NEGOTIATING THE SOLUTION TO THE CYPRUS PROBLEM: FROM IMPASSE TO POST-HELSINKI HOPE

Harry Anastasiou

Abstract

For more than four decades, the Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots have been negotiating in an effort to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The perspective, assumptions and hypotheses that underpin the respective approaches to the Cyprus problem disclose the general framework that renders understandable the impasse that has characterised the long history of negotiations on Cyprus. The Helsinki decision by the European Union to accept Turkey as a candidate state has fundamentally modified the framework within which the stakeholders will, henceforth, have to negotiate a possible solution for Cyprus. This shift in framework may provide the basis of hope for resolving the long overdue Cyprus problem.

State Sovereignty and Self-determination: The Perennial Problem

As far back as 1977 and 1979, the Greek Cypriots (G/Cs) and Turkish Cypriots (T/Cs), at top-level talks, have agreed in principle that the solution to the Cyprus problem will be a Bicommunal, Bizonal Federal Republic. However, since then, there has been total lack of progress. One of the major reasons for this arises from the fact that over the years, in the very process of the negotiations, the G/Cs and T/Cs, and Greece and Turkey respectively assumed their point of departure from within the structure of the conflict. This structure can be identified as the classic conflict reflected in the history of nationalism between state sovereignty and self-determination. Inasmuch as statehood and political self-determination are perceived in ethnocentric and monoethnic terms, unless society is ethnically homogeneous, the two principles will inevitably stand in contradiction to one another. In societies that are ethnically mixed but nationalistically oriented, the requirements of state sovereignty and the demand for self-determination increasingly come to operate as divergent forces, usually leading to conflicts and crisis.

In his work *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of Ethnopoli*T/C*al Conflict,* Robert Gurr points out that in nationalist conflicts, communal groups have four general orientations to, and demand on, the state and its sovereignty. These are exit, autonomy, access and control. Gurr explains:

> *Exit* implies complete withdrawal and severance of mutual ties between communal groups and the state. *Autonomy* and access both imply some degree of accommodation: autonomy means that a minority has a collective power base, usually a regional one, in a plural society; access (not mutually exclusive) means that minorities individually and collectively have the means to pursue their cultural, political and material interests with the same rights and restraints that apply to other groups. *Control* is the revolutionary aim of a minority or subordinate majority to establish the group's political and economic hegemony over others (Gurr, 1993, p. 292).

From the point of view of the state, explains Gurr, the exit option of secession, as a means of satisfying the need for autonomy, access and control, is perceived as the greatest threat due to the nationalist ideology (Gurr, 1993, p. 294). This is due to the fact that nationalism perceives the state in absolutely monoethnic terms. Simultaneously, nationalistically inclined movements within the state see the fulfillment of self-determination in the creation of a state that is perceived also in monoethnic terms. Within the framework of nationalism, the position of the existing state, on the one hand, and the position of the ethnic group seeking autonomy on the other hand, is in principle irreconcilable.

The case of Cyprus is no exception. The polarisation between an originally nationalist view of the state and an originally nationalist quest for self-determination has decisively conditioned public opinion in the G/C and T/C communities respectively. But in a more subtle way, it has conditioned the very manner, in which each side negotiates, as it has shaped the underlying assumptions and *modus operandi* of each side in conducting formal negotiations. The dynamics generated by the contradictory approaches, often hidden beneath the formal agendas that are set forth at the negotiating table, constitute one of the key factors that reproduces and reactivates the entire Cyprus problem with each cycle of negotiations. The manner in which the Cyprus problem creeps into the negotiation process is in effect a crucial dimension of its intractability.

The Greek Cypriot Approach to Negotiations

The G/C approach to a political settlement proceeds through the assumption that the establishment of a Federal Republic of Cyprus can only be the legal derivation of the present Republic of Cyprus, as the latter constitutes the sole and exclusive legal state entity on the island. The G/C side is firmly fixed on the underlying idea of a

strict legal continuity from the present republic to the future federation. Beneath the great and often persistent efforts to negotiate a settlement lies the assumption that only the Republic of Cyprus can legally evolve to a new and different state. In the eyes of the T/Cs, this dimension of the G/C approach is reinforced by that portion of G/C political opinion, that still speaks of the idea of a unitary state as opposed to a Bicommunal, Bizonal Federation.

Analyses such as that of Michael Stephen in *The Cyprus Question,* though clearly partisan and one-sided, reflect very accurately the interpretation and argumentation that gives rise to the T/C perceptions of the G/C approach to negotiations (Stephen, M. 1997, pp. 67-78). In the eyes of T/Cs, the G/C approach sets the acknowledged restoration of the Republic of Cyprus as a condition of priority before essentially entertaining the establishment of a new Cypriot state. In this mode of thought, the T/Cs suspect that for G/Cs, federation is not really a solution to which the G/Cs are truly committed, but a "Trojan horse" by which they are attempting to achieve the physical reunion of the island. As a result, the T/Cs gravitate, in principle, toward confederation, or secession, or even to the annexation of the north by Turkey in times of escalated tension and political reaction.

As the unquestionable supporter of the G/C position, Greece followed suit along the same lines for many years. The political challenge that Greece was accustomed to posing to Turkey, as regards Cyprus, was not so much to assist in establishing the agreed-upon Federal Republic of Cyprus. Rather, the perpetual insistence of Greece was that as an occupation force, Turkey withdraws its lroops from the Republic of Cyprus. Though justified from a strictly legal point of view, this position of Greece reiterated the same ambiguity as that which characterised the G/C approach to negotiations. Thus pursued, Greek diplomacy, for years, was rendered exposed to the interpretation that Greece's first priority was the restoration of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus and, by implication, not the settlement of the Cyprus problem in accordance with a new model of bicommunal state partnership. Of course, the argument sustained by Greece was that progress toward a solution could only occur with the withdrawal of the Turkish military from Cyprus. Yet, even as this fact was assumed by Greece, the priority and finality of the federal solution for Cyprus had been so hidden, that the direct and indirect references to the restoration of the Republic of Cyprus always appeared to dominate and colour diplomatic language. Consequently, the Turkish side could easily form the impression that the restoration of the Republic of Cyprus was in fact the essence of the Greek agenda.

