

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION: THE CASES OF NORTHERN IRELAND AND CYPRUS

Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay

Abstract

European integration is held to be one major element in the development of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe. (Neo-)functional integration is also often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of violent conflict, including ethnic conflicts. After an analysis of the posited mechanisms between integration and peace, this assumption is first examined in the light of one particular instance of ethnic conflict, that of Northern Ireland. It is argued that the main contribution of the European integration process to the settlement efforts was to help improve interstate relations between the United Kingdom and the Republic of Ireland. In a subsequent analysis of the Cyprus case, it is concluded that the prospect of EU membership has as of yet failed to contribute positively to the settlement efforts. Finally, the implications of these findings for integration theory and ethnic conflict resolution are extrapolated.

Introduction

European integration and the emergence of European institutions in the 1950s - the European Coal and Steel Community, the European Atomic Energy Community, the European Economic Community, the (failed) European Defence Community, the Organisation for European Economic Cooperation, and the Council of Europe - is held to be one major element in the development of peace and prosperity in post-war Europe. In particular it is credited for the historic French-German reconciliation, which transformed the relationship between the former enemies into one of peaceful cooperation. Furthermore, functional integration is often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of violent conflict, including ethnic conflicts. After an analysis of the posited mechanisms between integration and peace, this assump-

tion is examined in the light of one particular instance of ethnic conflict, that of Northern Ireland. The lessons from Northern Ireland are then used to evaluate the contribution of the European integration process to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Integration Theory

The motives behind post-World War II European integration were many. Narrow national self-interests, such as the French desire to keep Germany weak and under control while rebuilding French strength, and U.S. pressure for European coordination in relation to the Marshall Plan (and, after the advent of the Cold war in 1946-47, for the rapid revival of a West German state as a bulwark and ally against the Soviet) are factors that should not be discarded. However, the founding fathers of the European institutions were also motivated by more ideational considerations. The two World Wars had shown that Europe needed more than the nation state to guarantee peace and prosperity. Moreover, these two objectives were believed to be intimately linked. The reconstruction of the European economies was seen as a major instrument for peace as it presented the European countries with a common interest that, it was assumed, would promote the development of a security community, where the use of violence would become unthinkable. Dominant theoretical perspectives on international integration, in particular functionalism (Mitrany, 1975), transactionalism (Deutsch, 1957) and neo-functionalism (Haas, 1964) provided the theoretical underpinnings.

Functionalists posited that economic cooperation between states would lead to increased interdependence and a mutual interest in political cooperation. Coordinating agencies would be established for states that possessed common functional interests. David Mitrany emphasised the necessity of a gradual 'bottom-up' approach as he believed that imposition from above (from a supranational authority or group of political elites) would spark fears of losing sovereignty and be perceived as a threat to national identity. It would therefore entrench rather than erode borders. Gradually, however, through a natural process whereby citizens came to share functions and develop a multiplicity of contacts, state boundaries would erode.

Like Mitrany, the transactionalist approach of Karl W. Deutsch emphasised the role of citizens in the pursuit of integration. What would eventually erode state boundaries was the development of mutual sympathies and trust, an ever expanding 'we feeling' as a result of integration and increasing transactions between peoples. Eventually a security community - "the attainment within a territory of a sense of community and of institutions and practices strong enough and widespread enough to ensure for a long time dependable expectations of peaceful change."

(Deutsch, 1957, p. 5) - would emerge.

Neo-functionalism, most closely associated with Ernst Haas, shared with functionalism the emphasis on economic factors in encouraging cooperation. But while Mitrany had argued that emphasising the political aspects of cooperation risked undermining cooperation by creating a 'back-lash' among national elites, and that attempts to create a unified political framework therefore would prove divisive, Haas argued that cooperation could not be achieved in the absence of an overarching supranational institution. For neo-functionalists, the ultimate goal of the integration process was the attainment of a federal union of states.

Neo-functionalism saw political and economic interest groups as the driving forces of integration and thus shifted the locus of integration from the popular level of functionalist theory to the elite level. Economic cooperation, itself perceived to be politically neutral (or 'low-level' politics) and therefore providing a non-contentious starting point of an integrative process, would eventually 'spill over' to political cooperation ('high-level' politics), which would in turn lead to the establishment of central political institutions. Once formed, these supranational institutions were to provide the underlying dynamism for the integration process. By mediating between governments, a supranational authority would be able to conclude package deals where all sides would gain.

The posited peace promoting elements of integration theory can be summarised in the following way:

- i. Integration will promote prosperity and the realisation of economic interests.
- ii. Economic cooperation will 'spill over' to the political arena and lead to political cooperation.
- iii. Integration will create habits of peaceful cooperation and provide arenas for problem solving.
- iv. Integration will lead to the development of bonds between people, shared identities, and a concern for the welfare of the other.
- v. Integration will lead to the eventual erosion of state boundaries.

When we in the post-Cold War era take stock of the European integration process it is clear that although not all of these elements can be said to be fully present - even with the establishment in 1992 of the European Union national identities and state interests remain strong in the considerations of publics and politicians alike and the erosion of state boundaries have only just begun - the integration process has nevertheless successfully bound the countries involved together in a security community. The use of violence between them has indeed become unthinkable. However, parallel to this development we have seen an increase in the

threat to security and well-being arising from conflicts within states, notably ethnic conflicts. Among the countries thus plagued by violence arising from ethnic conflicts we find, somewhat paradoxically, several of the countries who themselves are involved in the European integration project (France, the United Kingdom, Spain). In this respect, the European experience reflects a global development whereby security threats arising from international conflicts have been superseded by threats arising from intrastate conflicts (Gurr, 1994; Sollenberg, 2000).²

The success of the (neo-) functional interdependence model of European integration process in ending French-German rivalry is often held up as a model to be emulated in other situations of conflict, including ethnic conflicts. Shifting the focus from the international to the intrastate arena we may therefore ask: to what extent has the development of European integration promoted a development towards internal peace and conflict resolution *within* these countries as well? In this article, we will undertake this examination in respect to one particular conflict situation, namely that of Northern Ireland. Using the above stated propositions on the peace promoting elements of integration, the question that we will seek to answer in the following sections is the following: To what extent did the development of European integration contribute to the settlement of the ethnic conflict in Northern Ireland in 1998?

The question of the potential contribution of integration to ethnic conflict resolution is of additional interest in that arguments pertaining to the benefits of European integration in contributing to ethnic conflict resolution have also been advanced in relation to one of the candidate countries for EU membership, namely Cyprus. Using the lessons from Northern Ireland as a backdrop, we will therefore undertake an evaluation of the prospects for European integration to contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

In the remaining parts of this paper, European integration will be narrowed down to one of its institutions, the European Community (from 1992 the European Union)³ This limitation seems justified as these institutions are the outcome of the most extended and far-reaching integration processes in post-war Europe. The establishment of the European Union represents a new feature of international association in that member states ceded some of their sovereign rights to a supranational organisation and conferred on it some powers to act independently. It is also a process which involves all the main parties to the two cases of ethnic conflicts this paper is concerned with, as they either are long-standing members of the union, in the case of Northern Ireland, or aspire to become members, in the case of Cyprus.

The Contribution of European Integration to Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Northern Ireland

Northern Ireland became part of the European Community (EC) in January 1973, when the United Kingdom, together with Denmark and the Republic of Ireland, acceded to membership.⁴ Subordinate to London on matters to do with foreign affairs, the decision to apply for membership was beyond the control of the local parliament in Belfast. The majority of the Northern Irish MPs at Westminster, however, voted against the principle of entry.

