expectation that change in the structure of political competition will be more easily observed (Mair, 2006, p. 66).

Nonetheless, the election itself (that is the campaigns, party tactics and factors that conditioned the results) followed a pattern that is by now distinctly familiar. In the light of a systemic contest and negotiation mentality, there is a good case to be made that a somewhat different background context did not produce a type of electoral competition that deviates from the Cypriot norm. Four main attributes that the literature on Cypriot politics (see, especially Mavratsas, 2003, pp. 148-188) ascribes to a Greek-Cypriot 'corporatist' culture, are reconfirmed in this election.

Firstly, sharing the spoils of governmental power as reflected in post-first round negotiations seemed to be the main and natural driver in managing the second round. More broadly, all parties seem to have made their decision based on their future as a collectivity, rather than on the perceived ideological proximity towards one of the candidates, notwithstanding signs of internal fragmentation on a personal basis. Overall, the election result was effectively determined by DIKO's stance in the second round, which was decided upon a rationale of ensuring the electability of the candidate to be supported, together with maintaining relative unity. In retrospect the election of Christofias to presidential office was not so surprising, once the inter- and intra-party politics are accounted for.

The debates characteristically involved mostly polemics, and each candidate's strategy, rather than focusing on ideological differences, focused on its natural enemies as conceived according to each phase of the campaign. Concurrently, the new government carried forward the tradition of basing an alliance on power sharing and not ideology and policies, with agreement existing so far on only general concerns and vague promises (also see Christophorou, 2008b, p. 228). The autonomy of Christofias, like that of the Presidents before him, is not, therefore, only constitutional but political as well. Indeed, this was repeated by AKEL during the period leading to the second round, presumably in an attempt to minimise the fear that EDEK and DIKO would interfere and dilute the 'significant change' component that compelled Christofias (see Koulermou, 2008). Certainly, the de-emphasis (even omission) of certain programmatic party positions and images of broad appeal were chief elements, useful both for votes and coalition building. Still, the fact that Christofias' electoral programme (not least his proposals for education reform and his party's diachronic stance on the Cyprus problem and rapprochement with the Turkish Cypriots) was markedly different from the policies favoured by DIKO and EDEK, showed once more that the

divide between the ideologies of left and centre is one easily surpassed through the distribution of executive posts.

The election result confirms that electoral behaviour remains deeply bi-polar and that an incumbent president's relative advantage in popularity can be overturned when left and right mobilise to the full. Cyprus problem policy continues to be an indicator of voting preferences but the Annan Plan's divisions have been less influential than expected, not least because two out of the three candidates running for office aimed at transcending this divide. A further erasing of the recent tri-polarity created by the Annan Plan referendum is to be expected in the inter-electoral periods, certainly at the political level and insofar as a similar Plan does not emerge in the near future.

That left and right competed against each other in a presidential election impacted for the first time on their respective parties' antagonism – or more broadly speaking, the left-right axis' topicality in the Cypriot political landscape. The candidacy of Christofias and the successful progression of both him and Kasoulides to the second round contributed to the re-elevation of the left-right cleavage, bringing all its accompanying sub-divisions (e.g. between church and state) to the surface of political contestation. Thus, the ensuing post-election period, where DISY had been softer in its opposition against the Christofias government could not appear in clearer contrast to the atmosphere of the election's second round.

The centre parties, as in 1988 and 1993, competed against both other power poles and this has naturally brought into question their organisational capacities. Clear indications are the losses of both DIKO and EDEK to Christofias and Kasoulides, the internal confusion at leadership level, and the self-acknowledgement of insufficient coordination. As a result of the election, the most evident change in the political landscape is that the centre was slightly weakened. Post-election surveys presented an increasingly bi-polar party system, with AKEL and DISY increasing their popularity. DIKO and EDEK initially appeared to be losing votes to the two bigger parties (GPO, 2008) and EVROKO, which has also suffered losses, has been calling for a united front with one or both of the centre parties in an attempt to supersede the evident bi-polarity. These events, in addition to the approaching European election of June 2009, appear to be currently stimulating the desire for constant differentiation from both the government and DISY. Electorally, the system may thus be thought to be returning to the textbook bipolarity evident from parliamentary elections, while a competitive and fragmenting climate, is also surfacing again.

Appendix

Interviews

A series of interviews (regular, telephone and via email) with presidential campaign team members, senior party officials and pollsters were conducted. All interviews (except those conducted via email correspondence) were semi-structured.

a) Member of AKEL Central Committee and Member of Christofias Presidential Campaign, 25 October 2008 (telephone interview).
b) Senior AKEL Figure and Senior Member of Christofias Presidential Campaign Team, 27 February 2009 (interview).
c) Senior DIKO Figure and Senior Member of Tassos Papadopoulos Presidential Campaign Team, 15 April 2009 (interview).
d) Senior Figure of Tassos Papadopoulos Presidential Campaign Team, 7 January 2009 and 29 March 2009 (email correspondence followed by telephone interview).
e) Senior DISY Figure and Senior Member of Ioannis Kasoulides Presidential Campaign Team, 20 April 2009 (interview).
f) Senior Member of Ioannis Kasoulides Presidential Campaign Team, 20 March 2009 (interview).
g) Member of DISY Senior Council and Member of Kasoulides Presidential Campaign Team, 20 December 2008 (telephone interview).
h) Senior EDEK Figure and Senior member of Tassos Papadopoulos Presidential Campaign Team, 23 April 2009 (interview).
i) Representative of CYMAR Research, 10 April 2009 (email correspondence).
j) Representative of CyproNetworks Research, 23 March 2009 and 24 April 2009 (email correspondence followed by interview).

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The Indigenous Foreigner: British Policy in Cyprus, 1963-1965

Andreas Avgousti

Abstract

This article examines British policy in Cyprus between December 1963 and December 1965, primarily through material at the Public Record Office in London. By viewing Britain as occupying the paradoxical position of being neither a foreigner nor indigenous to the island, the historian can come to understand the development and manifestation of British policy in Cyprus. The author contends that British policy was ad hoc and unshackled by long-term objectives. This policy was motivated by a concern to maintain the peace on the island and appearing as a neutral between claims made by the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities. Undoubtedly, Britain wanted to retain its influence in Cyprus, an influence that had been secured in the founding documents of the Republic. Caught in a period of rapid decolonisation and of protracted adjustment to its newfound status as a second rank great power, the effervescent situation in Cyprus afforded an opportunity for the questioning of the nature and extent of British self-interest at the highest echelons of Her Majesty's Government. Insofar as Britain was the major player in Cyprus during the period under consideration, the effect of Cold War considerations are best captured in British and not US policymaking.

Keywords: British foreign policy, 1963-65, Sovereign Base Areas, 1963 crisis in Cyprus, Cold War, Enosis, UNFICYP

Introduction

The twin concepts of 'decline of nerve' and 'identity crisis' used by historians to explain policymaking, as well as the fluidity of the regional and international context between 1963 and 1965, set the scene for an understanding of British policy in Cyprus. The 'decline of nerve' appears to lie behind almost every major action that Britain undertook in the Eastern Mediterranean and the wider Middle East post-Suez, which was to linger heavily for the next two decades.[1] Coupled

1 "Experience of post-Suez military intervention for British policy makers was also psychologically traumatic." Nigel J. Ashton (1997) 'A Microcosm of Decline: British Loss of Nerve and Military Intervention in Jordan and Kuwait, 1958 and 1961', *The Historical Journal*, Vol. 40, No. 4, p. 1070.

to this was the 'identity crisis' concept that historians use to explain British indecision. The rapid decolonisation (twelve countries of the Empire gained independence between 1960 and 1964) and the policies of the Colonial Office to paper over cracks by lumping territories together in federal relationships "did not succeed in combining unity and desire".[2] Add to this the well-documented domestic problems of Britain – rise in unemployment, consecutive sterling crises, sex and security scandals such as the infamous June 1963 Profumo Affair – and the image which emerges is one of a country desperately trying to come to grips with a new world order.

There are three main arguments that run through this article: firstly, that Britain still perceived itself and therefore acted as a great power in the region, secondly, that its policy could not have been anything else but ad hoc – albeit that continuity *can* be seen in the objectives of retaining influence (primarily through the Sovereign Base Areas)[3] and of appearing as a neutral, honest broker in the attempts to solve the Cyprus problem – and thirdly, that Cold War facts shaped the efforts to solve the island's quagmire.

The overarching theme in British policy concerning Cyprus was to achieve the fragile balance that would ensure peace and stability; in short, a policy of neutrality was pursued. Mallinson correctly identifies the British objective as one of hanging on "through thick and thin".[4] It would be a gross exaggeration to present Britain acting in a pre-meditated manner, sure of the results of its policies and definite in its wants. In any historical analysis, room must be made for the ever-present factor of 'reaction', although this does not imply an absence of initiative. An explanation for the continued ambiguity and reaction in British policy can be located in the fact that Cyprus was not high on the British agenda; rather, the island was important in the sense of its geographical position: that is, at one of the many Cold War crossroads conjured by Western policymakers. Moreover, the differences of opinion within the British government, and particularly that between the Commonwealth Relations Office and the Foreign Office made a straightforward and uncomplicated policy unlikely.

The oxymoron 'indigenous foreigner' is used because it seems to encompass the apposite characterisation of the relationship Britain had with post-independence Cyprus. Britain is a 'foreigner' in the sense that it had only recently (1878) become involved in the history of the island and had never 'Anglicised' it to any significant extent. Britain is 'indigenous' to the island because it possessed Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) of ninety-nine square miles plus the so-called Retained Sites, as well as a respectable size of British nationals residing on the island. It also left behind a legal code and an administrative infrastructure upon which the new state was founded; a new state that Britain promised to guarantee along with two countries whose ethnicities comprised the vast majority of the island's population.

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2 Alan Sked and Chris Cook (1983) *Post-war Britain: A Political History*. Harmondsworth: Penguin, p. 175.

3 This argument is also found in James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis.

4 William Mallinson (2005) *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 90.

Britain did not, therefore, completely abandon Cyprus to its own machinations; Cold War realities and the loss of Suez meant that the island had a role to play in the wider picture. Cyprus was no adequate substitute for Suez, and to retrospectively assert the opposite would be to endow more importance on the role of the SBA than necessary.[5] The claim by Hitchens that the violence of December 1963 proved that the "British were finally and definitely replaced, as the main outside arbiter, by the United States", is mistaken.[6] It is a contention of this article that Britain was the major player in Cyprus, especially given the Treaty of Guarantee and the presence of the SBA that provided Her Majesty's Government a permanent closeness with the events in Cyprus. The term 'indigenous foreigner' is employed in another sense as well: that is, Britain could be seen to act both swiftly and unilaterally to avoid the worst, very much as if it was indigenous to the island as opposed to a mere Guarantor Power or a former colonial master (Section I). However, this phase was not to last; both because of internal and external contingencies, Britain gradually tried to share the burden of the Cyprus crisis (Section II).[7] By the end of 1965, Britain was exasperated by the deadlock (Section III) and the United States came into the picture all the more conspicuously after this.

SECTION I

Britain Alarmed: The Thirteen Points, British Military Action and the London Conference

Our story begins with the rendezvous of two neophytes: a fledgling Cyprus Republic that was in a state of crisis and a new government to deal with in Britain. The two-month-old Conservative government of Alec Douglas-Home was faced with the "constitutional and ethnopolitical"[8] crisis that erupted in Cyprus on Christmas Day in 1963. The mere fact that a Cabinet meeting was adjourned on Boxing Day is revealing both of the importance Cyprus had in British policymaking in the region and of the perceived intensity of the crisis. The latter can be attributed to the fact that Cyprus was a bourgeoning republic counting barely three years of international existence. It was not the crisis *per se* which concerned Britain the most, but the possible escalation into a general

5 Argument in Wm. Roger Louis (2004) 'Britain and the Middle East after 1945' in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris. The SBA were increasingly used as NATO early warning facilities and wireless stations necessary for a worldwide network of military communications, and not as a primary launching pad for military operations.

6 Christopher Hitchens (1988) *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, 2nd edition. London: Noonday Press, p. 56.

7 Also in James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis.

8 Joseph S. Joseph (1997) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. Great Britain: Macmillan, p. 43.

conflagration in the area. Such an occurrence would prove to be catastrophic for the security of the area, not only in the sense of an intra-NATO Greco-Turkish war, but also due to the possible repercussions such a conflict would have on the future of the region: "For better or for worse, Britain had been given an explicit role to ensure that Cyprus did not ignite a larger problem".[9] A brief look at the incident that inflamed the crisis is warranted, namely, the Thirteen Points of President Makarios for the amendment of the Cypriot constitution.

What actually happened within the 'Britain – High Commissioner Arthur Clark – President Makarios' triangle in November 1963 remains unresolved. An exchange of notes containing the proposals by Makarios between Britain and Clark on the one hand, and Clark and Makarios on the other occurred in November 1963. The result was that Makarios thought that he had secured British approval of the proposed amendments, which he proceeded to present to the Turkish-Cypriots and the Guarantor Powers on 30 November 1963.[10] Makarios failed to see that Clark and Britain were not synonymous. Mallinson makes the probable claim that Makarios was "emboldened" by the help given to him by Clark,[11] and it is not a great leap of faith to claim this as evidence of British duplicity. British reception of the Thirteen Points was, however, not favourable. A laconic "No" was all that was written in response to the question as to whether Makarios had consulted London about the proposals .[12]

What seemed to be a misunderstanding as to British wants and an eagerness by Clark to help Makarios out with the Thirteen Points was the cause for a further deterioration of bi-communal relations within the island. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots felt excluded from government and vulnerable to the whims of the Greek Cypriots. To claim that the "prelude to the 1963-4 disturbances had been, in a sense, inscribed in the provisions of the 1960 constitution"[13] would be going too far. Such determinism is unhelpful to historical analysis and hinders rather than encourages debate.[14] A diametrically opposite view is found in Reddaway who claims that the December events were "obviously planned and premeditated ... sanctioned by the Archbishop and

9 James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, p. 9. I insert the quote here with caution: assuming a role may be too weak to explain why Britain acted the way it did, a deficiency I try to redress via my characterisation of Britain as an *indigenous* foreigner.

10 In a meeting with Clark on 19 December 1963, Clerides thought (and subsequently relayed to Makarios) that Clark was in favour of the Thirteen Points and that these were an example of "statesmanship". Glafcos Clerides (1989) *My Deposition*. Nicosia: Alithia Press, pp. 208-210.

11 William Mallinson (2005) *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 35.

12 PRO, PREM11/4139, FO Memorandum, 19 December 1963.

13 Christopher Hitchens (1988) *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, 2nd edition. London: Noonday Press, p. 55.

14 Hitchens gallantly admits his emotionalism in the preface to the second edition: "I wrote this book in a fit of bad temper". Christopher Hitchens, *Ibid.*, p. 2.

his cabinet".[15] The multi-faceted explanation elaborated by Joseph is sounder; ethno-political polarisation inherited from the past, the structural inadequacies of the Cyprus Republic, the lack of experience in self-government and the absence of a prudent political leadership which could transcend ethnic differences were the major factors which shed light on the breakdown of government.[16]

The Treaty of Guarantee, which was part and parcel of the 1960 Cyprus constitution, was a double-edged sword for Britain. Were British troops to intervene and calm things down before further escalation, "the present goodwill towards the British would probably cease and would consequently greatly increase the threat to the Sovereign Base Areas, Reserved Sites and to British families".[17] The High Commission also warned the Commonwealth Relations Office that "we must decide now what our answer would be to an appeal for military intervention".[18] Indeed, Britain often found itself in the middle of impossible situations, being asked to help one side or the other. For example, the Turkish-Cypriot Defence Minister of Cyprus, Osman Orek, pleaded with the Acting High Commissioner in Nicosia to help his community from being exterminated by the Greek Cypriots. A tripartite plea by the guarantor powers which urged the two communities to display moderation and cease the sporadic fighting proved unsuccessful. This pressed Britain to reassess its stance of 'diplomacy first, action later', to conclude that "we see no alternative to military intervention by the three Guarantor Powers to restore order provided that the Cyprus Government can be persuaded to invite us to do so".[19] As soon as President Makarios had accepted the proposal for the tripartite force, Douglas-Home called a meeting of Ministers to review the situation on Boxing Day, 1963. At the meeting it was decided that an armoured squadron from Libya and a battalion from the Strategic Reserve in Britain were to be sent to Cyprus.[20] The force was spearheaded by British General Young and was so effective that by the afternoon of the next day, all inter-communal fighting had ceased.

Britain then turned to the task at hand: how to disengage from the ungraceful peacekeeping role.[21] Unfortunately, unlike what had happened in the Jordan and Kuwaiti cases, there was to be

15 John Reddaway (1986) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p.146. R.A. Patrick confirms Reddaway: "there can be no doubt that a similar incident would have been precipitated by Christmas." *Ibid.*, p. 137.

16 Argument in Joseph S. Joseph (1985) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Concern*. New York: Peter Lang Publishing.

17 PRO, PREM11/4139, MOD to Commander of British Forces in Cyprus, 24 December 1963.

18 PRO, PREM11/4139, Nicosia to CRO, 21 December 1963.

19 PRO, PREM11/4139, FO to Ankara, 25 December 1963.

20 PRO, PREM11/4139, Minutes of Meeting of Ministers, 26 December 1963.

21 Although the Joint Truce Force was meant to be tripartite in nature, with Greek and Turkish contingents under the command of Young, it remained tripartite only in name. Britain's peacekeeping was an ungraceful role because it invited grievances from Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots alike, which is characteristic of positions of neutrality in general.

no indigenous (or, for that matter, external) action to allow Britain to extricate itself.[22] Nor was peace to be had on the Island since there were indications of a Turkish build-up of armed forces on the south coast of the island, in conjunction with over-flights conducted by the Turkish air-force.[23] Sir David Allen,[24] Britain's Ambassador in Ankara, urged his government to act with moderation. Britain concurred and no representations to the Turkish government were made. This is another example that exemplifies the reactive, as opposed to the pro-active, nature of British policy as events unfolded. Britain may have been quick to act in Cyprus, but there was no blueprint for future action.

The issue soon began to fan out to the United Nations (UN) as Zinon Rossides, the Greek-Cypriot Permanent Representative of Cyprus at the UN, proceeded to make representations to Secretary-General U Thant. British attitude to UN involvement was ambivalent. The fact that U Thant remained opposed to any UN involvement in Cyprus[25] was a mixed blessing for Britain: on the one hand it allowed for freedom of movement as regards the Cyprus issue, while on the other it laid all the responsibility on London. The Foreign Office outlined the negative attitude of the British government towards possible UN intervention. The "unfortunate consequences" of the Congo experience where UN troops were unsuccessful and the possibility of a loss of "virtually all control over future developments" was raised, as was concern about the Afro-Asian element in the UN seizing "any opportunity to try to oust us altogether from the island" using the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) as an excuse. The Foreign Office thus arrived at the conclusion that Britain should "do everything possible to persuade the Cyprus Government to accept the Tripartite offer of good offices" and that "we would probably be wise not to involve any third party at this stage".[26] The insistence on tripartite action was in line with the Treaty of Guarantee that required consultation amongst the guarantor powers with the general aim of the "mutual abandonment of the conflicting ethnopolitical goals of enosis and partition".[27]

Liquidation of commitments to Cyprus was indeed proposed by none other than the Prime

22 A comparison is made here due to the chronological and topographical proximity of the two countries to Cyprus, not to mention the involvement Britain had had in all of these countries in modern history.

23 The information first came from Ankara on 27 December 1963 and was confirmed the following day in a telegram from Nicosia. PRO, PREM11/4139, Nicosia to CRO, 28 December 1963.

24 PRO, PREM11/4139, Ankara to FO, 28/12/63. Allen thought Turkish manoeuvring was of a defensive and not of an offensive nature.

25 PRO, PREM11/4139, New York to FO, 27 December 1963.

26 PRO, PREM11/4139, FO to Ankara, 27 December 1963.

27 Joseph S. Joseph (1997) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. Great Britain: Macmillan, p. 21. I find this approach to be much more useful than that of Mallinson who argues that the Treaty of Guarantee handicapped the independence of the Republic. True as that may be, the *raison d' être* of the Treaty outlined by Joseph is enough justification for the necessity of its existence, as the continuous violence on the island proved.

Minister's personal Secretary Sir Oliver Wright who noted that, "our commitment to Cyprus is becoming both undesirable and unnecessary". Not only was there "something terribly old fashioned about our whole military thinking about the bases", but "we should consider handing over the whole problem to the United Nations" if the peace operation failed.[28] Proposals of retrenchment were not to be had, however. Britain did not relinquish its responsibility, as C.M. Woodhouse argues, but attempted to share it;[29] the distinction is crucial. Nonetheless, the success of the peace-keeping force urged Britain to proceed with a political initiative. Although there was an acknowledgement that "the present Constitution is proving unworkable",[30] no other alternative was hammered out and Britain tried to remain faithful to the 1960 Agreements. This had already been made clear at the Boxing Day Cabinet meeting: "military action could only stabilise the position; it offered no solution to the longer-term problem of the constitution of the island, which required a fresh political decision".[31] Although by no means evident at the time, the tripartite force was to prove to be the precursor of the much wider United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) that still survives to this day.

Contrary to the self-admission of being guilty to the accusation of "most reluctant premier of the twentieth century",[32] Alec Douglas-Home and his government launched a virulent effort to solve the Cyprus crisis. The effort was not taken solely in the name of wider Western interests, nor was it a half-hearted attempt to find a solution to what would become a chronic issue. Nicolet claims that the overarching theme of British policy was its inability to find a role in Cyprus. As a result, it portrayed a relaxed attitude to ground-shaking events such as the Thirteen Points controversy and was merely concerned for its SBA.[33] Whereas Reddaway is guilty of not paying enough attention to the importance of the SBA, Nicolet does quite the opposite. British efforts can truly be characterised 'British' in the sense that they were not taken in the name of wider Western interests alone, nor were they coordinated with the United States. British self-interest was the guiding hand, a self-interest already secured in the 1960 Agreements. Moreover, qualms existed, as expressed by the reticent nature of a statement by Douglas-Home to his Cabinet: "If the Turks

28 PRO, PREM11/4139, Minute to the Prime Minister from Oliver Wright, 27 December 1963. Such a proposal was at once radical and unpopular among officials of Her Majesty's government.

29 "British responsibility remained, under the letter of the Treaty, although Britain did nothing to honour it." C.M. Woodhouse (1986) 'Cyprus: the British Point of View' in John T.A. Koumoulides (ed.), *Cyprus in Transition: 1960-1985*. London: Trigraph, p. 91. Woodhouse proceeds to blame Britain for the consequent events in Cyprus, including the 1974 Turkish intervention.

30 PRO, PREM11/4139, Prime Minister's Personal Minute to Commonwealth Secretary, 27 December 1963.

31 PRO, CAB130/195, Meeting of Ministers, 26 December 1963.

32 Peter Hennessy (1996) *Muddling Through: Power, Politics and the Quality of Government in Post-war Britain*. Great Britain: Indigo, p. 235.

33 Argument in Claude Nicolet (2001) 'British Policy Towards Cyprus, 1960-1974: A Tale of Failure or Impotence?', *The Cyprus Review* , Vol. 13, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 89-101.

invade, or if we are seriously prevented from fulfilling our political role, we have made it quite clear that we will retire into base".[34]

As an indigenous party to the island, Britain tried to solve the problem by presiding over a short-lived conference in mid-January 1964 under the initiative of Commonwealth Secretary, Duncan Sandys. However, it did not bode well that the British government could not agree on a single interpretation of the intentions of the Greek and Turkish governments, not to mention those of the Greek Cypriots. The Prime Minister thought Turkey to be moving towards de facto partition, while the Foreign Secretary thought the Turks to be opting first for a federal solution, then perhaps for partition.[35] Partition of Cyprus was not an option at the time since it would render the British presence on the island invalid. A personal minute by the Prime Minister constitutes evidence of this: should partition occur following a deadlock in a Constitutional Conference, then "there will be no need for Guarantors and our presence in the Island for any reason other than our own military convenience would be superfluous".[36] Indeed, with Greece and Turkey both being members of NATO, it could safely be assumed that the two 'mother' countries would sufficiently control their respective communities. Britain was once again faced with the perennial issue of the last decade: an irrecoverable loss of power and prestige. In addition, the instability of domestic politics and regime changes in both Turkey and Greece hampered British efforts to conclude what the best way to deal with the 'mother' countries would be. Meanwhile President Makarios proceeded to be conveniently ambiguous about his wants in a stalling effort that he thought would give him the vantage point. Add to this the inability of Britain to act as a power broker in the region as it had once done, and the recipe for confusion and misinterpretation was complete.

The subject of the SBA was inadvertently raised at the conference because of the crisis since constitutional revision had the potential of compromising the legality of the bases. Indeed, whether the bases were desirable or not, was another point of contention within the establishment. As one would expect, the Ministry of Defence and the Chiefs of Staff did not wish to see their removal since "this could well create additional tensions in the area to the detriment of our interests".[37] The Treasury, however, thought that the severe economic strain Britain was under would be considerably relieved if overseas commitments were lessened.[38] NATO was another complicating factor because "NATO infrastructure installations in Cyprus are regarded as part of the British military element on the Island".[39] Crucially, this implied that neither the Greek nor Turkish

34 William Mallinson (2005) *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 37.

35 PRO, CAB21/5280, Record of a Conversation between PM and Robert Kennedy, 27 January 1964.

36 PRO, PREM11/4139, Prime Minister's Personal Minute to Commonwealth Secretary, 27 December 1963.

37 PRO, CAB21/5280, Memo by H. Godfrey of MOD, 7 January 1964.

38 Cf. Oliver Wright's view cited above.

39 PRO, FO371/179083, Minute by A.G. Munro, 1 January 1964.

military presence on the island could sufficiently guarantee the interests of the North Atlantic alliance.

Sandys accurately summed up the paradoxical situation at the conference: "... the Greeks had put a lot of influence on the Greek-Cypriots who were being very unreasonable, while the Turkish-Cypriots, who were being more reasonable, were being encouraged by the Turkish Government to be intransigent".[40] Joseph has pointed out that, "the two sides participated as two competing ethnic blocs rather than as four parties".[41] Either way, matters did not portend well either for the prospects of a solution or for British disengagement from the processes they had themselves initiated to protect their interests. The failure of the January conference to bear fruit meant that Britain would not try to solve the problem alone. Henceforth, Britain acted in a manner more akin to a foreigner than that of a native.

SECTION II

British Ambivalence and the Search for a Political Solution

The general pattern as regards British manoeuvring after the January 1964 Conference could be likened to a tug-of-war. On one side of the rope tugged British incapacity to bring about a solution to the Cyprus problem without the help of any other powers, while on the other was British determination not to appear as a non-independent actor. British pride was taking a battering, undergoing as it were a transformation that would finally lead to the end of empire in 1971 (albeit unclear by any means in 1964). The Foreign Office continued to operate within a Great Power mindset: "our international aims over the Cyprus problem should be not only to preserve the NATO alliance and retain our bases, but also to secure a climate of opinion to the establishment of British bases elsewhere if this should eventually prove necessary".[42] An incisive look at this statement reveals that British aims were not only defensive (such as the use of the words "preserve" and "retain" suggest), but also pro-active: 'securing' a favourable 'climate of opinion' undoubtedly meant positive action on the worldwide front. Britain successfully undermined the Greek-Cypriot effort to rush the problem to the UN by putting the issue to the UN first, thus minimising the damage of the Cypriot intentions to frame the problem of the island within "the concept of the sanctity of sovereignty and territorial integrity which has become something of a shibboleth at the UN".[43] In other words, Britain had the procedural advantage at the UN over the government of Cyprus.[44]

40 PRO, CAB21/5280, Meeting held in presence of PM, 26 January 1964.

41 Joseph S. Joseph (1997) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union.* Great Britain: Macmillan, p. 46.

42 PRO, FO371/174768, Minute by A.R. Moore, 20 April 1964.

43 PRO, FO371/174762, Minute by R.E. Parsons, 26 February 1964.

44 James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964.* Bibliopolis: Mannheim and Möhnesee, p. 79.

Broader Cold War considerations persisted to hover in the mind-frame of policymakers. In the case of "an armed foreign invasion of Cypriot territory, the Soviet Union will help the Republic of Cyprus to defend its freedom and independence against foreign intervention", wrote the Soviet Premier Nikita Khrushchev in February 1964.[45] The assertive tone of the letter sent by Khrushchev was rather misleading in light of the subsequent inactivity of the Soviet Union in Cyprus. Thus, it would not be unfair to include the letter as a propaganda move typical of cold war politics. "In London, the letter was simply regarded as a standard response, and did not cause alarm", Ker-Lindsay has argued.[46]

Nonetheless this was not clear at the time and six months later, when the possibility arose of transferring (at least part of) the British Home Fleet from the North Atlantic to the Mediterranean, the content of the letter resonated in the minds of British policymakers. Their fears were bolstered by the "recent evidence of a Soviet naval and military build-up in the Eastern Mediterranean in connection with Cyprus", and also by the emergence of "the possibility of a need for a naval blockade of the Island".[47] The possibility of communist subversion hailed from within the Island as well. Given that "the Cypriot economy depends to a great extent on the presence of British forces on the Island" largely complicated things since it meant that "a large scale withdrawal would, unless accompanied by economic aid, upset the economy and have political repercussions". The political repercussions meant a possible seizure of power by "the only efficiently organised party" of the island, the Communist Party AKEL.[48] Of course, this fits in with the ideological appreciation of how communism worked: not only that it was inherently expansionist but that it principally blossomed in beleaguered economies. This was yet another by-product of the Cold War mentality.

