

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION*

Heinz A Richter

Abstract

This paper describes some basic parameters of Turkish foreign policy and analyses how these are applied in Ankara's policy toward Cyprus in the context of the bilateral Turkish-Greek and Turkish-EU relations. It is shown that the policy of dividing the island (taksim) is a long term policy which began in the 1950s and reached a negative climax in 1974. Since then Ankara and its henchmen in the north of Cyprus have been steering a course of intransigence which ironically enough recently blocked Ankara's road to the EU.

It seems useful to begin with a few basic principles which characterise Turkish, foreign and domestic policy and then analyse whether and to what extent these axioms are applied in the policy of Ankara towards Cyprus.

Turkish and Vatican foreign policy have one thing in common, their long-term planning. They are neither influenced by parliamentary terms nor by the changes of government. Aims of their foreign policy are pursued over decades and never given up no matter which party rules. There may be tactical manoeuvring but strategically foreign policy aims are not to be discussed.

Memories of past mistakes or misdeeds are suppressed and everybody who dares to remind the Turkish public of these events encounters offended reactions or is simply denounced as an enemy. For long years, Turkey has made the experience that one gets through with this policy. The genocide of the Armenians during and after the first World War was even the subject of a trial in Istanbul¹ though nobody remembers that and today the Armenian genocide is either totally denied or played down.² When in October 2000 the American House of Representatives was about to pass a resolution acknowledging for the first time the fact of this genocide, Ankara blackmailed the US threatening to close the airfield from where the planes supervising the northern Iraq no-fly-zone take off.³ President Clinton promptly interfered and asked the speaker of the House to remove the topic from the agenda in order not to endanger US national interest.⁴ When the European parliament

passed a resolution on the Armenian genocide the Turkish ruling class fumed.⁵

The Armenian question as well as the fate of the Pontian Greeks may be considered history but there are later examples of rude treatment of minorities on the part of Turkey. During the Second World War, Ankara introduced a special tax (the varlik tax) ruining the economically prosperous upper classes of the Greek, Jewish and Armenian minority.⁶ In the 1950s and 1960s in the context of the Cypriot fight for independence, the 100.000 Greeks of Istanbul encountered horrible pogroms which led to a mass exodus so that today less than 2.000 Greeks live there.⁷ More recently the Kurds experienced another version of ethnic repression. In other words: Ankara has a problem finding a correct treatment for ethnic and religious minorities.

Turkey is a member of the United Nations, NATO, and the Council of Europe but it does not pay much respect to any of these organisations. For years Ankara has not given any attention to the resolutions of the General Assembly and the Security Council dealing with the Cyprus problem. Appeals of the Council of Europe to reach a friendly agreement in the Aegean question were not taken note of. As a member of the Council of Europe Ankara promised many years ago to respect Human Rights, to protect them and to obey the verdicts of the European Court of Human Rights in Strassbourg. The notorious Loizidou case showed for the first time that Ankara is not ready to submit its national interests to a supra-national court.⁸ When on 10 May 2001 the same court held that Ankara had violated in numerous cases the European Convention of Human Rights, Ankara dismissed the verdict calling it a "political" judgement.⁹

Another typical example of Ankara's contempt of supra national institutions was the behaviour towards resolutions of the European Parliament. When this august body adopted a resolution in October criticising Turkish policy towards Cyprus, Ankara considered the resolution a serious insult and asked the Euro-parliament to withdraw it.¹⁰ A similar disregard was shown to resolutions of the European Commission.¹¹

Turkey's stand in the highly complicated Aegean Problem shows clearly that the use of military power is still an option in its foreign policy. In 1995 Prime Minister Çiller made the Turkish parliament pass a motion that in case Greece exercises its internationally accepted rights and extends her national waters to 12 sea miles this will be considered a *casus belli*. Without any further recourse to the Turkish parliament the government can begin with military operations.¹² International law is respected only if it agrees with Turkish interests. As the international Convention of the Sea did not suit Ankara's interests in the Aegean it was not ratified and therefore, according to Ankara, it cannot be applied in this area.¹³ Turkey's limited re-

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

spect for international law and supranational institutions thus led to a policy of intransigence in the Aegean Question and in the case of Cyprus.

If one searches for the background of this behaviour one invariably comes to the conclusion that geostrategic factors play a central role. Whoever controls Asia Minor has a say in the Middle East, the Eastern part of North Africa, the Balkans and the area north of the Black Sea. The Ottoman Empire was the living proof of this. The dismantling of this empire by the treaties of Sevres and Lausanne reduced the real might of Turkey for many years. The Cold War, however, caused a revision. From then on Turkey became the cornerstone of the western alliance in this area. Ankara knew that due to the geopolitical position of Turkey NATO or rather the Americans needed Turkey as a strategic glacis against the Soviet Union. This, in turn, had another consequence: As long as the Cold War existed NATO was an important protector against the traditional enemy (Erbfeind), Russia. The traditional threat from the North was neutralised.