However, following the joint Greek and G/C decision in 1999 not to deploy the Russian S300 missiles in Cyprus, Greek foreign policy exhibited strong signs of moving beyond the traditional mode of approaching the Cyprus problem. The references to a bicommunal and federal Cyprus as the eventual solution have since

become more direct and explicit. The same tendency was also observed among some of the G/C leadership. Simultaneously however, this shift, as we shall see, appeared also as a counter measure to the T/C and Turkish explicit policy for Confederation, itself a by-product of the estrangement, resulting from the relapse to nationalism in the 1990s.

The Turkish Cypriot Approach to Negotiations

On the other hand, looking at the T/C approach to negotiations, we see a different picture transpiring, which has had its particular adverse effect on the negotiation process, intensifying and complementing the long-standing deadlock. The T/Cs always entered the negotiation process carrying with them, or dragging behind them into the process, the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC"), in search for opportunities to attain legal recognition. Formal recognition of "TRNC" was always set forth, or assumed to be the absolutely necessary condition for moving forward to a Bizonal, Bicommunal, Federal Cyprus, or, in times of heightened nationalist tension, to a confederal Cyprus.

The T/C assumption here is that since federation, by definition, implies the existence of at least two states that are federated, then no federation is possible without first recognising the existence of two pre-established states as equal legal entities. In diplomatic language, this position is formally set forth as the demand for "the sovereign equality of the Turkish Cypriot and the Greek Cypriot sides" (Joint Declaration, 1995). The "TRNC", as a breakaway "state" resulting from the use of force, operating outside of international law, is presented by the T/C and Turkish side as a *de facto* phenomenon that must be legitimised by the rest of the world. Here again, though federation is given diplomatic lip service, the suggested way of achieving its establishment is in essence dependent on the antecedent, unconditional acceptance of the *status quo* as this was formed in 1974 by the Turkish military intervention in Cyprus.

While remaining aligned with the formal T/C interests, Turkey, in the 1990s, has complicated the structure of the conflict by indirectly approaching the Cyprus problem as an accessory for its own political interests, namely, its attempt to attain status in relation to the European Union (EU). Turkey became increasingly insistent on the recognition of the "TRNC" not only as a gesture of support for the T/Cs, but also as a way of insinuating that unless Turkey is accepted into the EU fold, its position on Cyprus will become steadily fixed and non-negotiable. As a result, the traditional T/C demand for recognition of the "TRNC" was compounded by Turkey's demand for closer ties with the EU. The latter demand was implicitly, yet strongly presented as an imperative condition for any movement toward the solution of the Cyprus problem. This condition was a new element adding to the impasse of the negotiations, as

it became evident in the bicommunal proximity talks on Cyprus during the summer of 1997 in Switzerland. The fact that Turkey posed its political conditions, both for Cyprus and her EU aspirations, through the backing of its military power revealed the severity of the problem. The continuing military occupation of northern Cyprus and Turkey's persistent military exhibitionism in the Aegean has rendered Turkey most ambivalent in its dealings with Cyprus. This behaviour of Turkey, must also be viewed as a reaction to the Unitary Defensive Dogma of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, one of the key factors that contributed to the escalation of tension in the 1990s. Indirectly, Turkey demanded acceptance by the EU through power posturing and political hardening in dealing with Greece and Cyprus. In doing so, Turkey appeared as a giant who desperately wanted to enter civil society, without being able, as of yet, to fully operate within the parameters of civil society. The explicit use of one's superiority in military power as a means of conducting political dialogue with the EU or an EU member state was highly disagreeable with the current European mentality. It also exposed Turkey to the accusation by the Greek and G/C side of brute intransigence, blocking any prospect for meaningful negotiations. This entire backdrop to the negotiation process coincided with the rising nationalism and fundamentalism in the two Cypriot communities and in Turkey, and with the EU Luxembourg decision of 1997 rejecting Turkey's EU candidacy. A decision which threw Turkey into further isolation and reactionary hardening, having injured its historically ambiguous national goals and identity and hence its highly sensitive self-image and sense of national pride.

A Phase of Rising Tension and Increasing Alienation

Up until the commencement of *de tante* and the warming of relations between Greece and Turkey in 1999, the G/C and T/C communities have been moving in divergent directions. This orientation of the Cypriot communities inevitably had an impact on the subsequent negotiation process and the positions assumed by the parties involved. The divergent paths followed by the G/C and T/C communities can be traced in basically four interrelated factors.

The first concerns the revitalisation of nationalism in the two communities as a phenomenon that had affected the relationship of the two sides detrimentally (Mavratsas, C., 1998). The relapse of nationalism in the 1990s reawakened the old "tribal gods". The recourse to the nationalist rhetoric of the past; the amplified references to heroic epochs and national glories; the mental reconstruction of the pantheon of national heroes; the preoccupation with military options and the military dimension of the Cyprus problem; populist agitation and mobilisation around ethnocentric notions; verbal aggression and power posturing - all of these have contributed to alienating anew the two communities. Nationalism thereby moved the two communities further apart precipitating a heavy cloud of uncertainty regarding the possi-

bility for a solution. This was particularly the case in view of the military build-up, by the G/C's side, followed as always, and in excess, by the military build-up of the Turkish side *(Economist Intelligence Unit, Cyprus: 1st Quarter, 1996).*

The second entails the widening economic gap between the T/C north and the G/C south. Under the shadow of a rising nationalism, this fact inevitably added to the estrangement between the two communities, as the average T/C became increasingly impressed by the realities of economic disparity. The difference of 1 to 5, and rising, in the per capita income became a factor of deepening alienation as it touched daily life *(Economist, 6 August 1994).*

The third reason for the divergent orientations of the two Cypriot communities emanated from the fact that the Republic of Cyprus, under the control of the GICs, became progressively engaged with the EU. Deepening its links, through increasingly formal and institutional processes, the Republic of Cyprus thereby reinforced its legitimacy. The commencement of the Cyprus accession talks and the subsequent process of adaptation to the *acquis communautaire* inevitably enhanced the status of the Republic of Cyprus. On account of the EU factor, the G/C attachment to the Republic of Cyprus was thereby intensified as the stakes in maintaining the Republic's exclusive legitimacy over the whole of the island was raised to a higher level. The response of the Turkish side to the deepening formal ties between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU was to deepen ties between the "TRNC" and Turkey. As Greece was a full EU member and the Republic of Cyprus a candidate member, while Turkey's candidacy was rejected, the EU was transformed from an agent intended to bridge the two sides to a factor of the conflict.