UNFICYP was not regarded as a solution to the Cyprus problem.[49] British diplomats still pained to secure a more permanent solution. Financing the UNFICYP was a constant source of trouble for London.[50] Indicatively, "before expressing our willingness to contribute to a third period we should have at least the assurance that the Americans will repeat their own contribution as well

45 Quoted in William Mallinson (2005) *Cyprus: A Modern History*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 37.

46 James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, p. 66. Ker-Lindsay notes that, "the letter nonetheless appeared to reduce the effectiveness of the [Truce] Force." *Ibid*., p. 70.

47 PRO, FO371/179021, Minute by A.G. Munro, 24 August 1964.

48 PRO, FO371/168991, K.D. Jamieson of FO to D.J. Crawley of the CRO, 8 July 1963.

49 Ker-Lindsay documents the recalcitrance Britain had had towards UN peacekeeping since the fighting had started in Cyprus. James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, p. 31. Britain had also rejected a request by the UN Secretary-General to have a representative present at the London Conference. *Ibid*., p. 46.

50 U Thant had made it clear early on that the UN would not foot the bill for the maintenance of UNFICYP. James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, p. 71.

as support the renewal of the mandate", wrote Boyd-Carpenter of the Foreign Office.[51] Therefore, Britain looked to its closest ally for reassurance, much more after the failure of the US-sponsored Acheson Proposals of summer 1964 for the solution to the Cyprus problem. Britain itself could not opt out of UNFICYP, given that Her Majesty's Government was still considered to be the major power with a vested interest in the Island.

Britain was self-conscious in order not to appear as the former colonial power dictating its will. This was emphasised by the Prime Minister to United States (US) President Lyndon Baines Johnson in February 1964, in reply to the US proposal for a Conference between the Guarantor Powers.[52] However, by the autumn of 1964, the Foreign Office was worried lest the Secretary-General assumed a wider role in the Cyprus issue; "We have always understood his object to be to reduce tension in [the] matter affecting bilateral Greco-Turkish relations".[53] The problem with this was that the de facto government of Cyprus, the Soviet Union and Turkey were all pushing for greater UN involvement. British determinacy to appear as an independent actor was being constantly undermined. However, the political recommendations made by the UN were not to British liking. The appointed UN Mediator, Galo Plaza, was disposed to reject extreme solutions such as *Enosis*, exchange of populations, partition or a federal state.[54] Furthermore, during a visit to London, Plaza emphasised "that any solution of the Cyprus problem must be built around Archbishop Makarios".[55] This was unsuitable to British methods of involving the guarantor powers over and above the wishes of Makarios, and posed a problem once Plaza published his report in March 1965.

Nonetheless, Britain remained in the prominent position as regards the issue of Cyprus and wanted to stay there. This status was expressed in the Anglo-American relationship, as the Western superpower was quite happy to allow Britain to deal with their former colony. As in Jordan in 1958 and in Kuwait in 1961, the US was content enough to allow Britain the leading role. In fact, it demanded that Britain take measures appropriate to its special interests in the island: "I think that the British are getting to where they might as well not be British anymore if they can't handle Cyprus", said a disparaged Lyndon B. Johnson.[56] Whereas the Acheson proposals can certainly be characterised as evidence of a growing US involvement in Cyprus, the historian must be careful not to conflate this initiative with an assumption of responsibility for Cyprus by the US.

As the summer of 1964 approached, Whitehall was coming round to the fact that either

51 PRO, FO371/174762, FO Minute by T.A. Boyd-Carpenter, 8 September 1964.

52 PRO, CAB21/5280, FO to Washington, 19 February 1964.

53 PRO, FO371/174759, FO to UKDEL to NATO, 14 July 1964.

54 PRO, PREM11/4701, CRO to Nicosia, 2 May 1964.

55 PRO, FO371/174770, Minute by R.E. Parsons, 27 November 1964.

56 FRUS, 1964-68, Vol. xvi, Telephone Conversation between President Johnson and the Under Secretary of State (Ball), 25 January 1964.

Enosis with Greece or a unitary state with untrammelled majority rule would best achieve the security of the SBA.[57] The new High Commissioner of Britain to Cyprus, W.H.A. Bishop, had pointed to this as early as April 1964; "I can see no alternative to bringing Turkey to accept the unpalatable fact that, short of military coercion, the Greek-Cypriots will have to be allowed to have their day".[58] In addition, by no means was there any certainty that 'Natofication' of Cyprus was the most ideal solution.[59] The Foreign Office was not in favour of transferring the SBA to NATO,[60] although it did not look badly upon the suggestion that the UN be given facilities in the SBA.[61] Britain had wished to "underline the sovereign nature of the Base Areas" when UNFICYP came into being in the spring of 1964.[62] Indeed, the assertion that the SBAs "have never formed part of the Republic of Cyprus and are not involved in the present dispute" was the staunch policy line of Britain throughout.[63]

By mid-June 1964, Douglas-Home asserted that, "We are increasingly – and possibly rightly – putting our money on Enosis as the ultimate solution".[64] This was happily seconded by events on the ground which were outside of British control, as the Foreign Office noted a decrease "in the likelihood of a Turkish intervention" which would have been accompanied by "a de facto intervention by the Greeks".[65] This is not to say that Britain had publicly disavowed itself of the attitude to neutrality, as was evident by the British refusal to pay one and a half million pounds due to Cyprus in July 1964 as had been stipulated by the SBA lease agreement. Paying the sum to the Cypriot government meant handing over a considerable amount of money to the Greek-Cypriot community that could be misused or abused. Conversely, to share this instalment with the Greek and Turkish communities or to attach conditions over payment would constitute a breach of the 1960 Agreements that legitimated the SBA.

Perhaps it was only inevitable that all the talk of Treaties and Alliances, not to mention the status of the SBA, would lead to a pervading legalism in the Cyprus issue. Questions such as whether "Enosis would automatically bring Cyprus within the NATO area"[66] were "not entirely

57 This preference coincided with the wishes of the Greek-Cypriots, as opposed to those in Turkey or the Turkish-Cypriots who preferred a federal state or partition.

58 DO 175/162, Nicosia to CRO, 21 April 1964.

59 PRO, CAB21/5280, Prime Minister's Personal Minute, 29 May 1964.

60 PRO, FO371/174762, Minute by J.A.N. Graham, 17 June 1964. Markides points out that neither the CRO nor the MOD was amenable to such a proposal either. Diana Markides (2000) *The Issue of Separate Municipalities and the Birth of the New Republic: Cyprus, 1957-63*. Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, p. 133.

61 PRO, FO371/174762, Minute by E.J.W. Barnes, 12 August 1964.

62 PRO, FO371/174763, Minute by R.E. Parsons, 1 May 1964.

63 PRO, FO371/174762, Talking Points for British Foreign Secretary meeting with Galo Plaza, 25 November 1964.

64 PRO, CAB21/5280, Prime Minister's Personal Minute, 16 June 1964.

65 PRO, FO371/174766, FO to Washington, 9 July 1964.

66 PRO, FO371/174758, FO Minute by R.E. Parsons, 4 August 1964.

clear",[67] even if this was Britain's preferred solution at that moment in time. While it was evident that if the Soviet Union were to attack Turkey (should the latter invade Cyprus) "Articles 5 and 6 of the North Atlantic Treaty would *prima facie* apply",[68] Britain neither wanted to encourage Turkey into thinking that it could provoke a conflagration and thus present NATO with a *fait accompli* of having to support Turkey, nor to give the Soviets the impression that they could attack Turkey without any risk of escalation into a wider conflict. Once again, Britain found itself caught between Scylla and Charibdis, handicapped by its own impotence to act in the high-handed manner suited to a (waning) Great Power as itself. Furthermore, there was the problem of the conflict between UN law and the Treaty of Guarantee; sovereignty as preached by the UN did not fit in well with the said Treaty. The problem as to which of the two legal principles was superior proved so intractable that it remains insoluble to this day.

At this point, the need to address a very recent and emerging interpretation is considered prudent because of its possible implications. Martin Packard, a British naval intelligence officer sent to Cyprus in 1964, related the following episode between himself and Acting US Secretary of State George Ball: "Ball patted me on the back, as though I were sadly deluded and he said: That was a fantastic show son, but you've got it all wrong, hasn't anyone told you that our plan here is for partition?"[69] The citation was made as part of wider evidence that British undercover forces were involved in fomenting the conflict between Greek and Turkish Cypriots since 1964. Without ignoring the importance that first-hand accounts of events may have in historical research, the anecdote has the potential of being interpreted as evidence for a wider Western conspiracy to partition the island against the will of the local communities. Indeed, the majority of the Greek-Cypriot press was flooded with anti-British sentiment in 1964.[70] The dangers for historical analysis harboured by such an approach are palpable. Not only does the interpretation assume that the two Cypriot communities wanted to live together and were agreed on the form of government under which they would co-exist, it also mistakenly conflates British and American approaches into a uni-dimensional 'West'. Partition may, in retrospect, seem cold-blooded to any sensitive reader, but it is useful to keep in mind that the Republic under discussion was a fledgling one which even lacked wholehearted acceptance by the Greek-Cypriot majority that populated it. Certainly, *Enosis* was the solution preferred by the British; this solution did not mean the absence of "a cohesive unitary state" which Packard laments and is mistakenly seen as a panacea to the problems of Cyprus.[71]

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67 PRO, FO371/174758, FO Minute by M. Brown, 12 August 1964.

68 PRO, FO371/174758, FO to UKDEL to NATO, 2 September 1964.

69 [http://news.bbc.co.uk/1/hi/world/europe/4632080.stm].

70 James Ker-Lindsay (2004) *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*. Mannheim and Möhnesee: Bibliopolis, *passim*.

71 Quoted in Christopher Hitchens (1988) *Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger*, 2nd edition. London: Noonday Press, p. 6.

Evidence of British initiative honed towards *Enosis* is the fact that London had its own ideas about what type of settlement the UN should try to achieve in Cyprus. An exchange between Lord Lambton and the Prime Minister on 13 May 1964 is revealing.[72] The settlement which Lambton outlined, and Douglas-Home approved, included: a unitary state for Cyprus which should be encouraged to join Greece; accommodation of those Turkish Cypriots who wished to leave the island; Turkish Cypriots who remained should have their security and rights guaranteed by the UN; accommodation for a complete transfer of the 12,500 Greek population of Istanbul back to Greece; and that the Sovereign Base Areas (SBA) should remain either under Britain or eventually under NATO. Given that the UN showed the necessary "force to keep the two communities from fighting ... talks could be initiated between Greek and Turkish Prime Ministers towards agreement on such a settlement". The Prime Minister was wary as to whether this would be satisfactory enough for Turkey, since "they will want something for their prestige as well", but agreed that "things are moving in the general direction suggested in Lord Lambton's Minute". It is worthy of notice how the conclusions reached by Britain were starkly opposed to the aforementioned disposition of the UN to reject extreme solutions. Population exchange was being offered via linkage of the Istanbul and Cyprus issues. The contrast could not have been more blatant, given the staunch dichotomy made by Douglas-Home that "there were really only two possible solutions in Cyprus; one was enosis and the other was partition".[73]

By the end of 1964 the possibility of *Enosis* as a solution had diminished. This was not because Turkey was against it, but rather because the popularity of such a solution had waned in Greece. Makarios' presence at the Cairo Conference confirmed his drift to the Non-Aligned Movement, thus reducing his already diminutive attractiveness to Britain as an object of persuasion.[74] Britain privately asserted its decision "that there is no further useful step to promote Enosis in which Her Majesty's Government could take at the moment". Britain stuck to the position that "the British Sovereign Bases are not included in the Cyprus dispute" and that "we cannot conceive of a settlement which failed to provide for the continuation of British base facilities".[75] Moreover, the failure of US diplomacy in the summer had once again placed the Cyprus issue squarely in British hands. As Britain firmly remained the hub of the international efforts to solve the Cyprus problem – the twin visits by Plaza in October and November to London are indicative – there was a marked disgruntlement with the American efforts (and the subsequent lack of them after the summer). Britain believed the US thought "in terms of a stalling operation only" and did not "have any ideas about how to achieve a final solution to the Cypriot

72 PRO, PREM11/4700, Minute by Lord Lambton and Prime Minister's response, 13 May 1964. Douglas-Home instructed that Lord Lambton's minute be "fed into the Whitehall machine".

73 PRO, PREM11/4701, Record of a Meeting between Francis Noel-Baker and the Prime Minister, 4 June 1964.

74 PRO, FO371/174759, UKDEL to NATO, 5 October 1964.

75 PRO, FO371/174759, Speaking Notes for NATO Ministerial Meeting in Paris between 15-17 December 1964.

problem".[76] Although Britain had been relieved of the exclusivity of the burden for keeping the peace in Cyprus and the UN had accepted that the status of the SBA was "not an issue",[77] Britain refused to view UN intervention as the final word on the matter.

SECTION III

Resigning to Reality? British Acquiescence Increases

The dawn of 1965 harboured little hope for a solution to the Cyprus problem, as far as Britain was concerned. The year is remembered in the history of British foreign policy in the region as the time when the relinquishment of Aden became an inescapable reality. Subsequently, British policymakers awoke to the existence of an incongruity between actual British power and influence *vis-à-vis* the weighty responsibilities Britain had abroad. After a long spell of Conservative rule, the Labour government of the charismatic rhetorician Harold Wilson consolidated itself into power following its victory in the October 1964 elections.[78] Although there is an argument to be made for the increased willingness on behalf of the Labour government to abandon the Empire, for our purposes this cannot be exaggerated. Although the advent of a Labour government did mark a change in the presentation of policy, the strategic aims remained very much the same in the case of Cyprus. Continuity can be observed in the policy of neutrality and over the issue of the SBA. Given the constant flux of the Cyprus problem, the myriad of different proposals made to solve it, and the ad hoc policy Britain pursued, it was not to be expected that party ideology would come to sufficiently pervade the search for an accommodation.

Cold War attitudes and wider regional considerations penetrated the Cypriot problem. A manifestation of this twin truth can be observed in the February 1965 controversy regarding the construction of a fourth radio station in Iran. Iran was part of CENTO, an alliance that had evolved out of the Baghdad Pact of 1953, and had become important to the West as a valuable strategic ally in what was an otherwise volatile region. As Dockrill puts it, "by the mid-1960s CENTO's remaining value to the UK was in encouraging Iran to remain loyal to the West".[79] The fourth radio station would be built in the context of military aid by Britain to CENTO in addition to the SBA that were to be used by an air striking force to support the alliance.[80] The concern for Britain lay in potential Turkish reaction to the decision to build the radio station; "In

76 PRO, FO371/174772, UK Mission to UN to FO, 1 October 1964.

77 PRO, PREM11/4701, CRO to Nicosia, 2 May 1964.

78 Britain witnessed a change of Prime Minister, followed by another change of Prime Minister and party government; these were years of aberration as regards the frequency of governmental change in Britain.

79 Saki Dockrill (2002) *Britain's Retreat from East of Suez: The Choice between Europe and the World?* Hampshire/New York: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 125.

80 *Ibid.*, p. 33.

the Cyprus context we ought to be careful of Turkish susceptibilities", warned Sandys.[81] Britain did not wish to see a reduction of links between Iran and Turkey, both countries being vital allies of the West in the Middle Eastern theatre of the Cold War.[82]

Iran was not the only case where the all-embracing nature of Cold War politics seemed to penetrate the Cyprus situation. The Acheson Proposals, the Johnson-Inonu correspondence of June 1964 and the fact that during 1964-1965 Cyprus had received seventy million dollars worth of arms from the Soviet Union, are all incidents which cannot be explained without reference to the Cold War.[83] The attempt by the Soviet Union to deliver ground-to-air missiles to the Republic of Cyprus in March 1965 was a specific example of how the superpowers vied for space on the neutral geopolitical landscape. The effort proved abortive after Makarios succumbed to pressures from the US and Greece to refuse deployment of the missiles.[84]

A turning point in developments was the publication of the Galo Plaza Report on 30 March 1965. Earlier, Wilson had outlined British interests: "peace should be maintained in Cyprus, particularly during the period following the publication of the Mediator's report".[85] The UN Mediator made it clear that the most favoured solution to the Cyprus problem was going to be a unitary state. Peace remained the priority for Britain, though it felt that a brokered agreement between the two 'mother' countries was the best means to achieve this. Since the Plaza report ruled out *enosis*, double-*enosis* and partition, it placed constraints on the possible outcomes of Greco-Turkish negotiations. In addition, the report gave the Makarios government increased legitimacy in pursuing its aims, while taking legitimacy away from those who advocated either *Enosis* or *Taksim*. Meanwhile, by March 1965 reports from the SBA became increasingly concerned about military intervention in Cyprus by all sides. Specifically, possibilities such as jet fighters from either Greece or Turkey coming to the aid of their respective communities were tangible concerns for Britain. Another nightmare scenario was that of MiGs being donated by the pro-Soviet government of Syria to the government of Cyprus.[86] The belligerent press statements of Makarios did not help either; he would disallow "the British Bases which still exist in Cyprus to be used in any way whatsoever against the Arab world".[87] In May 1965 and with an undertone of fatalism,

81 PRO, PREM13/2206, Secret Memo from Commonwealth Secretary to Chancellor of the Exchequer, 19 February 1965. Sandys felt the need to dispatch the memo due to Treasury opposition to the building of the radio station because of economic reasons.

82 PRO, PREM13/2206, FO to Tehran, 20 February 1965.

83 Joseph S. Joseph (1997) *Cyprus: Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. Great Britain: Macmillan, p. 54.

84 The incident is well-documented in Makarios Droushiotis (2005) *I Proti Dichotomisi: Cyprus, 1963-1964*. Nicosia: Alfadi, Ch. 8.

85 PRO, PREM13/1992, PM Minute, 5 March 1965.

86 PRO, CAB191/9, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 12 January 1965.

87 PRO, CAB191/10, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 13 April 1965.

intelligence reported that "military equipment continues to be brought in".[88] Meanwhile, the Chiefs of Staff had "advised that in the event of UNFICYP being withdrawn, British forces in Cyprus would have to be sufficiently reinforced",[89] thus arousing the spectre of increased overseas military commitments.

Thus, it was Britain which took the initiative and suggested a six month extension of the UNFICYP mandate in late June 1965. Despite concern as regards the cost of the force to Britain, it was obvious from the political point of view that, "of all the countries participating in UNFICYP we would seem to have the greatest national interest in avoiding its premature withdrawal".[90] Britain could not afford to police the island on its own, nor did it wish to relinquish its role and responsibility in Cyprus. The 'responsibility without power' thesis employed by Smith to describe British diplomacy in the Persian Gulf during the same period could be applied to this scenario. In Cyprus, Britain lacked the means to adequately protect its current status.[91]

Unlike the Treasury, the Ministry of Defence attached "the greatest importance to the continuation of UNFICYP as long as there is no political settlement".[92] This attitude persisted throughout 1965, as Defence Secretary Michael Stewart pained to explain to the Prime Minister: "I am concerned that our continued support of UNFICYP provides the best and cheapest method of preserving the peace in Cyprus".[93]

The Wilson government faithfully followed the policy of its conservative predecessors as regards the status of the bases and the role they played in the Cyprus issue. At a meeting between Prime Minister Harold Wilson and Cyprus Foreign Minister Spyros Kyprianou, the former said that "the bases were UK territory now and their future was a matter between Her Majesty's Government and the Government of Cyprus".[94] From a legal perspective, the obvious point that would render talk about the future of the SBA futile was that the government of Cyprus was not one which was functioning in accordance with the constitution; hence its ability to discuss the future of the bases was a non-starter.

Moreover, inter-office rivalry was not lacking as regards whether or not the SBA could be part of a solution to the Cyprus problem. The Ministry of Defence argued that the defence review could not afford to be disrupted by a possible ceding of the SBA. The Foreign Office, however, suggested that the government should act fast and give up the Dhekelia base to Turkey as part of

88 PRO, CAB191/10, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 4 May 1965.

89 PRO, FO371/179991, Defence Secretary to Prime Minister, 23 January 1965.

90 PRO, FO371/179990, Blue Minute, D.S.L. Dodson, 31 December 1964.

91 Argument in Simon C. Smith (2004) *Britain's Revival and Fall in the Gulf: Kuwait, Bahrain, Qatar, and the Trucial States 1950-71*. London/New York: Routledge Curzon.

92 PRO, FO371/179990, Blue Minute, D.S.L. Dodson, 31 December 1964. Dodson reported the attitude of the MOD in the Minute.

93 PRO, FO371/179991, Defence Secretary to Prime Minister, 23 November 1965.

94 PRO, PREM13/792, Record of a Conversation between Harold Wilson and Spyros Kyprianou, 20 June 1965.

a wider settlement, if such an occasion were to avail itself. The Cabinet and the Prime Minister sided with this proposal, and agreed on probing the possibility of using the SBA as a bargaining chip.[95] Here was an opportunity for Britain to appear as a self-sacrificing honest broker for the sake of peace, while simultaneously ridding itself of costly overseas commitments. Once again, British interests had coincided with the desire for peace and security on the island.

As time went on, the intractability of the issue at hand became all the more apparent. Given that "the rift between Makarios and General Grivas (was) no nearer being healed than it ever was",[96] Britain faced the issue of a split within the Greek-Cypriot leadership. This further dampened the prospects for coordination with local actors, which was a tenet of UN methodology towards a workable solution. For Britain, the importance of local actors was debatable when it came to the Turkish-Cypriot community, since "Turkish-Cypriot policy is clearly still closely controlled by Turkey".[97] Britain thought that if Greece and Turkey could agree on a solution, the respective communities on the island would follow suit. Nonetheless, it was not obvious that the 'mother' countries were up to the task, despite their common membership in the NATO alliance. Indeed, were it not so, the Treaty of Guarantee would have proved more effective given that it presupposed a sufficient unity of purpose amongst the guarantor powers.[98] The decision of the Greek government in mid-November 1965 to maintain all of the Greek troops present in Cyprus did not help defuse the situation. To its dismay, British intelligence observed that the Greek Foreign Minister had "clearly failed to wrest the initiative from Makarios: if anything he has been compelled, like his predecessors, to toe the Archbishop's line".[99] Turkey too had sworn in yet another new government under Prime Minister Suat Urguplu in March 1965, the legitimacy of which was under question.

Hope in a Greco-Turkish understanding over Cyprus proved to be misplaced. In July 1965 the negotiations between the two countries broke down as a result of political crisis in Greece. Interestingly enough, the talks had been directed towards the possibility of *Enosis* with territorial compensation in Greece for Turkey.[100] This vindicated the British preference for *enosis* in the sense that it was probably the most realistic solution which would satisfy British concerns for peace and security.

British reaction to the August 1965 suggestion made by the State Department to refer the Cyprus problem to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) showed that Britain was unwilling to

95 PRO, PREM13/792, Burke Trend of the Cabinet Office to J.O. Wright, 22 July 1965.

96 PRO, CAB191/9, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 12 January 1965.

97 PRO, CAB191/9, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 12 January 1965.

98 Argument made in John Reddaway (1986) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London: Weidenfeld and Nicolson, p. 155.

99 PRO, CAB191/10, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 30 November 1965.

100 PRO, DO220/212, D.S.L. Dodson Minute, 30 November 1965.

neither allow the problem move beyond its realm of influence nor jeopardise the status of the SBA. The US calculated that a verdict by the ICJ would satisfy Cold War aims: it would both protect NATO interests and keep Cyprus at a safe distance from the Soviets. As before, Britain was worried that such an action would bring the 1960 Agreements under scrutiny, thus compromising the legal right of Britain to have a say in the future of the island. The Foreign Office instructed the embassy in Washington to "explain our hesitations to the State Department",[101] and the idea was dropped. Once again, this dispels the myth of concerted action in Cyprus which some accounts have claimed to be the defining influence on the course of the Cyprus problem.[102] As regards the status of the SBA, London wished the issue to be put on ice, since this would avert any negative ramifications such as local agitation about the Bases in other countries.

The Electoral Law of late July 1965 passed by the Cypriot Parliament in the absence of the Turkish-Cypriot MPs afforded Britain with yet another opportunity to display its policy of keeping the balance between the two communities.[103] Britain was swift to point out the constitutional override, concerned more with the progressive wresting of the state by the majority community rather than arguments regarding the workability of government that the Greek-Cypriots had put forth.[104] However, when one considers the private admissions by the members of Her Majesty's Government as regards the intractability of the Cyprus constitution, a case can be made for two-faced diplomacy on behalf of Britain. Here was an attempt at political 'plumbing' of a problematic constitution, which was never going to be a long-term solution. Although disparaged by this Greek-Cypriot action, Britain used its diplomatic clout to stop the Turkish government from asking for an early meeting of the UN Security Council to discuss the Electoral Law issue.[105] Such an action would prove an embarrassment to Britain as far as its relationship with President Makarios was concerned. This was not followed by further action as resignation had begun to sink in as the latter half of 1965 came in full sway: "We can do little more than continue our former policy of urging moderation on all sides".[106] The British High Commissioner in Cyprus, David Hunt, made a proposal that was indicative of the growing exasperation at the continuing deadlock; did Britain need to adhere to the line that a solution to the Cyprus problem must be acceptable to all parties concerned?[107]

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101 PRO, FO371/179984, FO to Washington, 7 August 1965.

102 Nicolet claims that by late winter 1964, the US had taken over the Cyprus problem from the British who now only cared for their sovereign bases. Claude Nicolet (2001) 'British Policy Towards Cyprus, 1960-1974: A Tale of Failure or Impotence?', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 13, No. 1, Spring, pp. 89-101.

103 According to the Electoral Law, provisions were to be made for elections to Parliament which would bypass the constitutional practice of separate elections by the two communities.

104 PRO, PREM13/792, CRO to Nicosia, 24/7/65.

105 PRO, PREM13/792, FO to Ankara, 29 July 1965.

106 PRO, PREM13/792, FO Private Secretary Tom Bridges to J.O. Wright, 4 August 1965.

107 PRO, FO371/179984, David Hunt to Neil Pritchard of CRO, 20 November 1965.

Even though the presence of UNFICYP was judged to have made Turkey more malleable over Cyprus, it was also deemed to have allowed Makarios to strengthen the Greek-Cypriot position *vis-à-vis* the Turkish Cypriots. In other words, this was a zero-sum game between two communities that were meant to be cooperating in running the Cypriot state. In December 1965, the Cabinet resignedly "decided that we should do all we can to keep UNFICYP in being".[108] Gradually, therefore, Britain came to accept UN peacekeeping. The reasoning behind this was threefold. Firstly, it was in accordance with the long-standing British notion of international organisations to keep the peace as having a stabilising and conciliatory role rather than one of enforcement. Secondly, it opened up the possibility of a continuing world role for Britain at not too heavy a financial cost, which was flattering to a diminishing world power. Lastly, it was in harmony with the British idea that non-aligned states (and especially those which belonged to the Commonwealth), should involve themselves in building up a zone of peace beyond the interlocking spheres of interest of the two superpowers.[109]

Conclusion

On 10 December 1965, an agreement to begin to dismantle their fortifications was reached by both communities at the port-city of Famagusta. What could have proved to be a landmark in the history of the Cyprus problem in the sense of serving as a potential foothold, from which a solution could be extricated, was soon consigned to the rubbish heap of history. The reasons for this are beyond the scope of this article. What is relevant, however, is the optimism of the December intelligence report: "Rumours of impending trouble over Christmas, which marks the second anniversary of the outbreak of inter-communal fighting, have been fewer than last year and there has been no significant increase in tension on the island. The settlement of Famagusta has been widely welcomed".[110] A more realistic appreciation of the situation was made in the report of the UN Secretary General published on the day of the Famagusta Agreement: "After almost two years, the stalemate remains despite a widespread longing in the island for a return to normality".[111] The irony of the matter was that, in light of subsequent events, such a situation was distinctly more 'normalised' than it would have ever been.

