

# POLICY IMPLICATIONS OF THE EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY SITUATION

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## Abstract

*We contend that the end of the Cold War has led to a fragmented world with the demise of the old bi-polar order of the US and USSR. We suggest the world system is more unstable with the absolute power of the US declining even though we live in a "Unipolar world in transition." We posit a set of concentric "levels": a world level, a regional level impinging upon the Eastern Mediterranean, and a "local" level which "vibrates" to the tones from the world and regional levels.*

*We suggest resolution of the problems between Greece and Turkey requires a "Big Package" detente comparable to that developed in the 1930s by Venize/os and Ataturk.*

*We review the mistakes of the state and sub-state actors in the Eastern Med. We argue that the US has learned from its earlier mistakes and that under both Clinton and Bush administrations, bipartisan US policy has been to support the UN's proposed "bizonal-bicommunal" [biz-bic] federation for Cyprus.*

*Lastly we ask what will happen to the Eastern Med when the Republic of Cyprus is admitted as a sovereign state to the European Union. We look at three scenarios Ankara may select - Status Quo, Annexation, or EU Fulfilment - and analyse each in terms of its effect on the Eastern Med.*

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## The Way Things Were:

"In the end, Americans will always do the right thing after exhausting all other alternatives."

- Winston Churchill<sup>1</sup>

"... we Turks have always consistently moved towards the West... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative."<sup>2</sup>

- Kemal Ataturk

'There is a tendency among Greeks to analyse Greek-American relations (Or

international politics in general) in a sentimental fashion . Terms such as 'we have been betrayed by our friends' or 'we have been sold out' have been employed frequently by political elites as well as by the Greek media. But international politics despite protestations to the contrary, is not being played in a field of law and morality but in an arena of shrewdness and power. Therefore, the policies of the United States toward Greece should be prudently understood in an analytical, detached, and generalised setting. They have been in short, the type of relations which are typical between superpower and their strategically located and relatively dependent allies or satellites. Consequently, the analyst who wishes to shed more light onto the nexus of Greek-American relations, should first explore and describe America's aggregate position in world affairs. Then he... can proceed to relate this larger picture to the specific setting of Greek-American relations. The benefits of this exercise are likely to prove quite useful for Greeks as well as Americans and their mutual relationships in the years to come."

- Theodore Couloumbis<sup>3</sup>

"Something there is that doesn't love a wall.... Before I built a wall I'd ask to know  
What I was walling in or walling out, And to whom I was like to give offence.  
Something there is that doesn't love a wall, That wants it down."

- Robert Frost,

*Mending Wall*, from *North of Boston*, 1913.

## The End of the Cold War and the New Global Configuration

**A Bipolar to a Unipolar + Fragmented World:** The Cold War Model is described by Morton A. Kaplan as a "Loose Bipolar Model II," since two superpowers dominated the international system. We must add that a subset of "non-aligned" states flourished to the mutual dismay of Washington and Moscow, each of which constantly tried to "turn" them and add them to its bloc so as to create Kaplan's Model III, "the Tight Bipolar Model." The interesting thing about this "Bipolar Model" was that the USSR was really only a superpower in **military** terms, since economically it was a "dual economy" with only the defence sector enjoying world-class status. Moreover, economically the Soviet Union was confronted by overwhelming economic competition since North America, Western Europe, and Japan were united in opposition. Unfortunately for the world (and Greece and Cyprus) this fundamental fact was not clearly understood in a strategic sense by many American leaders, many of whom in retrospect seemed possessed by a unrealistic fear of "The Evil Empire." Evil it surely was, in our view, but weak it also

was; for it was never able to feed its people properly, even though Tsarist Russia (with about the same acreage) was a major grain exporter. Nor was its Gulag or *sharashki* system an effective use of the Soviet peoples' human resources, hard work, or scientific genius. Even the "free sector" of Soviet society was remarkably inefficient in its use of labour and materials.

Clearly, Cyprus under Makarios was one of these "non-aligned" states much to the impotent fury of Washington. Indeed Makarios was often referred to (somewhat lugubriously in our opinion) as "The Castro of the Mediterranean" despite the fact that he allowed U-2 spy flights from British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) and permitted UK and US electronic monitoring stations to operate in the Troodos Mountains. But the fact that AKEL, on which he depended for maintaining his position, was extremely independent and Euro-Communist (like the Italian and Spanish CP's and unlike the French CP) was not generally appreciated in Washington. To American leaders there, all Communist parties were alike just as all Communists were identical. The Cold War was seen as a primordial struggle between Good and Evil, a Manichaeian moralistic crusade in which external parties had to choose, somewhat like the current Washington view of states "assisting" terrorists. Among the sad ironies of the Cold War, few were more poignant than the fact that during the conflict, the US seemed to adopt Andrei Zhdanov's "Two Camps" vision. To Zhdanov and Dulles, the Cold War was a zero-sum-game which had but one victor. In this both followed the Leninist adage of "*kto kogo*" (who will kill whom) despite George F. Kennan's plea that the Cold War was being over-militarised by Washington. A good deal of research might well be addressed to the psychoanalytic motivations of leaders in both Washington and Moscow explaining this "mirror image" phenomenon.

We would argue that the current world system is unstable with the **absolute power** of the US clearly declining as its armed forces are gradually pared down to peacetime levels, and the US trade deficit rising; even as the EU's "euro" and Japan's yen rise in relation to the former unchallengeable dollar. Thus we live in a Unipolar world in transition. Moreover, a series of concentric "levels" can be posited of which the largest is the outer or world level previously occupied by the US and USSR. After, the USSR's disintegration, it is now occupied solely by the US.

The next or regional level is occupied by regional powers such as the three Guarantor powers of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution: Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Finally, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Middle East comprise the third or local level and vibrate to the tones emanating from the world and regional levels. Alexis Alexandris cogently summarises the relationship of the regional to the local Ring by noting that "While Greece considers itself as the gate of the European Union in the new Balkans, the Turks are convinced that the post-Cold War environment has opened up new foreign policy options in a region stretching from

the Adriatic Sea to the Central Asia republics of the former Soviet Union... The geographical boundaries of Greek-Turkish rivalry include the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Thus Ankara accuses the Greeks of forming an anti-Turkish alliance with Syria, while Turkey has been flirting with Albania and FYROM at Greece's northern backyard. The Greeks openly regard Turkey as their main threat, citing troop build-ups in the Thracian border and the presence of the [Turkish-GC] Fourth Army on the Aegean coast. For its part, the Turkish military cites the Greeks as the reason that these troops cannot be transferred eastward to tackle the Kurds."<sup>4</sup> He observes that "An examination of the Greek-Turk minority question cannot but include, beside Thracian issues, the future of Ecumenical Patriarchate, the regime of local self-government for Imbros and Tenedos provided by Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne, [also-GC] some formula .... So that the native Greek Orthodox population may be repatriated in [sic-GC] Imbros and Tenedos...." Alexandris concludes "The property rights guaranteed the Treaty of Lausanne to the deported Istanbul Greek nationals should also be examined."<sup>5</sup>

