

# BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS, 1960 - 1974: A TALE OF FAILURE OR IMPOTENCE?\*

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## Abstract

*Upon Cypriot independence, in 1960, the British were relieved about having a troublesome policy issue out of the way. Their reaction was to relax and - in the eyes of U.S. officials - not to be overly concerned about either the Communist danger or the intercommunal problems on the island. The Americans were thus injected into the limelight of Cyprus diplomacy as a consequence of British withdrawal from their role as Western security interest guard in early 1964, leaving the U.K. on the sidelines. At least the U.S. diplomats could usually count on British moral support in their attempts to solve the Cyprus issue, including support for some of their conspiratorial schemes in 1964. Only after the Greek coup d'etat on Cyprus, in July 1974, were the British pushed back into Frontline diplomacy by their status as a Guarantor Power. The different policy parameters produced sharp disagreements between the U.S. and the British. At the end, the two blamed each other for having failed to prevent the Turkish invasion.*

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## Introduction

British policy in Cyprus must be seen in the context of the end of colonial rule on the island. The British were more or less kicked out. Still, since they left as rulers, their new policy came to be defined by two important parameters: Their Sovereign Base Areas (SSAs), to guarantee continued British military coverage of their regional role in the Mediterranean Sea; and their role as Guarantor Power, to continue to guard over the island's political future together with Greece and Turkey.

On the other hand, the story of United Kingdom policy in Cyprus cannot be told without some references here and there to United States policy. Not only did the

U.S. take over much of Britain's earlier role in 1964, but the policy was also often formulated, or at least discussed, jointly, within the traditional Anglo-American relationship.

The situation in 1960 was thus the following: The United Kingdom left by pressure at a time when its economy started to force her to redefine her role in the world anyway. In December 1962, former United States Secretary of State Dean Acheson would infuriate the British, when he claimed in a speech that Britain had "lost an Empire and has not yet found a role".<sup>1</sup> The quotation could be translated into the Cyprus situation: In 1960 Britain lost an island and would not find a new role there for quite a while, either.

### **Negligence and Administrative Confusion, 1960 - 1963**

Upon the Cypriot declaration of independence, in August 1960, the British, like other countries in contact with Cyprus, had to define their willingness and capacity to grant aid to the new republic. The special case about Cyprus and Britain was that the removal of two-thirds of the United Kingdom forces and most of the civil service personnel would leave a gap in the Cypriot economy. As Cyprus was also supposed to become a Commonwealth member, other countries such as the United States, gladly stepped into the background regarding aid, so as not to encourage Cyprus to orient itself elsewhere than to the Commonwealth and the United Kingdom. However, Britain did not fulfil its task as expected and the U.S. soon became alarmed that Communist countries could jump into the gap with attractive alternative aid. Britain thought the United States was unduly pessimistic in the outlook of the Cypriot future. Moreover, not only did Britain have too many economic problems herself by then to be more forthcoming in general, but the United Kingdom policy was also marked by a disastrous bureaucratic inefficiency at the time. Since the island's independence, and especially after its admission to the Commonwealth, the responsibility for Cyprus within the British Government was divided between the Foreign Office, mainly because of the military bases and the status of Britain as a Guarantor Power, and the Commonwealth Relations Office (CRO). Moreover, the CRO experienced a rapid turnover in officials, who were at least in the beginning rather inexperienced desk officers.<sup>2</sup> In addition there was the continued British uneasiness with the Cypriot President, Archbishop Makarios.

As the quarrels between Greek and Turkish Cypriots about the constitution and the rights of the communities grew more serious, throughout 1963, the British were again rather slow in responding, if compared with the United States. The climax of this relaxed United Kingdom attitude was High Commissioner Arthur Clark's dubious role in the formulation of Makarios' 13 points to amend the Constitution that he proposed to the Turkish Cypriots and this is what sparked the Cypriot powder keg in December 1963.

It is not necessary to go into the details of Clark's role during that time. Suffice it to say that Clark cooperated with Makarios, presumably on a purely personal basis, exceeding his authority.<sup>3</sup> He possibly actually helped Makarios formulate some of the proposals and we know from British documents that Clark had his government's authority to discretely put forward his ideas to the archbishop.<sup>4</sup>

The crisis was too much for the British. There was no plan for a situation like this one and in contrast to some other countries Britain did not expect such an explosion. In spite of all this: When U.S. officials told the British that Cyprus was clearly no issue that the United States wanted to be responsible for and that they would simply follow the British lead, the United Kingdom had to act.

