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Catholic and Orthodox Political Cultures in the Context of the Modern Model of a Democratic State

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Abstract

The article provides a detailed analysis of the role of the religious factor in the formation of political culture. In this sense, a comparative analysis of the key distinctive features of the Orthodox and Catholic political cultures and social institutions and how it is carried out. The authors conclude that, despite the fact that these political cultures are closest to each other and have a single system of common Christian values, they also contain significant differences related to the configuration of state-power relations. In the case of Cyprus, the society is not only not secularised, but is also more 'churched' than other western countries. However, the existence of the institute of ethnarch or 'head of the nation' on the island, determines another model: 'symphony'. Having received administrative power, Orthodox hierarchs were not just a living embodiment of the union of religion and state on equal terms, but also stood at the origins of the history of independent Cyprus.

Keywords: Christianity, religion, ideology, liberalism, democracy, political culture

Introduction: The Crisis of Universalism

The 20th century was characterised by the ideological division of the world into the capitalist and communist sides. After the Berlin Wall fell and the Soviet Union collapsed, the concept that any form of global conflict was ruled out for the future and that humankind will inevitably embrace a universal political model, both nationally and internationally, has become more and more popular.

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The political ideology,[2] model and values of liberalism claimed to be intended for all people, but it is evident that they have failed to cope with this role. The binary division of humankind had been overcome, but now the world is unable to address yet another watershed, the one of civilisational.

The western values have failed to become universal,[3] because they were not only western but also essentially Christian. The attempt to build a version of Europe that is based on so-called secular humanism instead of the Christian civilisational legacy is now in an acute phase of crisis, which manifests itself in a number of ways. The inability to integrate immigrants into society, the degradation of the family, education *etc.* are social indicators of the identity crisis resulting from Jacobin-style secularisation.

However, besides its social aspect, this crisis also has a conspicuous political dimension. When, after the 'Arab Spring' had been openly supported by western governments, it became evident that, despite the differences in the context of the protests, power was obtained not by democratic forces but by groups similar to the Muslim Brotherhood, which were prohibited in many countries worldwide. The political system was drastically different from models in Europe and the situation regarding the protection of human rights and freedoms had worsened. The concept of universality of the liberal democracy model had lost much of its credibility.[4] The adoption of new constitutions and the holding of honest and open elections by no means solved the problem.[5] The military dictatorship was replaced by a religious fundamentalist dictatorship that was later ousted again by the military elite.

The 'military/religious leaders' dichotomy is not new to the Middle East, and it is even unnecessary to mention it in this study. However, the problem appears to be deeper than just the personal composition of the political elite and includes essential institutional differences, which, in turn, rely upon a different conceptual and theoretical basis for political culture in comparison to European states. The

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[2]   J. Jost, S. van der Linden, C. Panagopoulos and C. Hardin, 'Ideological asymmetries in conformity, desire for shared reality, and the spread of misinformation', *Current Opinion in Psychology*, Vol. 23 (2018).

[3]   S. Strunz and B. Bartkowski, 'Degrowth, the project of modernity, and liberal democracy', *Journal of Cleaner Production*, Vol. 196 (2018).

[4]   V. Gutorov, East-West Dichotomy in the Comparative Analysis of Political Cultures, in *Proceedings of the St. Petersburg State Institute of Culture*, 208 (2015) [in Russian].

[5]   S. Abu-Bader, E. Ianchovichina, 'Polarization, foreign military intervention, and civil conflict', *Journal of Development Economics* (2018, June), DOI.org: 10.1016/j.jdeveco.2018.06.006.

aforesaid also applies to the political system in the Russian Federation, where there is a growing discussion to the effect that the procedural and institutional rules declared in Russia, as well as the forms in which they are implemented, are materially different from western models. In fact, the issue of Russia's civilisational affiliation ceases to be purely historical and becomes important in determining whether certain institutions and principles of liberal democracy are applicable in the local conditions.

Political Culture

In order to review this issue, it is necessary to define the key notions and scope of political culture, which, although frequently used in contemporary political science, have not been consensually defined by scholars. At the same time, the importance of political culture,[6] as the basis for the operation of any political system, is rarely doubted in contemporary political discourse, and it increasingly influences investigations into the reasons for the formation of certain economic models[7] and even the reasons for the differences in economic growth rates among various countries.

