

THE EUROPEAN UNION AND THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: POWERLESS TO HELP?

Justin Hutchence and Harris Georgiades

Abstract

This paper examines the role of the European Community/Union (EC/EU) in the effort to resolve the problem of the division of Cyprus. It focuses on the latest bid by the EU to achieve progress by linking the development of its relations with Turkey and the Republic of Cyprus with movement towards a reunification of the island. As events have shown, this effort was destined to fail, given the unwillingness of the EU to grant full membership to Turkey, without which Turkey will not even consider a re-thinking of its strategic objectives regarding Cyprus.

In the long-term, however, the EU remains well placed to help create a new, more promising relationship between Greeks and Turks, if only it can find a way to push Turkey towards democratisation.

Introduction

This paper is aimed at explaining the problems that the EU has had in exerting its influence towards the resolution of a long-standing international problem on its borders; it is not a paper which is aimed at examining the problems with Cyprus's accession to the European Union. To avoid unnecessary confusion it is important that terms should be defined. The European Union, for the purposes of this paper, will be referred to in the widest possible sense, noting its external policy in the region and attempting to explain the interests that drive that policy. Cyprus also needs careful definition. Since the Turkish invasion of 1974, the island remains divided. The government of the Republic of Cyprus enjoys international recognition, but does not control the northern part of the island. The latter is controlled by the authorities of the self-proclaimed "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" (TRNC), an entity recognized only by Turkey itself.

In many respects this whole paper might come under the umbrella of the 'capa-

bility-expectations gap' approach, put forward by Christopher Hill to explain the problems faced by the EU when it tries to exert itself in the area of foreign policy.¹ At present one could describe the 'capability-expectations gap' as quite low. Since the EU proved its inability to act effectively in its own backyard in the conflict in ex-Yugoslavia little has been expected of the EU as an international actor. However, the EU is of a considerable importance to all the parties involved in the Cypriot dispute and thus it holds a considerable number of cards. Greece is a member state of the EU; Turkey has a Customs Union agreement with the EU; while the Cyprus Republic is currently involved in the process of accession negotiations with the EU. One might have thought that if the EU used its influence strategically, then it could make a positive contribution towards resolving the island's problem.

However the situation that faces the EU is one which is stubborn and long term. Whilst the division of the island of Cyprus has been in place for the last 25 years the dispute between the two communities on the island has existed since 1960, and even earlier. Not only is it a deeply entrenched ethno-political conflict centred on an island but it is also part of a wider conflict between two middle ranking military powers who have a long history of conflict between them.

This paper is aimed at explaining the EU's apparent helplessness in enabling a solution to the division of Cyprus. Despite the economic and political carrots and sticks available to the EU, it seems that the division of Cyprus is, at least for the time being, unlikely to be resolved. The primary reason for this helplessness is the underlying tension over the future of Turkey's European orientation. Whilst the official opinion of the EU is that Turkey could become a member, it appears that there is opposition to Turkish membership on two levels. Initially there are several political and economic hurdles for Turkey to overcome before it can be admissible; issues of human rights, democracy and economic compatibility. Apart from these there is an underlying opposition to Turkish membership which can be seen in statements by European political leaders who argue against Turkish membership on the basis of issues such as Turkey's non-European identity.² Turkish politicians note that despite lengthy relations with the EU they have been pushed to the back of the queue for EU membership with the central and eastern European countries overtaking them. Therefore, whilst the Turks still want to join, they see membership as unlikely for some considerable time and therefore consider the preservation of their immediate strategic and political objectives as more significant than seeking a solution to issues of contention with the EU; such as the division of Cyprus.

The paper firstly outlines the problem of the Cyprus conflict, describes the power relationships in the Eastern Mediterranean and details the present situation. Secondly the history of the EU's involvement in the Cyprus problem over the years, and its current strategy is outlined. Thirdly the EU's inability to exert its power in the region is discussed.

What is the Problem?