Alexandris provides a detailed list of Greek concerns about apparent Turk revisionism in the Aegean with which we are forced to agree by his logic and facts: "Since 1974, there is a consensus in Greece based on the perception that Turkey is pursuing revisionist objectives, seeking to impose a shared sovereignty a resource utilisation in the Aegean, in spite of various multilateral treaties and the customary international law." (*ibid.*, p. 4) Among the further issues he lists in the Aegean are the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, (p. 5), the extension of Greek territorial limits according to the UN Law of the Sea (LOS), (p. 6), the Greek-Turkish Aegean airspace and control dispute including FIR (Flight Information Region), (pp. 7-8), Greek-Turkish NATO command structures (p. 8-9), the military status of the Aegean islands and the Turkish Aegean Fourth Army, (pp. 10-11) and Greek-Turkish relations regarding their mutual roles in Turkish entry into the European Union (p. 13). Indeed, Alexandris' paper is so complete, one could recommend it as the basis for the Greek Government's negotiations with Turkey on a "Big Package" *rapprochement!*

From our point of view, his meticulous list of complaints against Ankara clearly demonstrates the linkage between the regional and local geopolitical rings listed *supra*. He also includes Cyprus (pp. 13-20) proving that "Although it cannot be included in the Greek-Turkish bilateral issues," (p. 13), like all good Greek analysts he proceeds to do just that from pp. 13-20! Nor could he, in our view, do otherwise; since "Cyprus continues to burden Greek and Turkish foreign policy agendas" (p. 13) and is indeed "both the cause and victim of a recrudescence of a Greek-Turkish antagonism" (p. 13). Thus the Cyprus dispute interacts on several levels as, have argued *supra*, and certainly involves the world level: "On another level, the

Cyprus question is an international problem, for the settlement of which the Secretary General of the United Nations, in cooperation and co-ordination with the United States and the European Union, has been offering his good offices since the 1960s" (p. 13).

Even as US power has declined **absolutely**, its power has increased **relatively** owing to the disintegration of the USSR and the break-up of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia into competing nation-states each dominated by a single "custodial ethnic elite." Many of these states are seeking a road to national unity as in Indonesia, the Philippines, Columbia, and Turkey.

More importantly, the EU, gradually coalesced from a strictly Iron and Steel Community under Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, into a vast customs union. Now it has moved into the monetary field (the European Monetary Union), and is just starting to develop a fundamental aspect of a loose confederation: via a "National Defence Identity".<sup>6</sup> Contrary to the asseverations of many analysts such as Van Coufoudakis and Philippos Savvides, the US has done everything it can to **assist** this process, a policy which we find difficult to reconcile with their oft-stated description of the US as a "hegemonic power" clinging to a policy which we agree is counter-productive under a putative "Theory of Continuity" which we argue is no longer relevant or supported by the Clinton or Bush administrations.

Moreover a Reuters article from Plovdiv, Bulgaria of September 11, 1999 offers an even more dramatic report -of change in relations between Greece and Turkey. It notes that "Top military official from six Balkan states and Italy gathered on Saturday to inaugurate a joint peacekeeping force as part of efforts to boost stability in the conflict-torn region."

What is most striking, however, is the statement indicating that the forces in the joint Balkan peacekeeping force **will include Greek troops** (along with Albanian, Bulgarian, Italian, Macedonian, and Romanian units) **and Turkey "will lead the force for the first two years before handing [it-GC] over to Greece or Italy."** Truly as Nikolaus Dimadis, chairman of the military and political steering committee of the force, has noted, "Today is a historic day expressing the determination of our governments [Greece, Turkey *et al.*-GC] to start jointly a new era for our region." The "peace force would also aim to improve regional cooperation in case of natural disasters" said Turkish Defence Minister Sabahattin Cakmakoglu. The force will be headquartered in Plovdiv, Bulgaria and reflects "our policy of good neighbourly relations and attempts to strengthen security" added Bulgarian President Petar Stoyanov.

Moreover, the "Balkan force" will work in peacekeeping or humanitarian

operations under the umbrella of international bodies including the UN, OSCE **NATO**, and WEU.

Other signs of a "paradigm shift" in relations between Athens and Ankara include the exchange of rescue efforts by Greek and Turkish rescuers<sup>7</sup> which also, however, contains a warning by Professor Thanos Veremis at Athens University who doubt that the "logjam" in relations can be broken since "the Turkish military is highly conservative and it wants to preserve its political power."

But foreign governments, Kinzer concludes, including the US, "are encouraging the countries' new-found friendship"<sup>8</sup> and US President Clinton received Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit and visited both Turkey and Greece. The EU held a crucial summit meeting in Helsinki and Turkey is "hoping that Greece will help persuade the 15-nation Union, many of whose members have been critical of Turkey's human rights record, to add Turkey to its list of prospective members."

Finally, a new Special Assistant to the President has been hired, Alfred H. Moses; while David Philips, a specialist in conflict resolution, has been engaged by the US State Department to suggest ways of bringing Greeks and Turks together. These efforts hardly suggest a continuation of the "Theory of Continuity," devoted to partition or division of Cyprus via a "double enosis" formula for that has already occurred *de facto* though not *de jure*. Rather it suggests a focused effort by Clinton to resolve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes fairly and amicably.

Bipartisan US support for a just Cyprus solution is suggested by Secretary State Colin Powell's statement of December 5, 2001 that:

I might say that I thought that [my-GC] Turkish stop was quite good. We were able to talk about ESDP, and to see some movement in Cyprus, two things that have been sort of just lingering there for a long period of time, and I was glad that we had progress on both of them. With Cyprus, it's just the beginning, but at least we have got the two gentlemen [Clerides and Denktash-GC] talking to one another again and suddenly things are happening rapidly. Not just the first meeting, but they are having dinner tonight and they have already set the second meeting in January. So that's a bit of progress. Hopefully that will keep moving along.<sup>9</sup>

Moreover, a Department Spokesman noted on May 29, 2002 the reply of the US Government to a question, "Is the US engaged in Greek-Turkish discussions on the closing of Aegean airspace and in the negotiations on Cyprus, which have a target date of settlement of June 30, 2002?"

Answer: "We have noted and welcome improved Turkish and Greek relations. ...With regard to Cyprus, **the US strongly supports and stands ready**

**assist the UN Good Offices Mission in its efforts to assist the parties on the island in reaching a comprehensive settlement of the Cyprus issue. We stress the need for more urgency in these negotiations in order to reach agreement by the June target date.**<sup>10</sup>

We conclude that the world is currently in a shift from a Unipolar to a "National Fragmentation" or "Multipolar Model VII" in Kaplan's taxonomy, a transition from political and territorial **disintegration** hopefully preceding further global political and economic integration. We hope to see further world integration with an international criminal court, and a further increase in the frequency of UN- or regionally- sponsored "peacemaking" and "peacekeeping" operations, perhaps tied to such regional organisations as NATO or the WEU. If carried to its logical conclusion, the world might be fortunate enough to end the current terribly dangerous state of international anarchy which Robert J. Lieber accurately calls a world with *No Common Power*.<sup>11</sup> He cites Hobbes' *Leviathan*: 'tiring the time men live without a common power to keep them in awe, they are in that condition which is called war.'<sup>12</sup>

Alternatively, at the end of the current transition we may find ourselves back in Kaplan's "Oligopolar" or "Classical Balance-of-Power" Model I.<sup>13</sup> But we are not persuaded that the "offensive realist" offshoot of the "Realist School" of international relations accurately describes the reality of international relations. We do accept that most diplomats and statesmen think the realist school is accurate, and "nothing is but thinking makes it so." And therefore states usually act in accordance with realist theory. But in our view the realists overlook the role of **non-state** actors such as Al-Qaeda and other non-state terrorist organisations. But the UN family of agencies, the growth of lobby groups such as Amnesty International and other human rights and environmental, ethnic, and trade groups problems have forced many nation-states to attenuate their realist positions. Moreover the growth of terrorism-resistance groups in the developing - particularly the Arab world - has shown themselves to be very resistant to strictly military solutions as the Russians discovered in Afghanistan and the US in the World Trade Centre and Pentagon attacks.

