

SELF-GOVERNMENT - ENOSIS OR IMMEDIATE ENOSIS: THE INFLUENCE OF ZAKHARIADIS ON THE SHIFT IN AKEL'S STRATEGY (NOVEMBER 1948 - JANUARY 1949)

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Abstract

*This paper focuses on the meeting between a two-member delegation from AKEL, the Cyprus communist party, and Nikos Zakhariadis, the leader of KKE, which took place in November 1948. In particular, it considers the impact of this meeting upon AKEL's strategy in relation to the Greek Cypriot campaign for self-determination which was equivalent to **enosis**, the union of Cyprus with Greece. This paper argues that the meeting was instrumental in persuading AKEL's leadership to revert to an uncompromising stance towards British colonial rule and to embark on a political campaign in favour of immediate **enosis**.*

By 1948, Britain had scaled down its presence in Greece, decolonised India and withdrawn from Palestine. Conversely, the British were strengthening their hold over Cyprus. In British eyes, the onset of the Cold War, the perceived threat from the USSR and the continuing importance of the Middle East magnified the potential strategic importance of Cyprus. These factors reinforced the British government's determination to cling on the island and resist the demand for self-determination. Incidentally, they also affected British perceptions of AKEL, the island's influential communist party.

Against this international background, in November 1947 the colonial administration in Cyprus called a Consultative Assembly to formulate proposals for a con-

stitution promoting self-government within the framework of continuing colonial rule. This was done in accordance with the statement of the Secretary of State for the Colonies to the House of Commons on 23rd October 1946. Representative elements of the island's Greek majority and Turkish minority were therefore invited to participate. The response was mixed. Within the majority Greek community, AKEL mayors together with AKEL-led trade union leaders agreed to take part. Right wing invitees declined to participate, in conformity with a decision of the Ethnarchy Council, a body headed by the archbishop. In contrast, all Turkish invitees agreed to participate.

Notwithstanding the initial British undertaking, the Colonial Office proposed its own draft constitution in May 1948. To the disappointment of Greek Cypriots this fell considerably short of self-government. AKEL, which had assumed the responsibility of negotiating with the colonial administration, was deeply affected by this adverse development. The Right intensified its political attacks on the left wing party, accusing its leaders of collaborating with the colonialists. Given the limited nature of the draft constitution, AKEL immediately withdrew from the Consultative Assembly, leading to its collapse. Nevertheless, the party maintained its policy of achieving self-government by means of the establishment of a constituent assembly, in the expectation that such a development would represent the first stage on the road to self-determination, that is *enosis*.

As the months passed in 1948, such hopes faded with the result that the party's leadership became increasingly introverted. So much so that they began to question the wisdom of the step-by-step approach until the achievement of self-determination. As Andreas Ziartides, the leading left wing trade union leader, recalled in an interview with the author in Lefkosia (Nicosia) shortly before his death:

In the aftermath of the collapse of the Consultative Assembly in May 1948, intense arguments began within the party with regard to whether we had committed a mistake by entering the Consultative Assembly and adopting the demand for self-government. The party was split in two. By 'split' I do not mean that there was an acute rift ... There were two different views. On the one hand there were those who believed we had made a mistake and on the other hand there were those who believed we did well ... Besides, there were those who wavered between the two opinions ... I did not take a firm stance but I won't lie to you I was among those who believed we made a mistake.¹

At this critical juncture, KKE, the Communist Party of Greece, stepped into the picture. It did so quite by accident, with crucial consequences. It so happened that in mid-1948, Nikos Savvides, who was a member of the central committee of AKEL and the deputy mayor of Ammochostos (Famagusta), arrived from Athens conveying a message to the party leadership. He related that in the course of a discussion

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with Vassilis Bartzotas, then a senior member of the KKE's central committee and of the *Democratic Army*, the left wing guerrilla movement, it was revealed that KKE disagreed with AKEL's gradualist approach to *enosis*. It seems that this piece of information prompted AKEL to send a party delegation abroad to consult the leadership of fraternal parties about the 'appropriate left wing path' on the national question of Cyprus.

