

GREEK-TURKISH RELATIONS IN THE POST-COLD WAR ERA: IMPLICATIONS OF THE AMERICAN RESPONSE

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Abstract

This article analyses the American view of Turkey and her relations with Greece and Cyprus in the post-Cold War era and argues that the U.S. has pursued contradictory goals and has fallen victim to the attempts by Turkey to consolidate its claims against both Cyprus and Greece. It points the view that U.S. policy towards Turkey has enabled Turkey to follow a course of self-aggrandisement in the region and concludes with a series of propositions to enable Greece and Cyprus to combat Turkish claims.

Introduction

Rather than reviewing the known issues that currently make up the Greco-Turkish agenda, I propose to examine the implications of the American response to the issues affecting Greco-Turkish relations in the post-Cold War era and on how these issues may be resolved. The analysis that follows is an affirmation that Cold War policies and assumptions played a pivotal role in the definition and conduct of Greek, Turkish and American policy, and that American policy has been the most significant external influence in the bilateral relations of Greece and Turkey.

Greco-Turkish relations have deteriorated since the end of the Cold War because Turkey has capitalized on the conditions of the new international environment. Washington, by encouraging Turkey's ambitious role in the Balkans, in Central Asia and in the Middle East has encouraged Turkey's revisionist objectives in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

The Cold War Legacy

Let me begin with two fundamental assumptions. One is that a realistic analysis

of post-Cold War Greek-Turkish relations must be made not only in the context of the perceptions, assumptions, motives and policies of the two countries, but also those of the United States towards each of the countries and Turkey in particular. And, second, that post-Cold War American policies towards Greece and Turkey cannot be separated from the security considerations that guided American policy to this region during the Cold War.

Political reality is influenced by the images and perceptions of policy makers.¹ Such images and perceptions provide a simplified world view and comforting rationalizations for choices made by policy makers. Perceptions can also cause serious policy problems if there is a wide gap between image and reality. The reforms of Kemal Ataturk helped redefine the negative American perceptions of the Ottoman Empire. Kemal Ataturk emerged as modern Turkey's George Washington, as the leader who restored Turkey's sovereignty, curtailed external interference, and set his country on the road to secularization, westernization and reform.

Turkey was perceived as a "proud and independent country"² by American officials during the debate on the Truman Doctrine in 1947. This image of Turkey has not changed since then. The inevitable conclusion of this perception has been that the Turks would not tolerate external interference in their politics and policies,³ and that political conditions in that country limited the exercise of American influence.

Another American perception of Turkey was inherited from British imperial policy. Throughout the 19th century Britain considered the Ottoman Empire's control of the Straits as vital to the containment of Russia. During the Cold War, Washington defined in similar terms Turkey's geopolitical value. In turn, Ankara effectively exploited this strategic asset to promote and protect its interests in the United States. American officials acknowledged the interdependent strategic role of the "two sisters," Greece and Turkey. They attributed, however, far greater strategic significance to Turkey because of its control of the Straits, the size of the Turkish Army and Turkey's location which made it a barrier to Soviet expansion in the Middle East and American stepping stone to the Middle East to the vital Persian Gulf region.

In contrast to Turkey, Greece, during the Cold War failed to assert its independence and/or its strategic importance.⁴ Ideological biases and the dependence of Greek political elites on American support for their political survival created conditions confirming the American perception that Greek politics could be externally manipulated. Thus, if a policy choice had to be made between Greece and Turkey, Washington believed, especially prior to 1974, that the negative Greek reactions could be managed.⁵

Manifestations of the Cold War Legacy

Cyprus became the first test of the relations between the United States, Greece

and Turkey. England and Turkey effectively exploited Washington's Cold War concerns and gained her support for their objectives on the island. Thus, the interests of the Cypriots were sacrificed on the altar of the Cold War as Washington sought the resolution of the problem in a way that met NATO's and Turkey's concerns. Solutions proposed through NATO and/or American mediation sought to avoid a Greco-Turkish conflict and promoted positions demanded by Turkey. Thus, Washington's assumptions about Turkey and Cyprus have remained relatively constant over the last four decades.