The legacy of British colonial rule in Cyprus that came to an end in 1960, was a complex and delicate arrangement between the Greek and Turkish communities, which made up 80% and 18% of the total population of the island respectively. What was most needed for these arrangements to work for the benefit of everyone was goodwill and this was notably absent on both sides. On the contrary, both provided plenty of material to the propagandists of the other side, who have always been trying to place the blame for the failure of the new state to make a good start solely in the hands of the other. In 1974, following the period of strife within the Greek community culminating in a coup staged by the Greek junta (1967-74) against the Cypriot president, Turkey found the "perfect" opportunity to invade Cyprus and occupy the northern part of the island (36% of its territory). The Greek-Cypriot population was forced into the southern part of the island while the Turkish-Cypriots moved into the northern part and thus the division remains. The years since 1974 have been marked by successive rounds of negotiations. By 1977 the two sides in the conflict had agreed in theory on a "bi-zonal and bi-communal federation". However, since then there has been no progress towards the practical implementation of the agreement.

The island's division is inextricably bound up with the wider array of problems between Greece and Turkey, which have always supported their fellow communities in Cyprus. Consequently, the antagonism over the division of Cyprus reinforces and is reinforced by disputes over the Aegean, such as the one over the uninhabited islet of Imia (Kardak to Turkey).

The Structural International Context

The region's interrelationships are ordered by Greece and Turkey's membership in a number of organisations. Firstly there is the Greek membership in the European Union which is significant for relationships within the region in general and particularly for dealing with the Cyprus problem. Greece's membership in the EU means that, as far as Turkey is concerned, it is impossible for the EU to act as an impartial mediator in the dispute over the division of the island. Greece has used its position within the EU to promote the accession of Cyprus and has threatened to veto the expansion of the EU to the East if membership negotiations with the Republic of Cyprus do not go ahead according to schedule. In addition, following the dispute between the two countries over the islet of Imia, Greece has also blocked the disbursement of funds that were allocated to Turkey as part of the Customs Union agreement. Therefore it is clear that the EU policy towards the region and towards solving the Cyprus problem is strongly influenced by the Greek membership of the

EU. In addition, Greece is also a full member of NATO and of the WEU.

Turkey has an Association agreement and a Customs Union agreement with the European Union but has recently been left behind in the enlargement process. *Agenda 2000* does not recommend the opening of accession negotiations with Turkey, pointing out a number of political and economic problems that Turkey must resolve before it becomes eligible for membership. Turkey is also a full member of NATO and has associate status within the WEU. This gives Turkey a bargaining chip in negotiations with the EU in that it has to ratify the enlargement of NATO. It has threatened to block such an enlargement unless its own accession to the EU was ratified.³

In 1972 Cyprus signed an Association agreement with the EC which came into effect in June 1973. This agreement was quite minimal and mentioned no long term aim of Cyprus becoming a member state. The aim of the agreement was to eliminate trade barriers in two five-year stages that would lead to a Customs Union. However the economic and political repercussions of the 1974 invasion meant that the second stage of association was not signed until 1987. The Republic of Cyprus is also a member of the Council of Europe and the OSCE, but not of NATO or the WEU, opting instead for membership of the Non-aligned movement. However, in line with its application to join the EU, the Cyprus Republic is now pursuing closer relations with the WEU.

Present Situation

On 31 March 1998 the Republic of Cyprus started negotiations to become a member of the European Union. This resulted in heated diplomatic exchanges between the EU, Greece and Cyprus on the one hand, and Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot leadership on the other. The Turkish leadership responded to the event by stating that:

"Turkey has shown...that it will not allow any development which will distance Cyprus from Turkey,"⁹

This response was coupled with the long standing threat to integrate northern Cyprus into the Republic of Turkey if accession negotiations between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU went ahead. In fact on the same day that EU-Cyprus accession negotiations were inaugurated, there was a meeting of the Turkey -"TRNC" Association Council at which an economic union between the two was announced.

In reply Greece rebuffed the prospect of unification between northern Cyprus and Turkey, stating that the whole island would be better off within the European Union⁶. Greece also reminded its European partners that if Cyprus's accession to the EU was blocked because of the division of the island and the Turkish threats

then it would veto the enlargement of the EU to the East.

The affair of the S-300 missiles added to the confrontation for two whole years¹. The Cypriot claim was that these surface-to-air missiles were defensive and were aimed at countering the Turkish air superiority. Turkey had warned in no uncertain terms that the delivery of these missiles could lead to a pre-emptive strike on its part, something which raised concern for an all-out Greek-Turkish clash. Eventually, in an effort to diffuse tension, the deployment of the missiles on Cyprus was cancelled by Cypriot President Glafcos Clerides.