The fourth and related reason resulted from the fact that the T/C demand for recognition shifted from an informal and implicit position to an explicit and diplomatically formal position. The solidifying legitimacy bestowed on the Republic of Cyprus by its formal association to the EU, coupled with Turkey's rejection by the EU Luxembourg summit, compelled the T/C and Turkish side to move to a more secessionist approach to the Cyprus problem. The demand for independent state recognition and representation was thereby asserted more forcefully than ever, adding to the complexities of the Cyprus problem.

This divergence in approaches was further burdened by the fact that up until 1999, the interests of Greece and Turkey in the Balkans and Central Asia were directly competitive and fiercely antagonistic (Bacheli, Tozun, 1998 pp. 110-113). Further, nationalist elements in the popular culture in the two countries added to the aggravated relationship. The crisis of January 1996 over the Aegean islet of Imia that brought, yet again, Greece and Turkey to the brink of a military confrontation, marked the most striking highlight of the general escalation of tension during the period

under consideration.

With respect to each of the above historical phenomena the responses of each side to the actions taken by the other drove the two parties into a vicious cycle of mutual estrangement. Evidently, the divergent orientations of the two sides also had an unavoidable impact on their respective approaches to the negotiations that followed the period of nationalist agitation and alienation. The difference, however, lies in the particular way each side responded to the historical residue of the estrangement of the 1990s.

Under the stern leadership and influence of the Greek Prime Minister, Costas Simitis, the Greek government and G/C leadership generated the courage to eventually face and effectively come to terms with the bankruptcy of nationalist adversarial politics and the dangers laden in nationalist populist agitation. The conscious decision was thereupon taken to modify their general strategy. The change in policy by Greece and the Republic of Cyprus not to deploy the S300 Russian missiles on Cyprus and to shift from an adversarial to a rapprochement diplomacy marked the beginning of a new approach as far as the Greek side was concerned. In this context, the swift decision by Greece to offer Turkey humanitarian assistance during the terrible earthquake of the summer of 1999 initiated a process of popular rapprochement that began to dissolve some of th.e traditional stereotypes in public opinion.

However, as the Greek side launched this new beginning, it found the T/C community and leadership further away from the political position that had been anticipated. In view of the rising tension brought about by the relapse to nationalism, even moderate T/Cs modified their position. Given the alienation that ensued and its effect on public opinion, T/C moderates could no longer sustain a position of rapprochement toward the G/Cs let alone support federation openly. Seeing the danger of increasing dependency and integration into Turkey, the only tolerable position they could pursue at the time, was to assert independence. That is, independence both from Turkey and the G/Cs. This however, precipitated by default into a strengthening of secessionist politics, as the demand for recognition appeared in the eyes of the moderates as the middle of the road. As they were caught between increasing control by Turkey on the one hand and the estrangement from populist G/C nationalism on the other, the "TRNC" appeared, at the moment, as the only viable option. These signs became evident in overseas bicommunal workshops, where, even some of the most ardent rapprochement citizens appeared denouncing federation outright (Damdelen, M., 1998).

Sensing that it is possible to lose the historical window for a federal settlement, the G/Cs affirmed more strongly than ever their commitment to a federal solution, only to find that the T/Cs have become very uncertain and even negative with regard

to federation. Once again, the two communities have historically missed each other! Frustrated, the G/Cs echoed the argument that every time they move to meet the T/Cs half way, the T/Cs shift to a more extreme position abandoning their original, or previously held position. The T/Cs on the other hand, rationalised that the G/Cs move from their position only when the T/Cs take steps in the opposite direction from where the Greek side naturally gravitates.

The polarising dynamics initiated by the historical phase of nationalist estrangement became the backdrop of the negotiations that resumed thereafter. Inevitably, they had their particular impact on the negotiation process itself.

Negotiating: The Republic of Cyprus Versus the "TRNC"

In this general context of contradictory forces, the conflict between the status of the Republic of Cyprus and the 'TRNC" as key factors affecting the negotiation process became intensified in an unprecedented manner. Historically, prior to 1993, negotiations were taking place on an intercommunal level, where each side was represented merely as an ethnic community. The Turkish side always aspired to earn state recognition for its administration in north Cyprus. But their desire for state recognition was pursued only implicitly and indirectly. The effort had always been diplomatically blurred hovering in the background of the negotiations, as the T/Cs never dare raise it officially, or directly engage it as a factor inside the negotiation process.

However, following the phase of nationalist encounters, the conflict between the Republic of Cyprus and the "TRNC" did not only become explicit and crystallised, but was thrust in the foreground of the negotiations haunting the entire process. The Turkish demand for the recognition of the 'TRNC" started to touch the very core of the negotiation process. It had in effect become a condition for negotiations as far as the T/C's leadership was concerned. The issue entered the domain of official negotiations in full disclosure.

This became clearly manifested as the leader of the T/Cs, R. Denktash began to demand persistently of G. Clerides to openly declare as to whether he considers himself to be the legitimate representative of only the G/Cs or of both the G/Cs and the T/Cs. The underlying assumption of Denktash is that if, by reason of being the recognised president of the Republic of Cyprus, Clerides views himself as representing both communities, then there would be no grounds for entering any formal negotiating process, since Denktash would have no formal status as negotiator. On the other hand, if Clerides' answer was that he only represents the G/Cs, then Denktash would be a legitimate negotiator, as he would be acknowledged as the sole representative of the T/Cs and hence the only official representative. Further, the impli-

cation would be that the Republic of Cyprus, by default, would not encompass the T/C community. Hence, under these conditions, the very negotiating process would imply recognition of the head of the "TRNC" and consequently of the "TRNC" itself.

The response of Clerides to the persistent question of Denktash was that had he represented both communities he would not need to negotiate with Denktash, but rather, he would be negotiating with himself. The underlying assumption here in the response given by Clerides is that negotiations are taking place at community level. Hence, the negotiators are only the political representatives of the respective ethnic communities, but nothing more. The implication thereby is that while on the inter-communal level, Clerides does not represent the T/C community, on the state level, as the president of the Republic of Cyprus, he represents all the ethnic communities of Cyprus. This assumption on the dual role of the G/C leader has been repeatedly explicated on various occasions at different international forums. One of the most succinct statements to this effect was given by the foreign minister I. Cassoulides. Referring to the application for EU membership he noted that "The application was submitted by the Government of Cyprus for the whole of Cyprus" (*Cyprus Mail,* 11 March 1995). On another occasion, he expressed his wish that "the Turkish Cypriots accepted that Cyprus is represented by the legal government of the Cyprus Republic" *(Cyprus Mail,* 14 March 1995).