Though war between nation-states is still perhaps the major problem in international relations, we suggest that the Realists overlook the importance of economics and apotheosise, in our view, the importance of military capabilities. We have discussed "dual state" powers such as the ex-USSR already. We agree with Paul Kennedy's views on the endemic "overextension" of empires as a result of "side payments" and the gradual "hollowing out" of their domestic strength. As noted earlier also, we find his comments apply also to the US<sup>14</sup> and its policy toward the Third World.

We would stress the remarkable development of Greece in recent years into mature civil society<sup>15</sup> together with the concomitant efforts of the Europeans (including Greece) to develop both a joint Monetary (via the EMU) and European Security and Defence Identity. We note the EU slowly and painfully setting up an independent but integrated European pillar within NATO. This "pillar" would be capable of acting autonomously from NATO in certain situations, say in ex-Yugoslavia or other localised European areas or even the Middle East. That is, Greece and the other European democracies would be "separable but not separate" from NATO's integrated command structure within a common WEU framework.

Thus the existing WEU which to Greece's disappointment refused to support Athens against Turkey<sup>16</sup> (via Art. 5 of the WEU Charter), would be merged into the European Union and a EU Council of Defence Ministers and a EU military staff appointed.

Such a new European Defence Identity would clearly have profound effects the strategic shape of Eastern Mediterranean affairs including Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and probably exert a stabilising effect both on the Balkans and Turkey's Middle East neighbours. For the EU, the price would have to include entrance of Turkey as a full member.

For Turkey it would clearly require paying two high prices: First, resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece. But this would mean that Turkey would have to follow Greece's example begun by Papandreou and almost completed by Simitis via his "New Balkan Profile": good relations with Ankara's European and Balkan neighbours. But then Turkey would be free to deal with her less altruistic neighbours: Syria, Iraq, and Iran while pursuing the Kemalist dream of a secular Turkey as a fully accepted partner of the Western democracies.<sup>17</sup> Second, Turkey would have to develop domestic policies to meet the *aquis communautaire* requirements of the EU in such areas as the economy, and political and human rights for all citizens, including Kurds.

Would Turkey be prepared to pay such heavy prices? We believe it will have little choice for the alternative is to be "marginalised" as a Third World power, and experience a tragic descent into the miasma of a secular military dictatorship such as Iraq, or – even worse from the Kemalist elites' point of view – become another Iran and suffer the victory of the hated Muslim fundamentalist extremists within Turkey such as Necmettin Erbakan.

Thus we suggest the present period of US unipolar dominance is likely to be challenged further by rising new aggregations of power including the EU and the



European "pillar" of NATO, Japan and South-east Asia, and later on China, etc.<sup>18</sup> We also believe that Russia will gradually "get its act together" and once more become a major player in international politics. At the present time, Russia is almost totally preoccupied with its domestic problems and has, unfortunately, got involved in a war with Chechnya. Consequently, it is most unlikely that it will be able to play much of a role in the former Turkic republics of the ex-USSR or do much in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond offer to provide arms or stuff Cypriot banks with dubiously-obtained cash from looted assets in Russia.

When the Cold War ended, the two protagonists, the US and the USSR, were like boxers after a bitter and savage bout. Russia was knocked down, but not out. In our view the Russian people will come back and again assume their role as *velikie russkiye* (Great Russians). The US stood groggy but still standing. Groggy because the Cold War had cost the American people alone – not counting what our allies had paid or suffered – some \$7 **trillion** dollars.<sup>19</sup>

Thus when President Clinton assumed office, he promised to focus on the American "domestic deficit," all the huge infrastructure and other investments which had been allowed to lapse owing to the nation's concentration on foreign and security policies by previous administrations. Indeed, Clinton's first Secretary of State, Warren M. Christopher, was selected largely because Clinton believed he could safely be left to "handle" foreign problems while the President and the White House staff concentrated on rebuilding American schools, hospitals, roads and bridges, and reducing the enormous budget deficits accumulated under President Reagan. Reagan certainly helped defeat "the Evil Empire" by \$350 billion-dollar DoD budgets and threatening a "Star Wars" Ballistic Missile Defence (BMD) system. But in the process he weakened the basic strength of America's economy in our view.

Unfortunately for Clinton, the rest of the world refused to "go away" and Clinton was forced (as many presidents before him) to face foreign policy problems such as Cyprus and the Aegean dispute. One sees a similar intellectual reluctance in Bush's dislike of "nation-building" despite the fact that the US is clearly engaged in it in the Balkans and Afghanistan.

But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Greek-Turkish policy of the US could and did, we believe, change fundamentally. Some Greek analysts may doubt it, but US policy shifted massively like a huge supertanker reversing course. US **interests** remained the same, but the **policies** which could best defend those interests changed. To doubt this in the case of the Eastern Med is to suggest that US policymakers cannot learn from their mistakes, a somewhat arrogant view. Acheson I & II, Ball, the NATO Plan and other policies pursued by the US clearly

were intended to achieve "double enosis" with consequent partition of Cyprus. But that existing partition has not led to a lessening of tensions between Athens and Ankara, and permanent division of Cyprus via a "Hispaniola Partition" has clearly **not** brought about any lessening of the bitter hatreds of the parties involved.

This failure of US and UK policy, I believe, is clearly recognised by both Foggy Bottom and Whitehall. The problem is "What Is To Be Done?" (*Sto de/at'?*) And we believe that the only real solution is a "Big Package" agreement between Athens and Ankara similar to that achieved by Paris and Berlin in the 1950s or between Venizelos and Ataturk in the 1930s. It is not widely known, but Ataturk recommended Venizelos for the Nobel Peace Prize in that period.

Thus those who chafe under putative "hegemonic" policies of the US need only wait a bit and they may find themselves free from such onerous burdens. However, like the current nostalgia for the seductive simplicities of the Cold War and its search for enemies<sup>20</sup> they may find being the **executors** of policy for the first time in Greek history since the Delian League a bit less fun than being the **objects** policy. For the latter status gave them unlimited opportunity to shift the burden moral opprobrium to others which they cannot do as equal members of a union European democracies larger by far in population and GNP than the US.

