

THE MAKING OF THE CYPRUS SETTLEMENT, 1958-60

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Abstract

This paper deals with the transitional arrangements and complexities that preceded the establishment of the Republic of Cyprus. The involvement of the United Kingdom, Greece, Turkey, the two communities and in particular Archbishop Makarios in the developments that finally led to Cyprus' independence are traced in light of the aims they each pursued.

The Cyprus settlement emerged after three years of fierce Greek-Cypriot demands for union (enosis) with Greece. The campaign was formally led by the traditional spokesman for the Greek Cypriots - the Archbishop (Makarios - who for most of the time was exiled from Cyprus); and in the field by 'General' Grivas. Their partnership was often uneasy, but apparently successful in that Britain changed her view about the nature of her interest in Cyprus. She decided that in principle she could, after all, get out, provided that her strategic interests were satisfied, in the shape of permanent bases and certain facilities on the island. But as a practical matter, she could not leave without an agreement between Greece and Turkey, the sponsors of the Greek Cypriots and the (roughly 20%) minority Turkish Cypriots. Of that there seemed no sign at all. Then, however, and entirely out of the blue, there was a breakthrough. .

It occurred in highly improbable circumstances: after a contentious debate at the United Nations. Greece had begun taking the question of Cyprus to that forum in 1954. By that date it was becoming clear to the colonial powers that they were less protected against public inquiry into their imperial affairs than they had anticipated.

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They relied on an Article in the UN Charter which (except for the use of force to maintain peace) forbade intervention 'in matters which are essentially within the domestic jurisdiction of any state'. But the Charter also included a 'Declaration' on non-self-governing territories, and gave the General Assembly (in which all member states were represented and each of them had one vote) a licence to 'discuss...any matters within the scope of the present Charter'. The settlement of any procedural argument about the Assembly's competence was, if it so wished, up to the Assembly itself. And by the mid 1950s a number of members were ready to use their votes to permit the examination of certain colonial issues. Before long, of course, the undermining of colonialism was to become one of the UN's main aims. It was a striking instance of how political developments can sweep institutions beyond their initial purposes¹.

But in 1954, Britain still felt relatively safe, and in response to the Greek initiative successfully played her domestic jurisdiction card: a substantive debate was held, but ended without an attempt to pass a resolution. In the following year the Assembly went, from Britain's point of view, one better, refusing even to place Cyprus on its agenda. But then Britain concluded that she should change her tactics. Cyprus was a far from typical colony. It was located in Europe; relatively well developed; and, on grounds which could not be denied, attracted the close interest of Greece and Turkey. These factors, together with the increasingly-serious revolt, resulted in Cyprus having a high international profile. Inevitably, there would be strong pressures for a wide-ranging UN debate on what was going on. Accordingly, Britain now allowed that it was legitimate for the Assembly to consider Cyprus - but as an international rather than a colonial question. And in that context she pressed for it to be left to herself, Greece, and Turkey to sort out. The Assembly reacted sympathetically, simply urging (in February 1957) the conclusion of a peaceful, democratic, and just solution. Who could ignore such a high-minded call?

But by the end of that year Britain's response was being viewed somewhat critically, and the Greek case against her was endorsed, broadly speaking, by the Assembly's Political Committee, where voting was on a simple-majority basis. However, to receive the imprimatur of the plenary session of the Assembly, the draft resolution had to obtain a two-thirds majority in that body, and it failed to do so. Nonetheless, Greece had secured a 'symbolic victory'.² Clearly, in this particular campaign, Britain needed to improve her parliamentary diplomacy (as the practice was becoming known). She set about gathering votes with a will, and in December 1958, after long debates, seemed to have secured her reward: an Iranian draft resolution, in the wording of which Britain had had a hand, was passed in Committee on 4 December 1958. *It* said, in UN code, that Britain was not doing such a bad job on Cyprus, and gave its blessing to the idea (which Greece had already rejected) of an international conference. The draft did not receive a two-thirds majority. But Britain believed that this deficiency would be rectified when the draft was voted on in the plenary session, and Greece gloomily shared this view.³

After the Anglo-Turkish victory in Committee, the Greek Foreign Minister, Averoff, was publicly approached by his Turkish counterpart, Zorlu (who tended to be somewhat abrasive). Averoff raised his hackles, only to be hugely surprised by words of warm congratulation from Zorlu on the way in which he had presented the Greek case. Some cautiously-conciliatory remarks about Cyprus followed, which ended with Zorlu suggesting that they should meet to talk the matter over. Averoff did not disagree, but said that first they should see what happened in the plenary session of the Assembly the next day.⁴ The answer turned out to be "a lot". Very possibly spurred by the Averoff-Zorlu encounter, compromise was pervadingly in the air. The Iranian draft was left on one side; an 'anodyne resolution calling on the three governments concerned to renew their efforts to find a solution"⁵ was quickly put together; and it was no less quickly adopted by the Assembly, without any objection.

The way was now clear for a fuller exchange between the Foreign Ministers of Greece and Turkey, which was actively encouraged by Britain. Indeed, as Averoff was showing signs of hesitation, some members of the British Mission to the UN found themselves almost ushering him along to the meeting. It took place in the UN building on the morning of 6 December (a Saturday). The two principals, with just a few close advisers, talked for about two hours, sowing the seeds of what was soon to emerge as a "final" settlement. They agreed to keep the whole matter as secret as possible, and to renew their intensive interchange at the earliest opportunity.⁶ This came within a couple of weeks, in Paris, under the cover of a North Atlantic Treaty (Nata) meeting; and a meeting in the same city in mid-January 1959 of the Organization for European Economic Cooperation enabled them to take the matter further. Normal - but very limited - diplomatic channels were also used to advance the still very private discussions. The stage was being speedily set for one of the more remarkable surprises of the early post-War years. It emerged from a Greco-Turkish summit meeting at the Hotel Dolder on the outskirts of Zurich where, after almost a week of negotiations, it was announced on 11 February 1959 that agreement had been reached.

The heart of this accord was the acceptance by Greece and Turkey that the way forward for Cyprus was for it to become an independent state. The details of its proposed status were set out in four documents. One was a "Gentlemen's Agreement", which was kept from public view. It envisaged the entry of Cyprus into Nata, and the taking of measures by Cyprus (to be urged on her by Greece and Turkey) to outlaw the Communist Party and Communist activities.⁷ Another was a Treaty of Alliance between Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey, which included provision for the stationing in Cyprus of small Greek and Turkish military contingents (950 and

650 strong respectively). A third was a Treaty of Guarantee between Cyprus, Britain, Greece, and Turkey, by which the last three recognised and guaranteed the independence, territorial integrity, and security of the new state, and guaranteed its renunciation (given in the Treaty) of enosis and partition. These two Treaties were to have entrenched constitutional force. An outline of the Basic Articles of the Cyprus Constitution - which were also guaranteed by Britain, Greece, and Turkey - was presented in the fourth document.