According to Ball, "The British wanted above all to divest themselves of responsibility for Cyprus".[112] This assertion is all too often taken by historians at face value in an attempt to dismiss

108 PRO, FO371/179991, FO to UK Mission to UN, 3 December 1965.

109 Argument found in F.S. Northedge (1974) *Descent from Power: British Foreign Policy 1945-1973*. London: George Allen and Unwin Ltd.

110 PRO, CAB191/10, JiG (Cy) Intelligence Report, 14 December 1965.

111 PRO, PREM13/1992, UKMis to UN to FO, 10 December 1965.

112 Wm. Roger Louis (2004) 'Britain and the Middle East after 1945' in L. Carl Brown (ed.), *Diplomacy in the Middle East: The International Relations of Regional and Outside Powers*. London/New York: I.B. Tauris, p. 38. That both extremes in the historiography – Hitchens and Reddaway – espouse this statement is indicative.

the actions and initiatives taken by Her Majesty's Government in the history of the Cyprus problem. Such generalisations of the 'above all' type are of little use in historical analysis. In failing to address the 'why?' such generalisations are conclusions whereas they should be arguments.

Ball's conclusion sheds its importance since it is not vindicated by the documentation put forth in this article. The military and political initiatives described in Section I were a precedent for future occurrence. The Joint Truce Force was a predecessor of the extant UNFICYP, while the London Conference was a predecessor to the continuing conferences aiming at a solution to the problem. It was thanks to British decisive action that unfathomable distresses were averted, which in turn allowed the international community to take an interest in Cyprus. Even though Britain was unhappy with anything that it assumed would interfere with its interests on the island and the wider region, the side-effects of the British actions at the end of 1963 and the dawn of 1964 were seminal. Although it is arguable that the 1960 constitution was a device for Britain to keep her influence informally (via the SBA and the Treaty of Guarantee),[113] it does not follow that Britain had the power to live up to the demands of informal influence. The preference for *Enosis* points to a realisation that the 1960 Agreements were not the best for the island and informal influence was secondary to the primacy for the need for stability in the region.

Part of the problem for Britain was that it was never in the comfortable position of having to consider only one community. This was (and still is) a problem of two hyphenated communities which share the 'Cypriot' element just as much, or even less so, than the 'Greek' or 'Turkish' one. Inasmuch, the policy of balance and *enosis* were realistic, whereas the unitary, independent state argument was the most fragile. In short, there were more Greeks and Turks on the island than there were Cypriots. Herein lies a source of the modern tragedy of the island. Differently put, in the words of Douglas-Home, "sense is not enough".[114] The history of the evolution of the Cyprus problem to this day has vindicated the Prime Minister in his remark.

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With a Spray Can in Lefkosia/Lefkosha: Murals, Graffiti and Identity

Elizabeth Hoak Doering

Abstract

This paper is rooted in the observation that there is radically less graffiti of any kind in the north (Lefkosha) than there is in the south (Lefkosia). It presents an overview of kind, presence and absence of anonymous public writing – graffiti – in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, and then poses possible reasons for this discrepancy. What social and political identity differences does this discrepancy indicate? Why are murals not part of the visual public discourse in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, as they are in other divided societies? What is the graffiti writer's role, in the absence of murals? What political meanings are articulated in the interactions of graffiti writers in specific areas of Lefkosia/Lefkosha, and how does whitewashing fit into a much larger civic discourse that includes individuals, groups and authority? In particular this paper aims to parse the group-oriented visual discourse from the discourse related to individuals, and at the same time looks at gender equality in these expressions. Why, and in what ways do women seem to be less visible in terms of public political expression? How can reconciliation programmes clarify the audiences they target when designing cultural projects? Under what circumstances would a public mural arts programme be appropriate in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, and why is there none in place now? The methodology for collecting data is peripatetic and qualitative, because the emergent nature of graffiti and its erasure calls for a visual-ethnographic and documentary approach to sources and data. The instances of graffiti that shape the content of this paper have been selected from specific parallel areas located in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, although they sit within an expanding and temporal textual framework of graffiti documented in paint and in incision on Cyprus.[1]

Keywords: graffiti, murals, gender, street art, identity, hooligans, Cyprus, Lefkosia, Lefkosha, anarchists

1 This 'expanding temporal and textual framework of graffiti' is a documentation that began in 1997. At that time much graffiti in Lefkosia, and elsewhere on the island, was collected by *frottage*: graphite rubbings of incisions in the walls. The walls near the Buffer Zone were especially interesting in that regard. As spray paint became more popular photography was used to catalogue this and other emerging trends. The catalogue now includes a thousand or more images, digital and film, contemporary and historical graffiti from both sides of the island, including some twenty remaining wall rubbings from 1997.

ΔΕΝ ΑΝΗΚΩ ΣΕ ΚΑΝΕΝΑ (sic.)
ΔΕΝ ΑΝΗΚΩ ΠΟΥΘΕΝΑ

[I don't belong to anyone/I don't belong anywhere]
– social anarchist graffiti in the moat of the Venetian Walls, Lefkosia

Introduction: Walls, but no Murals

Lefkosia/Lefkosha has no wall murals.[2] A mural is defined here as *a planned, oversized image executed on a large expanse of wall that conveys a specifically local socio-political message in an*

2 Several noteworthy projects have been commissioned to non-Cypriot artists working for entities such as the British Council of Belfast, the British Council, the US Embassy in Cyprus, the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP), United States Agency for International Development (USAID). Artists include Farhad Nargol O'Neill, 'Constructing the Past' (2006); Xavier Cortada, 'Listen to the Children of the Green Island Mural' (2000); and Dan Perjovschi, 'Leaps of Faith. A Project for the Green Line and for the City of Nicosia' (2005). None of these fits the precise definition of 'mural' given here. All are more or less pan-Cyprian in nature, do not depend on local demand and were spurred by international programmes for social change and reconciliation.

evocative manner. Murals, even if publicly funded, arise thematically from local initiatives to express lived and site-specific experiences, social identification with place, and a desire to express aspirations for the future of the community, by the community. Although the media may vary, murals are usually painted with a brush rather than spray-painted or stencilled and they are usually painted by non-local, semi-professional artists who often act in collaboration with community leaders. Murals can be located on the sides of buildings, homes, highway retaining walls, or any place deemed appropriate by neighbourhood leaders whose interest it is to represent and indicate the presence of a knit community. Where dividing walls as were in Berlin, and are in Israel-Palestine have become an expressive focal point for the populations on either side,[3] Lefkosia does not have this kind of solid wall division. The city, and the island, are bisected by what is known as the UN Buffer Zone, the Green Line or the Dead Zone, which consists of sandbagged dead-ends, barbed wire, and mined or military patrolled open spaces. This 'line' has been perforated by pedestrian and auto checkpoints since 2003, and it is also an area of varying widths, featuring derelict buildings, wild overgrowth and makeshift dead-ends.

The lack of politically erected dividing walls in Cyprus does not explain the lack of murals. In the socially divided city of Derry/Londonderry there are no political dividing walls either,[4] yet murals are the central feature of Bogside, the community that experienced Bloody Sunday in 1972. There, murals are on the sides of buildings and houses, and they are meant to galvanise social recognition of a common local and national past, and also present and claim solidarity with other historical causes such as in Palestine and Cuba. Furthermore in Belfast, where there are politically erected walls ('fences') dividing the two communities, murals are not painted on the fences themselves but rather, like in Derry/Londonderry, on the sides of buildings and homes in politically charged neighbourhoods. The Berlin Wall and the Israeli/Palestine wall may be unique examples of site-specific political wall discourse.[5]

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3 Such murals are not limited to areas of ethnic and political conflict. In addition to the historically controversial, explicitly communist works of Diego Rivera, murals are now a high-profile component of contemporary urban renewal programmes. The largest of these is in the United States: the Mural Arts Programme of Philadelphia – itself inspired by a programme in Chicago – employs murals and muralists to "work on a symbolic level, providing opportunities for communities to express important concerns, values ... their desire to remember those who were overcome or who overcame ..." (Golden *et al.*, 2002, p. 11).

4 "Free Derry Corner" was painted on a freestanding house wall in 1969 to demarcate the entry into Derry; that is, it acted not as a dividing wall but a boundary marker. It now serves as a monument to the community and to the events that took place there, standing without support in the intersection of Lecky Road and Fahan Street.

5 For politically motivated painting on the Israel/Palestine wall, see BANKSY's work, commentary and feedback. One transcript follows:

> "*Old [Palestinian] Man*: 'You paint the wall, you make it look beautiful ...'
> [*BANKSY*]: 'Thanks ...'
> *Old Man*: 'We don't want it to be beautiful, we hate this wall, go home'"
> (BANKSY, 2006, p. 142).

In Lefkosia/Lefkosha, it seems that the cultural apparatuses for mural painting are absent, since blank walls of buildings abound on both sides of the Buffer Zone. But what are these cultural apparatuses? Where and in what social and political circumstances do societies create murals, support them, and maintain them? Why has this fashionable international mode of community expression not been exploited in Lefkosia/Lefkosha?[6]

One reason may be that the Cypriot societies that experienced the events during and leading up to 1974 are deracinated; they are removed physically from the sites of their experiences. Many, although not all, are also removed socially and as a community from their lived past, so that younger members of displaced Lefkosia/Lefkosha communities are not growing up in places that are invested with the history lived by their elders. Turkish Cypriots are officially encouraged by the state to focus on their present life in the north rather than dwell on experiences shared in their former villages in the south. Greek Cypriots by contrast are not at all discouraged from remembering the past.[7] In the south, local memory is preserved through coffeehouses and *somateia*,[8] however refugee church parishes seem most clearly to preserve and transfer the [displaced] social structures and shared experience of one locality. These parishes are self-identified through their priest and the name of their parish but importantly not through a built church.[9] In this way, some activities of the Orthodox Church may serve to exhaust some of the local or community sentiments that might otherwise have resulted in murals in the south. And since displaced Turkish-Cypriot communities are discouraged by the state to envision their past in the south, there may be no local desire to mount a mural – at least about the past. However there would be good reason to do so in order to reinforce concepts of the present and future.[10] Finally, Lefkosia/Lefkosha was, with a few notable exceptions, not resettled after 1974 by many of its

6 The unbalanced relationship between state-sponsored monuments and publicly arranged murals needs to be probed further: Lefkosia/Lefkosha has many state-sponsored monuments and political statues on both sides of the division. When is this a void filled by the state, in terms of the need for public expression; and in what situations does this void-filling pre-empt/proscribe public expression?

7 "Greek Cypriot refugees were re-housed indiscriminately and their settlements contain people from many villages and towns. Thus, on the one hand, they are encouraged to think of themselves as members of a community (the previous village) that no longer exists, while on the other hand, they were placed with people from other villages with whom they were unable to share memories of their previous lives" (Papadakis, 2006, p. 11).

8 For a detailed understanding of the socio-political roles of the coffeehouse in Greek Cypriot culture see (Nicos Philippou, 2007). *Somateia* are the Right wing, often nationalist coffeehouses/sports team clubhouses.

9 In the last ten years many of these transient parishes began to build their own churches. This may in part be because the refugees have finally achieved an economic status that allows for church building. Or it may be a tacit recognition that they will not be able to return in the manner they would have like to.

10 "Officially, the attempt has been to turn the area into their own place. This has led to a policy of erasing the traces of its previous inhabitants, and substituting them with their own. They also had to persuade those who moved into the north that this was truly their 'place'. This necessitated the discouragement of fond reminiscences of their previous 'places', which were officially deemed improper" (Papadakis, 1998, pp. 22-23).

original inhabitants. Instead, parts of the area became derelict and parts were re-populated by foreigners, guest workers, refugees and Turkish settlers.[11] The bulk of the people who experienced the local history of Lefkosia/Lefkosha no longer inhabit the divided city. Those people are dispersed throughout Cyprus, and the world, and their relative sense of community might be formed and found among other Cypriots in general, based on 'Greek/Turkish-Cypriot-ness', rather than in their specific locality within Cyprus. These are some suggestions as to why Lefkosia/Lefkosha are visually silent as *communities*.[12] But in this kind of environment graffiti becomes a salient feature of visual public discourse.

The youth growing up now in Lefkosia/Lefkosha are the ones who are spraying (or not spraying) the walls.[13] Graffiti in Cyprus is nearly exclusively a young male interest, even though in other places female graffiti writers are recognised and active. In introducing graffiti as a mode of public political discourse in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, this paper chooses to look not just at the occurrence of graffiti, but also at its erasure and – pointedly – at where graffiti is noticeably absent. In addition to the central question as to the general absence of graffiti in Lefkosha, there is also a marked absence of graffiti done by young female artists. Where do the female counterparts to male graffiti artists find adequate modes of political expression or dissent? Even though most graffiti is anonymous or pseudonymous, the gender of the writer can be ascertained through social research and then tracked by style. The quote used in the introduction ("I don't belong to anyone/I don't belong anywhere") is interesting in this respect.[14] The writer of this phrase is male. Knowing this

11 A 2004 Household Survey prepared for UNOPS assessed the demographics of all households within the walled city. It indicates that only forty-five per cent of households in the south are occupied by Greek Cypriots. The rest of the households claim a diversity of origins: Pontic, Indian, Philippino, Pakistani, Russian, Greek, Sri Lankan, Chinese and others, making up a thirty-nine per cent minority of extremely diverse origins. In the north the majority are occupied by mainland Turks – fifty-seven per cent – and followed by thirty-two per cent Turkish Cypriots. Only two per cent of those households are other than Turkish or Turkish Cypriot.

12 This disassociation is well exposed in Papadakis' research in the Tahtakallas area of Lefkosia:

> "The refugees typically spoke of 'being' from this or that village in the north, and of their own home and their own place as the one in the north. They complained that it was difficult for community life to emerge in Tahtakallas, since each family came from a different village and they were 'like strangers' to each other ... An attempt to set up a coffee shop in 'Tahtakallas Settlement' which could become a focus for (at least male) community life did not work out. The man who tried to open the coffee shop in the Settlement saw his efforts completely fail since, as he said, 'there is no sense of community here, so how could a coffee shop work?'" (Papadakis, 1998, p. 22).

13 Some of these youth are part of a discussion related to children of refugees and post-memory (see G. Dawson, 2007 and J. Nassari, 2007); how this generation of youth envisions itself now, as part of [or not part of] a community linked to a place, may be related to the stories they hear about the past from their family. Graffiti's spontaneous expression, or the lack of graffiti, may be indicative of more psychological – historical ends than will be discussed within the framework of this paper.

14 The phrase is written on a wall inside the D'Avila moat, below Plateia Eleftherias, in a garden area frequented more often by foreign workers than by Cypriots. In a sense, the contemporary reading of this quote is the most

problematises the implicit feminist criticism of the gendered – possessive surnames in Greek culture.[15] In Lefkosia/Lefkosha, only one work by a female writer was identified but here the veridicality of the source is questionable. Her identity and activity is guarded by a male who is himself interested to be noted, while hiding her.

Traditionally, and until a few years ago, female faces fronted the cause of the Missing[16] but this cause is less popular in the current generation of youth who are distanced by time and other layers of personal and family history from the war in 1974. There are not many other public arenas for the female voice in political matters.[17] The lack of female hooligan graffiti is not at all surprising,

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interesting, because even though it is written in a language perhaps unreadable to most of the park's denizens, it nevertheless speaks to their extraction from 'home', while ironically commenting on their non-negotiable status as workers here. In some qualified respects, they do belong to someone (their employers). If a foreign worker did personalise the phrase, however, it could be understood as a declaration of personal freedom and dissent. By contrast, the non-transparency of Greek-Cypriot culture is also implicit in this reading. The Greek phrase may be interpreted as part of the dominant national culture that is present, visible, and yet largely unavailable to all non-Greek-speaking inhabitants: a graphic image of linguistic dis-inclusion that may be read reflexively, interpreted as being aimed at foreigners and non-Greek speaking nationals themselves (i.e. [since you can't read this,]"you don't belong ..."). If there was no attempt by the writer to take audience into consideration, then the work is interestingly posed on a historical ring of walls that were intended to unify and protect what is now a famously divided city. The moat itself is a remainder and reminder of the failed Venetian attempt to resist the Ottoman invasion that took place on 9 September 1570, and resulted in a massacre of Nicosia's 20,000 male inhabitants, and the sale of women and children as slaves. In a historical framework, a Cypriot male's expression on the moat's walls could be read as a claim to independence as a result of total loss; or as a complete lack of root, identity and direction. Since the writer of the graffiti in focus here is supposedly affiliated with anarchists, the last interpretation is probably the closest to what he was claiming, and probably without intentional semiotic overlap with the architecture on which it was painted. At the time of this revision only two phrases of graffiti have been found that are most likely written by a Sri-Lankan. Both are in support of the LTTE [Liberation Tigers of Tamil Eelam], and both written on the portals of Paphos Gate.

15 It has been suggested that this phrase, "I don't belong to anyone" has long been a part of pan-Mediterranean feminist challenges to the patronymics that literally mean that the woman belongs to her father or husband.

16 Greek Cypriots count 1468 missing from the time of the Turkish Army invasions of 1974. Among other groups fighting for attention to the problem of the Missing, *Oi Manadhes tis Kyprou* (Mothers of Cyprus) is a group of women who sat at the UN Buffer Zone checkpoint at Ledra Palace and handed out leaflets about their cause. These women lost family members and/or spouses during the war. They dressed in traditional mourning attire and confronted tourists crossing to the north when there was only one UN checkpoint by the Ledra Palace Hotel. They also appeared internationally and actively sought written and personal correspondence with politicians, diplomats and policy makers. Since 2003 their activities lessened.

17 In *Violence* Žižek concludes, "Those in power often prefer even a 'critical' participation, a dialogue, to silence – just to engage us in 'dialogue', to make sure our ominous passivity is broken" (Žižek, 2008, p. 217). The silence of Turkish Cypriots in general, and women in the south should be well noted, as this non-participation in public discourse may set liberal expectations about [participatory] government off course.

since football and its *somateia* or *syllogoi*[18] are almost without exception for men. Young women, when asked, feign disinterest in the Left vs. Right athletics discourse and usually follow a masculine social lead in choosing sides. In addition to outlining a masculinity study worth probing further, the noticeable absence of young women participating in the public political spectrum, including graffiti writing, casts light on a masculine hegemony in Lefkosia/Lefkosha that seems to co-opt the feminine point of view by appearing to promote or protect women, their concerns and interests. Perhaps the feminine voice can be viewed as a silent narration that is visible by way of a recognisable absence.

With a few sparkling exceptions, there is little current graffiti that confronts the actual and mundane political issues of ongoing conflict and occupation on either side of the city. One anarchical stencil appears near the Buffer Zone in the north with the silhouette of an electric drill inside the silhouette of a speedy-looking shopping cart. It reads simply, "drilling the border". Another exception is on part of a wall ending at Ledras Street closing off a road going into the Buffer Zone.

18 Right-wing and Left-wing assembly places/football clubhouses.

This roadblock made of flimsy whitewashed boards was sprayed with several layers of graffiti and again whitewashed in early March 2009. But in February of 2009 blue letters read, "close the roadblocks [or checkpoints]", and signed with a fascist sun-cross. This was over-sprayed in black with tight lettering reading above, "I don't forget nationalism (1963)[19] – burn the roadblocks", and signed with the encircled 'A' of anarchy. Finally only "nationalism" was left, the rest being sprayed over with blue. The content and style are directly related to the location of the graffiti – more or less within 200 metres of the Lokmaji Checkpoint on Ledras Street – an area where anarchical, socialist groups tend to confront hellenocentric groups. The details of the groups involved and their signature styles will be advanced later in this discussion. Even though the graffiti on this roadblock is an exception, it distinctly reveals the south's internal conflict at a group level about the political *status quo*. Graffiti close the Buffer Zone in the south is almost exclusively a blunt, clashing discourse of socialist-anarchical (Left wing) against Right wing hellenocentric expression; it is less about popular culture, football and personal expression, some of which are also politicised modalities that become more prevalent further from the actual contested areas.

Popular Culture and Street Art

Graffiti here is openly defined as *rapidly produced anonymous public writing by an individual*. An examination of the amount and kind of graffiti in Lefkosia/Lefkosha reveals significant differences in the way graffiti is deployed as a medium for expression of identity in this divided society. Why does the individual actor, the graffiti artist, take the place of more collaborative efforts like murals? What is gender's role in graffiti's discourse? What groups are [meaningfully] left out of the discourse? What kinds of political sentiments get expressed? Who are the intended readers? What is the relationship between architecture and graffiti? The kinds of graffiti that appear merit careful parsing because they suggest a current picture of local identity and identities. Recognising these and other differences that are exposed in graffiti may lead to better application of reconciliation programmes designed for both communities and the island as a whole.

For this paper, it is essential to distinguish and set aside the style of graffiti associated with popular culture, and that emerged as the significant visual apparatus associated with the rise of the hip-hop music and skateboarding scenes, in the 1990s. This is the kind of spray-can graffiti that originated in New York and Philadelphia in the 1960s and which rapidly became popular thereafter in Europe, Latin America and elsewhere. It was a direct response to so-called ghettos and the advancing differences between rich and poor in capitalist and consumer societies. This kind of graffiti is sometimes viewed as a form of class struggle: a way for working class youth to express

19 An ironic overlap of the ideological use of "I don't forget [the Turkish invasion and occupation]", associated with conservative Greek Cypriots; and "1963" which was one of the flashpoint years for interethnic violence often cited by Turkish Cypriots and Left-wing Greek Cypriots, but ignored by conservative Greek Cypriots. .

their individual existences in a global society that is systematised, sterilised, and beholden to wealthy corporations. Through a simple act of writing one's moniker on a wall ('tagging'), commercial architecture, advertising billboards and other strategic uses of free viewing space become spectra for social criticism. In this way, graffiti can be interpreted as a form of class struggle that articulates dissent against corporations which hijack the gaze of local, working class populations by appropriating the space for commercial purposes including advertising.[20] For similar reasons graffiti on vehicles of public transportation[21] is a symbolic act in an arena where individuality is subordinated to the mass [transit]. The border between graffiti and vandalism is difficult to define, usually contingent on point of view, and often situational; graffiti is often associated with gangs, and sometimes with territoriality[22] although these determinations are also strongly contingent on point of view. There is a huge volume of websites, published papers and newspaper articles given to declaiming graffiti's place as an art form.

Street Art: Throws and Pieces, Tags and Crews

Contemporary use of the aerosol can to spray graffiti has evolved into general types, all which appear to varying degrees in Lefkosia/Lefkosha. The most visible kind are the large and colourful, fat-lettered 'throws', and also 'tags' which are quickly scribbled, simple (sometimes marker) signatures that serve as personal logos, sometimes related to an act of daring. More evolved works that include recognisable imagery, story and often portraiture, combined with expressive phrases are called 'pieces' (from 'masterpiece'). Pieces appear rarely in the south[23] and have not yet been tracked in the north.

Throws and tags appear with proficiency in the north and the south, put up in areas where graffiti seems to be condoned, and elsewhere. Graffiti is more sophisticated in the south than in the north, a fact explained by several things, including a difference in the arrival and spread of the hip hop music scene and its related styles. More centrally, there has been a difference in high speed internet access: the north did not get ADSL lines until June 2007. Interviews with graffiti writers in both the north and the south confirmed that access to images and networking on the Internet

20 See Werwath (2006).

21 For originary examples, see Takis 183's role in the expansion of graffiti in New York, and Banksy's self-described beginnings as a graffiti writer in the British transport system (Banksy, 2006, p. 13).

22 Cities then were an "... environment that fuelled an artistic battle against the powerbrokers in society, and a breakaway from poverty and the ghetto" (Ganz, 2006, p. 8).

23 There are several noteworthy pieces on the graffiti walls near Kykkos High School in Lefkosia. They seem to be the result of an interest group that passed through the school around 2003. Nothing of this complexity has emerged, at least there, since then and, in contrast to other more rapid kinds of graffiti, there are no pieces in highly visible areas in or around Lefkosia/Lefkosha aside from those aforementioned.

is an essential way that these street artists learn and improve their styles and techniques.[24] Another absolutely essential point of difference is the infrastructural development in the south where poured concrete walls and smooth concrete underpasses and retaining walls are common. These are the best surfaces for street art, and as the north develops its built infrastructure there may also be an increase in desirable areas for graffiti artists to work there.[25]

Some graffiti might appear to indicate territories of graffiti 'crews', or teams of writers operating under one tag, and their 'turf' – the territory they attempt to dominate. It was gleaned through interviews, however, that these are appropriated signs, without reference to actual territory battles that can occur in other cities with more hardened forms of urban culture.

Graffiti associated with popular culture can be interpreted as a mode of dissent, even in Cyprus. As a visual language of urban, low-income oppression graffiti is transmitted through popular culture, hip hop music and even the skateboard scene. The international popularity of these modalities compressed the individuated meanings of, and dissociated graffiti from its roots in urban North America and it has become a visual mode of dissent *in general*, including and especially on Cyprus. More elaborate works sometimes feature portraits and names of people perceived as liberators from oppression, and this is also true in pieces located in the south. Che Guevara is a popular graphic icon in Lefkosia, so is Griva Digenis.[26] Quite recently the popularised stencilling style of street artist Shepard Fairey[27] is used to iconize Alexandros Grigoropoulos.[28] His face appears in high contrast with the phrase, "he was 15 years old – HERO", and these images appeared in Lefkosia around the time of riots about the cause of his death. On one of these stencils "HERO" was over-sprayed with [Right wing] blue paint, so that the image simply read, "he was 15".

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24 See also Ganz (2006, p. 10).

25 It has been suggested that a reason for the lack of graffiti in the north is a difference in the perception of public space there, and the related ways in which youth would 'hang out' in such places but not write graffiti there. In this study little correspondence emerged between so-called 'hang out places' and spray can graffiti in either the north or the south; the primary aim of the graffiti observed in this paper is visibility to a particular, even if reflexive, audience. Of course graffiti scratched with a pen or written in marker seems to be a universal and historical remainder of boredom when located on benches, bus stations, school desks and other such spaces designated for passing time. On Cyprus this kind of graffiti is found in the north, the south, and in archaeological sites.

26 Georgios Grivas, a.k.a *Digenis* (1898-1974): Greek Cypriot Colonel in the Greek Army and leader of EOKA fighters. "Liberator" of Cyprus from the British Colonial Administration, and leader of EOKA B organisation for the purpose of uniting Cyprus with Greece after self-determination was achieved.

27 Shepard Fairey is known for his graphic portraits with slogans, especially the well-known image of 2008 US presidential candidate Barack Obama with the slogan, "hope".

28 A fifteen year old killed by police in Athens in December 2008, whose death spurred weeks of anti-police and anti-state violence all over Greece and elsewhere. Left-wing and anarchical groups tend to view him as a victim and a martyr, while most Right-wing groups and Greek nationalists see him as the opposite.

Most proponents of graffiti as an art form would like to distance themselves from the criminal, while still preserving the so-called 'street credit', the *caché*, which graffiti acquired in its romanticised present and past in working class areas and so-called ghettos. While owning or disowning the history of this kind of graffiti, its proponents have renamed what they do: *street art*, *aerosol art*, *neo-graffiti*, and *post-graffiti*. These designations are intended to diffuse and re-direct the notion of graffiti as plain vandalism. Street art is often touted as an 'art form' and since the early 1980s works of graffiti have been imported into museums and otherwise co-opted by the market economy.[29] Street artists apply different (primarily aesthetic) goals to similar (and often still illegal) methods, but the most important distinction here is that street art is inextricably linked with cosmopolitan trends in style (e.g. hip hop music, skateboard culture), and style-based market consumption. Given graffiti's origins, there would seem to be a paradox in the fact that many of the young street artists in Lefkosia/Lefkosha come from upper-middle and upper class families. But these are the sections of the population that currently can afford to take an interest in popular culture through exposure in travel, access to the internet, and in some cases by communicating with each other across the Buffer Zone. Still, some of street art's aesthetic power, its *caché*, comes from the fact that it contains historically recognised visual signals of the so-called ghetto. It is 'cool'.

29 See A. Charalambous (2009), for a description of the self-styled vandal and commercial graffiti artist, 'paparazzi' in Lefkosia.