Another manifestation of American policy has been the attempt to appear even handed during Greco-Turkish crises. Characteristic was the American response to the Turkish government sponsored pogroms against the Greeks of Istanbul and Izmir in September 1955. Secretary of State John Foster Dulles's cable placed on an equal footing the victim and the perpetrator of the crime. By placing the burden of responsibility equally on both governments Washington adopted a response pattern that was to be repeated over the next forty years. A final example of the greater strategic significance attached to Turkey by the United States has to do with the negotiations for the reintegration of Greece in NATO's military wing (1975-1980). Throughout these negotiations Washington backed Turkey's claims for revisions to NATO's operational and control areas in the Aegean because of changed circumstances since the founding of the alliance. However, Turkey's demands have direct implications on the resolution of other bilateral Greco-Turkish issues such as the Greek territorial waters and the Greek airspace. Washington pressed Greece negotiate with Turkey over these issues regardless of their legal merit or effect on Greek sovereignty.

The Deviations from the Rule

Despite the coincidence of American and Turkish objectives during the Cold War, there are at least three instances of policy disagreements that challenge these assumptions. These three instances were deviations from the rule required by circumstances that affected broader American interests. While Turkey exploited these disagreements to enhance its independent foreign policy and its bargaining power in the international system, Washington found itself apologizing to Turkey for upholding the rule of law and for offending Turkish sensitivities.

The first case of discord involved Lyndon B. Johnson's June 5, 1964, "*ultimatum*"⁷ to Turkey that stopped the impending invasion of Cyprus. What motivated the American action however was not a disagreement with Turkey's objectives on Cyprus, but with its tactics which risked a confrontation with the Soviet Union less than two years after the Cuban missile crisis.

The second example involves the pressures exerted in 1971 on the government

of Nihat Erim by the Nixon administration to suspend the cultivation of opium. The decision by the Nixon administration was in response to public and Congressional pressures about the influx of drugs from Turkey in the United States. The ban was unilaterally revoked by the Ecevit government after the 1973 elections. Despite protests, Washington did not take any further steps to penalize Turkey.

The third and final example involves the imposition of a limited arms embargo on Turkey by the U.S. Congress in 1975. This limited arms embargo was the result of Congressional action in response to pressures from domestic constituencies.⁸ The embargo was imposed despite the opposition of the Executive branch which had traditionally been Turkey's proponent in the United States.

What these three examples suggest is that Washington confronted Turkey only when Turkey's actions risked broader American security interests, or when domestic pressures prevailed over the traditional political and security preferences of the Executive branch.

The Post-Cold War Experience

Greece entered the post-Cold War era with a sense of optimism. It anticipated that the "new world order" would restore balance of the rule of law. Moreover, the Gulf War displayed once more the strategic value of Greece and Cyprus.⁹

The Greek optimism proved short lived. The American rule of law rhetoric excluded Cyprus and the outstanding Greco-Turkish issues. Greece, however, faced additional problems that affected its international standing. In addition to the outstanding Greco-Turkish issues,¹⁰ Greece faced serious economic problems that affected her position in the European Union. The crisis in the former Yugoslavia directly impacted on Greece because of its ties to Serbia and its policy on the recognition and the denomination of the Former Yugoslav Republic of Macedonia. Greece was also concerned about the fate of the Greek minority in Albania, about Turkey's involvement in the Balkans, and the rise of nationalism and irredentism in the region. The combination of all these problems undermined the role of Greece as a source of stability in the region, and as a promoter of economic, social and political change among the former communist states in the Balkans.¹¹

Turkey underwent its own soul searching as the Cold War ended. Turkey's foreign policy elite feared that the end of the Cold War would diminish Turkey's strategic value and thus its leverage with the superpowers. The collapse of the Soviet Union and Yugoslavia, the charismatic presence and vision of the late president Turgut Ozal and the Gulf War, helped Turkey redefine its role in the post-Cold War era and project its new look in positive terms which were compatible with the objectives of the United States.