These Articles provided for a Greek-Cypriot President and a Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President. There would be ten Ministers - seven Greek and three Turkish - with one of the Turks holding either the Foreign Affairs, Defence, or Finance portfolio. In the legislature (the House of Representatives) 70 per cent of the seats would be held by representatives of the Greek community, and the remainder by Turkish representatives. Decisions there would be taken by a simple majority, but the adoption of any law on duties, taxes, the electoral system, and municipalities (there were to be separate Greek and Turkish municipalities in the five largest towns) would need a simple majority of both Greek and Turkish members. Both the President and Vice-President would have a veto over any law or decision relating to foreign affairs, defence, and security. The civil service was to be 70 per cent Greek and 30 per cent Turkish; the gendarmerie and police likewise; but the army was to be 60 per cent Greek and 40 per cent Turkish. Each community was to have its own Communal Chamber, which would exercise authority in all relevant matters.⁸

This was indeed a massive advance, burying what could well have become a very bloody hatchet. On the one side, Turkey was giving up the possibility of taking the Turkish-Cypriots directly under her wing. However, there was never a realistic likelihood of an agreement to that effect; nor of unilateral armed action by Turkey securing much diplomatic support. If, therefore, Britain was to leave Cyprus (which was now firmly on the agenda), it made sense for Turkey to get the best deal which she could for the Turkish Cypriots, especially as the United States was pressing hard for a settlement.⁹ Under the Zurich Agreements the Turks in Cyprus were to be provided with as much protection, on paper, as a minority of 20 per cent could expect. Possibly more.

On the other side, Greece seemed to be making very large concessions. To an extent which went far beyond anything which she had previously contemplated, she was accepting Turkish-Cypriot participation in the government of Cyprus, and the safeguarding of Turkey's interests in Cyprus. But even all that paled before the fact that she could no longer look forward to the fulfilment of a key aspect of the Hellenic dream. A daughter Greek state could doubtless be seen as a fine thing; but it would not compensate for the closing of the door to the daughter's long-awaited return home. Nonetheless, in some yet larger interest the necessary renunciation had been made.

The exact nature of that larger interest, however, was not entirely clear. A Greek writer has speculated that the mounting East-West crisis over Berlin may have nudged both Greeks and Turks towards conciliation.¹⁰ But at least in the case of Greece, it does not carry much conviction: a keen and specific local interest is rarely sacrificed for some wider and vaguer cause. The Governor of Cyprus thought that Greece had been helped to a more accommodating frame of mind by Britain's determination to press on with her own scheme for constitutional development - the "Macmillan Plan" - notwithstanding its rejection by Greece and the Greek Cypriots.¹¹ In the view of a Foreign Office official then with Britain's Mission to the UN, Greece thought she might be losing the political battle in New York and had therefore decided to think about a settlement.¹²

Perhaps there is something in both these ideas, and they do not run counter to Averoff's own explanation. He said (much later) that once the Macmillan Plan had been put into operation, 'Turkey had become the decisive factor'. (Doubtless he was referring to Turkey's growing interest in the position of the Turkish Cypriots, and in the possibility of partition.) As Greece, militarily the weaker of the two, would be unable to secure enosis against Turkish opposition, 'one had no option but to come to terms with her'.¹³ It has to be said that this would have been somewhat out of keeping with the general Greek disposition towards Turkey, which was cantankerous rather than conciliatory. But there is probably something in it, especially as the intra-Nato feud with Turkey was aggravating a number of Greece's allies, not least the United States. To get the fullest picture, however, the human element probably needs to be taken into account. Early in 1959 Averoff told the British Ambassador to Greece, 'with the half-conscious and rather engaging naivety of which he is sometimes capable', that he was 'flattered' by Zorlu's congratulatory words, and had it not been for that 'he might never have been so forthcoming in his reply'.¹⁴ This factor may well have had an importance which went beyond the mere timing of the Zurich Agreements, contributing even to their very making.

Be all that as it may, an agreement had been secured. However, two of the key parties to the proposed package - Britain and the Cypriots - had had no hand in it. Manifestly, there could be no progress towards its implementation unless they were brought on board.

What was needed from Britain was a willingness to withdraw from Cyprus. There was unlikely to be much difficulty about that, provided her special interests on the island - relating to military bases and connected sites - could be accommodated. However, until arrangements to safeguard them were in the bag, Britain was naturally reluctant to give a firm undertaking on withdrawal - and Averoff had earlier irritated the Foreign Secretary (Selwyn Lloyd) by trying to secure one. As the Greek Ambassador in London was told by A D M Ross, it was 'obvious' that Britain

accepted the principle of Cypriot independence, but setting it out 'in black and white' would be the 'climax', not the start, of the negotiations.¹⁶ This climax was scheduled to emerge in London at a conference which was to open on 17 February 1959.

Its main purpose was seen as the provision of assurances for Britain regarding her strategic needs, thereby facilitating the transfer of sovereignty, and the making of arrangements for all the consequential discussions which would be necessary. (Getting the agreement of the Cypriots was not regarded as a problem.) Greece and Turkey had agreed the previous December that the two bases which Britain wished to retain should be under British sovereignty,¹⁷ and when this news reached Makarios he made no objection. Thus the state and the island of Cyprus would not be coterminous, as the state would not include what were to be known as the British Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs). Equally, it was accepted on all sides that - as she stated in a formal Declaration made at the London Conference - Britain would need certain rights on the territory of the new Republic of Cyprus to make effective use of the SBAs. These rights included access to and complete control of certain installations scattered throughout Cyprus - the Retained Sites, as they were to be called. It should be noted that such Sites would not be British sovereign territory; rather, they would be in the nature of British-owned property on the territory of the Republic of Cyprus.

Additionally, Britain wanted a specific acknowledgment from Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus of her special position on, and of her rights in, Cyprus. The chosen vehicle for this was the Treaty of Guarantee which had been agreed by Greece and Turkey at Zurich. Under this Treaty (as has been noted), Britain, Greece, and Turkey guaranteed the independence and territorial integrity of Cyprus, and the Basic Articles of its Constitution. In the event of a breach of any of the provisions of the Treaty, the three guarantors agreed to consult together with a view to remedial joint action. If they could not agree, each of them reserved the right to take unilateral action to re-establish the pre-existing state of affairs.¹⁸ Thus the Treaty gave Greece the right to protect the Greek Cypriots (against Turkey), and Turkey the right to protect the Turkish Cypriots (against the Greek Cypriots, and Greece); put differently, it was designed to block partition on the one hand, and internal malpractice and enosis on the other. It also gave both Greece and Turkey the right to call on Britain for help in these tasks. But the essence of the Treaty was not its joint but its several aspects: it was in the nature of two separate pieces of legal insurance.