Northern Ireland and the EC/EU

Northern Ireland joined the Community at a time of immense political and civil unrest. In 1968, the conflict had entered a new violent phase, a phase that with varying intensity was to last until the ceasefires in 1994. The year preceding accession, 1972, was the worst year for fatalities.⁵ Moreover, less than a week after the signing of the Accession Treaty, Ireland and the United Kingdom found themselves in a position of diplomatic confrontation, underlined by the burning of the UK embassy in Dublin.

In addition to civil unrest, Northern Ireland's entry into the EC coincided almost exactly with another major political change: the imposition of direct rule from Westminster after fifty years of semi-autonomy.⁶ EC membership, and entry into participation in a wider supranational arena, was thus paralleled by the opposite tendency of reassertion of national sovereignty. At the same time, with the simultaneous accession of the two 'motherlands,' EC membership put the two parts of Ireland in a joint framework after fifty years of separation.

From an Irish perspective, in addition to offering an opportunity to replace the country's traditional dependence on the UK European integration also raised the prospects of Irish reunification. Irish politicians of the time clearly subscribed to the rationale of functional integration and expressed hopes that common membership of the EC would bring the parts of the island closer together and promote the identification of Northern Unionists with the rest of the island. For them European integration equated Irish integration (Keatinge, 1984).

This prospect did not escape the Northern Protestants. For them, EC membership was no more than an attempt to use a European backdoor to 'settle' the Northern Ireland problem to their disadvantage. Proud to be 'more British than the British', Europe was seen as a real threat not only to cherished British values and traditions - the Monarchy, sovereignty of Parliament, Protestantism - but to the ex-

istence of Northern Ireland itself. Membership risked softening the border with the 'hostile' and 'annexationist' neighbour in the south and erode the union with Great Britain (moreover, with the latter's consent). In addition, the uncertainties generated by the introduction of direct rule and the loss of the regional parliament gave the sovereignty of the national parliament an added dimension.

Neither were the Northern Catholics initially overwhelmed by the prospect of EC membership. Republican and Nationalist forces shared a mistrust of the EC as an alien, capitalist/imperialist entity and as a threat to (Irish) sovereignty and neutrality.⁷

During the years of membership, these early positions have, however, undergone profound changes. The Anglo-Irish crisis was followed by improved relations and joint efforts in relation to the political turmoil in Northern Ireland. Fierce Protestant opposition to power-sharing within Northern Ireland as well as with the Republic (the so-called Irish dimension) undoubtedly helped put the prospect of Irish unification in perspective. The Southern Irish grew reluctant to incorporate a hostile Protestant population who in the event of Irish (re)unification would comprise twenty-five per cent of the population.

Northern Unionists have remained largely 'Euro-sceptic' but different orientations have emerged. The biggest party, the Ulster Unionist Party (UUP) has, despite its many reservations, been prepared to work constructively within European-community. This pragmatism may be explained by the fact that the UUP electorate counts many farmers enjoying the benefits of the Common Agricultural Policy (CAP) as well as business interest keen on the European market. At the same time, the UUP has been adamant to prevent a development of creeping integration with the Irish Republic, such as the establishment of joint institutions.

By contrast, the second largest Unionist party led by the Reverend Ian Paisley, the Democratic Unionist Party (DUP), has remained strongly opposed to the European integration project which they see as a Catholic-inspired creation of the European Christian Democratic parties and as a back-door meant to undermine the border with (Catholic) Ireland (Hainsworth, 1996).⁸

The strongest support for European integration has come from the (Catholic) Social Democratic and Labour Party (SDLP). Its initial scepticism was soon replaced by a pro-integration, post-nationalist agenda. SDLP, and in particular its leader (since 1979) John Hume, have consistently held forth the European experience and principles - proportional representation in voting, power-sharing and compromise - as an example for the island of Ireland (Hume, 1993).⁹ SDLP's post-nationalist vision - a supranational Europe of regions rather than states - has not, however, been

able to attract Unionist support. Unionists continue to see the SDLP's agenda as all-Ireland nationalism - albeit coveted in European integration terms.

Northern Ireland is represented in the European Parliament by three members.¹⁰ Without exception the three MEPs have come from the same parties, the UUP, the DUP, and the SDLP (with Ian Paisley each time topping the poll, far exceeding his party support). The MEPs provide a direct link between the province and the European structures. In addition, the province is represented indirectly on the Council of Ministers by the UK government's ministers, including the Secretary of State for Northern Ireland. Another contact point between the province and Brussels is the Northern Ireland European Commission Office in Belfast, which can articulate local concerns in Brussels and vice versa. However, the effectiveness of the centre has been hampered by the absence of a regional administration in Northern Ireland.¹¹

In relation to the political problems of Northern Ireland, the European institutions have been loath to take on a more active role, choosing instead to treat it as a purely domestic affair of the United Kingdom. As can be expected, this has particularly been the stance of the European Commission and the Council of Ministers, where Northern Ireland is represented by UK ministers. The European Parliament, where Northern Ireland has direct representation, has taken a slightly more active interest in the province. So for instance did the parliament in 1984 support a ban on the use of plastic bullets, used by the British security forces for 'riot control.' And on one occasion the Political Affairs Committee even took the controversial and unprecedented decision of launching an investigation into the political situation of Northern Ireland.¹² The Northern Irish MEPs have also at times used their influence in the parliament to highlight the economic problems of the province as a peripheral region of the Community.

EC/EU Contribution to Conflict Resolution in Northern Ireland: an Evaluation

In April 1998, after many failed attempts and two years of negotiations, a political settlement involving all the major parties to the conflict (including the two governments and the major political parties in Northern Ireland, with the exception of the DUP) was finally achieved.¹³ Generally called the Good Friday Agreement after the day it was signed, the agreement was subsequently ratified in two separate referenda by large majorities on both sides of the border (71 per cent in the north and 94 per cent in the south). In July a general election for a new Northern Irish assembly, based on power-sharing between the two communities, was held.

The Good Friday Agreement is comprehensive and addresses the totality of the relationships involved in the protracted conflict. Internally to Northern Ireland the agreement provides for a reintroduction of devolved government in a regional as-

sembly. It also provides for the creation of a North-South Council for cooperation between the two parts of Ireland. In addition, a (consultative) British-Irish Council (BIG) made up of members of the two governments, and devolved institutions in the United Kingdom are to be established. In addition to the settlement of the major issues, violence has decreased dramatically in the province (albeit not ceased completely) as a result of a cease fire observed, with some backlashes, by the main paramilitary (militant) organisations since 1994.¹⁴

Any attempt to evaluate the contribution of Northern Ireland's EC/EU membership to the settlement of the conflict will have to start by pointing out some obvious facts. Initially, the addition of a European dimension did not have any noticeable impact on the intensity of the conflict. The province became a member at a time when violence was at its height. Moreover, violent conflict continued to plague the province more than two decades after the accession to the EC. In fact, for the people in Northern Ireland, the continuing 'Troubles', as the conflict is euphemistically called, and the process of European integration have been two parallel experiences.

This does not preclude, however, that the experience of European integration may have had other less immediate effects. For these we return to our previous analysis of the posited links between integration and peace. On the basis of that analysis, we may ask: Has the EC/EU experience promoted prosperity and economic cooperation between the parties? If so, has cooperation in the economic field spilled over to the political arena, creating habits of peaceful cooperation and problem-solving? Has the shared experience of EC/EU membership lead to the development of bonds and mutual concern between the peoples of the British Isles (Great Britain and Ireland, north and south)? Have borders become less significant?