The leadership of AKEL decided to seek the opinion of the 'national party', the KKE, on the question of strategy and tactics regarding the Cypriot national liberation struggle. Consequently, Fifis Ioannou, the General Secretary, and Andreas Ziartides, a member of the polit bureau and General Secretary of PEO, the Pan-cyprian Federation of Labour, left Cyprus incognito and travelled to Greece via Cairo, Paris, Prague, and Budapest where they were provided with forged passports. In early November 1948, they reached the headquarters of Zakhariadis and Vafiadis in Lemos, in the mountains of northern Greece. Their mission was to brief them on AKEL's policy and officially receive KKE's approach to the Cyprus question. As Ziartides related:

We thought, why not seek the opinion of fraternal parties ... We set out around the middle of October for abroad. We had a programme to see the French, the British, the Greek, and the Soviet Parties and Cominform in Bucharest ... In Paris we told them the reason we wanted to see the leadership of the French Communist Party; we were received by one of the secretaries who said: "Listen comrades, this is a serious matter of yours, you should solve it on your own. It is not easy for us to intervene and give a guideline (opinion) on this matter". This is what the French Party told us.²

The two Cypriot communist leaders first met with Markos Vafiadis, the commander-in-chief of the *Democratic Army*. On hearing of the purpose of their visit, Vafiadis told them: 'It is better if you discuss this with Nikos [Zakhariadis]'. It was surprising that a leader of the Greek left wing movement of the calibre of Vafiadis would refrain from all comment. But, as Ioannou and Ziartides found out a few days later, the latest plenum of the KKE's central committee purged Vafiadis from his position as 'commander-in-chief and prime minister' of the 'government of the mountains'. That presumably explained his silence.³ The two AKEL delegates therefore waited to see Zakhariadis, the KKE's General Secretary, the domineering leader, (in)famous for the Stalinist code and methods of liquidation of 'Trotskyists', 'opportunists' or 'traitors'.⁴ In an interview with the author, Ziartides recalled the meeting with him and his close associates:

We saw Zakhariadis a couple of days after [our arrival]. Vladas, Gousias, Ioannides and one or two others were present, I do not remember if Petros Rousos was there I think he was absent ... Fifis Ioannou made a presentation from his notes for

fifteen to twenty minutes. He initiated the subject. Then Zakhariadis talked *for not more than five minutes, I hesitate to say seven I never say ten*. He told us roughly this: "Listen, comrades, you made a mistake. You deviated to the right. You had been discussing with Imperialism the question of a constitution, whilst at the same time we, up here, your Greek brothers 'fought' the British in an armed struggle. It was a mistake. You should not expect to arrive at *enosis* via such a [colonial] constitution. You should go back and correct your mistake."⁵

Ziartides was categorical that no theoretical or political discussion of substance took place:

Nothing, nothing, nothing! ... [T]he rest [of the Politbureau members] did not speak ... I think Ioannides put a minor question ... I did not say anything and we left. *What I would like to convey is that it was not a serious discussion for such an important issue that troubled Cyprus.*⁶

Fifis Ioannou, in several articles published in the Cypriot daily *Apoyevmatini* in 1976, gave a somewhat different account of the meeting with Zakhariadis. He recalled that Zakhariadis praised the contents of the document on AKEL's history and activities which he handed a few days earlier to the KKE's polit bureau. According to Ioannou's narrative, Zakhariadis told them that the conclusions within the document were 'very sound'. Then, Ioannou asked him to judge the platform for *Self-government-Enosis*. At this point, Zakhariadis became more critical arguing that