The idea for such a guarantee had been in the air for a while, and all concerned seem to have assumed that such a feature would form part of a settlement.¹⁹ When Britain received the terms of the Treaty which emerged from Zurich, she did not seem at all bothered about accepting them. The Foreign Secretary did point out to the Cabinet that Britain was being invited to guarantee the basic terms of a constitution 'which we had no part in shaping'. Moreover, intervention 'might be

embarrassing' given that there was no assurance that the Government of Cyprus would 'implement the Constitution in a satisfactory manner' or be able 'to maintain law and order'. But on the other hand, 'the Treaty represented a courageous and honest attempt to establish a balance between the conflicting Greek and Turkish interests in Cyprus; and it gave us the right - though it imposed on us no obligation - to take independent action if we had reason to believe that this balance was in danger of being disturbed'. If any of his colleagues had doubts about being a party to the Treaty, no record was made of it - which suggests that there were none. Furthermore, the Cabinet as a whole invited the Foreign Secretary to continue discussions with a view to giving effect to the Zurich proposals.²⁰

But what Britain was certainly very bothered about was securing formal recognition for her own position in Cyprus after the settlement came into effect. She wanted her own piece of legal insurance. In consequence it was agreed in London that an Additional Article should be inserted in the Treaty of Guarantee, by which Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus undertook 'to respect the integrity of the areas' to be retained under British sovereignty, and 'guarantee the use and enjoyment' by Britain of the 'rights to be secured to her' by the Republic of Cyprus.²¹ Thus the terms of the Treaty of Guarantee regarding its enforcement would apply also to this Additional Article. Accordingly, in the event of any Cypriot interference with her position on the island, Britain would be entitled to call upon Greece and Turkey for support and - the heart of the matter - to take such unilateral action in defence of her bases and installations as she deemed necessary.

In these ways Britain's needs had, in principle, been met. The details (like those of the Cyprus Constitution) had still to be worked out (and in fact, as will be indicated later, this was by no means plain sailing). But the wind seemed set fair. All that was now necessary for the whole package to be tied up was the agreement of the Cypriots - who, for the first time, were making an appearance, albeit in the wings, at the international discussions about the future of their island.

When, in September 1958, it looked as though the Greek Cypriots might lose out from their rejection of the Macmillan Plan, Makarios put the goal of enosis to one side for the time being, and came out with a plan for an independent Cyprus. Such a status, he suggested, might be replaced by enosis or partition only with the approval of the UN. Evidently, he did not bargain for Greece and Turkey coming up with a scheme for independence which, effectively, would never permit enosis.²² However, when he was presented with their Zurich proposals, he approved them (according to Averoff) 'without any reservations at all, which was most unusual for the Archbishop'.²³ The word was passed on to Britain, with the result that the only thing which worried her about Makarios' visit to the London Conference was that he

might find himself before the courts for his part in the Cyprus revolt.

A Foreign Office official recalled that in respect of a previous proposed visit by the Archbishop, it had been suggested in the press that he (after all, a British subject) should be charged with treason. No sooner had this recollection been put to paper than news arrived that a private application had been made for a warrant for Makarios' arrest 'as an accessory before and after the fact to murder'. (The magistrate postponed his decision.) Some ways in which Makarios might be afforded immunity from criminal proceedings by giving him diplomatic standing were considered - but all of them had to be dismissed. Nothing, apparently, could be done by the host state to protect Makarios from the process of its law.²⁴ Breath was held, and the hope expressed that he would leave before the time bomb detonated. (He did.)

But hardly had Makarios arrived in London than he delivered a bombshell of his own. He could not, after all, accept the Zurich Agreements. (It was, Britain's Colonial Secretary, Alan Lennox-Boyd, who observed after an eve-of-the- Conference dinner, 'an example of Archbishop Makarios' usual technique which had become only too familiar over the past five years'.²⁵) Makarios explained that in particular he was troubled by certain aspects of the Treaty of Alliance and of the Treaty of Guarantee. He did not want the former to be entrenched in the Cyprus Constitution; and he objected to the latter permitting each of the guarantors to intervene in the internal affairs of Cyprus (i.e. to maintain the Basic Articles of its Constitution). Greece was furious. She immediately got her diplomatic machine into high gear, working both on Makarios and the Greek-Cypriot delegation which he had brought to London (and which, independently of Makarios, wanted to reject the Zurich Agreements). On 18 February, the delegation agreed to support whatever decision Makarios reached. For his part, he was told by the newly-arrived Greek Prime Minister, Constantine Karamanlis, that the honour of Greece was at stake. If he persisted in his objections he would get no further help from Greece.²⁶ 'I give you Cyprus on a plate, and you refuse to take it. It's monstrous'. But Makarios remained adamant.

An unhappy tripartite meeting nonetheless decided to hold a second session of the Conference on the evening of the 18th 'to get the Archbishop's statement of his position on to the record'. It would then immediately disperse, and a joint Prime-Ministerial statement would be issued the next day emphasising Makarios' isolation.²⁸ But at the evening session Makarios prevaricated. He was told by Selwyn Lloyd that he had to 'take it or leave it'²⁹ He sought an extra day. This presented difficulties on the British side, as the next day the Colonial Secretary was leaving for the Far East, and Prime Minister Macmillan for Moscow.³⁰ But eventually it was agreed that he could have until 9.45 the following morning.³¹ Much activity followed including, reportedly, a telephone call to Makarios from the Queen³² of Greece.³³

The next morning Makarios reported the results of his reflections. He had spent the night, he said, in prayer and fasting. (This occasioned some concealed merriment on the part of his British auditors, who had just been reading the transcripts of the lengthy telephone conversations he had had during the small hours.)³⁴ He would accept the Zurich Agreements, as well as those reached in London in response to Britain's concerns - on which he and the Greek-Cypriot delegation never expressed any reservations. The signing ceremony followed. Later in the day, adopting his tantalising manner, Makarios asked Karamanlis and Averoff whether they really believed that he would not agree. Unsurprisingly, they wanted to know why, in that case, there had been so much fuss. In the same mode, Makarios replied, 'I had my reasons'.³⁵ It has been said, with some cogency, that the fear of partition was among those reasons.³⁶ Later he declared the settlement to have been one of 'harsh necessity', also saying that 'not for a moment did I believe that the Agreements would constitute a permanent settlement'.³⁷

But for the moment the prevailing air among the other signatories was one of relief and rejoicing. In the view of Britain's Prime Minister, her policy of 'the Bible in one hand and the sword in the other' had proved a success.³⁸ There were some complaints in Ankara, a great many in Athens, and in Cyprus Grivas was far from pleased: he called the outcome a 'surrender'.³⁹ But the settlement was endorsed by the legislatures in all three capitals. The revolt was over, the EOKA fighters were given an amnesty, and those in gaol released. On 1 March Makarios returned to Cyprus after three years of exile, to be met by ecstatic crowds. A couple of weeks later, Grivas left for the mainland. Averoff had suggested that Britain would do well to provide this recently most-wanted-man with a guard of honour at the airport. But although the point was seen, Britain felt it was 'impossible to take such a dramatic step because of [her] public opinion'.⁴⁰ In Athens, however, both the people and the state gave him a hero's welcome.