In the midst of this impasse Richard Holbrooke, the US President's Special Envoy to Cyprus, has been trying to bring the two communities on the island together to resume the face to face talks which broke up in the summer of 1997⁸. After separate talks with Clerides and Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktash, the US envoy announced that there had been no advance on the previous position; with Denktash refusing to resume negotiations unless the TRNC is recognised as a state in its own right. Therefore it is clear that at present the difficulties that surround the Cyprus problem are quite tense and intractable.

The Record of the EC/EU Involvement

Since the invasion of Cyprus in 1974 there have been three distinct periods in the EC/EU's activity regarding the Cyprus problem. These phases can be characterised as, firstly, a period of activism in response to the Turkish invasion, followed by a period of "detached concern" and then recently by a period of increased involvement in the effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem.

During the initial Cyprus crisis in 1974 and the immediate period that followed, the EC showed an interest in seeing a solution to the Cyprus problem. This was mainly expressed through European Political Cooperation declarations (EPC-the putative form of EC foreign policy cooperation) in support of the work of the UN and the USA to that effect.

From 1976 onwards the Community adopted a stance that has been characterised as one of "detached concern". During these years the initiative was left to the United Nations which undertook successive efforts to mediate between the Greek and Turkish communities of Cyprus in an effort to achieve a resolution of the problem based on the creation of a federation.⁹

The entry of Greece into the EC as a full-member in 1981, altered the political balance between Greece and Turkey, but did not lead to any significant EC activity regarding the Cyprus problem. The EC member-states, with the exception of Greece, were unwilling to agitate Turkey even further, which was already declaring that as far as it was concerned, the EC could no longer be considered as an impar-

tial third party.

Greece, on its part, was not in a particularly strong position within the EC, a result of the foreign and economic policy of the socialist government of Andreas Papandreou. Furthermore, the governments of Athens and Nicosia, did not actually envision and did not pursue an active EC role in the efforts to resolve the Cyprus problem. Instead, they showed a preference for the UN process, coupled with efforts to "internationalise" the problem by bringing it forward to various fora like those of the non-aligned movement.

On 19 October 1987, a Customs Union agreement was signed between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus, despite the division of the island and the fact that the provisions of the accord would not apply to the territory out of the control of the government. After the signing of the agreement the Greek and Greek Cypriot attitudes regarding the EC and its role began to change. The EC was now increasingly regarded as the main framework within which Greek foreign and economic policy would have to be shaped. A basic aspect of this approach was that the efforts to resolve the division of Cyprus should be brought within the "European arena" and this would be achieved through the forging of institutional relations between the Cyprus Republic and the EC. This in turn meant that the government of the Republic of Cyprus, as a follow-up to the Customs Union agreement, should apply for full EC-membership. This was eventually done in 1990, but it was only after 1993, with the coming into power of a transformed pro-European PASOK in Greece, that the "Europeanization" of the Cyprus problem was actively pursued by both Athens and Nicosia.

The opinion of the Commission which was given in 1993, was essentially positive reflecting the fact that the Republic of Cyprus was a European, democratic and prosperous state and confirming its vocation to belong to the Community.¹⁰ However, noting the problem of the division, it refrained from suggesting the immediate start of accession negotiations, suggesting instead the reconsideration of the issue in January 1995. The rationale for this decision was that the eighteen month period until January 1995 should be used for yet another effort to resolve the problem of the division. As a manifestation of the abandonment of the approach of "detached concern", the European Union went further and appointed an observer, Serge Abou, tasked with the monitoring of the behaviour of the parties in the conflict resolution efforts.

It is characteristic of the decision-making process in the Council, that the reconsideration of the Cyprus application became part of a "package deal" involving the EU's relations with Turkey as well. In particular, based on the report of the EU observer, the Council agreed to start accession negotiations with Cyprus six months after the conclusion of the 1996 Intergovernmental Conference (IGC), essentially accepting that the perpetuation of the division was due to lack of political will

on the Turkish Cypriot side.¹¹ Athens and Nicosia were successful in convincing the EU that not to open accession negotiations with Cyprus because of the division of the island would amount to a double punishing of the innocent side and would also be seen as granting a veto right to a non-member state, in this case Turkey. However, for the Council to take this decision, Greece was asked to withdraw its objection to the signing of a Customs Union and a Financial Cooperation agreement between the Union and Turkey. An overall agreement was eventually reached on 6 March 1995.

