

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

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Abstract

As most Greek Cypriots identify with Greece at least culturally, one would expect the political culture of contemporary Cyprus to be more or less the same as that of mainland Greece. However, this is not the case. Cyprus possesses more features of a Western European country than Greece and fewer signs of their common Ottoman heritage. The aim of this article is to demonstrate that this is to a great extent the outcome of social and political developments in Cyprus during the 82 years of British rule. This social and political change in Cyprus during this period is best understood by analysing clientelism which is a feature shared by all the countries of the former Ottoman Empire.

Clientelism

Definition

Despite the absence of common agreement amongst social scientists about the precise definition, there are some general features in any understanding of clientelism in this part of the world:

According to Jeanette Choisi, clientelism or patronage is a reciprocal relationship between two persons or groups of persons of different social status in a small or traditional agricultural society.¹ Clientelism creates a ritualised, morally ruled scheme of interaction between the patron and his clients .

Clientelistic relationships in Greece are according to Legg based on free approval, mutual esteem and respect for the freedom of both sides ("*Philotimo*").² The more influential patron and the client are under the obligation to give favours or services to each other.³ The patron is obliged to give money, posts, promotions and shelter to his client, while he gains power, wealth and social prestige from the client who has to support and vote for his patron. An essential element of clientelism is the personal

relationship between the client's family and his patron. A patron is often also advisor, godfather or marriage witness, expected to use his influence for the benefit of his client and his family.⁴

According to Almond and Bingham Powell, these clientelistic relationships can spread hierarchically within society and create an extensive or even state-wide network: *"The institution of friendship, based upon the moral notion of equality and the free exchange of favour, builds up, in situations of material inequality, a structure of patronage which links up the authority of the state through the economic power of certain individuals to the network of neighbourly relations."*⁵

Favouritism, nepotism, corruption and *"rousfett"* (i.e. favours given by the patron to the client in exchange for his support or services) characterise patron-client interaction, but also emerge outside clientelistic relationships. The duty of the client to support politically his patron or the candidate backed by him in exchange for *"rousfett"* is essential for clientelism. It is the personal patron-client relationship that determines this behaviour.

According to Lemerchand and Legg, clientelism is part of any political system.⁶ Therefore, patron-client relationships have to be defined and analysed within the specific historical, economic, cultural and political circumstances of each society.

The Heritage of Clientelism in the Ottoman Empire

When the Ottomans conquered a country they usually exterminated the ruling oligarchy in order to render the people leaderless and prevent potential upheavals. They then chose local clergymen or laymen to run the villages, towns or regions. Those local notables often acquired a double function: they became the leaders of local population and the target for repression by the Ottoman authorities if something went wrong in their area of responsibility. They interceded with the authorities on behalf of their fellow citizens and in return they acquired prestige, power and wealth. The local notables expected loyalty from those they favoured.⁷ Soon they were also rich enough to lend money to their fellow villagers thus increasing dependency.⁸ This patron-client structure was the main source of clientelism and became a common feature of all countries of the former Ottoman Empire, including Greece.

After Greece's independence clientelism became the means to run the country. The new political structure of the state was built around patrons, who used their relationships with clients for political purposes. They distributed favours to their clients who were expected to vote for them in elections. Soon Greece was covered with rivalling clientelistic networks. When political parties emerged they incorporated clientelism in the form of political party patronage, as Richter describes: *"The party was the clientele of the party leader and he alone decided on the course to follow. Conflicts within a party led to the separation of sub-networks. Party allegiance*

*became a function of the success of the leader i.e. of the rousfeti he could distribute. Change of power was achieved by change of allegiance of sub-networks. In general elections Greeks did not vote for a party but against that party which had not procured the expected rousfeti.*⁹ This clientelistic system survived all political changes of the 20th century and remained the decisive factor in shaping the political system of contemporary Greece.

When Cyprus was taken over by the British in 1878, after 300 years of Ottoman rule, clientelism was an important part of the island's social and political life too. Cyprus was a traditional, mainly village based, agricultural society whose Greek Cypriot community was dominated by a small elite of influential families and the high clergy. Its small and closed society provided an ideal ground for personal patron-client relationships reinforced by an Ottoman administration and judicature which were characterised by unequal treatment and corruption. Before 1878 the administration had been virtually the monopoly of the Ottoman officials and the Muslim Cypriots who had been the dominant community under the Ottoman Millet system. During the nineteenth century, however, the economy, commerce and manufacture were increasingly controlled by the Greek Cypriots who were led by the Orthodox Church, the biggest landowner.¹⁰

Sources of Clientelism in Cyprus under British Rule

Due to the lack of research on clientelism for the whole of Cyprus, there is not much information on patron-client relationships. It is therefore difficult to draw a precise picture of the extent of clientelism under British rule. The examination of the social and political changes during that period as well as information provided by British sources lead to the conclusion that on a local or regional level clientelistic relationships were prevalent during large parts of British rule. Moreover, its existence as a decisive form of interaction within the Greek Cypriot community is not disputed in the literature.¹¹

During the first half of their rule the British did not pay much attention to the social and economic conditions in Cyprus. They needed Cyprus for geostrategic reasons. A tribute payable to the Ottoman Sultan used up most of the money they got out of the island from taxes. The economic backwardness remained and "*laissez faire*" was the guiding principle in ruling the island with as little effort and money as possible. Therefore, the socio-economic structures created during Ottoman rule remained largely unchanged. It was mainly in these sectors of society that clientelistic patterns shaped large parts of the Greek Cypriot community.

The British limited the extent of corruption in all areas of the island's administration after 1878. Moreover, clientelistic structures could not spread into the public sector on a large scale since the highest administrative, financial and judicial

posts were taken over by a handful of British officials. The colonial power created an administrative system based on British norms, which according to Georghallides, "*...over a quite brief period of time, imparted honesty, order and efficiency to the conduct of public business*".¹²

During the first decades of British rule Greek Cypriots were not interested in an end to colonial rule by a mass struggle for union with Greece (*enosis*) or self determination lest Cyprus should be returned to the Ottomans. Therefore, there was no need for a comprehensive political organisation within the Greek community on the island. The local patron-client relationships remained but they did not develop into larger organisations such as political parties. On the political level it was only in the limited areas of administrative participation and episcopal election that clientelism played an important role.

The main features that characterised the process of money-lending, the system of agricultural product selling and the leasing of land preserved patron-client relationships for a large part of British rule. Similarly, education, the Church and administrative institutions such as the Mukhtar and the Legislative Council contributed a great deal to the preservation of old, and the creation of new, clientelistic relationships. The importance of those structures became evident in the 1920s. Threatened by a growing *enosis* movement the British directed their reform policies precisely towards undermining the central elements which sustained patron-client relationships.

The Network of Landowners, Merchants, Brokers and Moneylenders

In 1878 Cyprus was an agricultural society. Most of the peasants owned land, but due to the inheritance system of dividing land among the children, it was usually too small and the tax burden too heavy for many farmers to secure more than just the basic means of living. The small size and fragmentation of holdings became one of the main obstacles to agricultural progress. Moreover, during the first 60 years of British rule most Cypriot peasants were indebted to and frequently dependent on moneylenders, who were in fact usurers.¹³

With the exception of a British survey conducted in 1927-28 there are no detailed data about rural indebtedness during British rule. Sir Ronald Storrs, Governor of Cyprus from 1926 to 1932, initiated the survey and reports in his autobiography that 70% of the peasants were "*chronically indebted to usurers and merchants*".¹⁴

Michael Attalides describes how the money-lending system on the local level worked during the early decades of British rule: "*It has already been pointed out that money was frequently lent on the basis of 'word of honour'. In general the idiom of the relationship had to be one of friendship, as the frequently illiterate peasant was virtually at the mercy of the broker. Not only did he depend on him for his annual*

credit and sales, but also for keeping an account of these transactions. [...] It was only through exhibitions of friendship and if possible with bonds of fictive kinship that the client could hope to limit the broker's rapacity. [...] In this context, political alignment was part of the relationship of friendship and dependence. Generally people simply voted for whomever the broker they dealt with told them to vote for. [...] The merchant and broker network was reinforced by its overlap with the government administrative system. [...]

Through a series of individual vertical coalitions [...] the brokerage system provided the urban and rural merchant class with an extremely tight control over the peasant producer."¹⁵

Regional networks were created by merchants who supplied local brokers with money for credits. Once totally at the mercy of the local brokers, merchants and moneylenders, the farmer lost the freedom to sell his product on the market directly. The richer merchants bought the products the peasant had to sell to his broker or sub-broker. This broker network, linked with merchant houses which were sometimes connected with bigger ones in the cities, built the economic basis on which clientelistic structures could be formed.

Another source of potential patron-client relationships was the leasing of land to farmers by the big landowners and the Orthodox Church. According to Lanitis, in 1944 about 20% of the cultivated land belonged to religious institutions, big landowners, moneylenders or other town dwellers while the remaining 80% belonged to and was cultivated by farmers.¹⁶ Approximately 25% of the peasants were either scrapholders or full-time tenant farmers. According to the General Survey conducted by the British between 1909-1929, 5,3% of the total agricultural land was owned by the various bodies of the Orthodox Church.¹⁷ Large estates owned by the Church were frequently leased to wealthy people such as big landowners or merchants who in turn often sub-leased them to small cultivators. Smaller properties owned by village churches were usually leased to co-villagers. Amongst the various forms of leasing the short term lease (3-5 years) predominated¹⁸ so the tenant was highly susceptible to political pressure. The dependency of the farmers and indebted peasants on the moneylenders, merchants and big landowners allowed the elites not only to exploit their clients financially, but also to control their behaviour at the polls. It could have serious economic consequences for an indebted peasant or a tenant not to vote for his patron or the candidate supported by him in elections for educational, religious or political offices.