Thus positioned, the G/C side attempts to secure, throughout the negotiation process, the preclusion of any recognition to the "TRNC" and of the T/C leader as a head of state. That is to say, the G/C side is extremely particular of the fact that the T/C representative does not acquire any legitimate trans-community status through the negotiation process. For to do so, according to the G/Cs, would amount to an endorsement of the *de facto* conditions created by the Turkish military invasion of 1974.

This particular contradiction in the approaches of the G/Cs and T/Cs respectively, was one of the key elements that contributed to the collapse of the top-level talks in Switzerland in 1997. In the process of the negotiations, Denktash raised issues that had a bearing on the relationship between the T/Cs and matters of foreign policy, particularly with respect *to* the EU. In turn, Clerides argued that as these matters are state issues and not intercommunal issues, they couldn't be on the agenda of the negotiations. The process inevitably ran into a deadlock with Denktash declaring that he would not return *to* the negotiating table unless his state was recognised and the entry talks between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus were terminated.

The full disclosure of the deadlock in approaches occurred during the talks in Geneva in February 2000, when first Denktash and then Clerides violated the black-out on public statements. Denktash publicly reported that in the proximity talks he

had in fact put forth officially his claim for state recognition on the basis of the "reality" of the situation and that as far as he was concerned, the negotiations were being conducted on the basis of a confederal solution. Clerides, responding also publicly, asserted that "the object of the negotiations is not to create a new State of Cyprus, but to amend the existing Constitution of the Republic of Cyprus" (*Cyprus Weekly,* 4-10 February, 2000). This interchange between the leaders, emanating from the negotiation process itself, brought to clear focus what traditionally have been implicit and often blurred assumptions.

How the negotiation process is structured and by what status the interlocutors come to the negotiating table is itself a crucial element of the conflict, in which the fundamental constituents of the whole conflict are reproduced. The official T/C position regards as unfounded the assumption by the G/C*s* that the Republic of Cyprus continues to exist (Cyprus and the European Union, 1996, p.7; The Cyprus Question, 1997, p. 67). Hence, in the T/C mind, as long as the negotiations are con- ducted at the level of community representation, they are in essence placed within the framework of the Republic of Cyprus. Implicitly, they are, in effect, conducted under the umbrella of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus. This arouses T/C reaction in that the negotiating process is perceived as a re-legitimisation of the Republic of Cyprus.

On the other hand, if the negotiations are conducted at a level other than that of community representation, between equal and independent political entities, then the implication is that negotiations will be approximating an inter-state process. This position became explicit in the late 1990s, when the T/C leadership and Turkey put forth the condition that negotiations can only be conducted as an inter-state process through the *a-priori* recognition of the "TRNC". The deeper agenda in this position is to indirectly place the negotiation process outside the framework of the Republic of Cyprus. In the eyes of the G/C*s,* this is perceived as an attempt to achieve the dissolution of the sovereignty ofthe Republic of Cyprus as a condition of the negotiation process itself, taking effect prior to arriving at a settlement. This and other similar attempts have always aroused the indignation of the G/C side, in that the T/C approach implies a tactical attempt to legitimise in advance of a settlement what has been created by the use of force, namely, the regime of the "TRNC" in northern Cyprus.

In all this, the dynamics that have dominated the negotiation process disclose a political irony that is itself indicative of the proliferating ambiguities that protracted conflicts usually generate and sustain. While the G/C*s* always interpreted the Cyprus problem as essentially an international problem of invasion and occupation, within the negotiating context, they always approached the problem as purely and strictly intercommunal! The irony on the T/C side is that though they always explained the

Cyprus problem as being originally and essentially intercommunal, in their negotiating approach they always attempted to resolve the problem as inter-national, or better, inter-state in nature!

From all the above, it is evident that the two approaches to negotiation and the respective assumptions underlying them are irreconcilable. The T/C side claims to rest its position on the right to self-determination and statehood, while the G/C side banks on international law and the sovereign rights of legitimate state systems. Based on their respective rationale, the restoration of the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus, on the one hand, and the recognition of the "TRNC", on the other hand, weighs down the negotiation process. Another way of grasping this crucial fact is to understand that the T/C side wants to change the formal parameters of the *status quo* from the outset of the negotiations. By contrast, the G/C side wants to change them at the end and as a result of the negotiations. Put differently, the T/C side assumes that the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus is terminated and that this be acknowledged with the commencement of any substantial negotiations. The G/C side assumes that the sovereignty of the Republic of Cyprus is maintained intact throughout the negotiation process, at least until a comprehensive solution is formally achieved. In such a diagnostic perspective, it is easy to understand how and why the negotiation process has repeatedly failed, irrespective of the UN formal provisions of the basis of negotiations and the nature of the solution sought.

"Risk Aversion" and "Loss Aversion"

In his work *Why Negotiations Fail,* A. Mnookin explores a series of general obstacles and pit-falls which usually deter the process of negotiation from arriving at a successful outcome. Among theses are what are referred to as "risk aversion" and "loss aversion"; concepts based on the experimental work of cognitive psychologists Daniel Kaheman and Amos Tversky (Mnookin, 1993, pp. 243-245). Both of these terms refer to a set of psychological dynamics that, once activated, block the respective negotiators from the prospect of movement toward a resolution.

"Risk aversion" refers to the tendency of people to choose and hold onto what they actually have, rather than take a risk in order to gain more. They prefer what is minimal but certain, to what is optimal but risky.

"Loss aversion", on the other hand, refers to the inclination to avoid a decision that clearly entails a certain loss, even if that decision leads to a desirable end with benefits that supersede by far what is surely lost at the outset. In a negotiating setting, "loss aversion" suspends any movement towards a resolution and in turn, the attempt to avoid a certain loss, cumulatively ends up with a greater overall loss.

In the negotiating approaches of the G/C*s* and T/C*s,* both "risk aversion" and "loss aversion" are at work as psychological factors contributing to the failure of negotiations. Overall, the *GIG* side tends to be more conditioned by "loss aversion", while the T/C side tends to be more overwhelmed by "risk aversion". The G/C*s* suffer from "loss aversion" in relation to the issue of legitimacy. They know that progress towards a settlement inevitably means losing the monopoly of legitimacy. Yet, in the process of negotiating for a solution, short of a definitive agreement on a relatively complete and final settlement, the anxiety of losing even the slightest ground on the legitimacy question restrains positive movement, thus contributing to the perpetuation of the negotiating impasse. The TICs on the other hand are blocked by "risk aversion", with their habituation to the "TANG". The minimal gains they have acquired under the illegitimate administration reduce their willingness to imaginatively move negotiations forward. Seeking optimal arrangements that would be both legitimate and far more beneficial to the lives of the TICs does not come into view. "Risk aversion" creates thereby a minimalist and survivalist political attitude, at the expense of open-ended, progressive thinking.