What one notes is that in this case the European Union was able to exploit the respective objectives of Turkey and the Cyprus Republic and was able to strike a deal on two very sensitive issues. This diplomatic plan of the French Presidency of the Council of the time received favourable comments and was regarded as an application of an EU leverage on the parties involved in the Cyprus stalemate. In summary, it is important to view the EU's response to the Cyprus problem not as the response of a single political entity but as that of a collection of institutions and member-states coming to a compromise position in response to an international problem. In addition, it should not be seen as a pro-active attempt at solving Cyprus's problems, but as a reaction by the EC/EU to an initial crisis and since then, to the implications of the increasing institutional linkage between the EC/EU and Cyprus. The EU's more recent attempts to resolve the division of the island are aimed exactly at allowing the entry of a united Cyprus in the European Union.

The Formulation of the EU Policy after 1995

The Council decision of 6 March 1995, was indeed a landmark event that signalled the beginning of a period of heightened EU interest in and involvement with the Cyprus problem. To understand the importance of the decision and the steps that followed, it is necessary to examine how the deal was viewed by the various international actors involved in this problematic web of relations. The governments of Cyprus and Greece regarded the deal as an effective exploitation of the established practice of the Union to reach decisions by linking different issues, resulting in the setting of a firm date for the opening of accession negotiations for Cyprus. This, in turn, was seen to have significant positive political implications.

The immediate implication was that the opening of accession negotiations could force an urgent rethinking of Turkish policy and objectives regarding Cyprus. The deeper involvement of the EU and the prospect of a Cyprus membership would thus act as catalysts for the resolution of the conflict and the reunification of the island. In the longer-term, according to the Greek and Greek Cypriot thinking, membership would guarantee that a united federal Cyprus would not diverge from the European political, economic and social norms, that Cyprus would remain a liberal-democrat-

ic, free-market country and that it would be effectively secured against any possible Turkish move in the future.

However, for the Greek side, EU membership for the Republic of Cyprus would be equally important and would be pursued vigorously even if Greek and Turkish Cypriots remained apart. According to the Greek and Greek Cypriot thinking, in this second best scenario, an EU membership would guarantee the continuing existence and progress of the Republic of Cyprus and of the Greek Cypriots, in the face of the threat posed by the Turkish presence in the north of the island. This option is also seen as preserving the prospect that in the future the Turkish Cypriots might decide to join in.

The approach of the EU was in part similar to the Greek and Greek Cypriot approach. The EU has always been aware of the benefits that would result from the membership of Cyprus. Despite its small size, Cyprus has an advanced and dynamic economy with important links with the southern Mediterranean and Middle Eastern countries as well as with Russia and the former Soviet Republics. Thus the membership of Cyprus would not only facilitate the maintenance of the North-South balance within the Union, but would also facilitate the realization of the political and economic objectives of the EU in these regions. In short, Cyprus would constitute a useful EU partner.

These advantages of Cyprus were overshadowed, to a large extent, by the problem of its division. However, following the decision of 6 March 1995, a consensus seems to have emerged in the EU and its member-states, but also in the US which was and remains an important actor in the European political scene, regarding the way that this problem could be tackled. According to this consensus of opinion, the new landscape of relations and commitments of the EU with Cyprus and Turkey offered a unique opportunity to achieve a resolution of the Cyprus problem and ease relations between Greece and Turkey.

The shared view was that during the meantime until the opening of the accession negotiations with Cyprus, the EU was in a very strong position vis-a-vis both the Greek and Turkish sides and could apply significant leverage power upon them, pushing them towards a settlement. In particular, while the EU would be offering full-membership to the Cyprus Republic, it would also explain to its Greek Cypriot government that this was conditional upon flexibility and good-will in the efforts to resolve the problem of the island. At the same time, the Turkish Cypriots would be offered the benefits of EU-membership and Turkey itself an improved position, short of full-membership, but only if they allowed a reunification of Cyprus.