The "Theory of Continuity" which is so well developed by my friends, Van Coufoudakis and Philippos K. Savvides, does need to be reconsidered to see if it is still relevant.<sup>21</sup> We would suggest that both scholars make an irrefragable case with respect to the period from the early days of the Cold War through the Nixon Administration. Our former professor Henry A. Kissinger's did clearly and admittedly "tilt" toward Turkey in the grim "July Days" of 1974 and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces. He and his administration did nothing to prevent the totally illegal and continued occupation of northern Cyprus (37%) by Turkish troops as well as the importation of some 35-40,000 Anatolian settlers which illegally changed the demography of the area in clear violation of customary international law as well as Treaty obligations freely accepted by Turkey, i.e., Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the London-Zurich package and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The former required any of the Guarantor Powers, after consultation (which Turkey did with the UK) in case of unilateral intervention, to re-establish the situation *ante-bellum*. That is, each guarantor power "reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing a state of affairs created by the present treaty" (Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee). This clearly Turkey did not do, rather in August 1974 it began a further advance from occupying about 3% of Cyprus to some 37% after its own recalcitrance led to the failure of the Geneva meeting of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain.

### American Policy

Unfortunately, for the "Theory of Continuity" however, while "the times they are a'changin'" the "Theory of Continuity" failed to keep up. The Clinton foreign policy team of Secretary Albright, UN Ambassador Holbrooke, Secretary Cohen and President Clinton had rather different ideas about the goals of US power in the Balkans, the Middle East, and the Eastern Med. As Secretary Albright noted in greeting Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides on June 6, 1997, "The United States' goal remains to encourage a Cyprus settlement that establishes a stable, bizonal federation, with adequate security guarantees for all." She noted further: **"What we seek [sic-GC] is the reunification of Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island [of Cyprus-GC] is unacceptable.... We continue to support the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will do everything we can to bring the process forward."** [holding added-GC]<sup>22</sup> Even if we doubt the accuracy of Cyprus Desk Officer Tom Boyatt's clear denial of US involvement in the Turkish invasion of July 20, 1974 we are left with a puzzling conundrum. For as Boyatt cogently noted, "If US policy is so clever, so consistent, so Machiavellian; why has it failed so miserably in the Eastern Mediterranean?" Surely, brilliant statecraft would not envisage pushing two strong allies into a sullen and bitter mood which lasts to this very day! So if Koufoudakis and Savvides are correct that US policy has been consistent in the area from 1947 to 2000, why does everyone in the Clinton and Bush administrations recognise that the current situation both in the Aegean and on Cyprus is so dangerously unstable? Were American policy-makers really so stupid as to wish to bring about a situation which threatens war every few years over islets inhabited by rabbits and goats? As Boyatt noted with some bitterness:

... comparing the situation before the attempted coup [on Cyprus-GC] by Ioannides and the situation today from the point of view of the best interests of the [US-GC], I think everyone ... agrees [that the US-GC] is a damned sight worse off today than it was on July 13<sup>th</sup> and 14<sup>th</sup> [1974-GC]... I am prepared to accept that US policy was inadequate... and that... mistakes ... have been made... But I **absolutely reject the devil theory, the proposition that this [US-GC] Government, through any of its arms, somehow bluntly and clandestinely developed a situation with General Ioannides so that he would take any action which ... would have the result which is so totally disastrous for the [US-GC].**<sup>23</sup>

Even after the subsequent advance of August; even if we discount John C. Campbell's poignant comment that "American success in holding back the Turks in 1967 also strained US influence to the ultimate point, and American officials who performed wonders in averting war on that occasion knew that in a new crisis the same type of diplomatic persuasion would not work" we still find the 'Theory'

wanting.<sup>24</sup> Campbell continues regarding the tragedy of the "July Days": "Professor Van Coufoudakis has argued this theme of continuity in American policy. But even a continuity in attitude on the question of autonomy for Turkish Cypriots or partition of the island would not necessarily imply an intention to bring these things about, an intention to do so, in July 1974."<sup>25</sup>

Thus we are confronted with a dilemma: Coufoudakis and Savvides have a very strong argument in favour of their Theory: **the result**. A divided Cyprus, partitioned between Turkey and Greece, is a political result regardless of legal niceties. The so-called "TRNC" is nothing but a 28<sup>th</sup> *villayet* of Turkey; while the "Defence Dogma" and cultural, linguistic, and religious links with Athens make the Republic of Cyprus *de facto* part of Greece. But their Theory has another fatal flaw: it assumes that American decision-makers cannot learn from their mistakes and that they are currently unaware that partition of Cyprus is simply a formula for eventual war between Greece and Turkey. It is simply unreasonable to assume that 80% of the Cyprus population will forever accept the occupation by a foreign army and illegal settlers of 37% of the island by a minority of 18%. And this fact has been brought home to US policymakers most dramatically by the constant threat of war over islets such as Imia or veiled threats by Ankara to place populated Greek Aegean island such as Gavdos under Turkish control *pace* the Treaty of Lausanne of 1923.

The end of the Cold War has changed everything, or as the Americans say, "all bets are off." A firm but wise policy by the Simitis Government in Athens meets with a positive response from the Turkish Foreign Minister, Ismail Cem. In his opening comments at Istanbul University on October 5, 1999; Cem stressed that "he and his counterpart, Papandreou, were trying to break new ground and find new words to utter about the rapprochement between the two countries. These words included 'peace, understanding, and shared benefits.'"<sup>26</sup> Cem pointed out that the Greek foreign minister was defending his own country's interests just as he was defending those of Turkey.<sup>27</sup>

In our view the views of both foreign ministers are hopeful precisely because they share a common appreciation of "neo-realism," of *mutual* rational self-interest. We suggest such a basis is a very hopeful change from the superheated rhetoric of name calling earlier employed and further is the *only* basis upon which a successful *rapprochement* between Athens and Ankara could possibly be constructed. For all chancelleries and nearly all diplomats throughout the world operate on the *assumptions* of neo-realism. And in international as in national politics, perception is often the *sine qua non* for successful conflict resolution.

So we are prepared to admit openly that Acheson I & II, Ball, the NATO and ABC plans, and perhaps the Clifford Mission of 1977, etc., *did* intend the result which

occurred, although Sawides admits that Clifford's account of his mission is "very brief and vague"<sup>28</sup> (So perhaps a "Scotch Verdict" is needed there!)<sup>29</sup> But that still does not "prove" that that policy continues as part of a consistent US plan in the face of the architectonic changes of the Cold War's end. What Professor Dimitris Keridis cogently notes about US policy in the Balkans is also true of US policy in the Eastern Med in our view: "Greeks should not make the mistake of assuming that the Americans have a detailed plan of supporting Turkey and Albania to the detriment of Greece, as tempting as this might be. There is no coherent US policy for the Balkans, and there may never be [We hope he has changed his mind here! -GC]. American policy-making is fragmented between the regional embassies, the State Department, the Pentagon, Congress, and the White House. There are some general guidelines, but nothing more. **Those familiar with the American political system know how difficult it is to formulate a policy in the absence of an overwhelming threat.**"<sup>30</sup>