As one of the most peripheral and socio-economically disadvantaged regions of the community, Northern Ireland has enjoyed a special status as an Objective One region. This means that the province has enjoyed considerable financial support from the EU's structural funds. Northern Ireland farmers have also enjoyed the benefits of the CAP; in fact, support to farmers accounts for almost half of the total EC grants and subsidies in Northern Ireland (Hainsworth, 1996). Despite this economic assistance, however, analysts generally agree that community membership has not provided significant prosperity. With the exception of farming guarantees, the contribution has been marginal to the Northern Ireland economy, especially compared with the UK subvention. Nor has Northern Ireland's standing as regards EC regional disparities improved during the years of membership (Keatinge, 1984; Hainsworth, 1985; Keatinge, 1991; Hainsworth, 1996).

EC/EU membership has also failed to promote economic cooperation between

the two parts of Ireland. The Irish decision to join the European Monetary System in 1979, while the United Kingdom remained outside, can even be said to have had the opposite effect.

However, one by-product of EC/EU membership has been the increased scope for Anglo-Irish dialogue. Although the rules of the Commission prevent the discussion of foreign policy and defence policy matters arising between member states, the Irish and British heads of governments have made it a habit to hold bilateral discussions on the margins of council meetings. These meetings can be seen as precursors to the institutionalisation of Anglo-Irish contacts agreed to in the 1980s, which in turn facilitated the governments' joint peace initiative in 1993.¹⁵ Through the EC/EU, British and Irish ministers and officials have maintained regular contact on an agenda much broader than Northern Ireland and involving less antagonistic issues. It seems plausible that these contacts have led to increased familiarity and sympathy in Anglo-Irish relations. It has also helped the Irish republic overcome the asymmetry it suffers from in relation to its much bigger and more influential neighbour (who is also its former colonial ruler).

Provincial economic interests have also, albeit on rare occasions, been capable of uniting Unionists and Nationalists, often against the British government who has been criticised by both communities for failures to secure European funding and for not transferring to Northern Ireland the full value of allocated Euro-funds (Hainsworth, 1996). Divided on most issues, the three MEPs have nevertheless occasionally managed to join efforts in lobbying for European economic assistance to the province. These examples on the European arena should, however, be taken as evidence that European integration has given rise to habits of cooperation within Northern Ireland itself.

Neither is there any evidence that the experience of EC/EU membership has produced a shared 'European' or 'Northern Irish' identity capable of transcending divisive ethnic identities. After twenty-seven years of membership, the overwhelming majority of the people in Northern Ireland continue to identify themselves first and foremost as Catholic/Irish or Protestant/British, a fact that was acknowledged in the recent agreement where representation is based on communal identity. And although checkpoints have been dismantled and roads reopened, the borders between north and south still remain in the minds of people.

Although its contribution has been marginal in relation to another international actor, the US has played a far more active role, some impact of European integration on the 1998 settlement can nevertheless be seen. The Good Friday Agreement itself contains several trans- or supranational features, for example, the two confederal elements of the North-South Council and the BIC. The North-South Council

is itself structurally modelled on the EU Council of Ministers.¹⁶ There are also elements of co-sovereignty in the form of an inter-governmental conference for matters not devolved to the regional assembly.

The EU has also sought to underpin the current peace process with direct financial assistance to cross-community and cross-border initiatives. EU contributions have consisted of economic aid through the International Fund for Ireland and the establishment of the EU Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland (European Commission, 1995). These initiatives very much echo the functionalist approach to peace through economic development and cooperation.

It thus seems safe to conclude that the experience of European integration has indeed had an impact on the political situation although it is doubtful that this is due to functional integration along the lines envisioned by integration theorists.

The Contribution of European Integration to Conflict Resolution: Lessons from Cyprus

Of the four main parties to the Cyprus conflict, one is already a member of the EU, and the other three aspire to become so. Greece joined the EC in 1981. Turkey, having become an associate member of the EC, applied for full membership in 1987, entered a Customs Union with the EU in 1996 and was granted candidate status in December 1999. The Republic of Cyprus became an associate member of the EC in 1973 and signed a Customs Union agreement in 1987. In 1990, an application for membership was submitted. The application was accepted by the Commission three years later. In 1998, membership negotiations were initiated. The Republic of Cyprus hopes to become a full member at the time of the next enlargement, expected to take place 2003-2005. Asserting their own sovereignty in the north of the island, also the Turkish Cypriots have expressed an interest in joining the EU but have called for separate negotiations to be held between the EU and the two communities. In addition, the Turkish Cypriots have argued the need for a settlement to the conflict to be in place prior to EU membership.

Cyprus and the EC/EU

Early relations between the EC and the Republic of Cyprus were closely linked to Cyprus' relations with the UK. After its establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus remained heavily dependent on the British market and when the UK applied for membership, first in 1962 and then again in 1971, Cyprus followed suit.¹⁷

An Association Agreement between the EC and Cyprus was signed on 19 December 1972. During the twelve years since its establishment in 1960, the Republic of Cyprus had by then undergone some dramatic changes. After only three years, the two communities no longer agreed on the working of the constitution.¹⁸ Violent intercommunal clashes put an end to their partnership and accelerated a development towards political as well as geographical separation. While the Greek Cypriot community continued to govern on behalf of the Republic of Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots established their own administration in the enclaves to which they had been confined.¹⁹ Thus, when the approach to the EC was initiated, there already existed on the island two *de facto* separate political administrations.

Although the Turkish Cypriots had not been involved in the negotiations, representatives of the Turkish Cypriot administration expressed their support for the Association Agreement. They also, however, express some concern to the EC that the agreement would become the monopoly of the Greek Cypriot community and asked for direct communication to be established between their representatives and the EC (Tsardanidis, 1984). The request was turned down but the Turkish Cypriots received informal assurances that the Community would undertake a policy of non-discrimination regarding trade as well as financial, technical and scientific cooperation (ibid, p. 360, fn 20).²⁰ The EC also decided to accept Turkish Cypriot exports of fruits and other agricultural products as long as they had movements certificates issued by local Turkish Cypriot authorities or the local Chamber of Commerce (ibid, p. 357, fn 16).

Ever since the negotiation of the Association Agreement, EC-Cyprus negotiations have been conducted within the framework of the Republic of Cyprus with the *de facto* Greek Cypriot government as the sole interlocutor.²¹ The EC has repeatedly stressed, however, that the EC-Cyprus association must benefit both communities. In addition to this principle, the EC policy established at this time and maintained since then (at least on paper) has been to avoid involvement in the political and constitutional problems on the island and to seek to isolate the integration process from the political development in relation to the Cyprus problem.

However, EC efforts to distance itself from the political problems on the island soon proved difficult. The events of 1974, a coup against president Makarios followed by a military intervention by Turkey, left the island partitioned.²² The government of the Republic of Cyprus could no longer exercise authority over the whole island. As a result, the Commission expressed concern whether Cyprus would be in a position to assume all responsibilities which would result from a Customs Union as long as the island remained divided and whether under these conditions the principle that any advantages arising out of the Association should benefit the entire population could be fulfilled (Tsardanidis, 1984). When intercommunal talks failed to

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

bring the communities closer to each other, the EC decided not to proceed with the development of the Association Agreement into a Customs Union as planned.

The Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence and proclamation of the "Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus" ("TRNC") in 1983, mark a change in EC relations with the parties to the conflict. The EC institutions joined in the international condemnation of the proclamation and called for the establishment of a federation on the island.²³ Greece, having joined the EC in 1981, at the time held the Presidency and demanded that preferential access to Community markets for goods from the Turkish Cypriot controlled area be withdrawn; that progress towards a Customs Union with the Republic of Cyprus be accelerated, and that all contacts with the Turkish Cypriots should end. In December 1983, the Council of Ministers, decided that all Cypriot products to the EC countries must be accompanied by documents issued only by the government of the Republic of Cyprus and exported through ports in the area under Greek Cypriot control.²⁴

After the proclamation of the "TRNC", EC contacts with Turkish Cypriots became more complicated. Community representatives now had to tread a careful balance in order not to be seen as conferring legitimacy on this unrecognised state and the previous practice of non-discrimination was discontinued.²⁵

With only Turkey extending recognition to the "TRNC", the Turkish Cypriots have remained internationally ostracised and heavily dependent on Turkey. At the same time, the Greek Cypriot government's legitimacy as the representatives of the Republic of Cyprus has been strengthened. In addition, the Greek Cypriots and the EC/EU have developed close relations and mutual familiarity as a result of the integration process. The Republic participate in numerous community programmes and initiatives covering a variety of fields (among them, environment, education, research and development). In 1992, a Joint Cyprus-EU Parliamentary Committee was set up, and since 1995 regular meetings are being held at ministerial and other levels as part of the pre-accession 'structured dialogue' (Press and Information Office, 1997).

Although the EC/EU have developed close contacts with only one of the communities, the policy that the integration process 'should benefit all communities' has been maintained. Since the application for membership was submitted, the EC/EU has repeatedly 'encouraged' the Republic's government to include also Turkish Cypriots in their delegation.²⁶ The EU has also repeatedly tried to convince the Turkish Cypriots of the advantages, not the least economic, that would accrue to them as a result of membership.²⁷ Although suffering from lack of trade opportunities, international investments and access to the international financial market due to a widely observed international embargo, the lure of the economic benefits has so far

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION

been insufficient for the Turkish Cypriots to set aside their political demands. At the same time, there is no doubt that also the Turkish Cypriots are keen on joining the EU (although they have not submitted an application for membership on behalf of the "TRNC"). Several opinion polls have returned a large majority in favour of membership.²⁸

However, the Turkish Cypriots' aspiration for membership is not unconditional. A majority argue that a settlement of the conflict has to be in place before membership. There has also been some reluctance in joining the EU before Turkey, although in official proposals this position has lately been slightly modified. The August 1998 proposal for the establishment of a confederation on the island, opens up the possibility of a future confederal Cyprus joining the EU before Turkey, on condition that a 'special arrangement' provides Turkey with "the full rights and obligations of an EU member with regard to the Cyprus Confederation" (Oenktash, 1998). Thus, more than disputing the desirability of EU membership for Cyprus, the Turkish Cypriots have disputed the nature of the process whereby this goal is being realised, which they so far have not been part of. Turkish Cypriot calls for separate talks to be held between the EU and the two communities have invariably been turned down by union representatives. The union has also clearly stated that there is no question of renegotiating already closed chapters should the Turkish Cypriots at some point decide to join the accession talks.²⁹

Already inside the European structures, Greece has been an active advocate of the Republic of Cyprus' accession. At the same time Greece has been able to use its position to influence Community policy towards Turkey, another aspiring member and party to the Cyprus conflict. The bones of contention between Greece and Turkey are many but Cyprus figures prominently. Greece has threatened to block EU enlargement if its partners try to block the Republic of Cyprus' accession and initially opposed the Customs Union with Turkey.³⁰ Eventually, in what has been called 'an historical compromise', a package deal was negotiated in which the Greek government accepted the Customs Union while the EU Council of foreign ministers confirmed the Union's will to incorporate Cyprus in the next stage of its development and set a date for the initiation of accession negotiations (Brewin, 1999).

For Turkey the EU represents a challenge and at times a conflict of interest. Relations with the EU and aspiration for full membership are intimately linked to Turkey's relations (and conflicts) with Greece as well as her own interests in Cyprus and loyalty to the Turkish Cypriots. Which of these interests that figure most prominently in Turkish policy making have varied depending on priorities of the ruling government. At the time of the signing of the Customs Union agreement (1995), not opposing the initiation of membership negotiations for the Republic of Cyprus, which was the 'price' Turkey had to pay for Greece to drop its veto, caused a strain in her

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

relations with the Turkish Cypriots.³¹ Subsequent disillusionment and frustration after the European Council meeting in Luxembourg in December 1997, when Turkey's accession status was put on hold while the Republic of Cyprus was recognised as a candidate country, resulted in a crisis in EU-Turkey relations and a strengthening of Turkey's relations with the Turkish Cypriots. Ankara (and the Turkish Cypriots) suspended all political dialogue with Brussels and introduced several measures to formalise their relationship, among them, the establishment of an Association Council mirroring that between the EU and the Republic of Cyprus.³² EU-Turkish relations remained at a low until the Helsinki meeting of the European Council in December 1999, when candidate status was finally granted.

EC/EU Contribution to Conflict Resolution in Cyprus: an Evaluation

An evaluation of the EC/EU contribution to conflict resolution in Cyprus has to start from a different point of departure than a similar evaluation in the case of Northern Ireland. While all the parties to the conflict Northern Ireland are long standing members of the EC/EU, in the case of Cyprus only Greece has a history of such close association. Therefore what is being evaluated in the case of Cyprus is rather an ongoing process that has membership as its goal rather than the actual impact of membership.

Although the issue of membership and a settlement to the Cyprus conflict are intimately linked as far as the parties to the conflict are concerned, the approach of the EC/EU has been to seek to distance itself from the settlement efforts, leaving those to be conducted under the aegis of the UN. In the period leading up to the Republic of Cyprus' application for membership (1990), this approach presented few problems. However, once the application was submitted, the EC/EU arrived at a situation when certain decisions needed to be made.

The first of these decisions was whether or not to accept the application submitted by a *de facto* Greek Cypriot government on behalf of the whole island. Predictably, the legitimacy of the application had been challenged by the Turkish Cypriots on the grounds that they do not recognise the *de facto* Greek Cypriot government as a legitimate representative of the Republic of Cyprus nor as a legitimate representative of their community.³³

The Commission in its Opinion of June 1993, although acknowledging that the application had been challenged "by the *de facto* authorities of the northern part of the island" did not, however, express any reservations on the legitimacy of the application. It was confirmed that the Community considered Cyprus eligible for membership. The Commission did, however, express some reservations as to the initiation of the accession process, which, it stated, would start "as soon as the prospect

of a settlement is surer" (Commission of the European Communities, 1993).

As UN efforts failed to bring the prospect of settlement any closer, while pressure (not the least from Greece) to proceed with the accession of Cyprus continued, the EU was faced with the decision whether to proceed with the accession also in the absence of progress. In a series of steps, the issue of accession of the Republic of Cyprus subsequently came to be severed from the requirements of progress towards a settlement.

The turning point came at the June 1994 European Council meeting in Corfu where the Council announced that the next phase of enlargement of the union would involve 'Cyprus' and Malta.³⁴ This was the first time the need for a settlement and accession was explicitly de-linked. The conclusions contained no references to the need for a settlement before accession (European Council, 1994).

Another step in this direction was taken at the Council's Cannes meeting of June 1995 when the Republic of Cyprus was given a date for the initiation of accession negotiations.³⁵ Accession negotiations were to start six months after the conclusion of the forthcoming (1996) Intergovernmental Conference.