What emerges then, is that in the immediate post-March 1995 period, there was a general agreement that the time was right for one big push towards a resolution of the Cyprus problem. This would then be followed by the accession of a unified federal Cyprus into the EU.

However, it was unclear, at the time, if the EU and its member-states had considered what their strategy would be in the case of a failure of this major diplomatic effort. Specifically, it was unclear if they would really go all the way and accept the Cyprus Republic as a member without a resolution of the Cyprus problem, which as explained, was and remains the alternative objective of Nicosia and Athens. In fact it seems that the EU did not have an alternative strategy at all, while the successful conclusion of this effort depended almost entirely on Turkey; and as events have shown, Turkey has been quite unwilling to play along.

The Implementation of the EU Policy

Since 1995, the EU has been active in supporting the UN process for achieving a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus question, based on the creation of a bi-communal and bi-zonal federation. As noted above, the EU has been trying to exploit its own relations with the parties in conflict, as well as the prospect for a further development of these relations, in an attempt to achieve a reconciliation between the two communities of Cyprus which would, in turn, enable a wider improvement in relations between Greece and Turkey.

The benefit for the EU itself is self-evident. The EU would have facilitated the resolution of a complex and long-standing problem in a region which is vital for its own interests, establishing its credentials as an effective international actor, and opening the way for a much less problematic development of its relations with both Cyprus and Turkey.

However, four years on, success has not been forthcoming. The EU has been at pains explaining and emphasising to the Turkish Cypriot leadership, all the benefits of membership, especially the economic ones. Even though the US is also part of this effort, Rauf Denktash remained absolutely unmoved during the Summer of 1997 New York and Geneva meetings with Glafcos Clerides.¹² The Turkish Cypriot leader was equally negative in his response to the invitation extended by the Cypriot government, right after the re-election of Clerides in February 1998, for equal participation of Turkish Cypriot representatives in the negotiating team of the Cyprus Republic in the EU accession talks. However, to understand the stance of Denktash, it is important to have in mind the wider Turkish policy regarding Cyprus.

Turkish Policy and Objectives Regarding Cyprus

Since 1974, the territory occupied by the Turkish army has become increasingly integrated with and dependent on Turkey, both in political and economic terms. In addition, thousands of mainland Turks have actually settled in northern Cyprus, while the Turkish military presence has remained very high.

These developments are directly related to the perceived national and strategic Turkish interests. Firstly, these involve the security and self-rule of the Turkish population of Cyprus. Secondly, and probably more importantly, the security of Turkey itself is considered to be dependent upon Turkish control of northern Cyprus.

From Ataturk onwards, Turkish political and military leaders have repeatedly been making the point that in the hands of a hostile power, as Greece is perceived to be, Cyprus would become a "dagger pointed at the soft underbelly of Anatolia".¹³ To avoid such an eventuality, the Turkish military establishment and the majority of the political elite of the country considers the control of northern Cyprus and, through the presence there of a large military force, the strategic control of the whole island, as an absolute necessity.

In the words of Bulent Ecevit who, as Prime Minister, ordered the 1974 invasion: "Cyprus will become either a guarantee of or a source of threat to Turkey's entire southern shore...".¹⁴

One can speculate that only if Turkey found itself under enormous pressure, or if it were offered a compensation of great substance, would it be willing to even consider a change to its Cyprus policy.

The EU - Turkish Relationship

For the EU, Turkey is a country of great significance. Turkey is located at the cross-roads of the geo-politically and geo-economically sensitive and important regions of the Caucasus, the Balkans and the Middle East. Its secular organisation and western orientation are seen as attractive alternatives to the more radical Islamic regimes of the region, while the size of the Turkish economy makes it an important prospective market for European exports.

At the same time, however, the EU notes the existence of several problems regarding Turkey. The Turkish economy has not been able to develop sufficiently and equitably enough, while the Turkish population keeps growing rapidly, resulting, among other things, in a steady emigration of Turks into Europe. The Turkish state is seen to be engaged in a long and vicious civil war with Kurdish groups, while the level of democracy and respect for human rights in the country are well below European standards.

Given these realities, the aim of the EU over the years has been to keep Turkey as close as possible without actually offering it full membership, at least in the foreseeable future. For the Europeans, the Customs Union agreement of 1995, was a step in this direction. For the Turkish side, however, the Customs Union was seen as just a temporary stage before an actual full membership.