However, the dependency of the peasants on the merchants, moneylenders and big landowners did not necessarily produce patronage for the poor by the rich and influential. If the big landowner or the moneylender was not involved in politics or if he was satisfied with the financial profit of the relationship, it is fair to assume that no political pressure on the indebted peasant or the tenant was exercised. In addition

around 20-30% of the peasants had only small or no debts. These peasants could be "free" voters, not bound in a patron-client relationship based on economic dependency. Their political support could be gained through different forms of patronage created for example by wedding and baptismal sponsorship ("*koumparia*") or the payment for the education of children. Unfortunately, no precise figures about this widespread practice are available.

The Legislative Council

Two groups led the Orthodox Cypriot community during the first decades of British rule: the merchants, brokers, big landowners and lawyers, on the one hand, and the Orthodox Church, on the other. When the British took over in 1878 they no longer accepted the Church as the official representative of the Orthodox population, as had been the case under Ottoman rule.¹⁹ Instead, they tried to upgrade the role of the lay Orthodox elites, who subsequently became more influential.

In 1883 the British introduced the elected Legislative Council as a kind of parliament.²⁰ It consisted of six nominated British officials, three Muslim and nine Christian members, who were elected by their respective communities. Until its end in 1931 the Legislative Council remained a relatively powerless organ that gave British rule a veneer of democracy. It possessed no authority to enact laws and its jurisdiction was strictly limited. On controversial matters the Turkish members almost always sided with the appointed British members in voting against the Greeks. In the resulting stalemate the High Commissioner²¹ had a casting vote. In the rare case that the Legislative Council did not enact a bill, it could come into force by an "Order in Council" of the Secretary of State for the Colonies.

Membership in the Legislative Council gave prestige to its local representatives but only limited possibilities to distribute money, posts or favours. The members had great influence on the appointments and promotions of teachers until 1929 and after 1923 on the appointments of the local governmental representatives, the Mukhtars. In this respect, Greek members of the Legislative Council could give favours and establish patron-client relationships. However, since the British controlled employment in the civil service and state expenditures there were only limited possibilities for the members of the Legislative Council to distribute favours on a broad scale and thereby become heads of large clientelistic networks. Furthermore, politically unpopular members could be sanctioned by the British who would not enable them to distribute favours.

The electoral system for the Legislative Council limited but at the same time also opened doors to the use of clientelism. Only male Cypriots over 21 who had paid their *verghi* taxes²² in the year before the elections were allowed to vote. Therefore, the number of registered electors was directly related to the general state of

indebtedness. This resulted in the de facto exclusion not only of the lower strata but also of large parts of the rest of the electorate from voting, as Katsiaounis points out: *"In a society where indebtedness was becoming a chronic malaise this condition was tantamount to political rights being denied not only to pauperised labourers but also to the less competitive of petty traders and smallholders."*²³ From the 58.916 men who were liable to the verghi-tax only 21.703 (35,8%) were entitled to vote in 1882. The number of all Cypriots entitled to vote dropped by 1891 to 12.232 despite the increase of the population.²⁴ Many heavily indebted peasants, who were completely dependent on moneylenders, were not allowed to vote. Thus, clientelistic support based on economic dependency in elections for the Legislative Council was limited to electors who were dependent on moneylenders, merchants and landowners, but who also paid their taxes. At the same time, the limited number of voters potentially offered great advantages to a patron: each of the three electoral districts²⁵ elected three Christian members of the Legislative Council until 1925. Assuming that the number of voters in the three districts was roughly the same and given that three candidates were elected in each district, only a relatively small number of votes was necessary in each constituency for a candidate to be elected.

The extremely limited number of polling stations gave advantages to those candidates who could best mobilise their supporters and clients and who could defray the electors' transport and other expenses. A peasant often lost an entire day if he came from a remote village to vote. This was apparently a reason for many peasants not to vote at all.²⁶ Consequently, in particular during the early decades of British rule the poll was very low, as a 1883 report indicates: *"It is worthy of note that out of 63 villages with a total of 1,556 registered electors, not a single voter went to the poll and that 40 villages with an electorate number of 1,025 sent one voter apiece, and he, in the majority of cases, was the village representative whose presence is compulsory!"*²⁷

Moreover, since balloting was open voters had to cast their vote within view of the candidates or their agents. Even after 1906, when secret balloting was introduced, the danger of a client being caught voting against the will of the patron was very high, especially given the small size of Cypriot society. People in the villages usually knew for whom somebody had voted. It is therefore arguable that the number of clients who did not fulfil their expected electoral obligation after 1906 was very small.

A report of the Commissioner of Kyrenia in 1912 shows the extent to which the electoral system and voting procedure contributed to the domination of clientelism in the elections for the Legislative Council: *"The elected persons are all well to do, and generally towns-people such as Advocates, Medical men, Merchants e.t.c. to whom the majority of the voters are indebted;[...] it will be noticed that nearly all the voters who recorded a vote either live at the town where the poll is held, or so close by that they can be turned out on the actual polling day by the candidate or his agents."*²⁸

In 1925 the British made some amendments to the constitution of the island, including the increase of the Christian members from 9 to 12, now elected in 12 instead of three constituencies. High Commissioner Stevenson suggested the increase of the constituencies as a means to undermine the urban nationalists in 1923: "*...there is undoubtedly a tendency for political power to be concentrated in the hands of a few politicians in Nicosia and Limassol towns and, if the Council is to be fully representative, smaller constituencies are necessary*".²⁹

The urban Greek elites continued to control the political life of the island despite intense rivalries within them. In the 1920s their power derived not only from the successful operation of their clientelistic networks but also from their role in the pursuit of *enosis*. The Greek nationalists successfully boycotted the 1922/23 elections as a first climax of the growing *enosis*-movement. In 1925 they ended their boycott policy. Six Greek members of the last properly elected Legislative Council³⁰ (1916-1921) ran again but only one was re-elected. Two former members won seats again but the other nine were new and more moderate. But even this limited British success was at least as much the result of the serious blow on nationalist aspirations after the Greek defeat against Turkey in Asia Minor as it was the outcome of Stevenson's reforms. Union with a defeated Greece in chaos and flooded with refugees did not seem that desirable anymore. This made less nationalist candidates more popular even though some of them had fewer clients than their nationalist rivals. Although they owed their election to political conviction rather than clientelism, they too were part of the traditional elites, supported by their own clientele.³¹

Stevenson had increased the number of constituencies from 3 to 12 in order to strengthen the position of local candidates against the network of the dominating urban elites. The smaller size of the electorate automatically gave local candidates higher chances. But in terms of patronage the measure enhanced the effectiveness of local clientelistic networks and caused only a temporary setback of the traditional nationalist urban elites. In 1930 the nationalist candidates won most of the seats in the Legislative Council again, proving that the *enosis* movement had recovered.³²

In Marios Lyssiotis' survey of 56 Greek-Cypriot members of the Legislative Council between 1883 and 1931,³³ it was found that the members belonged almost exclusively to the traditional Greek elites. 88% were merchants, lawyers³⁴ or big landowners - the typical professions of Cypriot patrons. Since it was common for people of these professions to have several jobs at the same time many of them were moneylenders as well.³⁵

The survey also showed that the continuity amongst the Greek members in the Legislative Council was quite high. This was for Lyssiotis an indication of "*not only the conservative nature of the society but also of the hold which the political elites held on the society*".³⁶ Around 50% of the official leaders of the Greek Cypriots were re-elected, 19,4% three or more times. Moreover, 32% of all Legislative Council

members were directly related (either father and son, brothers, or uncle and nephew), reflecting the strength of the oligarchy of some influential families. If only the "father-son" and the "brother" categories are counted, 25% of the members of the body belonged to seven families.³⁷ So the Legislative Council consisted of a quite homogeneous group dominated by the traditional patrons, the rich merchant and land-owning families.

But it would be too simplistic to explain this homogeneity just with clientelism. A candidate had to be well off and able to pay for the electoral campaign. It was customary for agents of the candidates to give money in order to secure votes and to hold large feasts in the local coffee shops.³⁸ The level of education and political skills of the candidates were taken into account by many "free" voters as well. Hardly anybody outside the traditional elites was eligible and wealthy enough to run for a seat in the council.³⁹ Given that different positions on decisive political questions - as in 1925 - were rare within the Greek Cypriot elite, "free" voters usually had to decide between rivalling persons rather than diverse political programmes. Elaborated political programmes did not make much sense anyway given that nothing could be realised without British approval and assistance. The obvious powerlessness of the Legislative Council contributed also to the low poll. And the lower the poll the higher the likeliness that a candidate's success was determined by his clientele.

After the nationalist revolt of 1931 the British abolished the Legislative Council and no other similar body replaced it until 1959. Therefore, the already limited possibilities for parts of the Greek Cypriot elites to strengthen their position by giving favours via the central administration of the island were completely eradicated.

The Mukhtar

Since Ottoman times the Mukhtar was an elected member of the village who carried out lower administrative duties such as registration of births, deaths, land transfers, lodging of visiting officials, collection of certain taxes and reporting crimes to the police. Mukhtars remained during British rule the representatives of the government on the village level and at the same time they pursued the interests of the village through their contacts with the leading politicians in the cities and the government. Thus, Mukhtars had obligations toward the villagers but at the same time exercised control over them.⁴⁰

Only very few villagers were qualified for the Mukhtar's office. Literacy was required for the performance of his duties. He also would have to be wealthy enough to extend hospitality to visiting governmental officials. Moreover, his job would have to allow him time for his duties as a Mukhtar.

