

Irredentism Lite: The New Syntax of Domination and the Semantic Indexicality of a Postmodern Experience

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Introduction

Enosis was experienced in the past as an outlet of redemption but also as an allegory of existential deadlock with interesting and yet unsurveyed repercussions. In this essay I examine the charismatic afterlives of irredentist power and the semantic displacements involved in the syntax of domination. For this reason I argue for the need to reshuffle the theoretical agenda in order to trace irredentism's resilient mutations and be able to gain a more comprehensive understanding of its scope in an age in which nation-states restructure their power in the context of inter-statal associations. Ultimately the critical thrust of this essay seeks to counter hasty and lightweight arguments which claim that Cypriot nationalisms are stalemated in a cul-de-sac and which assert that Cypriot society is undergoing a phase of post-nationalism after its accession to the EU.

1. The Resilient Afterlife of Irredentism and the Necessity for Reshuffling Theoretical Agendas (from Weber to Castoriadis to Žižek)

In "The Social Psychology of World Religions" Weber argues that "it is not ideas but material and ideal interests that directly govern men's conduct". Yet very frequently the world images that have been created by ideas have, like switchmen, determined the tracks along which action has been pushed by the dynamic of interest. "*From what*" and "*for what*" one wished to be redeemed, and let us not forget, "*could be redeemed*", depended upon one's image of the world.¹ Although it is *interests* rather than *ideas* which provide the impetus for social change, at the end it is *world images* which decide which way action in the pursuit of interests shall go. In examining the social and psychological forces that shaped the irredentist outlook of Greek-Cypriot nationalism I surmise that the compelling force of the image of enosis was partly an *ideological simulation* of the interests of a specific stratum but it also reflected the *utopian insight* of creative individuals, religious innovators and virtuosos venturing too near the edge of the cliff such as Makarios III. The political socialisation of the irredentist ideal of enosis therefore appeared at moments to reflect Karl Mannheim's dialectic between a *conseNative ideological function* on one hand and a *utopian potential for heretic radicalism*, on the other.²

In the case of Cyprus this utopian potential appeared to be in outright opposition with the geopolitical line-up of the western alliance during the cold war. The overall geopolitical fallacy in which it was operating further reinforced the sectarian heterodoxy of enosis.

According to Marx ideology does not simply serve the psychological need of the dominant class for legitimation nor does it simply junk-up or desensitise the lower classes with social opium. Besides being a narcotic treatment for the subordinate classes, the hegemonic mindframe of the age resonates the sigh of the oppressed and occasionally reflects the heart of a heartless world and the spirit of a spiritless age.³ Marx seems to allow for an outlet of conflict, opposition and revolt within the hegemonic frame of the reigning ideology. Subordinate classes might never be able to break away from the hegemonic frame of reference but they can still appropriate *domains of hegemony* and put them into oppositional uses. The hegemonic image of enosis, for instance did not bear the same uniform signification for all classes. *Enosis was signified and resignified from contradictory class locations, from right and left and therefore was singularised in antagonistic fashion from above and below.* Oral reports by witnesses of that tumultuous era of the 1950s testify that the irredentist campaign of the left at the time met the malignant opposition and wrath of mainstream right-wing irredentism to the point where identifiable left-wing lodges in the countryside were systematically assaulted, in order to strike down and seize the Greek flags from their masts. Even the left's rather *casuistic irredentism* could not be tolerated because it seemed to be signifying in distorted fashion the radical potential of *plebeian republicanism*. The *hermeneutic indexicality* of a Greek flag masted on the balcony of a left-wing lodge in the 1950s was indexing much more than it was actually saying and it was precisely this *inner republican horizon* and *secular subtext* that were the real stakes involved in the short-lived episode of the equivocal and unreliable irredentism of the left. Sociological discourse on Greek- Cypriot irredentism is at last obligated to start elucidating existing and fundamental ethnomethodological distinctions between *referential* i.e. primary, prompt and linear semantic associations and those which are *indexical*, contingent and random. The sociological import of this distinction must be understood in terms of the historical and ethnographic specificities of left-wing and right- wing irredentisms along with hybrid combinations in between. We can no longer account for Greek-Cypriot irredentism as an invariable structure when there is ample ethnographic testimony that the social interaction of meaning in that context was *unstable, variant* and *risky*. The field so far is suffused with analyses which accommodate the *syntactic* component of irredentism. They do not, however, account for the *indexical context* and the way in which meaning was generated in precarious, ongoing social interactions. These views rather tend to subsume meaning under syntactic components ignoring intuitive, active and resistant redeployments of the *hegemonic syntax of irredentism*. The reductionist grammar implicit in conventional approaches