In the early years (Korean War) Turkey was the most obedient ally of the Americans. But in the mid-1960s when the troubles in Cyprus re-started Ankara began to emancipate itself from the US, started to flirt with the Soviets and thus became an only conditionally loyal ally of the US as could be seen during the Jom-Kipur- War.¹⁴ But during those years policy makers in Ankara still moved rather cautiously since the Soviet threat was still there.

After the Cold War came to an end and the threat from the north was reduced considerably Turkey remembered her old strength and old paradigms of Turkish foreign policy came to the fore again. This became obvious when Panturanism became an option in Turkish foreign policy. American oil interests in the Middle East and the Caspian area enhanced the strategic role of Turkey once more. The ruling elite noticed this increasing American interest and began to use it for their own national aims. At the same time they developed a new self-consciousness which often came close to arrogance. The statement of the well-known journalist, Mehmet Ali Birand, that in parts of the elite, old Ottoman behaviour surfaced again, is not an exaggeration at all.¹⁵

How radical these changes were became visible when Turkey's new security policy slowly took shape. The reduced threat from the north made Ankara develop a new military doctrine in the mid-nineties: Turkey's armed forces must be enabled to conduct two and a half (2½) wars simultaneously; Greece and Syria were identified as the primary enemies and the Kurdish Workers' Party (PKK) under Öcalan as secondary adversary.¹⁶ As NATO would not support Turkey in these wars the new doctrine required an increase in Turkey's defence spending for the modernisation and restructuring of the armed forces. In order to achieve this a gigantic armament

programme was conceived according to which Turkey was to spend the incredible sum of 150 billion dollars within the next 25 years.¹⁷

When the Luxemburg EU summit in 1997 let it be understood that a Turkish EU-membership was out of the question for many years to come Ankara turned increasingly towards Israel and the United States. There was even talk of building a second Europe with those two states.¹⁸ At the same time Ankara began to interfere with the Greek-Syrian military cooperation. In 1998 this new policy brought the first results: when Ankara threatened President Assad of Syria with war he expelled Ocalan and closed the logistical basis of PKK.¹⁹ However, after the elections in Israel and the change of government the entente cordiale between the two countries cooled down considerably and the economic crash in spring 2001 slowed down the speed of the armament programme, but there now has been a serious change of course. Ankara believes that a strong and deterrent force is necessary for its security and a successful foreign policy.²⁰

In 1999 two earthquakes hit Turkey and Greece. Spontaneously the two peoples helped each other. This allegedly led to a change in foreign policy of the two countries. Greece, indeed, to mention just one example, changed its course and stopped blocking EU help for Turkey. It was expected that Ankara would follow this example and change its political course in the Aegean and Cypriot questions. There were many words but no substantial changes. The Turkish behaviour during the NATO and the Greek-Cypriot manoeuvres in October 2000, however, was the obvious proof of the fact that so far not much had changed.²¹

However, it is not understood in Ankara that the new *grandeur* is a borrowed one and will only last as long as the US is interested in Turkey's role as local policeman. But Ankara seems to have never understood this or forgotten it. It is this new almost euphoric feeling which in summer 2000 led to Foreign Minister Cem's statement that Turkey is a world power adding that he never considered Cyprus to be a common problem for Turkey and Greece.²² This self-consciousness apparently led Ankara to the rather naive belief that American pressure will bully Turkey into the European Union without paying the entrance fees. Experience with the Americans, as in the already mentioned Armenian case, apparently leads Ankara to believe that Turkey can force or even blackmail her way into the Union. It is not understood that despite all its shortcomings, the EU is a community of shared moral values. Turkish verbal, virtual reforms will not open the European door. Moreover, even if the Americans could succeed in blackmailing the European politicians into accepting Turkey as a candidate, the European public is by no means ready to accept Turkey as a future family member.

This brings us to the second part of our analysis, i.e. the policy of Ankara towards

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Cyprus. In 1878 Cyprus became a kind of British protectorate. During the First World War Cyprus was annexed and later made a crown colony. In the international peace treaty of Lausanne in 1923, which ended the Greek-Turkish war, replacing the treaty of Sevres, Turkey renounced all rights on the island forever.²³

It was the British government under Prime Minister Eden which brought Ankara back into the game in 1955.²⁴ The idea was to neutralise Greek ambitions by Turkish aspirations and thus stay in Cyprus forever. This was the old colonialist recipe of divide and rule. In the case of Cyprus, however, this strategy did not function smoothly for a number of reasons. A prominent one was the fact that Turkey, brought back into the arena, began to develop her own plans. Athens and the Greek Cypriots dreamed of *enosis* (*union, Anschluß*) with the motherland and Ankara conceived the idea of *taksim* (partition) which most of the Turkish Cypriot leaders accepted willingly.²⁵

At the time when EOKA fought for independence the Turkish Cypriot counterpart, Volkan and later TMT, propagated *taksim*. TMT was a creation of the Turkish General Staff and was led by a Turkish staff officer; the political commissar was Rauf Denktash.²⁶ To prepare the partition of the island the Turkish Cypriot leadership advised its followers to *move north* and concentrate in certain purely Turkish villages. Greeks living in mixed villages in the same area were forced to leave. Turkish Cypriots who hesitated to move were often threatened by TMT. Thus the process of ethnic cleansing had begun already in the late 1950s and it was initiated by the Turkish Cypriot leadership around Kuchuk and Denktash.²⁷ It was the first step towards partition.

