

Turkish-Cypriot Nationalism: Its History And Development (1571-1960)

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Abstract

This article aims to trace the creation and development of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism on Cyprus. The article also aims at understanding the power of this "second" nationalism in Cyprus, as a reactive force vis-a-vis the already developed Greek-Cypriot nationalism. While the intellectual birth of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism and its initial spread as an ideological child of mainland Turkish nationalism had very little to do with Greek Cypriots and their already developed nationalism, its growth and final form came to be conditioned as that of a response and reaction to Greek-Cypriot nationalism. The partitionist nature, uncompromising ideology, and the militant character that Turkish-Cypriot nationalism would acquire by the 1950s ensured that cohabitation and compromise with the Greek-Cypriot community would be ousted as political choices by the nationalist Turkish-Cypriot elites, with the known devastating results.

The article examines the growth of a religious minority, symbiotic and flexible in character, and integrationist in social and economic attitude, into a monolithic nationalist force that was open to the outside intervention of Turkey and the British colonial government. The two basic characteristics of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, the belatedness of its growth and the contingency of its materialisation stand out as crucial factors in understanding its nature as well as its effects on the political history of Cyprus. Together with the analysis of the evolution, ontology and cohesion of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism, an attempt is made to juxtapose and compare Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot nationalism on the island. Finally an attempt is made to demonstrate how the lack of options that the Cypriots had in the late 1950s for forging an independent political existence, free of strife and conflict, were both a product of the formulations of nationalism on the island, as well as a result of external intervention and imposed options for a solution.

The Ottoman Conquest

The Ottoman conquest of Cyprus in 1571, was part of the rapid expansion of that Islamic Empire in the southeastern Mediterranean, and simultaneously of the

decline of European influence and control in that part of the world. The Ottomans were initially greeted as liberators of the island by its local inhabitants who had suffered the authoritarian and despotic rule of their Venetian overlords. The Ottomans brought to Cyprus an administrative system, religiously-inspired social structures, and a style of governance, already established in the rest of the Empire. Unlike other Ottoman possessions though, Cyprus was different in the fact that it experienced the import of human capital, and a significant change in demographics, through the Muslim population that was transplanted on the island.¹ The Ottomans brought their officials, the human capital that would form the backbone of the Empire's administrative machine on the island, and a superior caste, which would prove instrumental in ruling the Christians of Cyprus. On the orders of the Ottoman Emperor Selim II, a colonisation policy was adopted in September 1572 to encourage Turkish immigration to the island.²

The Ottoman immigrants were settled on land left behind by the old Latin aristocracy, the Venetian bureaucrats, Catholic priests, and soldiers of the previous regime, most of whom had been massacred during the siege or following the island's conquest.³ Although interspersed throughout the island's rural and urban concentrations, these initial settlers, whose demographic percentages fluctuated during the first centuries of Ottoman rule,⁴ were primarily rural dwellers who practiced in large part agriculture and farming. Apart from the higher caste of initial settlers who became administrators of the Ottoman bureaucratic machine and its religious or military representatives, the rest entered the social fabric of a rural working class that was *very* close and similar to its Greek-Cypriot counterpart. The nature of village life, the *modus vivendi* of an interdependent pattern of economic relations, and the shared cultural experience brought Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot peasants close in cohabitation and mentality for the centuries to come.

Thus was formed the social material of what would later come to constitute the Turkish-Cypriot community of the island. The Ottoman rulers, following their social and political model already imposed on the rest of the Empire, introduced to Cyprus the intricate *millet* system.⁵ As such, they conferred an ethnarchic role upon the Church of Cyprus, which had been seriously repressed during the previous Venetian and Frankish periods of rule. Furthermore, as was the case with the *Rum millet*⁶ of the Balkans, the Christian population of Cyprus became the dominant element in the affairs of trade and commerce, thus forming in the years that followed a well-defined and educated middle class.

These two characteristics (an organised cultural institution such as the Orthodox Church and a middle class) that so crucially and decidedly affected the development of Greek-Cypriot nationalism were absent in the experience of the Turkish Cypriots. By virtue of belonging to the ruling social milieu, and therefore a

superior social group as compared to the Christian community, the Muslims of the country did not develop a political or cultural institution that would counterbalance the Church of Cyprus, as a body which institutionalised not only religion, but also political influence and economic power. The structure of the state in Cyprus during the Ottoman years, as well as later with the British takeover, gave undoubted superiority to Muslims, who were preferred for government, military and judicial posts.⁷ Beyond that, and in administrative matters, the "nominal membership of Muslims in the ruling group" was even more explicit. According to Attalides,

"The system which the British found in Cyprus in 1878 was as follows: Each administrative district of Cyprus was governed by a body composed of five Muslim and two Christian members. Judicial tribunals had five members. A *Kadi* presided over two Christian and two Muslim members.. .Ordinary Christians were not even allowed to give evidence in the Tribunals until the Tanzimat⁹ reforms [wealthy Christians often used bribery with members of the Tribunals]."

As far as public administration went, Attalides notes that

"Even in 1872, after the Tanzimat, there were only 26 Greeks in public employment in Cyprus and those were in low positions."•

Owing also to the difference in religious organisation (and lack of rigid hierarchy) proscribed under Islam, the Muslims of Cyprus were left without a centripetal representative body¹⁰ that could draw and organise the internal dynamics of their society into a strong representational force. Being superior by ascription, the Muslims did not need to invest in institutions; their position in society, as well as their opportunities for advancement, were guaranteed by their status as the representatives of Islam among a sea of Christian infidels.

There was also the issue of economic organisation and outlook, which would come to play a significant role in the character that Turkish-Cypriot nationalism would adopt. The Muslim community's traditional and relatively backward economic position remained overall static and unevolved in the centuries of Ottoman and British rule. There existed the class of Ottoman administrators and bureaucrats, as well as that of military men, that was created in the Ottoman years and was more or less kept intact by Britain with the 1878 take-over. This population was a vital component of the existing political and economic status quo and for that it saw no reason to oppose it or to embrace ideas (such as nationalism) that could be conducive to its destruction.

In the towns, the Muslim population was more often than not found in professions such as arts and crafts. Beyond that, the bulk of the Muslim population of Cyprus was defined by a rural, semi-feudal outlook; land workers and farmers in

the rural countryside on the one hand and some land-owning families on the other. Neither of these two segments of the population would be prone to the calls of nationalism; the former due to the mere parochialism and conservatism of their socio-economic situation and the latter because the pattern of inherited land ownership was to be protected in its feudal Ottoman character from the advances of political modernity and nationalism.

Both these factors¹¹ were crucial in defining the Muslim community's role as a latecomer in the ideology and political programme of nationalism. The community's economic status did not encourage the development of a Turkish-Cypriot bourgeoisie and as such did not foster the birth of middle class politics and ideology that the Greek Cypriots experienced. Furthermore, the lack of such an economic and social milieu prevented the Turkish Cypriots from being exposed to the nineteenth century revolutionary trends of thought; education,¹² where it existed, was the experience of a small elite, which had more to gain from the maintenance of the political system than from either its radical transformation or its overthrow.

Another factor that accounted for the late development of nationalism within the Muslim population of Cyprus was the belatedness of Turkish mainland nationalism. The sources of loyalty and allegiance for the Turkish Cypriots continued to be until the first quarter of the twentieth century highly local and parochial: the family, the village community, the local ruler and oftentimes Islam. A *vatan*, in the sense of a political fatherland, which could draw their ideological yearnings, was still inexistent in the nineteenth century and in the first two decades of the twentieth century.

Unlike the Greek-Cypriot case, where a national state had been in existence since 1830, and where a mutual and dependent relationship was formed between metropolis and periphery from early on (as regards ideology, politics and education), the Muslim population of the island had no such national haven from which to draw and be drawn to. The Muslims of Cyprus were Ottoman in their orientations and beliefs, and paid tribute and respect to the Sublime Porte and Allah. Furthermore, being a relatively conservative population of Muslims, they hardly followed the modernising trends that were taking place in Turkey, and resolutely refused for a significant period of time to aspire to the ideology and reforms of the Young Turks. Kemalism took more than a decade after its establishment in mainland Turkey, to become a significant force in Turkish-Cypriot politics. Thus, by the mere lack of a national state, the Muslims of Cyprus lurked behind in their espousal of nationalism as a doctrine and a mass ideology to be seriously reckoned with.

For the reasons described above, the birth and growth of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism became a matter of contingency. In fact, what triggered nationalism's

abrupt emergence and rapid development was the constellation of three external forces: first, the British policy of divide and rule, second, the involvement of Turkey, and lastly, the militant phase of Greek-Cypriot *enosis*.

The Change of Rule: The Colonial Period

When the British came to Cyprus in 1878 they found a society that was still considerably poor, relatively backward, and with low levels of education. Although the Orthodox *millet* was already in contact with Western ideas via the Kingdom of Greece, little progress had been made in terms of actual modernisation of the political, economic and social character on the island. Cypriot society was largely still Ottoman in its outlook, with some educated elites, but in large part mostly conservative and parochial.