And it evokes a *frisson* that is commercially available to bourgeois and middle class voyeurs or consumers.

In Cyprus, where land occupation is an essentially definitive question, some of graffiti's origins in territoriality bring out an ironic, local dimension to that *frisson*. Cyprus' street art is different because it was always an appropriated art form, hitched to a romanticised understanding of urban culture and life. Few of the issues of class and corporate dominance have been relevant on Cyprus until quite recently, but now that such societal fractures are appearing, graffiti may become more importantly interpreted as an articulation of dissent than before. For now the number of graffiti writers is small, by one graffiti writer's estimation there is a group of about twenty active and inactive artists in Lefkosia; and from the point of view of the establishment, it seems that street art is more or less understood as a way for youths to express cosmopolitan (even if romanticised), aesthetic yearnings. In different ways, schools and other institutions normalise graffiti, with an aim to take advantage of this apparently bi-communal desire to be cosmopolitan among Cypriot youth.

A case in point is where the United Nations Development Programme (UNDP) held a bi-communal graffiti contest, the winners of which have their work on a wall outside the Ledra Palace Hotel within the UN-patrolled Buffer Zone. In this example street art presents a mixed message, because on one level it uses the expropriated visual language of gang territoriality, while simultaneously advertising bi-communal partnership in a zone still hotly under negotiation. The subtlety of this situation is almost certainly lost on the participating youth whose passive interest in popular culture has been their stylistic guide, but it is not likely to be lost on other passers-by, especially foreigners for whom graffiti style is nuanced by a different set of connotations. It also begs attention to the fact that there are few if any such elaborate works of street art remaining permanent in the north; i.e. graffiti is not [yet] an accepted medium of expression there. The UNDP's street art project is aimed to do what murals do: it makes a social cause visible as an appeal to the community and to the passing public. But the medium delivers a confusing message.

Street Art Discourse

Street art is varied in terms of the reflexive discursive properties of each mode. Throws can appeal to the general public because of their graphic and colourful aesthetics, regardless of the literal content, which is only sometimes self-evident. Discourse related to tags (both individual and crews) are specific to the in-groups; i.e. the writers themselves. Tags are usually considered to be a public nuisance because they are prolific, appear rapidly *en masse* and can become a palimpsest of scrawls indecipherable to the general public. Because street art is part of another more general and international discourse that is also intertwined with the hip hop music and skateboarding scenes, I will localise this paper and continue with a focus on graffiti that is not considered street art, but which is demonstrably part of a local discourse that includes regional politics and dissent.

Graffiti in the North and in the South

The most defining feature of Lefkosia/Lefkosha is the ring of Venetian walls that encircle it,

enclosing the old city on both sides of the Buffer Zone. Other than where demographic considerations shaped data collection, this paper refers to instances of graffiti collected in parallel areas within or just outside of the two halves of the Venetian Walls. Both societies have easy access to spray paint. But where graffiti itself is not considered a crime in the north – it is generally considered "dirtying the environment" (Yazilari, 2008), or destroying someone else's property[30] – offenders in the south could face up to 3 years imprisonment and up to €2,560 in fines. Regular articles about graffiti in the south's newspapers rarely if ever report someone being caught; officials reluctantly commenting something like: "they work at night", or "they run" (Saoulli, 2008).

A comparison of two incidents that took place within days of each other in early September 2008 reveals how differently authorities in the south and north deal with graffiti. Confrontational graffiti, either in scale or in message, can appear in the south without pursuit from the authorities as demonstrated by the massive defacement on 2 September 2008 of a monumental sculpture of Archbishop Makarios III.[31] This landmark within the walls of Lefkosia, centred on the lawn of the Archbishopric, was splashed using balloons filled with yellow and red paint and accompanied with a slogan reading "For Sale: Down With Idols", written on a retaining wall at its base. The slogan, while probably intended as an affront to the Church, also confronted the general public because of its spectacular location. In spite of the largeness of the statement, no one was accused. Makarios' combined affiliation with Church, state, and his nostalgic significance to large parts of the Greek-Cypriot community causes a range of interpretations and possible group affiliation or political orientation of the writer(s). In the Archbishop Chrysostomos II's words, it "could've taken place in mere seconds". (Leonidou, 2008). Instead of launching an effort to find the actor(s) responsible, he thought better to let the matter drop saying, "the best response to crazy people is not to respond" (*ibid.*), and the monument was covered until taken away for conservation and reinstallation elsewhere.[32] Similarly, Demetriou and Trimikliniotis (2008) discuss decisions and assessments made by the Cyprus Equality Body where school authorities did not make full police reports where graffiti with Nazi content was conflated with football team graffiti. Apparently, even though the schools condemn the Nazi content of the graffiti, authorities are reluctant to make the problem public because they claim that to do so might glorify the perpetrators.[33]

In contrast, there was one isolated incident with Turkish-Cypriot graffiti that took place in

30 Personal conversation with a Turkish-Cypriot judge, 26 February 2009.

31 Makarios III was the Archbishop of Cyprus (1950-1977), Ethnarch of the Greek-Cypriot community advocating union with Greece and self-determination for the island. He was president of Cyprus (1959-1977).

32 The incident occurred while the monument was overdue to be relocated to Kykkos Monastery.

33 The decision refers to a report by the Head of Educational Psychology, which claimed that whilst racial discrimination and racist behaviour are to be condemned, such issues must avoid any media coverage for fear that it would spread as "psychosocially vulnerable persons are at risk of copying action which is self-destructive or destructive of others when they know that they will [be] glorified as heroes via exaggeration" (Demetriou and Trimikliniotis, 2008).

Lefkosha the same week as the Makarios statue was painted. Four boys were accused of, and arrested for writing "Occupying Turkish army, sod off" on a wall. The police response in the north was radically different than the Archbishop's response in the south. First, police apparently apprehended the young men in the act, and they were additionally accused of graffiti that had taken place in the area over the course of a month. Second, they were publicly identified individually by first and last name, held in confinement for three days, and then taken to court.[34] Their parents were also exposed individually by name, the police raided their homes, and several computers were confiscated. Both the examples in north and south were ostensibly anti-state messages, albeit different ones, but the ways in which follow-through by the entities offended diverged shows the individual – versus group – identity differences in all aspects of graffiti in Lefkosia/Lefkosha. Individuals were exposed in the north, presumably to keep order and maintain social conformity by way of shame and small-society recognition. In the south, neither groups nor individuals were exposed, presumably to keep order by refusing to exclude the actors from the social structure. The authorities' refusal to recognise a group and refusal to punish (and thereby glorify) its actor is also a strategy that forces social conformity.

Graffiti not associated with popular culture in Lefkosia/Lefkosha seems to articulate dissent and also conformity, individual and group identification. These ethnic, political, social and historical postures can be interpreted through verbal and visual graphic content, symbology, medium, strategies of location and placement, over-writing and also erasure. This study reveals two completely different kinds of discourse related to group, or non-group identification. Graffiti writers in the south tend to identify themselves as members of groups. In the few places where graffiti occurs in the north, writers tend to identify themselves as individuals. But it is the Turkish Army writing, and chalk writings by children in Turkish settler areas that make up the bulk of this individualised action. With the special exception of the incident described above, in general one could say that the Turkish-Cypriot population is visually silent; graffiti in the rare case is usually about love, or a personal name.

Baudrillard's idea that the silence of the masses is a strategy of dissent in the face of a dictatorial Media monologue[35] is perhaps not very useful in looking at other Western or European societies. But it does bear some resemblance, at least visually, to Cypriot society in Lefkosha. Some of the Turkish Cypriots interviewed for this project say that their belief in fair government ended long before that of the Greek Cypriots, and as a result they are less likely to be motivated by group concerns. One Turkish Cypriot interviewed commented that the lack of graffiti, especially political graffiti, was protective self-interest intensified by fear of the police. Exoteric influence may explain

34 Deputy inspector Oral Ordu said under oath that the young men had written slogans against the Security Forces Command (Turkish Cypriot army) on the sides of buildings. This is obviously not the case with the graffiti they had apparently written when they were arrested which specifically named the Turkish army (Yazilari, 2008).

35 See Baudrillard (1988). For social group silence as provocative dissent, see also Žižek (2008).

some of this difference also: in Greece graffiti is, and historically has been, a feature of public spaces.[36, 37] This is not particularly the case with graffiti in Turkish and Ottoman public spaces, with the major although recent exception of street art, associated with popular culture. Even if the difference in graffiti is purely a result of external influence, it is quite a strong indicator of differing concepts of social identity as well as different orientations concerning uses of public space.

Graffiti and Group Identity in the South

With some effort graffiti can be expunged with paint and, to push the obvious, whitewashing truncates discourse. In the south there has been minimal effort to do this, resulting in conversations that bloom on walls, sometimes with humour. Is this apparent tolerance of graffiti a way to condone the content? Is it an implicit resignation to or acknowledgement of the continued, visceral division between the Left and Right in contemporary Cyprus?[38]

Left-wing and Right-wing politics are inconveniently convoluted in the Republic of Cyprus and conflated with elsewhere non-ideological organisations. This division becomes architecturally visible in the emergence of politically separate coffee houses[39] and the football clubs affiliated with them.[40] Greek-Cypriot athletic teams have been officially politicised since 1948. Bitter, sometimes violent local class struggle during hard economic times in the 1930s – late 40s meant a new critical

36 Graffiti has been found in the Athenian Agora dated to the time just after the introduction of the alphabet in Greece, in the eighth century BC. The graffiti was both incised and painted and contains all the features of modern graffiti: names, polyglot notes and lewd remarks (American School of Classical Studies at Athens, 1974).

37 In Cyprus, as elsewhere in the world, there are numerous examples of historical and modern Greek graffiti that remain in areas no longer inhabited by Greek speakers. One particularly strong example of this is in the village of Yılmazkoy/Skylloura, in north Cyprus, where the Greek Orthodox church was converted to a mosque. The front left wall of the mosque now bears remnants of graffiti in support of Grivas [Digenis], leader of the Right-wing nationalist EOKA organisation.

38 Lefkonos Street in Lefkosia is an interesting example of strategic erasure. In the spring of 2008 a large expanse of wall enclosing the elementary school was emblazoned in red with "Greek Cypriots, Turkish Cypriots – workers, brothers", finishing with the red star of Communism/Socialism. A similar swathe of wall perpendicular to the first wall, leading down into a municipal parking lot, had a separate work: a conversation. The under-writing was blue lettering with the symbols associated with APOEL football club, saying: "Turkish Cypriots: sons of whores" *(putanas yioi T/C)*, which was then over-written in black by an Omonoia football club supporter to read, "oranges: sons of whores". APOEL's colours are orange and blue, and 'orange' also rhymes, *(putanas yioi portokali)*. Close to 25 August 2008 the anarchist-socialist slogan was whitewashed, while the football discourse, which is essentially a political Left–Right discourse, was preserved on what is practically the same walled area. Inquiry at the Mayor's office eliminated two possible whitewashers in that locale: the municipality and the school district. The only remaining likely whitewasher is the Church, on whose grounds the school is built. There is an additional irony here in that the street's name, Lefkonos, carries a semblance of the word for 'white', or 'pure': λευκός.

39 See Panayiotou (2006).

40 For more on period athletics in the media, see Sophocleous (2008).

awareness and unity among workers at the time. Political divisions also emerged with different alliances (Left – Right) during the Greek Civil War, and later during the EOKA period where Cypriots fought against Colonial rule. This animated Left-Right athletics discourse results in even some small Cypriot villages having separate football pitches for the Left and for the Right, and it bears explanation because sports-related (hooligan) graffiti in the south is laden with political-cultural references.

The Cypriot Left emerged in the 1920s out of a yearning for modern ideals, coinciding with labour uprisings and lower class struggle for economic survival. It came into existence against an already present Right, made up of Cypriots who maintained wealth and power under the British Colonial system. The Cypriot Communist party (KKK), officially founded in 1926, was ideologically inspired from outside Cyprus and for the following score of years it united and mobilised Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot workers, eventually becoming a target for entities wishing to maintain power (i.e. the Right, the Church, the British Colonial Administration). Alternating between a legal trade union and outlawed political movement,[41] the Cyprus Communist Party eventually became the current, legally recognised Left-wing party AKEL, (the Uplifting Party of the Working People). AKEL continued to promote the agenda of the working-class and it took a staunchly pro-Soviet position during the Cold War. At the same time the Right, and the Greek Orthodox Church hoped for *enosis*, or union with Greece. The recent version of this dialectic became most visible during the Annan Plan referendum. But where one would have expected the proletarian agenda of the Left to affirm the reunification of the island, the leadership of AKEL officially promoted a 'no' vote and the majority of AKEL voted 'no'. And where one would expect the Right to want to affirm their "Greek-ness" by rejecting the plan for reunification with Turkish Cypriots, some of the Right-wing parties officially affirmed the plan (the centre-right party DISY), but many did not: most visibly the ruling party at the time (DIKO), the Church, and various nationalist groups who supported President Papadopoulos. Reasons for the official party positions on the Annan Plan are and were numerous; individual decisions were often linked to personal interest, party politics, and also were often unrelated to the facts of the Annan Plan itself.

During the period leading up to the Annan Plan referendum it was quite common to see discourse around affirmations or rejections in both the north and south, and what little political graffiti in the north exists, some remains from that time. Leftist graffiti usually affirms the Annan Plan, and nationalist graffiti associated with the Right usually comes along with a "no". A unique example of this from the north are two fading triple-crescent symbols (or *three hilal*) most often used by the MHP [Nationalist Action Party] and the [Right-wing fascist group] Grey Wolves. It was found behind the Lemar store near Kermia: a place where the authorities are slow to whitewash graffiti. Their symbols are an obvious response to the *'EVET'* [yes] written first, underneath.

41 Except the period 1926-1931, where the KKK was a legal political party.

This fragment of discourse is possibly complicated: the Leftist who wrote '*EVET*' in favour of the Annan Plan is likely to have been Turkish Cypriot, where the *three hilal* symbol could have been written by a settler from Turkey or by a radical conservative Turkish Cypriot. It is also possible that the graffiti writer was only visiting the island for a strategic period of time: university-aged supporters of the aforementioned Right-wing Turkish groups are known to arrive on Cyprus around election times in order to rally support. In a very much smaller way than in the south, there is a conservative Turkish presence visible in the north but it is not, however, in opposition to a visible Left. Since the referendum, the amount of political graffiti in the north has declined, just as in the south those '*oxi-nai*' [no-yes] slogans are also fading. But a bifurcation of Greek-Cypriot society now comes out with force in writings by sports fans, animating the politicised athletics discourse that precedes the Referendum by almost sixty years. Such is not visibly the case in Turkish-Cypriot society.

Lefkosia's hooligan fans of football teams Omonoia (Left wing) and APOEL (Right wing) are prolific. Typically APOEL hooligans and Right-wing writers use blue, orange or black spray paint, and include but are not limited to the sun-cross symbol of fascism, the Greek flag and the following phrases: '*ELLAS*' [Greece]; 'EOKA' [National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters]; '*dhen ksexno*' [I don't forget], 'ultras'; 'A.U.' [APOEL ultras]; and references to Grivas.[42] Unlike

42 See endnote 26.

Omonoia, which aligns itself with the presently ruling Cyprus Communist party AKEL, APOEL officially claims no affiliation with a named political party. Omonia hooligans and Left-wing writers never use blue, probably because it refers to the Greek flag. They usually use red (of Communism) or black spray paint, and include but are not limited to the hammer and sickle symbol of Communism; AKEL; 'Gate 9' or '*ΘΥΡΑ* 9' – their gate in the football stadium; or a mysterious '*ΚΑΟΥ* 9' – which several people interviewed insist refers to the burning of stands, or of being 'burned out' as in smoking marijuana. They also co-opt the encircled 'A' of anarchy, references to Che [Guevara] and antifascist or 'antifa' slogans.

Most hooligan graffiti takes place just outside the walls of Lefkosia. As the contested landscape becomes essentialised, so does the graffiti argument, which looks similar in style to hooligan graffiti but is unfettered by football symbology in proximity to the Buffer Zone. Therefore a general discussion can be debated about the graffiti of Left versus Right in Lefkosia, but the actors may be dissimilar, and variously motivated in different places. By the Buffer Zone, Right-wing, pro-union with Greece graffiti tends to overlap with anarchistic socialist graffiti; slogans refer to global struggles between the Left and Right, but are sometimes anchored in the history of Cyprus as well. This is particularly true in the neighbourhood of the Archbishopric of Cyprus where atheist, anti-Church, anti-State graffiti is often countered with pro-*Enosis* discourse. Actors writing closer to the Buffer Zone may be, and seem to be slightly more informed than average football hooligans about the content of the symbols they use and references they make.

Hooligans write anywhere, but most regularly on top of graffiti by the opposing group. They write on temporary walls erected in front of building sites, shop doors, retaining walls along

roadsides, the sides of shops, houses, road signs; in sum, they write on almost any surface anywhere. There is no apparent order or reason in the choice of placement except, if anything, to deface and corrupt what was written underneath. Hooligan symbols and phrases are crudely followed in the context of group identity and often not equated with social reality; i.e. an APOEL fan may not personalise the way a fascist government would affect his life, and yet he identifies with fascist symbols.[43] Thus, as with the assumed nature of street art and its associated styles of graffiti in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, the meaningful use of hooligan slogans is often legitimately open to question.

Audience: Hooligan Graffiti in the South

Cypriots recognise and understand the political meanings and cultural implications of hooligan graffiti and even though they are likely to have seen the same phrases and symbols repeatedly, this is not viewed as an attempt to shape public knowledge. Hooligan graffiti is an in-group dialogue between Left-and Right-wing hooligans: each the audience for the other. Where Durkheim claims that "crime draws honest consciousnesses together ... [and] a common indignation is expressed", (Durkheim, 1933, p. 58) the hooligan spraying and over-spraying the opposition can be interpreted multiply. First, because graffiti is a crime in the south, it generally reinforces the 'hool' (hooligan) identity against the rest of society. Interpreted from within the group, the graffiti is also a reinforcement of an in-group, shared set of values implied by conservative or radical slogans. Hooligan graffiti is often an expression of indignation about the opposition's set of values. No strategy is evident to convince the general public of anything. Certainly there is no attempt at



43 As of writing, the most recent letter to the editor of the *Cyprus Mail* regarding the rampant use of swastikas by APOEL fans was printed 19 March 2009 (see Porter, 2009).

aesthetics, as is the case with street artists. The importance of the APOEL vs. Omonia graffiti is in its indignant use of political slogans and writing and over-writing in an internally significant and culturally specific battle of Left vs. Right. No such battles exist in the north.

Graffiti and Individual Identity in the North

With a few noteworthy exceptions, most of the writing in the north is personal: about love, and names, nicknames. There are some examples of sports team initials, but the teams do not have the political connotation that they do in the south, except that they are almost always Turkish football teams not local ones. One lonely example of such graffiti, "CARSI" [meaning 'downtown' and short for the Group Bazaar] was written just outside the Venetian walls in Lefkosha. It is the name of a supposedly-defunct trend of Beshiktash football club supporters: interesting in that the trend (expressly not a fan club) is so anti-everything "except Ataturk" that they self-negated in May 2008. Even the 'A' of anarchy that is sometimes used in their slogan is officially denied its common significance.

A demonstrably large number of the names inscribed or written in the north are linked to Turkish army, and 'someone from a town' in Turkey. None of the fulminating conversations that occur in the south are apparent in the north. One exceptional example of a conversation does stand out, even though it is a simple give-and-take statement. It is 'HATAYLI' written on the back of

Turk Marif Kolegi (high school), probably by a Turkish army soldier. Students interviewed said that this was written by "a guy from Hatay,[44] and we don't like them – they cause crimes". The overlay of the word *piç* (bastard) exposes an anti-settler discourse that was reinforced by the student's comment. The graffiti is complicated, however, in terms of authorship. This ethnic slur could have been written by a Turkish Cypriot who is wary of mainland Turkish settlers (as was the informant). But it could also have been written by a conservative mainland Turk staying in Cyprus, even and especially another army member; in this case it would be someone who is against the presence of ethnic Kurds in the modern Turkish state. The same mode of thought applies here as it did previously in the discussion of the *three hilal:* the graffiti writer may have been visiting.

There is an interesting difference in exoteric orientation, where it occurs among football hooligans and the Cyprus Army in the south, and the Turkish Army in the north. A football hooligan in the south will sometimes also name similarly politicised Greek football teams, for example an APOEL fan may write PAO 13 (Panathinaikos – Gate 13), as both are Right-wing teams.[45] Greek-Cypriot hooligans identify themselves within a group, and externally link that group to other groups in Greece. Football graffiti in the north has no local-to-external links. A very few, rare instances of support for Turkish football clubs, unaligned with local Turkish-Cypriot clubs, have been noted but with problematic authorship. Similarly, a soldier's graffiti in the south commonly links him with his military group identity in birth year and division (A or B); the branch of the military is sometimes written also, but less frequently than in the past.[46] Graffiti by soldiers in the Turkish Army, who are distinctly part of a group in northern Cyprus, do something different: they externally identify themselves as individuals by using their first name and their hometown in Turkey. They do not tend to identify themselves externally with any other group. No indication of group identification or exoteric identification such as occurs in the south has been observed in the Turkish-Cypriot community.

Audience: Graffiti in the North

The implicit audience for the graffiti in the north varies depending on the type of graffiti. For the soldiers carving their hometown, this may be a purely solipsistic act of self-identification and hometown pride, whereas the declarations of love may be read within a small group of people who know the lovers and can identify them. Authorship, and therefore contingent meaning is

44 Hatay is a province in Eastern Turkey, with a sizeable population of ethnic Kurds and also Arabs. Until recently it was a contested area between Turkey and Syria.

45 The interpretation of football allegiances in Greece is different than in Cyprus, however. Football clubs and their fans do not seek/form identities so directly with political alignment; instead, these identities tend to be spread out in the spectrum of social/economic class characteristics of the area they – in effect – represent.

46 LOK, or Special Forces; and OYK or Cyprus Navy Seals, for example, are less frequently written than when this study began in 1997.

problematised by the existence of two parallel and yet similar and overlapping cultures: Turkish Cypriot and Turkish. In fact, the occurrence of graffiti is so limited and site specific that it is impossible to generalise about the intended impact of the writings in the north.

Anarchist Graffiti

Self-proclaimed anarchist groups exist on both sides of the city, often contributing humour to the political discourse with graffiti and stencils. There appears to be a similar anti-capitalist and anti-political agenda in both Lefkosia and Lefkosha, and possibly collaboration between them especially near the checkpoints. Some anarchists interviewed in Lefkosia believe that real anarchist activities are not about graffiti but are more about 'smashing capitalism' by stealing and squatting.[47] These young men and women sneer at the Omonoia fans' co-opting their symbol [the encircled letter A] and they claim no political affiliation. Women are involved in anarchist activities, sometimes as partners to the active male elements of the group, and sometimes as active participants themselves as in the example of a woman who features herself in an anti-capitalist poster, photographed in a birdcage. Women are fronted by or spoken for, however, by male members of this sometimes cohabitating group. The small number of anarchists in the north has local notoriety for political views rather than criminal acts, and there is evidence that the groups cooperate across the Buffer Zone.

Audience for Anarchist Graffiti

Since spring 2008 there has been a proliferation of anarchist phrases written in marker in commercial areas of Lefkosia. While possibly no more than the rants of one or two individuals, the anarchist sign is included and these phrases link meaningfully with anarchist writings elsewhere in Lefkosia/Lefkosha and the rest of the world. Phrases include "Be realists. Demand the impossible" (a slogan known from the May 1968 uprising in France), "Time isn't money. It's life", and "The wealth of the boss is the blood of the worker".[48] There have also been substantial improvements in the quality of stencilling, where corporate logos are combined with derisive phrases, such as [with the McDonald's M] "I'd Rather Eat Dirt" and [with the Nike logo] "Riot", and [with the Shell Oil logo] "Hell".

47 Since August of 2008 there has been an increase in graffiti reading "smash capitalism". On 29 September 2008 anarchists began formally squatting (see www.squatofcyprus. blogspot.com) in a building on Diogenes Street in Lefkosia previously used by the state artists union (EKATE). Called "the Light of Diogenes" *("to fanari tou Diogeni")* its intention was to be an alternative cultural centre based on anarchist principles. [As of this revision, the squat seems to have folded based on disagreements about whether or not to be organised.]

48 *Politis* recently published a thoughtful although Hellenocentric article on the subject of these anarchistic and other wry phrases: "If they say walls have ears, why are we writing?" (Sidiropoulou, 9 October 2008).

The highly visible placement of this graffiti, eye-level in shopping districts and malls, in clear block lettering or stencilling, points out that there is an intended audience (the mainstream, middle-class Cypriot consumer) and an anti-corporate, anti-political-hegemony ideology being promoted. This kind of graffiti is therefore entirely different in look and intent from the graffiti produced by the hooligan or the street artist, and these ideological and aesthetic characteristics appear on both sides of the city.

Graffiti in High School

The ways that school authorities attempt to control graffiti, or ignore it, is indicative of larger societal norms regarding graffiti and the way authorities deal with groups and individuals who deviate from the *status quo*. For this study a high school in the north, Turk Marif Kolegi (TMK) near Kermia was chosen to compare with the Kykkos Lyceum in Lefkosia in the south because they both have predominantly Cypriot students with similar middle-class economic status. The comparison could not be in higher relief: TMK regularly whitewashes its walls, while Kykkos is one of many high schools in the south with a high profile problem of nationalist and Nazi graffiti occurring, and remaining on school walls.

Both schools have areas where graffiti, most of which refers to popular culture, is tolerated. That area at TMK is regularly painted over. But at Kykkos there is an underpass and long

passageway where a cacophony of vibrant throws and urbane tags are not in any way controlled. Inside the schoolyard, a similar amount of graffiti appears, but in pen. Topics range from puerile insults to political 'insights' and a few notes about love.[49] Inside the schoolyard of TMK the walls are relatively spotless; the most obvious scrawls are declarations of love on the tables in the canteen, in pen or Tip-ex. The walls at TMK are visibly whitewashed. Some students interviewed for this report were surprised to see that the street art they had done, and wanted to show, had been whitewashed within the last few months. In a brief conversation with the principal of the school about the need for whitewashing, he said graffiti does not occur as much as it used to in the 1980s when society was 'more political'. The teachers call this generation of children *genç sev* – love children – because of their relative disinterest in politics.[50]

Conclusion

Graffiti of all kinds including street art suggests a current picture of local identities. It occurs much more often in Lefkosia than in Lefkosha and is nearly entirely a young, male pursuit. Graffiti in the south tends to be framed in the context of groups. Graffiti in the north is framed more within the scope of the individual. This difference is carried through in the manner in which authorities deal with graffiti, revealing significant differences in the ways the two societies exercise social control by exploiting critically different modes of identity construction and maintenance.

The social and political messages carried in graffiti vary, as do the presumptive audiences. These messages are specific to the particular kinds of graffiti writers: street artists, athletic hooligans, Turkish army, Greek-Cypriot Army, anarchists and other politically or personally motivated individuals. Even though messages contain slogans and symbols that may possibly be misunderstood by the writer, this kind of public discourse could be regarded as a kind of hegemonic means to access or mediate civic or social aims. This is not always for the better: who is or is not writing is one aspect of the discourse; who is whitewashing needs also to be examined. For sure, a municipal programme of whitewashing in the south would be quite desirable if citizens' complaints, in letters to newspaper editors and to the mayor, were to be acted upon. But it would also be viewed critically as an intrusion on the presumed right to free speech.

There are graffiti writers whose agendas are parallel on both sides of the Green Line, and they seem to interact. The messages of so-called anarchists and graphic imagery of street artists are examples of ways that some youth in the north and south seem to have moved away from hard-line national politics and focus on more global, anti-capitalist concerns and aesthetics. Such agendas should be recognised by policy makers, that is, reconciliation and urban renewal programmes should use care to match the place and style of the project with the programme's intended message, whether aesthetic or not.

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49 See Demetriou and Trimikliniotis (2008).

50 Personal conversation with Fehmi Tokay, 28 March 2008.

This paper raises and identifies questions about the effectiveness of mural art and street art programmes in the unique set of challenges in the unique context of Lefkosia/Lefkosha and on the island as a whole. Turkish Cypriots are not the only section of the population that is visually silent. Since males implicitly, and nearly exclusively, are the ones writing graffiti in Lefkosia/Lefkosha, where are such political and nationalist sentiments of women? If reconciliation programmes appropriate the language of graffiti art in appeals to youths on both sides of the Buffer Zone, are males in the south purposefully being targeted? Why?