At the same time TMT (and EOKA) began to destroy well functioning models of cooperation such as certain trade unions because they were leftist and against the aims of the fanatics.²⁸ Ankara, in turn, organised the already mentioned pogroms against the Greeks of Istanbul.

When independence came in 1960 it was accepted by both communities only conditionally with great mental reserves for the time being. The Greek Cypriots still *believed* in *enosis* and the Turkish Cypriots in *taksim*. On British and American advice, Makarios suggested those notorious 13 changes to the Constitution which triggered the next round in the struggle of Cyprus in 1963 and 1964.²⁹

This crisis brought the main elements of Ankara's policy towards Cyprus to the fore. First, the migration movement towards the north was resumed and strengthened. Unfortunately, the Cypriot government supported this policy inadvertently by isolating and encircling the Turkish enclaves. This made it easy for the TMT-leadership to force many hesitant Turkish Cypriots to move to those enclaves. Today

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

we know that this partitionist policy was masterminded by Ankara.³⁰ Second, Ankara began with concrete preparations of a military invasion of the island.³¹ This, however, was stopped by President Johnson by his notorious letter³² to Inonu, but from then on invasion and forceful partitioning remained an option for Turkey who was just waiting for an opportunity. American and British plans, developed in 1964, propagating *double enosis*, meaning partition (such as the "*enosis by putsch* plan³³ or the Acheson plan") were interpreted by the Turkish side as an indirect encouragement.

In 1974 the Greek junta's blunderous coup d'etat offered Turkey the chance it had been waiting for since 1964. In the first phase of the invasion in July only a bridgehead was formed because the Turkish Armed Forces had logistic and military difficulties; the interruption of the fighting for a month by a cease fire and political negotiations was therefore welcome since it enabled the Turkish side to bring heavy reinforcements to Cyprus. Though these negotiations were approaching a successful end the Turkish side resumed its military advance. In the second phase in August 1974 the partitionist plans were realised. Turkey occupied almost 40% of the island and made one third of the Greek population (200.000) refugees. More than one thousand persons disappeared completely.³⁴

In 1977, under international pressure, the Turkish side accepted a solution based on a federal concept, the high-level agreement signed by Makarios and Denktash.³⁵ But after the death of the Archbishop, Turkish and Turkish Cypriot politicians began to drag their feet. In 1978 Denktash suggested that the solution should be a loose confederation.³⁶ Renewed international pressure made him retreat from the position for a few months but when this pressure lessened he returned to his old policy and in 1983 he proclaimed the "TRNC" (Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus). At the same time Turkey began to change the island's demographic balance by bringing in settlers from the mainland. The international community condemned all this but neither Denktash nor Ankara cared much about this protest. They intended to sit this out and this they did rather successfully.

Successive UN Secretary Generals and US Presidents tried in vain to overcome Turkish intransigence. Denktash was visited by special emissaries and did not move a slightest bit. When US troubleshooter Holbrooke, who had achieved the Dayton Agreement, tried his luck he sent him home telling him that he had not done his homework regarding Cyprus.³⁷ Intransigence slowly turned into arrogance as was seen in the case of the visit of EU Commissioner Verheugen who was kept waiting at the check point at Ledra Palace for some time because he was allegedly unknown to the local authorities.

When Cyprus applied for membership in the European Union Ankara apparent-

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

ly believed that it could either block this or use this application as a lever to force itself into the EU and embarked on a diligent effort to this end. When Ankara's bluff was called and it became clear that Cyprus would be accepted irrespective of a solution, Ankara amazingly enough did not change its course. Turkey apparently believed that it would be accepted as a candidate without moving in the Cyprus question as was shown by a statement of Prime Minister Ecevit of 20 October 2000: "When we were taking steps toward candidate status, we clearly stated that we shall make no concessions on Cyprus. It is out of the question for us to make any concessions on Cyprus. There are two independent states there."³⁸ And his coalition partner Yilmaz stated in Brussels, "that Ankara doesn't want the Cyprus issue to be covered by the Accession Partnership Document. The Europeans should know the fact that the parameters of the Cyprus question are known. Compulsion other than these parameters will make the solution in Cyprus more difficult."³⁹

But arrogance was not only exhibited towards the European Union. When the GB summit passed a resolution on Cyprus Ankara made it clear that "the views stated in the G-8 statement have no chance to be accepted as they are not based on the consent of the parties in Cyprus. These resolutions will not form a pre-condition in the proximity talks."⁴⁰ Tahsin Ertugruloglu, "Foreign and Defence Minister" of "TRNC" added that the G8 resolution "*was based on the United Nations Security Council's resolutions. These resolutions will not form a pre-condition in the proximity talks.*"⁴¹ In October 2000 Ankara called the EP (Europarlament) resolution on Cyprus "biased" and "far from realities". "*Turkey fully agrees and shares the views and stands of the TRNC on the issue.*"⁴² More examples of this arrogant attitude could be added easily.