#### **Shoving the Issue Over to the United States: 1964**

At least the British managed to arrange a cease-fire and at the same time attempted to find a way to a political solution by inviting all parties to the conflict to a conference in London in January 1964. It was no surprise that nothing came out of that conference, as all parties adhered to their stubborn standpoints. At the same time the British decided that this was already their last attempt at peacekeeping. Even though they had their forces on two military bases they decided that they were neither able nor willing to act on a peacekeeping force but would instead pass the problem over to another forum.

The first idea for an alternative to a British force was a NATO force.<sup>5</sup> This was soon dropped, however, contrary to what many followers of international conspiracy theories claim. A NATO force was unsuitable, because many NATO partners would be against it, the forces were not equipped or trained for internal security measures, and establishment would take too long.<sup>6</sup>

The next best idea that would not open the door to Eastern bloc troops or control was a force constituted by partner countries (among them NATO allies and Commonwealth members). This scheme failed too, however, mainly because President Makarios resisted all attempts by U.S. Under Secretary of State George Ball to receive his approval for such a force. Instead, though Makarios did not have his way either, the "compromise", the United Nations Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP), was much closer to his than to the Anglo-American position.

It was at this time, in the late winter months of 1964, that the United States took over from the United Kingdom the guarding of Western interests in Cyprus. This was primarily because the British, in the eyes of United States officials, were not concerned enough about the island's, but merely the SSA's future, and because Britain was facing the U.S. with a *fait accompli* by unilaterally deciding to hand over

the peacekeeping role to whoever would be ready to receive it.

From 1964 to 1974, therefore, the British played a side role within the international dimension of the Cyprus conflict and often merely decided on whether to endorse, or actively support, U.S. plans, even though as one of the three Guarantor Powers Britain still retained a certain amount of formal responsibility. On the other hand, the U.K. was still involved militarily by constituting the largest contingent in UNFICYP.

The famous June crisis was symptomatic for this British political withdrawal. While U.S. intelligence received information about an impending Turkish invasion of Cyprus, British intelligence predicted normal manoeuvres.<sup>7</sup> While President Johnson sent a stern letter that eventually made Turkey cancel her plans, the whole staff of the British embassy in Ankara was thus on a field trip to Istanbul and found out after their return that something must have been brewing but was over as soon as it had begun.<sup>8</sup>

More interesting is the British role regarding plans for a long-term solution to the Cyprus problem. The United States officials in Washington and in the embassies of the countries concerned came to the conclusion during the spring of 1964 that the best solution to the Cyprus problem was to grant *enosis*, however not without concessions to Turkey.<sup>9</sup>

What is important for us and is a rather new insight thanks to newly released British documents is that the United Kingdom, in the summer of 1964, also favoured *enosis* with some concessions for a solution. When the U.S. officials told the British about their favourite scheme, the Assistant Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, John Rennie, wrote to Prime Minister Alexander Douglas-Home: "[i]t would be bad enough if the Turks were to learn too soon of American support for *Enosis*, but it would be disastrous if they heard that we had expressed the same view."<sup>10</sup> Indeed, High Commissioner William Bishop, the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee and the FO's Central Department all came out in favour of *enosis* with concessions.<sup>11</sup> While Foreign Secretary Butler was reported to express doubts as he "worried about [the] political effect on [the] Tory backbenchers of now pushing [a] solution which it could have had eight years ago", Prime Minister Home on 29 May finally came to the conclusion himself that "we should[...] prefer *enosis*".<sup>12</sup>

However, while America became active in the political field, the British kept their preferences to themselves, being relieved that the U.S. had definitely taken over from them by President Johnson's commitment to Prime Minister Inonu in his letter of June that the U.S. would become more active in the search for a solution to the Cyprus problem. They thus asked the United States to take the lead in the attempt

to mediate and represent British interests. They simply told the Americans that they intended to keep their SBAs and wished to be informed, if not consulted, about progress.