In the summer of 1997 UN sponsored peace talks stalled on the issue of the EU when it became clear that the Commission's programme on policy reforms to adapt the union to enlargement (Agenda 2000) recommended the initiation of accession negotiations with Cyprus even in the absence of progress.³⁶ The situation was further compounded by the Greek Cypriot refusal to discuss issues related to EU during the UN talks with references to these being strictly 'governmental' (Pillai, 1999). The Turkish Cypriots responded by withdrawing from the talks, demanding that the "TRNC" be recognised and that accession talks with the Republic of Cyprus be suspended.³⁷

The December 1997 Luxemburg Council meeting, at which a date was set for accession negotiations to begin with Cyprus while Turkey was denied its sought after candidate status, further aggravated the political situation. Turkey and the Turkish Cypriots ended most of their formal as well as informal contacts with the EU and, as noted above, 'in response' to the integration between the Republic of Cyprus and the EU took several steps towards formalising economic integration between Turkey and the "TRNC".

The Helsinki summit of December 1999, confirmed the EU policy of de-linking membership and the requirements for a settlement. The conclusions stopped short, however, of declaring that the union was willing to accept a divided Cyprus as a member. The Council stated that "a political settlement will facilitate the accession

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

of Cyprus to the European Union. *If no settlement has been reached by the completion of accession negotiations, the Council's decision on accession will be made without the above being a precondition.* In this the Council will take account of all the relevant factors" (European Council, 1999, italics added).

While the Republic of Cyprus has been making rapid progress in the accession negotiations, settlement efforts have remained at a standstill. Several rounds of proximity talks during 2000 failed to restart negotiations. The date for the 'final decision', that is, whether or not to accept a divided Cyprus as a member in the event of the parties failing to reach an agreement for reunification, thus draws closer.

Notwithstanding EU attempts at de-linking the issues of membership and settlement efforts, once the application for membership was accepted a dynamic was set in motion that inevitably was to impact on the settlement efforts. Moreover, the application for membership was a deliberate attempt by one of the parties to involve the EC/EU more actively in the settlement efforts. The Republic of Cyprus' application for full membership of the EC in 1990 came at a time of great disillusionment with the lack of result in the UN sponsored intercommunal talks. The Greek Cypriots had come to the conclusion that the key to a settlement lay in Ankara³⁸ and believed that 'Europeanisation' offered an arena on which pressure could be brought to bear on Turkey, and thereby indirectly on the Turkish Cypriots, to "proceed towards a negotiated settlement" (Press and Information Office, 1997, p. 7).

It was also inevitable that the nature of the integration process in itself would upset the balance in the union's relations with the parties. While the UN negotiations are conducted with both parties as equal representatives of the respective communities, that is, neither is seen as a government representative, the EU is a union of states and needs a government counterpart. The union concludes deals in negotiation with governments, and makes decisions in the expectation that they will be implemented by governments. With recognition extended only to the de facto Greek Cypriot government on the island, the UN principle of equality cannot be upheld in EU-Cyprus relations. In relation with the EU, while both communities in Cyprus claim to represent sovereign states only one enjoys the status of international recognition and therefore the status as interlocutor in EU-Cyprus relations. This asymmetry is accentuated by the fact that one of the 'motherlands' remains outside the European institutions while the other has been able to influence EC/EU policy from inside. This situation has prevented an even handed approach to the parties to the Cyprus conflict.

In contrast, in the case of Northern Ireland, with neither of the two communities claiming statehood and the joint accession of the two 'motherlands', the EC/EU approach has been characterised by equidistance in relation to the parties. While both

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION

governments have had direct links with the European institutions, the two communities in Northern Ireland have been equally disadvantaged.

An additional complicating factor in the Cyprus case is that EU membership is not equally compatible with the aspirations of the parties as regards a future settlement. For the Greek Cypriots the priorities are the withdrawal of Turkish troops from the island, the re-institution of island wide freedom of movement and settlement as well as a return of property currently inaccessible in the northern part of the island. These goals are in line with the union's *acquis communautaire*. Moreover, as the presence of the Turkish troops in the north of the island could be projected as an illegal occupation of part of the territory of a member state by a non-member state, EU membership for the Republic of Cyprus would undoubtedly bring additional pressure on Turkey to reconsider her Cyprus policy.³⁹

At the same time, meeting the Turkish Cypriot aspirations would rather require that exceptions be negotiated to the full implementation of the *acquis communautaire*.⁴⁰ Their priorities are the continuation of Turkish security guarantees; the achievement of political equality (currently stated as demands for recognition of the "TRNC"); continued self-determination in part of the island; and for freedom of settlement and the right to property to be implemented only gradually and in a way that does not upset the demographic balance.⁴¹

Finally, despite its professed non-involvement in the settlement efforts, the European institutions nevertheless regularly express their support for a particular solution to Cyprus and by producing their own recurrent 'evaluations' of the political situation and the settlement efforts.⁴² As has been the case in Northern Ireland, these initiatives have generally emanated from the European Parliament who has initiated several reports, on the basis of which resolutions are adopted.⁴³

Taken together, these elements have prevented the EU from developing equidistant relationships with the parties to the conflict, thus undermining the ability of the EU to act as a third party, and have severely impeded the ability of the European integration process to contribute constructively to a settlement to the Cyprus conflict. Rather than acting as a 'catalyst' for a settlement as was initially hoped, the prospect of EU membership has therefore rather introduced another bone of contention in an already polarised environment.

Conclusions

We started this paper with some posited links between integration and peace, derived from integration theory. Time has come to summarise our findings on the prospects of integration to contribute to peace in situations of ethnic conflicts.

The two cases of ethnic conflict examined here suggest that ethnic conflicts may not be as susceptible to the mechanisms of functional integration as posited by integration theory. Rather both the case of Northern Ireland and that of Cyprus lend support to arguments that ethnic conflicts are rather resistant to economic incentives for conflict resolution.

The Northern Irish case also suggests that political cooperation need not be the result of economic cooperation as integration theory holds. Depending on the outcome of recent political initiatives it may indeed suggest the reversed relationship of political cooperation leading to, rather than resulting from, economic cooperation.

Both cases examined here point to the conclusion that in a polarised context political arguments may actually stem economic cooperation in the bud: when seen through the prism of ethnic and national antagonisms the concept of 'low-level' politics loses its meaning and the onset of an integration process is prevented.

As was the case in Northern Ireland, the absence of a political settlement stands in the way of any process of integration also in the case of Cyprus. Trade relations between the two parts of the island are virtually non-existent. The on-set of an economic integrative process is precluded by mutual non-recognition and the use of economic means in the conflict. Until the parties arrive at a political agreement of some sorts, economic cooperation between them therefore seems unlikely. There are at present no sign that either of the parties would be prepared to compromise on political positions for any economic gains that EU membership may entail.

Thus, the two cases analysed here suggest that for integration to promote peace in ethnic conflicts it may be necessary for economic cooperation to be *preceded* by an agreement on the arena of 'high-level' politics, that is, the posited links between economic and political cooperation may have to be reversed.

Finally, it was noted in the Northern Irish case that the European integration process had provided the two 'motherlands' with an arena for discussion and developing habits of peaceful cooperation and problem-solving thus indirectly contributing to settlement efforts. However, in the Cyprus case, due to the prevalence of asymmetric relations between the parties and the union, the integration process has not been able to do for the development and improvement of Greek-Turkish relations what it did for Anglo-Irish relations. The decision during the December 1999 Helsinki summit to accept Turkey as a candidate country *may* change this situation but the necessity of a long-term perspective on Turkey's accession prevents any certainty on the matter. The prospects for European integration to contribute to a settlement of the Cyprus conflict under conditions of symmetry thus remain to be evaluated.