to irredentism neglects reflexive processes which actively modified hegemonic irredentism in context-bound, indexical and semantic settings. We are no longer entitled to keep encoding enosis by using the syntax of a reified ideal. If irredentism was indeed an effective symbolic structure of the Greek-Cypriot lifeworld then we ought to shake off our syntactic assumptions and resist the comfort of pre-established meanings. We have formalised the syntax of irredentism too severely allowing meaning to be inordinately divorced from context. The cognitive shifts engendered by the semantic reflexivity of discrepant irredentisms were not ruled by an invariant syntax. *We have to rethink the invariant as contingent if we actually want to make sense of the semantic and indexical displacements in the syntactic structure of domination. The challenge is to reconsider the syntactic density of power along with semantic idiosyncrasy.*

As it was argued above Cypriot sociology so far has failed to identify the parameters of the *hermeneutic indexicality* and *moral complexity* of the *clash of irredentisms* dramatised within the Greek-Cypriot community. It has also failed to identify and do the necessary justice to the fact that the public ethos favouring independence emerged gradually from the ranks of this *pragmatic* and I would say *reflexive irredentism*. This was indeed a borderline and precarious irredentism which in the face of geopolitical adversity and the risk of partition shifted to independence maintaining only a nominal and trivialised attachment to the ungraspable ideal of enosis. This kind of cogitative and *prudential irredentism* emerging precariously from a charismatic background and despite its inherent performative contradictions was constantly on the verge of converting to a pro- independence course of action. In fact it was Makarios himself, the virtuoso prophet of enosis who actually casted his charismatic prestige upon the baseborn idea of independence thus ending its ignoble status especially after 1964 and his consequential disapproval of the Acheson plan which provided for *conditional enosis* involving territorial compensations for Turkey in Cyprus. The very cogency and legitimacy of the disreputable idea of independence is to a great extent indebted to the Makarios leadership. Whatever traces of a percolating irredentism can still be detected in Makarios' public oratory after 1964 were only vestiges of a growingly hesitant and *reluctant irredentism* that was straining the concept of enosis to a breaking point and was for this very reason eliciting even more sonorous, verbose, and overblown irredentist opposition from the militant right-wing fringes.

Be that as it may, the heavy legacy of this *ruminative irredentism* which proved sufficiently resilient and responsive to change when it was mostly needed, issued nonetheless into a *majoritarian republicanism* that was ill-fitted to pay the necessary tribute to consociational symbiosis i.e. by making a *demarche* toward constitutional power-sharing with the Turkish-Cypriot community. The problem with both Greek-Cypriot as well as Turkish-Cypriot scholarship is that they systematically fail to

either soberly re-evaluate the nuances and moral complexity involved in the *constructive irredentism* represented by Makarios (in opposition to the grandiloquent and inflated irredentism of the right-wing fringes) along with the majoritarian adventurism inherent in it. We therefore have to distinguish between two levels of analysis comprising a more generous re-thinking of the clash of Greek- Cypriot irredentisms with an eye on the gradual emergence of a republican spirit of constitutional loyalism between 1964 and 1974 but contradicted at the same time by a reckless majoritarianism emanating from the very same republican wing of Greek-Cypriot constitutional patriotism which alienated and marginalised the Turkish-Cypriots.

In my view the irredentist meaning of enosis has not been completed yet. Its meaning is never completed. April 1, 1955 in the Greek-Cypriot cultural imagination cannot be celebrated simply as a "fool's day" nor can it be baited so that it can be celebrated as a surrogate independence day by way of double dealing. Much remains unsaid in what is already said about enosis.