Returning to this paper's original questions – why there are not murals in the divided city; why there is less graffiti in the north than in the south; and how graffiti acts as a medium of communication – the issue of place again becomes a central consideration. One of the defining features of graffiti in Lefkosia/Lefkosha is ideology, but *not* a sense of place or neighbourhood; i.e. typical Left-Right sports team commentary is the same regardless of its, or its writer's location in Lefkosia.[51] Even as the discourse becomes more political toward the contested area in Lefkosia, it indicates confusion about political direction, and a lack of local or community identification. Murals work in the opposite type of space. Murals are effective where there is already a collective identity established in relation to place. Murals represent the imagination of a group that inhabits the areas directly around the site of the art work. Interestingly, and symbolically, where murals are usually painted traditionally with a brush and bucket – a bucket that can be shared by others painting – graffiti is done with a spray can or marker: by using a pen, or pressing a cap. Graffiti is a solo act. Murals can be cooperative. As part of urban renewal programmes, murals are credited with a decline in tagging, and with an increase in social cohesion where neighbourhoods had been troubled by crime. Proponents of murals claim they construct a visible, even if imagined, social reality in urban areas that have undergone major economic, social and physical transitions over the last generation of inhabitants.[52] This improvement is possible, but it is also probable that there is already a high degree of social cohesion existing in the communities beforehand, such that a mural can be organised. Is it time to consider the mural as a constructed mode of reconciliatory discourse for Lefkosia/Lefkosha?

Probably not. The fact that mural art programmes seem to work in other divided societies is not necessarily a good recommendation for them as a mode of reconciliatory discourse here. Conflict on Cyprus has a particular set of actors and situations that are unique and unlike Belfast, unlike Berlin. Aside from the historically fragmented nature of neighbourhoods on both sides of the city, and the varied national agendas concerning memory and place on both sides, the visual

51 Limassol's hooligan graffiti seems to be more territorial; more indicative of gangs and neighbourhoods; perhaps an essentialised anti-immigrant discourse, especially in schools. This is an opportunity for further study. Also see Petrou (2008).

52 For a full history of murals viewed as part of urban renewal programmes in the USA, see J. Golden *et al., Philadelphia Murals and the Stories they Tell* (2002).

silence – or the apparent silence – of the Turkish-Cypriot community challenges the usefulness of mural programmes on Cyprus. The social reasons (fear, apathy) for the lack of graffiti that people living in the north suggested need to be better examined, but where the walls are blank, this emptiness is probably the most comprehensive, flexible marker of local identity. Murals are not a good recommendation for a community that may anyway be culturally disinclined or discouraged from public writing, no matter how engaging murals are in the eyes of reconciliation programme coordinators and others interested in peace building and visual media. A blank wall includes the possibility of future artistic action (imagined or real), while also being a stark surface for the play of shadows (symbolic or real). In effect, an empty wall *is* a mural.

Public mural programmes may seem educational in view of diversity and collaboration, but they negatively advantage participants who are, in study and in practice, already comfortable with expressing on walls notions such as solidarity, dissent, and informal verbal political conflict. Graffiti and mural arts programmes are forms of popular expression, but not modalities by which or through which a society can be formed. Communities and individuals must already self-identify as part of a place, or location, before effective mural arts programmes are instrumentalised as a step toward reconciliation. There are certainly other modalities for cultural reconciliation that could be explored, and preferably ones that are essentially shared on both sides. What if a public transit system were in place between Lefkosia and Lefkosha? Graffiti writers might then have a chance for transformative exposure. What national or transnational identities might be projected onto such transit cars and shelters? In this imagined scenario graffiti could appear and evolve naturally, instead of within a paradoxical scope of permission and guidance from peace-builders.

Viewed from a practical level, the graffiti artists and writers in the city who share agendas – adherents to all kinds of popular culture and anarchical and socialist writers – their work might seem to be a good starting point for considering a project. Street art style is particularly leading because these artists tend to work by pseudonym, exposed and articulated as individuals, but often without ethnic identity. Anarchical collaboration is also quite interesting and is occurring naturally without programmatic encouragement. Approval or identification of their activities by any authority, however, would likely mean a self negotiated end to their already shared dialogue.

Finally, the issue of 'where to paint?' will not go away.[53] The fundamentally historical connection that murals have with place is their social, civic and political strength. Murals are located where the viewers understand, and possibly feel validated by the content, which they have usually generated themselves based on their experience of living in that place. Putting aside the

53 In a letter dated 29 January 2009, the mayor Eleni Mavrou wrote, "The Nicosia Municipality expresses its support to the proposal for an aerosol art wall (graffiti) in Nicosia by the University of Nicosia [Elizabeth Doering] ... This initiative is an innovative, international and bi communal project that will promote ... intellectual outreach, critical thinking ... and encourage a responsibility for the inherent power of writing on walls" (personal correspondence with the Mayor's Office).

evident social divergences on public wall expression in the two communities, the biggest challenge to a mural programme in Lefkosia/Lekosha are community relationships with public space or property. The challenge is to find a wall where murals can emerge in place naturally, from local stories of shared experience among a group of people that is adhered as a community to the place. Since Lefkosia/Lefkosha does not have actual dividing walls, this shared surface is elusive, and rare.

This version of the study is extremely limited by a narrow focus on parallel geographic and social locations within the general Lefkosia/Lefkosha area. Nevertheless, given similar material circumstances the study shows differences in the ways that Greek Cypriots identify themselves and show emblems of their identity, from the ways that Turkish Cypriots do. The study should be expanded where possible to look comparatively at the graffiti cultures in Greece, Turkey and the UK as well as on Cyprus in general. It should also include an examination of the micro-cultural make-up of the areas in which the graffiti was located, and it could well be mapped over time. Further study should certainly include a comprehensive comparison of architectural and infrastructural differences that would variably encourage graffiti.

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Main Informants and Other Essential Assistance and Contribution

Alexis, Omonoia hooligan
Aydin Ali, writer, photographer
Batu graffiti writer
'Feelix' graffiti writer
Kochos, APOEL hooligan
'Hasan'
Melissa Hekkers, writer
'Jack Menti,' Anarchist
Mustafa graffiti writer
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Essay and Research Notes

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Dementia Cypria: On the Social Psychological Environment of the Intercommunal Negotiations

Zenon Stavrinides

Section I

Introduction

There is a well-known adage frequently attributed to Einstein to the effect that insanity is doing the same thing over and over again and expecting different results. This, I suggest, is the kind of insanity which characterises successive attempts by the Greek and Turkish sides to the Cyprus problem to reach through negotiations – some ten rounds of negotiations since 1975 – an *agreed* settlement by which each side hopes to secure for itself certain objectives that *it knows* to be incompatible with the objectives of the other side, and for the achievement of which it employs negotiating tactics and diplomatic moves that *it knows* from past experience to be ineffective.

It has often be noted by scholars and diplomats that the two Cypriot communities in their vast majorities, give very different explanations of the character of the Cyprus problem, how it came about, and what would be a just and 'viable' way to solve it; and further, they dismiss with disdain each other's accounts as untrue, insincere and self-serving. The Greek Cypriots in their large majority believe that the central core of the problem – the 'essence of the problem' as they often say – is the terrible wrong done to them by the 'barbaric' Turkish invasion of 20 July 1974 which resulted in probably more than 3,000 dead and 1,400 missing persons, as well as other victims of inhuman mistreatment and systematic rape. The continuing occupation of the northern part of the island by the Turkish army, in blatant breach of international law and morality, is for Greek Cypriots a continuing trauma and humiliation, with numerous adverse practical consequences for the rights and interests of the Greek Cypriot community, such as the displacement of some 180,000 Greek Cypriots from their homes and properties in the north, the effective partitioning of the island, the illegal immigration of tens of thousands of people from Turkey intended to change the demographic composition of the island, and so on. The meaning which '1974' has for Greek Cypriots, has been interpreted by politicians and political commentators of the community as a long catalogue of traumas and injustices inflicted by the Turks on them, 'Cypriot Hellenism'. For the Greek Cypriots, therefore, a settlement to the Cyprus problem – a *just* settlement – involves righting that wrong, reversing the injustices, undoing as far as possible the results of what they regard as the illegal Turkish invasion and its consequences.

On the other side of the divide, the Turkish Cypriot community in their large majority, take

the view – which is also the standard view of Turkey's officialdom and the media – that the Cyprus problem did not begin in 1974, but it existed at least as far back as the intercommunal fighting of which broke out in December 1963, when Greek Cypriots, failing to intimidate them into accepting changes to the bicommunal constitutional order which would relegate them to minority status as a prelude to bring about *enosis*, attacked them with groups of armed irregulars. Turkish Cypriots, in their thousands, were forced to leave their homes in isolated or mixed villages and move in fear of their safety to enclaves defended by a few hundreds of Turkish troops and their own poorly armed irregulars, mainly in an area extending from North Nicosia to the Pentadaktylos mountains, covering just 3% of the island's area. They slept in tents or sub-standard dwellings, few had jobs or anything useful to do, and they were provided for by the Red Crescent and watched over by the UN Peacekeeping Force, and for many years the Greek Cypriot forces had them surrounded and controlled all traffic of people and goods into their enclaves. The experience of living as second-class citizens left a deep trauma on thousands of Turkish Cypriots and had a formative influence on the collective mind of all those who went through it.

Given the Turkish Cypriot view of the Cyprus problem, the Greek Cypriots are not hopeful they can reach a fair and just settlement with the Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, Greek Cypriots believe that *ideally* they should not have to negotiate for their restoration of their rights and rightful interests with the Turkish Cypriot leader (the 'occupation leader' as the media often call him, who is supported and managed by the Turkish government), but rather the international community should apply painful sanctions on Turkey – the true culprit – to force it to release its grip on occupied north Cyprus and withdraw its forces and settlers, leaving the constitutional and other matters to be settled between their government and the small Turkish community. Similarly the Turkish Cypriots do not really want to enter into negotiations with the deniers of their rights and former oppressors, especially as such negotiations will involve their yielding currently populated territory in the north in exchange of international legitimation to which they believe they are entitled, anyway. The trouble is that the Greek Cypriots want to go forward to a future which resembles, as far as possible, the past of a Greek-dominated, virtually unitary Cyprus; and the Turkish Cypriots want to go forward to a future which resembles, as far as possible, the *de facto* two-state present.

Why don't the parties abandon the talks as a method for solving the problem, if it is ineffective? Maybe many people on each side are hoping against hope that in the current negotiations, unlike previous occasions, the other side will be induced to yield a little. Besides, the UN Security Council has long urged the parties to negotiate with good will for a settlement and in recent years the European Union has done the same; and neither side wants to appear to the international community to be intransigent. Thus, abandoning the negotiations does not seem to be an advantageous option for either side; so, they go on and on without ever reaching an agreed settlement package.

Why, it may be asked, don't the negotiators modify to an appropriate extent their main objectives or moderate their demands in order to accommodate the objectives and demands of the

other side? The question is reasonable. However, it must be appreciated that the President of the Cyprus Republic Demetris Christofias, as current leader of and negotiator for the Greek Cypriot community, reflects in his conduct not just a set of tactical decisions intended to secure for his people certain objectives which he regards as right and fair, but also a complex and tangled set of rational and irrational political and ethical beliefs, desires, illusions, hopes and worries which form part of the collective mind of his community, permeate political life and influence the formulation of the objectives themselves. To put the point bluntly, his objectives in the negotiations are shaped by the political and ethical beliefs and desires of the large majority of Greek Cypriots. In a similar way, the current Turkish Cypriot leader Mehmet Ali Talat, as representative of his community *and* the Turkish government which supports, controls and funds the Turkish Cypriot 'state', reflects in his own conduct a different set of political and ethical beliefs and desires – rational and irrational – which form part of the collective mind of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkish establishment, and which are in certain significant ways *mirror images* of those of Greek Cypriots. Indeed, the continuing leadership of current negotiators Christofias and Talat and their respective democratic legitimacy depends on keeping faith with their respective election commitments to promote and secure the interests and rights of their own communities. In that case it is hard to see how the two leaders, with all the good will in the world, can moderate their objectives which reflect the beliefs and desires – rational and irrational – of their communities without risking accusations of sell-out, personal rejection and humiliation in any future parallel referenda called to ratify any settlement package that may be reached.

I suggest that the conscious or unconscious collective political beliefs, desires, anxieties, aspirations etc that are experienced by most Greek and Turkish Cypriots respectively can be usefully likened to a syndrome of mental conditions which are studied by psychiatry and psychodynamic psychology under the name of *dementia*. What I refer to is the complex of disorders, usually found in the most extreme forms in a geriatric population, such as illusory beliefs, distorted judgments, unrealistic expectations fuelled by phantasy, selective memories and amnesia, and the development of two or more personalities within the same individual, e.g. one gentle and one aggressive. The *dementia* of the Greek Cypriot community and the *dementia* of the Turkish Cypriot community jointly form the social psychological environment of irrational political and ethical beliefs and desires in which successive rounds of intercommunal negotiations for a Cyprus settlement have taken place for the past generation, and failed dismally. This overall social psychological environment of the negotiations may be called *dementia Cypria*. My question is: what are the prospects of success of the current round of the Christofias-Talat negotiations, conducted as they are in the context of and under the constraints of *dementia Cypria?*

SECTION II

The Manichean Conception of Greek-Turkish Historical Conflicts

The contemporary British philosopher Alasdair MacIntyre has argued that what gives unity to a human life is the unity of a *narrative* embodied in that life, a life with goals whose realisation calls

for certain virtues. By analogy I want to suggest that gives unity to the life of a Greek or Turkish Cypriot person, a unity that includes a sense of *membership* of the Greek or Turkish Cypriot community respectively, is the existence of a certain narrative which is embodied in the community's public life and institutions, and is a narrative within which individual Greek and Turkish Cypriot fit their personal narratives at various significant moments. When my community is involved in a struggle against an adversary, I need to identify with the struggle and I am expected to display a fighting spirit, or the spirit of active resistance required by the struggle.

But I want to go further. During the first half-century of British rule, an increasing number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots came to conceive of their communal or public identity, through expanding literacy and higher education in the Greek or Turkish language and culture, as part of Greek and Turkish national identity *sans phrase*. Thus most Greek and Turkish Cypriots came to subsume their individual life's narrative under the community narrative, which itself had been derived and was constantly replenished from a certain comprehensive way of telling the story of the Greek and Turkish nations in the two mainlands. The aims which the nations achieved and the rights they realised through the application of virtuous effort, talent and sacrifice are national achievements, which cast a positive light on the ways individuals in Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities think about their communal identities. On the contrary, the frustration of national aims, the assault on national dignity, the denial of national rights, humiliations and other negative experiences are conceived and narrated as *national traumas*, which again reflect tragically on an individual's and a community's senses of self-identity.

The Greek and Turkish Cypriot communities conceptualise their respective traumas and grievances from 1963, 1974 and subsequently – directly remembered or acquired at second hand through school books, media, films, videos available on the internet etc – in terms of a larger 'national' historical narrative, or perhaps better, the partial and inaccurate quasi-historical narrative employed by people in Greece and Turkey, respectively, when they talk about the course of their relations since the Greek revolution of 1821-1828, if not the 'fall' or 'conquest' of Constantinople in 1453.

The Greek quasi-historical national narrative presents the Greeks throughout as virtuous, civilised, enterprising, brave people, who suffered under oppressive Ottoman rule for centuries and who rose in revolt in 1821 for the freedom of the nation in and the Orthodox faith, who achieved glorious victories and the liberation of ancient Greek lands in the next one hundred years, but tragically suffered a number of defeats, which resulted in great pain and humiliation in the hands of the Turks, the most dramatic of which (before 1974) was the Asian Minor disaster of 1922-23. The narrative itself, not unnaturally, contains a rich vocabulary used to enhance the moral and cultural standing of the nation, and belittle or diminish that of the nation's adversaries. And how does the Turkish national narrative present the wars between Greeks and Turks? Naturally enough, the Turkish national narrative of the history of Turkish-Greek relations is pretty close to a mirror-image of the Greek national narrative. According to this, the Greeks had been constantly seeking to expand their land at the expense of the Turks, and committed atrocities against Turkish

populations in conquered areas, most prominently in the Smyrna area in 1919-22, until they were expelled by Turkish national forces under Mustafa Kemal Ataturk. The idea of Ataturk as the leader of *national resistance* and saving his country from the humiliation of the Treaty of Sevres is very important for Turks and Turkish Cypriots, but it does not meet with much understanding by Greeks, which see Kemalism as an aggressive and barbaric movement.

These two potted quasi-historical narratives of Greek-Turkish relations during some one hundred years of intermittent conflict and tension from the Greek revolution to the Turkish War of Liberation, the former believed by Greeks and Greek Cypriots, the latter by Turks and Turkish Cypriots, provide two broad frameworks of ideas which Greek and Turkish people respectively have been taught for successive generations. Both narratives contain simplistic or distorted events of glory and trauma for the nation which involved a Manichean conception of Greek-Turkish conflict. One's own nation is good, virtuous, brave and freedom-loving; the other nation is totally evil, unjust, uncouth, cruel and oppressive.

The quasi-historical narratives of the two nations with its Manichean implications had already been established in the political consciousness of Greek and Turkish Cypriots in the 1950s, when EOKA led a 'national liberation struggle' against British colonial rule and in support of the *enosis* or union of Cyprus with Greece. This development provoked vigorous reaction from the Turkish Cypriot community who were opposed to 'replacing a colonial master for a worse one', and – more significantly – it provoked a determined opposition in Turkey, which now demanded *taksim*, the partitioning of Cyprus between Turkey and Greece. In Cyprus the Auxiliary Police which employed mostly Turkish Cypriots became involved in the local struggle and a Turkish underground militant organisation was set up in Cyprus under the initials TMT to protect Turkish Cypriots and attack Greek Cypriots. In 1958 some Greek and Turkish Cypriots were killed in intercommunal clashes, and properties were attacked and burned in acts of vandalism and revenge.

When Greek and Turkish Cypriots experienced their respective traumas under the conceptual scheme of their respective quasi-historical national narratives, they also adopted from these narratives the relevant forms of explanation ('why are *we* in conflict with *them*?'), and also what might be called, by analogy with the various kinds of individual trauma and distress studied by psychodynamic psychology, a number of habitual methods or 'strategies' for coping with them or alleviating them. These are strategies whose particular forms are suggested or sanctioned by the narratives themselves, and provide for many people an indispensable type of self-support. How, then, do the two communities cope with traumas, hurt, tension, humiliation, misery, insecurity, loss of loved ones and collective victimhood, given that they both see the protracted conflicts in Manichean terms, viewed of course from opposite standpoints? In the next section I shall attempt to outline an answer to this question – something in the nature of an explanatory model involving a degree of 'idealisation' – and trace its implications for the intercommunal negotiations for a Cyprus settlement.

SECTION III

The Use of Coping Strategies for Community Traumas

When you suffer a trauma or contemplate the personal consequences of disaster, it is easier to tolerate the pain when you are convinced you acted honourably, justly and wisely, than you acted badly and foolishly and got your comeuppance. The strong tendency of the Greek and Turkish Cypriots, at least in their large majorities, to see the conflicts between them in extreme terms, in black and white, the struggle of good against evil, is supported by the quasi-historical narratives of the Greek and Turkish nations. This is analogous to the psychological phenomenon of *splitting*. Child psychologists have long noted that infants think of the world purely in extremes, but adults of immature personality who come under stress, tend to cope with their problems in light of the belief that whereas they are good and decent, innocent and blameless, they have been put upon or suffered injustice from an evil person. When a person tries to cope with hurt in some way which involves splitting and is told by third parties, especially friends and family, that he must take or share the blame for what happened, he tends to get upset. Both sides to the Cyprus problem have had to hear from foreign statesmen, diplomats and UN officials, as well as journalists and writers that they are entirely innocent and blameless, and their stock reaction is to blame the third parties for hostile feelings towards them.

Very often Greeks and Turkish Cypriots are reminded of abhorrent acts which their community carried out and they just deny them. What, Greek Cypriots harmed Turkish Cypriots in 1963-74, terrorised them away from their homes in some 100 villages and usurped their properties? Impossible! What, Turkish Cypriots in 1963 forced Greek Cypriots out of their homes in mixed areas where the former predominated, such as Kermia in north-west Nicosia? No way! Sometimes people are lying through their teeth; but on other occasions they are genuinely *in denial*: they don't want to believe and they will not believe that they had been unjust and cruel, or just indifferent when their own militias carried out hostilities, no matter what evidence is brought before them. There are certainly many precedents in the quasi-historical narrative of the Greek and the Turkish nations when any suggestions of violent and oppressive behaviour towards groups belonging to the other nation are given short shrift despite ample historical evidence. When a Greek author writes about Greek atrocities against Turks in Smyrna in 1919-22 (as happened in early 2009 when a Professor at Panteion University in Athens found the evidence undeniable), or when a Turkish writer admits Turkish atrocities against Greek communities in Western Anatolia or the Black Sea in 1919-23 (or for that matter, against Armenians in 1915), then he can expect the mindless wrath of nationalist media and public opinion. In a community of deniers, the courageous admitter of unpalatable facts is considered a traitor.

It is interesting that one of the public deniers of Turkish Cypriot killings by Greek Cypriots is a man who should have been much better informed than most Greek Cypriots: Tassos Papadopoulos. On 4 September 2004 the Khaleej Times, an English-language newspaper based in the United Arab Emirates published an interview of Papadopoulos, President of the Cyprus

Republic at the time. The representative of the newspaper asked Papadopoulos to comment on Turkish Cypriot claims that "after independence and before the Turkish troops came, lots of massacres occurred ... the Turkish troops ... saved them from further violence ... ." Papadopoulos replied as follows:

> "They [the Turkish Cypriots] say that and claim that the Turkish troops protected them ... From the beginning, they were planning for a separation. But, in fact, the Turkish Cypriots were the ones who committed massacres and in 1963 we asked to increase police patrols, but they refused. From 1963 to 1974, how many Turkish Cypriots were killed? The answer is none."

The answer *ought* to have amazed tens of thousands of Cypriots who were old enough to remember hearing about Turkish and Greek Cypriot killings during that period, and thousands of people who took part in bloody battles. Richard A. Patrick in his ground-breaking book *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict: 1963-1971* estimates that about 350 Turkish Cypriots and 200 Greek Cypriots lost their lives in intercommunal hostilities between December 1963 and August 1964, when the Greek Cypriot National Guard attacked Cypriot units in Tylliria and Turkish Air Force responded by bombing them. On 14-15 August the National Guard and Police Tactical Reserve force under General Grivas attacked Turkish Cypriot positions in the Ayios Theodoros – Kophinou area. According to Patrick, 22 Turkish Cypriots were killed and 9 others were wounded. Greek Cypriots reported their casualties as one dead and two wounded. The incidents provoked a sharp reaction by Turkey which threatened to invade Cyprus unless the Greek division of 12,000 men was withdrawn, Grivas left Cyprus and the Cyprus government disbanded the National Guard. President Lyndon Johnson sent his Deputy Secretary of Defence Cyrus Vance to Nicosia, Athens and Ankara to find a mutually agreed formula to avert war – a possibility which the Cyprus government certainly took seriously. (The Greek division was soon withdrawn, but the National Guard remained in existence to fight another day, on 15 July 1974!) Could Tassos Papadopoulos, who was a minister in Makarios's government in 1960-70, have forgotten the whole affair?

Papadopoulos's claim attracted comment in the Greek and Turkish Cypriot media. Loucas Charalambous in an article which appeared on 12 September 2004 in the Cyprus Mail under the title 'Does the President have memory problems?' wrote: "I do not think there is anyone who would consider it wrong to describe the President's claim that no Turkish Cypriots were killed as a blatant lie. Which leads me to deduce one of two things: either our President is a liar or he is suffering from an illness that causes memory loss."

Both possibilities are credible, but there is yet a third possibility. If, as I suggested, a community suffering from a trauma or distress absolutely needs for its own sanity and self-support to assert its own complete righteousness and innocence, it will deny and deny vehemently that it has ever done anything to bring its present calamity on itself. The community internalises the denial of guilt, acts and speaks as if it has done no wrong, so it demands that the adversary is

blamed for the pain it is experiencing, and in due course it creates in its collective mind a state intermediate between knowing and not knowing that it has done wrong. This state of *denial* which, long before Freud gave it prominence in his account of the defence mechanism of the traumatised mind, was indicated by Friedrich Nietzsche by the remark: "'I have done that', says my memory. 'I cannot have done that', says my pride, and remains adamant. At last, memory yields." Perhaps Nietzsche could well have added to one's pride, one's need to enhance his moral standing and belittle that of his adversary.

Greek Cypriots must have felt comforted to hear their leader's reassuring words, to the effect that their community had not killed any Turkish Cypriots. Indeed, Papadopoulos's remark that the Turkish Cypriots "from the beginning ... were planning for a separation" and in fact "they were the ones who committed massacres" may have come as a confirmation of the belief held by thousands of Greek Cypriots who had joined the armed militias in 1962-63 and received weapons training that it was the other community which had planned a breach of the constitutional order and not their leaders, and so it was *legitimate* for them to engage in battle preparations. This observation neatly illustrates the familiar psychological phenomenon of *projection* where side A in a dispute attributes (sometimes sincerely) to side B hostile feelings and intentions which are similar or analogous to those which side A in fact has. Projection, like the mechanism of selective amnesia and selective memory works for individuals as well as peoples who have trouble accepting their own failings and errors.

SECTION IV

The Creation of *Dementia Cypria*

The Manichean conception of Greek-Turkish conflict, the splitting of human affairs into total good and total evil, the self-serving illusion that 'our' side was always right and when 'we' engaged in armed action we were only carrying out legitimate defence of our rights and just interests and that – and this is the ultimate phantasy – one day in the not-too-distant-future the civilised world will recognise the justice of our cause shape the climate of ideas, an environment of collective irrationality, in which intercommunal negotiations have taken place since 1975, or even earlier in the period 1968-74. The negotiators changed from time to time, but the fundamental demands raised by each of them were an inflexible reflection of collective belief and illusion, concern and anxiety, splitting and phantasy in his community, as was his resistance to the demands of the other side.

Various attempts were made by successive UN Secretaries-General to encourage a compromise between the two sets of beliefs and desires – by Kurt Waldheim in 1981, Javier Perez de Cuellar in 1984-86, Boutros Boutros-Ghali in 1992, Kofi Annan in 2002-04 – but whereas one or other side accepted it reluctantly, the other rejected it in the belief that it was unjust and that the future would surely bring along a fairer proposal. Indeed, the leaders of the rejecting side tended to

be very critical of any voices within its own community calling for acceptance. It may be that each community realised that they could not have a 100% just settlement package (even though they had all justice on their side!), but public opinion tended to be divided between those who insisted on securing, say, 90% of their rights and rightful interests, and those who more realistically declared themselves content with 70%. The 90 percenters accused the 70 percenters of being unpatriotic, defeatists and more eager to please foreign powers than fight for their just cause. The 70 percenters, in turn, accused the 90 percenters of having their heads in the clouds and of risking losing everything by their bloody-minded rejectionist attitude, but it is interesting that none of the two groups in either community acknowledged that the other community may have also suffered from injustice and have just grievances against it. In any case, during periods when power was exercised in each community by 90 percenters (Makarios, Kyprianou, Papadopoulos, Denktash) or 70 percenters (roughly, Vassiliou, Clerides, Christofias, Talat), the fact is that the declared objectives of the negotiators were a reflection of the beliefs, desires, concerns, prejudices, illusions and phantasies of their respective communities.

It may be asked: Since Christofias and Talat are realistic and moderate leaders, should they not have come to realise that they cannot agree on a deal which would give each of the communities even 70% of what they believe is their due, should they not be lowering their sights to 50%? It is *possible* that is what they inwardly want; but they are both captives of the Manichean ideas, rational and irrational beliefs, rational and irrational desires, pious hopes and unrealistic expectations of their communities, constantly fuelled by maximalist claims of nationalist politicians and the media in their respective communities. Christofias must know full well that Turkish Cypriots suffered killings, atrocities and cruel treatment in 1963-74, and indeed in the wake of the invasion in the villages of Maratha, Aloa, Sandalaris, Tochni and elsewhere. Talat must know full well of well documented and independently corroborated killings, atrocities and cruel treatment against Greek Cypriots in 1963, and especially in 1974. But can the two leaders ever acknowledge this to their own peoples and tell them that *they do not deserve* to get all they are demanding, as the other side also has just grievances and must secure their rights and protection? Can Christofias and Talat stand together at the Ledra Palace checkpoint which saw scenes of battles in 1963 and 1974, hold hands as French President Francois Mitterand and West German Chancellor Helmut Kohl did on 23 September 1984 before the memorial of the fallen in the Battle of Verdun of 1916 and pledge 'never again'? Could they retain their authority with their respective communities if they sought sanity in a world of collective *dementia*?