During the first decades of British rule the Mukhtars were elected by the villagers

as had been the case in Ottoman times. In 1923 the British changed the electoral procedure in order to tighten their control over Mukhtars: the villagers selected or elected a list of persons and gave it to the District Councils ("Mejlis Idare") who chose two persons from the list. The elected members of the Legislative Council selected another three out of the proposed candidates. The Governor finally decided who of the five would eventually become the Mukhtar, while the other four became his advisors. This "odd blend of local election, intermediate and executive selection"⁴¹ encouraged the development of clientelistic relationships between the notables of the village and members of the Legislative Council, whose support was needed in case a villager sought to become Mukhtar. As the most important Greek newspaper, Eleftheria, commented soon after the new law was implemented in 1923, influence, jobbery and bribery became the acknowledged methods for the selection of the Mukhtars.⁴² After the 1931 uprising the Governor changed the system to direct appointment, convinced that many Mukhtars had been disloyal to colonial rule.

A powerful Mukhtar could gain substantial influence and local patron status through his connections within the government, the Legislative Council, and the colonial administration. This enabled him to obtain favours or minor governmental posts for his clients. This local patron position was strengthened by the fact that some Mukhtars were at the same time teachers or brokers. In turn, his influence made him a useful client to potential as well as existing members of the Legislative Council in the constituency to which his village belonged. However, not every Mukhtar managed to become a patron on the local level. To achieve this, a strong personality and sufficient resources were required, as Peter Loizos points out: "*It is likely that only a 'big man' can turn the mukhtar's office into an important patronage position - it is not the case that the office itself inevitably brings much power.*"⁴³

The Orthodox Church

The ottomans had accepted and used the Orthodox Church during their rule as the subordinate authority on the island. Therefore, the Church acquired a double function: it represented the Orthodox Cypriots to the Sultan and at the same time it undertook administrative tasks for the colonial power. Among its duties in the ottoman Millet system was the collection of taxes for the rulers. Moreover, during Ottoman rule many peasants had given their land to the Church as pious donations in order to forestall Ottoman expropriations. Together with the Ottoman notables the Orthodox Church became the biggest landowner in Cyprus. In 1925 the various bodies of Orthodox Church owned still 5,3% of the total acreage under cultivation.⁴⁴

At the same time the Church was the leader of the Greek Orthodox people preserving their Hellenic culture and identity. Kyriacos Markides describes the role of the Church under Ottoman rule as follows: "*In the eyes of the Greeks the Church was not only the symbol of their ethnic and religious identities, but also their protector*

against mistreatment by local officials. Thus, the Church under the Turks gained substantial honour and prestige in Cypriot society. As long as the Turks occupied Cyprus, the Church remained the central institutional sphere around which the political, intellectual, and cultural life of Greek Cypriots revolved."⁴⁵

When the British took over, the political life of the island was centred around the competing of prelates and heads of prominent families for influence and posts within the Church. The Archbishop and the Bishops were the only subjects of popular election beyond a local level. Clientelistic networks were used by the big families to ensure support also in Church politics. As Katsiaounis points out, the heads of these networks mainly lived in the cities: *"Localism had been a significant factor in the formulation of political allegiances; in this context the most significant decisions concerning the community were heavily influenced by the powerful Greek notables in Nicosia."*⁴⁶

Some of the British administrative changes after 1878 offended the clergy. The colonial administration tried to minimise the ethnarchical role of the Church, i.e. being the political and religious leader of the Orthodox Cypriots. The Legislative Council was established, with popularly elected representatives. State support for the collection of the Church dues was no longer granted, as it had been under ottoman rule. In the years after 1878 the income of the Church was reduced to less than one third of what it had been before.⁴⁷ The authority of the Bishops on several issues of the community was taken away. The direct and indirect changes within the Greek-Cypriot community caused by British colonialism were perceived as a threat to the power of the Orthodox Church. The clergy also became alienated from the rulers because they realised during the 1920s that the British would not satisfy their nationalist aspirations. As a result, large parts of the clergy became increasingly hostile towards British rule as did parts of the educated upper class.⁴⁸

The strong political and clientelistic power of the Church had several roots. Ideologically, it was based on the ethnarchical concept of being the political and religious leader of the Orthodox Cypriots. Resistance against the will of the Church signified resistance against the representatives of God in a highly religious society such as Cyprus. Moreover, the Orthodox Church was a major economic force as an employer and landowner. With the exception of the state property, it remained the biggest landowner until the end of British rule. The practice of share-cropping, in which the tenant annually rented the land of the Church and shared the harvest with it was widespread. Given the short-term character of the contracts, tenants could easily be pressured by the local or central leadership of the Church to vote for a certain candidate.

The Church also had influence in the Legislative Council, either by supporting candidates or even directly: out of all Christian members of the Legislative Council ever elected, 7,1% were clergymen.⁴⁹ The Orthodox Church contributed to the costs

of local education over which it exercised a high degree of influence. It was the stronghold of perpetuating Hellenism and therefore anti-British nationalism. Particularly during the second half of British rule it organised and led the movement for union with Greece.

Together with the Orthodox Church the wealthy traders, brokers and lawyers dominated the internal political life of the Greek Cypriots under British rule by virtue of their economic power and their membership in the Legislative Council. However, their influence was limited compared to that of the Church. They could become heads of regional clientelistic networks but only the Church had the organisational structure, moral authority and enough land to be influential in all parts of the island. On the other hand the political power of the Church was limited by the frequent personal and political rivalries and conflicts between its leading members.

Governor R. Stubbs described in 1933 the political and partly clientelistically structured power of the Church as the leader of the nationalist movement. He also shows the typically self-deluding perception of the British colonialists regarding Greek nationalism as an elite phenomenon with no roots in the population: *"The Church is notoriously the worst landlords. And yet its influence persists [...] Of course, as the largest landlord in the country the Church can bring much pressure to bear its tenants [...] In my opinion, if the Church were removed, Philhellenism would die out quickly.*

[...]As regards the Church, I think it is a case not of loving Greece but of hating England, because English rule means the gradual termination of the power to the Church."

The British failed to develop the country's political institutions and as a consequence the Orthodox Church retained its ethnarchical role. Its economic power, based on its large property, also remained untouched. The Church continued to be the leader of the nationalist movement during the struggle for enosis under the leadership of Archbishop Makarios III in the 1950s.

Education

The British preserved the Ottoman system of separate education for the Greek and the Turkish communities of Cyprus. In 1895 the British supported the expansion of education by creating administrative bodies. Heading the school administration was now the Board of Education comprised of a board for Christians and another for Muslims. The Christian Board consisted of the British Chief Secretary to the Government, who chaired the entire board of education, the Archbishop, three Orthodox members of the Legislative Council and six Greeks, each chosen by one of the six District Committees for Education. The District Committees presided over by the British District Commissioners consisted of the Bishop and four representatives

elected by the Greek inhabitants of the district. On the local level, the people of the towns and villages elected their school committees. The important town committees were chaired by the Bishops of their respective episcopate.⁵¹

During the first decades of British rule Greek schools were mainly financed by private fees, subscriptions and Church donations. Even though the government also paid annual grants in aid of the primary schools, official financial assistance was not sufficient so the education depended mostly on the Cypriots' own efforts. In 1901 the British gave school committees permission to raise taxes for financing improvements in education.⁵²

The Board of Education recommended to the High Commissioner which of the schools in the villages should get British grants in aid.⁵³ It also decided together with its subsidiary organisations on district, municipal and village level about employment, salaries, promotions and transfers of teachers. Board members, in particular those of the Legislative Council, could make use of the possibilities of their respective bodies to distribute favours and to create patron-client relationships.⁵⁴ This was encouraged by the fact that the British education policy was characterised by non- interference. However, the possibilities for Board members to give favours was limited by the role of the British officials in the Board of Education and in the District Committees.

The teacher was an important figure in village politics: According to Surridge, *"he was the party 'boss' in politics and was forced to bow the knee to the local Member of the Legislative Council to whom, not infrequently, he owed his appointment."*⁵⁵ Teachers were therefore an important part of the clientelistic network on the local level. Their career often depended on their political patron.

Education, particularly through those secondary school teachers who were trained in Greece or were mainland Greeks, transmitted the nationalist ideals to the ordinary people. Their loyalty to the nationalist Greek-Cypriot elites was thereby secured. A report of the British colonial administration in 1929 describes the power of the Board and the impact of nationalism in the schools: *"As the Board has complete power over the schools with respect to salaries, appointments, promotions, and all other administrative matters, it is an important body in the life of the Island. [...]. The main criticisms levelled against it are[...]:*

1. *The Board of Education has been turned by the local politicians into a political machine. The politicians control the teachers. [...]*

2. *The schools through the operations of this system are turned into hotbeds of anti-British propaganda. The children of the Island are therefore being brought up on a curriculum which may in future have serious political effects if nothing is done to check it."*⁵⁶

A further pursuit of a laissez-faire policy in education could in the long run

endanger British rule. Moreover, this system encouraged the development of clientelistic networks. In 1929 Governor Ronald Storrs finally put an end to it: *"The method of appointing, transferring and dismissing teachers, male and female, by the Greek Members of Council was open to grave objections. The politicians too often exercised their power for political or petty personal aims. The teacher was usually the only educated man in the village; as a political agent he was therefore almost indispensable to the politicians, who were exclusively town-dwellers. Being dependent upon the politicians for advancement in his profession he had to serve the political purposes of his masters. This system was bad, but had been tolerated, partly because the Government had lacked the financial means to pay the teachers itself."*⁵⁷ Storrs handed over the authority to make decisions about appointments, promotions, transfers and salaries of elementary teachers from the educational boards to government officials.⁵⁸ After 1929 the possibilities of creating patron-client relationships on the primary school level came under the exclusive control of the British administration.