In November 2000, however, things took an unexpected turn. On 7 November the EU Commission announced its conditions which Turkey must fulfil before accession talks can begin. The document referred to fundamental EU decisions and the Copenhagen criteria underlining the essentials: i.e. human rights, democracy, rule of law and respect for minorities. All this was said very tactfully but on one point the document was explicit stating that Turkey's National Security Council (MGK) must be turned into a consultative body. Additionally the paper recalled that problems with Greece must be solved before accession talks could begin and it asked for a solution of the Cyprus problem.⁴³

The well-known Turkish journalist Mehmet Ali Birand commented: "*The applicant will pay that price if it wants to. If, on the other hand, the applicant isn't willing to pay that price it can simply withdraw its application for full membership in the EU. But one cannot say, this price is too high. I cannot afford it. Give us a reduced price. If one says any such thing the reply he will get is, then apply to another club. Besides, the conditions ... are the principles adopted and implemented by all civilized*

*countries.*⁴⁴ On the same day Romano Prodi, President of the European Commission let it be understood that the EU was no longer satisfied by verbal intentions, it required actions. The commission's report itself stated that Turkey still had not fulfilled the political conditions required to begin membership negotiations.⁴⁵

During the following weeks Ankara fought a retreat battle trying to have the solution of the Cyprus (and Aegean) question removed from the goals of the EU Access Partnership Document.⁴⁶ On 11 November 2000 Prime Minister Ecevit stated that "Turkey cannot accept a connection between the Cyprus issue and the EU candidacy."⁴⁷ Yilmaz voiced the general belief in Ankara that Cyprus cannot become a EU member prior to a solution.⁴⁸ On 20 November Minister of State Gurel called the inclusion of the Cyprus Problem in the APD a provocation and threatened that this could lead to a cut-off of the political dialogue by Turkey [sic].⁴⁹ Ecevit even spoke of an embargo on European companies.⁵⁰ One day later Yilmaz expressed the opinion that Turkey did not need the EU.⁵¹ All these statements were for home consumption, but showed a growing uneasiness and the strong words used couldn't hide the underlying fears of Ankara's political leadership.

In northern Cyprus Rauf Denktash interpreted the tense situation in a characteristic way. He refused to continue with the UN sponsored proximity talks and received Ecevit's blessing,⁵² since Ecevit declared that no results could be obtained from the talks so long as the existence of two states in Cyprus were not recognised.⁵³ Obviously Ecevit agreed with Denktash's policy of intransigence. And even the moderate Foreign Minister Cem played the hardliner stating that Turkey might give up EU membership if pressured on Cyprus and Aegean problems.⁵⁴ On 24 November Ecevit blamed the EU for the lack of a solution in Cyprus and added that the EU intended to break the "TRNC" away from Turkey, admit it into the EU and - mass troops there.⁵⁵ It was obvious that panic was ruling in Ankara.

On the same day (24 November) a meeting of the political and military establishment of Turkey took place in Ankara in the presence of Denktash. The summit had two main topics: the Accession Partnership Document and the Set of Ideas of UN Secretary General Kofi Anan. In the discussion the two themes were confused with each other and at the end merged into one. And Ecevit added a new blurred dimension to it by linking the stalemate in Cyprus with the security of the Baku-Ceyhan oil pipeline which may or may not be built. This outcome led to rumours that the Turkish Armed Forces were against the country's EU membership and against a settlement in Cyprus.⁵⁶

One commentator came to the conclusion that *"Turkey's ruling class is opposed to Turkey's full membership in the EU, because it cannot say explicitly to the public that they have been playing on the Cyprus issue. There is an organised gang activity to block Turkey's integration with the EU by arousing nationalist sentiments*

*and by pushing the Cyprus issue forward.*⁵⁷

During the following weeks Ankara's diplomats and politicians managed after a lot of diplomatic haggling to have the wording of the Accession Partnership Document changed but the substance remained.⁵⁸ But the military showed who is running Turkey. On 2 December the General Staff published a White Book on Turkey's defence strategy covering all topics from "terrorism" to the "National Security Council" (MGK). The paper emphasised the indispensability of the MGK, repeated the well known Turkish position on the Aegean conflict and called Denktash's confederation plan the "fairest and the most constructive proposal" submitted so far.⁵⁹

With these warning signals of the military in the back of his head Ecevit went to the EU Summit in Nice. On 6 December *Hurriyet* expressed the hope that *"unless, God forbid, some unexpected 'road accident' does occur, EU's heads of state and government will endorse at the highest level the decision taken by EU foreign minister in Brussels two days ago."*⁶⁰ Ecevit and Yilmaz were doing their best to create a good impression and even agreed to allow a Kurdish radio program. All of a sudden the abhorred "road accident" happened. The Turkish General Staff let it be known quite clearly that there will never be anything like a Kurdish cultural autonomy. This statement burst like a bomb in the conference. The General Staff disavowed its own prime minister. Mehmet Ali Birand was flabbergasted: *"We could have expected everything, except such a development... Why now? Why did they feel the need to express their views already known by everybody in such a sharp wording just at a time [when] the Prime Minister Ecevit was giving assurances to the EU summit. ... People inferred that the General Staff was trying to say 'we are here, too. Ask us, too, about these issues.'"*⁶¹ Rarely in history was a Prime Minister let down in such a way in public.