But maybe a ray of rational hope can reach the madhouse of Cyprus. In recent years a number of distinct developments have posed serious challenges to the mutually reinforcing phenomena of the Manichean conception of Greek-Turkish historical conflict and its moral elevation of one's nation and diminishment of the adversary nation on the one hand, and on the other hand the subsumption of each community's traumas and humiliations under the quasi-historical national narrative and its attendant mechanism of splitting, denial, selective amnesia and memory, and projection.

The first development is that a new generation of Greek, Turkish and foreign historians trained in the methods of evidence-based historiography delved methodically into primary sources – government documents, diplomatic despatches, memoirs, personal and formal correspondence, official announcements and statistics, photographic and film records and so on – and produced historical accounts of important past events as they happened. When the light of rational historical understanding falls on historical myth and prejudice, the political elite who receive their authority and prestige from the myth and people who receive comfort from prejudice will offer vigorous resistance, but the resistance may be worn out in the long run. If serious historians find overwhelming evidence for the occurrence of massacres on both the Greek and Turkish sides during the various phases of Greek-Turkish conflict, how long can the Manichean conception survive? Already history school books in Greece and Turkey are changing in line with the need to increase factual accuracy and reduce offensive stereotypes of the other nation. Turkish Cypriot school books have changed, and the Cyprus government is trying to do the same for Greek Cypriot books, although it is facing rearguard action from conservative teachers and the Greek Orthodox Church of Cyprus!

Some historical and political scholarship has already established itself in Cyprus, and a small number of writers have offered balanced, and so anti-Manichean accounts of what happened in Cyprus during the conflicts of the mid-1950s, 1963-74 and beyond. In the long term it is likely that an increasing number of people will be able to understand that both communities have had their victims and killers, and that some of the victims of one community met their fate in the hands of that same community's killers or execution squads. The demented Goliath of nationalism remains the principal intellectual force in the political life of both communities, but it constantly has to watch out for David's sling of rational scholarship which is taking aim at some cherished myths in the narratives of the communities.

Another development that has unnerved nationalists in both communities is the work of the Anthropological Laboratory of the Committee on Missing Persons. For the first 30 years following the 1974 events the fate of Greek and Greek missing persons – the number was fixed at 1,619 – was a subject of great political interest and intense propaganda. In due course it turned out that some at least of those listed as missing had been killed and buried in cemeteries in the Greek-controlled part of Cyprus, *and* that a number of Greek Cypriot politicians and officials had known about it but kept silent so as not to weaken the official propaganda line. A new procedure was set up whereby the bicommunal Committee on Missing Persons undertook to follow up any information about burials of missing persons, carried out exhumations, and tried to identify the dead by matching their genetic material again DNA samples offered by relatives of the missing. The Anthropological Laboratory of the Committee has been asked to track down 1,340 Greek Cypriots and 502 Turkish Cypriots. From time to time the remains of missing persons are successfully identified and given over to their relatives for proper burial. The slow process of looking and finding more human remains in shallow graves and wells, identifying them through the DNA method, and returning the remains to relatives for burial at the final resting place under

the gaze of the media presents opportunities to hear the circumstances of the deaths of ordinary Greek or Turkish Cypriots, people who met their death while going to work, or looking after their herds, or undergoing treatment in a hospital, or doing their military service and finding themselves in a battle, people who were killed because of the community to which they belonged. Some people, on hearing these stories draw grave conclusions; but others just shrug their shoulders as if to say "It's nothing to do with me – I am innocent!"

Perhaps the day will come when it will be generally understood by the two communities that it is just nonsense to think that only their side have victims and sufferers, but not killers and oppressors. This understanding will not happen any day soon. Even if for each community the image of its leadership is to some extent besmirched, it believes that any settlement that is sufficiently just to be acceptable must involve the restoration of its rights, if not fully at least to a very considerable extent, irrespective of what the other side needs and desires. The division of Cyprus into a Greek and a Turkish Cypriot community, the majority of which dislikes and distrusts the other side (Turkish Cypriots and Turkey's political-military establishment, Greek Cypriots and the dominant Greek culture) is one of the fundamental aspects of Cypriot reality. The fact that each community, over a period of several generations, has developed a sense of its own identity through a quasi-historical national narrative which incorporates the traumas and humiliations, as well as the aspirations and virtues of the nation, in terms which are antithetical to that of the other community has contributed to their adversarial relationship – and this is also another fundamental aspect of reality in Cyprus. These two fundamental aspects, together with a series of accidents of history, including the ways Greek and Turkish politicians perceived Cyprus, have contributed to the creation and maintenance of the Cyprus problem. The Cyprus problem and the EOKA struggle of 1955-59 which aimed at *enosis* and provoked Turkish demands for *taksim*, reinforced the sense of separate identity of the two communities, and a separate sense of their respective rights and just interests.

However, the compromise settlement of the Cyprus problem in 1959-60 reinforced the existence of separate 'ethnic' leaderships which based their authority on their respective claims to advance the rights of their own communities. The violence of 1963-64 and 1974 brought about traumas and loss of rights for both communities, and they both yearn for justice *for themselves*, rather than a balanced political arrangement for Cyprus. For one reason or another the view has prevailed in Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the international community that the Cyprus problem now needs another attempt at a settlement through negotiations for a *bizonal, bicommunal federation*. The two communities are willing to negotiate, if only reluctantly, on the understanding that the projected settlement is going to be just and fair, as defined by the terms of the national narrative. But each of the national narratives incorporates rational and irrational beliefs, rational and irrational desires, twisted ideas of virtue and bravery, anxious concerns and so on, and as a result the social psychological conditions in each community, which together constitute the social psychological environment in which any negotiations take place, prevent or rule out the achievement of an agreed settlement which the majority of each community could endorse in

separate referenda as sufficiently just and fair.

As was indicated, Christofias and Talat, no matter what they think privately, are bound by their commitments and democratic relations to their respective communities to be guided by their rational and irrational beliefs and desires, which are fundamentally incompatible. This is the kind of madness that keeps Cyprus in an *impasse* when the world moves forward to ever closer forms of cooperation: the Greek Cypriots want to move forward though negotiations to the unified past and the Turkish Cypriots want go move forward through negotiations to the separatist present. This is *dementia Cypria*.

The Smaller Issues Complicating the Larger Picture

Arne Strand

There are direct negotiations underway in Cyprus, and there is hope for a negotiated settlement of the Cyprus conflict. This is, academically speaking, a very interesting phase of a peace process, where a number of studies looking comparatively at differences between such processes become relevant.[1] In particular, such studies have analysed the issues that have been included or excluded from the final agreement texts. In Cyprus the two parties negotiating, i.e. the leaders of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities, have chosen to maintain a relatively closed process. Beyond their advisors and reports to political parties and other governing bodies, very limited information has been made available and interaction or debate with civil society has largely been excluded from the process.

While all conflicts are different, my research on other conflicts (including Afghanistan, Sri Lanka and the Aceh Province of Indonesia) indicates that some issues are frequently left out of the debate on a possible settlement, either because they are deemed at the time to be less important compared to the larger issues at stake, or because of a strategy of postponing their resolution until after the larger problems have been resolved. The experience from hindsight is, however, that these issues form an important part of the larger conflict picture, and avoiding addressing them in a coherent manner might increase the challenges of implementing a negotiated peace settlement. On the contrary, addressing them early in the negotiation stage can contribute to reducing the underlying conflicts emerging on the large issues and ease the way towards reconciliation and development of common strategies. Moreover, if tended to in the peace negotiations these issues might prove instrumental in confidence building and in establishing a settlement that can be acceptable to larger parts of the population.

There are from my experience three issues that are frequently left out of negotiation debates: (i) the rights, role and influence of women, (ii) the rights, role, and influence of minorities, and (iii) environmental issues. The latter is of concern to everyone, gender issues to at least 50 % of any population and minority issues to a varying proportion of the population, depending on how well organised the various minority groups are and the extent to which the conflict is seen to affect them.

1 See, i.e. S.J. Stedman, D.S. Rothchild and E.M. Cousens (Eds.) (2002) *Ending Civil Wars: The Implementation of Peace Agreements*. Boulder: Lynne Rienner Publishers; P. Wallensteen (2007) *Understanding Conflict Resolution*. London: Sage Publications; R. Paris (2004) *At War's End: Building Peace After Civil Conflict*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press.

These have been recognised as concerns in the negotiation process in conflict areas like Afghanistan, Sri Lanka, Aceh of Indonesia, to mention but a few, where decades of violent conflict and to some extent culture and religion have had a considerable effect on gender and minority roles. Environmental destruction has frequently been the direct result of conflict, or caused indirectly due to lacking ability and will to undertake environmental sound planning. Drilled wells have dried out the traditional underwater irrigation channels in Afghanistan as these lacked maintenance or were mined, rain forests were cut down to secure the military income in Indonesia. The initial question to be asked in connection to this is whether the same concerns are valid for Cyprus, a country located in Europe and ranked in 28th position in the UN Human development Index?

Yes, I will argue. The Republic of Cyprus has been ranked as far down as 41st place out of 108 countries in the 2008 Gender Empowerment Measure rank; there are a number of minority groups with Cypriot citizenship, notably Armenians, Maronites and Latin; and the environmental challenges the island faces are evident in daily debates on the lack of water, concerns about the groundwater reserves and the impact of global climate change.

Allowing Women Larger Influence

If we start with gender, the United Nations Security Council passed in 2000 a resolution that called for broader participation of women in peace-building and post-conflict reconstruction, frequently referred to as resolution 1325.

In the introduction to the resolution the Security Council, after unanimously calling on all actors involved in negotiating and implementing peace agreements to adopt a gender perspective, they point out that:

> "Such a gender perspective would also include measures that supported local women's peace initiatives and indigenous processes for conflict resolution, and that involve women in all the implementation mechanisms of the peace agreements, as well as measures to ensure the human rights of women and girls, particularly as they relate to the constitution, the electoral system, the police and the judiciary."

This is an area where major improvements will be easily achieved in both parts of Cyprus. There are presently no women on the peace negotiation teams, and only one female minister in the Cabinet in the Republic of Cyprus (and none in the National Council). In the north the speaker of the Parliament was until the recent elections a woman, as is the head of the Immovable Property Commission. The participation of women in the respective parliaments is 8 out of 56 in the south and 5 out of 50 in the north, and out of the 6 members that Cyprus elects to the European Parliament none is a woman. Within Europe Cyprus is ranked among the countries with the highest gender segregation in occupation, and in an interview in February 2008 lawyer Androula Vassiliou stated that for the Republic of Cyprus "... there is a difference of 30 per cent in women's

salaries compared to male colleagues, in both the private and public sector".[2] There is no available data for the TRNC[3] for comparison, but one might expect the same difference. As for employment, a recent report stated that the gender difference in employment is 19.1 per cent in southern Cyprus, while as high as 30 per cent in northern Cyprus, while the EU average is 14.4.[4]

While there are a range of women's organisations and initiatives in both parts of Cyprus, there are no common initiatives geared towards ensuring the interest and opinions of women in the peace negotiations. Neither have the two leaders and their teams taken any joint initiatives to invite such organisations and initiatives to express their views on the process, let alone having them represented in the negotiation teams.[5]

How is it then possible to create awareness among both men and women, convincing them that women can do as well as men and that by allowing them to participate in top level decision making the quality of decisions is bound to improve? This is no way denying that collective wisdom is more encompassing than that of only 50 per cent of the population, and that the democratic process could certainly be better served if decisions that affect the whole of the population are not only taken by half of it.

Hence the question remains whether this is primarily a lack of awareness, or, taking a more cynical view: rather that the current male dominated establishment resists the sharing of power with the female part of the Cypriot population.

And while, arguably, changing gender roles is a long process that needs to include and involve both women and men (and certainly boys and girls), there are ways found to kick start the process. Several countries have taken quite drastic measures to ensure a higher degree of influence for women, as the Security Council resolution calls for. Afghanistan's constitution set the female representation in the parliament to a minimum 25 per cent, thus ensuring a formal female representation and allowing women the experience of holding public office. More temporary measures might be to encourage political parties to promote women in top positions in parliamentary elections and in nominations for various committees. And, some countries outside of the EU have gone further. In Norway, publicly listed companies have to comply with a law requiring a 40 per cent female quota for board members as from 1 January 2008, following the same regulation introduced for publicly owned companies in 2004. The result: the female board

2 Jacqueline Theodoulou. 'I don't think there is full democracy in Cyprus', *Cyprus Mail*, 7 February 2008.

3 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

4 Women's Initiative in the Comprehensive Settlement Process (2008) *Recommendation for the Inclusion of Gender Equality in the Negotiation Process*. Report from a Working Group established by the Turkish Cypriot Women's Solidarity Council. Nicosia, 2 September 2008.

5 Mehmet Ali Talat has welcomed and received input and advice from Turkish Cypriot women's organisations.

representation in Norway is up from 6 per cent in 2002 to at least 40 per cent in 2009,[6] and more women are getting prepared for an even more active role in the business community.

However, just starting with fulfilling the recommendations provided by the Security Council would mark the beginning of major changes for Cyprus. The United Nations could even be challenged to help facilitate the process, using their extensive experience from other conflicts.

Ensuring the Rights of Minorities

Historically the minorities in Cyprus were living in all parts of the island. With Independence, only Armenians, Latins and Maronites were recognised as minorities, leaving other smaller communities out. Moreover, the minorities were given the choice of either accepting a Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot citizenship. There was no option of maintaining their minority identity; they had to choose the citizenship they thought could best secure their interests. Thus, many of them were to experience migration in two forms, from their identity and (for those that moved following the division) from their land.

Comparing their treatment under the two regimes, it should be noted that Armenians, Latins and Maronites were granted representation as religious minorities in the Parliament of the Republic of Cyprus but that there was a complete exclusion of minorities from the TRNC Parliament. Yet, even in the Republic's parliament, minority representatives were not granted voting rights or the possibility to address or raise issues in the House of Representatives. Thus, they ended up being observers to political processes that came to affect their lives rather than being allowed to influence the course of history.[7]

Over recent years their struggle for acceptance as minorities has continued, not least to ensure them the rights minorities are granted within the framework provided by the European Union and the Council of Europe. An example here is the struggle for recognition of Cypriot Maronite Arabic as a language in need of protection, as the Armenians have managed to secure.

Turning to international conventions that provide guidance to the matter, the Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities of the Council of Europe is the most comprehensive, acceded to by Cyprus without any reservations.[8]

The introduction to this convention explains that the need for a convention for "... the creation of a climate of tolerance and dialogue is necessary to enable cultural diversity to be a source and a factor, not of division, but of enrichment for each society;"

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6 [http://eng.kilden.forskningsradet.no/c52778/nyhet/vis.html?tid=57242].

7 For a full presentation and discussion on minorities in Cyprus, please see Costas M. Constantinou (forthcoming 2009) 'Cyprus, Minority Politics and Surplus Ethnicity' in A. Varnava, N. Koureas and M. Elia (eds.), *The Minorities of Cyprus*. Cambridge: Cambridge Scholars Publications.

8 Council of Europe (1995) *Framework Convention for the Protection of National Minorities*, Strasbourg, 1 November 1995, European Treaties Series – No. 157.

Thus, in article 3, part 1, it is pointed out that:

> "Every person belonging to a national minority shall have the right freely to choose to be treated or not to be treated as such and no disadvantages shall result from this choice or from the exercise of the rights which are connected to that choice."

And in article 5, part 1, it is stated that:

> "The Parties undertake to promote the conditions necessary for persons belonging to national minorities to maintain and develop their culture, and to preserve the essential elements of their identity, namely their religion, language, traditions and cultural heritage."

And, article 15, establishes that "[T]he Parties shall create the conditions necessary for the effective participation of persons belonging to national minorities in cultural, social and economic life and in public affairs, in particular those affecting them".

Thus, not only does the Convention (which Cyprus ratified back in 1996) provide clear guidance on how the rights of minorities are to be secured and maintained in Cyprus, it also instructs the parties, which in this case arguably includes the Turkish Cypriot community and their elected leader as citizens of the European Union, to ensure effective participation of minorities in issues of public affairs, which certainly a peace negotiation must be defined as.

That might both rectify past discrimination of minority rights in Cyprus, and help ensure that the hopefully forthcoming peace-agreement is in compliance with internationally accepted guidelines for the protection of minorities. Moreover, it will also allow minority groups ownership of both the process and the final results.

Protecting the Environment

The environmental issue is arguably less about international conventions and rights than about opportunities and the ability to meet common and international challenges. And while the literature places emphasis on the possible conflicts that can be caused by struggle over scarce resources, as water is in Cyprus, there is an increasing body of academic work identifying the potential for unification and development of common environmental strategies. As Zikos, Rauchmayer and Sorman point out in a recent research project abstract,[9] drawing on the work of Wolf: "There is historical evidence that water can function both as a unifier promoting collaboration between entities at different levels and scales but also an irritant worsening already bad relations." The authors go on to argue that "... exactly because of the very nature of the resource, water is rather the medium for successful negotiation between stakeholders, leading to consensus building, collaboration and peace".

9 D. Zikos, F. Rauchmayer and A. Sorman (2009) *Participation, Conflict and Cooperation over Water Resources: Experimenting in Cyprus.* Research project abstract. Leipzig, Helmholtz – Centre for Environmental Research.

There is substantial evidence that the drought that has affected Cyprus over the last years might not be only a temporary matter, but rather a first indication of a more permanent climate change. There is growing attention internationally to the increased use of renewable energy and lowering of CO 2 emissions, areas where Cyprus fares less well despite its agreement in March 2007 with the EU binding targets to increase the share in renewable energy. The target by 2002 is for a coverage of 13% in Cyprus (20% in average for the EU), which is up from 2.9% in 2005. This is a target a united Cyprus will strive hard to accomplish. Added to this are issues such as management of waste and sewage water. In short, environmental issues are major issues, and it is as such that they need to be addressed at the earliest and in a coherent manner.

That in itself is a reason for placing environmental issues high on the leaders' negotiation and consultation agenda, not least as a range of issues that can only be resolved effectively if addressed in a holistic way, as "island-wide issues". Moreover, the opportunity a politically neutral and internationally recognised theme as the environmental issue poses for initiating collaboration and common planning beyond the water issue cannot be overstated. Not least as it opens up avenues for collaboration between civil society organisations and technical experts in the two communities and can bring about suggestions and plans that will hold strong positive impact on the lives of all Cypriots. It is what both academics and politicians like to term a "win-win" solution.

Final Comment

I have in the above examples tried to illustrate both the opportunities that lie in the ongoing peace negotiations to address three issues that have proven vital for other peace negotiation processes to succeed and be sustained. As all peace researchers know, a peace agreement is itself no guarantee for peace to be secured.

These three issues moreover offer, as I hope I have managed to demonstrate, an opportunity to ensure a structured dialogue with groups in the two communities whose rights, based on international and European treaties, needs to be addressed in a peace agreement. By structuring consultations with these groups, possibly with the help of the United Nations or the European Union, and allowing for their input to the negotiation process the final outcome might be more easily owned by these stakeholders.

From a negotiation point of view, as is the duty of the two leaders to consider, is there any risk that the demands will be very different in the two communities and that such a consultation might add further difficulties to the peace negotiations? I would argue no. On the issues identified there are no major differences in opinions and views held in the communities in Cyprus, and there is a set of international legislation and guidelines that provide a framework that both the parties negotiating and those that should be consulted need to abide by.

And, moreover, such a strategy might help address important issues that so far have been left unresolved because of the larger conflict. By addressing them in a coherent and consultative manner some of the contributing causes of the conflict will be addressed, and thus help strengthen the final text the two leaders are expected to agree on.

Property Rights and the Cyprus Problem: Insights from Economics and Social Psychology

Andreas P. Kyriacou

The issue of property rights goes to the heart of the Cyprus problem and for this reason it has been a highly contentious one. For Greek Cypriots, respect for property is an extension of the wider demand that any solution respect basic and inviolable human rights while Turkish Cypriots see property rights strictly within the confines of "bizonality" which is interpreted to mean a restricted right of restitution of Greek Cypriot property in the north (Gürel and Özersay, 2006). In this essay I will suggest that the way property rights are eventually handled in a settlement of the Cyprus issue is likely to have a direct impact on the viability of the post-solution state of affairs for specific reasons related to perceptions of fairness. To develop this idea, I will draw from work in economics and social psychology dealing with cooperative behaviour in different settings. One major finding which emerges from this literature is that the sustainability of social interaction depends on the perceptions of justice and fairness held by individuals. To understand how, consider the following three important results:

1. People tend to act according to some principal of justice or fairness in their dealings with others but will eventually abandon these principles when they believe that others act in a more selfish way (Rabin, 1998 and Fehr and Gächter, 2000).
2. People who perceive the status quo distribution of rights or entitlements to be unfair are less likely to cooperate with others or, more specifically, are less likely to play along with the rules of the game and more likely to justify the use of coercive or violent action to change the initial distribution of rights (Brennan and Buchanan, 1985).
3. People's perceptions of what is fair are not set in stone. Rather, they are flexible and can be bent to suit one's personal interests. Thus, people involved in legal disputes interpret what a "fair" resolution to the dispute would be to fit their own identifiable interests. The more people diverge in their perceptions of what is fair, the more difficult it is to achieve a settlement (Babcock and Loewenstein, 1997).

All in all these results can be summarised by saying that people prefer to act in a fair way towards others but their tendency to do this depends on: others acting in a similar manner; their perception that the social distribution of rights and entitlements is a fair one; and the extent to which their personal interest coincides with fairness-driven behaviour.

Let us take result number 1 first: people act fairly but only if others also do so. This result is relevant to the politically sanctioned appropriation of Greek Cypriot properties in the northern part of the island following the failure of the Annan Plan at the polls. The Turkish Cypriot

authorities seem to have chosen to interpret the *rejected* Annan Plan's property provisions as giving them carte blanche to violate these property rights in contravention of international and EU law. The treatment of Greek Cypriot properties by the authorities in the north, contrasts with that in the south where the government acts as the "custodian" of Turkish Cypriot properties (Gürel and Özersay, 2006).

The Turkish Cypriot authorities approach is likely to precipitate a violation of Greek Cypriot property rights in the north, first by individuals unconcerned with the ethical dimension of their actions, but eventually also by more law-abiding and morally primed citizens who may not want to be left behind in the rush for windfall gains through the unlawful appropriation of assets. This "race to the bottom" effect (insofar as law abiding or morally driven behaviour is concerned) has been discovered by economists who study the issue of tax compliance. In particular, it has been shown that tax evasion increases when people perceive that others engage in it with impunity (Klasko, 1992). Why should I do the right thing and pay when everybody else is not and getting away with it. One's initial feeling of indignation may eventually give way, buried if you like, under the pressure to stop being the only one who pays his taxes.

While opportunistic and non-ethical behaviour in one area is a problem, it is only the tip of the iceberg. The real danger emerges when people's selfish and unethical behaviour expands to other areas leading ultimately to a generalised reduction in law abiding and moral action (Graetz *et al.,* 1986; Frey, 1997; Kyriacou, 2009). There may eventually be little place in such a society for fairness, ethical or moral norms which dictate right from wrong. Ultimately, this leads to the deterioration of what political scientists call social capital which includes trust and is seen as the glue that binds society together (Putnam, 1993; Fukuyama, 1995). And societies with less social capital are not only poorer ones (in terms of income), they also have lower quality governments and are prone to more social conflict (Knack and Keefer, 1997; La Porta *et al.*, 1999; Knack, 2002 and Varshney, 2002).

How can this process of social deterioration be avoided or detained? By pursuing unlawful behaviour by citizens, to ensure the generalised respect for the rule of law: But who has to do the pursuing? – The public authorities, of course. And here lies the tragedy: rather than promoting the respect for the rule of law, the Turkish Cypriot authorities may be directly undermining it insofar as they foment the direct violation of internationally recognised Greek Cypriot property rights. In effect, the authorities in the north would be lighting the fuse which will inevitably lead to the serious erosion of social capital there, to the detriment of the people it purports to govern. So what should the Turkish Cypriot authorities be doing instead? They should be protecting Greek Cypriot property rights and be negotiating in "good faith" with Greek Cypriots in the search of a workable solution to the conflict.

Let us turn now to result number 2: the perceived fairness of the status quo distribution of entitlements affects the extent to which one is willing to play (cooperate) with others. Obviously this is directly related to the issue of property restitution, or in the case of non-restitution, compensation in the context of a settlement. It is patently clear that any solution that reduces the

volume of property to be returned to its original owners or that does not unambiguously ensure sufficient compensation for expropriated property owners will be less viable since it would create a status quo distribution of rights which would be perceived as unfair.

The Annan Plan envisaged leaving 29% of the island under Turkish Cypriot administration, meaning the return over five years of about 7% of the 1960 area to Greek Cypriots. This implies the relocation of 46,000 Turkish Cypriots currently residing there and would allow the return of about 86,000 Greek Cypriots and their residence under Greek Cypriot administration. Those Greek Cypriot property holders who would not benefit directly from this territorial adjustment would be entitled to 1/3 of their property in the north. The rest would be expropriated in exchange for "full and effective compensation". In particular, those displaced persons (mostly Greek Cypriots) who were to be expropriated would receive compensation in the form of "bonds" and "appreciation certificates" payable 25 years later from a fund initially financed by the federal government (again mostly Greek Cypriots).

The viability of the compensation provisions ultimately depends on the evolution of property prices in the long run after a solution. Economic forecasting is a difficult exercise in the short to medium term and can be outright courageous in the long run. Unsurprisingly, both positive and negative assessments of the workability of the Plan's compensation provisions have been advanced (see Platis *et al.*, 2006) for the former and Lordos (2009) for the latter). So the truth is that there is a degree of uncertainty as to whether the scheme set up by the Plan to attain "full and just compensation" is in fact a viable or realistic one. And this uncertainty is likely to undermine the perceived fairness of such compensation and, by extension, of the Plan's treatment of property rights in general.

It is important to note that for any given restrictions to restitution of properties to their original owners, increasing the proportion of land placed under Greek Cypriot administration (and thus reinstated) will improve the perceived fairness of the property arrangements. It would also have the salutary effect of implying fewer expropriations thereby increasing the financial viability of any compensation scheme something which, again, should reduce uncertainties surrounding it and improve perceptions of fairness. Of course, the economic viability of the compensation scheme would also be improved by raising the ceiling applied to the properties to be returned to their original owners in the north.[1]

1 As an aside, it is worth adding that the low ceilings imposed by the Plan on the proportion of land which may be reinstated to displaced persons together with the permanent restrictions on the right of establishment, are aimed at preserving overwhelming ethno-linguistic majorities in each constituent state. As a resident of multi-national Spain, I think I can fairly confidently argue that NO Spanish citizen would understand the imposition of any type of restrictions to residence, on Spanish citizens in ethno-linguistically distinct areas of Spain (such as the Basque Country or Catalonia). It would simply be perceived as something which contradicts all conceptions of what is appropriate for preserving the distinct identity of such regions.

An additional point is in order. Gürel and Özersay (2006) make a distinction between individual and collective property rights. The former are self-evident and are the ones I have dealt with above. The latter are interpreted by these authors as "the right of Cypriot Hellenism to the ancestral land" (p. 24). While fairness concerns emanating from individual property rights may be dealt with through appropriate compensation, those emanating from "collective" property rights are unlikely to be similarly responsive. These rights will always be violated by any bizonal solution to the conflict.

But, again, these violations can be mitigated through the territorial adjustments: the amount of land put under Greek Cypriot administration could be more reflective of the distribution of land ownership before the division of the island (around 23% to 26%, according to Lordos, 2009). Moreover, a bizonal solution to the conflict does not preclude the possibility of restitution of land or properties which have a special significance to either community. The ability of ethnic groups to access and administer historic and religious sites and shrines which they consider fundamental to their cultural identity but which have been "lost" as a result of inter-ethnic conflict would help remove a serious obstacle to inter-ethnic reconciliation (Gottlieb, 1994; Kyriacou, 2006). In this respect it is encouraging to see that the final version of the Annan Plan did foresee the full reinstatement to respective religious authorities, of religious cites in use in 1963 or 1974.