During the famous Acheson mission to Geneva, the British, though appointing Viscount Samuel Hood as their representative to the talks, contented themselves to receive news about Acheson's thinking and comment on it in order to signal support or make reservation on it. It is unnecessary to go into the specific plans here. Suffice it to mention that there were more than just two Acheson Plans and that the more dubious ones included conspiratorial schemes to induce either the Greeks or the Turks to invade Cyprus and to then stop the other army respectively in time to prevent a bloodbath.<sup>13</sup> All of the plans simply reflected the U.S. fear that Cyprus could go Communist. In early August, as Acheson and Ball started to think about supporting Greece in a scheme for "instant *enosis*" to be established by a Greek overthrow of Makarios, British Ambassador to Athens, Sir Ralph Murray, in support of the scheme urged the Foreign Office: "[...] it we do not want a serious risk of a weak but still independent Cyprus pursuing long-term intrigues with the Soviet Union and Egypt we should go all out for *Enosis* by hook or by crook."<sup>14</sup>

The British were well aware of the consequences of such a conspiracy. When Acheson told Hood that within this plan the Greek forces that had been infiltrated into Cyprus during the previous months would be encouraged to "remove Makarios", Lord Hood concluded in his top-secret letter to the FO: "this is pretty explosive stuff!"<sup>15</sup> Eventually, in spite of British approval, the plan was not executed, primarily because the Greeks were not ready to grant Turkey the few concessions regarded as necessary by the U.S. and U.K. to give the green light.

Acheson and Ball were so frustrated by the lack of a Greek-Turkish agreement that in desperation they devised another plan that would have endorsed Greek unilateral intervention on the island with the removal of Makarios, while the United States would have prevented Turkey from reacting. The scheme was meant to frustrate a possible Cypriot-Soviet axis, and it was simply believed that a Greek invasion could manage this while a Turkish invasion could not. Now *this* was when the British had their finest hour, though not because they specifically cared about the fate of the Cypriots. Lord Hood sent an urgent telegram to the Foreign Office, commenting, "we should not be the gainers if we saved Cyprus but lost Turkey".<sup>15</sup> On a slight variation of this plan, the Under Secretary of State for Foreign Affairs, Sir Harold Caccia, consequently warned that Her Majesty's Government "might even have to dissociate itself from any such development", thus threatening the withdrawal of U.K. support to the plans. Prime Minister Home duly sent a respective message to the U.S., but by the time it arrived cooler heads in the United States itself had already prevailed.

As a consequence, the Acheson mission and Hood's presence in Geneva came to an end. Thanks to a gradual de-escalation on Cyprus proper, no more of these extreme schemes came forward. The lessons learnt by U.S. and U.K. officials included the insight that it was best to wait for the Greeks and Turks themselves to come up with a deal - the Cypriots themselves still had no voice regarding their own future.

### **Waiting-position: 1965 - 1967**

That the general Western policies towards Cyprus were in a mess is evident by the exercise of U.S. officials to push the British back into the forefront of Cyprus diplomacy, in the autumn of 1964, and the British blockage of the attempt. The new Foreign Minister Patrick Gordon Walker in October let the Americans know that the new Labour Government under Prime Minister Harold Wilson would not contemplate any new initiatives, but would be prepared to help, if the United States decided to devise any new schemes.<sup>17</sup>

It took several months for Greece and Turkey to take up a dialogue about the island's future. However, when ideas and proposals became more concrete, the British were suddenly pushed back into the picture. The reason was an ingredient in Greek schemes that was being attempted to be sold to Turkey: the cession of the British SBA Dhekelia. With the cession of British territory in Cyprus, Prime Minister George Papandreou thought he had found a miracle solution that would not involve ceding Greek territory but would still give Turkey a military base.<sup>18</sup> However, the belief that the small base would satisfy Turkey was an illusion. The British knew this. This is why they let it be known that they would only contemplate throwing Dhekelia into the lot if there was evidence that it would remain the last item to constitute a solution viable to all parties involved. King Constantine received the same answer upon his similar attempt, in November 1966.<sup>19</sup> While the Greek-Turkish differences seemed to have been bridged to a large extent, it was now President Makarios who was known not to agree, and in contrast to the Tory Government in 1964, the Labour Government in 1966 actually seemed to care and thus to consider the Cypriot president's opinion, largely thanks to their pro-Greek Cypriot High Commissioner Sir David Hunt.