Both Muslim and Orthodox Cypriots accepted and greeted the British change of rule. The Orthodox religious elites hoped that the "democratic and freedom-loving Englishman" would some day soon hand over the island to Greece, a country whose history the British admired and respected, and whose past the British romantic philhellenes had so greatly idealised in the nineteenth century. Furthermore, the Greek-Cypriot masses were hoping that the new regime would relieve them from their wretched economic condition, a result of the overbearing Ottoman taxes and the economic mismanagement and financial malaise that characterised Ottoman rule in its latter stages. The Muslims themselves accepted in large part the British occupation without protest or resentment. As Beckingham writes,

"... They had indeed some reason to welcome British rule...It did not then seem likely that Great Britain and the Sultan would ever be at war, and since the Convention recognised Ottoman sovereignty and safeguarded Muslim institutions they had little reason to resist a regime which secured their status and their religious liberty under the aegis of the most powerful empire in the world."³

In addition, the Muslim peasants, much like their Orthodox counterparts, also accepted the change of sovereignty with delight, in hope of better economic conditions.

The British, as was shown from their experience in so many colonial dominions in the Middle East and Africa, little understood the social structures and delicate communal divisions that the Ottoman imperial system had established. Indeed in Cyprus they met with a very complex phenomenon; a Muslim numerical minority, that was poorer and less educated than the Orthodox majority but which had been politically franchised by virtue of being the notional ruling group on the island. By contrast, although the orthodox population was a numerical majority it was in all

respects an inferior community, with little military or administrative power and no political say over the status of the island.¹⁴ Lastly, the British came to an island with a population that was religiously and culturally heterogeneous, but which had managed to integrate itself well through the practices of economic and professional life.

For the British colonial officers the situation was defined and assessed through a Western lens of politics, civilisation, and culture through which nations and peoples were clearly segregated according to religion, language, and territory (the modern nation state) and where races, in the case of Cyprus Greeks and Turks, were in fierce and perpetual conflict for the definition and survival of one over another. From the very first days of British rule the colonial government began to categorise the Orthodox and Muslim populations of Cyprus as Greeks and Turks respectively, and took it upon itself to devise ways of balancing one against the other in order to guarantee the colonial safety and longevity of rule. For that reason the new rulers facilitated a process of identity reconstruction, by which communal identities previously defined in religious terms (*millet*s) were now being transformed into ethnically divided (and antagonistic) subjects. Previously apolitical differences were now presumed by the British as being highly political, and rudimentary forms of institutional representation were introduced through which antagonistic groups of Greeks and Turks were to pursue the protection of their assumed communal rights. This distorted view of society was one of the gravest and most important factors in forging the communal nationalist divide on the people of Cyprus.

Before proceeding to describe this intricate yet crucial phase of British colonial rule it bears mention that the British policy of political institutionalisation of communal differences (what has become known historically as the policy of divide and rule) was in the first decades of English rule perhaps an unconscious choice. The colonisers, acting according to their very own institutional and legal references, and their own understanding of majority-minority politics, chose to promote a political system that was democratic only in theory and that recognised divergent social groups as natural contestants in a political system where their neutralisation was the solution to healthy and peaceful colonial rule. The British chose to maintain the millet divisions, albeit with a considerably different interpretation, in order to avoid resistance to their rule and in an attempt to run the colonies according to a frame of reference that suited the British political mentality.¹⁵ When it became clear to the colonial authorities that this system was producing a deep social and communal divide, over which it became easier to rule, then this policy (that gained the infamous name of Divide and Rule) was adopted on a much more intentional and official level.

How did the British conceive of their rule in Cyprus, what were their goals, and

what the effects of their colonial take-over? Let us carry on now to examine the effects of British colonial rule on the development of national consciousness for the Muslim Cypriot component of the island's population.

As noted earlier, the Ottoman bureaucratic elite (civil and legal) that administered Cyprus at the time of the island's transfer to British control was kept almost intact by the island's new rulers. After all, the Cyprus Convention¹⁶ had called for a mere change of administration; the place remained under Ottoman sovereignty and nominal ownership. Whatever independent Islamic institutions existed, (such as the *Evka*¹⁷ were transferred without protest from Turkish-Cypriot administration to British, and slowly the Moslems came to form the backbone of the British administrative machine.¹⁸ This process created a certain solidarity between successors and predecessors, as the British came to consider the Muslim Cypriots a loyal population, while the latter thought of the English as a force of security and guarantee against Greek-Cypriot nationalism.

To return to the issue of the institutionalisation of social cleavages, it should be realised that the British saw on the island two national, antagonistic communities, those of Greeks and Turks. In fact the colonial rulers began using the ethnic terminology, before the populations began to identify themselves en masse as such. Treating the two communities in that manner, the British began to categorise the Muslims and Christians according to their cultural differences (language, religion), summed up by the criterion of ethnicity, a factor that had not yet been a defining one in Cypriot social stratification.¹⁹ Acting upon this perception, the colonial government introduced a political system which fortified such a division, and which rooted permanent fear and suspicion between the two communities.

Writing on the nature of the political system, including the Legislative Council that was introduced early on, A. Pollis comments:

"The British operated simultaneously in terms of two irreconcilable principles. On the one hand, they created representative legislative bodies, in which majority rule was to operate; on the other, they strengthened and institutionalised a non-democratic communal social system.²⁰

By imposing political identification of Muslim and Orthodox with their respective representatives in the Legislative Council (through voting procedures that required of the communities to vote exclusively for the representatives of their religious community) the English ensured an enforced solidarity among members of the same religious group and prevented democratic and free choice from being made by the Cypriots themselves.²¹ Furthermore, the composition of the Legislative Council (nine elected Greeks, three elected Turks, six British appointees, while the Governor maintained a casting vote) was aimed at neutralising the presumed

communal antagonism in favour of the colonial government.²² The British, it became clear from very early on, depended on the Muslims' votes in order to pass laws and make policy in a seemingly democratic way.

Most of the times this British political logic worked itself out in practice. It was challenged no doubt, by Englishmen like Captain Orr, who would observe in 1918,

"Whether it is wise to rely on the permanent hostility between two sections of the population to carry into effect the policy of the government is a matter of opinion."²³

Orr went on to explain this tactic by observing that

"It has been urged with some show of justice and considerable force that such a balancing of votes must tend to keep alive the racial animosity that *naturally* [italics added] exists in an island inhabited by a mixed Christian and Muslim population..."²⁴

Yet the political strategy of pitting one against another was kept well in place until the abolition of the Constitution and the Legislative Council in the aftermath of the 1931 uprising, and the introduction of Emergency Laws. As Choisi observes, "the danger of a common 'national cooperation' of Greek and Turkish Cypriots had to be avoided at all costs if the 'colonial peace' in Cyprus was to be retained."²⁵ The 1931 rejection of the budget by the common front of Greek and Turkish Cypriots on the Legislative Council (this was not the first instance of cooperation between the two elements),²⁶ one of the causes for the revolt itself, created alarm among British ranks, and was one of the basic reasons for the abolition of the constitution and the introduction of emergency laws. When a common front was created between Orthodox and Muslim on the island, (be it in matters political, economic or professional, e.g. the considerably powerful bi-communal workers associations) the British made sure to neutralise or dissolve it early on; most of the time these colonial tactics depended on the maintenance and fermentation of nationalist rhetoric which suggested a willingness for the mutually-assured destruction of the two communities.²⁷ Playing on the Muslims' serious fear of Enosis, the British were successful in distancing them from their Greek-Cypriot compatriots and in installing in them a primordial fear which became a key element in the character of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism.²⁸

In matters of education, the colonial government used methods that promoted communal segregation and nationalising acculturation. While the Cyprus government maintained the educational system that was inherited from the Ottoman period of rule (separate Christian and Muslim schools, as well as separate Boards of Education), it allowed the nationalist curricula to be imported directly from Greece, and later, in the 1920s from Turkey and to form the teaching material in the respective schools.²⁹ Books and educational material were sent directly from the

mainland's respective ministries, and dissemination of nationalist education as well as cultural nationalisation was allowed to flourish, especially in the Greek case. In addition, nationalist education was aided by the British decision to embark on a policy of increased education, aimed at reducing illiteracy. By 1918 they had succeeded in expanding the number of schools to 729 elementary schools and a number of secondary schools.³⁰

In the Greek-Cypriot case, the existence of a national motherland since the 1830s supported and allowed for education in the spirit of Hellenism to thrive. In the Turkish-Cypriot case, matters were a little bit different. The education that the Muslim community of the island received, until the 1920s, was religiously-centred, on the elementary level, and professionally-oriented, on the secondary level. After all, the educational materials came from an Ottoman homeland, and despite being in the Turkish language, these materials focused on a non-national culture where education in the spirit of Islam was the main pillar of knowledge. Yet in the early 1920s, when Kemalism was making its way into the school curricula of the newly established Turkish state, Muslim education in Cyprus too began to be affected by this new nationalist direction.

In the 1930s, and following the 1931 uprising, the British Government in Cyprus decided to guide the Cypriot educational system into a new path; that of denationalisation. The dissemination of nationalist doctrines in the communal schools began to present a direct threat to the colonial government; instead of turning one community against the other, nationalist education began to turn both against the colonial government; young educated Greek and Turkish Cypriots, well-versed by now in the ideas of their respective nationalisms, began to question the value and purpose of a foreign colonial rule that usurped them of their right to define and fulfil their political destiny. To prevent such a development from taking root on a wider scale the British decided to introduce new educational legislation in 1933, which among other things called for: the inter-communal standardisation of education, whereby Greek and Turkish histories and languages were taught as self-contained courses and not as education in national basics; primary education, under the complete control of the British government; the elimination of educational symbols that were considered as potentially nationalist material (maps, teaching of national anthems, celebration of mainland Greek and Turkish national holidays); the renaming of the Turkish *Lycee* into the Islamic *Lycee*; the overseeing, by the colonial administration, of the appointment of teaching staff for both communities.