As is explained by Seyfi Tashan, Director of the Foreign Policy Institute of the Turkish Foreign Ministry, the Turkish participation in the Customs Union but not in the decision-making mechanisms of the single market on matters concerning the economy, commerce and other major policies, is untenable on a permanent basis. The Customs Union would, then, have to "be transformed into full adhesion as soon as it is possible and feasible for both sides."¹⁵

The disagreement between the EU and Turkey concerning the objectives of their relationship and their expectations from it reached a climax following the publication of the Commission *Agenda 2000* report of July 1997, and the Luxembourg European Council meeting of December 1997. The EU had decided to inaugurate accession negotiations with a group of five Eastern European countries and also with the Cyprus Republic. The same did not apply to Turkey. Instead, it was decided that the further development of EU-Turkish relations would be dependent upon Ankara meeting a set of rules and principles, mainly concerning the respect of human rights, democratic institutions, borders and international law. The most that Ankara was granted was a seat in the European Conference which would bring together the representatives of all member and applicant governments in an essentially ceremonial meeting.

Turkey reacted angrily to these developments, and did not participate in the European Conference which took place in London, in March 1998. For the Turkish leadership, the EU was discriminating against their country, mainly on the grounds that it was an Islamic country while the EU was a "Christian club".

Various responses came from Europe, denying the Turkish accusations and pointing out that the EU conditions were nothing more than the self-evident prerequisites for the participation of a country in the European unification process. In a typical response British MEP James Moorhouse, a member of the Joint EU-Turkey parliamentary committee, stated that:

"Turkey's membership of the European Union is not being held back because Turkey is a non-Christian state. It is being held back because Turkey is not a liberal democracy".¹⁶

Powerless to Help

The important point for our analysis is that the political realities of the EU system and of the Turkish Republic do not allow the forging of those institutional relations, which amount to nothing less than full membership for Turkey that could raise the possibility of Turkish concessions in Cyprus. Neither the carrot nor the stick of the EU appear to be substantial enough to cause this change in policy, without which the whole diplomatic "master plan" put forward after 1995 will fail. Consequently, the

EU approach seems to have reached a dead-end, and the Union is once again powerless to help.

Far from achieving a breakthrough, the Turkish side has actually hardened its position, by openly declaring what until recently was its concealed objective: that Cyprus will remain divided, that the north will be integrated with Turkey and that the only future negotiations could be between two internationally recognised, sovereign states of the island of Cyprus. The Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash, during a press conference attended by Turkey's Foreign Minister Ismail Gem, on 31 August 1998, formally declared that the only scope for future negotiations was the creation of some kind of confederation between the two states of Cyprus.

Conclusions

Several conclusions can be reached regarding the involvement of the EU with Cyprus and its latest bid to help towards a reunification of this divided island.

Firstly, the EU has been drawn over the years into a closer involvement with the long standing and complex political problem of Cyprus as a result of the pursuit for and the forging of institutional relations with the states involved in the conflict. The application by the Cyprus Republic for full-membership and the fact that this became the number one foreign policy objective for the Cypriot government, was instrumental in engaging the Union with the efforts to resolve the problem of the division of the island.

Secondly, as the "package deal" of 1995 shows, the EU is still not quite able to formulate a long-term strategy when it comes to "high politics" and specifically to issues with foreign and security policy implications. Rather, its decisions are largely the result of political bargaining, linkage of different issues and, ultimately, the achievement of a convergence of different national and Community interests.

Thirdly, the attempt by the EU, with the support of the US and the UN, to broker a resolution of the conflict by offering the benefits of full-membership to the Turkish Cypriots and a very "special" relationship to Turkey, in exchange for concessions in Cyprus, as part of a grand "political bargain" has not been successful up to this point because of the overriding Turkish strategic considerations regarding Cyprus.

And fourthly, the development of EU-Turkish relations, an essential aspect of the EU approach towards the Cyprus problem, is adversely affected by other problems as well. Turkey's level of political and economic development is not up to EU standards, so what the EU can offer Turkey in terms of institutional relations is limited, not to mention the "cultural issue" that seems to lurk in the background.