It must be pointed out, however, that the United Kingdom would have been willing to give away Dhekelia, if it had promised success for a solution, because contrary to Akrotiri, Dhekelia had lost in military value within the changes in military technology and Britain had been experiencing disastrous economic problems that made it scale down on strategic bases in the Mediterranean throughout the 1960s.<sup>20</sup> The climax of this economic turmoil was probably the necessary devaluation of Sterling in November 1967, which absorbed all British administrative powers during

the very week Cyprus experienced its most dangerous crisis since 1964.

Though not much more could be expected from the United Kingdom anyway, given its passivity since 1964, the sterling crisis may have been the primary reason why Britain again remained on the sidelines, while United States trouble-shooter Cyrus Vance almost single-handedly managed to pull Greece and Turkey back from the brink. A war seemed imminent following the showdown in the area of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou, and the U.S. only for a very short instance at the outset of the crisis attempted to push the British into the limelight of crisis diplomacy. On the other hand, Britain made no secret of her wish to extricate herself from the problem.<sup>21</sup> As late as two weeks into the crisis, the Foreign Office eventually considered how to support the Vance mission. But by then, the British Embassy Counsellor in Washington was told that there was nothing more for Britain to do but to support the American formulas.<sup>22</sup> Eventually, U.S. Ambassador Bruce cabled from London that the British had at no time during the crisis "evinced unhappiness about 'being left out' [...]".<sup>23</sup>

### **Hiding Behind U.S. Diplomacy: 1968 - 1973**

Genuine cooperation between America and the British was only resumed in early 1968. After the shock over events in late 1967 and especially the speed of escalation of the crisis, within hours they devised new schemes to find a solution to the Cyprus problem. The British study on the "Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute" called for an approach to the problem in three "tiers".<sup>24</sup> The first tier (or phase) would contain a general improvement of living conditions on the island, hopefully by March 1968. The second tier would entail bicommunal constitutional talks that could last until the following year. Finally, the third tier would provide approval of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, to the Constitution worked out by the two communities. The U.S. study in broad terms agreed on the different aspects and on how to handle them.<sup>25</sup>

Thanks to a local *detente* and eventual international support the talks between Glafkos Clerides and Rauf Denktash did begin, in the spring of 1968, but they did not result in much agreement. During the early stages of these talks the British, together with their American colleagues decided that it was best not to interfere, but instead to encourage both parties to move on. Nevertheless, they soon expressed concern over the lack of progress that was obvious as early as in autumn of 1968.

However, in general, the British were again retreating behind the back of the Americans in any action the latter decided to take. This included the diplomatic interventions in Athens to prevent a Greek coup against Makarios in March 1972. As it seemed, the U.S. mostly did the talking, while the British let the local officials

know that they backed whatever the United States was backing.

#### **Reluctant Reinvolvement: 1974**

When the Greek junta attempted to overthrow President Makarios, on 15 July 1974, things were no longer that easy, of course. The British Government was rein-volved in the Cyprus problem against its will, by its status as Guarantor Power that was supposed to guarantee Cypriot independence and territorial integrity. The consequence was a deep split between U.S. Secretary of State Henry Kissinger and British Foreign Minister James Callaghan.

To sum up the two positions, the U.S. regarded the crisis within the NATO context, whereas the U.K. was primarily concerned about the invasion of a Commonwealth member. The U.S. approach thus made it less willing to antagonise either the Greek Colonels or the Turks. Callaghan himself, as he remembered in his memoirs, felt fewer inhibitions.<sup>26</sup>

Turkish Prime Minister Bülent Ecevit on 17 July confronted Britain with a request to allow Turkey to use the British bases for a military intervention to restore constitutional government. To most observers it was obvious that a Turkish call for the return of Makarios was mere window-dressing, in order to let a Turkish invasion appear legal according to the Cypriot constitution. In spite of Callaghan's rather naïve assessment in his memoirs that Ecevit's claim that he was "almost weeping" over the departure of Makarios was a genuine testimony of how much the relations between the archbishop and the Turks had improved over the past few years,<sup>27</sup> the British refused a Turkish use of their bases, because, as Callaghan later stated, the island needed fewer Greek troops, not more Turkish troops, and the British had already called on the Greek Government to withdraw their officers.<sup>28</sup> Nevertheless, to be fair, it was not Britain's refusal to cooperate with Turkey that led to the failure of the consultation, but rather the Greek Colonels' continuing refusal to comply with the British urgings, as they still regarded a Turkish invasion as unlikely.<sup>29</sup>