The Greek-Cypriot community protested via its leaders with much vigour against these changes; after all, as opposed to the Muslim educational system, the Greek Cypriot one had been independent from British influence and directly linked to that of its motherland well into the 1930s. This attempt, which was seen as a policy of "de-hellenisation", was much worse than a mere refusal to change the sovereignty

of the island. It was a threat to the personal identity and culture of the island's people.³¹ On the Muslim side, although a reaction to the British educational changes did take place, it was generally limited, due to the fact that education had already been in large part under British influence and control. In addition, and perhaps most importantly, the strategic political alliances that the modernising Turkish-Cypriot elites were already forging with the colonial government, prevented the reaction to these changes from turning into a communal affair, or a widespread mass movement.

Nevertheless, the British educational reforms had come in too late, in terms of de-nationalisation, and perhaps at an unfortunate time. The nationalist curricula and educational values of the mainland had already made their way to Cyprus, and had managed to transplant on Cypriot soil, (albeit partially for the Muslim community), the symbolism of nationalistic antagonism between two "historical" enemies. The shared history of the people of the island, (which was marked by distinct differences from that of Turkey and Greece), the communal integration, and the common values of a pre-modern society would be brushed aside in time in favour of identification (and therefore segregation) with the ethnic sentiments that the motherlands inspired. The vertical divide that this form of ethnic differentiation had imposed on the Cypriots through education was an important factor affecting the growth of respective Greek and Turkish nationalisms on the island.

From the 1930s onwards, and with the colonial repressive measures, nationalism began to take off as a mass movement. While in the Greek-Cypriot case the Enosis ideology and movement continued to flourish with more vigour and determination, in the Turkish-Cypriot case (as will be observed in the rest of this article) the new nationalism quickly made allies with British colonialism.

Before moving on to the serious outburst of militant nationalism that would characterise the tumultuous decade of the 1950s it would be wise to outline and analyse the intricate development and outlook of Turkish nationalism on Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriots: From Religious Community to National Minority

The Turkish-Cypriot community, as noted earlier in this article, was first and foremost a religious community that was conservative and parochial in its orientations and outlook. The allegiance of the Turkish Cypriots during the Ottoman years was centred around the community's local religious institutions and by extension to those same religious institutions in Istanbul. The community's political focus was to be found in the Ottoman governors of Cyprus and the administrative circles of that local government. Its cultural trademarks were to be traced in the idiosyncratic Muslim character of Cyprus, with its distinct local Turkish dialect, its rituals and its unique social patterns.

When the British takeover took place, the allegiance of the Muslims of Cyprus was duly transferred to the new ruler; as Beckingham notes, the Muslims had more to gain from accepting the protective aegis of the new administrator than from fighting against it. Several reasons accounted for that, important among which the desire to maintain their overwhelming (as compared to the Greek Cypriots) representation in the administrative machine of the island, the hope of better economic conditions and the fear of Enosis. The Turkish Cypriots saw that an alliance with the new ruler could guarantee and prolong the superiority that they had enjoyed under the Ottomans in matters administrative, as well as protect them from the nationalist yearnings of the Greek Cypriots. Furthermore, as already pointed out, the absence of a national homeland allowed for this strategic allegiance to develop unhindered, as the parochial and particular Ottoman Muslim minority easily focused its attention on closing ranks with the new and perhaps more liberal and rewarding ruler of the island.

Under these circumstances, the Muslim community of Cyprus found a good recipe from what it saw as threatening Enosis agitation; the Muslim elites' protest against Greek-Cypriot calls for union with Greece, was to be characterised by the determination and vocal support for the continuation of British colonial rule. Having made a homebound alliance with the British rulers, the Turkish Cypriots refused to see the island cede to Greek mainland control mostly out of fear of the effects that such a change of rule would have on their privileged domestic status. This reaction, was evident, and a result of, the lack of significant nationalist development within the Turkish-Cypriot community. A nationalist opposition to Enosis, and the growth of a violent and reactive nationalist ideology would have to await the end of World War II and the changing local, regional, and international circumstances.

In a most interesting analysis of the interconnections between local nationalism and international politics Michael Attalides observes: "To show the difficulty of integrating the Turkish Cypriots into Cypriot society is to show the integration of the Turkish-Cypriot leadership with Turkey."³² The remaining part of this article will concentrate on explaining the gradual yet complete alignment of the Turkish-Cypriot elites with their political (and military) counterparts in Turkey, the slow yet effective severance of the Turkish-Cypriot population from any sources of common consciousness (with Greek-Cypriots), and the role of Britain in promoting this steady social and political segregation between the two Cypriot communities.

The early years of the Kemalist revolution in Turkey had an estranging and repelling effect on the Muslims of Cyprus. This was a result of two basic factors: the new Turkish regime's modernism, which rejected Ottoman religious principles and traditions, and Atatürk's statist, territorial nationalism, which renounced the inclinations of an irredentist panturkism. The Turkish Cypriots, being conservative and deeply religious, were at first alienated, if not threatened, by these profound

changes in their Ottoman motherland. At the same time Kemalism was already slowly making inroads into the Cypriot Muslim society, by way of teachers and intellectuals who travelled to the island to spread the new ideology and 'proselytise' for its cause.

The effects of this new Turkish nationalist ideology on Cyprus were reflected in two especially illustrative dimensions of the history of the Turkish-Cypriot community: first, in Ataturk's immigration policy directed towards the Muslims of the island and second, in the 1930s struggle of the two Muslim dignitaries for a position in the Legislative Assembly.³³

The Treaty of Lausanne, which recognised the territorial character and sovereignty of the modern Turkish state, included a clause by which Turkey renounced all her rights over Cyprus.³⁴ Having been annexed by Britain at the start of World War I, Cyprus was now recognised officially as an English dominion and sphere of influence. Under clause 21 of the Treaty of Lausanne, Turkey invited the immigration of the Muslims of Cyprus to that country.³⁵ The new Turkish state under Ataturk hoped to repopulate areas that were ethnically cleansed of minorities once living in Anatolia such as Armenians and Greeks. The accommodation and properties now being offered to Turkish-Cypriots were intended as an incentive for immigration in order to boost the demographics and economy of the war-devastated areas. The Turkish state was not simply providing accommodation to fellow Muslim Turks from Cyprus but was instead intending to use those immigrants to repopulate as well as work in an ethnically cleansed Anatolia. For that purpose, a Turkish consulate was opened in Nicosia in June 1925, under the diplomatic authority of Assaf Bey. As historian C. Kyrris observes, "from 1924 until the middle of 1928 about 5000 out of 61.389 Cypriot Muslims had emigrated to Turkey."³⁶ As Kyrris goes on to note, a large percentage of the Cypriot emigres returned to Cyprus after a short period of time, having been disappointed with the prospects and situation in Turkey, and having perhaps been disillusioned, one could add, by the affairs of a 'homeland' that was quite foreign to them.³⁷ Yet the immigration policy remained in place until 1929, and the British colonial government continued throughout the years to be alarmed with the prospect of a weakening Muslim community on Cyprus; the Muslim element was a necessary counter-weight to Greek-Cypriot Enosis ambitions.³⁸

Having failed in his immigration policy, Turkish Consul Assaf Bey turned his attention to the Legislative Council where a struggle, indicative of the new orientation affecting the Muslim community, was taking place in the form of a political competition between the Ottomanist Munir Bey and the nationalist Nejati Bey. Munir Bey was the symbol of the Ottoman mentality of the Muslims of Cyprus, a strong and influential personality within the community whom the British regarded

as an indispensable ally. In the late 1920s, Munir Bey functioned simultaneously as director of the Evkaf Department (a most powerful position, given that Evkaf was the only economic and to an extent political institution that the Cypriot Muslims had) and as a delegate to the Legislative Council. In 1930, his double function as a British civil servant, – the Evkaf was under the control of the British administration, – and as an elected representative was challenged by a lawyer of Kemalist orientations, Said Bey. While a legal decision favourable to Munir Bey's case was reached (considering the fact that he was thought of as indispensable for the containment of the anti-British Kemalist opposition)³⁹ Bey was defeated in the 1931 elections for the Legislative Council by Nejati Bey, the Kemalist candidate. Nejati was a favourite of the Turkish Consul Assaf, who had himself campaigned among the Muslims of Cyprus on N. Bey's behalf. Assaf, had in the meantime been the subject of correspondence between the colonial government and the colonial office; the Governor of Cyprus, Sir Ronald Storrs, greatly alarmed by Assaf's Kemalist propaganda, had asked for the latter's recall to Turkey (a request that was rejected by the Foreign Office which did not wish to burden British-Turkish relations).⁴⁰

When Nejatin won the elections the colonial government was faced with the dilemma of how to deal with a man who represented two very different, yet equally serious positions; a modernist, anti-British, Kemalist stand and a political attitude of openness to cooperation of the Muslim community with the Greeks of Cyprus. Nejatin represented a younger generation of Muslims who, impressed by the achievements of the Turkish state and at the same time depressed by their own backward and stagnant situation, looked forward to a change of outlook for their community. These intellectual elites, were not, in these early stages, revolutionary nationalists who wished to do away with colonial rule and move towards integration with Turkey; they simply wanted to work towards ending the influence of the Ottoman generation in Cyprus. These young Kemalists, inspired by the achievements of Ataturk, wished for political and economic changes on the island that would improve the situation of the Muslim population and that, at the same time, would move it forward to a greater purpose and more significant existence. In this sense, i.e. the empowerment, modernisation and re-orientation of their community, this group could be regarded as nationalist.