In the following days Turkey manoeuvred herself even more into the political and diplomatic *cul-de-sac*. Denktash repeated his position that he would only return to the proximity talks after the "TRNC" is recognised as a state. And on 16 December he made his parliamentary assembly accept his position obliging him to steer exactly his own political course thus creating a perfect excuse for further intransigence. The National Security Council of Turkey gave its blessing to this course⁶² and a few days later it became known that Turkey would take northern Cyprus under closer control making it something like the 82nd province of Turkey but avoiding formal annexation. At the same time Ecevit let it be understood that "TRNC" would under no conditions be allowed to join the EU because it could no longer be controlled by Ankara.⁶³ The old game we have known for years goes on, Denktash does not want to relinquish his hold on power and the military in Ankara are not ready to give up what they won by the force of weapons.

But let us come to the decisive question. Is there a chance that Ankara might change its policy towards Cyprus in the near future? And is there someone who might influence the policy makers in Ankara? The answer to the first question is simply no.⁶⁴ There are no signs of any change. Not even the recent economic and financial crisis brought a change. Even the new economic strongman, the western trained Kemal Dervis stated that Turkey urgently needed economic help but he let it be understood that it would be a capital mistake if the West were to link the economic help with political stipulations. Turkey's economic crisis had no connection with the Cyprus Problem. *"We meet all economic conditions, so that the financial aid can become effective. But to link political conditions with the financial aid – is blackmail. In such a case you would achieve the exact opposite."*⁶⁵ In other words: The West is kindly allowed to pay but Ankara will not change its policy; according to the German weekly *DIE ZEIT* this money is thrown out of the window.⁶⁶ Thus Turkey has once more been saved from the total crash but there won't be a change of policy because a change would lead to a loss of power of the ruling elite and neither the politicians nor the military are interested in this. After the collapse of the "TRNC" Government in May 2001 the former Vice-premier Mustafa Akinci characterised the Turkish elite: *'Two schools of thought exist in Turkey. One of them supports changes, democracy, and accession to the EU and the other believes that Turkey should not join the EU and democracy is unnecessary. There are those who are convinced that the 'TRNC' should not be included in the process. Those who believe in that cooperated with Denktash to achieve their objective.'*⁶⁷

But this lack of flexibility is not only seen in internal politics of Turkey but in foreign policy as well. And as long as the policy makers in Ankara know that the United States have an interest in the Caspian oil they know that the US cannot and will not exert serious pressure. The *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* emphasised: *"In Washington, Brussels and Berlin the strategic importance of Turkey weighs so heavily that one is ready to help almost any Turkish government. It remains an iron law: Turkey is needed – as a Western outpost in the Muslim world, as a NATO-bridge between the Black Sea and the Mediterranean, as a military operational field for the Near East and as a partner in the oil business in central Asia. In order to preserve this, even bankrupt governments are helped and a system incapable of reform is kept alive."*⁶⁸

Against this background it is not astonishing that Ankara does not care much about the fact that its own policy towards Cyprus is the biggest impediment on its way towards Europe and that unless it removes this obstacle there will be no progress on the road towards the EU. To make this crystal clear to the policy makers in Ankara, plain language on the part of the Europeans would be needed but as most European politicians are afraid of a clash with Turkey and the Americans, there is still a lot of cautious hypocrisy in the game on their side. Few have the

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

courage of the former German Chancellor Helmut Schmidt who stated clearly that for quite a number of reasons he did not consider Turkey a qualified candidate for EU membership.⁶⁹ All this will induce Rauf Denktash to continue his intransigent course, a course that provoked the former US troubleshooter Holbrook to call him the "most obstinate and obstructive personality" of the region.⁷⁰

The consequences for Cyprus? There is no doubt that the Republic will be accepted in the European family in the near future and thus the threat from the North will end; EU membership will be a kind of life insurance for Cyprus. In the North the status quo will continue i.e. this part of the island will be more and more absorbed by Turkey but not annexed because this would close the door to Europe with a bang, as Birand wrote.⁷¹ The actual losers of this process will be the Turkish Cypriots. Their Europeanised political culture will be replaced by Turkish clientelism. The more courageous ones among them will emigrate, the rest will adjust themselves and thus the only genuine example of a Europeanised, perhaps really Kemalist Turkish community, outside the EU will vanish.

For the Europeans on the other hand it's high time to start thinking what will happen if the Republic of Cyprus becomes an EU member in two years. The partition of the island has never been accepted by the UN and the EU can scarcely take a different position. Thus Cyprus as a whole will be accepted in the Union. This will create complicated legal problems for the international, European and the security sectors which will demand a lot of creativity for its solutions.⁷² Thus the almost forgotten Cyprus Problem will surface again and will become a hot political topic over the next two years to come.