Taking up reflections of Maurice Merleau-Ponty from "The Sayable and the Unsayable" I would argue that there is always something other and more to be said than what has already been said, *but knows nothing beyond the fact* that it is not completed by what has already been said. There are new resourceful, vexatious and offensive visualisations as well as imaginary accomplishments of enosis. The latter still remains an unstated but compelling subtext of the confrontation between Left and Right in Greek-Cypriot politics. It remains an indispensable component of the symbolic repertoire of right-wing power because it embodies the fundamental distinction that traverses the political field: in Schmittian terms enosis speaks the *friend/foe vernacular*. Enosis furnishes the Right with the necessary credentials of heterodoxy and radicalism which are resources of cardinal symbolic value in the *classificatory struggles* against the Cypriot Left's muffled and subdued culture of insubordination. By sustaining enosis as an active background component of its symbolic repertoire the Right is enabled to capture a considerable nominative power of claiming a period of charismatic political creativity thus reducing the Left to a self-professed avantgarde *leading from the rear*. Hence, although the Right was effectively proved to be a conservative force• it did manage to engage in advanced *classificatory struggles of distinction'* with a progressive but rearguard Left. Enosis unavoidably implies a *friend/foe* distinction which classifies the Right as Hellenic and the Left as *something other* than that, a shifting signifier which periodically and in terms of temporal succession denotes "anti-hellenism", "Russian Communism", "atheism", "philo-Turkism", "Cyprocentrism", "lack of cultural refinement" lack of nerve, prowess, lack of the gallant virtues of Hellenic valour. One way or the *other* the Left is defined as *lack* with the Right embodying the flawless legitimate and straightened norms of Hellenic propriety and rectitude. The

veiled controversial debate concerning the desirability or the rightness of enosis and the irredentist guerrilla war indicates once more that history is about the creation of meaning and that there can be only a comprehension *ex post facto* of its meaning. The institutionalisation of enosis by the media, the party system and government agencies as well as the elucidation of its status is still a distressing issue as it was very tellingly expressed by vehement remonstrations of the former Clerides government which faulted its Greek counterpart for licensing revisionist and iconoclastic accounts of the EOKA movement to appear in high school textbooks in mainland Greece.

The growing pressure by relatives for the rehabilitation of left-wing activists and trade-unionists executed by EOKA for treason and disloyalty to the cause of enosis is an equally contentious issue fraught with Greek-Cypriot society's unexamined dependence on a disguised irredentist ontology. The Right cannot undertake the political cost for the rehabilitation of unjustly executed EOKA victims because it desperately needs a certain *poetics of well-deserved violence* in order to hold the Left accountable for its faltering attitude toward enosis between 1955-1959. Enosis remains still an integral part of the Right's self-legitimation⁶. It is an incessant disguised longing upon which the Right hankers restlessly. Most importantly, however, the *poetics of well deserved violence* associated with the irredentist uprising affords the Right-wing lager an *elegiac release from the control of reason; a balladry of poetic violence* which compensates for the Right's compulsive-neurotic subordination to the new order of independence. This narrative balladry about enosis signifies a denotative and allegorical emancipation from the Right's own bureaucratic engrossment in the *raison d'être* of the Republic. The Right seems to waver between the *instituted Republic* and this *instituting agency*, - what Castoriadis calls an ontology of magma - which is a *fluid substrate* of its own accredited but decomposed and foggy republicanism. Access to the European Union is in this respect an obsessive escape from the predicament of a nebulous and murky republicanism. Accession to the European Union becomes thus a *subsidiary union* with Greece, an oblique '*rhiprastic enosis* which sublimates and refines the Right's elegiac poetics of violence along with a precarious reconciliation between its *indecorous* and *unstylised republicanism* on one hand and the military grandeur and heroic splendour of its irresistible irredentism on the other.

It is for this reason that no sustained public debate over enosis can take place within Greek-Cypriot politics. The virtual possibility of an *oblique enosis* by way of integration in the European Union makes redundant the moral emergency for such a debate. Enosis has been traditionally the Right's foremost *imaginary institution* and in this respect it is the Republic's hidden, imaginary transcript. *Alienation*, according to Castoriadis *occurs when the imaginary moment in the institution becomes autonomous and predominates, which leads to the institution's becoming*

autonomous and predominating with respect *to society... in other words* [society] *does not recognise in the imaginary of institutions something that is its own product.*⁷ It is not the nature of the republican institutions as such but the *unreflexive relationship* of society to its own *imaginary institutions* which accounts for systematically distorted public communication.

The "European Union" for the right-wing imaginary is a "stand-in" metaphor for the lost object, the renounced libidinal object of enosis. The way Greek-Cypriot right-wing politicians identify with the "European Union" has a strong affectual and libidinal resonance similar to the cold war "Soviet Union" of the AKELites and the "Hettas" of the first generation irredentists, alt elevated to the status of untouchable authority. Hence right-wing reprehension with regard to left-wing euroscepticism stands in as a *temporary stopgap* for the farmer's indignation against the latter's equivocation with respect to enosis.