Ozal envisioned a Turkey whose influence and role extended from the Adriatic to the China Wall. The 21st century was to be the "century of the Turks." Turkey was the source of stability and regional leadership in a region of instability which encompassed the Balkans, the Middle East and the Turkic republics of Central Asia. It was a regional role model for others in the area in terms of its economic and political development, especially because Turkey was an Islamic country that was also secular and democratic. In view of its location and its cultural and political ties to the Balkans and to the Turkic republics of Central Asia, Turkey saw itself as a *conduit* for trade and investment to this developing region.

Turkey presented its foreign policy to the United States and Europe as one of moderation and responsibility, and of commitment to an international order based on commonly shared values and a common European "mind-set." Turkey's leadership, prior to the rise of Erbakan to power in 1996, while down playing the Islamic threat at home and in the region, promoted itself as both a bridge to that region and as a barrier to turmoil in the European fringe. Turkey also courted the United States reminding the U.S. of Turkey's important and continuing role in NATO an organization still serving security needs.¹²

Turkey's significance to the United States has another but less advertised dimension, access to Caspian Sea oil. The United States has consistently backed the transportation of this lucrative new source of oil only through Turkey.¹³

Turkey succeeded where Greece failed, i.e. in selling this glorified image to the United States. The compatibility of Turkey's new image to America's emerging objectives in the region, provided American policy makers with the appropriate rationalizations to continue their relationship with Ankara in even stronger terms than those seen during the Cold War.

Manifestations of the Post-Cold War Legacy

The post-Cold War trends in the attitudes of the United States towards Greco-Turkish relations have been manifested in at least four areas, i.e. the *Imia* crisis and the on-going Turkish military challenge in the Aegean; the Kurdish insurrection; Cyprus and Erbakan's rise to power.

The Imia Crisis and the Turkish Military Challenge in the Aegean

Starting late in 1973 Turkey undertook a coordinated campaign to revise the Aegean *status quo*.

The January 1996 *Imia* crisis was not the first "hot" incident in the Aegean that required American intervention to prevent the outbreak of Greco-Turkish hostilities. It had been preceded by the Summer 1976 *Chora* incident and the March 1987 *Sismik* incident.

During the January 1996 crisis over *Imia*, the intervention of the White House prevented a Greco-Turkish conflict. It is instructive to see the American response to this crisis and its policy implications.

a) Once the crisis was defused, the White House called for a resort to the International Court of Justice (ICJ) or another form of international arbitration. The White House did not recognise Turkey's claims to sovereignty over *Imia*, and opposed the threat or use of force for the resolution of bilateral differences in the Aegean. However, President Clinton went on to question Greek sovereignty over *Imia* because of doubts expressed by his legal advisors as to interpretations of documents and agreements dating back several decades. Thus, the resort to the ICJ was recommended in order to "weigh impartially the legal arguments of both sides."¹⁴ This response was a classic example of the American policy of maintaining "equal distance" among the parties in the dispute. In reality, however, Washington's position agreed with the Turkish challenge of Greek sovereignty over *Imia*. This was a serious error because, in order to satisfy Turkey, Washington undermined a fundamental rule of American foreign policy, i.e. the respect for established boundaries and for the continuing validity of international agreements.

b) Because of the escalating incidents in the air and at sea in the Aegean, Washington urged the implementation of confidence building measures (CBM) to reduce the chances of accidental war.¹⁵ However, Washington continued arming Turkey with sophisticated weapons with the justification that such armaments were needed because of threats emanating from the region.¹⁶ In addition, Turkey has received technical assistance and investments from the United States to develop a sophisticated arms industry. Both of these developments threaten peace and stability in the region and undermine the military balance between the two countries.

c) Having challenged Greek sovereignty in the Dodecanese through the *Imia* case with Washington's indirect support, Turkey, in the Summer of 1996, presented new claims of contested sovereignty in the Aegean. These included the island of *Gavdos*, and some one hundred other islands in "grey areas" of the Aegean on the grounds that they were not specifically listed in the treaties ending World Wars I and II.