Precisely! The overwhelming threat is gone now so we can hope for a "general guideline" to assist in the reunification of Cyprus and the settlement of the Aegean issues between Athens and Ankara. We wonder with Keridis why, "Words such as economic penetration of the hinterland are used with ease to describe what Greeks should do in the Balkans. There is no need to emphasise that such **imperialist talk** is no music to the ears of Greece's neighbours. What this vocabulary shows is arrogance coupled with a profound lack of knowledge and good judgement on the part of Greeks..."<sup>31</sup> Keridis suggests that "Not all is gloom. There have been some successes [including-GC] the Greek presidency of the EU and Greece's consent to the EU-Turkey customs union in exchange for a fixed timetable for Cyprus's accession to the Union... If Theodoros Pangalos is to be credited with the above successes, Giannis Kranidiotis should be praised for the EU-Turkey rapprochement, Greece successfully linked European policies towards Turkey with Cyprus while de-linking Cyprus' own accession from the prior settlement of the Cypriot question. Greek policy was flexible, innovative and ultimately successful."<sup>32</sup>

Our question to the "Continuity" theorists is simple: If Greeks can learn from their mistakes, why can't Americans learn from theirs? Or are my Greek friends correct in arguing only partly tongue-in-cheek: "*pas mi Ellin varvaros!*" ("all non-Greeks are barbarians!").

The US leadership clearly realises that the current "Hispaniola Formula" is both dangerous and counterproductive in the extreme. It adds little to Turkish or Greek or Cypriot or American or UK or world security. In fact it guarantees (in our view) an eventual Greco-Turkish conflict which would be a disaster for all concerned. If Europe (the EU) and America move together, Turkey will either join in or be marginalised and that would run directly counter to the Kemalist *Weltanschauung* of

the Turkish military and civilian elite. It would be a *denouement* which could not but arouse alarm among Turkish decision-makers. For Turkey needs Europe, and Europe needs a reformed Turkey as a full partner in the EU, EMU, revised WEU Balkan peacekeeping force, and NATO.

### Other Sinners

In our view, all sides to the Cyprus tragedy made serious and unnecessary policy misjudgements which led to great suffering for all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish. The polemic between the "National Narratives" of the Greek and Turkish peoples of Cyprus with their subtexts might not have been so devastating if the two peoples had not been together on an island the size of the US state of Connecticut.

But the British used one people against the other in classic "*divide et impera*" imperial policy to maintain their control over the island when in fact they only needed two SBA's, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, for their reduced role as a Europe, regional power. Ironically the Cyprus tragedy might have been avoided had the British given more weight to realistic political and less to unrealistic security needs in the Eastern Med. Indeed it is a tragedy that little trans-ethnic "Cypriot nationalism" ever developed, for in our view there is no "Cypriot nation" – only two ethnic communities: one Greek and one Turkish. In my various trips to Cyprus, I never saw a Cypriot flag, only Greek on one side of the Green line and Turkish on the other. I doubt if many G/C's know what their flag looks like and they have, as far as I know, no national anthem. Pollis is correct in suggesting that British colonialism bears much responsibility for the lack of a Cypriot sense of "nationhood." Still we doubt very much that such a hybrid nationalism could have emerged in the cruel world of Middle East and Eastern Med politics: for Cyprus has been the object of foreign intrigues since Neolithic times. As Markides suggests pessimistically regarding Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) nationalism:

As early as 1914, [T/C-GC] leaders protested ... against Greek agitation for *enosis*. And in December 1949, only six years before the EOKA struggle had started, about 15,000 Turks marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia cursing Enosis and hurling insu and threats at the [G/C's-GC].

Cyprus never became a "consociational democracy" like Switzerland... owing to the failure of political will of both elites [G/C & T/C-GC].

Markides concludes as do we with the sad negative conclusion that "Nothing short of a 'cultural revolution' can establish the *internal preconditions* [ital. adde, GC] of a lasting intercommunal peace."<sup>33</sup> Those "preconditions" just do not exist in the view of Prof. Thomas Ehrlich of Stanford; they "could only develop if supported by pressures from without."<sup>34</sup> We would suggest that the EU and the US should

seriously consider ways to help provide additional external support by adding to the strength of internal Cypriot forces on both sides of the Green line which are willing to push for a "bizonal, bicomunal, federal" solution brokered by the UN and supported by the Western democracies including Greece. Our colleague, Joseph S. Joseph comments in similar negative fashion:

Despite four centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, the [G/C's and T/C's- GC] remained separate and distinct ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, cultural, and political lines. The preseNation of their ethnic identity could be attributed to ... .loyalties with Greece and Turkey. *With the establishment of the {RoCJ, the ethnic and political fragmentation inherited from the past were institutionalised and incorporated into the state apparatus and the political process.*

*Commonal dualism became the foundation of political structures and practices that prevented the development of ... common patriotism, joint Cypriot consciousness, and unifying political culture supportive of the Cypriot state [ital. added-GC].*<sup>35</sup>

For a contrary view, blaming primarily British policy for the lack of a common Cypriot nationalism, cf. Adamantia Pollis.<sup>36</sup>

We conclude that although Whitehall's policy in Cyprus exacerbated the problem of intercommunal relations for reasons of *raison d'etat*, Britain was **successful** in this policy because of **pre-existing conditions of communal division**. Very few were the marriages of Greek and Turkish Cypriots such as those of Demetrios A. Theophylactou. Cf. the touching dedication in his trenchant work.<sup>37</sup> For though *his* parents "were brave enough to break the norm of Cypriot society in the mid-fifties" we fear that few others were as courageous. His parents were, as Theophylactou himself notes, "one of a handful."

Moreover, mainland Greeks and Greek-Cypriots (G/C's) seemed never fully to take into account in their strategic calculations that Turkey was only 40 miles away while Greece was 400 miles away. Thus their continued struggle for *enosis* was bound to produce a bitter response from Ankara. Their huge majority of 80% vs. 20% blinded them to these strategic realities with tragic results.

President Makarios himself committed a second Greek policy failure on November 30, 1963 when he unilaterally proclaimed his famous "13 Points" which in effect unilaterally revised the London-Zurich Agreements with disastrous results. We admit that those Agreements were rigid, that "The 1960 Constitution was a peculiar and highly rigid one that, in the final analysis, proved to be unworkable."<sup>38</sup> But that begs the question, "could the Constitution have been made to work absent Greek (EOKA, EOKA B!) and Turkish (TMT) extremism?" Savvides assumes the answer is "no" as do many Greek analysts. But Greek Professor Dimitris Kitsikis

and American Professor Linda B. Miller as well as many Turkish and *TIC* analysis<sup>39</sup> believe the 1960 Constitution **could** have worked given more flexibility on the part of the G/C's including Makarios.

Moreover, we find Savvides' description of the Makarios 13 Points somewhat exiguous since he fails to note either that the British High Commissioner supported Makarios' Proclamation or that the wise statesman of Greece, Constantine Karamanlis, opposed it. Moreover, Savvides' description that "the disproportional rights provided to the Turkish minority impaired the orderly functioning of the state, *thus leading to the collapse of the First Cypriot Republic*", seems somewhat tendentious. Savvides further rather blandly argues that President Makarios' Thirteen Proposals merely "sought to amend constitutional provisions that had become detrimental to the normal functioning of the Cypriot government."<sup>40</sup> The facts were a bit more dramatic in our view. For in effect, Makarios clearly and unilaterally revised the London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution with disastrous results.