After the 1931 uprising the British made an attempt to fight nationalist education in the schools. In all primary schools the subject of Greek history was removed from the curriculum and English language lessons were obligatory. The Orthodox Church as the guardian of Hellenistic culture and many Greek Cypriots regarded this as an attack against their national identity. But the British measure had to fail for financial reasons. With the exception of small governmental grants in aid, the British were neither able nor willing to cover the expenditures of secondary schools and pay the salaries of the teachers. The urban secondary schools were able to raise substantial fees from their students, so in their majority they remained financially and politically independent of the British authorities despite tighter control during their dictatorial rule between 1931 and 1940. Thus, secondary education was mostly influenced by the mainland Greek Ministry of Education. The curriculum was the same as that of Greece and nationalism was reinforced by mainland Greek teachers.⁵⁹

The Decline of Traditional Forms of Clientelism - the Rise of Mass Politics

The End of the Money-Lending System

Changes caused by two conflicts weakened the merchant-moneylender networks in a long process starting in the 1920s. The merchants and moneylenders were part of the Greek elites who came into conflict with the colonial government about *enosis*. The other conflict arose between the Greek elites and the developing agricultural and working class movements partly led by the newly founded Communist Party of Cyprus.

In 1917 the British administration appointed a commission of enquiry for the problem of rural indebtedness. They decided to enact laws in 1919 which apart from

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

their apparent usefulness in reducing indebtedness were aimed at the indirect reduction of the political power of the money-lending members of the nationalist Greek elites. The maximum interest rates for credits was limited to 12% by law. It was now also possible to challenge excessive interest rates in court. Merchants were obliged to keep records about their financial transactions, including debts, credits and bonds under the supervision of a Court officer. The forced sale of a rural debtor's property was limited - enough land had to be left to him to support himself and his family.⁶⁰

In reality the laws of 1919 proved to be counterproductive, as the governmental survey edited by 8. J. SurrIDGE in 1929 reports: "*The immediate result of the 1919 Laws was restriction of credit which in its turn led to the selling up by creditors of the immovable property of their debtors, an increase in the number of landless peasants and a general lowering of commercial morality*".⁶¹ The farmers still had no alternative or better sources of credit. Therefore, they could risk the hostility of their only financial source by taking their creditors to court. Consequently the situation of the indebted peasant had worsened since 1919.

When the enosis movement became more active in the 1920s the British started to take serious measures against the potential danger for their rule from the political and economic dependency of the peasants on the moneylenders. In the British perception the peasants were misguided by the nationalist elites and once the influence of the elites on the peasants could be reduced, they would only care about their everyday life and not about politics.⁶² Therefore, the British now seriously tried to set up agricultural village co-operatives and credit societies in order to weaken the dependency of the peasants and to increase productivity. Their first attempt in this direction had been the "Co-operative Credit Societies Law" in 1914, allowing villages to set up their own credit societies, giving their members long term credits at reasonable interest rates.⁶³ But the number and importance of co-operative credit societies remained on a very low level due to the lack of governmental financial support until 1925, when finally the British, following popular demand, set up an Agricultural Bank.⁶⁴ The political aim was to break the influence of moneylenders by giving reasonable long term loans at an interest rate of 4% to the co-operative credit societies. From the economic perspective rural indebtedness was also regarded as the main source of widespread peasant apathy while an increase of productivity was important to the British. In the early years however, the money the co-operative societies borrowed from the Agricultural Bank was used not so much for co-operative purposes but for the payment of old loans to moneylenders.⁶⁵

Nevertheless the co-operative societies slowly began to undermine the dominance of the moneylenders and brokers in the agricultural market by starting to sell their products themselves. In addition, the British at long last transferred the main tax burden away from the peasants to the traders: in 1926 they abolished the

cereal tithes and imposed higher taxes on imports and exports instead.⁶⁶

After 1925 the number of co-operative societies increased rapidly: while in 1925 only 29 co-operative credit societies existed, there were 318 by 1929.⁶⁷ But according to a British memorandum, in 1929 still 80% of the peasants were indebted to moneylenders.⁶⁸ The British measures could not destroy the merchant-moneylender system yet, but they could reduce its influence by breaking the money-lending and product-selling monopoly of the brokers and merchants. While before most farmers were indebted to a private moneylender, they could now get money for long-term credits at reasonable interest rates from other sources as well such as the credit society or the local bank.⁶⁹

The anti-clientelistic aims of the British measures and their limitations were summed up in a report of the colonial administration in 1929: *"The power of the usurer will inevitably continue, but not to the extent of enabling him to dictate the choice of the voter [...]. His power however is already in the process of abatement owing to the operations of the Agricultural Bank and the co-operative Credit Societies and in several cases moneylenders have recently found it necessary to reduce their rate of interest in order to retain their business."*⁷⁰

But the British reforms were not comprehensive yet. Given that the Agricultural Bank lent money to the co-operative societies only for long term loans there were no funds for short term loans. Therefore, even members of the co-operative societies who had managed to transfer their debts to the Agricultural Bank fell back into the hands of moneylenders. During the 1930-1933 economic depression the repaying capacity of members was considerably reduced as they were pressed for the repayment of their debts by both the Agricultural Bank and the moneylenders. Again many farmers lost their land.⁷¹

A new phase in the history of the co-operative societies started with their reorganisation in 1935. A British "Registrar of Co-operative Societies"⁷² was appointed and a Department of Co-operation was introduced. The aim was to promote the co-operative idea and to monitor the existing co-operative societies. They soon managed to increase the spreading and effectiveness of the co-operatives:⁷³ while in 1934 16.000 peasants were members of co-operatives, their number had almost doubled in 1942: about 29.000 peasants organised themselves in 362 co-operative societies. In 1954 759 co-operative societies existed with a membership of 131.604 i.e. almost all peasants were members of co-operative societies.⁷⁴ the 445 credit societies with 74.772 members in 1954 there were 210 consumer or store societies which distributed the products of the co-operative societies (before 1945 only 18 co-operative retail stores existed), 29 Savings Banks, 29 producers' marketing and processing co-operatives and various other specialised co-operatives.

The inability of the Agricultural Bank and the co-operative credit societies to

provide the peasants with short term loans led in 1937 to the establishment of the Co-operative Central Bank. A few years later medium-term credits were also given. The Bank was financed by deposits from co-operative societies and the British Barclays Bank.

Apart from increasing agricultural productivity and improving the living standard of the rural population, the various reforms aimed also at taking the sources of economic and political influence away from the moneylenders. But although the financial situation of the Cypriot peasant continuously improved from 1936 onwards, in 1940 low peasant productivity was still the result of high debts and the low prospects of paying them off: *"The mass of long-term debt owed to money-lenders constitutes the most serious burden on the country [...] that since the loans often included no provision for repayment, the usurer looked on them as an investment and the client remained as heavily indebted as ever after years of work, consequently, it was only natural that peasants lacked interest in improving productivity."*⁷⁵

The old network created out of friendship and economic dependency led by the traditional elites still controlled the majority of the rural society.⁷⁶ In 1940 the British finally decided to attack the core of the problem. The agricultural commission created in 1940 a "Debt Settlement Board" and "Rural Debtors Courts" to enforce the process of alleviating the burden of peasant indebtedness by enforcing fairer interest rates on their old debts. Some debts were discounted by 30% and the period of repayment was limited to a maximum of 15 years in annual instalments. Debts due to the Government, the co-operative societies and the Agricultural Bank remained untouched. The whole burden of debt reduction had been borne by the private creditor without any compensation from the state.⁷⁷ According to Attalides, some of the brokers and moneylenders lost so much money that they went out of business.⁷⁸

During the five years of its existence the Debt Settlement Board helped about a third of all peasants to reduce their debts. The rates of interest on any debt or obligation contracted after 1944 were now finally fixed on a maximum of 9%, signalling the end of usury. In addition, a strong increase in the prices of agricultural products as well as inflationary tendencies during the Second World War enabled many peasants to repay their debts.⁷⁹

After 1945 the trend towards debt reduction was reversed and rural debts increased rapidly again. But this time for different reasons: debts were mainly caused by the purchase of agricultural machinery and water pumps during the post-war years, when those goods were available again. Agricultural land previously obtained by moneylenders through foreclosure, was in the majority of cases purchased back by the farmers during the post-war years. High peasant indebtedness was now a sign of improved standard of living. It also reflected the confidence of the farmers in the continuation of the agricultural boom of the war years. But since many peasants

became excessively indebted they soon had to face serious problems again. Given that money was now lent mainly by co-operative credit societies and the Agricultural or Co-operative Central Bank dependency on private moneylenders was not renewed on a large scale.

In a 1955 report on rural welfare the Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W. G. Alexander, describes the success of the British policy in fighting moneylenders through the co-operative movement: *"The moneylenders have definitely lost their strong hold over the villages and some of them left the village or changed occupation and deposited their surplus money with the co-operative movement. They have been replaced by the co-operative societies which enabled the farmers to obtain credit on reasonable terms. (...) The farmer unlike the old days, was freed from all sorts of exploitation."*⁶⁰

The success of the co-operative movement and the British measures to reduce peasant indebtedness and economic dependency finally destroyed most of the money-lending and broker networks. Moneylenders and usury continued to exist but after 1940 their influence declined rapidly. Merchants and moneylenders were no longer strong enough to create politically decisive clientelistic networks on a broader scale. Ideologically based loyalty and other forms of patron-client relationships had to replace economic dependency in order for the elite to maintain its leading role in the community.