The line for constitutional reform in Cyprus is a version of 'liberalism.' We, here, will [march victorious into] Athens in one way or another in two months time. Therefore, you there in Cyprus can no longer be talking about self-government as an intermediate stage to the ultimate aim of *enosis*. *Enosis* with Greece should become your immediate aim!⁷

He went on to explain to his Cypriot comrades that Ioannou's article on 'guaranteed abstention' (from any constitutional process) forwarded for publication in *Rizospastis* was rejected because the KKE's leadership could not appreciate its substance. Not without reason, Ioannou felt uneasy about Zakhariadis' reference to AKEL's gradualist approach to the *enosis* question as 'liberalist deviation'. Thus, he ventured to suggest that: "if your estimate, that in two months you will be in Athens, is proved wrong, does our line of *Self-government-Enosis* continue to be a 'liberalist deviation' or is this slogan defined as 'liberalist' from the point of view of you marching victorious into Athens?" Zakhariadis reiterated dogmatically that AKEL's line was 'liberalist' and that it should be reappraised. He even encouraged the Cypriot communists to engage in armed struggle. Ioannou was shocked to hear the suggestion that guerrilla warfare be initiated. He suspected that Zakhariadis was being carried away by revolutionary passion and that he had overestimated the

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chances of KKE's success in its armed struggle against the British-backed nationalist government in Athens. Thus, from the Cypriot communists' point of view, the question they had posed remained unanswered: in the event of KKE's failure to emerge victorious, would the pursuance of self-government as an intermediate stage to national restoration still be regarded as 'a deviation from the correct national liberation path'? Ioannou recalled that this scepticism perturbed him because Zakhariadis passed his dismissive and dogmatic verdict on AKEL's strategy. Nevertheless, he dared not raise the matter again with Zakhariadis:

I never grasped the opportunity to bring up the question anew, perhaps because I was possessed by the fear not to be misconstrued for lack of confidence in Zakhariadis' sound judgement ...⁹

According to this account, during their farewell meeting Ioannou found the courage to tell Zakhariadis that he and Ziartides were still unclear about the 'correct' strategy, as the advice given to them in Greece was diametrically opposed to that received from the CPGB (Communist Party of Great Britain), which had urged AKEL to confine its actions to legal means. Ioannou claimed that Zakhariadis then suggested that the only way of resolving the controversy was by consulting the Cominform. He recalled his relief upon hearing of the suggestion that AKEL leadership should visit Bucharest and liaise with Cominform:

To say the truth ... I breathed a sigh of relief! I was not disputing the correctness of the KKE's views, to say this would be a great exaggeration - irrespective of who was vindicated later. But from the moment we heard Zakhariadis reverse our strategy and tactics, which were so widely supported by the working masses of the Cypriot people, I felt inside me the deepest void ... the opinion of such a high level organ such as Cominform made me naturally feel relieved and convinced that we would at last establish the right way to follow in Cyprus.¹⁰

Fifis Ioannou's account of the visit to *the mountain* is in certain ways different from that related to the author by Andreas Ziartides, the other member of the AKEL delegation. In a second interview that sought to clarify what Zakhariadis had actually told the delegation, Ziartides reiterated two interconnected points, which suggest that the reader should view with caution Ioannou's account in *Apoyevmatini*. The first point on which Ziartides disagreed with Ioannou - and he insisted that he was entirely right in this regard - was that the decision to consult the Cominform along with other fraternal party leaderships was taken in Lefkosia before their departure. According to Ziartides, the visit to the Cominform in Bucharest had already been scheduled, irrespective of the views of Zakhariadis. The decision was not therefore taken after the meeting with him. In addition, Ziartides categorically asserted that they met Zakhariadis only once. Accordingly, there was no question of the latter appearing more moderate at a second meeting. Ziartides pointed out that

their meeting with Zakhariadis preceded his meeting with Harry Pollitt, General Secretary of the CPGB, in London and therefore when in Greece the AKEL delegation had not as yet received the views of the CPGB on the problem of strategy posed for AKEL after the collapse of the Consultative Assembly. Below is the dialogue between the author and Ziartides on this point:

Question: With regard to the emphasis with which Zakhariadis supported his position: Fifis Ioannou claimed that at the farewell meeting Zakhariadis appeared more moderate. When Ioannou said to him that the CPGB advised a gradual approach to *enosis*, a struggle by stages ...