What the Zurich and London Agreements established was 'the agreed foundation for the final settlement of the problem of Cyprus'.⁴¹ To erect the necessary structures on this foundation three bodies were set up: a Joint Committee in London to devise a Treaty of Establishment, which would deal with the legal aspects of the transfer of power from Britain to Cyprus; a Transitional Committee in Nicosia to make the necessary administrative arrangements; and a Joint Commission in Nicosia to draft a Constitution for the new state. It was envisaged that everything would be completed within a year, which was another way of saying that 19 February 1959 was pencilled in as independence day.

The Transitional Committee worked smoothly, and quickly. The Joint

Commission encountered a number of difficulties, notably on the question of the executive power (to be held by the Greek-Cypriot President and the Turkish-Cypriot Vice-President). But to all intents and purposes it had completed its work within the stated time scale. The Joint Committee, however, ran into very choppy water, as considerable disagreement emerged over the extent of the areas on the island which Britain was to retain as sovereign bases, and certain related matters. This caused two postponements of the date for Cyprus' independence. Britain was also exercised by two other matters (although they did not much impinge on the work of the Committee): the political and financial relationship between her and Cyprus; and her legal position on the territory of the new state.

This last matter had a number of aspects. One concerned Britain's legal right to take such action as was necessary to defend her bases - the SBAs - should Cyprus be attacked (by a non-guarantor of the settlement: the Soviet Union was, of course, the presumed aggressor). Early in April the Ministry of Defence pointed out that the effective defence of the SBAs required the defence of the 'island as a whole'. (This, of course, had been exactly the argument for **not** getting out of Cyprus!) The Ministry felt that Greece, Turkey, and Cyprus had an obligation to cooperate with Britain in this, noting (among other things) that an "Agreed Minute" (drawn up at the London Conference) stated that these three 'will consult and co-operate with the United Kingdom in the common defence of Cyprus'.⁴²

A Cabinet Committee of officials, however, did not agree that such an obligation existed; and on the specific point about the Agreed Minute noted that its statement of what Cyprus would do had been drawn up by Britain, Greece, and Turkey without consulting the Cypriot representatives and, indeed, was being kept from them! As for Britain's right to take unilateral action on the soil of Cyprus in defence of the SBAs, the Committee thought that this would be justified under the Treaty of Guarantee in face of an actual attack, but not if an attack was merely threatened. It saw no prospect of a direct amendment of the Treaty to provide for such a contingency, and instead suggested that an attempt be made to insert a wording similar to that of the Agreed Minute in the Treaty of Establishment. It thought, by a complex process of reasoning, that the breach of any such undertaking would permit unilateral action to counter a threat which could be 'demonstrated'.⁴³

The Attorney-General was very unimpressed by this last line of argument.⁴⁴ His view was accepted by a Ministerial Committee of the Cabinet, which thought that Britain would have to do without the right of unilateral action in Cyprus in face of a threatened attack (demonstrable or not). But it was not much bothered. As the Prime Minister summed up: 'we could envisage American co-operation in the event of a major external threat to Cyprus and in those circumstances there should be no undue difficulty in taking whatever steps seemed necessary at the time'. Nonetheless, it would be expedient, 'if only as a matter of presentation' to get Cyprus to accept an obligation to cooperate with Britain in defence of the island.

The attempt should therefore be made to get such a clause included in the Treaty of Establishment.⁴⁵ (It was successful.)

Then, in May, another disturbing issue popped up. It concerned the definition of the rights which were guaranteed to Britain by Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey - that is, her right to use certain facilities and installations which lay outside her sovereign bases. They were identified in the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee by referring to Britain's unilateral Declaration about their necessity. However, their detailed identification was to be made in the Anglo-Cypriot Treaty of Establishment. When that Treaty came into effect (that is, on the independence of Cyprus) 'the Declaration will be spent and legally ineffective'. In its existing form, therefore, the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee would refer to a document which no longer had any standing, and to that extent Britain would no longer receive the Treaty's benefit. Her guarantee, and her entitlement to take action under it, would be left hanging in the air.

The ideal - and apparently obvious - response to what, on the face of it, was just a technical hitch was for Britain to secure the amendment of the Additional Article so that it referred to the Treaty of Establishment instead of the British Declaration. But it was thought that the other negotiating parties would, at least at that stage, 'react strongly against any attempt on our part to tamper with the Treaty of Guarantee'. It was therefore decided to prepare an extra article for the Treaty of Establishment which would link that Treaty with the Additional Article of the Treaty of Guarantee; and to table it at a later stage if, meanwhile, no opportunity had arisen to alter the Additional Article.⁴⁶ In the event such an opportunity did arise, so that worry was settled.⁴⁷

But then it seemed that instead of having a guarantee for certain rights which had to be given secure definition, Britain would have no guarantee at all. In midsummer Greece and Turkey tabled the proposed final text of the Treaty of Guarantee. To Britain's considerable dismay, the wording of what had been the Additional Article (now Article 3 of the Treaty) had lost the key word, "guarantee", so that Britain's 'use and enjoyment' of her rights in Cyprus was now merely to receive the 'respect' of Cyprus, Greece, and Turkey. That meant that 'we should lose the right to call upon Greece and Turkey to assist us in asserting our rights against the Republic of Cyprus; they could simply say that it was not they who were failing to respect these rights and' they were not therefore bound to take action against the Republic'. In response to Britain's complaint, Turkey thought that that matter was a 'verbal' one, and could be put right without difficulty. But the Greek Delegate claimed it was one 'of substance', and gave an explanation for the wording which Britain found unconvincing. In her view a change in the text had to be sought, as it was 'of vital importance for us to have this guarantee'.⁴⁸

It was decided to pursue the question through diplomatic channels rather than

the Joint Committee, and in October lengthy discussions were held in London with the Greek Ambassador. He wanted a statement that a Greek guarantee of Britain's rights would not oblige her 'to defend British installations in the island against any fifth power'. Britain was prepared to go that far, but declined the Greek request that she give a similar assurance to the other signatories - by which she meant Cyprus. It was one thing to give Greece what she wanted, 'because we trusted them: it was quite another to say the same thing to the Cypriots who, at least so long as they were represented by Mr. Rossides, would be only too likely to twist our words and argue that we had released them from all obligations in regard to common defence'.