The easiest and most efficient way for bringing about change was the replacement of the old, traditionalist, and Islamic-oriented notables in the island's Legislative Assembly. When that was finally achieved, the modernist Turkish-Cypriots saw that they could now pursue policies in that political body that would aim at improving the conditions, especially in terms of economics, of their community. In that spirit, the Turkish-Cypriot representatives did not hesitate to build a common political front with the Greek-Cypriot members of the Assembly. In 1931 they voted together with their Cypriot compatriots in opposing the colonial

budget indicating that indeed their ideology was more concerned with actual administrative reforms and social modernisation than with sterile nationalist rhetoric. Turkish-Cypriot nationalism as an exclusivist political agenda and as a primary goal and ideal had not yet taken full root even within the modernist, Kemalist-oriented elite of the community.

The colonial government's response to this unforeseen cooperation was a panicked and immediate attempt to regain the Muslims' trust for, as Kizilyurek notes, the vote "destroyed the colony's constitutional system and together with that the policy of Divide and Rule."⁴¹

In 1931 and in the midst of this crisis, Governor Storrs wrote:

"The attitude of the Greek members has been ineffective for so long as the Government could rely on Turkish cooperation. This is no longer available as the Greeks, having taken advantage of personal and party rivalries within the Turkish community, have managed to buy or otherwise persuade a recently elected nonentity, Nejatın Bey, to vote with them, thus effectively blocking the passage of the Customs Bill... There is every reason to suppose that Nejatı Bey can be counted upon for full cooperation in all steps to embarrass the Government."⁴²

A few years later, in 1937, two documents of the Colonial Office summed up the views of the colonial government with regards to this problem:

"Moslems have in fact reached a critical period in the history of the island... The traditional discipline of Islam in Cyprus is weak, and the older generation is passing away. The difficulty of the government to single out this community for the purpose of providing special assistance to it is intensified... by the spirit of hopeless resignation to which economic decline over a long period had reduced an erstwhile governing class."⁴³

In that same year, on 17 August, Governor Palmer would note in a letter to the British Minister of the Colonies, Ormsby-Gore:

"It is important to make the Moslems of Cyprus feel that the Government is taking adequate care of their interests and that they have a definite part to play in the colony under British administration... It is my intention to take all legitimate measures ... to raise the position of the Moslem section of the Community and to prevent them from becoming... a depressed and impoverished minority.. ."⁴⁴

The British government, through its economic policies, and by way of its embrace of the new Kemalist generation of Cyprus, extended to the Turkish-Cypriot community an offer it could not refuse. Given that the Muslim population had no significant educated elites independent of the colonial administration (they were in their largest part members of the administration), and no middle class, which could

boost the economics and the bourgeoisie politics of the community via its actions (and thus oppose the Government's marionette-playing), it succumbed easily to the call of prosperity and cooperation. In the years leading to World War II and immediately after the war, the strategic alliance between Turkish-Cypriots and the colonial government was established, on the basis of a solid economic and administrative cooperation as well as a common political front against Enosis. In the decades of 1930 and 1940 Turkish nationalism was a monolithic, if still underdeveloped, ideology, and as such it became an easily malleable object that the colonial government could mould according to its own needs. The re-instituted relations of Great Britain and Turkey on the eve of World War II did much in the way of promoting cooperation and allegiance between the Colonial rulers and the Turkish Cypriots on the island.

Thus the opportunity for forging a common Cypriot nationalism was lost, in the midst of colonial intricacies, mainland Turkish politics, and communal awakening to the calls of nationalism. Although the Turkish Cypriots would continue to peacefully coexist, and in fact heavily cooperate with Greek Cypriots in all aspects of life in years to come,⁴⁵ they had in the meantime embarked on a nationalist path that would gradually introduce their eventual segregation in the ultimate future.

The Extremist Phase: The Self-isolation of the Turkish Cypriots

The years 1930-1955 were marked by two steady and consistent trends within the Turkish-Cypriot community: the growing consummation of the Turkish-Cypriot elites with Turkish-Cypriot nationalist ideology (and efforts at promoting the segregation of their community), and their practical attempts at forging a strategic alliance with the island's colonial rulers. Having been indoctrinated in the ideology of nationalism, those Turkish-Cypriot circles sought ways of infusing their people with a separatist logic and in turn worked towards methods that could enhance and empower their ideological struggle. Greek-Cypriot nationalism, and especially the growing demands for Enosis, gave the Turkish Cypriots the pretext, if not the much needed-explanation, of why the separatist forces of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism had to become the order of the day for their community. Nevertheless, and despite the painstaking efforts of these elites, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism only became a mass movement in the 1950s.

Apart from the political apathy to nationalism of the larger Turkish-Cypriot community, there were other reasons why in the 1930s the evolution of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism was a slow and difficult process. These were to be found in the official disinterest of the "motherland" itself to the calls of the Turkish-Cypriot elites.

Although the educated, administrative class of the Cypriot Muslims was coming

closer to and more in tune with the ideas of Kemalism it could hardly attract the attention of the Turkish state. The national motherland, the 'homeland' of Turkish-Cypriots (as those elites had it) was at the time in the midst of a huge reconstruction, both practical as well as ideological, that left little time or political energy for external preoccupations; Kemalism proved a difficult and complicated project in a war-ridden, poor, and overpopulated land that was still deeply affected and connected to its Ottoman past and history. Furthermore, the ideological pillars of Ataturk that were being realised into actual state policy rejected irredentist, Pan-Turkic tendencies for a more centralised, territorially-defined, and internally focused nationalist perspective. Last but not least was the Kemalist policy of "peace at home, peace abroad" that was being promoted at the time and which was embodied in the friendship and co-operation that was officially pursued in the 1930s with Greece. This non-expansionist, domestically-focused policy allowed little diversion in terms of foreign policy priorities for the Turkish state. Therefore, although the Turkish-Cypriot nationalist elites were becoming more and more oriented towards their believed motherland, the motherland herself had little interest in becoming involved.⁴⁶

With the outbreak of World War II, and amidst the mounting pressures of Greek-Cypriot political circles for the union of the island with Greece, the colonial government began to feel an urgency for the stimulation and promotion of a Turkish-Cypriot reaction. In 1943, and according to Kizilyurek "with the encouragement of the English colonial government", the first mass organisation representing the Turkish-Cypriots was formed, KATAK (Cyprus Minority Association). KATAK had two main principles: the maintenance of the colonial status quo, as opposed to Enosis, and the empowerment of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Under KATAK, the Turkish-Cypriot political forces joined ranks to promote the interests of their community. In 1945, the first Turkish-Cypriot trade union was found and although PEO (the Greek-Cypriot leftist trade union) continued to attract membership from both communities, (in fact its Turkish-Cypriot membership continued to grow and reach for example 3.500 in 1958) the Turkish Cypriots were urged to leave PEO and join their own, exclusive workers' associations.

In 1948 three events took place which were significant in indicating the paradox of coexistence vs. ideological separation that was taking place between the two communities: the joint mine workers' strikes of January-May 1948, the first Turkish-Cypriot anti-Enosis rally, and the formation of the colonial "Committee for Turkish Affairs".

The workers' strikes, which were aimed at safeguarding some basic rights for the employees of the metal mines in Cyprus, lasted for three months; the workers,

both Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots, as well as their families, continued to demonstrate throughout the three months, both against their employees at the Cypriot Metal Company (CMC) and the colonial government, which seemed to support the CMC's position. Against the advice of political leaders from both communities, the Cypriot workers remained steadfast in their demands until concessions began to make their appearance. The common workers' strikes were an important indication and proof of the existing strong bonds that linked the two communities well together and as such of the still contingent patterns of Greek- Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot nationalisms.

In late 1948 the first Turkish-Cypriot rally was held in Nicosia, organised and led by the new nationalist elites of the community that wished to penetrate the still traditional mentality of the larger Turkish-Cypriot population. Personalities like Rauf Denktash, the future militant leader of Turkish-Cypriot extremism, made his first appearance at this rally where slogans against Enosis, and for the maintenance of colonial rule were aired. Different speakers suggested the new policy that was being advocated within Turkish-Cypriot circles: if Britain decided to leave Cyprus, it would have to give it back to Turkey.

In that same year the colonial government, according to the initiative of governor Lord Winster, decided to set up the "Committee on Turkish Affairs" which would aim at being "instrumental in securing a higher standard of living for the Turkish community and pave the way to greater prosperity."⁴⁷ The Committee was composed entirely of Turkish-Cypriots, and included political, religious, and administrative representatives. The Committee was instructed to make recommendations concerning the office of the *Mufti*, the *Evkaf*, the religious *Sheri* courts, and the education and family laws that concerned the Turkish-Cypriot community; all colonial government departments were instructed to aid the research of the Committee in any way the latter deemed necessary. The report that came out in 1949 recommended among other things the restoration (under Turkish-Cypriot control) of the office of the *Mufti*, the management of the *Evkaf* by an elected Turkish-Cypriot committee, the modernisation of family law and the alignment of Turkish-Cypriot education/instruction with that of Turkey.