Ziartides: But until that time we had not seen the CPGB.

Question: Are you saying that until that time *you were not aware of their views?*

Ziartides: Yes, all right, we were aware of them, but at that special mission we had not [yet] seen the British Communist Party. The CPGB had told us its view *before* the Consultative Assembly, but after its failure and the emergence of the problem [of what was to be done] it had not given us its view... Then in respect of what Fifis says about Zakhariadis being more moderate during our farewell, I do not remember such a thing. I am sure it was not like this because our farewell was not that ... organised. We finished the meeting, Zakhariadis stood up, we shook hands, he got into his car with his comrades and Roula Koukoulou - his wife - and departed.

Question: You did not see him again?

Ziartides: We did not see him for a second time.

Question: You saw him only once?

Ziartides: Only once!

Question: Fifis says something different.

Ziartides: Well...maybe Fifis writes in a literary fashion!

Question: He claims that you stayed for a couple of days after the meeting with Zakhariadis and that he came back to see you off the third day.

Ziartides: After the meeting we did not see Zakhariadis in front of us even for a moment. He got into the car and left!

Question: What you have just said is at variance with what Fifis had written [in *Apoyevmatim*]

Ziartides: It is up to you who to believe!¹¹

In fact the two AKEL leaders did submit a formal request for official and structured discussions between the communist parties of Greece and Cyprus. In their letter to the secretariat of the central committee of the KKE, Ioannou and Ziartides explained the purpose of their visit:

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We are here under the instructions of the Central Committee of AKEL, with three basic aims [in mind]:

1. To get a closer view of the technical difficulties that we encounter in our specific duty to reinforce the armed struggle of the Democratic people of Greece, and to exchange views on how to overcome earlier rather than later such difficulties.

2. To discuss extensively the Cypriot political situation, and also the line, the strategy and the tactics of our party in Cyprus. To examine together the general but also the internal party difficulties which we encounter and [to find] the way to overcome them.

3. To enrich our political and organisational experience ... ¹²

The two AKEL leaders attached a background historical report on the political situation and on party politics in Cyprus¹³ together with a list of 'certain special issues' on which KKE was asked to comment in detail. The historical report presented a precis of the origins and development of the leftist movement. Lastly, they submitted a document setting out the basis for discussion on the logistics of reinforcing the guerrilla war waged by the *Democratic Army* against the 'monarchofascist government' in Athens. Their request included the following:

- (i) preparatory discussion with the General Secretary of the KKE;
- (ii) official discussion at a meeting with the Polit Bureau;
- (iii) preparation of a document setting out the views discussed;
- (iv) assessment of the military and political situation in Greece;
- (v) arrangement of common meetings and press conference with the political and military leaders of the *Democratic Army*.¹⁴

The attached list of 'special issues' was extensive. The first question concerned the ideological purpose of the struggle and was highly critical. Greece was, for the most part, under Western control. In the four years following liberation from German occupation, successive post-war governments in Athens were kept in place because of British (1944-47) and subsequently American support (1947-48). That was not a happy state of affairs for AKEL. From 1946 onwards, KKE initiated a bitter civil war to overthrow the regime in Athens and to 'liberate Greece from Western imperialism.' AKEL enthusiastically supported the KKE's decision to initiate immediately an armed confrontation against the 'nationalists' in Greece. Whether the KKE could secure a victory was another question. For the time being - the end of 1948 - the right wing 'monarchofascists' were still in power in Athens and the policy of securing self-government was faltering. The Cypriot Left faced a crucial dilemma.