Later, Britain gave way on this point, on the ground that the obligation on Cyprus under the relevant article of the Treaty did not relate to external defence. (Doubtless she also bore in mind her earlier conclusion that in case of necessity she would defend her installations against an external threat, whatever Cyprus said or did.) Further discussion followed about the exact wording of the British statement, who should make it, and how it should be introduced into the work of the Joint Committee. There was also internal debate in the Foreign Office as to whether the statement should take the form of a "Note" or a "Letter" - it emerged as the latter. Eventually it was all satisfactorily wound up, as at the same time were some other exchanges with Greece about the French text of the Treaty of Guarantee and whether the English text was at least equally authoritative with it. It had all been rather tiresome for the British official who had been dealing with these matters (A D M Ross). He minuted: 'I think the Greeks have pushed us around enough'.⁴⁹

There was one further, and different, risk to the solidity of Britain's legal position regarding her interests in Cyprus. It concerned the provision in the Treaty of Guarantee which permitted the guarantors, in certain circumstances, to intervene in Cyprus, either jointly or individually. This was mainly an expression of Turkey's concern about the Turkish minority, and Britain's wish to have a sound legal basis for defending her use of the facilities and installations which were identified in the Treaty of Establishment. However, except in response to an armed attack the UN Charter prohibited the use of force against a state's territorial integrity or political independence; and the Charter also stated that its provisions overrode those of other treaties. There was therefore a danger of the interventionary rights under the Treaty of Guarantee being deemed invalid.

The Greek Cypriots were alive to this possibility, and at the London Committee proposed that an article be added to the Treaty saying that it did not prejudice the rights and obligations of any of the parties under the UN Charter. It was opposed not just by Britain and Turkey but also, 'rather surprisingly', by Greece, and therefore foundered.⁵⁰ Turkey tried a gambit to the opposite effect, proposing an article saying that the various treaties making up the settlement were in conformity with the UN Charter. Again the guarantors showed a united front, but it was not pressed in view of the 'firm opposition' of the Greek Cypriots.⁵¹ Neither of the

proposed additions, of course, would necessarily have put the matter to rest. And in fact it did not go away. But Britain was already taking the philosophical line that this was a situation she would have to live with.⁵²

When questions relating to the SSAs came to the fore, notably the issue of their extent, it was the turn of the Greek Cypriots to try to push Britain around. The bases themselves, strictly defined, were not over large. They were in two separate places: one, in the south of the island adjacent to Episkopi and Limassol, was at Akrotiri; the other, in the south east between Larnaca and Famagusta, was at Dhekelia. In all they came to about 12 square miles.⁵³ However, it was recognised on all sides that additional space would be needed for their functioning as self-contained bases surrounded by foreign territory. Reinforcements might need to be accommodated; existing installations might need to be expanded, or additional ones constructed; and storage facilities would be required both for the bases themselves and for the provisioning of the Retained Sites which lay beyond their boundaries. There was also the need for dispersal space in case the bases were attacked; and it was at least desirable that the bases controlled their own water supplies. But on the question of the amount of extra space which these requirements would entail, the two sides started from very different positions.

Britain came up with an initial figure of 170 square miles; the Greek Cypriots suggested that 36 square miles would be enough. Recognising that the Cypriots wanted to minimise the number of their nationals who would find themselves under British jurisdiction, Britain played with boundaries, reducing the area which she needed to 152 square miles, and the number of Cypriots living within it from 16,000 to 4,500. This was 4.1 per cent of the island. Further haggling followed, with Britain coming down to 122 square miles, and the Greek Cypriots going up to 80.⁵⁴

By now almost a year had gone by; an international conference had been held in London in the hope of breaking the deadlock, but failing to do so; and the date for independence had been postponed by a month. Negotiations were moved to Nicosia, whither Julian Amery, a junior Minister at the Colonial Office and also the Prime Minister's son-in-law, was despatched to hurry them along. Britain's Ministry of Defence returned to its maps, and while it concluded that further sacrifice would be 'neither reasonable nor prudent', it said that for the sake of a settlement an additional paring of 18 square miles could be made, provided Britain could make use of the facilities it contained. But, said the Minister, this was the 'minimum requirement', and he went on to make some alarmist remarks about the effect on public opinion in general and the Conservative Party in particular if the cutting-down process was continued.⁵⁵

However, this reduction did not produce results, and independence was again postponed, this time without a new date being set. Now Britain began to think of the presentational allure of a two-digit figure,⁵⁶ and the Turkish Cypriots weighed in with the suggestion of the nice round figure of 100 square miles. Makarios then proposed a common Cypriot front on the figure of 95, and was thought to be reluctant to increase it for fear of being judged to have been carried along to the slightly higher figure by the minority Cypriot community. Various devices for bringing Makarios up to 99 were advanced by Britain, but to no avail.⁵⁷ For her part, she refused to go any lower. The Minister of Defence reported to Parliament that every concession to Makarios was 'merely a springboard for another demand',⁵⁸ and in May talks were broken off. Subsequently Britain made it known that as certain Parliamentary legislation was necessary for her to withdraw from Cyprus, the lack of an agreement by early July would mean (because of the long summer recess) that independence would be postponed at least until the late autumn.⁵⁹ That seemed to speed things up, and early in July agreement was reached on 99 square miles.⁶⁰ Makarios is thought to have drawn comfort from the two-digit figure, and from the fact that as it included a lake of four square miles, he could claim that his offer of 95 square miles had, in terrestrial terms, been accepted.⁶¹ Britain had also agreed that if she ever relinquished the base areas they would be passed to Cyprus.⁶² Thus the SBAs issue was at last out of the way.