Nevertheless, a large number of issues related to the concept, essence, and origin of political culture[8] remain open. As a rule, the consideration of this matter is caused by an attempt to identify patterns of political behaviour, to explain the ability or inability to carry out political mobilisation, to substantiate tendencies for various political ideologies or – very rarely – to review the relationship between culture and the genesis of political institutions.[9]

It is widely accepted that the term 'culture' (*coltura*) was first used by Abbot J. Andres in his book *The Origin, Processes and Contemporary State of All Literature*, where culture was limited solely to written sources, but a century later, in 1865, anthropologist E. Taylor already considered it as an integral phenomenon including knowledge, beliefs, morals, laws, customs and many other capabilities and habits acquired by an individual as a member of the society.[10]

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[6]   V. Fedotova, N. Fedotova and S. Chugrov, 'Kul´tura, instituty, politika', *POLIS*, 1 (2018) [in Russian].

[7]   M. Flemmen, V. Jarness and L. Rosenlund, 'Social space and cultural class divisions: the forms of capital and contemporary lifestyle differentiation', *British Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 69, No. 1 (2018).

[8]   T. Clark and R. Inglehart, *The New Political Culture* (New York: Routledge, 2018).

[9]   J. Becker, M. Kraus and M. Rheinschmidt-Same, 'Cultural Expressions of Social Class and Their Implications for Group-Related Beliefs and Behaviors', *Journal of Social Issues*, Vol. 73, No. 1 (2017).

[10]   T. Alekseeva, 'Strategic Culture: The Evolution of the Concept', *POLIS*, Vol. 5 (2012) [in Russian].

In 1973, US sociologist Clifford Geertz defined culture as, 'a system of inherited conceptions expressed in symbolic forms by means of which men communicate, perpetuate and develop their knowledge about and attitudes toward life'.[11]

One of the most widespread definitions has been offered by Luigi Guiso, Paola Sapienza and Luigi Zingales; according to them, political culture is constituted by the beliefs and values that certain ethnic, religious and social groups pass down from one generation to another.[12] It should be noted here that beliefs and values are combined in a single group, although they are not identical notions.[13] Beliefs, or faith, refer to the notion that determines individual and social values.[14]

For instance, Guiso et al. state in a later work that individual beliefs would originally be acquired through cultural transmission from one generation to another and then they would slowly be renewed through experience.[15]

The work by Gabriel Almond, where he defined political culture as 'a particular pattern of orientations toward political action in which each political system is embedded',[16] became an important reference in discussing culture and, in particular, political culture. In a subsequent work, *The Civic Culture*, Almond, together with Sidney Verba, offered a detailed systematic analysis of political culture, the first of its kind.[17]

In their text, Almond and Verba study the democratic systems in five countries: the US, Germany, Mexico, Italy and the UK. They questioned about 1,000 people in each of the countries regarding their views on government and political life. They defined 'civic culture' as 'based on communication and persuasion, a culture of consensus and diversity, a culture that permits change'. Culture (and, therefore, political culture) was understood as something superior to the individual, but not to such an extent that ruled out any individual action. It is true that people would

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[11] C. Geertz, *The Interpretation of Cultures* (New York: Basic Books, 1973).

[12] L. Guiso, P. Sapienza and L. Zingales, 'Does Culture Affect Economic Outcomes?', *Journal of Economic Perspectives,* Vol. 20, No. 2 (2006).

[13] R. Herrmann, 'How Attachments to the Nation Shape Beliefs about the World: A Theory of Motivated Reasoning', *International Organization*, Vol. 71, No. 1, (2017).

[14] D. Flynn, B. Nyhan and J. Reifler, 'The Nature and Origins of Misperceptions: Understanding False and Unsupported Beliefs About Politics', *Political Psychology* 38 (2017).

[15] L. Guiso, P. Sapienza, and L. Zingales, 'Social Capital as Good Culture', *Journal of the European Economic Association*, Vol. 6, No. 2–3 (2008).