Should AKEL continue to campaign for *enosis* under these circumstances? What *kind* of Greece was Cyprus going to be united with? Should AKEL support union without reference to the regime in the mainland or should it connect the issue of *enosis* to the prospect of the KKE gaining power? Ioannou and Ziartides posed the question: '*enosis* with *any* Greece, irrespective of its regime, or *enosis* with a *democratic* Greece'.¹⁵

Seventeen more questions were added seeking guidance on domestic organisational structures, tactics and on the external aid which AKEL could obtain. For example, Ioannou and Ziartides asked for the systematisation of the broadcasts of 'Free Greece' radio station¹⁶ to Cyprus and of 'our direct and regular link-up'. The two AKEL leaders requested the despatch of a good and experienced KKE cadre to cater for the organisational networking and the overcoming of the party crisis. Furthermore, they asked for KKE's assessment of the international situation, in particular if there were any prospects of a new international conflict as a result of antagonisms within the capitalist world. Lastly, they raised the matter of AKEL's external relations. The crucial question was how the party could benefit both financially and politically from the ruling communist parties of Eastern Europe. They asked the KKE whether it was advisable to brief nine fraternal parties in Europe on the 'designs of the Anglo-Americans in Cyprus' and whether they could establish regular contacts with them. They appealed for university scholarships and the possibility that Eastern European countries could open consulates in Cyprus. In exchange, they offered to provide teachers for Greek children behind the iron curtain.¹⁷ These were sons and daughters of *Democratic Army* fighters, taken (voluntarily or otherwise) to the 'People's Democracies' for safety reasons i.e. fear of reprisals from the government's armed forces.

Nevertheless, the willingness and promptness which the leadership of AKEL showed in 'coming' to the aid of KKE and fighting the 'nationalists' was not reciprocated.¹⁸ The KKE paid little if any attention to the request of their Cypriot comrades for a considered opinion on the correct strategy.¹⁹ In concentrating on the civil war effort, the leadership of KKE failed to devote the time and energy required to deliberate and bring about a well-versed policy towards the Cyprus question. The autocratic and domineering character of Zakhariadis can also be cited as a contributing factor in this respect.

Cominform also offered no advice on the best strategy for AKEL. Fifi Ioannou stayed in Bucharest waiting in vain for meetings. Likewise, Moscow simply ignored the Cypriot party's request for 'guidance'. It would not be farfetched to deduce that Moscow's attitude had much to do with its acceptance that Greece (and Cyprus) were to be kept under the British sphere of influence in accordance with the infamous 'Percentages Agreement' reached between Churchill and Stalin.

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As soon as Fifi Ioannou returned to Cyprus (on 30 December 1948) he called an extraordinary meeting of the central committee and the polit bureau of AKEL in order to apprise their members of his mission. The communique that followed was rather economical with the truth. Indicatively, it made no reference at all to self-government. Neither did it mention the KKE's position on AKEL's campaign for self-rule nor the reluctance of the Cominform Secretariat in Bucharest to express an opinion. The communique merely noted Ioannou's 'satisfaction about the enlightenment' he and Ziartides had shed 'on the situation prevalent in Cyprus and separately on the immutable longing of the Cypriot people for union with mother Greece.'²⁰ In an equally misleading statement, Ioannou claimed that it was made clear to him that 'the government of Free Greece, the *Democratic Army* General Staff, the KKE, and the AKE (Greek Agrarian Party) absolutely adopt the national programme of EAM and that the Cypriot *enosist* cause has always been in the first line of their interests as it has been the cardinal and clearest national claim of Hellenism'.²¹ In this respect, the Governor in Cyprus was also misinformed, as his report to London reveals. Referring to AKEL's General Secretary he wrote:

In Belgrade he had established contact with the Markos [leftist guerrillas] Government which had given approval for the AKEL strategy of clamouring for self-government now with the hopes of Union in the future.²²