One could reasonably argue that the "European Union" has domesticated the offensive right-wing *romanticism of well deserved violence* directed randomly against Turkish-Cypriots in general and Greek-Cypriot leftists in particular. The ritual value of the "European Union" is that it sacrifices enosis, the innermost parts of the *slaughtered ideal* (its heart and intestines), allowing nonetheless the enjoyment of a nourishing meal of the remaining meat. And yet, although right-wing discourse apparently seems to stick to the "European Union" as an embodiment of the rule of moderation, it produces an excess out of moderation itself. Greek-Cypriot press coverage and political discourse accounting for the EU Athens Convention for the signing of the accession treaty by candidate members (16 April, 2003) actually indulged in intemperate self-gratification⁸ underscoring the fact that this diplomatic breakthrough signified a first rate Greek-Cypriot victory, the most eventful and far-reaching in consequences Greek triumph since the disgraceful defeat of 1974. ⁹By resisting its transgressive and self-destructive desire for enosis, the Right seems to invest in an equally brassy, imperious and hawkish manner in "European moderation" generating thus the ideological excess of a surplus enjoyment. The ideological surplus value of the "European Union" as a source of right-wing enjoyment is that it operates as an *affectual and libidinal displacement of enosis*. It operates in accordance to the logic of what Slavoj Zizek calls *theoretical stopgap*¹⁰ instead of enabling us to think the implications accruing from irredentism's *multiple afterlives* and their articulation with European power, this *stopgap* relieves us from the duty to think; it forecloses the debate. And the debate is that although the Right seems to strike a proper distance from its "lethal ideal" of enosis attempting in this sense to make inroads into the Turkish-Cypriot community, it finds itself indirectly immersed into the imaginary displacement of this ideal, enjoying that is its very proximity. Although the "European Union" seems to increase the distance from enosis, at the same time it seems to reduce it. This is precisely what makes a

disingenuous gesture, namely the extension of right-wing sympathy for Turkish-Cypriot mobilisations in support of the Annan plan along with an exhibitionist display of servitude to the Greek government portrayed as the patronising benefactor, godfather and mainstay of Cyprus' former success.¹¹

2. Postmodern Romance and the Metastasis of Enjoyment on the Irredentist Frontier

The "European Union" is unmistakably a new status-legend which neutralises the earlier "punitive order" of independence. Indeed for the irredentist imagination independence embodies a penal, disciplinary and correctional continuum which was resentfully endured for decades. Not accidentally in the 1970s and 1980s marginal anarcho-maoist groups crystallised around the bookstore "Octovriana" (commemorating the 1931 irredentist uprising) and the "Aigaeon" bookstore, restaurant as well as institutional site of postmodern irredentist fermentation produced analyses which framed independence as a regressive, power hungry, mendacious, corrupt and viciously puritanical regime having a vested interest in a law-and-order provincial stagnation protective of bureaucratic officialdom which encumbered cultural regeneration inspired by the *haute culture* of irredentist Hellenism. The independent state was portrayed as a *technical exigency* which ensured order instead of justice. In their eyes *state law* and *police* became identical, for law was no longer anything but an instrument of the state. In this anti-disciplinary Foucaultian sense the anarcho-maoist groupuscules which firmly sustained the creative power of the irredentist romance were on the whole regarded as *enemies of state* although they themselves advocated integration into another equally repressive state. What is important in my reconstruction of Hellenism's thrilling *affaire de creur* is that from the standpoint of the sociology of law, this peculiar subculture regarded law as a mere technique for assuring order and that order was the application of the bureaucratic *will of the state*. Actually much of the right-wing critique directed against AKEL's folkloristic Cyprocentrism has successfully filtered and streamlined variants of this highly eclectic postmodern re-enchantment of enosis among trendy intellectual circles. Today it is also true that this anti-statal impetus of hereditary irredentism directed against the consolidation of Neo-cypriot power fits well with the neo-liberal reforms required by EU directives.

Many luminaries including Greek ambassadors are reported to have frequented "Aigaeon" in the late 1970s, 1980s and 1990s, thus lending extra glamour to the sidelined but still seductive idealism of enosis. Prominent civic-minded *cognoscenti* who emerged from the ranks of late postcolonial neo-irredentism are currently pursuing valuable careers in mainstream journalism and politics¹² practicing a *streamlined* and *inferential irredentism*. Thus accession to the European Union reflects among other things a certain apocryphal *anarcho-rightist poetics of*

resentment disguising a rational interest for *ideal compensations* against decades of psychological tribulation under the lacklustre and philistine order of a spiritless independence. But for the blue-eyed postmodern irredentist aristocracy of mainstream Hellenocentrism, full membership in the EU and further downsizing of independence yields right-wing bliss by rationalising the psychic extraordinariness and orgiastic romanticism of the apparitional and legendary irredentism of the EOKA generation.