[16] G. Almond, 'Comparative Political Systems', *Journal of Politics* Vol. 18 (1956): 396.

[17] G. Almond, S. Verba, Civic Culture: Political Attitudes and Democracy in Five Nations California: SAGE Publications, Inc.

be consolidated within their culture, but they would also generate and reproduce it. Culture was also understood as a factor containing political systems[18] without being identical to them: only specific systems could adapt the relevant culture to them, but certain inadvertent consequences of institutions could alter the culture[19] that created them.

This approach, while undoubtedly being very important with respect to the evolution of the political science's concepts of culture and its influence upon political systems, has a number of defects and omissions in today's circumstances.

First, there is considerable doubt regarding the very method of polling individuals that proposes to review society as the aggregate of its constituent individuals. Such a paradigm of sociological analysis is well known and has many supporters in the scholarly community. It is said, for example, in M. Weber's *Basic Concepts in Sociology* that, 'for cognitive purposes or for practical ones, it is perhaps appropriate or even inevitable to treat social entities just like particular individuals. These entities are simply processes and relations of specific behaviour of individuals, because they are the only carriers of meaningful acts understandable to us'.[20]

However, this paradigm is not the only one of its kind. A different concept treats society as consisting of individuals but not being their mere aggregate. Society is an integral entity, which has its own life, non-reducible to the existence of its constituent individuals, and which develops according to its own laws. Whereas the former approach can be designated as sociological individualism,[21] the latter is often called 'sociological realism'.

Second, Almond and Verba elected to analyse five countries, which belong to a relatively common civilisational framework and have similar political regimes. The purpose of such self-limitation is not to identify the key values of this specific political culture as one of many cultures existing in the world, but to define a cer-

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[18]   M. Böker, 'Justification, critique and deliberative legitimacy: The limits of mini-publics', *Contemporary Political Theory*, Vol. 16, No. 1, (2017).

[19]   G. Pasquino, 'The Disappearance of Political Cultures in Italy', *South European Society and Politics*, Vol. 23, No. 1 (2018).

[20]   M. Weber, *Basic Concepts in Sociology. Selected Works*, trans. and ed. Yu.N. Davydov. (Moscow: Progress, 1990).

[21]   S. Foy, C. Schleifer, and E. Tiryakian, "The Rise of Rational Choice Theory as a Scientific/Intellectual Movement in Sociology", *American Sociologist*, Vol. 49, No. 1 (2018).

tain 'ideal' civic culture,[22] which in any event should be embraced by all countries seeking to build democracy. Such an approach seems to be extremely ideologised and constitutes a classic example of liberal idealism,[23] which does not recognise the possibility of different civilisations with their characteristic values and, accordingly, political cultures with their own political institutions.

It should also be noted that most contemporary investigations into the issues of political culture and its influence upon political processes are limited to studying changes in the political behaviour of individuals under the influence of a specific culture or the degree of political participation.[24]

By no means undervaluing individuals' political preferences and their electoral behaviour, this matter appears to be secondary to the genesis of political institutions that this approach actually fails to cover. Western science considers the origin of governmental institutions primarily within the paradigm of liberal idealism and legal positivism,[25] limiting its discourse to the perfection of legal regulation, the mechanisms ensuring the constitutional status etc., while overlooking the key importance of the political culture, which has led to their formation.

The genesis of social institutions upon which, in turn, political institutions rely is of paramount significance. If social institutions of a particular type[26] are non-existent, the operation of political institutions characteristic of contemporary democracy either proves to be just a formality or terminates at all, giving way to the power

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[22]   P. Kasatkin, M. Bobrova, 'American Civil Religion Concept Development', *Mezhdunarodnye prot-sessy* [International processes], Vol. 14, No. 3(46) (2016) [in Russian].

[23]   N. Kaymaz, 'From Imperialism to Internationalism: British Idealism and Human Rights', *International History Review* (2018).