As Joseph wisely observes, Makarios "pursued a policy aimed at the establishment of Greek Cypriot dominance in an independent, unitary, and non-aligned Cyprus."<sup>41</sup> Even Hitchens, a harsh critic of US and UK policy on Cyprus, notes that "Throughout the years of independence, the Makarios government failed to set up any institution specifically designed to meet Turkish needs."[-GC]<sup>42</sup> Nor does Savvides mention the Turkish-Cypriot "ghettoization" after 1964 in the sense of psychological oppression of the Turkish population on the island as stressed by Vamik D. Volkan, a Turkish-Cypriot professor of psychiatry now living in the US. Volkan contends that 3% of the land was occupied by 18% of the population which had a profoundly negative and bitter impact on T/C's both psychologically and politically.<sup>43</sup> Volkan's "national narrative" seems to describe a totally different island than that by Greek-Cypriot analysts who, like Dr. Volkan, are native to Cyprus.

Indeed, one must ask, "Where were the reformers (on both sides) on Cyprus? Where were the Jean Jaures, the Mahatma Gandhis, the Martin Luther Kings, the Ibrahim Rugovas? Why was there until recently no Cyprus branch of the Greek Amnesty International or Akim Birdal's Turkish Human Rights Association?"[GC] The answer, we suspect, has to do with the depth of the ethnic divisions and the regnant political culture of Cyprus such that even the then President and Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus made little effort to "reach across" to the "other" community and build a sense of common Cypriot nationalism. The ultimate reality of Cyprus remained the "we-they" distinction of separate ethnicities.

Thus the "national narrative" of Turkish Cypriots seems psychologically inaccessible to many Greek and Greek-Cypriot analysts. They appear concerned



only with the *Greek* national narrative and its subtexts, while the Turkish narrative is viewed solely through a monolithic Hellenic lens to the tragic detriment of both communities. They evidently see no linkage between Makarios' and the Greek-Cypriot majority's policies and the violent response of the Turkish Cypriots in December 1963, 1964, and 1967. Was not this linkage connected to the fateful decision of Bulent Ecevit to invade Cyprus in 1974? "We did it your way in 1963 and 1964 and 1967," he is reputed to have told American diplomats, "now [1974- GC] we're going to do it our way."

For the Republic of Cyprus was constructed via the London-Zurich Agreements as a "*consociational state*". And "*Consociationalism* involves the systematic sharing of political power among the different groups, giving each group control over its own life." Almond and Dalton continue: "This system allows each group to veto collective policies that it believes will affect it adversely and it provides for proportionate sharing of national offices and resources...." They conclude in words which surely describe Makarios' dilemma and which many Greek analysts totally overlook: "... this approach ... offers security to communal groups **at the cost of the efficiency and redistributive possibilities of majority rule.**"<sup>44</sup> Thus we would argue that the 13 Points of President Makarios destroyed the fragile basis of the Cypriot state, which clearly put communal peace above efficiency. But many Greek analysts see the question solely in terms of efficiency because they were both the majority and the business elite and thus the controlling community. Indeed, Coufoudakis and Savvides adopt a sort of "legal brief" for their "Theory of Continuity", a kind of grand *post hoc ergo propter hoc* fallacy which can only be maintained by asserting that the US and Britain had one overriding goal – the partition of Cyprus – which never changed even though that policy was clearly a total failure in terms of resolving the problem to the mutual satisfaction of both Cypriot communities. They also offer little space to the possibility that US and British decision-makers might also have considered partition the **only** way to stop killings by extremists in both communities along with admitted *Realpolitik* power-related considerations. Even today many analysts wonder if extremists in both communities could be controlled if a fair and just negotiated settlement between the two communities were achieved. We too have our doubts, but feel the risk must be taken.

We doubt that the unspoken summum bonum clearly sought by Coufoudakis, Savvides, and many other Greek analysts - recreation of a "democratic unitary" Cypriot state is possible today, even though it was envisaged as the only legal justification for individual or group intervention via Art. IV of the Treaty of Guaranty. For *pace* Savvides' assurance, we find the "Theory of Continuity" both "static" and "monolithic".<sup>45</sup> Too much blood has been shed, too much history has intervened. But a **federal** solution embracing a bicomunal and bizonal state incorporating the

"confederal" aim demanded by the Turks and the "Three Freedoms" and democratic structure and sovereignty for the federal central government demanded by the Greeks is possible in our view. Federation offers the possibility of future evolution into a tighter federation, and with eventual evolution into a democratic unitary state when mutual trust has developed, and fear of the majority subsided. But a return to the unchallengeable power of the majority Greek community in terms of both demographics and economic control is impossible in our view. A new form of "consociation" will have to be developed with powerful guarantees for the Turkish minority and full security for the Greek majority. A number of suggestions for how this could be done have been advanced.<sup>46</sup>

Thus we feel that many Greek and Greek-Cypriot analysts who embrace the "Continuity Theory" are enmeshed in a logical fallacy akin to that described by America's own "cracker barrel philosopher," the US's own Nastradin Hodja – the redoubtable Mark Twain. Twain had a favourite kitten which loved to sit on a stove lid in the kitchen during winter. One day, Twain relates, the kitten made a serious error and sat on a stove lid which happened to be hot. Twain reported that the kitten never made the same mistake of sitting on a hot stove lid. Unfortunately, it never again sat on a cold one either. We hope that "Continuity analysts" do not draw similar illogical conclusion and refuse to help resolve the Cyprus and Aegean disputes when the opportunity arises; for the "heat" of the Cold War is fortunately past!

In cataloguing Greek policy failures we must also include Ioannides' fatal errors of judgement in beginning the "July Days" by trying to overthrow the elected leader of the Cypriot people, President and Ethnarch and Archbishop Makarios. The Junta's inability to realise Turkey's propinquity to Cyprus is a bit mind-boggling in retrospect, but must be included in Greek errors of contributing to the Cyprus tragedy. And their perhaps desperate selection of a pathological thug such as Nikos Sampson, whose sobriquet was reputedly "the Turk Killer", to carry their banner on Cyprus also displayed a rather primitive understanding of Cypriot political reality.

Finally, the Greek side must take some responsibility for the activities of General George Grivas (Dighenis) who died on January 27, 1974. To the best of our knowledge, Grivas is rarely mentioned in Savvides' article or in most Greek or Greek-Cypriot national narratives. Rarely is he given responsibility for contributing to the pathological fear of Greek Cypriots which we observed on the part of Turkish Cypriots and which we believe was made indelible by the "July Days".<sup>47</sup>

Nor were we Americans without guilt in the Cypriot tragedy. Perhaps then US Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca, was correct: the brutal leader of ESA (Ethniki Stratiotiki Astinomia or Greek Military Police) was only a "cop". But that

hardly relieves Tasca in our view from the responsibility of dealing with him. Diplomats are not entitled to choose the leaders of countries to which they are accredited and simply walk away.<sup>48</sup>

Tragically, it is widely believed by many Greeks and Turks as well as by some foreign students of Eastern Med affairs that the US Government financed EOKA-B! despite its bloodthirsty practices toward patriotic but dissenting Greek Cypriots. Whether the US helped finance TMT is also not clear, but it certainly followed similar practices toward its dissenting majority.<sup>49</sup> Again, absent convincing evidence, a "Scotch Verdict" must suffice until the files are available.