This latest set of the claims brought a measured American response during press briefings at the U.S. Department of State.¹⁷ The press spokesman, Nicholas Burns, confirmed the Greek sovereignty over *Gavdos*, but qualified his response by indicating that questions of sovereignty should be discussed between Greece and Turkey. Seeking campaign support from the Greek-American community, President Clinton criticized "frivolous territorial claims" such as those over *Gavdos*.

The ambivalence of American policy has encouraged Turkish claims. On October 22, 1996, the State Department press spokesman referred to the existence of islands in the Aegean that may not belong to either Greece or Turkey under inter-

national agreements. He went on to suggest that the Greco-Turkish boundaries should be respected and that any changes should come peacefully and by mutual consent. In the storm of protest that followed these comments, which contradicted those of the President to the Greek-American community, the Department of State spokesman on October 24, 1996, attributed his comments to an error and emphasized once more the traditional position about a resort to the ICJ.

d) Turkey has mastered the art of creating incidents and provocations which are systematically followed by calls for negotiations in a show of goodwill and peaceful international conduct. If Greece rejected these offers it was accused of intransigence. Since 1974, the policy of the United States has been to urge negotiations regardless of the motives and of the validity of Turkey's demands.

The Kurdish insurrection

Despite the massive evidence by international human rights organizations, and by the U.S. Department of State Report on Human Rights Practices about the gross violations of Kurdish human rights in Turkey, Washington developed a hypocritical and contradictory policy on this issue. Washington supported the Turkish army's repression of the Kurdish insurrection in Turkey as well as its cross border raids into Iraq and provided Turkey with intelligence, weapons and political support. This was done in the name of combating terrorism. On the other hand, Washington launched Operation Provide Comfort out of bases in Turkey for the protection of the Kurds in Iraq whose insurrection against Saddam Hussein gained them the designation of "freedom fighters."

Cyprus

The Cyprus issue has been and continues to be the issue that exemplifies the American assumptions about Turkey both before and after the end of the Cold War. I will only provide five examples of the manifestations of American policy since the end of the Cold War.

Without disputing the significance and the necessity of the American involvement in the search for a solution, the substance of American policy and its fundamental assumptions about Turkey's interests in the Cyprus dispute have not changed. The following are characteristic examples:

a) In the aftermath of the Kuwait crisis and the American policy of implementing all the United Nations resolutions on Kuwait and Iraq, Cyprus failed to get the same consideration from Washington. The United States has consistently opposed the implementation of United Nations resolutions on Cyprus, especially when they contained goals that differed from those of the United States and Turkey.

b) The American position did not substantially differ from that of the Turkey on the issues of the constitutional structure of the Republic and on the issue of the external guarantees. The United States accepted Turkey's views regarding a loose confederation and the continued presence of significant numbers of Turkish troops in the occupied part of the island. The disagreement with Turkey was over the territorial concessions to be made to the Greek Cypriots. To increase the pressure on the Greek Cypriots there were implied threats of more formal ties with the unrecognized regime of the occupied areas, and the linkage of the constitutional solution to the Cypriot application for membership in the European Union.