The Rise of Communism

After 1878 several rural crises led to waves of expropriations and increased social problems. In particular after the First World War, when the prices of agricultural products dropped, many indebted peasants lost their land to usurers. Many of the expropriated peasants became part of the local labour market, seeking jobs in the new and fast growing mining industry while others emigrated. When the war ended large parts of the lower strata desired a policy that would solve the social problems and put an end to colonial rule. However, most members of the traditional leadership refused to demand substantial social reforms which would have damaged their own interests. This caused tension between the elites and the mass of the poor peasants. But the Greek community, including the lower strata, remained closed around their traditional leadership, because of the possibility that a post-war settlement would lead to enosis. When the elite-controlled nationalist movement became stronger after the First World War, demanding enosis but no social reforms, an increasing number of people realised that they could not expect much help from their leaders in fighting the social problems of the island.

Therefore, in the early 1920s the Greek labour class - poorer peasants, sharecroppers, artisans, miners and other wage earners - started to organise itself by

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

founding trade unions.⁸¹ Following several unsuccessful attempts to create a communist movement in Cyprus in the early 1920s, some bourgeois intellectuals founded in 1924 a club for workers in Limassol. They soon attracted workers and farmers' unions around Limassol. The club published a newspaper under the name "Neos Anthropos" (New Man), which called itself the mouthpiece of the Communist Party of Cyprus. In August 1926, 20 Cypriot Communists formally established the Communist Party of Cyprus (KKK= Kommounistikon Komma Kyprou).⁸³

The social base of the early communist movement led by bourgeois intellectuals was the politically and economically unsatisfied workers and peasants. The aim was to organise them in trade unions. In the following years the KKK established itself as a political force in Cyprus by organising several successful strikes and gaining supporters.

They were opposed to the Greek Cypriot elites as well as to British colonial rule, whom they blamed for poor social conditions. The atheist,⁸⁴ anti-capitalist and revolutionary ideology was a threat to the Church and the privileged groups. The conflict between the communists and the Greek Cypriot elites was used by the British in their effort to apply the method of 'divide and rule' within the Greek society.⁸⁵

Until 1929 the KKK policy favoured unspecified autonomy for Cyprus. It tried to unite the Greek and Turkish communities against British rule, neither excluding nor supporting enosis. In the ensuing years it followed in the question of enosis a see-saw policy between the demand for union with Greece and Cypriot autonomy. The communist party in Cyprus remained during large parts of British rule mainly a Greek Cypriot party, accused of being "not Greek", when it did not pursue enosis. Their policy was strongly influenced by the Communist Party of Greece and the Comintern but also by events such as the revolt of 1931.⁸⁶

In 1929 the KKK started a campaign against the nationalist Church and the bourgeoisie, supporting the establishment of a socialist republic in Cyprus. Two years later, in 1931, the communists took part in the anti-British uprising and their leaders strongly supported enosis.⁸⁷ As a consequence of the revolt the KKK and the trade unions were proscribed in 1931. But despite their proscription it was the communists who organised and controlled the trade unions after their legalisation in 1936.⁸⁸

The Second World War brought about major changes which had an important effect on the socio-economic development of Cyprus. A pre-war population increase and the war itself led to a rapid urbanisation and industrialisation. The economic growth caused social changes: Before 1945-46 most people worked in the agricultural sector. Until 1931 the number of town-dwellers remained about the same (in 1881 17%, in 1931 19% of the population). From 1945 to 1960 the urban population increased by 80%.⁸⁹ Now an urban working class emerged and

membership in trade unions organised by the communists went up from 2.544 in 1939 to 12.961 in 1945.⁹⁰

Although the communists always enjoyed greater support in the cities, their power increased in the more conservative and traditional rural areas as well. After the legalisation of parties in 1941 a new left - but originally not communist - party AKEL (Anorthotikon Komma Ergazomenou Laou = Progressive Party of the Working People) was founded, which was turned within half a year into a Leninist party. AKEL coexisted with the old, more orthodox KKK, which was absorbed by the new party three years later. In 1943 the strength of the communist movement became evident in the first municipal elections after the 1931 revolt. The communists won the majority of seats in Famagusta and Limassol and the mayors of both cities were members of AKEL. Even greater was communist success in the municipal elections of 1946: AKEL candidates became mayors of the four biggest cities in Cyprus (Nicosia, Limassol, Famagusta and Larnaca). The communist party had been the only political party which supported social and economic reforms convincingly. Communism was therefore bound to become a mass movement. After the Second World War it became the strongest communist party outside a socialist country.

The grass roots of communism in Cyprus were the trade unions and in particular their umbrella organisation PSE (Pankypria Syntechniaki Epitropi = Pan-Cyprian Committee of Workers), founded in 1941.⁹¹ The farmers' associations organised by the leftists also gained strong influence in the agricultural co-operative movement.⁹²

The political right founded its own trade unions and farmers' associations in an attempt to counterbalance communist strength. Left and right wing farmers' associations organised collective sales in the post war years, thereby facilitating the reduction of economic dependency of peasants on single merchants and therefore potential patrons.

Gradually, political loyalty of many workers and peasants was not so much connected by personal connection with a patron but by their direct affiliation with the left or right political camp instead. Attalides sums up the result as follows: "*Social changes during the war made possible horizontal peasant coalitions. The struggle between groupself/ing schemes and merchants indicates an attempt by peasant producers to alter their articulation with the market. In this they were helped by the fact that AKEL existed as a national party with a strong base in the urban areas. They were also helped by the fact that as a counter to Communist influence the Church also promoted the creation of peasant associations. These conflicts resulted in the increasing separating of individual economic linkage and political control.*"⁹³

This development affected the clientelistic structures decisively. The British administrative changes after 1925 and the rise of the communist movement contributed significantly to the breakdown of the economic basis for patron-client relationships built on money-lending and the monopoly on selling and distributing the

clients' products. Money-lending continued to exist. But as a source of political dependency its influence was not comparable to the pre Second World War years.

With the exception of the municipalities, the communists - like the political right - remained excluded from administrative power and could not distribute much rousfeti until the end of British rule. But within the trade unions, farmers' associations and, after 1943, on the municipal level, communist leaders could give favours and offer posts to their supporters. Furthermore, higher education in socialist countries granted to members of AKEL ensured their loyalty. Communist support was therefore based on both political conviction and the new form of party patronage.

Nationalism as a Source of Loyalty

British rule brought social, political and economic changes in the direction of a modern, capitalist and secular society. These changes posed a threat to the power of the old ruling elites and the Orthodox Church. Their traditional ways of ensuring power and loyalty through economic dependency and clientelism gradually weakened. The reinforcement of nationalism in the Greek community from the 1920s onwards - mainly through education and the Church - was therefore also used by the Greek elites as an alternative source of political loyalty to economic dependency. Consequently, it also became a means to fight the growing communist movement. This dual function of nationalism soon made it the most important linkage between the elites and the ordinary people.⁹⁴ But despite the political and socio-economic changes some of the old patron-client relationships were still present in the 1950s: *"Patron-client ties reminiscent of the period of unchallenged brokerage co-existed with ideological appeals from right-wing nationalist and left-wing parties, each claiming to represent the interests of the producers."*⁹⁵

With the exception of a brief period after the 1922 Greek defeat in Asia Minor, nationalism in Cyprus had been increasing rapidly since the end of the First World War, when the long desired union with Greece seemed possible in the context of a post-war settlement. The need to promote and organise the demand for *enosis* led in 1921 to the foundation of the "Political Organisation of Cyprus" by the Greek Orthodox Church and parts of the Greek-Cypriot elites.

The Political Organisation created a network that covered the whole island. This network was comprised of the National Council, Executive Committee, District and Municipal committees. The National Council was the highest committee of the Political Organisation. It consisted of 46 persons: the Archbishop, the metropolis of Paphos, Kition, Kyrenia and the abbot of Kykko monastery were ex-officio members. One member was elected by the primary and secondary schoolteachers. The other 40 were elected indirectly in six voting districts by representatives of the residents of each parish. Every Greek Cypriot over 21 had the right to vote and every Greek over

25 was eligible. The National Council considered itself the representative of the entire Greek community in the effort to achieve union with Greece: "*The National Council represents the Greek people of Cyprus in all matters generally concerning the promotion of the purposes of the Political Organisation, has the Political and Financial Management of the Cyprus Struggle...*"⁹⁶ The Executive Committee consisted of five members, announced annually by the National Council. Its duties were to carry out the Council's decisions, transmit them to the District Committees and to control the finances. The six District Committees consisted of the local Bishop, the abbots of the monasteries of the district, the local members of the National Council and the Greek mayors of the cities and bigger villages of the district. The president of the teachers' association of the district and the editors of the Greek newspapers who lived there also had a seat. The committees were always chaired by the Bishop. On the municipal level, the local priest, the members of the school committees and the teachers of the area formed the committee.⁹⁷

The dominance of the Church in the National Council, the District and Municipal Committees is striking. On all levels the people of influence and prestige, potential and real patrons, were members of the committees. The Political Organisation of Cyprus was therefore the umbrella organisation linking the nationalist elites and the Church in their struggle for *enosis*.

The National Council followed a policy of non co-operation with the government achieving an almost complete abstention of the electorate from the elections for the Legislative Council in 1922 and 1923. But soon conflicts within the body resulted in a significant loss of its prestige. In the following years the activities of the National Council were limited to the level of speeches and proclamations.⁹⁸ Moreover, the immediate improvement of the economic conditions of the lower class was not on the agenda of the elite-controlled Political Organisation, as Katsiaounis points out: "*The leaders of the National Council offered no outlet to the distress of rural smallholders and the labouring strata in the towns. To the mass of the population this was the cardinal weakness of the National Council.*" In the perspective of National Council it was the achievement of *enosis* that would pave the way for social, economic and political reforms.