Moreover, there is the counterproductive role played by President Nixon in sending his Vice President, Spiros T. Agnew, to visit the Junta leadership in Athens and Nixon's Secretary of State and former Special Assistant for National Security, Henry A. Kissinger's dubious statecraft before and during the "July Days" of 1974. Kissinger's vaunted *Realpolitik* seemed to backfire as both America's allies, Greece and Turkey, responded negatively to his "tilts" – first toward the Greek Junta, then toward Ankara. He did not even follow the dictates of Bismarkian *Realpolitik*, which never **required** that the manipulator of the balance of power should not consider at all the deeply felt wishes of the manipulated. But Kissinger seemed oblivious to both Greek and Turkish national feelings.<sup>50</sup> For after Congress instituted a boycott on US arms to Turkey, the Turks closed down US bases in Turkey while America's best friend, the wise though conservative Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO. He was the same Greek leader who advised Makarios *against* proclaiming his 13 Points discussed earlier. We conclude that though Kissinger's statecraft was brilliantly successful in the Middle East and in the vital "triangle relationship" of Washington- Beijing- Moscow (where he admitted his lack of local area knowledge), his diplomacy in Europe was not a striking success while that in the Eastern Med was a tragic and unnecessary failure.

We conclude that the "July Days" of 1974 brought little credit to US statecraft or then Secretary of State Kissinger, for it is rarely the goal of prudent diplomacy to infuriate one's closest allies. Once again, US policy seemed oblivious to strongly felt local needs, and seemed unnecessarily dominated by short-term security considerations at the expense of regional alliance and local political needs.

Taken together with Acheson's, Ball's, and others' policies, Henry Kissinger's statecraft does not arouse much enthusiasm either among Greek, Greek-Cypriot, Turkish, or American observers of US Eastern Mediterranean policy. We are, however, persuaded that American decision-makers have learned from their mistakes; and that the Bush Administration can help provide the "external pressures" which Ehrlich so wisely saw as the vital diplomatic ingredient in reaching

a just and lasting settlement on Cyprus.

Since there are enough failed policies on all sides to go around, perhaps we should adopt the old Greek apothegm "perasmena xehasmena" ("Let's forget the past") and start afresh. The signs are hopeful in Athens, in Ankara, and in Washington and Europe. We must not delay for lack of courage to begin anew. We note that the top UN envoy for Cyprus, Alvaro de Soto, visited in Cyprus meeting with President Glafcos Clerides and Turkish-Cypriot leader, Rauf Denktash. De Soto also met with EU officials in Brussels noting that "the EU and the Commission are undertaking a process that has great relevance for our efforts to reach a comprehensive settlement on Cyprus."<sup>51</sup> US, UK, and other envoys have all visited Cyprus recently. US Ambassador to Cyprus, Donald Bandler announced that US Cyprus Presidential Emissary Alfred Moses and US State Department Coordinator for Cyprus, Thomas Weston, will also visit the island. The US remains, **"committed to the goal of bizonal, bicomunal federation and ones that meets the needs of all Cypriots"** Ambassador Bandler concluded following a meeting with Cypriot President Clerides. (*ibid.*, p. 3a). The US seems firmly on board the demand for a just settlement of the Cyprus issue to the benefit of all Greeks, Turks, and the world.

### Quo Vadis?

It is most likely that the Republic of Cyprus will be admitted to the EU at the December 2002 EU Commission in Copenhagen. Greece, which will chair the meeting, has indicated it would veto the admission of any new EU members if Cyprus is *not* admitted. Turkey, on the other hand, has threatened to annex the North if the Republic *is* admitted to the EU.

Legally, when the Republic is admitted to the EU its sovereignty will *de jure* be island-wide, including the North, since only *de facto* does Ankara control the North and no country other than Turkey has recognised the North as a "state" in international law.

Thus the 28-year agony of partition may remain, but the entire security situation will change dramatically. Turkish foreign policy will be seen by all as having failed in its efforts at a "two-state" solution on the Island. Turkey will be confronted by several major choices: – all painful. Three scenarios are possible and we list the in terms of our belief as to their probability.

First, a "Status Quo Policy" under which the present situation is maintained as much as possible with minatory gestures and a vast public relations campaign of threats and a general circling of the wagons. Over-flights of Greek and Greek-

Cypriot airspace could be expected as well as further reinforcements of Turkish mainland troops on Cyprus. Such a policy would, ironically, indicate a victory for the sophisticated elites especially the Turkish diplomatic elite supported by the military and National Security Council (MGK) since it would preserve the "bargaining chip" card discussed above. It would have the advantage of delaying further the painful and enormous domestic changes in Turkish society required by modernisation and subsequent entry into the EU. Its costs would include a continuation of the present unacceptable status quo with all its dangers of further "Imia-Kardak" Greco-Turkish conflict and possible war between the two NATO allies. It might well lead to escalation and a situation which neither Ankara nor Athens could control. In any event it would not resolve either the Aegean or the Cyprus problems which could at any time boil up out of control by Athens or Ankara.

Second, "Annexation": Turkey may respond as it has threatened: Annex the North and move away from the West toward its neighbours. This option has considerable costs. It means giving up the chance to join the EU for the foreseeable future. It also violates the basic Kemalist elite desire to move toward the West as noted in the introduction.<sup>52</sup> It would also mean the "hard liners" had won, since it would mark a serious and dramatic diplomatic defeat which could hardly be concealed and might lead to domestic upheaval between the Westernisers and the Islamicist nationalists. It would lead to an exacerbation of the "brain drain," native Turkish Cypriots driven abroad by economic and fiscal problems imported from Turkey as well as by the dramatic and painfully obvious differences in living standards between the Greek Cyprus and the North. Finally it would mean giving up the possibility of any arrangement for reunification of the Island which is an important bargaining chip in dealing with Greeks, Greek Cypriots and the US, EU, and UN. This "bargaining chip" of pretended interest in a peaceful non-partitioned federal settlement (the so-called "biz-bic" [bizonal-bicommunal federal] solution) has served Ankara's and Denktash's tactical diplomatic needs very well. Since the North is *already* annexed *de facto* to mainland Turkey, annexation would be a confession of weakness that Ankara could not resist domestic political pressures to annex officially what it has already annexed unofficially.