When Turkey invaded after all, the British seemed rather helpless. So did the Americans. However, a cease-fire was arranged and the U.S., Britain and France jointly called for a couple of conferences in Geneva under British auspices. These conferences again produced little agreement. Callaghan and Kissinger sought to save the conference and to prevent a second Turkish military move, the former by chairing the conference and the latter from the sidelines and through his emissary Assistant Secretary of State Arthur Hartman. When the Turkish forces broke the cease-fire at the end of July and the UN forces were in danger of being attacked, the British sent some reinforcements to be placed under UN command. Furthermore, Callaghan informed the British press that some Phantom aircraft would be

sent to the island, and dropped a heavy hint that British troops would be authorised to fire on Turks to stop any breach of the ceasefire.<sup>30</sup>

The Americans, however, had a different opinion about the situation in Cyprus. Hartman argued that there was no longer an odious regime in Athens and no illegal regime in Cyprus after the Colonels had departed, that the Turkish Cypriots were protected, and that there was a strong UN resolution. These were rational arguments that should appeal to Turkish intelligence and restrain them from action, Hartman argued.<sup>31</sup> Therefore, the U.S. was not happy with Her Majesty's Government's approach. To President Ford, Kissinger complained that the British were "threatening military action against the Turks which is one of the stupidest things I have heard".<sup>32</sup> The Secretary preferred to trust his former Harvard student, Prime Minister Ecevit. Therefore, Kissinger only promised diplomatic support to the British, while emphasising that threats of military action were neither helpful nor appropriate.<sup>33</sup> Callaghan had to transmit the news to Clerides, pointing out to him that the United Kingdom was no longer a superpower, that it could not afford another Suez, and that any strong-arm action could not be contemplated by the United Kingdom, except within the context of the UN or an American initiative.<sup>34</sup>

When Turkey eventually cut the Gordian knot by seizing the territory it had been demanding, the disappointed Callaghan allegedly wrote Kissinger an angry letter accusing the Americans of "disgraceful and duplicitous behaviour".<sup>35</sup> On the other hand, Kissinger was reported to have remarked that "Callaghan's handling of the peace talks showed the dangers of letting 'boy scouts handle negotiations'".<sup>36</sup> Neither accusation seems very appropriate. If anything could have stopped the Turks, it would have been the threat, or even limited implementation, of joint British-American military action. To what extent Callaghan really wanted to stop Turkey militarily but was hindered to do so by American refusal to participate is still not clear. – Not to mention what the American intentions really were.

### **Conclusions**

When trying to assess the British policy towards Cyprus between 1960 and 1974, we cannot just look at the question of whether Britain would have had a right to intervene militarily in Cyprus and – if so – whether it should have used that right in 1964 or 1974, after the constitution had been breached. We must also look at what the British role was, in trying to prevent situations from happening that brought forward such questions in the first place. However, while it can be said of the Americans that they at least prevented a Turkish invasion of Cyprus in June 1964 and in November 1967, no such thing can be said of the British. Moreover, neither Britain nor the U.S. was able to come up with a longer-term scheme that would have promised success regarding a political solution to the Cyprus problem. Still, con-

## THE CYPRUS REVIEW

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trary to the role of the U.S., Britain can be blamed for not living up to her general responsibility as one of the three Guarantor Powers, among other reasons because she often failed to grasp the critical nature of the communal and regional tension in and around Cyprus. Especially, Britain must be blamed for quickly withdrawing from most of her responsibilities in the crucial year of 1964 with an *après-nous-le-déluge* attitude, leaving the U.S. with a *fait accompli*. But here the aspect of impotence comes in, as the limited number of troops would have prevented Britain taking any forceful action in the absence of trilateral Guarantor Power agreement to restore the *status quo ante*. On the other hand, the poor state of the British economy prevented the United Kingdom from assuming a more vigorous role in terms of aid or a general responsibility for the safeguard of Western interests.

British policy in Cyprus was thus mainly characterised by both, failure and impotence, with only very few laudable instances in-between. Nevertheless, this does not mean that Britain – or the U.S. for that matter – can be blamed for the various disasters that Cyprus experienced between 1960 and 1974. After all, most of the Cypriot problems were still homemade.