Some of the Committee's recommendations were put into practice by the colonial government, while others were postponed until the 1950s. Although the report was devoid of political significance *per se*, it came to signify two important practical developments: the actual orientation of Turkish-Cypriot circles towards Turkey and the making of a political programme for the Turkish-Cypriot elites to which they devoted most of their energy.⁴⁸ Furthermore, the formation of the Committee suggested to both Turkish- and Greek-Cypriots the priority of the colonial government in furthering the interests of its protégé minority.⁴⁹

In the meantime, Turkish-Cypriot nationalism on the island was strengthened by two regional developments, which could potentially affect the future of island: the civil war that was tearing apart Greece, and the geopolitical indications that Greece was on its way to acquiring the Dodecanese. The fear of Greece turning communist, apart from being a geopolitical matter of grave importance for the Western alliance, was also a source of preoccupation for the Turkish-Cypriot elites who now saw Enosis as a double evil. Furthermore, the involvement of Great Britain in the internal affairs of Greece – when the former decided to become actively involved in supporting the Greek Right during the civil war – raised Turkish fears of a possible cession of the island to the war-torn Greek state, if the outcome of the civil war was to the satisfaction of the British Foreign Office. The Turkish-Cypriots, seeing this transitional and paradoxical, yet solid post-war Greco-British alliance, became apprehensive and quite active in their anti-Enosis agitation.

Moreover, the cession of the Dodecanese and Rhodes to Greece in 1947 (Italian Peace Treaty) and the allegations of discrimination against the islands' Turkish communities (Rhodes and Cos) raised Turkish-Cypriot fears for a possible cession of Cyprus, and the future of their community in such a possible arrangement. Such projections, security dilemmas, and fears set the stage for the cultivation and the rapid growth of popular Turkish-Cypriot nationalism on the island.

The Turkish Factor

Writing on the gradual consummation and final integration of the Turkish-Cypriot community with Turkish nationalism Michael Attalides notes:

"A community that was economically dependent to a large extent on state institutions, numerically a minority, with its left-wing political movement eliminated by the nationalist organisation oriented to Turkey and possessing a highly anti-communist leadership was obviously one capable of turning into a "strategic" one, quite reminiscent of the Sudeten Germans in relation to Nazi Germany..."⁵⁰

The years 1950-55 were the most important years in determining the future of the island of Cyprus; that period also marked the official involvement, by way of British recognition, of Turkey in the affairs of Cyprus. Being recognised as an "interested party", Turkey was allowed a free hand at influencing and affecting developments on the island, both through its infiltration of Turkish-Cypriot politics and also through its dealings with Britain on the issue. From 1955 on, when Turkey was officially invited by Britain to attend the London Tripartite Conference on the future of Cyprus, until 1974, when Turkey finally invaded the island, Cyprus ceased to be a colonial problem, an inter-communal affair or at most a Greco-British issue; it became a geostrategic problem, affecting Western power politics and threatening peace in NATO's southeastern flank. Being the Cold-war indispensable ally that

Turkey became in the years following World War II, it could hardly be denied its influence and role over Cyprus, once the green light had been signalled, courtesy of Great Britain in 1955.

It becomes necessary to note and analyse, for the scope of this study, the initial, yet decisive involvement of Turkey with Cyprus. Although the years following Cypriot independence (1960-1974) fall outside the focus of this article, it will suffice to recognise the major trends that were carved in the 1950s and that became decisive in determining the future of Cyprus.

During World War II, and at the time of Turkish neutrality, it became quite clear that Pan-Turkic circles were making a reappearance in Turkish culture and politics. These influential elites, convinced of Germany's future defeat of the Soviet Union, were becoming restless with the possibility of such an outcome on their country's relations with the Turkic peoples inside the huge Eastern Empire. While during the war the preoccupation of the Pan-Turkists was with the 40 million Turks of the Soviet realm, towards the end of the conflict these ideological circles began to turn their attention to the Turks of Europe, such as those of Eastern Thrace and Bulgaria.⁵¹ The Turkish-Cypriots too, who since the early 1940s had been receiving messages from these circles in Turkey, began to form now an obvious target. As J. Landau observes

"Pan-Turkists in Turkey, during those years (WWII) and afterwards, visibly increased their activities and propaganda. One obvious target was the Turkish Cypriots, who were displaying signs of increased politicisation during the late 1940s in reaction to the increasing demand of the Greek Cypriots for Enosis. This became a popular issue in Turkey as Pan-Turkists encouraged the Turkish Cypriots to organise themselves and the Turks in Turkey itself (students and others) to demonstrate and write for the cause."⁵²

Furthermore, the mainland Pan-Turkic societies and organisations were now making inroads into Cyprus through their representatives who were travelling to the island. Hikmet Bill, the President of the Organisation 'Cyprus is Turkish', arrived in Cyprus to organise the local representation of his society, the Party that was led by Dr. Kuchuk Fazil and which became known by the homonymous title.⁵³

Together with this phenomenon, came the electoral victory in 1950 of the Turkish Democratic Party, under the leadership of Adnan Menderes. This was the first non-Republican government since the days of Ataturk; Menderes and his party became convinced of the need to reverse some Kemalist principles and policies, such as the secular direction of Turkish society, and to that end they began to introduce wide-ranging reforms within the country. Menderes developed, as Kizilyurek notes, "a populist approach which led to the return of Islam in Turkish political life and the popularisation of Turkish nationalism."⁵⁴

Yet despite the wide-ranging changes taking place within Turkish society, the Turkish government still remained convinced of its principle of non-intervention, and entrenched in its ideology of the territorial character of Turkish nationalism. For Turkey, Cyprus was still a national security goal in the making.

In 1954, Greece decided to internationalise the Cyprus-question by introducing it to the Agenda of the General Assembly of the UN as a case of self-determination that needed to be considered. While Turkey was still an observer of Cypriot developments (as late as August 1954, at the Balkan Pact meeting, the Turkish Foreign Minister was insisting that "there is no Cyprus question for Turkey")⁵⁵ she was now being approached by Britain, to be sounded on the issue of the UN internationalisation. In a report from the US ambassador to Turkey to the Department of State in February 1954, the former writes of his meeting with the Turkish Under-Secretary Birgi. In it he notes, *inter alia*:

"In conversation with Under Secretary Birgi today he raised Cyprus question on own initiative. He stated British recently approached Turks ascertain their views if Greeks should raise issue at UN. Turks replied they would consider such action by Greece most unfortunate...Foreign Office now informed by British, Greek Government has formally advised UK its intention raise issue next UNGA. British inquired if Turks prepared support their request to US that we urge Greek Government not take this step. Turks have now decided do so."⁵⁶

In 1955, the EOKA struggle broke out. The British were convinced that Turkey's urgent involvement in the Cyprus issue was now essential,⁵⁷ despite the fact that by attempting to jeopardise Greece's stake in Cyprus the British were at the same time jeopardising their own.⁵⁸ The Greek Cypriot EOKA was careful, in the beginning of its campaign, to exclude the Turkish Cypriots from its violent dealings with the British. Yet as a response to the armed insurrection, the colonial government decided to include the Turkish Cypriots in the affair, planting therefore the seeds for the first inter-communal trouble that Cyprus would experience. In a remarkable show of divide and rule tactics, the British colonial government formed an Auxiliary Police force, made up exclusively of Turkish-Cypriots, to counter EOKA attacks. The spirit of insecurity and fear that had existed up to then on the island was now turned into a show of violence, direct conflict, and hatred.

In 1958 the Turkish Cypriot Resistance Organisation (TMT) began its operations. Founded at first in 1956 under the name VOLKAN, the military arm of the 'Cyprus is Turkish' organisation, TMT was a nationalist, anti-communist group financed almost in its entirety by Turkish funds. This underground organisation, which had as its main goal the countering of EOKA, and Greek-Cypriot demands for Enosis, was focused on attacking Greek-Cypriot targets, as well as Turkish-Cypriot ones, where it became apparent that the latter were not serving Turkish

nationalist goals. By 1958 TMT was responsible for the deaths of many Greek- as well as Turkish-Cypriots.⁵⁹ In July 1958, following the death of approximately 70 Greek-Cypriots in June and July of that year, EOKA decided to retaliate; thus ethnic conflict was given its tragic premiere.⁶⁰

Unlike EOKA, TMT managed through its methods, to force the Turkish-Cypriot community into tacit compliance with its goals and methods. Advocating *Taksim*, or partition (the new and perhaps first ideological motto of Turkish-Cypriot nationalism) TMT stated in its constitution that any measures deemed necessary would be implemented for the alignment of a person(s), whose acts were considered to be harmful to the community, with the right path. The pressure towards the Turkish-Cypriot community would be eased only when the ideal was achieved. One could presume that the ideal was partition.

TMT, therefore, began terrorising Turkish-Cypriots who either chose to cooperate with Greek-Cypriots in their social and economic dealings or who simply belonged to bi-communal trade unions or farmer/peasant associations. All communist Turkish-Cypriot clubs were gradually closed or burned down, and many Turkish-Cypriot individuals were assassinated for either criticising TMT or simply resisting it. Through its extreme measures TMT managed by 1958 to force the Turkish-Cypriot community almost in totality to stop cooperating with the Greek-Cypriots and to isolate, under the aegis of Turkish nationalism.⁶¹ While coexistence and ethnically mixed villages and towns survived well into the 1960s (when inter-communal violence resumed), and in fact up to 1974,⁶² the Turkish-Cypriots were being led under the otherwise empty and senseless motto that "Turkish and Greek Cypriots can not live with one another". By 1960 the Turkish-Cypriots would transform into a monolithic and insecure minority, with little independent political voice over their future on the island and over the prospects for healthy co-existence with their compatriots, the Greek Cypriots. The only security and hope to which they turned was Turkey's strategic embrace.