Federation and Confederation: Concepts or Symbols?

In the process of any negotiations, the anticipated final structure of the political settlement is inevitably raised, at least in general terms. The general framework of the solution has been repeatedly given in the UN Security Council Resolutions. However, the different interpretations given by each side as to the practical substance of the framework, as well as the passage of time and historical change, have undermined the prospect of a common frame of reference for the negotiation process.

In the background of the UN directives, the two sides had agreed in principle, in 1977 and 1979, that the solution to the Cyprus problem would be based on a Bizonal Bicommunal Federation. But even as early as the 1970s and 1980s, the tendency of the *GIG* side was to interpret "federation" in terms of a strong central government. The T/C side, on the other hand, interpreted "federation" in terms of a very weak central government with enhanced powers to the federated entities. The divergent orientation of this tendency escalated, especially with the relapse to nationalism in the 1990s, culminating in the political explication of the different approaches. This became especially evident as the T/C side and Turkey formally adopted the term "confederation" to refer to the envisioned solution, thereby officially departing from the language of the UN.

It has been correctly noted that in the general evolution of political systems, the tension between federation and confederation reflects the two ends of a continuum along which a political compromise is attempted between "self-rule and shared rule".

It entails an attempt to reconcile "the apparently contradictory benefits of union/interdependence and the benefits of autonomy/separation" (Peristianis, N., 1998, p. 33). The detailed answers given to the question of why the G/Cs and T/Cs have not met on this continuum range widely. The fundamental answer however, lies with the historical impact of nationalism on the two communities and its continuing, albeit slowly weakening, presence throughout the decades and up to the present times. It can be traced to the original, ideal nationalist aspiration of each community to set up its own sovereign monoethnic state; two political agendas that have proven mutually irreconcilable given the multiethnic and originally mixed demographic morphology of Cypriot society.

Historically, one can plot the development of the negotiating starting points and positions of each side from the 1950s to the present by assessing the level of impact that the original nationalism has had in each community. In the 1950s, the G/Cs started with the ideal of *enosis,* the union of Cyprus with the state of Greece. In the 1960s, reluctant and divided, they moved to a unitary state, the Republic of Cyprus, which, nevertheless, was considered as essentially a Hellenic state inasmuch as the original rationale for union with Greece was psychologically retained. In the 1970s, in the backdrop of civil and inter-communal violence and the Turkish invasion of 1974, they moved hesitantly to federation, but negotiated for a strong central government, as a way of holding onto the single sovereignty of the island reminiscent of its Hellenic singleness.

The T/Cs, on the other hand, originally expressed their nationalism in the background of Turkish press reports demanding the return of Cyprus to Turkey in the event of British withdrawal from the island (Crawshaw, N., 1978, p. 45). In the 1950s, the concept was transposed to *taxim,* on the basis of which the T/Cs demanded the geographical partition of Cyprus to make way for a separate, "pure" T/C sovereign state. In the 1960s, just like the G/Cs, the T/Cs reluctantly accepted the Republic of Cyprus, but positioned themselves strongly on its biethnic and bicommunal aspects stressing invariably the separateness of the T/Cs. Following the tragic events of 1974, the T/Cs moved to a bizonal federation adding a geographical dimension to ethnic separation. In 1983, they resorted to the unilateral declaration of independence with the "TRNC". But failing formal recognition, the T/Cs attached themselves to confederation as their negotiating premise and objective.

The undercurrent of the impact of nationalism was such that the new negotiating positions of each side, in light of what was viable at each new stage of the conflict, were kept tacitly captive by the previous and historically outdated phases of their respective nationalism. Under the influence of nationalism, the natural, forward momentum of history was generally retarded by the stalling pull of the past. The legacy of this history was carried to the present. It is still evident as a haunting shadow

immediately behind the more updated schemes proposed for a solution. In this perspective, the inability of the two sides to converge their positions somewhere on the federal-confederal continuum has less to do with a difference than with a similarity. That is, the backward pull from the past originating in the aspiration of each side for a monoethnically conceived state. Both the G/Cs and the T/Cs perceive their willingness to negotiate for a federation and a confederation respectively as a substantial compromise. The degree of this compromise is measured by how far the present negotiating positions have deviated from the original nationalist concept of a single ethnocentric state. Scanning public opinion in the two communities, as well as in Greece and Turkey, one can see the entire spectrum of positions of each historical phase of the conflict still lingering on. While the earlier ones of union and partition are weakening, the rest are still present and will inevitably concern the negotiators. In this light, the G/C position for federation with a strong _central government and the T/C position for confederation with a very weak central government betray a similar historical backdrop. Under the circumstance, both can be interpreted as the positions that are closest to the original, yet identical desire, of each community for a single, ethnically defined state.

Looking at the international scene in light of political and historical change, the terms "federal" and "confederal" have assumed a far more complex and ambiguous meaning than is normally attributed by the classical theoretical definitions of political science. When scrutinised closely, the realities of the contemporary world no longer justify fixed meanings, as the terms under consideration cover a great range of phenomena and arrangements in regard to forms of government. For example, Switzerland is referred to as a confederation, but in effect it operates as a federation. Canada on the other hand is thought of as a federation, but has confederal features. The impact of technology and the socio-economic integration it brings about, has often lead to the transference of power from the state to trans-state authorities, as has been the case with the United States of America. In the more advanced democracies, a devolution of classical state sovereignty has been taking place by way of the allocation of functions to both trans-national and sub-national centres of political power. The European Union is the most definitive and striking example of the former. Devolution of state power within the state is evident in the establishment of sub-national parliaments, as is the case with Wales and Scotland, and generally the tendency within the European Union to decentralise the political power of the nation state in favour of local and regional authorities. In the perspective of present international trends, Richard Falk of Princeton University has expanded on the uncertain future of the structure of the nation state, as we have hitherto known it. With all its uncertainties, central to what the future holds hinges on whether or not "the sovereign state can adapt its behaviour and role to a series of deterritorialising forces associated with markets, transnational social forces, cyberspace, demographic and environmental pressures, and urbanism" (Falk, R., 1999, pp. 30-35). All these devel-

opments in the general context of globalisation affect such changes in the environment of states that new forms of governance beyond the classical definitions are inevitably in the making. In view of the new realities of the world, classical concepts of governance and what they mean in practical terms become increasingly blurred as they also become increasingly enriched by more sophisticated arrangements in the institutions and concepts of democracy.