Notes

1. Taner Akcam, *Armenien und der Völkermord. Die Istanbuler Prozesse und die türkische Nationalbewegung* (Hamburg: Hamburger Edition, 1996); idem., "Retter des Vaterlandes. Die Türkei und der Völkermord an den Armeniern" *Le Monde Diplomatique* (July 2001), p. 19.

2. A typical example of this attitude is Türkkaya Ataöv, *The 'Armenian Question' Conflict, Trauma & Objectivity* (Ankara: Ministry of Foreign Affairs, Centre for Strategic Research,

3. 'The Turkish base at Incirlik, where the allied planes monitoring the no-fly zone in Northern Iraq are stationed, is therefore crucial to the American policy of containment. Turkish lawmakers had threatened not to renew the mandate of 'Operation Northern Watch', run from Incirlik, if H. Res. 596 was adopted." From: <http://www.turkeyupdate.com> *US Congress Withdraws Armenian Genocide Resolution* (20 October 2000).

4. Text of a letter from the President to the Speaker des House of Representatives of 19 October 2000 from: <http://usinfo.state.gov> "I am deeply concerned that consideration of H. Res. 596 at this time could have far-reaching negative consequences for the United States. We have significant interests in this troubled region of the world."

5. Hidir Goktas, 'Turks Fume over Armenian Genocide Vote in Europe' *Reuters* (16 November 2000).

6. Faik Ökte. *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax* (London: Croom Helm, 1987).

7. Ekkehard Borntreger, "Die Türkeigriechen seit dem Ersten Weltkrieg: Vom griechisch-orthodoxen Millet zur ethnisch religiösen Minderheit in der kemalistischen Türkei" *Thetis* 5/6 (1999), pp. 367-390.

8. Christian Rumpf, "Die staats- und völkerrechtliche Lage Zyperns" *Europäische Grundrechtszeitung* 21:24 (1997), pp. 533-46.

9. "Judgment in the case of Cyprus v Turkey" *The Cyprus Weekly* (11 May 2001), p. 14f.

10. The Permanent Representative of Turkey at the EU, Nihat Akyol stated, that the EP-Resolution "will not facilitate the efforts to find a just and lasting solution on Cyprus." Ankara Anatolia 16:9 GMT (4 October 2000); Denktash, in turn, threatened, he would no longer participate in the intercommunal talks.

11. Heinz Richter, "Außenpolitische Probleme Griechenland", in: Pantaleon Giakoumis (ed.), *Griechenland, außen-, sicherheits- und europapolitische Aspekte* (Aachen: Mainz, 1999), p. 28.

12. *Ibidem*.

13. Idem, "Griechenland und sein türkischer Nachbar: Geschichte und Politik", in: Bernd

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

Rill (ed.), *Griechenland: Politik und Perspektiven* (München: Hans Seidel Stiftung, 1999), p. 66; Özdemir A. Özgür, "The Greco-Turkish Disputes over the Aegean Sea" *Sudosteuroopa* 8:45 (1996).

14. Idem, "Cyprus: The Perennial Conflict", in: Hans Günter Brauch et al. (eds.), *Euro-Mediterranean Partnership for the 21st Century* (London: Macmillan, 2000), p. 231.

15. See also Dietrich Jung, "Die Erben der Paschas. Osmanisch-türkische Kontinuitäten: Mythes und Wirklichkeit der Kemalistischen Revolution", *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (12 February 2001), p. 10.

16. Sukru Elekdag, "2½ War Strategy" *Perceptions. Journal of International Affairs* 1:1 (Ankara, 1996), pp. 33-57. This journal is the official organ of the Turkish Foreign Ministry. Elekdag who had been Deputy Undersecretary of the Foreign Ministry and Ambassador to the US is an influential foreign policy columnist.

17. Lale Sariibrahimoglu, "Arming for Peace" *Jane's Defence Weekly* (19 August 1998); Malik Muftu, "Daring and Caution in Turkish Foreign Policy" *Middle East Journal* 52:1 (1998), pp. 33-50.

18. Hüseyin Bağcı, "Türkische Außenpolitik nach dem Luxemburger EU-Gipfel vom Dezember 1997", in: Erich Reiter (ed.), *Jahrbuch für internationale Sicherheitspolitik* (Bonn, 1999), p. 582f.

19. N. Gem Orekli, "Turkey's National Security Strategy" Internet.

20. Elekdag, *op. cit.*, p. 57.

21. İlter Turkmen, "Road Accident" *Hurriyet* (31 October 2000); "NATO exercise reignites tension between Turkey and Greece" www.turkeyupdate.com (3 November 2000).

22. Exclusive interview in *Turkish Daily News* (1 August 2000): "Cem underlines very strongly that Turkey is a world power whose considerations should be taken into account in every major foreign policy decision.... I never considered Cyprus to be a common problem for Turkey and Greece."

23. Article 20 "Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November, 1914" in: Great Britain, *Treaty of Peace with Turkey Signed at Lausanne on July 24, 1923* (London: HMSO, 1923), p. 23.

24. Robert Holland, *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959* (Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1998) *passim*; Evanthis Hatzivassiliou, *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955- 1959* (Minneapolis: University of Minnesota, 1997), p. 24f.