Notes

1. The cursory review of integration theory presented here is not intended as a full scholarly treatment of the subject. For treatments of different theoretical approaches to international cooperation, refer to (Groom et al., 1990) and (Hix, 1994). For an influential critique of integration theory see (de Vries, 1990).

2. Monitoring armed conflicts in the post-1989 period, the States in Armed Conflict data project at Uppsala University, Sweden, found that of 110 armed conflicts in the 1989–1999 decade only seven were conflicts between states, the remainder being conflicts within states (but involving a government). An armed conflict is defined as a contested incompatibility which concerns government and/or territory where the use of armed force between two parties, of which at least one is the government of a state, results in at least 25 battle-related deaths. For operationalisation of the separate elements, refer to (Sollenberg, 2000).

3. The European Union (EU) was established in 1992 as a result of the Treaty on European Union (also known as the Maastricht Treaty). The treaty was signed on 7 February 1992 and went into effect on 1 November 1993. Together with European Coal and Steel Community and the European Atomic Energy Community (Euroatom), the European (Economic) Community, was renamed the European Communities, constituting the first so-called pillar of the union (the other two pillars being common foreign and security policy and justice and home affairs).

4. Previous attempts by the UK to join the EC had been vetoed by de Gaulle on the grounds that 'the UK was not ready for membership of Europe'. Accession was made possible with de Gaulle's political exit (Hainsworth, 1985).

5. As far as we have been able to ascertain, there were no objections raised from the Community to membership on the basis of the unresolved conflict even though it involved a border dispute between two prospective members. There is no mentioning of the conflict either in the Commission's Opinion of 19 January, 1972, or in the Council of the European Communities' decision concerning the accession of 22 January, (Office for Official Publications of the European Communities, 1987). The UK was, however, granted one concession with respect to Northern Ireland – unrelated to the conflict – namely a five-year derogation from the EC legislation requiring freedom of movement of labour for EC citizens (Moxon-Browne, 1992).

6. The Westminster Parliament only reserved control over areas such as defence, foreign policy, and monetary policy. The parliament was dominated by the Protestant majority through the Unionist Party, and became discredited by accusation of widespread discrimination against the Catholic minority.

7. In Northern Irish parlance 'Republican' refers to more militant Irish Nationalists, some of whom have resorted to violent means in the national struggle, whereas 'Nationalist' refers to Irish nationalists who reject violence and advocate the use of constitutional means. Both groups are overwhelmingly Catholic, pro-Irish unity and left-leaning. Republicans tend to be

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

socialists while Nationalists have become associated with social democracy. A similar distinction can be made between militant 'Loyalists' and constitutional 'Unionists'. Both groups are overwhelmingly pro-British, Protestant and conservative, with the exception of some small working class Loyalist parties who are leftists.

8. In one (in)famous incident in October 1988, Paisley was even thrown out of the European Parliament in Strasbourg after having shouted "anti-Christ" after a speech by the visiting Pope John Paul II.

9. During negotiations in 1992, the party even tabled a proposal that the EC, should appoint one member of a proposed six member Executive Commission for Northern Ireland, with two others being appointed by Dublin and London, this as a reflection of 'key external relationships' (Arthur, 1993).

10. With three seats Northern Ireland is over-represented in relation to its population and other regions of the UK. The third seat was given for political reasons, in order to ensure representation of the Catholic minority.

11. The return of devolved government is bound to lead to an 'upgrading' of the Northern Irish presence in Brussels as the centre will then, like other similar offices, represent a regional administration.

12. N.J. Haagerup, *Report drawn up on behalf of the Political Affairs Committee on the Situation in Northern Ireland*, Euro. Parl. Working Documents, 1984, Doc.1-1526/83.

13. For accounts of the peace process, see (Mallie et al., 1996; Mitchell, 1999; Cox et al., 2000; Hennessey, 2000). For an analysis of the agreement, refer to (Doyle, 1998) and (O'Leary, 1999).

14. The IRA resumed the military campaign in February 1996 but declared a second ceasefire in July 1997. In Northern Ireland, close links exist between the major paramilitary organisations (illegal militant groups) and legal political parties, the latter of which participated in the negotiations having secured a democratic mandate in specially held elections.

15. In 1981 the governments set up the Anglo-Irish Intergovernmental Council to facilitate regular meetings between civil servants and ministers. In 1985 the Anglo-Irish Agreement established an Intergovernmental Conference with a permanent Anglo-Irish secretariat outside Belfast. The Agreement gave the Irish Republic a consultative role in relation to Northern Ireland (Morrow, 1996)

16. The council will meet in sectoral format under the leadership of ministers from the devolved assembly in Northern Ireland and the Irish government according to the topics under discussion.

17. Following the UK's first bid for membership, Cyprus had requested association to the EEC already in 1962. However, when the UK's application was turned down, Cyprus' appli-

cation remained dormant until 1969 (Gaudissart, 1996).

18. The constitution was based on power-sharing and political equality between the two communities. It provided for a Greek Cypriot president and a Turkish Cypriot vice-president elected separately by the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot community respectively. In the main executive organ, the Council of Ministers, there were to be seven Greek Cypriot Ministers and three Turkish Cypriots. The legislative organ, the House of Representatives, consisted of 50 representatives, 35 elected by Greek Cypriots and 15 by Turkish Cypriots. For each community, a communal chamber was established exercising legislative and administrative power on subjects relating to i.a., religious matters, educational and cultural matters and civil status. A Greek Cypriot perspective on the 1960 constitution is given by Criton G. Tornaritis, former attorney general of the Republic of Cyprus (Tornaritis, 1980). For a Turkish Cypriot perspective, refer to Zaim M. Nedjatigil, former attorney general of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (Nedjatigil, 1977).

19. The Turkish Cypriots living in these areas were at first governed by a central organisation known as the General Committee. In addition, the Turkish Communal Chamber continued to function and the Turkish Cypriot members of the House of Representatives continued to meet. The Committee was replaced in 1967 by the Provisional Cyprus Turkish Administration, followed in 1971 by the Cyprus Turkish Administration, and in 1975 by the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus (Nedjatigil, 1977). See also <http://www.com.gov.nc.tr/cm/yonet.htm> (accessed 16 October 2000).

20. Under the first financial protocol under the Association Agreement (1979-1983) the Turkish Cypriots received twenty per cent of the EC aid; under the second protocol (1984-1988) their share was only 4.5 per cent (Alemdar, 1993). It is hardly coincidental that the reduction coincides with the Turkish Cypriot declaration of independence (1983).

21. The Turkish Cypriots' position thus resembles that of Northern Ireland. As a province of an applicant state, Northern Ireland was not directly represented on the main negotiating teams. However, the British government held frequent discussions with local ministers on issues of particular concern to Northern Ireland, and Northern Irish officials were appointed as advisers to the negotiating team (Hainsworth, 1985).

22. On 15 July 1974, Greek Cypriot supporters of *enosis* (union with Greece) under the leadership of Greek officers overthrew Makarios and installed in his place Nicos Sampson, a leader of the militant 1950s and 1960s EOKA movement. Acting on the legal basis of the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee, under which Turkey together with Greece and the UK were accorded the role of guarantors of the independence, territorial integrity and security of the Republic of Cyprus, Turkey launched a military intervention five days later. In a subsequent advance, 37 per cent of the territory was occupied. Turkey still maintains a large contingent of troops (est. 30 000) in the northern part of the island.