c) The United States and Turkey have opposed the unified defense dogma that has placed Cyprus within the Greek defense space and the activities associated with the implementation of this agreement on the grounds of their impact on the process of resolving the Cyprus problem. It is ironic, however, that Washington has not opposed the continued presence of 35,000 heavily armed Turkish troops in the occupied area. Recently, Madeleine Albright,¹⁸ as US Ambassador to the UN, spoke of the "illegality of the Turkish Army's occupation" of Cyprus. Welcome as this statement may have been, it is doubtful that it reflects the administration's policy. The Albright statement may have been motivated by electoral considerations and personal ambitions.¹⁹

d) During the fall of 1996, a number of incidents occurred in the neutral zone during which unarmed Greek Cypriots were murdered in cold blood. The lukewarm reaction of the United States to the first murder in *Dherynia* clearly encouraged the repetition of Turkey's violent conduct. When pressed for a reaction to these killings the Department of State spokesman called for "mutual restraint." His qualified response implied that Turkey's actions were in response to Greek Cypriot provocations. Washington also used these killings at a pressure tactic on the government of Cyprus to reopen a face to face dialogue at the highest level with the Turkish Cypriots, and to open talks for military disengagement along the dividing line.

The condemnation of these killings that was included in the statement of President Clinton to the Greek-American community has to be seen in the context of the President's re-election campaign. This statement was not reflected in American policy.

e) The Clinton administration supported the involvement of the European Union in the search for a solution of the Cyprus problem. It has also expressed its support for the membership of Cyprus in the E.U.

The Clinton policy would be welcome if it was intended to develop new options in the search for a solution of some of the intractable issues in the negotiations such as those of human rights (three freedoms), the issue of guarantees, borders, etc. Washington, working in cooperation with Britain, has clearly linked the accession of Cyprus to the European Union with that of the political solution of the Cyprus prob-

lem, even though Washington has no voice in the E.U.'s membership policy. Washington is using the incentive of E.U. membership to impose the kind of political settlement demanded by Turkey.

Washington's policy parallels and reinforces that of Turkey who objects to the entry of Cyprus in the E.U., not only prior to a political solution on the island, but also prior to the entry of Turkey in the E.U.

The Rise and Challenge of Erbakan

The rise of the Islamists to power in Turkey in the Spring of 1996, provides a classic example of the rationalizations in and the contradictions of American policy towards Turkey. The United States extended its full support to Tansu Giller for being the pro-Western barrier to the Islamic takeover of Turkey. To Washington's great surprise, the coalition between Giller and Erbakan brought to power the very nemesis of the United States.²⁰ Erbakan's anti-American, anti-western, anti-Israeli views, and his support of Islamic movements that threatened America's Middle Eastern allies distinguished him from all other Turkish politicians.

In an attempt to bolster ties with radical Islamic states Erbakan visited and closed new business deals with countries such as Libya, Iran and Nigeria, countries on Washington's black list and the object of new American sanctions imposed in the summer of 1996. In his visit to Iran, Erbakan struck a \$21 billion gas pipeline deal that violated American-sanctions. Erbakan described Libya as the "victim of terrorism" rather than the "sponsor" of terrorism. He also struck a \$2 billion deal that violated American sanctions. Erbakan also remained silent while Qaddafi criticized Turkey for its ties to the United States, NATO and Israel, and described Turkey as a country "under Western occupation."

Erbakan, along with Giller, had expanded their political and economic cooperation with Iraq on the basis of inadequate Western compensation for losses suffered by Turkey since the Gulf war. Moreover, Giller and Erbakan urged the Iraqi regime to end Kurdish autonomy in Iraq and obstructed the use of Turkish bases by *Operation Provide Comfort* and for the enforcement of the no-fly zone over Iraq by arbitrarily implementing ATC regulations.

Erbakan's exploits were criticized during press briefings at the Department of State.²¹ The press spokesman found Erbakan's statements and actions to be "objectionable," "off base," "unwarranted," and that they sent the "wrong message" to countries such as Iran. He apologetically indicated that it was "unusual to speak this way about a NATO ally" but "given the circumstances ... we had no choice." The United States did not wish to involve itself in the internal Turkish debate, and Mr. Burns expressed the "hope" that Erbakan's actions were not in violation of American sanctions. The press spokesman concluded that the United States stood

by Turkey, a country victimized by terrorism, and felt that Turkey should do the same for the United States.