In the meantime, a few months after the insurrection broke out, Britain decided to hold a Tripartite Conference in London whereby the governments of the three "interested" parties (Greece, Turkey and Great Britain) were invited to discuss the future of Cyprus, with emphasis, in Mr. Macmillan's words, on the common interests of the three Governments in the political and defence problems of the eastern Mediterranean as a whole.⁶³ Representatives of the Cypriot people were not invited to attend this conference, and it became clear that this was the colonial way of replying to the internationalisation of the Cyprus issue in the UN, by way of officially declaring and recognising British, Turkish and Greek interests on the island. Thus Cyprus would cease to be treated by world opinion as a colonial question of self-determination, but would be henceforth internationally recognised as a question of

strategic concerns in the Eastern Mediterranean. Being unable to hold on to Cyprus exclusively and unconditionally, the British decided to tie the future of the island, as well as its independence, on the security and defence concerns of the three "interested" parties and by extension to those of NATO. Although this London conference ended in the autumn of 1955 with no agreement, it was the prelude to both the Zurich-London agreements of 1959, the "reluctant" independence of Cyprus, and the divisive, partitionist nature of the new Cypriot state, with the geopolitical interests and security concerns of the three being reflected in every aspect of the constitution that the Republic would acquire in 1960.

A day before the tripartite meeting was scheduled to convene, on 29 August 1955, rumours began to spread in the Turkish press on the imminent "genocide" of the Turkish-Cypriots on the island. A week later, on the 6th and 7th September 1955, riots broke out in Istanbul aimed against the Greek population of the city which resulted in the destruction of Greek property in Izmir and Istanbul and the terrorising of the Greek communities of those areas.⁶⁴ The Istanbul riots had two main effects, an actual and a symbolic one. On the practical level, the riots marked the beginning of the rapid decline of the remaining Greek population of Izmir and Istanbul, that had, significantly, been excluded from the population exchanges at Lausanne. Symbolically, apart from seriously significantly cracking the bond of friendship that Ataturk and Venizelos had managed in the 1930s, the riots also came to mark the immediate impact that Cyprus would have from now on, on the Turkish political front. The riots represented the direct link that was henceforth established between Cypriot affairs and Turkish internal developments.

As already mentioned, no agreement was reached at the London Conference, although the countries involved were invited to reconvene in the near future. Following the conference, Anthony Eden noted that

"I considered it capital that we should carry the Turks with us in any new move. We had now to convince them that our purpose was not to abandon our interests or theirs in Cyprus, but to find a solution that would meet Western defence needs in the eastern Mediterranean. I sent a message to the Turkish Prime Minister, Mr. Menderes, asking for his understanding."⁶⁵

A few months later, during the time of the Radcliffe Constitutional proposals for the future of Cyprus the option of partition began to crystallise as a possible scenario. Although Eden would write that "Partition also had its advocates, especially in Turkey, and we agreed in December that it must be included among the eventual options before the Cypriot people,"⁶⁶ it was by this time obvious, given the complication of events on the ground in Cyprus, the growing geopolitical and strategic value of the island, and the increasing concern and involvement of Turkey

in the debates on the future of Cyprus, that partition was becoming a very credible, and very real possibility for a solution.⁶⁷ In the parliamentary debates concerning the constitutional proposals of the eminent British Judge Radcliffe, Lennox-Boyd, the then minister for the Colonies, stated that "Her Majesty's government recognises that the exercise of self-determination in such a mixed population must include partition among the eventual options."⁶⁸ Commenting though on the proposals and policies that were being put forward, Anthony Nutting, British Minister of State for Foreign Affairs, would write:

"Thus Britain has, I am sorry to say, committed herself to accepting the principle of partition... What is needed, and needed desperately, in Cyprus is some solution which will serve to unify this divided island, not to divide it in perpetuity."⁶⁹

The Turkish government and the Turkish Cypriots political elites⁷⁰ were by this time fully committed to the idea of *taksim* or partition. A Turkish-Cypriot nationalist involved in the affairs of this period would later observe that the new generation's slogan was no longer "Cyprus is Turkish" but instead "partition or death". He went on to note that

"during those years we learned to face the Cyprus problem with realism. We learned that Cyprus was not an affair that concerned the fate of the 120 000 members of the Turkish- Cypriot community, but rather that it was a matter affecting the Turkish state's security."⁷¹

In this spirit and under these strenuous circumstances, continued the negotiations for the solution of the Cyprus problem, which resulted in the 1960 independence of the island, and the creation of what has been dubbed the "Reluctant Republic."¹² The character of the new state, its constitution, its representative bodies and its political essence were divisive in most respects, and entrenched the isolation and segregation of the island's two communities. Furthermore, the country's legal and international existence was directly linked to the political will of the three guarantor states, Great Britain, Turkey, and Greece. Whether the Cypriot reluctant republic could have survived and indeed *overcome* its inherent abortive characteristics is a matter of speculation. Greece's tumultuous internal politics, which played themselves out on Cypriot ground, and Turkey's involvement in the affairs of the island, which culminated in the lethal invasion of 1974 left little room for trial and error, and for the improvement of power-sharing arrangements, which could have allowed the two communities to *overcome* problems, and attempt to make the new state function, and the two communities to continue to co-exist.

Notes

1. See also Francois Crouzet, La Conflit de Chypre 1946-1959 (2 Vols., Brussels, 1973, p. 42) who supports the point that for the Cypriots themselves this was not a mere change of domination, but a change in demographic and social character. As Coufoudakis also observes (*The Dynamics of Political Partition and Division*) [the Ottoman conquest] "totally altered the demographic patterns of the island by transplanting there a population different from the Greek native element by culture, ethnic origin, language and religion." (Coufoudakis in Essays on the Cyprus Conflict, p. 30, NY, 1976).
2. "In view of the report of the Beylerbey of Cyprus, Sihan, according to which many fertile regions on the island were devastated during the war, it seems necessary to colonise the villages and the towns, in order to return to the preceding prosperity of the island... Residents should be sent to Cyprus in a ratio of one head out of every ten. They should bring with them their tools and farming instruments... The settlers should be chosen from every municipality according to their social status and their profession... " (the Order goes on to name the kind of settlers suitable for colonisation, such as landless farmers and peasants, craftsmen and unemployed village and town people, lawbreakers or those 'known for bad behaviour' (Jeanette Choisi, *The Turkish Cypriot Elite - Its Social Function and Legitimation*, The Cyprus Review, Vol. V, No. II, 1993, p. 26 Appendix).
3. See C. F. Beckingham, *The Cypriot Turks*, The Royal Central Asian Journal, Vol. XLIII, 1956, p. 126.
4. As Sir David Hunt writes, "Nearly all the statistics of population in the 16th century are unreliable but there seems to be general agreement among historians that the new settlers numbered about 20 000" [as opposed to the approximate 85 000 Christians]. (Sir David Hunt, "The Turkish Period", p. 227, in Footprints in Cyprus, London, 1990). It also bears mention here that in the first decades of the Ottoman takeover, a large number of conversions to Islam took place, by which Christian subjects sought to relieve their economic misfortunes (tax easements) or simply advance in the Cypriot - Ottoman professional realm.
5. On the millet system, see, inter alia, Bernard Lewis, 'The Emergence of Modern Turkey'. 2nd edition, London, 1961, p. 335.
6. *Rum* or *Romios* in Greek was the collective name by which the Orthodox millet was recognised, meaning in essence Roman, or a descendant of the Eastern Romans, the Byzantines.
7. "Christians were not legally eligible for military service in the Ottoman Empire before 1855, and in practice after that time as well. Christians were subject to sumptuary laws, for example in dress. They were legally compelled to show deference to the Muslims. And although the Christians were not allowed to possess arms, the Muslims were", Attalides, p. 38.
8. On the Tanzimat reforms in the Ottoman Empire, see Lewis, p. 76-127, and particularly

footnote # 3 p. 76, which lists a number of sources on the Tanzimat.

9. Attalides, Cyprus, pp. 38-9.

10. The administrative division of the island went thus: a governor was appointed by the Sublime Port who ruled the island together with a Central Council, the *Mejlis*. Six district councils supervised local government and the villages were run by an elected *mukthar* (headman) and *azas* (elders). In each district there existed a head of Islamic religious affairs and law known as the *kadi*. While the *kadi* was the administrator of the law, the *Mufti*, was its interpreter. Beyond that there existed the *Evkaf*, the Muslim religious foundation, which was run by the *Murahhsalar*, or Delegates. (See Halil Ibrahim Salih, Cyprus - An Analysis of Cypriot Political Discord, New York, 1968, pp. 14-15, and C. F. Beckingham, *Islam and Turkish Nationalism in Cyprus*, Die Welt des Islam, Vol. V, 1957, pp. 65-67).

11. Beckingham describes these two phenomena, during the first British years of rule: "Commerce remained, what it had already become by 1878, a Greek monopoly. Intellectually, the Muslims were inactive. Within a few months of the arrival of the British a Greek newspaper, ... began publication in Larnaca. There was no Turkish newspaper till 1888, when *Sadet* (Topic) began publication; it survived for a few months only... A copyright law, providing for the registration of books published, was enacted in March 1887... By 1914 about 600 books, mostly in Greek, had been registered; there were less than 50 wholly or even partly in Turkish" (Beckingham, *Islam and Turkish nationalism in Cyprus*, p. 69).

12. It also needs to be pointed out that education in the Muslim community was, until well into the twentieth century, religiously inspired and focused.

13. Beckingham, *Islam...* p.68.

14. One could also consider the anthropologist Peter Loizos's interesting modern-day distinction of a double minority; Loizos points out that while the Turkish Cypriots are the minority of the population of Cyprus, the Greek Cypriots are a minority in the eastern Mediterranean, by virtue of the fact that Cyprus is just 50 miles away from Turkey while being 500 miles away from Greece (Peter Loizos, *Part Two: An Alternative Analysis, Cyprus Minority Rights Group Report*, No. 30, 1976).