[24]   J. Ayers, C. Hofstetter 'American Muslim Political Participation Following 9/11: Religious Belief, Political Resources, Social Structures, and Political Awareness', *Politics and Religion*, Vol. 1, No. 3 (2008); K. Beyerlein and M. Chaves, 'The Political Activities of Religious Congregations in the United States', *Journal for the Scientific Study of Religion*, Vol. 42 No. 2 (2003); R. Driskell, E. Embry and L. Larry, 'Faith and Politics: The Influence of Religious Beliefs on Political Participation', *Social Science Quarterly*, Vol. 89, No. 2 (2008); R. Glazier, 'Bridging Religion and Politics: The Impact of Providential Religious Beliefs on Political Activity', *Politics and Religion* Vol. 8, No. 3 (2015); J. McCauley, 'The Political Mobilization of Ethnic and Religious Identities in Africa', *American Political Science Review*, Vol. 108 No. 4 (2015).

[25]   P. MacKlem, 'Positivism and practice beyond sovereignty', *University of Toronto Law Journal*, Vol. 67, No. 4 (2017).

[26]   Y. Gorodnichenko, G. Roland, "Culture, institutions, and the wealth of nations", *Review of Economics and Statistics*, Vol. 99, No. 3 (2017).

distribution and implementation mechanisms more traditional for a given society. In such an event, culture and, accordingly, political culture acquire key importance.

Therefore, if the authorities, the population or international organisations prefer the western model of democracy in developing a constitutional, legal, political and party system,[27] then the existence of a political culture enabling the operation of such institutions is an indispensable condition. One may understand political culture as a system of values, which is intrinsic to a society, is transmitted from generation to generation and shapes an attitude toward political institutions and the processes and mechanisms of power implementation. At the same time, one should abandon the paradigm of 'ideal political culture', 'ideal system' and 'ideal institutions' in any form, understanding that they do not exist and that different models, each of which relies upon millennia-old social processes, both exist now and will exist in the future. Any political culture and, accordingly, any political system imply a certain extent of altruism on the part of the citizens.[28] If subjective egoism were dominant in this regard, the whole political life of a society would only be driven by its components' endless will to power.

In his work *Will to Power*, F. Nietzsche gives several key formulas concerning values and their relationship with the will to power. In addition, it becomes evident from his text that any society would be plunged into chaos in circumstances,[29] where each of its components seeks supreme power and its values are volatile and change at the sole discretion of those who possess the highest power. However, Nietzsche himself describes these circumstances as the characteristics of nihilism, which he believes will prevail after the crisis of morals, primarily Christian morals. He is convinced that Christianity itself will, eventually, lead to nihilism, because the world is incompatible with its ideals.

Consequently, if we apply a reverse logic, no values can be possible without religion, and their absence would eventually lead to chaos.[30] He calls the transition from religion to moralism only a stage on the way to nihilism, because humankind,

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[27]   B. D'Haeseleer, 'Paving the Way for Baghdad: The US Invasion of Panama', *International History Review* (2018).

[28]   R. Carlin and G. Love, 'Political Competition, Partisanship and Interpersonal Trust in Electoral Democracies', *British Journal of Political Science*, Vol. 48 No. 1, (2018).

[29]   M. Clark, "Will to power and sexuality in Nietzsche's account of the ascetic ideal", *Inquiry*, Vol. 60, No. 1–2 (2017).

[30]   K. Lee, M. Ashton, Y. Griep, and M. Edmonds, 'Personality, Religion, and Politics: An Investigation in 33 Countries', *European Journal of Personality*, Vol. 32, No. 2 (2018).

while in the framework of religion, does not need to consider itself as the creators of values, it will inevitably come to nihilism when faced by such necessity.

Therefore, any system of values which is not in fact reliant upon religion is the product of human activity and, accordingly, implies possible participation of individuals in determining such values, that, given their influence upon the system (first of all, the political system), rules out any stability or institutionality.

In this regard, when studying the role of religion in the evolution of political culture, it is important to start the analysis not from the role of spiritual values in an already operating culture but from its formation. It is evident that political systems do not constitute objective natural phenomena but are an abstract concept,[31] in the same way as any political or social institutions. M. Foucault believes that 'the State, undoubtedly, both now and throughout its history has never possessed unity, individuality or rigid functionality ... in the final analysis, the state is probably just a complex reality, mythologised abstraction'.[32] This is a system of behavioural patterns of individuals and their groups evolving in the political area. Moreover, this system is different from country to country just due to the influence of political culture. In this regard, it appears interesting to review the correlation between the institutions of western democracy and Orthodox political culture.