### Notes

1. The quotation from a speech of 5 December 1962 can be found in: Dickie, J. (1994) *'Special' No More: Anglo-American Relations: Rhetoric and Reality*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 130; Ball, G. (1968) *The Discipline of Power: Essentials of a Modern World Structure*. Boston and Toronto, Little, Brown and Co., p. 69.
2. Whitney, John A., Airgram from London G-547, 8 November 1960: State Department Central Decimal Files, 1960 - 63, box 2032, doc. 780A.00/11-861, National Archives, College Park (MD, USA), (hereafter referred to as NARA); Bruce, K. David, Airgram from London A-543, 26 October 1961: State Department Central Decimal Files, 1960 - 63, doc. 611.80a/10-2661, NARA.
3. Clerides, G. (1989) *Cyprus: My Deposition*. Vol. I. Nicosia, Alithia Publishing. pp. 169 - 173. See also: Brown, Mervyn, Minute, 18 December 1963, in Madden, F., ed. (2000) *The End of Empire: Dependencies Since 1948. Part 1. Select Documents on the Constitutional History of the British Empire and Commonwealth VIII*. Westport and London, Greenwood Press, pp. 483 - 484.
4. For more detailed information on Clark's dubious role, see: Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 2134, 30 October 1963: National Security File (NSF), Countries, Cyprus, 8/63-11/63, box 65, doc. 8, John F. Kennedy-Library, Boston (hereafter referred to as JFK-Library); Jones, G. Lewis, Embassy telegram from London 2185, 1 November 1963: *ibid.*, doc. 11, part I, p. 2; Rusk, Dean, Department telegram to London 2913, 6 November 1963: State Department Subject-Numeric File (hereafter referred to as SDSNF), 1963, POL 15-5 CYP, box 3881, NARA; Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 2283, 8 November 1963: NSF, Countries, Cyprus, 8/63-11/63, box 65, doc. 17, JFK-Library, p. 1; Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 2540, 27 November 1963: SDSNF, 1963, POL 15- 5 CYP, box 3881, NARA, p. 1; Clark, Arthur, to Duncan Sandys, Letter, 6 December 1963, in Madden (2000), *The End of Empire*, part 1, pp. 479 - 481.
5. Foreign Office to the British delegation to NATO in Paris 177, 7 January 1964: DEFE 11/397, doc. 922, Public Record Office, Kew (UK) (hereafter referred to as PRO).
6. Shuckburgh, Sir C. A. Evelyn, U.K. Delegation to NATO in Paris to the Foreign Office 16, 8 January 1964: DEFE 11/397, doc. 946, PRO.
7. Hare, Raymond A., Embassy telegram from Ankara 1628, 8 June 1964: NSF, National Security Council Histories, Cyprus Crisis, Dec. 1963 - Dec. 1967, box 16, doc. 95a, Lyndon B. Johnson-Library, Austin, TX (hereafter referred to as LBJ-Library), part 111, p. 1.
8. Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 6071, 5 June 1964: SDSNF, 1964 - 66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2085, NARA, p. 1; Hare, Raymond A., Embassy telegram from Ankara 1615, 6 June 1964: *ibid.*; Allen, Sir William D., Ankara to Foreign Office 901, 5 June 1964: DEFE 11/451, doc. 2929A, PRO.

## THE CYPRUS REVIEW

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9. For an extensive discussion of the U.S. plans regarding Cyprus, see: Nicolet, C. (forthcoming 2001) *United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974: Removing the Greek-Turkish Bone of Contention*. Mannheim and Mbnese, Bibliopolis.

10. Rennie, John O. to Prime Minister Alexander Douglas-Home, Memorandum: "Washington talks: Cyprus", 17 April 1964: FO 371/174750, doc. C 1015/1361, PRO, p.2.

11. Bishop, William H. to Duncan Sandys, "Cyprus: Possible Long-Term Solution of the Cyprus Problem", 21 April 1964: DEFE 11/450, doc. 2724 A, PRO; Brief by the Defence and Overseas Policy Committee for the Secretary of State: "Cyprus", 14 May 1964: DEFE 11/450, doc. 2762 D, PRO, p. 1; Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 5657, 14 May 1964: SDSNF, 1964-66, POL 23-8 GYP, box 2084, NARA, p. 1.

12. Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 5762, 20 May 1964: SDSNF, 1964 - 66, POL 23-8 CYP, box 2084, NARA, p. 1; Douglas-Home, Alexander, to the Secretary of State for Defence, Personal Minute, 29 May 1964: DEFE 11/451, doc. 2884, PRO, p. 1.