Third, a "Fulfilment Policy" may begin on major and real domestic change and cooperative work on joining the EU with the support of the West. The costs of this policy are also very high. Without a "Marshall Plan" by the EU and US for Turkey, the striking differences between the Greek-controlled South and the Turkish-controlled North of Cyprus will likely grow even larger. The GDP per capita of the Republic is approximately \$16,400 per year, the corresponding figure for the North is only \$5,263.<sup>53</sup> Moreover, the social costs are likely to be enormous, possibly even leading to a breakdown of the current power distribution in Turkey. The

domestic changes required would be comparable to those instituted by Atatürk upon the founding of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. It might well lead to an "Iran Reaction" of Islamic fundamentalism by the population similar to that in Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini or the Taliban-Al-Qaeda alliance in Afghanistan, i.e., ascent to power of the hated Islamic fundamentalists. Such a reaction would mark the failure of the Kemalist dream and is anathema to the military and Kemalist elite.

We suggest that the first scenario, a continuation of the Status Quo Policy is the most likely with the second, outright Annexation the next most likely and unfortunately the third or Fulfilment Policy the least likely since it would require the greatest vision and bureaucratic disruption. A constructive and imaginative US-EU Marshall Plan for Turkey might change the probabilities somewhat, but unlike Europe, which required only re-establishing a pre-existing economic and social status quo after WWII, Turkey requires building up from the grass roots. A US which is opposed to "nation-building" and a Europe which is turning inward and more conservative, are unlikely to be willing to provide the necessary help.

Thus we cannot be sanguine as to the probability of fundamental reform in Turkey or of reunification of Cyprus – especially in the short run. We are, however, very sanguine that the Republic of Cyprus will take its proper place as a European state with its fellow EU countries. Some 24 of the 25 required chapters of the EU *acquis communautaire* have been completed and we believe Cyprus will be admitted to the EU at the upcoming EU Copenhagen meeting in December 20. That admission will transform the Eastern Mediterranean security situation in fundamental ways. Moreover, reunification may well come later after admission of Cyprus has become embedded into the architectu"re of the New Europe. It is only regrettable that Turkey is unlikely in our view to join the EU soon or end the division of Cyprus – for Turkey needs the EU, and the EU needs a reformed Turkey.<sup>54</sup>

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#### Notes

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14. On John Mearsheimer's thoughtful review of the "Realist" vs. the "Liberal" schools of international relations, see his *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (NY/London, W.W. Norton & Co., 2001), pp. 1-27. For Paul Kennedy's views on the inevitable overextension of empires, the 'grim' Soviet dilemma, the importance of economics, and the US decline in absolute even as its relative power increases, see *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. (NY, Vintage Books, 1987/89), pp 513-514.
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16. Robert Kagan, The Benevolent Empire in *Foreign Policy*, Vol. iii, Summer, 1998, pp. 24-35. See also, Louis R. Golino, *European Union Links up with NATO, Providence Journal- Bulletin*, 29 September 1999, p. B6.
17. "The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks... but we Turks have always consistently moved toward the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative." Kemal Ataturk as cited in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 38.
18. We do find Mearsheimer's views on China in the 21<sup>st</sup> century fascinating if not fully persuasive. Cf. Mearsheimer, *op. cit.*, pp. 397-398.

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43. Vamik D. Volkan, M.D., *Cyprus-War and Adaptation, A Psychoanalytic History of Two Ethnic Groups in Conflict* (Charlottesville, VA, Univ. of Virginia Press, *passim* for a description of events by a Turkish-Cypriot psychiatrist.

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46. Cf. Thomas F. Farr, "Overcoming the Cyprus Tragedy: Let Cypriots be Cypriot", *Mediterranean Quarterly*, Vol. 8, Fall 1997, pp. 32-62; also Marcia Christoff Kuroop, "Greece and Turkey, Can They Mend Fences?," in *Foreign Affairs*, January/February 1998, Vol. 77, No. 1, esp. pp. 11b, where she recommends a Greek-Turkish Non-Aggression Pact overseen by the US as well as maintaining current Greek bases and active development of economic ties between business elites of the two countries (p. 12b).

47. Cf. *General Grivas* edited by Charles Foley (NY, Praeger, 1964).

48. For ESA and the Junta's brutality, cf. James Becket's revealing survey of repression *Barbarism in Greece with a Foreword by Senator Claiborne Pell* (NY, Walker and Co., 1970.) Becker was an Amnesty International lawyer married to a Greek, while Pell is the retired and widely respected ex-senior US Senator from the state of Rhode Island.

49. Cf. Public Information Office, Republic of Cyprus, "Turkey's Expansionist Designs on Cyprus: The Role of TMT' Nicosia, September, 1979.

50. Cf. Demetrios A. Theophylactou, *Security, Identity, and Nation Building. Cyprus a, the European Union in Comparative Perspective* (Avebury/Brookfield USA, Avebury, 1995), p. 152. See also, Brendan O'Malley and Ian Craig, *The Cyprus Conspiracy, America, Espionage and the Turkish Invasion* (London/N, J.B. Tauris Publishers, 1999). See also Kostas Venizelos & Mixalis Ignatiou, *Ta Mistika Arxeia Tou Kisintzer, I Apofasi gia Dixotomisi (The Secret Archives of Kissinger, the Decision for Partition)* (Athens, Ekdotikos Organismos Livani, 2002). These works as well as Hitchens (*op. cit.*), hold Nixon's Secretary of State Henry A. Kissinger personally responsible in large measure for the "July Days" of 1974 and the resulting partition of Cyprus.

51. *Cyprus, RoC Embassy Newsletter, March 2000*, p. 1c.

52. Cf. f.n. 2 *supra*.

53. US Agency for International Development, web page, (<http://usaid.gov/country/ee.cy>, p. 1.

54. For a thoughtful view of the Turkish situation, cf. Neophytes G. Loizides, "The Politics of Nationalism in the Eastern Mediterranean: Greek-Turkish Dilemmas and the Cyprus EU Accession Process," MS. Delivered to the Seventh ASN Convention, New York, 12-14April 2002. For a typical Turkish view, cf. columnist Erol Manisali's column, "Understanding Turkish-European Relations, in *Cumhuriyet* as reported in CYPRUS LIST of 14 June 2002, 16:27:06 + 0300 by Ismet Ustuner. Manisali accuses the EU of trying to delay Turkey becoming a EU member and the "unilateral" EU-Turkish Customs Union of constituting "colonial order" against Turkey. For a very thoughtful review of "Turkey's EU Struggle Enters New Phase," cf. Mohammad Nouredine's article in *The Daily Star* (Lebanese News) a reported by Nick <ru4real\_u@YAHOO.CO.UK to CYPRUS LIST of 4 January 2002 19:465:08 + 0000. Nouredine reviews the entire Turkish effort to join the EU over the period 2000-2001. He notes that "All Turkish political currents, secular or Islamist, right- or left-wing have always eyed European behaviour suspiciously....." The Turks, both secularists and Islamists have taken to repeating a slogan which says "the West wants to divide Turkey... and have accused the EU of being a 'Christian club' and... suggested The Accession Partnership Document' was a 112-article virtual political, economic, and institutional roa map which Turkey has to implement to gain EYU membership. ... [which would amount to creating-GC] a 'new Turkey'", p. 1. In short, Nouredine is not very sanguine that Turkey is prepared to make the "drastic judicial, economic and political changes" requisite for EU membership.