The National Council ensured by its influence and clientelistic power, that most successful candidates in the elections of 1925 and 1930 were also members of the body.¹⁰⁰ By the end of the 1920s the prestige of the National Council was re-established. In 1931 its influence was described by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs as follows: "*The National Organisation appears to bear the same relationship to the Greek elected Members as does the Third International to the Soviet Government, that is to say they play into each other's hands and into those of the Church, while the organisations shoulders responsibility for utterances and actions too overtly hostile to the Government to be publicly reconcilable even with that minimum of co-*

operation conceded by the Legislative Council."¹⁰¹

But in autumn 1931 old as well as new conflicts and rivalries paralysed the body again. On 17 October, one day before the outbreak of the 1931 revolt, it finally dissolved.¹⁰² The nationalist riots of 1931 proved that despite the failure of the Political Organisation the attempt of the nationalist elites to instil the desire for enosis to the ordinary people had been successful. Conversely, the British attempts in the 1920s to detach the "apolitical" masses from the nationalist Greek Cypriot elites proved to be a complete failure. In 1931 the British had to learn that their perception of nationalism as purely an elite phenomenon in the 1920s had been wrong. The people followed the Church and the nationalist elites against the British rulers under the slogan of *enosis*. In fact, the masses mobilised themselves to such a degree that the violence that occurred was largely against the caution of their leaders, who - with the exception of the electoral boycott in 1922/23 - had always been moderate in their choice of means.

The nationalist movement gradually succeeded in its effort to make the desire for enosis indistinguishable from "being Greek" for most Orthodox Cypriots including the communists.¹⁰³ After 1931 any Greek Cypriot who was opposed to enosis denied automatically his Greek identity. Particularly in the years after 1945, when the Greek Cypriots legitimately expected that their national aspirations would be respected by the colonial power as it was the case in other parts of their empire, British intransigence reinforced the nationalist feelings of many Greek Cypriots. Nationalist ideology had become a new strong link between the elites and the rest of the Greek Cypriot population.

New Potential Sources of Clientelism after 1941

Political Parties

The process of forming a party system in Cyprus in the 1920s was stopped by the British as a consequence of the revolt of 1931. The communist-dominated trade unions and co-operative societies remained the only important organisations under the control of Cypriots until 1941. Not only were these new organisations of labourers and farmers independent of traditional clientelistic relationships but they also contributed decisively to their dissolution.

To secure maximum Cypriot support in the Second World War, the British liberalised the dictatorial rule they had imposed on the island since the 1931 revolt. In 1941 they reinstated some basic freedoms including party formation. To counter the influence of the left party AKEL, the political right founded the KEK (Kypriakon Ethnikon Komma :::: Cypriot National Party) which was based on the idea of *enosis* and enjoyed the support of the traditional elites.

Parties were now allowed to take part in municipal elections. Ideological polarisation and the universal suffrage for men led to the rise of mass politics. The large electorate could no longer be bound by the traditional clientelistic relationships, which had become insignificant due to the British measures anyway. With the exception of sectors of municipal politics, the parties had no possibility to distribute favours on an administrative level. Favours could only be given within the trade unions and farmers' organisations or, in the case of AKEL, by granting education to party members in socialist countries. Therefore, the size of the electorate, on the one hand, and the limited access of the parties to the administration, on the other, prevented them from creating clientelistic relationships on a large scale. Ideological conviction became the most important means to ensure political support which could not be gained by party patronage alone.

EOKA

After 1955 the Church-led nationalist demand for *enosis* culminated in the violent struggle of an underground organisation, EOKA (Ethniki Organosi Kyprion Agoniston = National Organisation of Cypriot Fighters) against British rule. During the anti-colonial struggle EOKA created a new powerful network, based both on the widely accepted idea that its members were the only "true" fighters for *enosis* and the use of force against those who did not share its views or did not respect its authority. Despite the fact that most of the young EOKA fighters had not been part of the elites,¹⁰⁵ they quickly gained political influence. They often replaced the old elites as power-holders on the local level as Attalides describes: *"The young men who had joined EOKA acquired the power to assert themselves over all the forces which were locally competing for power before their appearance. But at the opening stage of the anti-colonial campaign it was free-floating power and not attached to social institutions other than the organisation of violence and the legitimisation of the nationalist ideology."*¹⁰⁶ At the same time the right wing organisation, EOKA, also turned against AKEL which by supporting *enosis* only through peaceful means lost influence over the lower strata.

Many "homines novi" emerged from the EOKA struggle as powerful political figures. Those nationalist EOKA veterans enjoyed the support of many Greek Cypriots who prior to the liberation struggle had been loyal to the traditional elites. Ironically, by challenging the traditional elites and their social power, nationalism undermined the position of those who had led the struggle for *enosis* also to preserve their position as leaders of the Greek community. After 1959 new clientelistic networks developed around those EOKA veterans who became an important part of the new political elite in the transitional government and, after 1960, in the independent Republic of Cyprus.¹⁰⁷

Summary and Conclusions

As soon as the British took over the administration of the island in 1878 they formed a new political system introducing Western European institutions and values into the political culture of Cyprus such as the eradication of administrative corruption and arbitrariness and the establishment of an equitable justice system. These measures, although initially introduced to ensure efficiency, were at the same time hostile to the existing clientelistic structures.

In the British administrative system there were only a few prestigious offices accessible through elections and usable for distributing favours. The most important office until 1931 was membership in the Legislative Council. But with the exception of teachers and Mukhtars, relatively few people owed their job, promotion or other favours to members of this body. Although the Legislative Council was the only political institution which could have enabled its Greek Cypriot members to develop islandwide clientelistic networks, its limited resources and strict British control made that practically impossible. Therefore, most of the patron-client relationships under British rule were built outside the administration mainly on economic dependency on a local or regional level.

In the 1920s the British started to regard nationalist tendencies among the Greek elites as a threat to their rule. By introducing different political and economic reforms, the colonial rulers tried to cut off clientelistic links between the nationalist elites and the rural masses, whom they considered apolitical and misguided. The limited possibilities of the Greek elites to distribute favours in the administration were finally taken away from them. Moreover, on the economic level the British fought the dependency of the peasants on merchants and moneylenders. Their measures gradually led to the destruction of the traditional clientelistic networks. However much to the displeasure of the British, the economic and therefore also political liberation of the peasants could not prevent enosis-nationalism from becoming rooted in the Greek Cypriot community.

During the dictatorial period between 1931 and 1941 no political parties existed and no elections were held. This made the use of clientelistic networks impossible. In 1941, when a party system was established, the increasing importance of communist and nationalist ideology became evident. Conviction and to a lesser extent the new clientelistic form of party patronage had replaced traditional forms of clientelism as the main source of political loyalty.

British policy had unintentionally prepared the ground for the rise of communism and a nationalist movement leading to the EOKA struggle. Both AKEL and, ironically, also EOKA were hostile to the surviving clientelistic structures. After 1959 new political leaders emerged from the EOKA struggle some of whom were not part of the old elite. By the end of British rule clientelism was no longer the decisive means to ensure political support. After independence it re-emerged initially around the new

powerholders most of whom were former EOKA fighters. The ensuing establishment of a party system led to the formation of clientelistic relationships based on party patronage. However, clientelism never shaped the political culture of Cyprus as decisively as that of Greece.

The institutions and values established by the 82-year British rule have limited the extent of clientelism until today. The newly founded Cypriot state retained almost unchanged the British administrative system. However, traditional clientelistic patterns such as favouritism and nepotism as well as political party patronage are also prevalent in the small and closed Cypriot society. These features continue to coexist with the British values of non-corruption, meritocracy and efficiency in shaping the political culture of modern Cyprus.

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CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

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Ideologischer Nationalismus und Machtbehauptung im Kalkül konkurrierender Eliten. Stuttgart, Franz Steiner, pp. 48-49.

2. Legg, K.R. (1969) *Politics in Modern Greece*. Stanford, Stanford University Press, pp. 38-39. Legg describes the clientelistic system of Greece, which in terms of the internal structure of the relationship was the same as that of Cyprus.

3. Lande, C.H. (1977) 'The Dyadic Basis of Clientelism', in Schmidt, S. (ed) *Friends, Followers and Factions*. London, p. XIV.

4. In Greece a patron was often the godfather of hundreds of people. This ensured their loyalty as long as he fulfilled his commitments.

5. Almond, G.A. and Bingham Powell Jr. G. (1966) *Comparative Politics. A Developmental Approach*. Boston Little, quoted from: Legg, *Modern Greece*, p. 33.

6. Lemerchand, R. and Legg, K. (1972) 'Political Clientelism and Development', in *Comparative Politics*. No. 4, p. 149.

7. Richter, H.A. (1996) 'The Political Culture of Cyprus', in Charalambous, J. Serafis, M. and Timini, E. (eds.) *Cyprus and the European Union: a Challenge*. London, University of London Press, pp. 104-105.

8. Legg, *Modern Greece*, p. 34.

9. Richter, *Political Culture*, p. 105.

10. Katsiaounis, R. (1995) 'Social and Political Change in Cyprus: 1878-1924', in *Epetiris tou Kentrou Epistimonikon Erevnon, XX/*. Nicosia, p. 223.

11. There are authors who have dealt extensively with clientelism in Cyprus during British rule: Michael Attalidis, Jeanette Choisi, Rolandos Katsiaounis, Peter Loizos and Heinz Richter.

12. Georghallides, G.S. (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926, with a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule*. Nicosia, Zavallis, p. 37.