Certainly, the differences in principle between federation and confederation are not completely eradicated. But in the background of these developments, all of which point to the increasing decentralisation of state power, the effort to resolve a conflict that centres on the difference between federation and confederation, ought to be easier, logically speaking. However, up until the commencement of the EU accession talks in March 1998, political opinion in Cyprus, did not only function outside the framework of political changes on the international scene, but tended to add to the terms "federation" and "confederation" an excess of meaning, rendering them extremely heavy laden. The protracted nature of the Cyprus problem has in effect transposed the word "federation" and that of "confederation" from concepts to highly emotive symbols. For the G/Cs the word "confederation" has come to imply the sense that the other side is deviously inclined in its pursuit of a settlement. In the G/C mind, the word conceals an attempt on the part of the T/C leadership to legitimise partition. For the T/C leadership on the other hand, the word "federation" arouses suspicions of G/C domination. It implies a roundabout way of reinstating the pre 1974 regime of a unitary state. Objectively speaking neither of these views are accurate, but they become highly controversial because each side relates them selectively to the extremist voices of the other community. Centralist concepts of state power that bespeak of their nationalist origins appear to condition the interaction and negotiations between the two sides.

In this context, the reference to "federation" and "confederation" has inevitably become counter productive as points of reference in public opinion exchanges between the two sides. But it has become even more detrimental to the process of negotiation itself, as it poses from the very outset a problem of semantics and of fixed ideas of finality that deter any deep exploration of viable political partnership options for a new Cyprus. In their work *Getting to Yes,* Roger Fisher and William Ury stress the fact in succeeding to deciding. They note that any creative input in the process of negotiations that leads to a mutually beneficial and acceptable outcome must separate the initial generation of options and possibilities from the critical end issues of final choices and commitments. The recommendation is "Invent first, decide later" (Fisher, R., Ury, W., 1991, p. 60). The references to "federation" and "confederation" have in effect become an obstacle to the negotiation process, as well as an agitator for public opinion. As preconceived and highly emotive finalities, they curb and restrain in advance the imaginative and creative thinking necessary to generate ideas and explore possibilities.

A crucial element is to open up the negotiation process in such a way so as to start addressing the constitutional distribution of powers to the three entities of the new Cyprus, namely, the respective G/C and T/C states and the central state. What this central state is to be called and what structure it will assume cannot be fixed from the outset. If it could there would be no need for negotiations, let alone creativity for new ideas. In the perspective of a three-entity solution, namely, a central overarching joint state and two respective Greek and Turkish Cypriot states, the question of whether the new constitution will define a new Cyprus or an old one modified becomes superfluous and meaningless. This issue becomes a problem only when the respective approaches are preoccupied with a two-entity scenario. That is, when the negotiation effort is conducted and structured around the polarisation of the Republic of Cyprus and the "TRNC".

Reflecting on the European experience, Denton explains that federalism does not exist as "one specific, well-defined system of government". He notes that "every actual federation appears 'sui generis', since each responds to a particular set of geographical and historical circumstances" (Denton, G., 1993). In practice, federalism has thereby proven to be one of the most flexible and sophisticated systems capable of being customised to the unique features of different situations reconciling political interests. Hence, to negotiate a Cyprus solution of political partnership by starting from assumed fixed schemata of federation/confederation is tantamount to missing the essential meaning of federalism.

It has been suggested that rather than block the negotiations at the starting point by a preoccupation with "federation" and "confederation", it may be wiser to start by referring to the new political arrangement as "The United States of Cyprus" (USC). (A term that has been fashioned by a bicommunal think-tank in 1998.) Resorting to this terminology has the potential of safeguarding the negotiating process and orienting attention away from polarised terminology that the protracted nature of the conflict rendered counterproductive. It is a way of securing suspended ambiguity as a necessary condition for giving impetus to creativity and exploration during the negotiation process. The reference to the USC appears to initially cover the concerns of both sides in that it contains the autonomy and distinctness of each of the communal states, which concerns the T/Cs, as well as the overall unity of the new political edifice, which concerns the G/Cs. As a linguistic and heuristic device, the idea of the USC may prove helpful, for initiating negotiations into a new, open-ended framework that will activate the generation of creative options and possibilities prior to making choices and decisions on the final shape of the settlement. It is indeed a central principle of successful mediation that the process and outcome of negotiations "allow each party to save face both internationally and domestically" (Susskind, L. and Babbitt, E., 1994, p. 31).

Helsinki Summit December 1999:
The New Political Environment of the Cyprus Negotiations

The decision taken on December 11, 1999 at the Helsinki summit of the EU heads of states to grant Turkey the status of EU candidate marked the beginning of an historical process that is likely to fundamentally modify the political environment within which the Cyprus negotiations are conducted. So significant is this development that it could impact the negotiation process in a way that that could alter significantly the traditional points of reference that have hitherto constituted the negotiating framework of the G/Cs and T/Cs respectively. It could in fact provide the basis for a more open and creative process capable of assimilating novel approaches, such as the ones suggested herein.

The advancement of Turkey to an EU candidate introduced for the first time ever a system of law and a path of procedures for the future Euro-Turkish and Greco-Turkish relations. Even more importantly, it introduced a system of well-functioning political, economic and social institutions within which future Euro-Turkish and Greco-Turkish relations will have to be elaborated. The EU framework and all that this entails in terms of privileges and obligations is now a common denominator for Greece, and Turkey, as well as for the G/Cs under the Republic of Cyprus. The European Council asserted that candidate states "must share the values and objectives of the European Union as set out in the Treaties" *(Helsinki Summit Conclusions,* 1999, par. 4). The adversarial, nationalist approaches that have traditionally conditioned their interactions will henceforth have to be counter balanced and eventually eclipsed by the non-nationalist, conflict-resolution and conflict prevention procedures, laws and institutions of the EU at national, sub-national as well as transnational levels. This is a *sine qua non* of belonging to the European family.