The final matter to be settled with the Cypriots was the financial aid which the new state was to receive from Britain. At a later date it became common for her ex-colonies to be so endowed - a kind of coming-of-age gift. In 1960, however, it was an idea with which Britain was still coming to terms. A January 1960 memorandum for a Ministerial Committee worried about 'embarrassing repercussions elsewhere' if Cyprus were given a 'free grant'; any gift would therefore need to be presented as a device to bring 'the revenue balance up to a reasonable level'. In particular, it must not be interpreted as payment for 'defence facilities'; any such course was 'wholly unviable'.⁶³ In Committee, Ministers favoured the making of loans, but agreed that if a grant had to be made, it would be over a period of five years, and would be reduced each year. This tapering principle was seen as of considerable importance,⁶⁴ doubtless to make it clear both to Cyprus and to other newly-independent territories that they would not be subsidised indefinitely.

However, this was exactly what the Cypriots were after, causing the Chancellor of the Exchequer much concern. In April he sent a minute to the Prime Minister saying that he had reluctantly agreed that the question of future financial aid would be discussed five years hence, but that the Cypriots were pressing for a wording which implied not just that aid would be continued after the initial period but that it would be on the initial scale. He 'could not possibly accept' that. Moreover, he thought the initial British offer of 10 million was 'an exceedingly liberal payment to a

small country with such a prosperous outlook and can only be justified by reference to the immediate circumstances.⁶⁵

Britain had decided that this matter should be left to the end (doubtless because getting an agreed figure offered even more scope for haggling than fixing the area of the SBAs). At that time a figure of 12 million for general financial aid was agreed (to be allocated on a tapering basis over five years), plus some other sums for specific purposes arising out of Britain's strategic needs, and some aid for the Turkish community. While the figure was higher than Britain had hoped, there is reason to believe that an even higher one could have been extracted, so that this was one occasion on which Makarios was (as he soon suspected) outwitted.⁶⁶

It can be seen with hindsight that independence for Cyprus was negotiated at a time when the prevailing view about the international acceptability of small states was in transition.⁶⁷ It had been supposed, although it had never been set out with precision, that a state the size of Cyprus - with half a million people - could not expect to play a full international role. Admittedly, two smaller states (Iceland and Luxembourg) were members of the United Nations. But special historical reasons could be advanced for that, Luxembourg having been independent since 1815, and Iceland having enjoyed self-government since 1918. Furthermore, all the other UN members had populations of well in excess of one million. Thus the inclusion of these two tiny members could be seen as exceptions which proved the rule.

Given this context, it is not surprising that at first there was some uncertainty about how an independent Cyprus should be treated, especially as it was obvious that Britain, Greece, and Turkey all wanted to claim a special say in the running of certain aspects of its affairs. In January 1959 a British Committee of officials thought that Cyprus should have the 'status of independence subject to certain limitations', and loftily went on to observe that it would be 'undesirable' for her to become a UN member, 'although it would be useful' for her to be associated with the regional work of the UN Specialized Agencies.⁶⁸ A treaty was drafted embodying Britain's more specific 'requirements', which included the provision that Cyprus would not, in her foreign policy, adopt an 'attitude which...might create difficulties for any of the other Parties [to the settlement] or...enter into any military obligations with any other country'.⁶⁹ Next month, the secret agreements reached at Zurich and London - the bilateral Gentlemen's Agreement and the tripartite Agreed Minute - were along similarly-paternalistic lines, each of them setting out policies on important external and internal matters which Greece, Turkey, and Britain would expect the new state to adopt.

But before long it was realised that this sort of approach was just not on.

Pressure on specific issues could, of course, be brought on Cyprus in the usual ways; but - with the exception of the agreed restrictions of the Treaty of Guarantee Cyprus had to be treated as formally in control of her own affairs. Independence meant independence. Hence, as the Foreign Office concluded late in 1959, Britain 'cannot possibly contemplate' trying to stop her entering the UN; indeed, 'a virtue [should be made] out of necessity' by actively sponsoring her.⁷⁰ Likewise, decisions about her foreign, defence, and domestic policies were ones for Cyprus alone to take.

But on one matter Britain continued for a while to nurse the hope that Cyprus could be shunted into second-class citizenship: her relationship with the Commonwealth. Late in 1959 Britain presented a note to the Cypriots suggesting that Cyprus should enjoy a 'Special Association' with the Commonwealth, through which she would enjoy its normal privileges in the areas of trade, finance, and citizenship, including representation at the Commonwealth committees dealing with these subjects. But what was missing from the bill of particulars was attendance at the Commonwealth Prime Ministers' Meetings - which normal membership' would entail. A long list of reasons was advanced by the Secretary of State for Commonwealth Relations, the Earl of Home, explaining to his colleagues why in this case the usual sort of membership was undesirable: Cyprus' 'close Treaty and other links with Greece and Turkey', including the presence of their troops; 'the security considerations (not forgetting the possible effects on Anglo-American relations) to which attendance' at the Prime Ministerial Meetings 'might give rise'; the 'precedent' for smaller colonies'; her 'small size and population'; her 'dubious past'; her 'scant weight in international affairs'; and the 'possible ill effects on the Commonwealth' through its 'growing dilution' by 'like size dependencies', which would take it to a point 'where serious political and other forms of consultation become impossible'.⁷¹ Was the Commonwealth, the Prime Minister later asked, 'to be the R.A.C. or Boodles?'⁷²

But despite all this, Home regretfully concluded that the Special Association scheme was not viable. It had received only the 'grudging and provisional' agreement of some other members (notably Canada), and Makarios had said that Cyprus 'could not possibly accept' unequal status within the organisation. If Cyprus did apply for membership, it would be 'difficult if not impossible' for Britain to turn her application down unilaterally; the other members would have to be consulted. And while they would be informed of Britain's views, the Minister had no expectation that they would prevail.⁷³

Subsequently, however, Prime Minister Macmillan perceived a straw, and eagerly grasped it. The Independence Bill being submitted to Parliament provided that although Cyprus would (at least temporarily) not be a Commonwealth but a foreign country, she should continue to enjoy Commonwealth privileges until the question of her Commonwealth status had been resolved. It was envisaged, and indicated in

the Bill, that nine months might be needed for this process. Then the question arose of whether the Bill should be amended, to allow for greater time. The Governor of Cyprus thought that this might encourage the Cypriots to 'go on indefinitely, getting the best of both worlds'. But the wily Macmillan immediately wondered 'if this would not be a good thing. Would they not then be accepting **de facto** that very special association with the Commonwealth which they rejected **de jure**?'. Thus he favoured playing the question of membership 'as long as possible', worrying only that this languid course might be upset by the 'zeal of Her Majesty's Representatives; we should have to tell the latter both in Cyprus and elsewhere to take no initiative in the matter at all'.⁷⁴

Cyprus, however, did not take the bait: a formal application for Commonwealth membership was made, and accepted at the Prime Ministers' Meeting in March 1961.