In Slavoj Žižek's terms independence signified a *theft of enjoyment*. Now reformed irredentists can gleefully compromise with a still valuable *ersatz enjoyment*, a kind of *cognitively rationalised stopgap* for the self-destructive irredentist intoxication of the EOKA generation. Ultimately it signifies a Weberian shift from the *patrimonial* and *patriarchal irredentism* of EOKA's charismatic generation to a *rational-juristic irredentism* effectively transcoded and diffused in the processes of EU's inter-governmental federalisation which of course involves Greece. It is a much more speculative, inferential, *federal euro-irredentism* which yields no less bliss but shifts dramatically the *scope of domination* from the post-colonial orgiastic irredentism of the first generation to a more *business-like, efficient, eclectic, technically clean-cut and postmodern irredentism of the present*. It is an entertaining idea of lite irredentism fully consistent with Cyprus' entry into the realm of New Age mysticism, commodity fetishism, lifestyle politics, the stock-exchange, brainy neo-orthodox musings, fast-food and vegetarian sensibilities, fast cars and bicycles, Champions League and Erasmus projects, gerontocracy and feminism, management gurus and hero-cults, Christmas and St. Valentine's Day, Iron Maiden and national anthems, reading horoscopes and then confessing to the venerable Churchmen, queer pet-lovers and Turk-haters, petty bourgeois scientific ethos and *hommes de lettres*, coloured underdogs and *nouveau riches*. The above New Age contradictions of Cyprus' hyperreality which now undergoes a mutation through integration in the hyperspace of Europe allows only for a *simulated generation of differences and second-hand truths*.¹³

There seems to be a genetic miniaturisation of irredentism as a dimension of simulation. *It is no longer measured against the ideal*. It is produced from molecular narratives legitimised by stylishly correct electronic fantasies, memory banks and capitalist command models. Having effaced the contradiction between the actual and the imaginary, postmodern irredentism can no longer be ideal but simply centreless and *operational in a hyperspace without atmosphere*, trading off memories with packaged fantasies and second-hand truths. Stripped of its spontaneous seductive validity it now enjoys a more *versatile optimum validity*. Irredentism now is framed by new structures of cultural space and time made possible by informational networks, transnational communication and cash exchange which contain innumerable hyperreal constructs and image-flows of

virtual enosis centred around Greek soap opera stars, fashion models, soccer clubs, satellite academic cognoscenti, pop singers, star journalists. These are routinely pieced together, continuously recoded and countercoded creating new servitudes, fixations and grids of consent. And yet this new digitalisation of enosis in the screened spaces of mediascapes, this new *satellite irredentism* affords contemporary Greek-Cypriots the possibility of completing their own individual scripts so as to match the fantasies partially promised on the screens. It is a kind of "do-it-yourself" enosis which discloses new sources of mystification, power and domination in the production and consumption of meaning; a *do-it-yourself irredentism* which reflects a dimension of utopian fulfilment melting into the hyperreality of late capitalism's technological humanism. It corresponds to a postmodern tribalism consisting not of *ascribed Gemeinschaft* but of *achieved communion* defined by social, educational and spatial mobility. Postmodern tribafisation to which Greek-Cypriot irredentism corresponds could be an intense but also unstable sociation replacing the premodern or early modern *logic of identity* with a more superficial and *tactile logic of identification*. It is a *civic parody*, a mocking travesty of EOKA irredentism aspiring to a new Greece staged as a fantasyland of a belatedly successful modernisation, a leisure space for weekly shopping trips, relaxation and night-clubbing, indeed *irredentism as a civic culture of consumption*.

This banal habitual irredentism, or irredentism lite is predominantly frontstage, generates new vicarious performativities, it has no public sphere but only public stage. I therefore suggest that we rethink Greek-Cypriot irredentism as a fractal and oblique narrative, a fragmented phenomenon reproduced at different surrogate scales structured through travel circuits, diverse mobilities and the lateral satellite axes of a commercialised diaspora. All these reconstruct the irredentist heritage by unfixing and liquidating conventional signifiers of irredentist Greekness. It is an uprooted irredentism that no longer dwells authentically in the legendary and enchanted woodlands of EOKA. It is rather constituted through virtual mobilities, incessant travelling digital networks and satellite dishes, a mere abstraction of global technology and economy and above all a postmodern reverie induced by Greek-Cypriot *edutainment*¹⁴ which increasingly dedifferentiates education and entertainment, textual analysis and visual imagery, student citizenship and consumership.