15. On this see Adamantia Pollis, p. 577, (*Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy*) who writes, inter alia: "The French differentiated themselves from the 'natives' in terms of cultural superiority and a higher level of civilization to which, however, all could aspire. To the British, cultural differences among peoples reflected innate qualities; their own superiority and distinctiveness could not be attained by Asian or African. Native customs, beliefs, and behaviour being manifestations of innate qualities should, where possible, be preserved." It can be added here, that most colonial governors who ruled Cyprus were usually transferred there after a term in West Africa (i.e. Palmer who had served in Nigeria and the Gambia). Although the effects of this are difficult to quantify it will suffice to note here the resentment that this produced among the Cypriots (who felt that they were being viewed as primitive, backward people) and also the psychological framework of rulership that this created in the

colonial officer's mind.

16. See Salih, pp. 22-23 as to the details of the Annex to the Convention, which lay down the principles for the new administration.

17. Evkaf was the Muslim pious foundation that handled the community's religious finances and property.

18. An example was the police force, where in 1919, out of the twenty-six officers and 763 men and NCOs in the Cyprus police force, 420 were Muslims (who at this time formed about 25% of the population of the island (Attalides, p. 41). Attalides also notes that British rule was welcomed by local leaders. "Before the announcement of the [British] annexation (1914), the *Kadi*, the Mufti and the senior *Evkaf* councillor suggested that Britain should annex the island to free it from the intrigues of the Porte. After the annexation the same dignitaries visited the High Commissioner to affirm their loyalty and to express shame at the behaviour of the Ottoman Government which had joined the war on the side of the Central Powers." (Ibid. p. 42-3).

19. Adamantia Pollis writes on this: "Once ethnic, racial, religious or tribal differences had been institutionalised, the alternative – the breakdown of separate communal identifications and integration of communal groups into one nationality – was no longer psychologically feasible" (Pollis, *Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy: The Case of Cyprus, Comparative Politics*, July 1973, p. 580).

20. Ibid., p. 591.

21. As Pollis notes, "despite the multiple levels of segregation imposed by the British, they failed, despite repeated efforts, to abolish the mixed municipal council at the village level" (Pollis, "*The Role of Foreign Powers in Structuring Ethnicity and Ethnic Conflict*" in Calotychos (ed.), *Cyprus and Its People*. Oxford, 1998, pp. 87-105).

22. "The only explanation", Captain Orr would write in 1918, "of the situation created by the Cyprus Constitution would appear to be that when the Constitution was passed consideration was given to the fact that the three Turkish members were unlikely ever to combine with the nine Greek members to defeat the local government on any really important issue, and that the votes would be cast with those of the six official members and produce an equality of votes with those of the nine Greek members, the casting vote of the High Commissioner or presiding official deciding the issue" (Orr, *Cyprus Under British Rule*. pp. 106-107).

23. Similarly, a British official would observe in 1929, after the official British annexation of Cyprus, that, "Crown Colony rule had to be continued somehow under the colour of a free constitution. The simplest way seemed to be the way of 'divide and rule' – communal representation was intended – [...] If there had been at Nicosia a safe official majority, if we had to play off Turk against Greek, if we had not had to resort to stratagem to secure progress the administration would have laid better foundations and taken more pride in this job" (Colonial Office 67/22714-f-143277, Memorandum on Cyprus Constitutional Question,

23 April 1929, quoted in Niyazi Kizilyurek, Cyprus: Nationalisms at a Dead End, Athens, 1999, No. 5, p. 157).

24. Orr, p. 106.

25. Choisi, p. 20.

26. Greek and Turkish Cypriots had cooperated on the Legislative Assembly in the past, especially in building common front against the detested Tribute. On further cooperation in matters financial and political see Prologue to Ottoman Archives 1840-1912 (The Kykkos Monastery Archives, Vol. I, p. XXIII) where editor I. Theocharides notes inter alia the 1912 Proposed "Goat Bill" which was defeated by a common front between "Christian Greeks and Muslim Turks". As Theocharides observes, "the representative of the latter in the legislative Council, Mehmet Ziya, noted in a written demarche [to the Greek members of the Assembly] Partners. We are co-signers to this claim regarding the destruction of our goats."

27. In 1938, in the midst of the friendship era of Ataturk and Venizelos, the British Governor of Cyprus, Sir H. R. Palmer wrote to the British Minister of Colonies: "A recent and more serious aspect of the Turkish nationalist *movement* has supervened in the form of a tendency for 'Enosis' and Kemalism to make common cause[...] There is essentially no community of interest or purpose between the Greek and the Turkish speaking elements in Cyprus and, as you are aware, it was for many years only through the support of the Moslem members of the Legislative Council in the days when the body existed that the Government was enabled to overcome the continuous and solid resistance of the Orthodox opposition. The fundamental difference of outlook and temperament which divides the Moslem and Greek Orthodox Communities is unlikely to lead to a *permanent political partnership* [italics added]. But a marriage of expediency, engineered by those whose antagonism to the Government is strong enough to *overbear* any too nice scruples of race and religion might constitute a serious embarrassment" (Foreign Office 371/21935-146129, Palmer to Macdonald, 24 June 1938, as quoted in Choisi, p. 20).

28. It can be noted here that cooperation could not and perhaps would not automatically have translated itself into a common national identity for the Greek and Turkish Cypriots. That question lies outside the scope of this study. Yet cooperation, horizontal identification and social symbiosis could have been translated into a deep-rooted, common political cause, in which both communities would have a stake too important to challenge, and too vital to disregard. This mixture of political, social and economic symbiosis could have led to civic cleavages, constituting a shared civic identity. Thus, nationalistic tendencies which promoted political partition could have been assuaged, had the British allowed the symbiotic and interdependent socio-economic modus vivendi to determine political culture and identity.

29. Greek official textbooks began to appear in Cyprus after the establishment of the Greek state (the policy of nationalist education was promoted by the newly established kingdom). In the Muslim case, education during the Ottoman and early British years (until the beginning of importation of materials from Kemalist Turkey) was Ottoman and religiously orientated. According to Newham, who wrote in 1905, "The subjects taught are the reading and chanting

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of the Koran and the repetition of the religious code 'ilmihal', reading and writing of the Turkish language, some Ottoman and general history and geography... and, for the highest classes in some schools, a little Arabic and Persian." (Newham, Rev., F. D., *The System of Education in Cyprus*, London, Board of Education Special Reports, No. 12, 1905, as quoted in Attalides, *Cyprus*, p. 27).

30. Pollis, *Intergroup Conflict*, p. 589. Attalides notes that "the number of 'Greek-Christian' schools in Cyprus increased from 94 in 1881 to 238 in 1901" (*Cyprus*, p. 26).

31. See Attalides, p. 29.

32. *Ibid.*, p. 80.

33. The Legislative Council, which was granted by her Majesty's orders in 1878 and revised in 1882, consisted of 12 elected members (nine Christian and three Moslem) and six appointed officials. It was presided over by the High Commissioner who had the casting vote.

34. Part 1, Political Clauses, Article 20: "Turkey hereby recognises the annexation of Cyprus proclaimed by the British Government on the 5th November 1914."

Article 16: "Turkey hereby renounces all rights and title whatsoever over or respecting the territories situated outside the frontiers laid down in the present Treaty and the islands other than those over which her sovereignty is recognised by the said Treaty, the future of these territories and islands being settled or to be settled by the parties concerned..." (Salih, pp. 33-34).

35. The article, as G. S. Georghallides writes, stipulated that the "the permanent residents of Cyprus living in the island on 5 November 1914, would acquire British nationality subject to the conditions laid down in the laws of Cyprus". Those who chose to keep their Turkish nationality would, in the words of the article "auront la faculte; pendant une periode de deux ans à dater de la mise en vigueur du present Traite; d'apter pour la nationalite turque; dans ça cas, ils devront quitter l' isle de Chypre dans le douze mois qui suivront l' exercice du droit d'option." Treaty of Peace with Turkey, Cmd. 1929, London 1923, p. 22, quoted in G. S. Georghallides, *Turkish and British Reactions to the Emigration of the Cypriot Turks to Anatolia, 1924-1927*, *Balkan Studies*, Vol. 18. No. 1, Thessaloniki, 1977.

36. *Kipros. Tourkia ke Ellinismos-Thesmoi. Domes. Shesis. Provlimata (Cyprus. Turkey and Hellenism-Institutions. Structures. Relations. Problems)* Nicosia, 1980, p. 105. Other sources estimate the total number of immigrants at about 7-10 000.

37. See Minutes of the Legislative Council of the session of 1924, (Nicosia, 1925) where Mussa Irfan Bey (Turkish delegate of Evkaf and member of the Executive and Legislative Councils) stated: "... certain persons of the Muslim section of the population had been led to believe that they would live in a fool's paradise if they emigrated to Asia Minor. These unfortunate people had sold all their belongings in Cyprus before emigration and now returned to the Island absolutely penniless. They had to undergo quarantine restrictions"

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(upon their return) "and they were a burden on the Government and their community ... The Government had the right to refuse them [permission] to land to Cyprus, and he was thankful for the latitude already allowed them" (Georghallides, p. 44).

38. Kizilyurek, p. 56. See also Georghallides, p. 45-52 for the colonial regulations to prevent immigration, and the relevant diplomatic correspondence between the protesting Turkish government and the British Foreign Office (that was asked to intervene with the colonial government).