Inevitably, this new political framework is already having and will continue to have an effect on the G/C community, particularly as the G/C leadership has been fully engaged in the EU accession process. Any remnants of ethnocentric nationalism and appeals for a unitary monoethnic state will substantially weaken as the G/Cs move closer to the EU through the progressive adoption of EU laws, institutions and cultural values. Simultaneously, the G/Cs will be faced with the fact that strong central governments are out of vogue, as the EU is strongly committed to a Europe of citizens where democracy is conceived and structured in an increasingly decentralising mode. G/Cs would have to come to terms with the European idea of "democracy from the bottom up", both as G/Cs move forward with accession and as they negotiate a solution to the Cyprus problem. With these factors impinging on the negotiation process, it will become increasingly difficult to sustain the monopoly of state legitimacy throughout the negotiation process. Setting forth the exclusive legitimacy and full acknowledgement of the Republic of Cyprus as a tactic to be strictly adhered to until

the negotiations reach a definitive and final solution will increasingly prove counter-productive. Though it will be possible for the G/Cs to sustain the exclusive legitima-cy of the Republic of Cyprus formally and abstractly, it will not be possible to cap-italise on it substantially and practically to the point of facilitating the actual reunifi-cation of the island. While continuing to absolutely honour the exclusive legitimacy of the Republic of Cyprus, the EU does not see the Republic as the structure that will integrate the T/Cs and reunite the island. It is noteworthy, that the Helsinki text speaks of "the accession of Cyprus" and not of the Republic of Cyprus.

On the other hand, in the post-Helsinki era, the T/C leadership's negotiating tac-tics of secession and formal recognition, as a condition for a settlement will become increasingly untenable, as such tactics run directly against EU law and accession procedures. In principle, the EU will not grant state recognition to an administration that the UN considers illegitimate and whose status is secured solely by the military might of Turkey. From an historical perspective, the prevention of such scenarios lies at the very heart of the EU concept. As a post-war, transnational system that has painstakingly struggled to put nationalism and militarism behind it, the EU is strictly bound to the rule of law. Within its boundaries and framework, it is thereby impossi-ble to endorse the political outcome of military action. Hence, the T/C demand for state recognition is an outright impossibility. In the EU context, the promotion of Turkey to a candidate state weakens rather than strengthens the demand for the recognition of the "TANG".

With Turkey on the EU road, the politics and strategies of separatism and iso-lationism hitherto pursued by the T/C leadership will be far less convincing than they have ever been in the past. The traditional nationalist politics of the T/C leadership will inevitably appear increasingly archaic. With Greece a full member of the EU and Turkey and the G/G controlled Republic of Cyprus in the waiting room of the EU, the T/Cs face the risk of political exclusion. By contrast to the pre-Helsinki era, time is suddenly functioning more to the detriment of the T/Cs than to the G/Cs.

Ismail Cem, the Turkish foreign minister, in support of the T/C leadership assumed the position that the Cyprus problem ought to be set aside from the progress of Greco-Turkish and Euro-Turkish relations. He suggested that, it should be left to the T/Cs and G/Cs to work out their differences through negotiations (Berna ton Athenon, 16 January 2000). Though it echoes Turkey's traditional position, and though it appeases psychologically the nationalists among the T/C leadership, this position will become increasingly difficult to sustain within the EU framework. In the post-Helsinki era, the politics of secession and marginalisation in regard to the Cyprus problem may be verbally reiterated, but in practice Turkey will be increasing-ly compelled to address the Cyprus problem directly. The Helsinki decision to render Turkey an EU candidate has also placed the Cyprus problem closer than ever before

to Turkey's doorstep. Turkey will therefore have to deal with Cyprus as an aspect of its EU candidacy.

Thereby, in the EU context, the T/Cs may forcefully raise issues concerning their distinctive identity, their need for security and political equality, their *de facto* functioning administration, their need for economic development, and on all these levels earn the understanding and acknowledgement of the EU. But they will never earn from the EU formal state recognition for the "TRNC".

Under the new circumstances launched by the Helsinki decision, the Cyprus problem has also become a European problem to which the EU will be compelled to also contribute for its resolution. The EU, like the UN, will continue to formally view the Republic of Cyprus as the sole legitimate state of Cyprus and regard the "TRNC" as the illegitimate regime. However, parallel to the negotiation efforts, the EU is likely to progressively treat the Republic of Cyprus as a G/C entity, albeit legitimate, while gradually pulling the T/C community and its administration into the sphere of informal acknowledgement, but short of granting recognition to the "TRNC". The political logic of the EU here is based on the assumed strategy that its approach to each side, while being formally strictly legal but informally ambiguous, will both facilitate and be phased out with the forging of the final settlement. The Helsinki conclusions note that "The European Council underlines that a political settlement of the Cyprus problem will facilitate the accession of Cyprus to the European Union. If no settlement has been reached by the completion of the accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition. In this the Council will take account of all the relevant factors" *(Helsinki Summit Conclusions,* 1999, par. 9,b). In dissociating the entry of Cyprus in the EU from the political settlement, the Council is sending a clear message to the Turkish side. While in referring to the consideration of "all relevant factors", the Council is posing a clear challenge to the Greek side. The single message is that the two sides are expected to make progress toward a settlement that would move the process beyond the respective traditional positions.

Given the gravity of events, particularly within the scope of the EU, the Republic of Cyprus may be able to enter the EU, but historically it would be impossible for it to be the vehicle to carry the T/Cs into the EU. To be able to do so would presuppose that the T/Cs denounce the politics they have pursued on Cyprus since 1963. On the other hand, the "TRNC" may be able to retard the progress of Cyprus towards the EU, or it may seek autonomous links with the EU, but historically it would be impossible for it to enter the orbit of the EU as "TRNC". To be able to do so would presuppose that the G/Cs denounce their politics on Cyprus since 1974 and that the UN and the EU violate their resolutions and laws respectively.

In the post-Helsinki period, the historical options open to the G/Cs and T/Cs are to focus their negotiation efforts, among other targets, on achieving a minimum agreement, at the very top, so as to the establish the most basic elements of a new Cyprus, of the United States of Cyprus. Achieving minimum agreement, and elemental implementation, based on the general parameters of the bicommunally administered federal central state, distinct from G/C and T/C administered states respectively, will open up the required legal space and political possibility for the creation of a Bicommunal Accession Council. Once minimum agreement is achieved, it would be possible to consider the prospect of transferring the formal task of the accession talks to this bicommunal body. The benefit of such an eventuality is that a Bicommunal Accession Council will be able to play a catalytic consultative role in linking the EU accession process to the negotiation process for a detailed comprehensive settlement for Cyprus and its step-by-step implementation.