The AKEL party leadership, however, continued its consultations with regard to the party's tactics and strategy throughout the following two months. The long gestation resulted in the central committee resigning en masse after a bout of self-criticism. 'The serious mistakes in the political line and tactics of our Party weigh heavily upon the entire central committee and the party cadres' stated the *Provisional Central Leadership* in its first communique. It attributed the allegedly mistaken tactics to the fact that the majority of the members of the resigned central committee comprised of elements exhibiting petty bourgeois influences and tendencies. Such elements could not form part of the leadership.²³

As promised in the first announcement, the *Central Provisional Leadership* issued, a week later, a lengthy and detailed address to the Cypriot people in which it sought to analyse 'the objective reasons for the deviation towards self-government'. Further an attempt was made to set out the long and short-term goals of the struggle. The proclamation began with a historical review of developments since the war. It noted that AKEL believed that the sacrifice of its members in the 'great anti-fascist war' laid the moral and political foundations on which the national liberation claim could be based. For this reason, the declaration explained, AKEL could never distinguish between the 'anti-fascist struggle' and the Cypriot national cause during the war. The party expected London to reward the Cypriots by granting them the unfettered right to determine their own future.²⁴

The proclamation also outlined the adverse conditions being faced. These were, on the one hand, the unwillingness of the Cypriot Right and the Greek government to co-operate with the Left in bringing the Cyprus issue to international fora. This aversion to internationalisation stemmed from Greek foreign policy, which refused to unsettle Anglo-Greek relations. The cornerstone of this philosophy was the axiom that Greece could not survive as a western democracy without the paternal protection of the United Kingdom. Consequently, the British were not to be provoked in international fora for the sake of Cyprus. On the other hand, the deception of imperialism, as it was put, refused to honour its own declarations on the right of self-determination of peoples. The proclamation further accused 'the right wing plutocratic reaction' of being 'the prop of the loathsome Palmer regime'.²⁵ AKEL pointed out that right wing party cadres served in the Executive and the Advisory Council, in school boards and in appointed rural councils. It was in this context that AKEL found that self-government could have furnished a way out of the impasse by supplying the 'foundation for political and economic relief and the furtherance of the national liberation struggle'. In self-critical mood, however, the provisional leadership admitted that this policy was mistaken. The reappraisal concluded that it was an 'illusion' because at a time when the movement was willing to compromise on a constitution securing true self-government, the government intensified its policy of restricting political freedom, using violence against striking workers and sentencing trade union leaders for organising illegal processions and protests. Consequently, the party, having gone through all those experiences, became convinced that 'nothing can save Cyprus and its people but the immediate deliverance of the Island from the English imperialist yoke and our *enosis* with Greece.' Thus, the *Provisional Central Leadership* declared:

For our life, for our existence and the development of our land there is only one way out: to be nationally liberated and to join our fate with the fraternal Greek people.²⁶

In conclusion, there is little doubt that Zakhariadis had adopted an authoritarian manner in expressing his ideas about what AKEL should do in connection with the national struggle for self-determination. It is equally clear that this convinced the Cypriot party's leadership that it had committed a serious strategic error in negotiating constitutional reform with the British administration. Accordingly, it is fair to conclude that Zakhariadis's position was pivotal in engineering the crucial shift towards an uncompromising strategy in favour of immediate *enosis*.