25. The most prominent among those who continued to believe in a united Cyprus and fought for it was Dr İhsan Ali who later became advisor to President Makarios.

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

26. Ahmet Qavit, "Zur Stellung der türkischen Widerstandsorganisation (TMT) in der Zypernfrage" *Thetis* 5/6 (1999), p. 511.

27. *Ibidem*, p. 512.

28. *Ibidem*; Patriotic Union of Turkish Cypriots (ed.), *Victims of Fascist Terrorism* (Nicosia, [1958]).

29. Claude Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention* (Mannheim, Mohnesee: Bibliopolis, 2001) = Peleus Bd. 9.

30. Report of the United Nations Mediator on Cyprus to the Secretary General, S/6253 (26 March 1965). The Turkish Cypriot leadership "envisaged a compulsory exchange of population in order to bring about a state of affairs in which each community would occupy a separate part of the island. The dividing line was in fact suggested ... It is said to have the area of about 1,084 sq. miles or 38% of the territory of the Republic of Cyprus."

31. Heinz A. Richter, "Zypern: das Krisenjahr 1964" *Thetis* 2 (1995), p. 283.

32. Jacob M. Landau, "Johnson's 1964 Letter to Inonü and Greek Lobbying of the White House" (Jerusalem: The Leonard Davis Institute for International Relations, 1979) = Jerusalem Papers on Peace Problems.

33. Richter, Krisenjahr, p. 284.

34. Some 2,000 to 4,000 Greeks and Greek-Cypriots were killed and more than 170,000 Greek-Cypriots were expelled from the north of the island. More than 1,000 Greek Cypriots are still missing to this day. Hubert Faustmann, "The United Nations and the internationalisation of the Cyprus conflict 1949-1958", in: James Ker-Lindsay & Oliver Richmond (eds.), *Promoting Peace and Development in Cyprus over four Decades* (London: Macmillan, 2001) und Idem, "Menschenrechtsverletzungen auf Zypern seit der Unabhängigkeit" in: Franz- Josef Hutter et al. (eds.), *Das gemeinsame Haus Europa. Menschenrechte zwischen zwis- chen Atlantik und Ural* (Baden-Baden: Nomos, 1998), p. 214f.

35. Text in: Cyprus Press and Information Office, *The Cyprus Problem* (Nicosia: PIO, 1999), p. 151.

36. *Ibidem*, p. 26f.

37. Denktash in an Interview with REUTERS (5 May 1998); the Turkish Minister of State for Cyprus, Sukru Sina Gurel, said similar things in an Interview with Anatolia News Agency (6 May 1998).

38. Studio interview with Turkish Prime Minister Bulent Ecevit by Sebahattin Onkibar on the 'Alternative' Programme (20 October 2000).

ANKARA'S POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS AND THE EUROPEAN UNION

39. Ankara Anatolia 2033 GMT (19 October 2000). Yilmaz spoke in Brussels at a lunch hosted by UNICE (Union of Industrial and Employers' Confederation).
40. Press Release of the Ministry [of] Foreign Affairs Concerning the Joint Statement on Regional Issues at the G-8 Summit No: 124 (24 July 2000).
41. Ankara Anatolia 1747 GMT (24 July 2000).
42. "Turkey fully agrees and shares the views and stands of the TRNC on the issue." Ankara TRT 1 Television 1000 GMT (6 October 2000); der "Außenminister" der "TRNC" Er-tugruloglu bezeichnete die Entscheidung als "unacceptable". Nicosia Bayrak Radio 0500 GMT (6 October 2000).
43. "EU conditions determined."
44. Mehmet Ali Birand, "EU announces the road map today" *Turkish Daily News* (8 November 2000).
45. "Prodi Proposes to Speed up Expansion Talks" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* Internetausgabe (8 November 2000).
46. Sukru Sina Gurel in Ankara TRT 1 TV, 9:00 (9 November 2000).
47. Bülent Ecevit, "Turkey cannot accept Cyprus reference in Accession Partnership Document" Istanbul, NTV, 14:07 GMT (11 November 2000).
48. "Turkey, Yilmaz Assesses EU Document, EP Resolution" Ankara TRT 1 TV 21:30 GMT (15 November 2000).
49. Istanbul *Sabah*, Internetversion (18 November 2000).
50. Istanbul *Star* (21 November 2000).
51. "Yilmaz and Bahçelli: We don't need the EU" *Turkish Daily News* (22 November 2000).
52. "Greek Cypriots: Denktash blackmailing EU" *Turkish Daily News* (26 November 2000).
53. Haluk Sahin, "Non-solution in Cyprus" *Radical* (25 November 2000).
54. Mesut Yilmaz, "Turkey may give up EU membership if pressured on Cyprus, Aegean Problems" Ankara TRT 1TV, 18:00 (26 November 2000).
55. "Ecevit explains decision to withdraw from Cyprus talks" *Hurriyet* (26 November 2000).
56. İler Turkmen, "Moving away from rational policy" *Hurriyet* (30 November 2000).