The discussion of the perceived fairness of the distribution of property-rights or entitlements is also pertinent to the issue of intra-community trade. Hatay *et al.,* (2008) report that inter-community trade is very limited and attribute this to each side's psychological attitudes towards it. Greek Cypriots fear that if they trade with Turkish Cypriots they will be stigmatised by their own Community. One rationale driving this stigma is that Turkish Cypriots are selling goods produced using Greek Cypriot land. Turkish Cypriots contemplating trade with Greek Cypriots fear being treated as inferiors by the latter. In their view, Greek Cypriots see trade as a way of controlling them. The authors identify these psychological barriers to trade and argue that they must be tackled in several ways. On the one hand politicians must encourage trade openly, the practical obstacles to trade must be tackled and the dissemination of information on trade opportunities should be improved. On the other hand, we should be promoting inter-community trust through measures of reconciliation, forgiveness and revisiting historical narratives.

My discussion emphasises the difficulties faced by those wanting to promote inter-communal trade in the current status quo situation. For trade to occur and flourish in any market one first has to define property rights and these property rights must be generally accepted by others. The problem is that under the current status-quo most Greek Cypriots do not accept Turkish Cypriot property rights on Greek Cypriot land in the north, and this undermines any economic transactions which may be based (or thought to be based) on these rights. Again, to the extent that individuals do not, for some reason, consider the distribution of property rights to be fair, they are unlikely to engage in social interaction which effectively legitimises this distribution. By the same token, any solution which generates a distribution of property rights acceptable to most, is likely to

lead to a significant increase in inter-communal trade, something which is likely to benefit both communities and especially the Turkish Cypriot one whose access to larger and wealthier markets is limited under the current state of affairs.

Epilogue

In the world of Realpolitik which characterises international relations, there is little room for fairness beyond empty rhetoric. Recall the Melians who, after asking the stronger Athenians why they wanted to invade and destroy their island, basically received as an answer: because we can (Thucydides, 1954). And one reason why it is relatively easy to pay lip service to justice norms without actually adhering to them in practice lies in the third result mentioned above: what is just, is, to some extent, in the eye of the beholder. Being a subjective concept it is malleable, and an important force acting upon our idea of what is just, is our own interest.

But there is a danger here that all Cypriots earnestly seeking a viable solution to the conflict must guard against. The more we bend (or are forced to bend) our definition of justice to suit our ends (or those of others), the less likely we will be to find a settlement to the conflict. This was clearly illustrated by the overwhelming rejection of the Annan plan by Greek Cypriot voters. And, on a deeper level, we should be worried that a solution which is deemed unfair by many of us is less likely to be a viable one, ultimately because it will reduce the likelihood that people will play within the rules in the post-solution period.

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Book Reviews

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Προδομένη Εξέγερση [A Rebellion Betrayed]

Themos Demetriou and Sotiris Vlahos
Sosialistiki Ekfrasi Publications Ltd. (Nicosia, 2007) 196 pp.
ISBN: 978-9963-9429-0-9

This book can be considered as a contribution to Cypriot studies in terms of history and of the dynamics of the Cyprus problem but it is also a significant contribution to the study of social movements. In terms of Cypriot studies this is an effort at analysing [in a historical and geopolitical context] the Turkish Cypriot [T/C] uprising/rebellion of the period 2002-2004. In terms of research and studies on social movements this is an interesting and pioneering effort at interpreting what might be termed a postmodern Cypriot uprising, through the lens of Marxist historical systemic analysis. The greatest contribution of the book is indeed this: the linking of the specific events in the T/C community with broader developments – in the Greek Cypriot [G/C] community and in the interaction of local history with broader international actors.

Methodologically this work belongs to the local leftist tradition of historiography and analysis which stretches all the way back to the emergence of the communist current in Cypriot culture and politics. This tradition is rooted in Marxist analysis but it is not often considered [with the deserved weight] in academic circles due to the fact that this analysis is part of a methodology emphasising the interaction of theory and practice [in *praxis*] as revealing of social reality. Thus the authors, for example, proclaim openly their sympathy, and their data include experiences and texts derived from their engagement in solidarity with the movement they describe/analyse. In effect one of the valuable methodological dimensions of the book is that it provides a G/C "insider's" view of the T/C movement. But beneath the surface of the popularising narrative and political advocacy, there is a theoretically informed analysis which links structural dynamics with historical trends. We have here the effort to interpret the T/C uprising in the framework of Trotsky's model on the dynamics of revolutions ["dual power"] and the internal causes of the failure of uprisings to implement their ideals. On the latter Trotsky's position is close to the Weberian position [to compare it with the characteristic sociological position advocating a "value free" analysis] with one significant difference – while Weberians would claim that modern revolutionary uprisings [and especially those that come to administer power] lead [as an "unexpected consequence"] to a rise in bureaucratisation, Trotskyite-influenced-Marxism, claims that the failure of revolutions to implement their goals can be sought in internal subjective factors – e.g. leaders and policy choices – which allow the restructuring of power. The Trotskyite position has been influential on a whole set of theories pointing to the emergence of a new managerial class in the ex-socialist societies in Eastern Europe which led the overthrow of the structures of "existing socialism". But in the Trotskyite interpretation there is also the Marxist emphasis on historical

continuity – thus despite their seeming defeat, revolutions create "frozen realities" which help shape the dynamics of the future. And theoretical frameworks are significant in the analysis of the subject/data under discussion precisely because the issues raised are [politically and sociologically] open to interpretation: the T/C uprising managed to bring its leaders to power – is this rebellion or revolution? Can one call it victory? The authors claim that the seeming "victory" was actually a "betrayal" of the historical consciousness which emerged in the days of the uprising and thus of its historical potential for the people of Cyprus and for the lower classes in particular.

The basic argument is the following: the T/C uprising was the result of dynamics in the T/C community leading to the formation of a "working class"/"popular" front [in the late 1990s-early 2000s] which challenged the status quo and produced a situation of dual power [2002-2003]. The uprising, according to the authors, emanated from issues of "everydayness" but when the international context allowed [the EU integration process], it acquired a dynamic which can be compared with the great class/social modern uprisings/rebellions of the twentieth century – with its chief characteristic being the "self organization of the masses". Documentation for this thesis is satisfactory [texts from leaflets, data from interviews, and newspaper reports] but if the argument stayed at this, it would have been on examination a deductively derived hypothesis. In an incisive analysis of the dynamics and the discourse of the uprising the authors point out that the historical consciousness born of the uprising "revealed" that the key hegemonic structure limiting the prospects of lower class social movements in Cyprus has been, historically, the ideology of national unity in front of "life or death" national danger. Thus the most successful achievement of the uprising was actually cultural-political: it overthrew the hegemonic ideological structures and consequently its impact spread to the G/C community. The "overflow" of people at the crossing points which opened in the spring of 2003 is interpreted, in a fascinating way, as the "G/C response". But the uprising, the wave of social revolt, was contained, according to the argument, due, largely, to the failure of the leadership of the T/C Left to lead the masses to "a total overthrow"/revolution which would have implied a radical questioning [from both sides of the dividing line] of the reality of division. And the "fateful decision" by the CTP [Turkish Republican Party] to take part in the elections was accompanied by the organised campaign from the G/C political elite to demonise the Annan plan. Thus if the 2003 scenes at the crossing points were the revolution, the referendum was in effect the counter revolution.

The historical perspective is refreshing – and so is the broadness of the conceptualisation. Too often, unfortunately, analysis of issues related to the Cyprus problem tends to be focused exclusively on events, texts, or personalities. There are, however, some theoretical issues which remain unresolved in the text. The key issue is the use of concepts – at times the authors refer to the "working class", at times to the "masses", while they attribute the causes to issues of "everydayness". As a matter of fact one can see justification for the use of all three terms – but one should note also that they refer to different frameworks. The "working class" line of thought leads inevitably to classical Marxist analysis – and the trade unions were indeed the "organizational leaders" of the movement. But one should note also that the leading unions were of the cultural sector – the

teachers' union for example. This points towards the direction of the discussions on "the new working class" – but also to the direction of the emergence of "new social movements" from the cultural and everyday sphere. And here one feels that a more analytic focus on the economic structures of the T/C community would have helped. The transformation of the movement into one of "masses" is again a point on which a theoretically demanding reader would want some more analysis: what are the "masses" as an analytic category – the concept of the "people" or the new concept of the "multitude"? The fact that the issues originated from everydayness points to the latter possibility. Indeed one could claim that the T/C uprising had elements of the popular movements which started to emerge from the 1970s-1980s in the non-western world [Iran, Philippines], which were used by the West in order to destabilise the geopolitical space of the ex-socialist bloc, but which represent also a reality of our postmodern times.

The lack of theoretical elaboration on the link of causes [everydayness] to the initial building of the movement [trade union platform] to the mobilisation of the masses in the uprising/control of the street ["dual power"], is unfortunate but the text lays down a framework for future studies of the "moments of transition" [of the specific movement and of others to come] and the way different movement identities were shaped and transformed. It would have been interesting, for example, to elaborate on the multiple implications of the emphasis on the collectivity of the "T/C people" in the discourses/proclamations of the movement. It would have helped also if the book focused more on the relation of the movement and the parties of the T/C Left – indeed one of the novelties of the T/C political scene [in comparison with the G/C one] is the existence of a multiplicity of leftist parties which compete to express the broader subculture of the Left. In terms of political power it is also open to question [irrespective of whether one sees the movement as "modern" or "postmodern"] what "realistic" options were available to the T/C leftist leaders [or the G/C ones for that matter] – movements generate dynamics but political elites tend to focus inevitably on the administration of power.

On the level of the analysis/interpretation of the empirical data there are two significant elements in the book: a historical narrative weaving together four "fields" [T/C community, G/C community, EU, Turkey] into a sub-system, and a perceptive analysis of G/C media texts as part of a strategy of "manufacturing consent". A methodologically demanding reader may raise the issue of the representativeness of the selected sample. But the argument of the book is not really to document the strategy but to point to its existence. The discussion of the change in tone by *Fileleftheros* on the opening of the crossings [and their aftermath] in 2003 and on the construction of the climate leading to the referendum is superb, reminiscent of Chomskian analysis.

Where one feels that there is some incomplete discussion is the focus on the media of the G/C Left – and indeed the ambiguous position [no/yes] of this section of the broader Cypriot Left. The authors note that the party newspaper was leaning towards the "no" position, while the radio station of the party towards the "yes" position. One could extend here their argument that there was a spreading of the uprising in the G/C community by pointing to the G/C leftist subculture

as a first sensitive [due to historical-cultural reasons] recipient. But unfortunately the authors do not elaborate on this.

The narrative of the book is historical and its contents are organised into 11 chapters which may be subdivided into three sections [outlining the background, the rebellion and the process of containment]: there is first a historical framework and a geopolitical outline of the background to the T/C uprising in the late 1990s [chapters 1-4]. Chapters 5-7 outline the uprising in both communities – the process leading to the T/C rallies of 2002-2003 and the G/C "response" to the opening of the crossing points. Chapters 8-9 describe the process of "containing" the movement in both communities, while the last two chapters focus on the strategy to demonise the Annan plan among G/Cs and thus transform "containment" into counter-revolution.

This is a useful book – empirically as a report and as a source of data. Theoretically it is more significant: it raises the issue of historical-systemic analysis, which, as a level of analysis, would contribute significantly to the social scientific literature on Cyprus. In relation to social movements this work points to the need of studies on the process of the breakdown of power due to the crisis of the hegemonic ideology – not only because they reveal the dynamics of emerging social movements, but also because they reveal the functioning of the structures of control and their cleavages. In terms of current political debates the book claims obviously that the T/C uprising was not manufactured from the outside and its potential was not simply a modernisation [and rationalisation] of the political structures of the T/C community. Their argument claims that the uprising created a "new reality" by revealing the power structures holding the island divided. Their argument, for example, that the Papadopoulos regime was actually fragile [the book was published before the elections] points to a perceptive understanding of historical trends. On whether, however, the historical consciousness born of the uprising can manage to create *a praxis* of social transformation beyond the breaking down of the nationalist division, is an open question.

ANDREAS PANAYIOTOU

Cyprus 1974: Greek Coup and Turkish Invasion

MAKARIOS DROUSIOTIS
Bibliopolis (Mannheim and Möhnesee, 2006) 281 pp.
ISBN: 3-933925-76-2

Cyprus 1974: The title raises expectations. If a book is dedicated to a time period as short as two summer months, it is expected to provide a novel viewpoint, new interpretation, new evidence, or new information. This is especially so since the particular period is considered to be the most crucial period in modern Cypriot history, the moment that Greeks and Greek Cypriots like to refer to as the point when the Cyprus problem was created, while Turks and Turkish Cypriots view it as the moment the Cyprus problem was finally resolved. So, what value does this book have to attract researchers, historians and other interested readers? Does it present new evidence, considering that in particular the US National Archives have classification periods of some 30 years which have, in the meantime, passed by since the 1974 events?

In fact, Makarios Drousiotis has conducted his own research at the US National Archives and is thus able to quote from first-hand sources. The relevant question is how consequent his research has been – or in other words, how thoroughly his findings have been cross-checked within a limited number of first-hand sources before being presented as evidence for a specific claim that fits into his argumentation. The impression at the end of the book is that Drousiotis, a well-known Cypriot journalist, has an obvious claim to have his publication considered as the work of a historian – but he is mastering the tools and methodologies of historians only partially. So, does the value of the book rest on the concentration of a specific, novel aspect followed throughout the story?

Actually, a common thread is hard to find in Drousiotis' book because it is a patchwork of articles and excerpts from other books which have been published in Greek in the past, composed and translated into English for a single volume, in which a clear chronological account of the period seems to be the only concept. The foci of some chapters have aspects that are positioned differently to others. While the chronology of events continues, the respective chapters shed light on the various periods from several angles – the intelligence, domestic, international, or military technical aspects, but unfortunately without any justification as to why this may be of relevance to the book's main concept.

For Cyprus research, the added value of this work is not, therefore, obvious. The historian likes to skim through the introduction in the expectation of finding the main question or thesis for the book, as well as information on the general state of international research about which the present

work is embedded, together with a clear explanation of the gaps it attempts to fill. It is indeed disappointing that, by way of introduction, Drousiotis merely summarises Cypriot history from the end of World War II to 1970 without reviewing the aspects that a scientific introduction is expected to yield. When considering that the author is well informed on the many common conspiracy theories or nationalist propaganda produced over the past decades from domestic authors, it ought to have been especially important for him to point out the specialities of his work that would make his conclusions all the more trustworthy as opposed to the mass of unserious authors from whom he can distance himself.

Within such an alternative introduction – or preface to the book for that matter – the author, or the editor on his behalf, might have explained that the real value of the book lay in the combination of US archival research with vast Greek material and Cypriot oral history. This combination provides added value to the Cyprus research of historians who are unable to work with Greek-language sources, as well as to those without the international picture who concentrate on the domestic and regional aspects only. On the one hand, the author's neglect here to adequately set the Cypriot history facets into the broader general history context – such as the Cold War or the British Decolonisation period – make the story a rather isolated one that renders some important international behaviour inconclusive to all but those who have the respective historical general knowledge at their disposal. On the other hand, presenting a work based on a huge variety of international sources also means opening up the perspectives through which the book loses focus as it simply tries to cover too many aspects. In spite of these *caveats*, the book goes a long way to dispute, with good reason, the mass of simplistic Greek or Turkish arguments on the market as it frequently takes on a well-varied, differentiated view of key aspects.

Nevertheless, Drousiotis also seems to have fallen into the trap of writing about some aspects with a foregone conclusion in mind, urging him to make adventurous direct links that do not seem conclusive enough to be evident to the unprejudiced reader, or – even worse – are not supported with references (e.g. p. 192). This often leads to generalised indications of protagonists, such as "the Americans", when the distinction between the political elite, the diplomats in the field, the secret service establishments or individual CIA officers would have been crucial for respective conspiratorial conclusions or blame. To be fair, however, while such deficiencies are evident in various areas where specific provocative conclusions are reached, Drousiotis clearly identifies policy differences between the above-mentioned actors elsewhere. The emphasis of individual ambassadors' disagreements with their superiors that have, on more than one occasion, led to catastrophic neglect are valuable – the best-known being the all-too-silent disagreement between the Head of the Europe Desk at the US State Department, Arthur Hartman, the US Ambassador to Greece, Henry Tasca, and the Secretary of State, Henry Kissinger. More doubtful are some conclusions on the behaviour of key persons, built on inconclusive documents or second-hand accounts. Here, especially, it would have been indispensable to have adequate source critique in the footnotes: clear indications on how a specific source and statement is to be judged in terms of trustworthiness, relevance, and context. This is delivered in a few instances only, i.e. on p. 198.

Drousiotis begins his work with a brief summary of post-World War II Cypriot history up to 1970 with the obvious exercise of transposing the US Gladio concept at the outset of the Cold War on the Cyprus context, together with other components of "a network of semi-legal paramilitary organisations in Europe" (p. 2). This exercise fails to convince those readers who are not primarily looking for confirmation of their own presupposed conspiracy theories on US and British hidden agendas in Cyprus – especially as from here onwards, few references to the link between US behaviour vis-à-vis Cyprus, US policy behind such behaviour, the US secret service influence of policy or behaviour, and Greek, Turkish or Cypriot military or para-military establishments are conclusive enough not to leave a shallow after-taste that the author has trouble resisting the temptation to draw attention to an overall conspiratorial concept of the superpowers. A typical example of this is a rather bold statement claiming that the US, by 1958, had been "acquiring footholds in EOKA through the Greek regime and controlling TMT through the Turkish Gladio" (p. 15), or the contention that in the late 1950s a Cypriot para-state had been created "with the assistance of the Greek secret services and the CIA and the strengthening of TMT, an offshoot of the Turkish Gladio [...]" (p. 21). Later on, Drousiotis claims that "the Americans, through IDEA, carried out their political coup of 15 July 1965 and toppled George Papandreou" (p. 28). No reference is indicated to support such a claim. By concentrating on such rather overstated, alleged "American" roles, the more crucial aspects of Cypriot history remain neglected. The November 1967 crisis is treated within one sentence only, which conceals the impact of the crisis on Cypriot politics concerning both the plans of General Grivas and the bicommunal negotiations for a solution commencing in its immediate aftermath (p. 30).

There next follows a very detailed, well researched and carefully written development of the Cyprus scene up to the 1974 war, with well-structured chapters that illuminate various aspects. More adequate space is allocated to the US role here, and after the doubtful generalisations in the introduction on alleged US intelligence community interference with Greece and Cyprus, the elaborated differences between the influence of individual US actors, opinions, and attempts by diplomats to rectify somewhat misdirected attitudes in Washington, may come as a positive surprise. It is deplorable that the author then destroys his own carefully built-up plot with renewed contentions based on somewhat doubtful or irrelevant sources (compared to evidence to the contrary) or based on no references at all.

Impatience first arises in chapter 7, which focuses on the Ioannides junta 1973, with quotations that are too lengthy. By this time, it has also become clear to the reader that the prelude to the alleged actual focus of the book – the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion of 1974 – takes up more than half of the book, which eventually unmasks the book's choice of title as inadequate. Something akin to "the path to disaster", indicating that the prelude is as relevant as the coup and invasion themselves may have been more suited.

The chapter on the coup of 15 July 1974 itself is a thrilling account, mostly based on domestic evidence. At the same time it is again an attempt to whitewash some characters and blame others regarding their roles. It is good and attractive for readers to include oral history in research, but

some protagonists' statements about alleged behaviour sound suspiciously influenced by the 30-year time lapse rather than mirroring the feelings at the time. Chapter 11 then follows, which amplifies in too much detail, military technical data on the forces fighting each other in Cyprus in July 1974. This part of the book possibly stems from an article originally written for a military magazine. Also, while elaborating on the time span between coup and invasion, Drousiotis makes it sound as though the coup follow-ups had been masterminded by the US tacit behind-the-scenes manoeuvrings – a contention again not supported by relevant documents.

At the end, the main questions remain unanswered: Why should direct links between a CIA hidden agenda and the Greek and Cypriot military policy be proven by the mere evidence of individual contacts? Why should alleged CIA preferences have been powerful and influential enough to undermine a much more thoroughly founded official US diplomatic policy? And most of all: Why should there have been US policy conspiracies in 1974 based on alleged CIA interests, if the overwhelming US interests had been counter to the situation as it turned out? Researchers tend to scan the book for clues to prove their doubts once suspicion on the reliability of research and on the justification of key claims sets in. It is at this stage that some – mostly minor – deficiencies are noticed, which results from the book's rather hasty composition, without allocating adequate time to its editing. It transpires that the original writings were in Greek, but the author used the Greek translations of standard British and US literature and quoted the Greek translations in this English version rather than the respective originals. Finally, several editorial mistakes spoil the overall positive impression, of which style and spelling are the lesser of these evils. If the names of crucial protagonists are misspelled, not too much harm is done ("Sands" instead of "Sandys" p. 25 and index). But if Ambassador Macomber turns into "Macawber" the impression may be worse. This is surely not helped by cases of anachronism, e.g. a reference from 1967 serving as alleged evidence for a quote uttered in 1970 (p. 35).

Nevertheless, the listing of errors and deficiencies may not do justice to the general impression: Overall, the book is attractive and interesting reading for a wide readership. It might not, however, be satisfactory to the scientists who will not settle for just being entertained.

CLAUDE NICOLET

The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard

NATHALIE TOCCI
Routledge (London, 2007), 202 + xvi pp.
ISBN 978-0-415-41394-7

It is widely accepted that the European Union has a powerful role to play in the resolution of conflict. Indeed, the EU has often been presented as the world's most ambitious conflict resolution project. However, such perceptions appear to be based on past purposes and results rather than contemporary and future challenges. Thus far, the role of the EU in conflict resolution has tended to be focused on two specific cases. In the first instance, it has been lauded for the way in which it has managed to extinguish the Franco-German tensions and rivalry that lay at the heart of European insecurity for the latter part of the nineteenth century and the first half of the twentieth century. Secondly, and perhaps less obviously, through the mass enlargement of 2004, which saw eight former communist countries join the bloc, it has served as a vital element in the process of healing the Cold War divide between East and West Europe. However, while both of these are truly enormous achievements that have brought fundamental peace and stability to the European continent, the EU continues to face major challenges. The question facing EU decision makers is how the European Union can adapt, enhance and update its goal of conflict resolution in order to provide a means to address a range of conflicts that simmer away at the fringes of the Union.

The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard seeks to address this very question: how can the European Union act to transform those disputes that lurk beyond its current boundaries? To do this, the first chapter presents an overview of the ways in which the European Union can address conflict. This theoretical chapter explores the evolution of the European Union's conflict resolution capacity, analysing such tools and mechanisms as conditionality, social learning and passive enforcement. In other words, what measures can the EU introduce to force a country to behave in a certain way, what can it do to alter the way in which a party understands and approaches a conflict and how can it encourage a country to adopt the rules of European behaviour? In order to explain the efficacy of each of these mechanisms, the work also examines a range of determinants shaping this efficacy. Unsurprisingly, the key conclusion is that, 'when full membership is an option, the EU's potential leverage is higher than in cases where relations are based on association, partnership or financial assistance.' Likewise, the perceived importance of the EU to a party is a key factor in deciding how a state responds to EU policies. Lastly, timing is all important. Expecting countries to make immediate changes in the hope of the long-term prospect of membership is problematic. Taken together, these ideas provide the basic

parameters for understanding the role the EU can play and assessing how successful it is going to be in its efforts to transform a conflict, or promote peace and stability.

Thereafter, the work explores the way in which these tools have been put into action across a variety of specific examples. The array of case studies tackled is impressive in its scope. In addition to Cyprus and the Kurdish issue, both of which have immediate resonance, the author also addresses the question of Israel-Palestine, Serbia and Montenegro and the conflicts in the Caucasus. As the author explains, these cases have been chosen precisely in order to explore how the EU's conflict management techniques can be applied across a range of different relationships. These examples are then revisited in the final chapter, where the work assesses what wider lessons can be learned from the cases about the way in which the European Union can contribute to conflict management, resolution and transformation.

In the case of Cyprus, the first conflict that is addressed, the author tackles the question of the degree to which the process of accession acted as a catalyst for a settlement process. This is a subject that she has addressed in her earlier work, and so is fairly familiar territory. In assessing the role of the EU, the point is made that when the EU first entered into membership discussions with the Republic of Cyprus, the expectation was that Cyprus would join when a settlement had been reached. However, as the process continued, this gradually became watered down. Eventually, this element of conditionality was abandoned in the case of the Greek Cypriots, but in fact strengthened in the case of Turkey. This, as the author suggests, brought about mixed results. It meant that whereas Turkey eventually came to understand the importance of solving Cyprus in terms of its own accession hopes, the Greek Cypriots were left in a position where they could adopt a hard line position with little or no cost to their own membership hopes. Indeed, this is where most observers now recognise that the EU made its most major mistake. In its fixation on the intransigence of Rauf Denktash and successive Turkish Governments, and assisted by the apparent moderation of successive Greek Cypriot leaders, it had neglected to consider the possibility that the Greek Cypriots might eventually elect a leader with equally hard line views as his counterpart across the Green Line. This is what happened in 2003, with the election of Tassos Papadopoulos. However, by that point it was too late to change things. As many EU leaders came to understand, this complacency was a huge mistake.

The obvious question is whether this was a mistake that could have been rectified before 1 May 2004, when Cyprus joined the EU – or even avoided altogether. The work appears to be strangely silent on this key question. In reality, though, it is likely that conditionality was a rather blunt tool, for both political and institutional reasons. Politically, it would have meant that Greece would have had to have dropped its threat to veto the entire enlargement process unless Cyprus was included. Even though the Greek Government supported the Annan Plan, would it have been prepared to punish the Greek Cypriots for rejecting it? Greece treads a very difficult path on Cyprus. If it had pushed the Greek Cypriots too hard it would have faced the inevitable accusation that it was trying to force Cyprus to accept a peace agreement to solve a problem that Greece had played a major part in creating. Secondly, even if Greece had been willing to back down, it would

have been very difficult to halt the accession process in order to disentangle Cyprus from the other nine acceding states. The Treaty of Accession being ratified by the national parliaments treated the countries as a group. To have presented an entirely new treaty would have taken the whole ratification process back to square one.

In this sense, and as is suggested, social learning and passive enforcement could have played a stronger role in the case of Cyprus. In the case of passive enforcement, the very interesting point is made that while the inability of a divided Cyprus to adhere to the *acquis communautaire*, the EU's body of laws, was initially seen as a hindrance on the island's accession, by the end of the process it had become a tool of rejecting the terms of a peace agreement. Simply put, whereas at the start of the process the concern was that a divided Cyprus could not meet the requirements of the acquis, by the end of the accession process the Greek Cypriots leadership – in rejecting the Annan Plan – argued that the model of reunification on offer was in fact in contravention of the *acquis* and so should not be accepted. As for the notion of social learning, this could have been a more fruitful line of approach. However, this is also a longer-term project. A mindset cannot be changed overnight. Suffice to say, the Papadopoulos Administration simply did not understand the underlying values of the European Union. Meanwhile, many others, most notably those favouring the European Solution, in fact adopted a wholly warped understanding of what it means to be a part of EU, viewing it as a way of achieving their nationalist ends. This could have been better tackled by the EU, but even then the chances of succeeding, given the short space of time available, were minimal.

This notion of social learning is rather interesting when one considered bilateral Greek-Turkish relations – a case not covered in the book. The process of rapprochement, which began in 1999, provides an extremely valuable insight into the ways in which the European Union can provide an impetus for a process of conflict resolution by shaping the thinking of decision makers. As this case shows, it is not so much the lure of membership for Turkey, the much vaunted 'power of attraction', that proved to be the defining influence on the process. Instead, it was the process of 'Europeanisation', the element of social learning, which became embedded in Greek political thinking, which acted as the spur for the momentous developments that took place in 1999.

After Cyprus, the work proceeds to examine the other cases. While the book provides a very interesting range of examples, and these are structured according to a specific range of relationships, it is nevertheless noticeable that it omits several key problems that Europe will have to face in the years ahead. Perhaps most obviously, while the work explored the interesting, and little analysed, case of the dissolution of the state union between Serbia and Montenegro, it did not examine the more obvious trio of Balkan conflicts: FYR Macedonia, Kosovo and Bosnia-Herzegovina. In the case of Macedonia, a peace agreement put in place in 2001 cannot mask the fact that deep divisions continue to exist between the large ethnic Albanian minority and the Slavic majority. At the same time, the ongoing dispute with Greece over the name represents a further destabilising influence. Meanwhile, over in Bosnia, efforts to forge a multiethnic state have all but failed. Over a decade has now passed since the Dayton peace accords brought an end to the vicious and bloody civil war and

yet the country remains deeply divided along ethnic lines and subject to international oversight. Lastly, Kosovo, which unilaterally declared independence in February 2008, poses perhaps the biggest challenge of all. What role could, or should, the EU play in all these cases? Given that the Western Balkans represents the next phase of EU enlargement – or, more correctly 'EU completion' as many officials rightfully note – it would have been good to see these cases addressed simply because of their salience for the Union.