23. In two so-called high level agreements (in 1977 and 1979) the parties agreed on guidelines for the establishment of a bi-communal federation with territories administered separately by the two communities. Although, until the Turkish Cypriot August 1998 proposal for

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

a confederation rather than a federation, both parties continued to subscribe to the federation formula no progress had been made to this end.

24. Some member states (the UK, Belgium, Germany and the Netherlands) objected to the decision (Tsardanidis, 1984, p. 370, footnote 39). However, as late as 1992 three-quarters of all Turkish- Cypriot export went to EU countries (Axt, 1999). This situation was to prevail until 1994 when a Court of Justice ruling of 5 July 1994 (following a dispute between the British ministry of agriculture and Greek Cypriot exporters), called on member states not to recognise other certificates of origin and plant health than those issued by the Republic of Cyprus (Emiliou, 1995).

25. The EC/EU policy has been to conduct these contacts in consultation with the government of the Republic of Cyprus.

26. As a result of such encouragement, on 12 March 1998 President Clerides in a letter extended an invitation to the Turkish Cypriots to join the delegation. As acceptance was seen as amounting to recognition of the validity of the Republic's application on behalf of the whole island, and thus the legitimacy of the Republic's claim to represent both communities, the invitation was (predictably) turned down (Dodd, 1999).

27. The Conclusion of the EU Council of Ministers of 6 March 1990, reconsidering the Republic of Cyprus' application for membership for example, stated that "Cyprus's accession to the EU should bring increased security and prosperity to both communities on the island. In particular it should allow the North to catch up economically and should improve the outlook for growth and employment, particularly for the Turkish-Cypriot community. The Council considers that this community must perceive the advantages of EU accession more clearly and its concern at the prospect must be allayed."

28. According to an opinion poll published in the Turkish Cypriot daily *Ktbns* on 8 September 2000, 94 per cent of the Turkish Cypriots want to join the EU. 72.7 per cent support membership *after* a settlement to the conflict, 30 per cent on condition that also Turkey is admitted while 21.3 per cent are willing to join the EU also in the absence of these conditions.

29. As of March 2001, 17 of the total 31 chapters have been closed. According to chief negotiator George Vassiliou, Cyprus hopes to close four to six more by the end of June (and the Swedish presidency) (*Cyprus Weekly, March 23-29, 2001*). It should be noted, however, that the Commission reserves the right with all candidate states to return to chapters before final admission.

30. Turkey in her turn has threatened a similar course of action regarding the expansion of NATO should the Republic of Cyprus be admitted while Turkey herself is prevented from developing closer ties with the union.

31. Of course as a non-member Turkey finds herself at a severe disadvantage vis-a-vis Greece when it comes to her ability to influence EU decisions.

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION

32. To respond to each step towards integration between the Republic of Cyprus and the EC/EU with corresponding steps towards integration between the "TRNC" and Turkey is a pattern that has been followed since the Republic's application for membership was submitted. A few months later, passport control's between the "TRNC" and Turkey was abolished and a Customs Union was established.

33. The Turkish Cypriots consider the Republic of Cyprus defunct as it is not governed according to the partnership arrangement agreed as part of the 1959 Zurich Agreements, establishing the Republic of Cyprus. In addition, the 1960 constitution accorded the Turkish Cypriots a veto right in relation to foreign policy issues "except the participation of the Republic of Cyprus in international organisations and pacts of alliance in which Greece and Turkey both participate" (Basic structure of the Republic of Cyprus, Article VIII). They also prohibited the Republic of Cyprus from joining any political or economic union with any other state (Treaty of Guarantee, Article I) or engage in any activity aimed at promoting either union with any other state or partition of the island (Treaty of Guarantee Article II). The Turkish Cypriots interpret these articles as also preventing membership of the EU, which, they argue, would indirectly mean union with fellow-member Greece. International lawyers remain divided on the issue, see (Axt, 1999). For the Turkish Cypriot arguments, see (Denktash, 1990).

34. EU documents tend to refer to the Republic of Cyprus as 'Cyprus', giving rise to speculations on whether the union deliberately refrains from pronouncing an opinion on the relation between today's Republic of Cyprus and a future unified Cypriot state, itself a matter of dispute. The Greek Cypriots hold that a future Cypriot state should be seen as a successor to the Republic of Cyprus while the Turkish Cypriots hold that the Republic of Cyprus as established in 1960 has ceased to exist and a future state would therefore mean the establishment of a completely new partnership.

35. As noted earlier, the Council decision was the outcome of a 'compromise' in which Greece lifted its ban against the signing of a Customs Union agreement with Turkey.

36. Accession negotiations were subsequently launched on 30 March 1998.

37. After the December 1999 Helsinki summit meeting the contacts were resumed (without the fulfillment of the Turkish Cypriot demands). The contacts continued in the form of proximity talks during 2000.

38. The then President of the Republic, George Vassiliou, presently chief negotiator with EU, pursued a policy of further internationalisation of the Cyprus problem. He initially refused to meet with the Turkish Cypriot leader, instead demanding a meeting with the then Turkish prime minister Ozal. The request was turned down (Bolukbasi, 1995; Richmond, 1998).

39. For a Greek-Cypriot perspective on the EU, see (Joseph, 1997, esp. Chapter 7). For Greek Cypriot perceptions in relation to the Cyprus conflict, refer to (Stavrinides, 1999).

40. Negotiating exceptions, at least for a transition period, would not be incompatible with

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

current EU practice. Denmark, for example, was permitted to refuse Germans permission to buy second homes in Denmark and Finland negotiated exceptions regarding *inter alia* freedom of movement in relation to the autonomous Aland islands. However, given that the Turkish Cypriots are not involved in the negotiations they are in no position to raise such demands.

41. Unlike the Greek Cypriots the Turkish Cypriots have no desire to resettle in the areas they previously inhabited. For Turkish Cypriot preferences see e.g., (Denktash, 1996/97) and (Ertek0n, 1999).

42. For example, at the June 1994 Corfu European Council meeting where the Council stated "any solution to the Cyprus problem must respect the sovereignty, independence, territorial integrity and unity of the country" (European Council, 1994).

43. See e.g., (Poos, 2000). Due to their non-participation in the process, the Turkish Cypriot authorities have refused to cooperate with the EU institutions in the accession procedures. EU officials therefore mostly rely on contacts with and information from representatives of the Republic of Cyprus also concerning the northern part of the island. As a result, their reports cannot be said to be based on a balanced understanding of the situation.

Bibliography

Alemdar, Sakir (1993) 'International Aspects of the Cyprus Problem' in Dodd, C.H. (ed.) *The Political, Social and Economic Development of Northern Cyprus*, pp. 75-101. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

Arthur, Paul (1993) 'The Mayhew Talks 1992', *Irish Political Studies*, Vol. 8, pp. 138-143.

Axt, Heniz-Jürgen (1999) 'The Island of Cyprus and the European Union' in Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 174-194. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

Bölükbaşı, Suha (1995) 'Boutros-Ghali's Cyprus Initiative in 1992: Why Did it Fail?', *Middle Eastern Studies*, Vol. 31, No. 3, pp. 460-482.

Brewin, Christopher (1999) 'Turkey, Greece and the European Union', in Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 148-173. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

Commission of the European Communities (1993) *Commission Opinion on the Application by the Republic of Cyprus for Membership, 30 June, (COM(93) 313 fin.)*.