This approach would be one way to bring to historical alignment a) the G/C desire to reunite their island, b) the T/C aspiration to acquire political legitimacy and equality, c) the efforts of Greece to achieve a secure Aegean through political reconciliation with Turkey, d) Turkey's ambition to enhance its progress toward the EU, e) the EU vision of extending its political framework to the Eastern Mediterranean and f) progress on the details of a comprehensive solution for Cyprus.

Such scenarios will be increasingly possible in view of the fact that the Helsinki decision has introduced a new framework of relationships between Greece, Turkey and Cyprus that has rendered the traditional clear-cut positions of "friends" and "enemies" rather ambiguous. For Turkey, Greece is no longer just a traditional enemy, but the geographically closest EU member state with which it will have to naturally cooperate for its progress toward accession. Further, within the EU system, the Turkish view of the Republic of Cyprus as the enemy of the T/Cs has been skewed by the fact that the Republic of Cyprus is also a co-candidate for EU membership. And EU candidates are obliged to fully cooperate not only with the EU, but also with one another in accordance with EU procedures. A general provision of the Helsinki summit is that candidates who will not be able to resolve their differences within a reasonable length of time are obliged to refer their differences to the European Court, the authority of which is a given for the EU and all its candidates *(Helsinki Summit Conclusions,* 1999, par. 4). The same ambiguity also emerges in the Republic of Cyprus's relation to Turkey. Turkey is not only an occupation force, but also a co-candidate. Already under the weight of the EU Gusto.ms Union requirements, the Republic of Cyprus was compelled to officially announce that trading with Turkey is permitted. Yet trade with the T/Cs in the Turkish occupied north is sustained. As the Republic of Cyprus and Turkey move progressively closer to the EU these anomalies and paradoxes will become accentuated, thus mounting the need for a political settlement of the Cyprus problem.

The contradictory elements in the network of relationships that have been introduced with the Helsinki decision will inevitably have a substantial effect on the mode by which negotiations for a Cyprus settlement will develop. It is evident that to the degree that the traditional relationships of adversarial nationalist politics continue to prevail, influencing directly or indirectly the negotiation efforts, the outcome will be historically regressive. It will be fundamentally detrimental to the EU-related interests of all the parties engaged in the Cyprus problem, particularly the candidate members, as their very progress to EU membership will be jeopardised. On the other hand, inasmuch as the negotiation framework and process will be conditioned by the new EU non-adversarial and non-nationalist mode of conflict management and resolution, progress toward a solution to the Cyprus problem and accelerated EU membership will be a likely prospect. This will not mean that negotiation between G/Cs and T/Cs will be automatically easier. Rather, it will mean that the negotiating parties will be faced with a unique historical opportunity to secure their respective interests in relation to the EU. But this historical opportunity will only be realised if the objectives of the negotiations comply also with the EU trans-ethnic and transnational values of democracy and if the negotiations are conducted within the general framework prescribed by EU law and institutions of civil society. Given the fact that the traditional rivals are now structurally and institutionally within the sphere of influence of the EU, any attempt, by either side, to secure ethnic interests on the basis of nationalist concepts of autonomous ethnocentric states will be shunned by the EU.

G/Cs and T/Cs alike will be compelled to discover that the EU furnishes new instruments of resolving differences and of building democratic institutions and civil society that have nothing in common with the old nationalist approaches and ethnocentric heroics of the past. In enhancing their particular causes and interests they will be inevitably challenged to adopt non-adversarial means and ways of dealing with differences and conflict. They will have to come to terms with the challenge to move beyond the traditional nationalism of nation states and to develop a culture of peace and cooperation that would transpose their history and respective cultural differences from a source of estrangement and conflict to one of complementation and enrichment. They will have to confront and resolve their political differences in a common framework of multi-ethnic, multi-cultural pluralism. The cultural and political will to make this transition a reality is the legacy and inheritance that the European Union brings to the region of the Eastern Mediterranean. A legacy that was born out of the suffering of two world wars and initiated by the awe-struck words of the survivors.... "Never again war!"

Bibliography

Bacheli, Tozun (1998} 'Cyprus in the Post-Cold War Environment: Moving Toward a Settlement?' *Cyprus and its People: Nation Identity and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997.* Oxford, Westview Press.

Berna ton Athenon, 16 January, 2000.

Crawshaw, Nancy (1979} *The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for Union with Greece.* London, George Allen & Unwin.

Cyprus and the European Union (1996} United Nations Association of North Cyprus.

Cyprus Mail, 11 March 1995.

Cyprus Mail, 14 March 1995.

Cyprus Weekly, 4-10 February 2000.

Dandelen, Mustafa (1998) *Scenarios to the Cyprus Problem: European Union and Sustainable Peace* (Unknown Publisher}.

Danton G. (1993) *Federation and the European Union after Maastricht.* London, HMSO.

Economist, 6 August 1994.

Economist Intelligence Unit, Cyprus: 1st Quarterly, 1996.

Elazar D. (1987} *Exploring Federation.* Tuscaloosa, University of Alabama Press.

Falk, Richard (1999} 'World Prism: The Future of Sovereign States and International Order', *Harvard International Review,* Vol. **XXI,** No. 3.

Fisher, **R.,** Ury, W. (1983} *Getting to Yes: Negotiating Agreement without Giving In.* New York, Penguin Books.

Gurr, Robert, (1993} *Minorities at Risk: A Global View of EthnopoliT/Cal Conflict.* Washington, United States Institute of Peace Press.

Helsinki Summit Conclusions, European Union, 11 December 1999.

"Joint Declaration by the President of Turkey and the 'President' of the 'Turkish Republic

of Northern Cyprus'", Ankara, 28 December 1995.

Mavratsas, Caesar V. (1998) 'Greek Cypriot Political Culture and the Prospect of European Union Membership: A Worst Case Scenario.' *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 10, No.1.

Mnookin, R. (1993) 'Why Negotiations Fail: An Exploration of Barriers to the Resolution of Conflict.' *Ohio State Journal on Dispute Resolution,* 8, No. 2.

Peristianis, Nicos. (1998) 'A Federal Cyprus in a Federal Europe.' *The Cyprus Review,* Vol. 10, No.1.

Stephen, M. (1997) *The Cyprus Question.* London, The British-North Cyprus Parliamentary Group.

Susskind, Lawrence and Babbitt, Eileen (1994) 'Overcoming Obstacles to Effective Mediation of International Disputes'. In Berkovitch, J. and Rubin, J. {eds), *Mediation in International Relations.* New York, St. Martin's Press.