Orthodoxy and Politics

It is usually believed that the Orthodox Church came into existence in 1054. Although it is worth noting that Christianity has not been a consolidated a belief since the fourth century AD. The period between the fourth and tenth centuries saw a strong internal evolution within the Church, it was then that the authorial contents of key postulates were determined and the service was given its commonly recognised structure.

Over several centuries, Christianity gained a sufficiently stable area of existence, and five great spiritual centres were established in Rome, Constantinople, Alexandria, Antioch, and Jerusalem.[33] The archbishops of those cities were proclaimed Patriarchs, and they ruled solely within their respective areas: 'regional bishops

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[31] M. Wilder, 'Comparative Public Policy: Origins, Themes, New Directions', *Policy Studies Journal* 45 (2017).

[32] M. Foucault, *Intellectuals and Power*, Part 2 (Moscow: Praxis, 2004), p. 45.

[33] M. Kozlov (ed.), *The rules of the Orthodox Church with the interpretation of Nicodemus Bishop Dolmatinsko-Istriyskogo*, vol. 1. (Moscow: Izdatel′stvo «Otchiĭ dom», 2001), 253-255 [in Russian, trans. from Serbian].

shall not extend their power beyond their regions, nor shall they mix churches; but, according to the rules, the bishop of Alexandria shall govern only Egyptian churches, the eastern bishops shall rule only in the East, provided that the preferences of the Church of Antioch, as recognised by the Nicene rules, shall be retained'.[34] At the same time, despite the clear delimitation of diocesan areas, a single culture was developing, primarily based on a mixture of the Greek, Roman and Judaic cultures, which has shaped contemporary western (in the broadest sense of this word) culture.

In 381, Constantinople became the 'New Rome', and its bishop became second in honour after the Roman one,[35] having risen above the bishop of Alexandria, who had previously been deemed the first in the East. The dispute between the east and the west, already anticipated by then, gained new momentum and resulted in a church law argument and, in fact, the Great Schism.

The beginning of the second millennium in Christian history saw a widening gap between Constantinople and Rome. Political differences were manifested in a radically different attitude toward the primacy of power. The western Christians grouping around Rome put forward the idea that the Pope, as successor to Saint Peter, should have the primacy of power. The role of the pope within the church was also different from that of Orthodox patriarchs. The pope was a figure possessing extremely broad powers, and this fact soon began to play a key role in developing the model of relationship between the state and the church in the west and the east of the Christian world.

> The relationship between the church and the state in the Byzantine Empire was established, in principle, in the form of symphony, i.e., mutual coordination, while keeping the independence of each field. The state recognised ecclesiastical law for the purposes of its internal guidance, and the church believed that it should submit to the state.[36]

Helene Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, the Greek scholar in Byzantine history, explains the essential contents of 'symphony' as follows: 'The monarch, as a Christian, submits to the patriarch, and the patriarch, as a subject of the state, submits to the mon-

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[34] Ibid., 247-248.
[35] Ibid., 253.
[36] S. Bulgakov, *Pravoslavie* (Moscow: Terra, 1991), 230.

arch'.[37] The principle of symphony was adopted as mandatory for the activities of both secular and ecclesiastical hierarchs. However, popes were not bound by the emperor's edicts and could openly oppose them, and, since the establishment of the Papal States within the area of the former Exarchate of Ravenna, the pope concentrated in his hands not only spiritual but also secular power.

On the one hand, it would be logical to suppose that the constitution of the church and its relationship with the secular authorities as described above would have facilitate the inception and development of a modern democracy and republic primarily within the area of eastern Christianity, where the principle of conciliarism and the absence of an excessively personified ecclesiastical power could have created prerequisites for the evolution of parliamentarism, the separation of powers as such etc.