Cox, Michael; Guelke, Adrian & Stephen, Fiona (ed.) (2000) *A Farewell to Arms? From 'Long War' to Long Peace in Northern Ireland*. Manchester, Manchester University Press.

de Vries, Michael S. (1990) 'Interdependence, Cooperation and Conflict: An Empirical Analy-

sis', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 27, No. 4, pp. 429-444.

Denktash, Rauf Raif (1990) "Turkish Cypriot Memorandum Addressed to the Council of Ministers of the European Communities in Respect of an 'Application' for Membership by 'the Republic of Cyprus' (12 July 1990)", *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, Vol. 16/17, pp. 165-174.

Denktash, Rauf R. (1996/97) 'Urgent Need to Rethink Cyprus', *Perceptions*, Vol. 1, No. 4, pp. 5-16.

Denktash, Rauf R. (1998) 'Proposal for Confederation made by Rauf R. Denktash, the President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus, 31 August 1998', *Journal of Cypriot Studies*, Vol. 16/17, pp. 223.

Deutsch, Karl W. (1957) *Political Community in the North Atlantic Area*. New York, Greenwood.

Dodd, Clement H. (1999) 'Postscript. Recent Developments' in Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 313-323. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

Doyle, John (1998) "'Towards a Lasting Peace?' The Northern Ireland Multi-Party Agreement, Referendum and Assembly Elections of 1998", *Scottish Affairs*, No. 25, pp. 1-38.

Emiliou, N. (1995) 'Cypriot Import Certificates: Some Hot Potatoes. Annotation of ECJ Judgment of 5 July 1994, Case C-432/92', *European Law Review*, Vol. 20, No. 2, pp. 202-210.

Ertekun, Necati Munir (1999) 'The Turkish Cypriot Outlook' in Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 97-113. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

European Commission (1995) *Peace. Fact Sheet. The Special Support Programme for Peace and Reconciliation in Northern Ireland and the Border Counties of Ireland*. Brussels, European Commission. Directorate-General for Regional Policy and Cohesion.

European Council (1994) *Presidency Conclusions, Corfu 24-25 June*. Brussels, General Secretariat of the Council.

European Council (1999) *Presidency Conclusions, Helsinki 10-11 December*. Brussels, General Secretariat of the Council.

Gaudissart, Marc-Andre (1996) 'Cyprus and the European Union. The Long Road to Accession', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 8, No. 1, pp. 7-38.

Groom, A.J.R. & Taylor, Paul (ed.) (1990) *Frameworks for International Co-operation*. London, Pinter Publishers.

Gurr, Ted Robert (1994) 'People Against States: Ethnopolitical Conflict and the Changing World System', *International Studies Quarterly*, Vol. 38, No. 3, pp. 347-377.

THE CYPRUS REVIEW

Haas, Ernst (1964) *Beyond the Nation-State. Functionalism and International Organization*. Stanford, Stanford University Press.

Hainsworth, Paul (1985) 'Northern Ireland in the European Community' in Keating, Michael & Jones, Barry (ed.) *Regions in the European Community*, pp.109-132. Oxford, Clarendon Press.

Hainsworth, Paul (1996) 'Northern Ireland and the European Union' in Aughey, Arthur & Morrow, Duncan (ed.) *Northern Ireland Politics*, pp.129-138 London, Longman.

Hennessey, Thomas (2000) *The Northern Ireland Peace Process. Ending the Troubles*. Dublin, Gill and Macmillan.

Hix, Simon (1994) 'The Study of the European Community: The Challenge to Comparative Politics', *West European Politics*, Vol. 17, No. 1, pp. 1-30.

Hume, John (1993) 'A New Ireland in a New Europe' in Keogh, Dermot & Haltzel, Michael H. (ed.) *Northern Ireland and the Politics of Reconciliation*, pp. 226-233. Washington/Cambridge, Woodrow Wilson Centre Press/Cambridge University Press.

Joseph, Joseph S. (1997) *Cyprus. Ethnic Conflict and International Politics. From Independence to the Threshold of the European Union*. London, Macmillan Press Ltd.

Keatinge, Patrick (1984) 'The Europeanisation of Irish Foreign Policy' in Drudy, P. J. & McAleese, Dermot (ed.) *Ireland and the European Community*, pp. 33-56. Cambridge, Cambridge University Press.

Keatinge, Patrick (1991) 'Foreign Policy' in Keatinge, Patrick (ed.) *Ireland and EC Membership Evaluated*, pp. 149-159. London, Pinter Publishers.

Mallie, Eamonn & McKittrick, David (1996) *The Fight for Peace. The Secret Story Behind the Irish Peace Process*. London, Heinemann.

Mitchell, George J. (1999) *Making Peace*. New York, Alfred A. Knopf.

Mitrany, David (1975) *The Functional Theory of Politics*. London, Martin Robertson.

Morrow, Duncan (1996) 'Northern Ireland 1972-95' in Arthur, Aughey & Morrow, Duncan (ed.) *Northern Ireland Politics*, pp. 20-28 London, Longman.

Maxon-Browne, Edward (1992) 'The Impact of the European Community' in Hadfield, Brigid (ed.) *Northern Ireland: Politics and the Constitution*, pp. 47-59. Buckingham, Open University Press.

Nedjatigil, Zaim M. (1977) *Cyprus. Constitutional Proposals and Developments*. Nicosia,

THE CONTRIBUTION OF EUROPEAN INTEGRATION TO ETHNIC CONFLICT RESOLUTION

Public Information Office, Turkish Federated State of Cyprus.

O'Leary, Brendan (1999) 'The 1998 British-Irish Agreement: Power-Sharing Plus', *Scottish Affairs*, No. 26, pp. 14-35.

Office for Official Publications of the European Communities (1987) *Documents Concerning the Accessions to the European Communities of the Kingdom of Denmark, Ireland and the United Kingdom of Great Britain and Northern Ireland, the Hellenic Republic, the Kingdom of Spain and the Portuguese Republic*. Luxembourg.

Pillai, Johann (1999) 'A Conversation with Mr. Rauf Raif Denktash, President of the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus', *Journal of Cyprus Studies*, No. 14/15, pp. 7-48.

Poos, Jacques F. (2000) *Report on Cyprus's Application for Membership of the European Union and the State of the Negotiations AS-0249/2000, 19 September 2000*. European Parliament, Committee on Foreign Affairs, Human Rights, Common Security and Defence Policy.

Press and Information Office (1997) *Cyprus: The Way to Full EU Membership. Fourth Edition*. Nicosia, Press and Information Office, Republic of Cyprus.

Richmond, Oliver P. (1998) *Mediating in Cyprus. The Cypriot Communities and the United Nations*. London, Frank Cass.

Sollenberg, Margareta (ed.) (2000) *States in Armed Conflict 1999*. Uppsala, Department of Peace and Conflict Research, Uppsala University.

Stavrinides, Zenon (1999) 'Greek Cypriot Perceptions' in Dodd, Clement H. (ed.) *Cyprus. The Need for New Perspectives*, pp. 54-96. Huntingdon, Eothen Press.

Tornaritis, Criton G. (1980) *Cyprus and Its Constitutional and Other Legal Problems. Second Edition*. Nicosia, not stated.

Tsardanidis, Charalambos (1984) 'The EC-Cyprus Association Agreement: Ten Years of a Troubled Relationship, 1973-1983', *Journal of Common Market Studies*, Vol. 22, No. 4, pp. 351-376.