13. Christodoulou sums up information on rural indebtedness during British rule. Rural debts were estimated around the end of the nineteenth century at £150.000, Surr ridge put it at the end of the 1920's at £1.800.000, Oakden in the mid-1930s at £2.000.000 and Lanitis in 1940 at £2.329.000. Christodoulou, D. (1959) *The Evolution of the Rural Land Use Pattern in Cyprus*. London, Taylor & Co., p. 92.

14. Storrs, R. (1939) *Orientalions*. London, Nicholson & Watson, p. 491. The colonial survey was conducted for the whole island in 1927-28 and prepared by the Commissioner of Larnaca, B.J. Surr ridge. According to the survey out of the 59.175 peasants in Cyprus 48.513 (or 82%) were indebted. The lower the estimated value of property the higher the percentage of debtors became. Out of the mass of small and smaller landowners around 85% were indebted. Their average debt was £10 for

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

property of estimated value lower than £50 (14.177 debtors), £19 for property between £50 and £100 (8.468 debtors and 27 for property between £100 and £150 (6.262 debtors). According to Hill, the average annual per capita income was £10 in 1927. It is evident that most small landowners were heavily indebted and that their financial strain made it very difficult for them to pay off their debts. Hill, Sir G. (1972) *A History of Cyprus*. Vol. IV.: *The Ottoman Province, The British Colony 1571-1948*. Cambridge, University Press, p. 459.

Around 80% of the bigger landowners were also indebted. The average debt was £36 for property valued between £150 and £200 (6.032 debtors or 81%); £48 for property between £200 and £300 (5.424 debtors or 79%) and £69 for property between £300 and £400 (4.009 debtors or 80%). Even 74% of the big landowners with property worth more than £400 (4.141 debtors) had average debts of £125. SurrIDGE, B. J. (1930) *A Survey of Rural Life in Cyprus*. Nicosia, Government Printing Office, p. 37.

Lanitis compared average indebtedness with the estimated value of the peasants' property. For the two lower categories average indebtedness was 33% (estimated value of property up to £50) and 25% (estimated value of property up to £100). Indebtedness of landowners in the remaining higher categories was considerably lower (between 19 and 21%). The real debt burden for the small and smaller landowners was even higher, given that the same amount of money possesses a relatively higher value for poor than for wealthy people. Lanitis, N.C. (1944) *Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus*. Limassol, pp. 26-27.

15. Attalides, M.A. (1977) 'Forms of Peasant Incorporation in Cyprus during the Last Century', in Gellner, E. and Waterbury, J. (eds.) *Patrons and Clients*. London, Duckworth, p. 141.

16. Lanitis, *op. cit.*, p. 10.

17. According to the General Survey, out of the 4.175.324 donums of alienated land 222.296 donums were owned by the Orthodox Church. Christodoulou, *op.cit.* p.74.

In the last years of British rule about 16% of the cultivated land was leased to small farmers. According to the Annual Report for Cyprus in 1959, 5% of the agricultural land was on short leases (1 or 2 years), 5% for longer terms and 6% was share cropped. Colonial Office (ed.) (1960) *Report for the Year 1959*. London, Her Majesty's Stationary Office, p. 31. According to Christodoulou, sharecropping was much more common before the abolition of the tithe by the British in 1926, for it enabled a precise estimate of the entire crop. Christodoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 83.

18. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

19. Attalides assumes that the motive was Western secularism. Furthermore, it seems a fair assumption that it was not in the British interest to use a powerful institution such as the church, which was hard to control and whose support was strengthened through religious loyalty, as a representative of the Orthodox Cypriots. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 139.

20. Between 1878 and 1883 all the members of the Legislative Council were nominated directly by the High Commissioner, from 1883 until its abolition in 1931 they were elected. Dischler, L. (1960) *Die Zypernfrage*. Dokumente XXXIII. Frankfurt/M. Alfred Metzner, p. 11.

21. Due to the Anglo-Turkish ratification of the Treaty of Lausanne, Cyprus became a British Crown colony and so the title of the highest British official changed from High Commissioner to Governor in 1925.

22. There were three classes of *verghis*: a tax of 4 per 1.000 on the registered value of land, houses and other immovable property, a tax of 4% on the rent of all property not occupied by its owner and a tax of 3% on trade profits and salaries. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, p. 25.

23. Katsiaounis, R. (1996) *Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century*. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Center, p. 85.

24. *Ibid.*, p. 86. By 1906 still little more than 20.000 out of a population of 235.000 had the right to vote. Loizos, P. (1975) *The Greek Gift: Politics in a Cypriot Village*. Oxford, Basil Blackwell, p. 31.

25. Larnaca-Famagusta, Nicosia-Kyrenia and Limassol-Paphos.

26. Some examples out of the year 1883: The polling station of Limassol served 56 villages. Lefka was the polling station for villages in a very remote area. Katsianounis, *Social Change*, p. 228.

27. SAI/3829. Merton King, Commissioner of Nicosia to Falk Warren, Chief Secretary, on 8 November 1886.

28. CO 67/165. The Commissioner of Kyrenia W. N. Bolton to Charles Orr, Chief Secretary, on the 5 January 1912.

29. CO 67/210. Stevenson to Devonshire on the 24 October 1923.

30. See notes 33 and 39 for the boycott policy of the National Council and the composition of the Legislative council from 1921/22 to 1925.

31. Six were lawyers (S. Stavrinnakis, G. Hadji Pavlou, K. P. Rossides, P. L. Cacoyiannis, S. Pavlides, P. Ioannides), two merchants (C. Fieros, L. Pierides) and one, N. Mylonas, was the Bishop of Kition. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, pp. 433-452 (Biographical Notes).

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

32. Georghallides, G.S. (1985) *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs. The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*. Nicosia, Zavallis, pp. 380-381.

33. Eight members of the Legislative Council between 1922 and 1925 were not included in most parts of the survey for several reasons. Two of them were Maronite church officials who were elected as non-Muslim members during the Greek Cypriot boycott of the 1922 elections. Out of the seven Greek Members, picked by the government to fill the empty seats in 1923, six were excluded too, due to massive abstention from their election and its exceptional conditions. Lyssiotis regards it as improper to include the six in the political class studied. Only one of the seven, who was re-elected in "regular" elections was included in the survey. Lyssiotis, M. (1990) 'An Analysis of the Cyprus Legislative Council', in *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 2, No. 2, p. 57.

34. Lawyers were usually the sons of big landowners or merchants, because only they could afford to give their children a university education abroad. Many of them depended on moneylenders, whom they represented in trials against insolvent peasants. They were also hired to threaten debtors that they would take legal action against them if they were late in paying off their debts. Choisi, *Wurzeln*, p. 108.

35. Out of the 30 lawyers seven were big landowners and/or merchants, two owned a factory and one was a bank manager. From the 11 merchants six were big landowners and/or lawyers. Lyssiotis, *op.cit.*, pp. 62-64.

36. *Ibid.*, p. 64.

37. *Ibid.*, pp. 59-66.

38. Loizos, *Greek Gift*, p. 35. Storrs reports that in 1930 election expenses of some members exceeded (illegally) £4.000. Storrs, *op. cit.*, p. 527.

39. The bad impression seven members of the Legislative Council (called therefore "*heptadics*") left in the collective memory of the Greek Cypriots until today, proves this: In 1921 the traditional nationalist leadership had successfully organised a boycott of the 1922 elections for the Legislative Council. Defying their leadership some hardly literate Cypriots finally ran and were elected in 1923, despite the small number of votes they got. These seven members were completely overtaxed with their duties in the Legislative Council and had hardly anything constructive to say in the lawmaking process. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, pp. 248-249 and Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, p. 240.

40. Loizos, P. (1977) 'Politics and Patronage in a Cypriot Village, 1920-1970', in Gellner, E. and Waterbury J. (eds.) *Patrons and Clients*. London, Duckworth, p. 122.

41. *Ibid.*, p. 122.

42. *Eleftheria*, 19 September 1923, quoted from Georghallides, *Political and*

Administrative History, p. 291.

43. Loizos, *Politics*, p. 123.

44. Christodoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 74.

45. Markides, K.C. (1977) *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic*. New Haven and London, Yale University, p. 5.

46. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, p. 224.

47. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, p. 61.

48. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, p. 227.

49. Lyssiotis, *op. cit.*, p. 63.

50. CO 67/254/4. British Governor R. Stubbs in a memorandum from the 16 October 1933.

51. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, pp. 49-50. 52. *Ibid.*, pp. 48-49.

53. Loizos, *Politics*, p. 119.

54. Choisi, *Wurzeln*, p. 119.

55. Surridge, *op. cit.*, p. 20.

56. CO 67/232/1. Memorandum of the Advisory Committee on Education in Cyprus in 1929.

57. Storrs, *op. cit.*, pp. 521-522.

58. The process of submitting elementary education to full government control had already begun with the Greek education law of 1923. Still in 1929 the continuous abuse of power by the Board of Education was criticised even by parts of the Greek elites. Consequently, three Greek members of the Legislative Council voted in 1929 in favour of legal changes. As a result none of these three "traitors" was able to run in the 1930 elections. *Ibid.*, p. 522.

59. Choisi, *Wurzeln*, p. 123.

60. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, pp. 178-182.

61. Surridge, *op. cit.*, p. 46.

62. Governor Ronald Storrs suggested unsuccessfully to the Colonial Office in 1929 that three quarters of the Legislative Council should by law be engaged in agriculture and money lenders should be indelible. Storrs, *op. cit.*, p. 521.