However, as it appears, it was the mighty, central figure of the pope, capable of restricting the power of a secular monarch and acting as a counterbalance to his absolutism, as well as representing a truth higher than the sovereign's, including being able to check the sovereign's acts for compliance with the unchangeable text of the Holy Scripture, that played the key role in the development of a political culture implying a system of checks and counterbalances, the supremacy of law, the separation of powers and other institutions of contemporary democracy.

On the other hand, conciliarism and the 'theory of conciliarist democracy' imply the principles of succession, stability, high respect for the government, the priority of spiritual and moral factors over secular ones, the prevalence of society over the individual, and solidarity. Moreover, its dual, religious/theological (the relationship of believers within the community) and historical (communal organisation), origin determines conciliarist democracy as a form of government based on the organic unity of society and the state relying on a strong government and an authoritative leader. As a result, any non-adapted, direct borrowing of liberal values and western democratic institutions can lead to the population being alienated from the government.

Does it mean that the implementation of such institutions and mechanisms is impossible within different political cultures? No, it is not always so. It is evident that, despite the material controversies between today's Catholic and Orthodox

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[37] H. Glykatzi-Ahrweiler, 'The Fundamental Principles of Political Thought in the Byzantine Empire', *Cacak* (1993), 69.

Churches, they are close enough to each other as the structures, which have shaped the civilisational foundations of the whole of contemporary Europe, including Russia. It is clear, however, that the perception of these institutions and mechanisms as some universal values of humankind is wrong. They have resulted from a historical process of government power, socio-cultural, economic and other transformations, which have occurred within the area of Catholicism. Consequently, the resulting political institutions relied upon social institutions and political culture that were different from those prevailing in eastern Christianity; therefore, the imposition of the models and configurations of government power relations that were established in western countries cannot find social and cultural support in all aspects in the countries of the Orthodox area. It is still harder to imagine any direct replication of the said institutions and principles in countries belonging, for example, to the Islamic civilisation.

Formally, the Schism constituted a separation between the local Churches of Rome and Constantinople, but the Patriarch of Constantinople was later supported by the other eastern Patriarchates, as well as the younger churches included in the Byzantine zone of influence, in particular, the Russian Church.

Orthodoxy is more or less widespread around the globe, but the key centres of Orthodox culture are located in Eastern and Southern Europe and in the Balkans. Orthodox Christianity first occurred in the Slavic regions of Eastern Europe in the ninth century. Initially, Orthodoxy came to Bulgaria, Serbia and Moravia (now part of the Czech Republic), and then, beginning in tenth century, to Russia, where it would spread up until the 19th century. In contrast to Catholicism, Orthodox missions were scarcely active outside Eurasia, although in the Middle East, for instance, Orthodox churches have existed for centuries, and Orthodox missionaries would convert into their faith residents of such distant lands as India, Japan, East Africa and the US.

In total, 220 to 250 million people practice Orthodoxy. The countries, where most of the population are, according to census and poll data, Orthodox, include Belarus, Bulgaria, Greece, Georgia, Cyprus, Macedonia, Moldova, Romania, Serbia and Ukraine. Orthodoxy has also a noticeable presence in Bosnia and Herzegovina, Kazakhstan, Estonia, Latvia, Lithuania, Kyrgyzstan, Albania, Uzbekistan, Turkmenistan, Finland and the Aleutian islands in the US State of Alaska. In addition,

Orthodoxy is professed by some portion of the population in Lebanon (8%[38]), Syria and Israel.