39. Colonial Office 67/235/13-143509, Henniker-Heaton to Passfield, 25 June 1930, quoted in Choisi, p. 14.

40. Foreign office 371/14584-XC 146076 CO Minutes, 11 June 1930, quoted in Choisi, p. 14.

41. Kizilyurek, p. 57.

42. Colonial Office 67/239/14-3441, Storrs to Passfield, 4 June 1931.

43. CO 67/274/5-144052, Political Situation in Cyprus from the 1 July to 31 October 1937.

44. CO 67/281/14-144143 Palmer to Ormsby-Gore, 17 August 1937.

45. AKEL, the Communist party of Cyprus, and PEO, the trade union directly linked to it managed to maintain strong links and contacts with the Turkish Cypriot community, when other fronts of cooperation between the two peoples were collapsing; from the early 1920s when the KKK (the earlier version of the communist party) was calling upon the Turkish Cypriots to unite with the Greeks in a common anti-colonial struggle ("However small the Turkish minority might be it cannot afford to remain idle in the struggle for our political freedoms") until the early 1950s when AKEL was urging the Turkish Cypriots to accept the Referendum for Enosis because "real freedom and happiness will prevail for both, such that had never existed under the colonial government", the left of Cyprus made a conscious and painstaking effort at keeping the Turkish Cypriot working class in common ranks with the Greek Cypriots. AKEL's own ideological contradictions, together with the steady and militant campaign of the Turkish-Cypriot nationalists were the main reasons why cooperation and common representation for the working class of Cyprus ultimately failed. For a documented view on Greek – Turkish relations in trade-unions see Loukas Kakoullis, H ApIOT&pa KOL ol TouPKOKurtpIOL. (The Turkish Cypriots and the Left), Nicosia, 1990.

46. It should be noted here that some Turkish rightist circles, those political and military forces that opposed Kemalism still held Pan-Turkic visions and attempted to forge relations (and help) the Turkish-Cypriots in their initial nationalist call.

47. Lord Winster, Committee on Turkish Affairs, op. Cit., pp. 57-58, quoted in Nancy Crawshaw, The Cyprus Revolt: An Account of the Struggle for the Union with Greece, London, 1978 p. 44.

48. Beckingham, p. 76.

49. In December of 1948, a British dignitary of the colonial government noted: "I am very concerned at the apparent growth of minority consciousness among the Turks in Cyprus during the last year, and I fear that the Cyprus Government may have unwittingly encouraged this by, for example, the Committee for Turkish Affairs which Lord Winster has set up." The report goes on to note: "The superficial attractions of a loyal minority community supporting the Government of a foreign protective power, ought to be well known by now for us to fall into this kind of trap. Recent history is littered with examples from Northern Ireland to the Moslems in India... the only way out is for *the minority to make its peace with the majority without seeking protection elsewhere*" (italics added). Colonial Office 67/342/1 127219, S.S.B, 13 December 1948, quoted in Kizilyurek.

50. Attalides, in Cyprus, p. 80 and p. 90.

51. Kizilyurek, p. 9.

52. Jacob M. Landau, Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation, London, 1981, p. 118.

53. As Charles Foley, editor of the 'Times of Cyprus' at the time, observes in his Legacy of a Strife, "The Cyprus Government raised no objection to the new party [Cyprus is Turkish] or its title when it was announced, and no questions were asked of Mr. Bill, a foreign national concerning himself with colonial politics." (Legacy of a Strife - Cyprus. from rebellion to civil war, London, 1964, p. 30).

54. Kizilyurek, p. 72.

55. Stephen Xydis, Cyprus. Reluctant Republic, Mouton-The Hague, 1973, p. 43-44, footnote 31.

56. Foreign Relations of the United States, 1952-54, Vol. VIII, 747C.00/2-2654, No. 362.

57. In his memoirs, Anthony Eden, British Premier at the time observed of the beginning of the EOKA struggle: "The Turkish newspapers had hitherto been more outspoken than the Turkish government, which had behaved with restraint. It was as well, I wrote on a telegram at the time, that they should speak out, because it was the truth that the Turks would never let the Greeks have Cyprus..." (Anthony Eden, Memoirs-Full Circle. London, 1960, p. 400).

58. This was so, because the acceptance of the internationalisation of Cyprus by Britain formed a de facto forfeiture of British exclusive rights on Cyprus.

59. Foley notes in his memoirs that "no official notice was taken of VOLKAN, although EOKA was proscribed at once and membership of it made a criminal offence" (Foley, p.30).

60. EOKA had already been accused for the deaths of some Turkish Cypriots, although those deaths occurred in a random manner and under mysterious circumstances. What is certain

is that EOKA had not included the severance of relations with the Turkish Cypriots, their systematic harassment or the 'isolation' of the Turkish-Cypriot community, in its founding statements, and its pronounced aims and goals.

61. An indication of this was the increase in 1958 of membership in separate Turkish trade unions from 1.137 to 4.829. (Republic of Cyprus, Ministry of Labour and Social Insurance, Annual Report, 1968, quoted in Attalides, p. 49).

62. See Reports of Brigadier Harbottle, Chief of Staff of the United Nations Force in Cyprus in 1967 describing village life after a battle between the National Guard and Turkish-Cypriot fighters. Among other things his report mentions: "I suppose the most heartening sight of all was to see the way in which the two communities of Ayios Theodoros picked up the threads of their old relationships and life together. The Greek villagers, who had opened their doors to the Turkish women and children at the height of the battle, now lent a hand in the restoration work, and it was not long before social contacts were being resumed... At the height of the international crisis in December it was reported that members of both communities in Ayios Theodoros were sitting together in the same coffee house, not only exchanging conversation but Christmas gifts - a sign that whatever the rest of the world was doing, they at least were determined to get relationships back to normal and live in quiet accord with their neighbours." In 1974, after the Turkish invasion Brigadier Harbottle revisited Cyprus and after his trip he wrote: "The myth of deep animosity between Greeks and Turks is one that has been perpetuated by those who seek to convince their fellows and world opinion that the two communities cannot live together; but it is a myth long overdue for exploding. There are too many examples of people in mixed villages and mixed communities living amicably as neighbours; of Greeks and Turks working together in factories and the fields...One would imagine that such relations would have been severely or badly mauled as a result of recent events, but no, the cooperation and coexistence remains as firm as before. Many are the examples of during the fighting where human relations and standards of civilised behaviour have triumphed over ethnic differences..." Harbottle, M., *The Impartial Soldier*, Oxford University Press, 1970, p. 163, and Harbottle, M. "Why Cyprus is doomed to Become a Political Volcano", *The Times*, 17 October 1974, as quoted in Attalides, pp. 82-83.

63. Eden, p. 397.

64. The Yassiada trials of 1960-61, in which Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu were tried and sentenced to death, revealed among other things, that the Turkish government of the time (Prime Minister Menderes and Foreign Minister Zorlu) was directly linked to the events of September 6-7th in Constantinople by way of its cooperation with the 'Cyprus is Turkish Society', that had organised the riots. As Xydis notes "Evidence was presented at these trials that the Turkish Foreign Minister had phoned from London during the tripartite conference there, noting that 'a little activity would be useful' to his negotiating position, and that the police had received orders not to interfere with the demonstrators" (W. F. Weiker, *The Turkish Revolution 1960-61*, Washington D.C, 1963, p. 34, quoted in Xydis, p. 51). At the same trials, as Kizilyürek observes, a member of the organisation 'Cyprus is Turkish' testified that "the news of the imminent Greek-Cypriot massacres against the Turkish-Cypriots was a lie. It was a rumour fabricated and spread by us in an attempt to

provoke the Turkish people" (Ozger Yashin. Nevzat ve Ben, Istanbul, 1997, p. 808, quoted in Kizilyurek, p. 74).

65. A. Eden, p. 404.

66. Ibid., p. 415.

67. As Makarios Drousiotis points out in 'EOKA, the Dark Side', in July 1956, during the discussions within British government circles on the future of Cyprus, the option of partition was discussed for the first time. The FCO presented a map of a partitioned Cyprus (see Drousiotis, p. 180), while by October 1956, the then *governor* of Cyprus Sir John Harding presented *five* scenarios for the future partition of Cyprus (Drousiotis, 'EOKA, the Dark Side', Athens, 1998, p. 181). Although the outbreak of the Suez crisis in the summer of 1956 caused the discussion on the future of Cyprus to be partly postponed (and indeed highlighted the merits of keeping Cyprus as a British strategic colony), the formulations of the Radcliffe constitutional proposals were on their way to completion, as was the general debate among certain governmental circles on the possible solutions to the Cyprus imbroglio.

68. Great Britain Parliamentary Debates (Commons) 19 October 1956, Vol. 562, Cols. 1267-69.

69. Anthony Nutting, I Saw for Myself, London: 1958, pp. 27-28.

70. Nutting observes in his memoirs that "In all my talks with Greek-Cypriots I did not find one who was opposed to the idea of negotiations ... and with the participation of Turkish-Cypriot representatives." Nutting goes on to note, "I wish I could say that I had found the same ready acceptance from amongst the Turkish-Cypriot leaders. The most I got from them was that they would take orders from Ankara..." (Ibid., p. 31).

71. Tanil Bora, *Türk Milliyetçiliği ve Kıbrıs*, Birikim Dergisi 77, Istanbul, September 1995, p. 24, quoted in Kizilyurek, p. 81.

72. See Stephen Xydis, Cyprus-Reluctant Republic.