Officially Washington rationalized the situation in Turkey²² along the following lines:

- 1) That the majority in Turkey remains secular and pro-Western.
- 2) That the Erbakan-Ciller coalition was temporary and the result of internal political manoeuvring rather than support for Erbakan.
- 3) That Turkey should be dealt with sensitivity. While keeping the Islamists at "arms length," avoid alienating and undermining America's "real allies" in Turkey.
- 4) That the Turkish Army was the ultimate guarantee of secularism.
- 5) That Erbakan would self destruct by his actions, and
- 6) That the United States needed Turkey's military facilities more than ever before and that it should not do anything to strain its relations with a "very important ally" located in a "tough neighborhood." Other apologists for Turkey²³ continued to describe Turkey as the "antidote to Islamic fundamentalism and Russian imperialism" and that it was in the Western interest to be frank with the Turks but keep them as friends and to help them practice a "comfortable form of Islam."

In the final analysis, wishful thinking and rationalizations of Turkey's behavior characterized Washington's post-Cold War assessments of Turkey. Decades of contradictions, ambivalence, conflicting priorities of American policy towards Turkey,²⁴ and the unqualified support extended to Turkey for its geopolitical importance have contributed to Ankara's self-importance and arrogance. Thus, the United States has been the most important contributor to Turkey's international misconduct.

Implications for Greece and Cyprus

Despite the frustration felt in Washington because of Erbakan's challenge to American policy, American officials appear prepared to ride the storm and wait for him to self-destruct or for the Turkish military to remove him from power by direct or indirect action. Washington is not likely to upset its long term relationship with Turkey by interfering in Turkish politics. Nor is it likely that Turkish political elites would welcome such interference.

With stable governments in Greece and Cyprus American pressures are likely to be exerted in the direction of Athens and Nicosia rather than in Ankara in the search for solutions to regional problems. Another reality check for Athens and Nicosia ought to be the fact that despite promises by American presidential candidates

and/or the president, in the absence of a crisis, Greco-Turkish relations and Cyprus will remain bureaucratic problems. Generalized pronouncements affected by campaign needs should not be confused with the fundamental American assumptions as to how the Greco-Turkish problems and Cyprus might be resolved. These assumptions have not changed.

Greece and Cyprus have sought Washington's involvement in the region's problems but neither country should expect that Washington will abandon Turkey. In view of the experience with American policy in the Aegean and Cyprus during 1996, both countries ought to be prepared to face pressures for a settlement accommodating Turkey's demands in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

What can Greece and Cyprus do?

a) Avoid the temptation of package deal solutions. While positive movement on Cyprus may contribute to an improvement in the Greco-Turkish political climate, Cyprus cannot be held hostage to Turkey's revisionism in the Aegean. Greco-Turkish issues have their own dynamics.

b) Greece must not engage in another interminable dialogue with Turkey until Ankara renounces the threat or the use of force in its relations with Greece, and acknowledges in unequivocal terms the validity of the frontiers and of the *status quo* established in the region under relevant international agreements Turkey must renounce any claims as to "grey areas" in the Aegean.

c) Cyprus must not venture into another high level meeting with the Turkish Cypriots until a common ground has been established and the Turkish Cypriot side has renounced claims to sovereignty. Further, prior to entering into another round of high level talks, Cyprus must not repeat the tactical error of making concessions up front prior to the commencement of negotiations and without any reciprocal concessions by the Turkish/Turkish Cypriot sides.

d) Neither Greece nor Cyprus should be drawn into "Camp David" or "Dayton" style negotiations. Their sovereignty and territorial integrity is likely to be affected in such talks.

e) Greece and Cyprus should not suspend or renounce their defense cooperation agreement until such a time as a definite timetable for the withdrawal of Turkish forces has been agreed upon, and appropriate international provisions have been agreed upon for demilitarization and for the presence of an expanded international peacekeeping force. However, the presence of such an international force cannot subvert the sovereignty of Cyprus or the standing of its government, as it was the case of the NATO plan of 1964, and is the case today with the Bosnian model.