Meanwhile, Cyprus had become independent on 16 August 1960. On that day sovereignty was transferred from Britain to the new Republic, and the Cypriot Constitution came into force. Also on that day the Treaty of Establishment, the Treaty of Guarantee, and the Treaty of Alliance (together with an enabling Treaty for the latter) were signed by the parties in Nicosia, and immediately took effect.⁷⁵ These ceremonies took place immediately after midnight on 15/16 August, as Britain - doubtless wanting to pocket the guarantee of her position in Cyprus without delay - was anxious for there to be 'no hiatus between the coming into being of the Republic and the signing of the Treaties'. There was, however, no flag-lowering and raising ceremony at midnight: the Union Jack was taken down at dusk the previous evening, and the Cypriot flag raised for the first time the next morning.⁷⁶

Could these wary and rather muted arrangements have reflected some foreboding about the prospects for the new state?⁷⁷ If so, it was soon to be justified.

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Notes

1. The Articles of the UN Charter to which reference is made in this paragraph are, respectively, 2(7), 73 and 74, and 10.

2. Xydis Stephen G. (1973) *Cyprus: Reluctant Republic*. The Hague and Paris, Mouton, 333.

3. *Ibid.*, 338.

4. See *ibid* (a book chiefly based on Averoff's papers), 337-8; Averoff-Tossizza, Evangelos (1986) *Lost Opportunities. The Cyprus Question, 1950-1963*, translated from Greek by Timothy Cullen and Susan Kyriakidis New York, New Rochelle,

Caratzas, 295-6; and Mayes, Stanley (1981) *Makarios: A Biography*. London, Macmillan, 123.

5. PRO: FO 371/145242, UN 1011/1, Annual Review of events at UN during 58, from Pierson Dixon, Despatch no. 3, 2 Feb 59.

6. This account is based on the works by Averoff and Xydis cited in footnotes 4 and 2, and on private information. Xydis (342) says they met in the Delegates' Lounge, but that seems inherently improbable, and is also contrary to what the present writer has been told.

7. See PRO: CAB 129/96, C(59)32, 16 February 1959.

8. See Ertekun, Necati (1984) *The Cyprus Dispute and the British of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus*. Nicosia North, Rustem, Appendix I, Part II, 146-52.

9. See PRO: FO 371/144629, RGC 1051/8, letter from Sir Derek Hoyer Millar (civil service head of the British Foreign Office) to Sir Roger Allen (Ambassador to Greece), 5 February 1959; and Kitson, Frank (1977) *Bunch of Five*. London, Faber, 212.

10. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 298.

11. See PRO: FO 371, 144646, RGC 1073/87, letter of 19 March 1959 from the Governor (Foot) to Sir John Martin at the Colonial Office.

12. Private information.

13. Averoff, work cited in footnote 4, 367.

14. PRO: FO 371/144643, RGC 1073/63, letter from Sir Roger Allen to AD M Ross, Foreign Office, 5 March 1959.

15. See PRO: PREM 11/2629, FO to Ankara, 3922, 25 December 1958, and FO 371/136314, RGC 10319/283, FO to Athens, 1975, 26 December 1958.

16. PRO: FO 371/136314, RGC 10319/287, minute reporting conversation, 28 December 1958.

17. See PRO: PREM 11/2267, record of a meeting in Paris, 18 December 1958.

1-8. See UK Parliamentary Papers, Session 1958-59, Cmnd. 679.

19. See a British reference to it having been agreed in January 1959 that 'the new Cyprus should be tripartitely guaranteed by Greece, Turkey and Britain'. This seems to refer to a Greco-Turkish rather than a tripartite agreement, but no exception was taken to it at all: PRO: FO 371, 144629, RGC 1051/16, Southern Department round up of 29 January 1959.

20. PRO: CAB 128/33, C.C. (59), 9th Conclusions, 13 February 1959.

21. Cmnd. 679, cited in footnote 18. It should be noted that Greece, Turkey, Cyprus did *not* 'guarantee' the 'integrity' of her sovereign bases, but only undertook to 'respect' it. Initially, the word guarantee *had* been used in respect of the bases, but it did not appear in the final version of the Additional Article: see PRO: CAB 134/1592, C.Y. (0) (59) 16, 15 February 1959, and C.Y. (0) (59) 18, 16 February 1959. Later, the Greek Delegate to the London Joint Committee said that he believed the word guarantee had been removed from the part of the Article which referred to the bases 'since it seemed inappropriate to "guarantee" United Kingdom sovereignty': PRO: FO 371/144647, RGC 1073/110, minute by C R E Brooke, 9 July 1959. This seems plausible, as a state of Britain's standing would perhaps not have been entirely happy about appearing to be in need of a guarantee of help from Greece and Turkey should two pieces of British territory, housing major military facilities, be threatened by the tiny state of Cyprus.

22. See Reddaway, John (1986) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London, Nicosia, Weidenfeld and Nicolson and K Rustem & Bro., 143; and Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 242.

23. Averoff, work cited in footnote 4, 337.

24. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/49, various minutes, 16-24 February 1959.

25. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/41, 16 February 1959. The same Minister had said of Makarios' tactics in 1956 that "'as soon as one obstacle is out of the way another one, unheard of until a week or two before, rears its head'".

26. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 437-41.

27. Salih, Hali! Ibrahim (1978) *Cyprus: The Impact of Diverse Nationalism on a State*. University, Alabama, University of Alabama Press, quoting from Psomiades, Harry J. (May 1965) 'The Cyprus Dispute', *Current History* 48, no. 285, 271-2.

28. PRO: FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/54, 18 February 1959.

29. Quoted in Polyviou, Polyvios G. (1980) *Cyprus: Conflict and Negotiation, 1960-1980*. London, Duckworth, 14.

30. Admirers of Macmillan will recall that this was the occasion on which he appeared in Moscow sporting an ancient white fur hat which, he did not realise at the time, 'was a form of headdress peculiar to Finland': Macmillan, Harold (1971) *Riding the Storm, 1956-1959*. London, Macmillan, 591.

31. The time is taken from Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 453; Vanezis, P N (1979) *Makarios: Life and Leadership*. London, Abelard-Schuman, 54, gives it as 10.30.

32. See Mayes, work cited in footnote 4, 133-5.

33. This may also have been the occasion when, so it is said, Makarios was visited by a member of Britain's Secret Intelligence Service, allegedly presenting evidence of his unorthodox sexual proclivities and saying how regrettable it would be should the material find its way into the hands of the press. The present writer has been assured that such an incident occurred at or about this time. It has been said that such evidence was gathered by the security apparatus in Cyprus in 1958: see West, Nigel (1990) *The Friends. Britain's Post-War Intelligence Operations*. London, Coronet edition [originally published by Weidenfeld and Nicolson, 1988], 103. It should be noted, however, that Makarios was not in Cyprus during 1958.