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

57. Asli Oktener, "Turkish academic express contrasting views on Cyprus" *Miliye* (28 November 2000).

58. Gerd Höhler, "Wortspiele in der Zypernfrage" *Frankfurter Rundschau* (6 December 2000).

59. Sibel Yuksek, "White Book by Ministry of National Defence" *Sabah* (2 December 2000).

60. Hadi Uluengin, "The EU is in the photograph" *Hurriyet* (6 December 2000).

61. Mehmet Ali Birand, "General Staff's message. Take us into consideration" *Turkish Daily News* (9 December 2000).

62. Hüseyin Bağcı, "Quo vadis Turkey after Nice Summit?" *Turkish Daily News* (18 December 2000).

63. Gerd Hohler, "Ankara greift wieder verstärkt nach Zyperns Norden" *Frankfurter Rundschau* (6 January 2001).

64. For a similar assessment, the former Secretary General, Perez de Cuellar. Javier Perez de Cuellar, *Pilgrimage for Peace* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1997).

65. *Wir erfüllen alle wirtschaftlichen Bedingungen, damit die finanzielle Hilfe wirksam werden kann. ...Aber politische Bedingungen an die Finanzhilfe zu knipfen - das ist Erpressung. Damit würde in der Türkei ilbrigens auch das Gegenteil erreicht werden.*
"Wir lassen uns vom Westen nicht erpressen" *Die Zeit* 18 (26 April 2001), p. 12.

66. Jochen Buchsteiner, "Zur Fenster raus. Die Türkei erhält zehn Milliarden Dollar aus dem Westen - und wird doch bleiben, wie sie ist" *Die Zeit* 19 (3 May 2001), p. 8.

67. "Turkish Cypriot Leader: Turkey is cutting the ground from under its own feet" *Istanbul Radical* (26 May 2001).

68. *In Washington, Brüssel und Berlin wiegt die strategische Bedeutung des Landes viel zu schwer, als daß man nicht nahezu jeder türkischen Regierung unter die Arme greifen würde. Es bleibt eine Art ehernes Gesetz: Die Türkei wird gebraucht - als westlicher Vorposten in der muslimischen Welt, als Nato-Brücke zwischen Schwarzem Meer und Mittelmeer, als militärisches Operationsfeld für den Nahen und Mittleren Osten und als Partner im zentralasiatischen Ölgeschäft. Um dies alles zu erhalten, wird eben auch abgewirtschafteten Regierungen geholfen und einem reformunfähigen System das Überleben gesichert.*
Buchsteiner, *op. cit.*, p. 8.

69. Helmut Schmidt, "Wer nicht zu Europa gehört" *Die Zeit* 41(5 October 2000); idem, "Schmidt against Turkey's EU membership" *Cyprus Weekly* (8 June 2001) "Turkey ... should

never enter the Union ... Referring back to the history of the 18th century, Schmidt said the main driving force in Europe's political and economic development had been the era of the Enlightenment, which had bred a culture of entrepreneurial management and open markets. 'The Enlightenment has never reached Turkey and will never reach Turkey' he said."

70. "Holbrook blasts 'obstructive, obstinate' Denktash" *The Cyprus Weekly* (8 June 2001), p. 12.

71. Mehmet Ali Birand, in *Sabah* (11 November 1997): "If Turkey annexes the TRNC the EU doors will be closed for Turkey's face and never opened again. Washington-Ankara relations for their part, will suffer a major blow."

72. Werner Hoyer, "Die Zeitbombe Zypern tickt" *Frankfurter Allgemeine Zeitung* (14 May 2001); Jürgen Reuter, "Zypern - Eins und doch geteilt." *Rheinischer Merkur* (25 May 2001), p. 5.

* This article is the elaborated version of a speech delivered in Intercollege in March 2001. Its topic was the policy of Ankara towards Cyprus and the European Union. Though footnotes were added and lengthy arguments were added I decided to stay as closely as possible to the original so that participants of that meeting would recognise the original.

Bibliography

Birand, Mehmet Ali (1991) *Shirts of Steel. An Anatomy of the Turkish Armed Forces*, London, Tauris.

Hatzivassiliou, Evanthis (1997) *Britain and the International Status of Cyprus, 1955-59*, Minneapolis, University of Minnesota.

Holland, Robert (1998) *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus 1954-1959*, Oxford, Clarendon.

Ker-Lindsay, James & Richmond, Oliver (eds) (2001) *Promoting Peace and Development in Cyprus over four Decades*, London, Macmillan.

Koydl, Wolfgang (2001) *Gelobt sei der Hl. Staat. Türkische Tragikomödien*, Wien, Picus.

Nicolet, Claude (2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*, Mannheim, Mohnesee, Bibliopolis = PELEUS 9.

Ökte, Faik (1987) *The Tragedy of the Turkish Capital Tax*, London, Croom Helm.

Özgür, Özdemir A. (2001) *Cyprus in my Life. Testimony of a Turkish Cypriot Diplomat*, Mannheim, Mohnesee, Bibliopolis = PELEUS 7.

Rüstow, Dankwart A. (1990) *Die Türkei. Brücke zwischen Orient und Okzident*, Göttingen, Vandenhoeck.