Notes

1. Max Weber (1970) 'The Social Psychology of World Religions', in Gerth, H. and Mills, C. W. (eds.), *From Max Weber: Essays in Social Theory* (London, Routledge), p. 280.
2. Karl Mannheim (1960) *Ideology and Utopia* (London).
3. Karl Marx (1955) *On Religion* (Moscow, Moscow Publishers), p. 42.
4. The Right consistently opposed the enhancement of Higher Education (especially Anglophone education) as well as the foundation of the University of Cyprus fearing further consolidation of Cyprocentrism and severing of the ties with metropolitan Hellenism.
5. Pierre Bourdieu (1984) *Distinction* (London, Routledge).
6. So much so that Kati Clerides, a self-proclaimed avatar and pioneer of rapprochement politics within the right-wing lager feels obliged to periodically display evidence of steadfast ritual obedience and unwavering allegiance to the ethnocentric values of her lager by publicly attending April 1 commemoration ceremonies organised by EOKA veteran clubs or by making momentous appearances in funeral ceremonies such as the one held for the deceased coupist Nicos Sampson
7. Cornelius Castoriadis (1987) *The Imaginary Institution of Society* (Cambridge, Mass. MIT Press), p. 132.
8. The same holds true for the mainland Greek press, the liberal Eleftherotypia, 18 April, 2003, "Pancyriot Arousal".
9. Widespread jubilation over this nirvanic smash-hit allowed several luminaries invited to radio debates and T.V. talk shows to remind all the bemused and unmindful ones about the disgrace Greek-Cypriots would have suffered had they endorsed during the preceding period the proposed Annan plan which provided for a transitional period of co-presidency. Could anybody on earth imagine, they argued, the despicable Turk Denktash setting his hand on the documents of such a *tour de force* at the foothill of the most *awe-inspiring* shrine of Western civilisation, our Acropolis? The important thing is that although some of the invited guests did raise objections with regard to an outright rejection of the Annan plan, they did not challenge the *racist reflexivity* of Greek-Cypriot self-love and conceit. The *syntax of domination* remained intact. It was not forced by other participants or journalists to perform *semantic displacements*.

In another interesting occasion exemplifying the visiting dignitary's slip-up, the Greek Prime-minister Costas Simitis (during his welcome reception at Nicosia's Hilton two days after the conclusion of Cyprus' accession treaty in Athens 16 April, 2003) blundered in the midst of gripping excitement by saying that "Cypruseventually achieved enosis". Realising his lapsus he amended with a smirk: "...I mean accession to *evropaiki enosis* (European Union). During the state dinner that followed right after, President Papadopoulos had no misgivings

to elucidate Simitis' lapsus by awarding him an illustrated gravure featuring Cyprus gratuitously close to mainland Greece. The Cypriot president and ex-EOKA activist was unequivocal in emphatically coding "Europe" as "Greece": "Now Cyprus is not only in close proximity to Europe (displayed on the map by Greece in the role of Europe's proxy) it is also *inside it.*", meaning Cyprus as a geographical extension of Greece and therefore of Europe itself.

Evidently Simitis did not slip-up at Hilton. The next day, 18 April, 2003, and right before addressing the Cyprus parliament the Greek Prime-minister paid his tribute to *phi/akismena mnemata*, the enclosed graveyard inside the penitentiary where the British confined members of EOKA waiting in the death row.

10. Slavoj Žižek (2001) *Did Somebody Say Totalitarianism?* (Verso), p. 138.

11. DISY chairman Nicos Anastasiades in one such spectacular gesture during a social gathering honouring UN General Secretary K. Annan removed in front of the cameras his own coat lapel badge featuring "Cyprus" and pinned it on Denktash's son.

12. The celebrated radio-broadcaster Lazares Mavros who dominates morning airwaves along with the urbane and classy DISY, M.P. Prodromos Prodromou are such examples.

13. Jean Baudrillard (1983) *Simulations* (New York, Semiotext), pp. 4, 12-13. The term *edutainment* is innovatively used by John Urry (2000) in *Sociology beyond Societies*, (Routledge).