Notes

1. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 10 June 1994.
2. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, 10 June 1994. Historically AKEL's requests for support of its aims and guidance on tactics from fraternal parties had met with uninterested attitudes and dismissive responses which obviously never matched the party leadership's expectations. International communist solidarity was at least indifferent. Further it may be noted that in January 1965 the Soviet Foreign Minister Andrei Gromyko spoke in favour of a federal solution of the Cyprus dispute without consulting the Cypriot communist party. (*The New York Times*, 22 January 1965) Ironically he had met Ezekias Papaioannou (General Secretary of AKEL) in Europe a few days before putting out such a statement, yet Gromyko never raised the issue with his Cypriot comrade. AKEL subsequently released a statement condemning Gromyko's declaration. Moreover in July 1974 following the Turkish invasion of Cyprus a Soviet Embassy press release in Lefkosia reported that the invading Turkish forces were allegedly 'fighting the putschists who violated constitutional order'. AKEL once more distanced itself from such a view issuing a document that condemned the Turkish invasion. This was done against the will of the Soviet Ambassador in Lefkosia. Personal Interviews with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 20 April 1994.
3. Interview with Ziartides, Lefkosia, 10 June 1994. Also Fifis Ioannou commented on Vafiadis refraining to give his opinion: 'I thought that something was going wrong in the leadership of the KKE and of the *Democratic Army* ... It was not long before what I suspected had become a certainty that Markos was pushed aside and ... Zakhariadis was in full control.'. Fifis Ioannou: *This is How the Cyprus Question Started. At the Footprints of a Decade 1940-1950.* *Apoyevmatini*, 21 August 1976.
4. For an analysis of the Zakhariadis phenomenon in connection with the Stalinisation of the world's Communist Parties see for example Haris Vlavianos: *Greece, 1941-49: From Resistance to Civil War, The Strategy of the Greek Communist Party* (Macmillan, 1992), 194-198.
5. Interview with Ziartides, 10 June 1994.
6. Ibid.
7. Fifis Ioannou op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 21 August 1976.
8. Ibid.
9. Fifis Ioannou, op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 23 August 1976.
10. Fifis Ioannou, op. cit. *Apoyevmatini*, 27 August 1976.
11. Interview with Andreas Ziartides, Lefkosia, 4 August 1995.

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12. Archives of Contemporary Social History (ACSH), Athens, K371: Φ20/21/13, Ioannou & Ziartides (on behalf of the Central Committee of AKEL) to the Secretariat of the Central Committee of the KKE, 'Free Greece', November 1948.

13. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/14. The 48 hand-written pages report traces the development of the leftist movement and its confrontation with the Right. It was a cumbersome document.

14. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

15. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

16. This is the radio station controlled by the Greek communists.

17. ACSH, K371:Φ20/21/13.

18. ACSH, K371: Φ20/21/15 (1948): V. Vassiliou, member of the Central Committee of AKEL to Partsalides, member of the Polit Bureau of KKE, n. d.:

"1. The issue of Volunteers.

We now have in Cyprus 350 volunteers for the *Democratic Army*. From those 90% are ex- servicemen, members of AKEL and single. They are absolutely ready to depart. Finance is the only obstacle existing. The party does not have the necessary funds for them to travel up to France. For each one 25 pounds is needed."

Vassiliou was already on the Greek mountains as a member of a mission of Cypriot doctors who responded to AKEL's call for volunteers to join the medical services of the *Democratic Army*.

19. On checking the minutes and the conclusions of the meetings of the KKE's Polit Bureau for the years 1948 and 1949 deposited at ACSH, no discussion could be found of AKEL's requests.

20. *Democratis*, 31 December 1948, 1.

21. *Democratis*, 31 December 1948, 1.

22. Public Record Office, London, Colonial Office (CO) 537/4041: Political Situation December 1948. Governor to Secretary of State for the Colonies.

23. *Democratis*, 9 March 1949, 1: 'On the Basis of the Party's Reform Forward for the Liberation of Our People'.

24. *Democratis*, 17 March 1949, 1: 'Declaration of the Provisional Central Leadership of AKEL: The Only Salvation Lies in the Decisive Struggle for [the Solution of] the Economic Problems and the Immediate National Restoration of the People'.

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25. The reference is to the governorship of Palmer 1933-1939 during which civil liberties were suspended *sine die*.

26. *Democratis*, 17 March 1949, 2.

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