The world's Orthodox community is represented by 15 local Orthodox Church-es, each of which has its own head having the title of Patriarch, Metropolitan or Archbishop. Moreover, in any local church, its head does not enjoy supreme pow-er, because it belongs to a council. The Church of Cyprus is one of these 15 local churches (since 2019, 14 generally recognised churches and two partly recognised ones), and in it 'national' Orthodoxy finds a new meaning. The specific features of interaction between the church and the state institutions in Cyprus are interesting. At least, it should be mentioned that the Orthodox Church of Cyprus is not sepa-rated from the state, as is the case in, for example, the Russian Federation. More-over, the clergy receive part of their remuneration from the state budget, and the government funds church projects. The history of the institution of head of state in the Republic, in particular, the person of its first President, Archbishop Makarios III, is the best example of its unique political culture.[39] On the one hand, from the standpoint of classical liberalism and the western model of state-church relations, it is hard to imagine that a church being supported by the State takes a neutral or critical attitude toward legislative decisions. From this perspective, the State has a clear mechanism for influencing the church that protects the State from criticism and add some legitimacy to its decisions. J. Haynes noted, 'The more secularised a society, the less likely that religious organisations would be able to play a politically significant role'.[40] In the case of Cyprus, society is not only non-secularised, but also still more churched than in western countries. For instance, a poll conducted by Eurobarometer in 2012 demonstrated that the percentage of Cypriots calling themselves atheists or agnostics was close to zero.[41] To compare, a poll conducted two years before showed only 3% of such people, with the European average be-

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[38]   Central Intelligence Agency, 'Middle East: LEBANON', *CIA The World Factbook* (2018, November 13), available at https://www.cia.gov/library/publications/the-world-factbook/geos/le.html, accessed on 13 November 2018.

[39]   V. Roudometof, 'The Church of Cyprus' Transition into the 21st Century', in Stupperich, R. and Richter, H.A. (eds), *THETIS*: *Mannheimer Beiträge zur klassischen Archäologie und Geschichte Griechenlands und Zyperns*, Vol. 20, (2013).

[40]   J. Haynes (ed.), *Religion and Politics in Europe, the Middle East and North Africa* (Milton Keynes: Routledge 2010).

[41]   European Commission, *Discrimination in the EU in 2012* (Brussels: European Commission, 2012, November), 233.

ing 20%.[42] Thus, the scholars include the Orthodox Church of Cyprus in the list of churches significantly influencing society.[43]

However, the existence of the institution of ethnarch, or 'head of the nation', on the island predicates a different model, namely 'symphony'. Having obtained administrative power, the Orthodox hierarchs were not only a living embodiment of a combination between religion and the state on an equal basis, but also initiated the history of independent Cyprus. Moreover, the ethnarchs were responsible for the local population's compliance with law. For instance, a wave of turmoil did not reach Cyprus during the 1821 Greek rebellion, and even earlier, in the middle of the 18th century, Archbishop Philotheus had repeatedly asked the Turkish government to reduce the taxes and duties payable by the island's Greek population. He even managed, through a personal petition to the Grand Vizier, to reduce the aggregate amount of the *kharaj* (per capita tax) payable by the Christians within his diocese.[44]

A close interaction between the church and the state can be seen in today's world as well. During the 2008 financial crisis, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus decided to pledge part of its assets to the state's creditors and to sell another part in order to invest the proceeds in Cyprus sovereign bonds and help the country overcome the crisis. A similar solution was proposed five years later, in 2013. 'The whole wealth of the church is at the disposal of the country. 'We should stand on our two feet, but not on the feet of the foreigners', said Archbishop Chrysostomos II.[45] In this statement, one can easily see not only the degree of mutual penetration between the government and ecclesiastical fields, but also the fact that the hierarch criticised the existing system as a statesman. At an earlier date, Chrysostomos II stated that the Europeans wanted to choke the economy of Cyprus and that the Cypriots should use the first opportunity to leave the Eurozone and return to their national currency.[46]

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[42]　European Commission, *Biotechnology* (Brussels: European Commission, 2010, October), 204.

[43]　S. Mudrov, 'European Christian Churches and Their Level of Influence' *RUDN Journal of Sociology*, Vol. 17, No. 1 (2017).

[44]　*Orthodox Theological Encyclopedia* or *Theological Encyclopedic Dictionary*, Vol. X: Cinnamon - Kion [in Russian], available at https://azbyka.ru/otechnik/Lopuhin/pravoslavnaja-bogoslovskaja-entsiklopedija-ili-bogoslovskij-entsiklopedicheskij-slovar-tom-10-kinnamon-kion/24, accessed on 05 February 2019.

[45]　TASS 'Politicians in Cyprus Search for a Way out of the Crisis after the Decision to Deny the Imposition of a Fee on Bank Deposits', TASS News Agency (2013), available at https//tass.ru/archive/586814/, accessed on 23 January 2019.