Still, while there is a strong case for seeing these other examples addressed, especially given their immediate resonance and significance, one can also appreciate the fact that there are only so many studies that could have been covered. To this extent, while it would have been good to see some reference to the Greek-Turkish conflict or the remaining conflicts in the Balkans – or even to the question of Trandniestra, another conflict in Europe's backyard – the omission of these cases should not detract from the value of the work in laying out a model for understanding how the EU can shape disputes on its periphery. In addition to the recent co-edited book by Diez, Stetter and Albert, *The European Union and Border Conflicts* (Cambridge, 2008) – another work that uses case studies, but again curiously omits the Balkans – *The EU and Conflict Resolution: Promoting Peace in the Backyard* is an extremely interesting and very welcome addition to the developing body of literature on the role of the European Union in the management of conflict.

JAMES KER-LINDSAY

A Functional Cyprus Settlement: The Constitutional Dimension

TIM POTIER
Verlag Franz Philipp Rutzen (Mainz and Ruhpolding, 2007), 764 pp.
ISBN: 978-3-938646-20-5

The Annan plan was the most comprehensive and ambitious plan ever constructed to resolve the Cyprus problem and as such it is a landmark. Following the publication of the first version of the UN Secretary General's plan to resolve the Cyprus Problem, a number of Greek language publications appeared, and a small number of English language publications. But since then, post-Annan plan Cyprus has become a hot subject with numerous new publications appearing in various languages. Overall, the vast majority of the Greek and Greek Cypriot publications have been opposed to the plan outright, many of them containing rather opinionated approaches based on a distorted picture of its content and context. As time goes by we are seeing a more fruitful debate emerging with more balanced arguments in Greek and English publications about the referendum and the Annan plan.[1] In any case, it cannot be disputed that the publication of the UN plan in late 2002 was a watershed. It decisively transformed the 'terms' of the debate by taking a very specific approach to the notion of the 'solution' and its content, bringing about a rupture in the political constellation in a way that no other plan or event has since 1974.

Tim Potier's book attempts to do something constructive with the UN failure of the Annan plan. Of course this lengthy 764-page effort at "a functional Cyprus settlement", which merely aims to capture what he refers to as "the constitutional dimension", is not bed-time reading. But then again, who said that constitutional texts are to be easy? We must recognise that despite the attraction of making our works as academics, lawyers, and social scientists accessible to a wider audience, such a task is seldom successful. A book of this size covering 16 chapters or "a portion of the Annan plan", as the author suggests (p. 9), reads like an encyclopaedia of the Annan plan; in that sense the book must be very useful to the team of experts surrounding Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, particularly the constitutional brains behind the scenes.

The subject matter of the book as well as the way it was conceived and written invites readers to engage in a political and a constitutional debate over the resolution of the Cyprus problem. In this sense this review will not confine itself to a review function but will take the form of a broader commentary on the issues the book deals with.

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1 See for instance Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), *The Failure to Reunify Cyprus: The Annan Plan, the Referendums of 2004 and the Aftermath*. London: I.B. Tauris.

After a short but not particularly insightful survey of the Cyprus problem (ch. 1, pp. 15-18), the author proceeds to deal with the content of the Annan plan. He shapes the general scene with two short chapters: the structure of the plan (ch. 2, pp. 23-32) which outlines the basics of a plan so overwhelmingly rejected by the Greek-Cypriots, and chapter 3 (pp. 19-22) entitled 'Cyprus and the Constitution'. The author misses the opportunity here to set out the basic constitutional theory of the plan, or to critique it, or to explain the theoretical frame on how and on what basis the author proposes to fix it. Rather, these chapters, and indeed the whole book, reads like a long 'surrogate' or 'secondary' text, which really make sense only if the reader has the Foundation Agreement plus the Annexes (i.e. the Annan Plan) open next to Potier's book in order to cross-refer to the texts. In that sense, as a technical commentary, the text is useful.

In chapters 4 to 16 he delves into the nitty-gritty of the Annan Plan: Entry into Force of the New State of Affairs (ch. 4); State Succession (ch. 5); Separation of Competences (ch. 8), and Citizenship and Citizenship Status (ch. 9), all of which are short chapters. The remaining chapters are longer: Federal Parliament (ch. 11, pp. 183-361), Federal Elections (ch. 12, pp. 361-550), Civil Service (ch. 13, pp. 551-570), External Relations (ch. 14, pp. 571-644), EU Relations (ch. 15, pp. 645-728) and finally the Central Bank (ch. 16, pp. 729-762). The book ends with a two page bibliography.

Overall, the book is timely and highly relevant to the current negotiations' phase as a sourcebook on the various dimensions the author is dealing with. It is comprehensive and covers a broad range of issues which have been identified as "thorny". A major weakness however is the absence of a detailed index: the content list which broadly sets the outline cannot make up for this. It is nowhere as detailed as one would expect, particularly when one tries to make sense of the interconnections between the various themes. Other weaknesses relate to the way this book has been conceived and produced: it is too embroiled in the Annan plan context; in other words, *it is too much a product of the specific conjuncture and as such it fails to take a longer-term perspective past this political moment*. At the same time, it is highly technical and does not have socio-historical and the necessary political rooting *to be read by researchers beyond those legal scholars interested in the detail*. Then again, we all know that the "the devil is in the detail" – in this sense what Potier does is valuable in providing such a scrutiny on various aspects of the plan for those who are currently and others in the future working out the details of a settlement. However, it would have been particularly useful and interesting intellectually if he had devoted some more thought and space in the outcome, to spell out explicitly where he is coming from theoretically: what form of democracy should Cyprus strive for; how best to combine consociational with federal principles; what kinds of representation should be preferred and why are they best suited to the situation? He has no references to the normative theory behind his own proposal which he conveniently designates as 'functional'.

Potier does, however, take one point of reference passionately – his starting point in the Annan plan – and he diligently sets out to mend two things which he identifies as problems of the plan, to "identify the countless errors, gaps and inconsistencies" and to present "a compromise

acceptable to both sides" (p. 9). We may assess the book on these two criteria. On the first criterion Potier is correct in pointing out the errors and inconsistencies. In fact he has rendered a good service by putting in "thousands of hours of careful thought", as he points out (p .12). On the second criterion, matters are far more complicated. I agree with Potier that his proposals are in general balanced and even-handed in line with good mediating traditions of legal crafting. What I do take issue with is his insistence, mostly implicit but nevertheless quite apparent, that he provides *the answer*. Of course in his book title he refers to *a* functional settlement and not *the* functional settlement. Yet he does not provide the reader with *any* alternatives: the proposal he puts forward in each of the chapters is *merely one possibility amongst many, which may also be balanced*. In his defence he could say that this would have made the book too long – it is already massive. The answer to that, however, is that he chose to deal with too many aspects that are *not* strictly speaking *constitutional* and could have been dealt with in another shorter and more focused volume: for instance, the Central Bank chapter oddly enough is longer than his Human Rights chapter. Moreover, he does not deal with crucial questions such as whether we are dealing with a federation, a confederation, or other contentious points.

I would like to finish my assessment of the book with three comments that refer more generally to rethinking the Annan plan now that the dust has settled but while negotiations are still taking place for what is likely to be the last opportunity to resolve the problem on the basis of a bizonal, bicommunal federation.

Firstly, although the Annan plan is misguidedly cited many times as a 10,000-page long document, [2] the truly *constitutional aspect* refers to the 'Foundational Agreement' and the Constitution (Annex I): this was published in all the Cypriot newspapers and was debated heavily throughout the media, albeit in a highly distorted manner, at least in the Greek-Cypriot context. These define the core elements of the new constitutional arrangement in terms of (a) the nature and status of the state, the constitution and the institutional structure of governance; (b) the relations between the various institutions, the 'central' or 'federal' Government and 'regional' or 'constituent states'; (c) the rights of citizens. Of crucial importance there are, of course, various

2 Even expert lawyers, who know better, such as Claire Palley (2005) *An International Relations Debacle. The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus 1999-2004* (London: HART Publishing) make such comments; in fact all the anti-Annan Greek-Cypriot literature claims this, whilst it is well-known that it was the Greek-Cypriot side who insisted that all the lengthy 10,000-page laws were to be part of the agreement; and rightly so, to ensure that there is a fully functioning state with its laws and treaties in place, should it be approved by the people of Cyprus. But it remains grossly misleading to suggest that the incorporation of these laws as part of the Foundational Agreement required that Cypriots had to study and digest before making a decision in 2004. This is an absurd argument: such laws are currently in operation at the moment; no one has ever read them all but they are publicly available as part of the Cypriot legal order (for a critique of the literature on the Annan plan and the referenda see book reviews, Trimikliniotis, N. (2005) 'The Cyprus Problem: An International Relations Debacle or Merely An Unclimbed Peak?', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 144-153.

issues from an international and EU law perspective that acquire a constitutional entrenchment and are treated in the context of the discussion.

Secondly, to understand the plan it must be located within the historical and wider socio-political context of Cyprus, where there is an 'imbalance' of military and political forces in what can be considered *a system of multiple asymmetrical power relations* between the various political actors. In other words, the plan cannot be seen outside the context of the failed Zurich accord that created a consociational Republic, the ten years of inter-ethnic strife (1964-1974) and the thirty years of de facto partition that was the result of the Greek coup and the Turkish military invasion and occupation of the northern territories of the island. In this context the Annan plan marks a significant move forward in the direction of finding a solution to the divided island and provides the essentials for a peaceful and lasting solution. This is because it defines a bizonal bicommunal federal republic which ensures a functional and viable arrangement of power in the light of 'democratic constitutionalism' and because basic human rights, international law and the EU *Acquis* are safeguarded, in spite of the derogations that are conceded.

Finally, a constitutional assessment of the UN plan must not assume that the political failure of the referendum necessarily implies a constitutional failure of the logic or basic philosophy of the plan. As argued elsewhere we must de-link the political and other social, economic as well as legal aspects of the failure from the *constitutional logic* if we are to properly assess the latter in addressing the Cyprus problem.[3] The challenge for the post-Annan endeavours to search for a solution is to be reflexive about the failure of the initiative and define a post-Annan and post-accession constitutional framework that may draw on the foundational logic of the Annan plan in order to move into a future whereby Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots would agree on a common bizonal bicommunal federation. There is however considerable scope for improving the Annan plan to make a solution workable, viable and above all legitimate in the eyes of both communities, which means *moving beyond* the strictly 'constitutional' issues:

1. Deal with the security and military issues, which are essentially international law and political issues.
2. Radically reduce the transitional arrangements such as timetables and uncertainty in the implementation.
3. Enhance the incentives for cooperation that encourage the inter-communal action and political representation.
4. Address the questions of the right of displaced persons to settle as well as the issue of the Turkish settlers in a more acceptable way.
5. Redress and fine-tune some of the governance issues.

3 See Nicos Trimikliniotis (2009) 'Annan V: Rethinking the Viability of the Constitutional Arrangement and its Future Importance' in Andrekos Varnava and Hubert Faustmann (eds.), *The Failure to Reunify Cyprus: The Annan Plan, the Referendums of 2004 and the Aftermath*. London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 105-119.

6. Provide a better property regime for both communities.
7. Deal with the question of 'legitimacy' of the proposed plan in such a way that the solution is 'owned' by the people.

There are matters which have been 'resolved' by the passage of time: for instance the question of 'virgin birth' is history now, as we cannot return to the pre-accession era; others are becoming more difficult such as the derogation issues and above all the developments on the ground, as the property question and other human rights issues remain unresolved. We are living in the post-Annan and post-accession era, and a solution must be sought that takes into account this reality. Yet the legacy of the UN plan and the meaning of the popular mandate that was given on 24 April 2004 remains a bitterly contested political issue between and betwixt the communal and inter-communal politics of Cyprus. This era requires that the prospect of a solution in the short-term be re-evaluated and that the experience and knowledge gained in the last failed attempt become a source for reflection and reflexivity.

To this end, Potier's effort is welcome for he engages with the core issues of the demise of the last effort to resolve the problem. As a constitutional document the Annan plan remains an active force that will inevitably illuminate the future, and in this sense we can remark with confidence – perhaps tongue in cheek – that this defines the ironic wisdom we can derive from a truly ghost-like affair: 'the Annan plan is dead, long live the Annan plan'.

Nicos Trimikliniotis

Iron in the Soul: Displacement, Livelihood and Health in Cyprus

Peter Loizos
Berghahn Books: Studies in Forced Migration, Vol. 23
(New York/Oxford, 2008,) 202 pp.
ISBN 978-84545-444-9

This book is a labour of commitment to Cyprus and to the community of the Argaki village, which Professor Loizos first started to work with in 1968. It presents an unusually, perhaps, uniquely, deep study on issues of forced migration by providing a long-term perspective into the lives of people now displaced for more than thirty years. Yet, this is also a difficult commitment exemplifying the difficulty of the anthropological project itself, empathy and critical distance, a high-wire balance act that the book strives to achieve.

The first book of Professor Loizos, *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village*, examined local politics in Argaki based on fieldwork he conducted there in 1968, providing an account of social change and the opportunities as well as drawbacks that the local community faced in its interaction with wider state politics. His second book, *The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees*, drew a lively image of the processes and hardships of displacement and adjustment after 1974 by using extensive excepts from his interviews, thus allowing the refugee voices to be heard in their disturbing and tragic tonalities. This is now the third book on the Greek Cypriots of Argaki. Taking all three books together provides a deep insight into the social history of Greek Cypriots from the 1960s to the present.

But who exactly are these refugees after almost 40 years? The long term nature of this work inevitably raises this issue, which Professor Loizos attempts to answer through a chapter on the sociology of displacement and the question of the sociological meaning of generation. Another chapter focuses on illness, presenting his results from a comparative study with another village of non-displaced people. How do the refugees compare with non-refugees is the question asked. He explores this beyond health, in the economic sphere too. Were refugees able to catch up? If so how, and at what cost?

Other chapters are equally tantalising both in their intellectual and their political implications. What was it like for a refugee to return to his or her home, not as the owner, but as some kind of guest or visitor after almost 30 years when checkpoints partially opened during 2003? How is this humanly, or humanely even, possible? Then there is the issue of the referendum during 2004, a tense period that strained family relationships and friendships. Why did most refugees from Argaki vote NO which meant voting not to return then? This in turn poses further questions. Do the children of refugees feel like refugees? What does home mean for them, those

who never lived in their so-called homes in the north? What does home mean for young people anyhow whose lives are based on different ontological foundations? The metaphors of roots and uprootment hark back to an agrarian past. But for many young people nowadays, especially those living in highly mobile western societies, their most stable address is their email address, and their most permanent home could be their home page. And do the older people themselves want to return now? Or would this be yet another displacement in their old age, a new life in isolation from their children, friends and kin? The answers are not always blatantly stated, but they are there none the less, contentious and difficult to generalise from given the scale of anthropological research, as they may be.

As with the previous books, this an account mixing theory and data analysis in a highly readable manner that can engage readers irrespective of academic discipline and can be accessible to a wider public. It follows an empiricist tradition that combines quantitative and qualitative research, and the long excerpts from interviews provide a rich emic perspective.

Beyond the academic analysis, which inevitably is rather cold and distant, there lies another story, a powerful human story about perseverance and dignity. And this is a story told not just in word but also through the nineteen photographs by Loizos that appear in *Iron in the Soul.* Ten of the photographs in the book were taken by the author during an earlier period of fieldwork which gave birth to *The Heart Grown Bitter: A Chronicle of Cypriot War Refugees,* mentioned earlier.

In 1975 Peter Loizos located, interviewed and photographed many Argaki refugees scattered around the island after their forced displacement in the summer of 1974. These were members of a then dismantled community which Professor Loizos had previously photographed in its prosperous village during his anthropological field work between the years 1968 and 1973.

None of the pre-displacement photographs appears in *Iron in the Soul.* They nevertheless demonstrate very clearly those characteristics of Loizos' photography that set it apart from dominant – at the time and within similar context – representational traditions. That (the 60s and 70s) was the period during which a local variation of a "Romantic School" in photography established itself and imposed its own aesthetic and set the thematic parameters within which Cyprus and its people were to be represented. These persist to this day. In a nutshell this school displays a preference for the picturesque and for romanticised rustic aesthetics.

In contrast Professor Loizos' photography is direct and his subjects are not reduced to mere actors in a photographer's fantasy of a Cypriot Arcadia. His lens did not shy away from manifestations of modernity and his subjects were given room to compose and portray themselves according to their own perception of the self. The ten 1975 portraits of Argagiotes in *Iron in the Soul* exemplify Loizos' approach. Despite the huge losses these people have suffered just a few months earlier they come across in the photographs as proud and strong and they look back at the lens confidently; they seem to be engaging with the photographer in an almost self-assertive manner.

But these are people with whom Loizos has had very close ties with and the distance between ethnographer and subject is here bridged. The cover photo of his recently published collection of

Argaki photographs (1968-1973 and 1975) titled *Grace in Exile* is characteristic of this. The photograph depicts a family sitting around a table having Sunday lunch. In the foreground at the top of the table there is a vacant space, which we can easily imagine was occupied a moment earlier by Loizos who was, it seems, participating in the party. His light-metering device left sitting on the table next to a bottle of KEO is a testimony to this.

The rest of the photographs in *Iron in the Soul* are from his most recent fieldwork and despite that they have been produced about three decades after his early work they do maintain the same distinctive character, which is defined by directness and intimacy. A photograph published in page 163 exemplifies the nature of Loizos' ethnographic and photographic work. It depicts three Argaki refugees, in a coffee house looking at photographs of Argaki and its people in *Grace in Exile*. This is a manifestation of the integrity of an anthropologist who is very much aware of the balance of power shifting in favour of the researcher within the ethnographic process and who – as a remedy – seeks for the approval of his subjects and not just that of the academic community.

Yiannis Papadakis and Nicos Philippou

Spanish Politics: Democracy after Dictatorship

Omar Encarnación
Polity Press (Cambridge, 2008) 192 pp.
ISBN: 978-07456-3993-2

In this book, Omar Encarnación unravels - in an analytically insightful way – the experience of a country with one of the most successful democratic transitions in Europe, namely post-Franco Spain. Although the 'paradigm' in the literature of 'Transitional Justice' emphasises the cathartic function of trials, policies of lustration, truth commissions and more generally a comprehensive scrutiny of a society's violent past, the book 'Spanish Politics' puts forward a refined and provocative theoretical argument that democratic consolidation can be achieved without 'coming to terms with the past', provided that strong democratic institutions are established in the emerging democracy which, subsequently, offer the basic instruments for prospective truth-seekers.

The Spanish Civil war (1936-1939) left the country in ruins with approximately 500,000 dead, a deeply divided society, and the beginning of a remarkably long-lived dictatorship under Franco (1939-1975). The death of Franco (1975) signalled the beginning of a successful process of democratic consolidation, which became known – sarcastically sometimes – as *'Santa Transición'* (Holy Transition). The book focuses on tackling two puzzling and interrelated questions: How can a deeply divided society with virtually no previous democratic experience set the founding tenets of a successful and widely recognised democracy? Subsequently, why does an established democracy remain reluctant to debate the traumatic experiences of its distant past related to the legacies of the civil war and the dictatorship?

'Consensus' was the central ingredient of the Spanish recipe for democratic consolidation. But how did it become possible for groups formerly in conflict to reach fundamental consensual agreements ranging from the recognition of the Communist Party, the granting of pardons to the 'enemies of Franco' to the remarkable rapprochement of former arch-enemies (the Catholic Church, the Communist Party and the army)? In his effort to reply to the stimulating question, Encarnación draws on the concept of 'political learning', pioneered by Nancy Bermeo (1992).[1] Based on the premise that political elites are capable of altering both their objectives, priorities and their tactics on how to best achieve these objectives in view of their previous traumatic experiences, the conception of 'political learning' constitutes an analytically useful instrument in explaining negotiated transitions. In Spain, the disappointing experience of the Second Republic (1931-1936)

1 Nancy Bermeo (1992) 'Democracy and the Lessons of Dictatorship', *Comparative Politics*, Vol. 24, No. 3, pp. 273-291.

to establish democracy which ended in the bloodiest civil war of this century on European soil, coupled with almost forty years of Francoist indoctrination, served as the twin sources of political learning. The previous experiences of polarisation and violence informed the objectives of political elites in a critical juncture in the transition process (1977), prioritising the stability and viability of democratic institutions through the inclusion of a wide range of political groups in the project of democratic consolidation, instead of a comprehensive screening of past abuses.

As a result, Spain, an established democracy, the world's eighth largest economy and a member of the most important international organisations, presented a remarkable reluctance to 'open old wounds' and discuss the painful experiences of the past (the Spanish civil war and the Francoist repression). The theoretical question logically deriving from this assumption is whether this culture of consensus can have a long-term negative impact on the quality of the emerging democracy – known in the literature as the 'frozen democracy' thesis. The very articulate argumentation of the author points to the recent reactivation of the recovery of historical memory as an illustration that the 'frozen democracy' argument is not valid in Spain. Since 2003 Spanish (civil) society has been uncovering the veil of oblivion, with exhumations of mass graves containing the remains of the victims of Franco, the withdrawal of monuments referring to the Francoist repression, the epitome of which was the Law on Historical Memory (2007). Therefore, a vibrant civil society challenging the founding tenet of Spanish politics over the last thirty years serves as the perfect illustration not only that a transition to democracy can be successful without a scrutiny of the past, but also that democratic institutions may provide the fertile ground for the retrospective recovery of truth – the best indication of an established democracy.

Why would the readership of Cypriot studies be interested in a book tackling such a specific, in time and space, phenomenon? The prioritisation of a settlement to the 'Cyprus issue' not only has set the agenda in policy-making but also demarcated the basic lines of academic research, dominated by Conflict Resolution and International Relations approaches. Therefore, only scant attention has been paid to the processes through which previous experiences of (intra-communal) violence served as 'lessons' for the Greek-Cypriot political elites. Could we imagine an alternative analytical approach to the Cyprus problem, such as that offered by Encarnación, which would elucidate the impact of the 'negotiated' type of democratic transition in 1974 (in the aftermath of the short-lived coup d'état and the Turkish invasion) to the institutions of the Republic and the preferences of the political leaders, as well as the reluctance of the Republic to proceed to a comprehensive recovery of historical memory? An interesting lesson deriving from the reading of the book is that contrary to the emphasis of the transitional justice literature with cathartic solutions (trials, lustration, truth commissions), a successful democratic consolidation is possible even if it is based on 'forgetting'; so long as the main focus is the establishment of strong democratic institutions that will subsequently – even thirty years after the transition – be used by those who want to challenge the official version of the past. Finally, the meticulous examination of the grassroots initiatives concerning the recovery of historical memory in Spain contains a valuable

analytic example related to the role of the civil society in the recent processes of truth recovery in Cyprus.

The author's argument could have been even more instructive if he had incorporated in his theoretical discussion comparative evidence from societies with similar experiences such as Mozambique, Northern Ireland, or even Cyprus. Overall, though, Omar Encarnación's book 'Spanish Politics' constitutes a very instructive reading for those interested in transitional justice in general, and explaining the recent resumption of activity on the recovery of historical memory in Cyprus, in particular. Its clarity, the bold argumentation, the rich empirical evidence as well as the insertion of useful analytical tools to the study of transitions, qualify this book as a point of reference.

Iosif Kovras

Closing or Widening the Gap? Legitimacy and Democracy in Regional Integration Organisations

Edited by Anna van der Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffman
Ashgate (Aldershot, 2007), 206 pp.
ISBN: 978-0-7546-4968-7

Over the past two decades, the build up of synergies between regionalism and globalisation translated into a new wave of regional regimes and arrangements, often formally committed to the promotion of *integration*, that is transfers of sovereignty as opposed to mere *cooperation*. Considering the rise of self-labelled Regional Integration Organisations (RIOs) or Communities, what are the implications for issues previously considered as the exclusive preserve of the sovereign nation-state and, at best, the European Union (EU)? Reviewing this conundrum through the discussion of legitimacy and democratisation sets the overarching objective assigned to the 11 contributors to this volume.

The foreword of Philippe Schmitter points right away to the diverse and ambivalent nature of the assumptions that permeate the project. For comparative purposes, should the discussion of RIOs require inventing a distinctive theory of "trans-national integration"? Or, more flatly should one assume the putative rise of "trans-national regions", or that of "sovereign national states at various early states in their formation"? Another and more down to earth option is the mere understanding of RIOs as functional intergovernmental Organisations (OIGs). Despite the title of the volume, regional cooperation, rather than integration is what numerous contributors to the volume undertake to review – Berry Tholen's introductory caveat on "conceptual confusion" even points to the significance of regionalism and RIOs as cases of "scholarly interest ... developing even faster the regional *cooperation* [emphasis mine] itself".

The editors' introduction (Anna van der Vleuten and Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann) opens up the debate with a reminder of the diversity of players and arrangements subsumed under the notions of "new regionalism", before concluding to the definition of RIOs as "an inter-state political system". As a result, one may regret, bringing regionalism into the forefront somewhat falls short of its potentials – not much room is left for the discussion of congruent vs. paradoxical interactions between regionalism and regionalisation processes, the convergence vs. disentanglement of regionalism and regional integration.

Frequently addressed in the context of the EU, the issue of legitimacy and its deficit takes an entirely different form whenever "deficient" states belong to a RIO. In such cases, Tholen's contribution argues, legitimacy should draw from the legitimising functions of democracy with respect to the participation of non-state actors, checks on the use of power within RIOs, and "the realisation of basic values like democracy and rule of law" in member-states. In practice, as Africa illustrates, such functions are more commonly associated with the policy packages carried out

under the aegis of donors, International financial institutions and UN post-conflict transitions. The relevance of discussing the interactions between regional and national democracy similarly amounts, Julianna Erthal argues, to a discussion of how to promote the former when domestic democracy is missing. In such a context, considerable expectations are attached to the empowerment of regional parliaments. Legitimacy, whenever economic integration is at stake, has its own twists, stresses Bob Reinalda whose taxonomy of different types of economic organisations represents a rare attempt to bring some order into the disparate group of so-called RIOs. The teleological problems addressed by Schmitter's foreword are very much present in the three appendices to the chapter – the Arab Maghreb Union, which has not managed to meet at Heads of State level over a decade, is euphemistically described as a "booster" organisation, the Economic Community of Central African States as a "malfunctioning" one, while other RIOs function "weakly" and even "informally", etc. Referring to integration becomes an oxymoron in such cases.

Regional parliaments and sub-national state actors build considerable expectations with respect to the narrowing of democracy and legitimacy gaps both at regionally and within member-states. Andrés Malamud and Luis de Sousa offer a systematic and empirically based depiction of Latin America's four regional parliaments and the EU provides a firm basis for further comparisons. Mercosur, the focus of Marcelo A. Medeiros's discussion of sub-national actors, reveals a pattern that, albeit on a minor mode, is not altogether different from a number of those monitored within the EU. Civil society participation within Mercosur is also addressed by Michelle Ratton Sanchez, while Gerda van Roozendaal discusses the lack of involvement of non-state actors in Caricom.

The ability of regional groupings to promote democracy within their member-states is reviewed by Anna van der Vleuten through the cases of the Southern Africa Development Community (SADC) and the Asian Association of South Eastern Nations. SADC, unlike what the author claims, has adopted its own Principles and Guidelines Governing Democratic Elections since 2004, a move that contrasts with a lingering approach to Mugabe's political transition through the lenses of regime stability enforcement. The EU and Mercosur, both marked by institutionalisation of democratic clauses, also reflect the limited effectiveness of political conditionality to "'preserve democracy", Andrea Ribeiro Hoffmann finds. It would have been valuable to have an additional assessment of the democratic clauses inserted in the ACP or European Neighbourhood Policy packages.

The volume's final overview concludes with a reminder of the diversity of RIOs and the existence of a gap between legitimacy/democracy within the inter-governmental organisations discussed. From the standpoint of Cyprus studies, this discussion of RIOs might seem of limited application, beyond the references to the EU noted above. However, this volume does offer some good comparisons into the workings of regionalism in extra-European contexts where, unlike what is the case within the EU, 'small' states cannot depend on the balancing effects of consociational engineering.

DANIEL C. BACH

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