f) Turkey has mastered the art of creating threats of conflict and later retreating to calls for peaceful negotiations in order to display to the international community

her peaceful intentions. There are issues over which negotiations are appropriate, as in the case of the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf. There is no room for negotiations or for resort to arbitration over Greece's established sovereign rights and/or its frontiers.

g) Cyprus will soon have to respond to American and European initiatives for a political solution of the problem. Cyprus must stand firm against a Bosnia style solution that will only confirm and legitimize the partition of the island. Instead, proposals ought to be presented capitalizing on new options available to resolve what have been major obstacles in earlier negotiations. For example, NATO and the E.U. can provide creative new alternatives on issues of human rights, borders and guarantees. Cyprus must engage in a pro-active rather than a reactive policy that only responds to American and British initiatives. The United States must not be viewed as the *deus-ex-machina* that will resolve the serious challenges facing Cyprus today.

h) Critics of the American initiatives call for a more active involvement by the U.N. Security Council in the search for a Cyprus settlement. Unless permanent members such as Russia and France rise to their responsibilities in the Council, the United States will retain the initiative and use the United Nations to legitimize its policies. This is the challenge for Mr. Primakov if he intends to re-establish Russia as a superpower with its own interests in the Eastern Mediterranean.

i) Even though the integration of Cyprus in the E.U. is a top Cypriot priority, Cyprus ought to be prepared to tell its European partners that it will not pay any price in return for membership. Cyprus cannot be victimized twice.

j) Greece and Cyprus can cooperate with the United States in the search of defining ways to reduce tensions in the Aegean and along the dividing line in Cyprus. *Moratoria* in active military exercises, cooling off periods, hot lines, arms limitations and deconfrontation arrangements are possible once Turkey acknowledges the Aegean *status quo* and renounces the use or the threat of force in its relations with Greece and Cyprus. Deconfrontation and demilitarization proposals in Cyprus and the Aegean are meaningless if they are not mutual and in depth. This includes the withdrawal of the occupation forces from Cyprus and arms limitations along Turkey's Mediterranean and Aegean coasts.

I have argued that American policies have contributed to the inflation of Turkey's ego and self-importance and, thus, to Turkey's revisionism in the Aegean and Cyprus. America's assumptions about Turkey have remained relatively constant since the end of World War II. This is why Athens and Nicosia ought to be realistic about forthcoming American initiatives in the region. Athens and Nicosia can protect their fundamental interests in the post-Cold War environment by pursuing realistic, consistent and credible policies. These policies ought to place their national interests above party and personal interests, and build on the strengths both coun-

tries bring to the post-Cold War international environment.

Notes

1. There is a large body of work on this subject. See the pioneering work by Kenneth E. Boulding, "National Images and International Systems," *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 3, June 1959, pp. 120-131.

2. United States Senate, Committee on Foreign Relations, Legislative Origins of the Truman Doctrine, Hearings held in Executive Session on S938, First Session, 80th Congress, Historical Series. Washington, DC: G.P.O., 1973, pp. 78-80.

3. Van Coufoudakis, "Turkey and the United States: The Problems and Prospects of a Post-War Alliance," *Journal of Political and Military Sociology*, vol. 9, no. 2, Fall 1981, pp. 179-196. Harry. J. Psomiades, "American Images of Greece and Turkey Since 1945," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (eds.), *Greek American Relations: A Critical Review* (New York: Pella Publishing Co., 1980), pp. 91-106.

4. Despite the small size of Greece its strategic significance during the Cold war was even more important than that of Turkey, especially in relationship to Turkey's control of the Straits and the presence of the 5th Eskadra in the Mediterranean. Van Coufoudakis, "The Eastern Mediterranean in the Defense of the West-The Case of Greece," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, October 1986, vol. 31, no. 6, pp. 34-39. Also: "The Essential Link: Greece in NATO," *NATO's Sixteen Nations*, July-August 1988, vol. 32, no. 4, pp. 35-44. Jesse W. Lewis, Jr., "The Strategic Balance in the Mediterranean." Washington, DC: *The American Enterprise Institute*, 1976.