[46]　Vedomosti, 'Orthodox Church of Cyprus Is Ready to Pledge Assets to Help the Country', Vedomosti

Furthermore, this kind of symphony has predetermined a special democratic system of electing the Archbishop and Metropolitans. In the 20th century, the Orthodox Church of Cyprus was the only Orthodox Church where archiepiscopal elections were held by general, secret and indirect elections. According to the 1979 Statutory Charter, the right to elect special and general representatives was granted to women as well as men. All Orthodox believers of both genders (whose minimum age was changed by the new charter from 21 to 18 years) participate in the election of 1,400 special representatives (Greeks over 25 years old) in their respective parishes, who, in turn, elect 100 general representatives (Greeks over 30 years old, including 66 laymen and 34 clergymen). The general representatives participate in the Electoral Assembly, which includes, in addition to them, a number of top church officials.[47]

This also suggests another analogy to the contemporary world, the dichotomy of globalisation and sovereignty. It is evident that Orthodoxy is essentially a 'national' or at least territorial association. Orthodox churches are closely connected with national state entities in which they have been formed and quite actively facilitate the development of a political culture, including a high significance of the 'national' factor.

For instance, according to a survey by Pew Research, the ten countries characterised by the highest percentage of population who are convinced that their national culture is superior to others are Greece, Georgia, Armenia, Bulgaria, Russia, Romania, Serbia, Moldova, Belarus and Ukraine. As regards the top three countries, this figure was 84% to 89%, respectively. Out of the Catholic countries, the list includes Poland (55%), Hungary (46%) and Croatia (44%).[48]

Catholicism is global in its essence. Despite the status of the Pope as the Bishop of Rome, the structure of his church has no national basis, extends to distant continents and erases all ethnic boundaries within the church itself. Representatives of 13 ethnic groups have been elected as Popes, and the political doctrine of the

(2013, March 20), available at https://www.vedomosti.ru/politics/news/2013/03/20/kiprskaya_pravoslavnaya_cerkov_gotova_zalozhit_imuschestvo/, accessed on 18 January 2019.

[47] Orthodoxie.com, 'Chypre: une nouvelle charte fondamentale de l'Eglise', *Orthodoxie.com* (2010), available at https://orthodoxie.com/chypre-nouvelle-charte-foundamentale-de-leglise/, accessed on 23 January 2019.

[48] Pew Research Center, 'Democracy, nationalism and pluralism', Washington, D.C.: Pew Research Center (2017, May 8), available at http://www.pewforum.org/2017/05/10/democracy-nationalism-and-pluralism/pf-05-10-2017_ce-europe-08-10/, accessed on 11 November 2018.

church has implied its universal and global nature. Moreover, one can state that the Holy Roman Empire, which was based on Catholicism and disintegrated as nationally oriented Protestantism rose, was the only full-fledged integration project in Europe having a united cultural space.

An analysis of the genesis and evolution of Christianity as the conceptual and theoretical basis for various political ideologies, philosophical theories, legal schools and political movements demonstrates that its role in the formation of modern, in a broad sense, European civilisation, is indisputable. The culture, principles, institutions and mechanisms of contemporary republican democracy increasingly appear to be the result of the Christian civilisation, which has accumulated some elements of the Greek, Roman and Judaic cultures.

In this regard, just as Christianity contributed to the formation of European political culture, its internal branches and confessions resulted in the bifurcation of this culture into various models and configurations of government power relations. On the one hand, it appears that no civilisation has ever been so close to western civilization as the Orthodox one. Any attempt to compare, say, Italy with Iran, Swaziland, Laos or Japan would clearly indicate that it has much more common civilisational and cultural principles with Bulgaria, Greece or Russia than with them. On the other hand, the differences between the western and eastern Christian world that have developed over centuries have played an extremely important role in the formation of political cultures in the countries belonging to these civilisations, so that it is impossible to replicate the institutions, mechanisms and principles characteristic of a different culture by a positivist modification of legislation, without adaptation and without due regard for the specific features of social evolution in such countries.

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