13. On the Acheson mission and the various plans emerging during the summer of 1964, see Nicolet (forthcoming 2001), *United States Policy Towards Cyprus*, pp. 247 - 289.

14. Murray, Ralph, Telegram from Athens to the Foreign Office 19 Saving, 5 August 1964: DEFE 11/455, doc. 3335, PRO, p. 1.

15. Hood, Samuel, to John O. Rennie, Letter, 14 August 1964: FO 371/174753, doc. C 1015/1898/G, PRO, p.2.

16. British Consulate in Geneva to the Foreign Office 406, 23 August 1964: DEFE 11/456, doc. 3581, PRO.

17. Memorandum of conversation between delegations of the U.S. and the U.K.: "Cyprus", 26 October 1964: *The Declassified Documents Reference System (1977-)*. Arlington, Carrollton Press, Microform, doc. 1979 74C, p. 2. The British version of this is: Record of Conversation, 26 October 1964: PREM 13/197, doc. 222, PRO.

18. Anschuetz, Norbert L., Embassy telegram from Athens 1754, 26 May 1965: SDSNF, 1964 - 66, POL 27 CYP, box 2097, NARA, part 11, pp. 1 - 2.

19. Wilson, Sir James Harold, to King Constantine, Draft Letter, 18 November 1966: PREM 13/1372, PRO, p. 333.

20. Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 4374, 26 November 1966: SDSNF, 1964-66, DEF 15 CYP-UK, box 1620, NARA, p. 1.

21. See e.g., Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 4088, 21 November 1967: SDSNF, 1967 - 69, POL 27 CYP, box 2024, NARA.

BRITISH POLICY TOWARDS CYPRUS, 1960 -1974: A TALE OF FAILURE OR IMPOTENCE?\*

22. As told by Rusk, Dean, Department telegram 74906 to the U.S. Embassy in Athens, etc., 27 November 1967: SDSNF, 1967 - 69, POL 27 GYP, box 2025, NARA, p. 1.

23. Bruce, K. David, Embassy telegram from London 4525, 5 December 1967: *ibid.*, p. 1.

24. The following is based on the British "Settlement of the Cyprus Dispute", version of 19 January 1968, attached to: Memorandum of conversation between delegations of the U.S. and the U.K.: "Notes on Cyprus Discussions with the British", 17 January 1968: SDSNF, 1967 - 69, POL 27 GYP, box 2026, NARA.

25. On the U.S. study and its compromise with the British scheme, see Nicolet (forthcoming 2001), *United States Policy Towards Cyprus*, pp. 380 -384.

26. Callaghan, J. (1987) *Time and Chance*. London, Collins, p. 339.

27. *Ibid.*, p. 340.

28. *Ibid.*

29. A Select Committee of the British House of Commons on Cyprus saw this differently. In its report in 1976 it scolded the Wilson Government for its failure to intervene together with Turkey: "Britain had a legal right to intervene, she had a moral obligation to intervene, she had the military capacity to intervene. She did not intervene for reasons which the Government refuses to give:" Committee Report quoted by Reddaway, J. (1986) *Burdened with Cyprus: The British Connection*. London, Weidenfeld & Nicolson, p. 168.

30. Callaghan (1987), *Time and Chance*, p. 351; Dickie (1994), '*Special*' No More, p. 156.

31. As told in Callaghan (1987), *Time and Chance*, p. 347 .

32. Kissinger, Henry A., to President Gerald Ford, Telephone Conversation, 10 August 1974: *The Declassified Documents Reference System* (1977-), doc. 1998 1975, p. 2.

33. Callaghan (1987), *Time and Chance*, p. 353.

34. Clerides, G. (1992) *Cyprus: My Deposition*. Vol. IV. Nicosia, Alithia Publishing, pp. 48 - 49.

35. Dickie (1994), '*Special*' No More, p. 158.

36. Quoted, unfortunately without reference to the source, in Panteli, S. (1984) *A New History of Cyprus: From the Earliest Times to the Present Day*. London and Den Haag, East-West Publications , p. 391.

\* This article is based on a speech held on 5 May 2001 at a conference entitled *Britain and Cyprus: Colonialism and its Impact*, at Intercollege, Nicosia.