34. Private information.

35. Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 456.

36. See Foley, Charles and Scobie, W I (1975) *The Struggle for Cyprus*. Stanford, California, Hoover Institution Press, Stanford University, 157.

37. A 1964 statement to the Greek Government, quoted in Sonyel Salahi, R. (1997) *Cyprus: The Destruction of a Republic. British Documents 1960-65*. Huntingdon, Cambs, Eothen Press, 80. Similarly, the leader of the Greek Cypriot delegation at the Commission which drafted the Cyprus Constitution has said that the Agreements which it reflected were accepted only reluctantly and with the intention of abrogating them in order to achieve Enosis': see Necatigil, Zaim M. (1993) *The Cyprus question and the Turkish Position in International Law*. Oxford, Oxford University Press, second edition, 12 fn 21.

38. Macmillan, work cited in footnote 30, 692.

39. Foley Charles (ed.) (1964) *The Memoirs of General Grivas*. London, Longmans, 192.

40. Landa, Ronald D., Miller James E, Patterson David S, Simpson Charles S (eds.) (1993), *Foreign Relations of the United States, 1958-1960 Volume X, Part 1, Eastern Europe Region; Soviet Union; Cyprus*. Washington DC, United States Government Printing Office, 777.

41. Britain, Greece, Turkey, and the two Cypriot communities all put their signatures at London to documents which included this phrase: see Cmnd. 679, cited in footnote 18, and Ertekun, work cited in footnote 8.

42. PRO: CAB 134/1593, CY (0) (59) 38, 8 April 1959. The text of the Agreed Minute is given in CAB 134/1592, C.Y. (0) (59) 22, 25 February 1959.

43. PRO: CAB 134/1593, C.Y. (O) (59) 31 (Revise), 15 April 1959, para 9.

44. See PRO: CAB 134/1593, C.Y. (0) (59) 41, Attorney-General to Foreign Office, 15 April 1959.

45. PRO: CAB/134/1587, C.Y. (M) (59) 1st Meeting, 28 April 1959.

46. PRO: CAB 134/1593, CY (0) (59) 44, Note by the Foreign Office, 8 May 1959.

47. See PRO: FO 371/144646, RGC 1073/90, minute of RLWG [Robert Wade-Gery], 12 June 1959.
48. PRO: FO 371/144647, RGC 1073/110, minute by CR E Brooke, 9 July 1959.
49. PRO: FO 371/144652, RGC 1073/144, series of minutes, 1-19 October 1959.
50. PRO: FO 371/144653, RGC 1073/158, minute by R L Wade-Gery, 20 October 1959.
51. Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 514.
52. See PRO: FO 371/144646, Defence and Foreign Policy of Cyprus, Report by the Cyprus Committee, 10 April 1959.
53. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 481.
54. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, minute and attachment from the Minister of Defence to the Prime Minister, 18 February 1960. Cf CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 2nd Meeting, 14 January 1960.
55. Ibid.
56. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, Prime Minister to Foreign Secretary, 4 April 1960.
57. See PRO: PREM 11/2923, Nicosia to FO, 429, 11 April 1960, and PREM 11/2924: Minister of State at the Foreign Office to Prime Minister, 11 April 1960.
58. Mayes, work cited in footnote 4, 146.
59. Private information.
60. Two villages and a power station were to be enclaves of Cypriot territory within the SSAs with special arrangements for access to them. The only village under British sovereignty was to be that of Akrotiri, which was too close to the Akrotiri airfield to be treated as a Cypriot enclave: see PRO: PREM 11/3242, House of Commons statement by the Secretary of State for the Colonies, 4 July 1960.
61. See PRO: Prem 11/2924, Nicosia to FO, 753, 2 July 1960.
62. See Xydis, work cited in footnote 2, 481.
63. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 12, 13 January 1960.
64. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60), Second meeting, 14 January 1960.
65. PRO: PREM 11/2924, 29 April 1960.
66. See PRO: PREM 11/2924, Nicosia to FO, 735, for the Foreign Secretary from Amery, 1 July 1960; and private information.
67. See p.346, Garner, J. (1978) *The Commonwealth Office, 1925-68*. London,

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68. PRO: CAB 134/1591, CY (0) (59) First meeting, 2 January 1959. (It should be noted, however, that very shortly afterwards a Foreign Office memorandum said that 'there would be little objection from our point of view to Cyprus as a United Nations member': CY (0) (59) 4, 9 January 1959.) See also FO 371/144629, RGC 1051/16, Southern Department round-up of developments, 29 January 1959, in which it is said that the basis for the solution of the problem is 'a type of independence' for Cyprus.

69. PRO: CAB 134/1592, CY (0) (59) 3 (Revised), 3 February 1959.

70. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) 1, membership of International "Organisations, Memorandum by the Foreign Office, 1 January 1960.

71. PRO: CAB 134/1588, C.Y. (M) (60) Second meeting, 14 January 1960, and attached memorandum, C.Y. (M) (60) 6, 8 January 1960.

72. Quoted in McIntyre, W.D. (1996), 'The Admission of Small states to the Commonwealth', 24 *Journal of Imperial and Commonwealth History* 2, 269. The R.A.C. and Boodles were two Gentlemen's Clubs in London, but the latter was the much more exclusive of the two.

73. PRO: CAB 134/1588, documents cited in footnote 71.

74. PRO: DEFE 13/382, minute from the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the Prime Minister, P.M. (60) 45, 14 July 1960, and Prime Minister's reply, 15 July 1960.

75. There had been concern in the British Foreign Office over the Republic Cyprus being a party to the Treaty of Establishment, given that it would not become independent until the Treaty had come into force: see PRO: FO 371/144639 RGC 1073/1, 4 February 1959. The answer was given by the Colonial Office in FO 371/144642, RGC 1073/55 - an undated document which was handed to Cypriot representatives on 16 February 1959. See also FO 371/144631, RGC 1051/49, 16 July 1959.

76. See PRO: PREM 11/3242, exchange of telegrams between the Colonial Office and the Governor, 20 and 21 July 1960, and despatch no. 1 from I F Porter, 7 September 1960.

77. Fairfield Roy P. (1959) 'Cyprus: Revolution and Resolution', 13 *The Middle East Journal* 3 quotes a letter from a Greek friend which 'reflects dimensions of the problem not found in public statements' (247). In her belief 'every single Greek soul all over the world' is embittered by cooperation with Turkey 'against whom we keep an eternal hatred in our hearts for untold hardships...for so many centuries' (248).