For the time then, the EU is not finding it possible to use its influence with the

states involved with the Cyprus problem in a way that will lead to a resolution of the problem. However, the involvement of the EU has not been counter-productive, despite the apparent hardening of the Turkish position, and in the long-run the EU remains best suited to help create a new kind of relationship between Greeks and Turks.

The essence of European integration is that it forms a unique association between prosperous liberal democracies, thus creating an area of peace, democracy, stability and development. The challenge for the EU is to achieve an expansion of this area into the troubled Eastern Mediterranean. The accession of Greece back in 1981, the probable accession of the Cyprus Republic in the coming years, and, the highest price of all, the accession of Turkey, when it becomes a prosperous liberal democracy, will make this ambitious aim a reality.

The extent to which the EU policy, as expressed by the European Council at Luxembourg, will be successful, will depend largely on the EU stance from now on. The EU and its member-states should be firm in upholding the conditions set at Luxembourg, but generous and flexible in their rewards to Turkey when it displays real progress on these issues. To side step these conditions would be as wrong as the consideration of issues of religion and culture in the shaping of the EU policy regarding Turkey.

It is only under conditions of democratic peace and stability that the problem of the division of Cyprus could be resolved. The future role of the EU then, is none other than encouraging, helping, urging, pressurising and sanctioning Turkey, until its leadership accepts to shed the legacy of the past and truly comprehends and shares the vision of European integration. Sadly, for the time being, this is more of an aspiration and less of a real prospect.

Notes

1. Hill, Christopher (1993). 'The Capability-Expectations Gap, or Conceptualizing Europe's International Role', in *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, September. Reprinted in *Economic and Political Integration in Europe: Internal Dynamics and Global Context*, ed. by Simon Bulmer and Andrew Scott, (1994), Oxford: Blackwell, pp. 103-126.

2. Schauble, Wolfgang, quoted in *Financial Times*, 21 March 1998.

3. *The Day in Politics*, Agence Internationale d'Information Pour La Presse, (1997), Luxembourg-Bruxelles, No. 6904, p. 2.

4. Gaudissart, Marc-Andre (1996), 'Cyprus and the European Union: The Long Road to Accession', in *The Cyprus Review*, Intercollege, Nicosia, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 14-15.

5. Reuters News Agency, 4 April 1998.
6. Ibid., March 31 1998.
7. These missiles were ordered in January 1997 before Cyprus began negotiations for EU membership. The decision to divert the missiles to Crete was taken in December 1998.
8. The US envoy has been working alongside Sir David Hannay the UK special representative to Cyprus who was also the EU Council Presidency representative during the UK and Austrian Presidencies of the EU in 1998.
9. Stephanou, Constantine and Tsardines, Charalambos (1991), 'The EC Factor in the Greece-Turkey-Cyprus Triangle', in *The Greek Turkish Conflict in the 1990s: Domestic and External Influences*, ed. by Dimitri Conostas, London: Macmillan, p. 219.
10. European Communities - Commission (1993), 'The Challenge of Enlargement - Commission Opinion on the application by the Republic of Cyprus', Supplement 5/93 *Bulletin of the European Communities*.
11. The lack of political will was noted by the UN Secretary General, under whose auspices the efforts for a settlement have been taking place. In his report to the Security Council he notes that "for the present the Security Council finds itself faced with an already familiar scenario: the absence of political will on the Turkish Cypriot side". (UN Security Council, *Report of the Secretary General, on his mission of good offices in Cyprus*, S/1994/629).
12. See Statement to the Press by the President of the Security Council British Ambassador Sir John Weston, after the briefing of the Special Adviser of the Secretary General Mr Diego Cordovez on the outcome of the Glion Talks, New York 20 August 1997.
13. Alembar, Sakir, 'International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem', in *The Political, Economic and Social Development of North Cyprus*, ed. by Clement H. Dodd, (1993), London: Eothen, p. 99.
14. TRT TV, Ankara, 21 January 1997, 0540 GMT, in *BBC Summary of World Broadcasts*, 24 January 1997.
15. Tashan, Seyfi (1994), 'A change in relations between Turkey and the EC', in Peter Ludlow (ed.), *Europe and the Mediterranean*, London & New York: Brassey's, 1994, p. 261.
16. *Financial Times*, 30 March 1998.