5. Theodore A. Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction to American and NATO Influences*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1966.

6. Theodore A Couloumbis, *Greek Political Reaction*, pp.95-97.

7. For the text of this unusually strongly worded letter to Turkish Prime Minister Inonu see Republic of Cyprus, Public Information Office, *Cyprus: The Problem in Perspective*. Nicosia: PIO, 1969, pp. 36-37.

8. Clifford P. Hackett, "The Role of Congress and Greek-American Relations," in Theodore A. Couloumbis and John O. Iatrides (eds.), *op. cit.*, pp. 131-148. Lawrence Stern, *The Wrong Horse-The Politics of Intervention and the Failure of American Diplomacy*. New York: Times Books-Quadrangle, 1977.

9. Nearly 90% of the logistical support of the allied operations in the Gulf moved through the Mediterranean. Greek and Cypriot facilities played a major supporting role in these operations.

10. These issues included: the Muslim minority in Western Thrace; the Greek minority of Istanbul and the Ecumenical Patriarchate; the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf; the width of the Greek airspace; the extension of the Greek territorial waters to 12 miles; NATO command and control areas; search and rescue areas in the Aegean; and the militarization of certain Aegean islands. The Cyprus issue is also part of the Greco-Turkish agenda, even though it is not a Greco-Turkish issue *per se*.

11. Van Coufoudakis, "Greek Foreign Policy in the Post-Cold War Era: Issue and Challenges," *Mediterranean Quarterly*, vol. 7, no. 3, Summer 1996, pp. 28-29.

12. Among the many recent studies and statements promoting Turkey's "new role" see Dr. Tansu Giller, "Turkey and NATO: Stability in the Vortex of Change," *NATO Review*, no. 2, April 1994, pp. 3-6; Graham E. Fuller and Ian O. Lesser (eds.), *Turkey's New Geopolitics-From the Balkans to Western China*. Boulder: Westview/RAND, 1993; and Andrew Mango, *Turkey-The Challenge of a New Role*. Westport: Praeger, 1994.

13. Fiona Hill, "Pipeline Politics, Russo-Turkish Competition and Geopolitics in the Eastern Mediterranean," *Cyprus Review*, vol. 8, no. 1 (1996), pp. 83-100.

14. See the letter of President Clinton, dated February 26, 1996, to Angelo Tsakopoulos and other leaders of the Greek-American community.

15. See the letter of President Clinton to Greek Prime Minister Simitis dated July 1, 1996.

16. See the Clinton letter of February 26, 1996 to the Greek-American leadership. In addition to weapons acquired by Turkey under NATO's cascading policy, Turkey received from the United States air tankers for the refueling of its F-16's in flight, the new short range ATACM missiles and attack helicopters. All these systems pose a clear and present danger to the Greek islands in the Aegean and in Cyprus.

17. Daily Press Briefing, U.S. Department of State, June 17, 1996.

18. In a speech to the Annual Awards Gala of the Cyprus Federation of American in New York, September 28, 1996.

19. At the time, Washington political observers considered Albright as a contender for the position of Secretary of State *in* a new Clinton cabinet.

20. Jim Hoagland, "Political Con Game in Turkey," *The Washington Post*, July 11, 1996. By this unholy alliance Giller may have escaped prosecution for various financial scandals from her previous administration.

21. Especially in those of October 7 and October 8, 1996.

22. An excellent example of this rationalization is the op-ed by Alan Makvsky, a Turkish expert who held various official positions in Washington. See his "Responding to Turkey's Eastward Drift," *The New York Times*, August 17, 1996.

23. Amos Perlmutter, "Turkey's Strategic Mideast Position," *The Washington Times*, September 23, 1996, and Andrew Mango, *op. cit.*, pp. 85 and 133.

24. For example the subordination of human rights to security considerations.

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