63. The co-operative movement in Cyprus began in 1909 in Lefkonico village with

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

the establishment of a "Village Bank". Its foundation was initiated by a village school teacher who had visited Germany and happened to hear about the "Raifeisen" system. In 1917 the Village Bank was converted into a Co-operative Credit Society. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

64. In 1906 the Anglo-Egyptian Allotment Company of Cairo set up an Agricultural Bank in Cyprus. By 1919 the Bank had lent £141.106. It ended its unsuccessful activities by the end of 1923. Christodoulou describes its role as follows: "*There is no doubt that the Bank gave long-term loans at a fair rate of interest, but the malady of rural Cyprus could not be cured simply in this way. Land held on security when sold did not pay for the loans. The Bank neither reduced indebtedness nor put the farmer on his feet.*" Christodoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 95. The demand for a new and state supported Agricultural Bank was raised first by a peasant movement led by a populist lawyer, Kyriacos Pavlou Rossides. The movement reached its peak at an agricultural conference in the village of Lefconico on 13 April 1924. It was organised by the Mukhtars of several villages of both communities also demanding the lowering of taxation. The aims of the movement were not in the interest of the elites and the conference refused to deal with any issues concerning the island's political future. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, p. 249. This proves that not all Mukhtars were part of, or exclusively, influenced by a clientelistic network dominated by the traditional elites.

65. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

66. Loizos, *Politics*, p. 117 and Attalides, *op. cit.*, pp. 143-144.

67. The numbers given in the literature for 1929 vary. Attalides reports 422 co-operative credit societies, Loizos only 204 and Lanitis 320. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 144; Loizos, *Politics*, p. 117; Lanitis, N.C. (1944/Revised 1992) *Rural Indebtedness and Agricultural Co-operation in Cyprus* Limassol, Proodos, p. 78.

The official - and therefore presumably correct - number of registered societies given in the colonial report prepared by J.B. Surridge is 318. In December 1929 co-operative credit societies existed in 402 out of 641 villages. Surridge, *op. cit.*, p. 48.

68. CO 67/22714-143277. The deputy of the Governor, Nicholson, in a memorandum dated 30 January 1929 to the Minister for the Colonies, Amery. As quoted above Governor Ronald Storrs speaks of 70% of *chronically* indebted peasants in 1927/28. Storrs, *op. cit.*, p. 491.

69. Surridge reports that in 1929 approximately 20% of the total rural mortgage debts were already held by the Agricultural Bank operating through the co-operative credit societies. According to Georghallides, the Agricultural Bank had given 294-542 pounds in loans by the end of 1929. Georghallides, *Ronald Storrs*, p. 299. This was more than double the sum of all credits given by the Anglo-Egypt "Allotment

Company" (see note 64) in Cyprus between 1906 and 1919 (141.106 pound Sterling). Christodoulou, *op. cit.*, p. 95. Surridge estimates that in 1928 rural debts amounted to 1.800.000 pounds. Surridge, *op. cit.*, p. 42-48.

70. CO 67/22714 from the 30 January 1929.

71. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

72. The former Commissioner of Larnaca, B. J. Surridge, who prepared the colonial survey on rural indebtedness in 1927-28 was appointed as the first Registrar.

73. The Registrar registered co-operative societies and had the power to strike off any co-operative society which he thought should be liquidated. He audited the accounts and could directly intervene in the administration and disputes of the co-operative societies. With the enactment of a new law for the restatement of loans in 1938, farmers could get long-term loans directly from the Agricultural Bank with no mediation from co-operative societies which in the British view should focus exclusively on purely co-operative activities. Therefore, many societies which were established with the only purpose of borrowing funds from the Agricultural Bank were gradually liquidated. SA 1/1380/7. The Commissioner for Co-operative Development, W.G. Alexander, in a 1955 report on rural welfare in Cyprus.

74. John-Jones, L. St. (1983) *The Population of Cyprus. Demographic Trends and Socio-Economic Influences*. London, p. 44 and Lanitis, *op. cit.*, 1992, p. 142.

75. John-Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44. Jeanette Choisi published a report of the District Commissioner from 1936 in which she enclosed a printed contract widely used by moneylenders. A peasant whose property was seized due to his large debts had to sign this contract if he wanted his land back or another piece of land. The main provisions of the contract as quoted by the report are as follows:

"Para. 1. The Purchaser {the villager} must work the property or pay for the work to be done.

Para. 2. The Purchaser pays all the taxes.

Para. 3. Failure of pay regularly means the forfeiture (as rent) of all previous payments, plus the liability to pay a special penalty and the cancellation of the agreement.

Para. 4. All the produce is the exclusive property of the Vendor. The purchaser cannot touch the result of his own labour unless a solvent guarantor is found.

Para. 5. An improvement, addition and so on, becomes the absolute right of the Vendor. There is no question or argument about it.

Para. 6. A nice and large compensation clause.

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

Para. 7. A nice and large compensation clause.

It is so easy to see how it works. Mr. A. signs and agrees to purchase for Pound Sterling 300-0-0. After years of struggle (during he is encouraged to fall behind his payments) he has paid perhaps Pound Sterling 280-0-0, not nearly enough in view of the interest due, the taxes paid by the Vendor but to be charged by the Purchaser, etc. At the right moment, i.e. when the chances of getting another piastre are remote, the default is noticed, (not a shilling paid has reduced the original debt, it has all been rent, sinking fund and interest) and the agreement is cancelled (para. 3). The moneylender (Vendor) has, by now, had all the money he can get, the free labour of the unfortunate Purchaser, the actual produce at a price dictated by the moneylender (para. 4), the debt remains intact plus interest and penalty added (para. 7) and the moneylender retains the property, absolutely, plus all improvements, additions etc., and is ready to play the same trick on Mr. B. So long as such agreement is possible, and upheld in Court, one cannot blame a Villager for displaying little interest in his alleged property".

A peasant had hardly a chance to pay his debts off for the rest of his life. CO 67/271/13. Office of the Commissioner of Limassol, Greening, report from the 8 December 1936 quoted from Choisi, *Wurzeln*, p. 50.

76. Lanitis estimates that in 1939 about 63% of the entire debts of the peasants were owed to money lenders and that before the Debt Settlement Department was set up in 1940 still only 18% of all peasants were free of debts. Lanitis, *op. cit.*, pp. 24 and 43.

77. *Ibid.*, pp. 25-27.

78. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 144.

79. John-Jones, *op. cit.*, pp. 43-44.

80. SA 1/1380/7.

81. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, pp. 246-250.

82. In June 1925 peasants recently dispossessed of their land by moneylenders formed unions in three villages of the Limassol district. These unions were working in co-operation with the communist "Labourer's Club" in Limassol. Adams, T.W. (1971) *AKEL: The Communist Party of Cyprus*. Stanford, CA, Hoover Institution Press, p. 14.

83. Richter, H.A. (1996) 'Die Kommunistische Partei Zyperns (KKK) 1926-1944', in: *THETIS* 3, p. 210.

84. Atheism never played an important role in Cypriot communism. Almost all Cypriot communists remained Christian Orthodox.

85. Choisi, *Wurzeln*, pp. 136-139.
86. Richter, *KKK*, pp.207-213. 87. *Ibid.*, p. 212.
88. Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 17-19.
89. John-Jones, *op. cit.*, p. 127.
90. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 145.
91. The PSE was renamed in PEO (Pankypria Ergatiki Omospondia = Pan-Cyprian Federation of Labour) in 1947.
92. Richter, *KKK*, p. 215..
93. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 146.
94. Choisi, J. (1995) 'The Greek Cypriot Elite - Its Social Function and Legitimation', in *The Cyprus Review*. Vol. 7, No. 1, p. 37.
95. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 138.
96. CO 67/207. Article 17 of the Political Organisation of Cyprus quoted from Choisi, *Greek Cypriot Elite*, p.45.
97. *Ibid.*, p. 44.
98. The authority of the National Council reached its lowest level in 1925, when the majority of its members objected to the idea of authorising a list of candidates for the Legislative Council. According to Georghallides, "*with this failure the National Council in effect abdicated its authority. Its members were no longer willing to subordinate their personal ambitions for the sake of overall decisions*". Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, p. 345. Despite the low prestige and influence of the National Council and the competition within it for a seat in the Legislative Council, the former remained the umbrella organisation of the nationalists.
99. Katsiaounis, *Social Change*, p. 248.
100. Even out of the 12 Greek members of the moderate Legislative Council in 1925, at least seven were members of the National Council. Georghallides, *Political and Administrative History*, pp. 433-452 (Biographical Notes).
101. FO 371/15233. Confidential report by Governor Sir Ronald Storrs to the Minister for the Colonies, Lord Passfield, from the 12 February 1931.
102. Tzermias, P. (1991) *Geschichte der Republik Zypern*. Tübingen, Francke, p. 42.

CLIENTELISM IN THE GREEK CYPRIOT COMMUNITY OF CYPRUS UNDER BRITISH RULE

103. Loizos, *Greek Gift*, p. 14.

104. In December 1955 AKEL was proscribed by Governor Sir John Harding allegedly because it promoted disorder. It remained so until 1959, a few months longer than EDMA Eniaion Demokratikon Metopon Anadimiourgias (United Democratic Reconstruction Front), the political party of the right-wing *enosis* which backed EOKA. Adams, *op. cit.*, pp. 48-51.

105. Loizos points out that from the 86 EOKA fighters that were killed only a handful can be placed in any plausible elite. Loizos, *Greek Gift*, p. 16.

106. Attalides, *op. cit.*, p. 148.

107. The first cabinet of Makarios in 1960 consisted almost exclusively of former EOKA chiefs and their close associates. In the 1960 Legislature 26,7% of the right-wing House members were leading EOKA members. A prominent example is the first Minister for the Interior, Georkadjis, murdered in 1970. Being the son of a peasant he became one of the most powerful politicians by creating a large clientelistic network during the 60s. Papaioannou, I.A. (1984) *Politics in Cyprus between 1960 and 1981*. Nicosia, Theopress, pp. 48-49.