

SAYING YES TO EU ACCESSION: EXPLAINING THE TURKISH CYPRIOT REFERENDUM OUTCOME

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Abstract

What accounts for the decisive Turkish Cypriot endorsement of the Annan plan in the referendum on 24 April 2004? In spite of considerable reservations, most Turkish Cypriots supported it and the prospect of imminent EU citizenship. Offering better economic prospects and an end to their isolation in the midst of an economic crisis, the Annan plan's prospects were considerably enhanced. Also, even as the plan foreclosed independent statehood, most Turkish Cypriots were satisfied with the wide measure of autonomy that they would be able to exercise in the envisaged constituent state in northern Cyprus, and the fact that Turkey would retain its status as guarantor.

Furthermore, by endorsing the Annan plan, Tayyip Erdogan's AK party government in Turkey influenced the referendum outcome in an important way; emboldening those who favoured the plan to overcome the opposition led by veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Rauf Denktaş.

Introduction

On 24 April 2004, while their Greek Cypriot counterparts overwhelmingly rejected the latest version of the UN (Annan) plan for a settlement of the Cyprus issue, sixty-five per cent of Turkish Cypriots voted to endorse it. Although this was the first time Cypriots on both sides of the Green Line cast votes in a referendum, two recent Cypriot elections can be said to have been referenda on the merits of the Annan plan.

In the presidential election on 16 February 2003 in the Greek Cypriot-administered part of the island, Greek Cypriots replaced Glafkos Clerides who declared his receptivity to the UN plan, with Tassos Papadopoulos who rejected it. By contrast, in the 13 December 2003 parliamentary elections in the Turkish Cypriot-administered north, the pro-Annan parties did well, although the number of seats they won (25 out of 50) fell short of an overall majority.¹

The solid victory of the 'yes' camp in the Turkish Cypriot referendum is only partly attributable to the terms of the settlement contained in the Annan plan that provided for the reunification of the island as a loose federation and simultaneous accession to the European Union (EU). Indeed, although their objections to the plan were evidently not as strong as those of their Greek Cypriot counterparts, many Turkish Cypriots were unhappy about some key provisions of the plan.

In particular, they objected to the proposed settlement of tens of thousands of Greek Cypriots in the envisaged Turkish constituent state; the recognition of Republic of Cyprus title deeds in north Cyprus; and the resettlement of tens of thousands of Turkish Cypriots with the return of territory to Greek Cypriot control. Turkish Cypriot negotiators failed to satisfy a key demand on permanent derogations on Greek Cypriot settlement and purchase of property in the envisaged Turkish Cypriot constituent state, and had to settle for transitional arrangements for the application of EU law in north Cyprus. The opponents of the plan - including veteran Turkish community leader Rauf Denktash who led the 'no' camp in the campaign leading to the referendum - sought to capitalise on these concerns and the fact that acceptance of the UN terms meant forsaking the *Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus* (hereafter the TRNC). Ultimately, in spite of considerable reservations, a majority of Turkish Cypriots endorsed the Annan plan. The prospect of imminent EU citizenship seemed to represent a better prospect for their future than continuing on with the existing state of affairs.

Security in its broad sense has been the overriding concern for both Cypriot communities. The problem that has confounded both Cypriots and third party intermediaries in settlement endeavours over many years has been that satisfying the security needs of one community tended to negate those of the other. For Greek Cypriots security meant removing Turkey's military presence on the island. Indeed, security has been the overriding Greek Cypriot motive in pursuing EU membership. Turkish Cypriots, on the other hand, have tried to shield themselves from the Greek Cypriot majority, and to retain Turkey's security commitment: hence their demand for self-government within a federal/confederal framework, and that Turkey should remain a guarantor under the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee.²

The Positives in the Annan Plan

From the Turkish Cypriot position, the acceptance of the TRNC as a sovereign state and its parallel accession to the EU along with the Greek-Cypriot controlled Republic of Cyprus would have represented an ideal solution. But after two decades of separation no state other than Turkey had granted recognition to the TRNC. Greek Cypriots made it clear that, even in return for substantial territorial adjustments, they would refuse recognising a separate Turkish Cypriot state and thus accept the partition imposed by Turkish force of arms in 1974. EU states too

repeatedly warned the Turkish Cypriot leadership not to expect the recognition of the TRNC's sovereignty. By the time the Annan plan was introduced in 2002, Turkish Cypriots no longer harboured any hopes that other states would recognise the TRNC. Although the Annan plan fell short of satisfying Turkish Cypriots' aspiration for a separate state, it went a long way to satisfy two key objectives, viz. the desire for self-government and the continuation of Turkey's guarantor rights.

The UN plan has been aptly described as providing a loose federal settlement by many observers. It conferred a great deal of authority to the two envisaged constituent states, and provided safeguards to ensure a Turkish majority in northern Cyprus. Moreover, it affirmed the political equality of both communities. In spite of reservations concerning the risks of reunification, these features appeared reassuring to many Turkish Cypriots. Except for the recognition of separate sovereignty, numerous key provisions of the Annan plan reflected key demands that Turkish Cypriot leaders regularly made throughout the intercommunal negotiations of the previous two decades. Thus Article 2 (1a) of the plan states that:

The United Cyprus Republic is an independent state in the form of an indissoluble partnership, with a federal government and two equal constituent states, the Greek Cypriot state and the Turkish Cypriot state. Cyprus is a member of the United Nations and has a single international legal personality and sovereignty. The United Cyprus Republic is organised under its Constitution in accordance with the basic principles of rule of law, democracy, representative republican government, political equality, bi-zonality, and the equal status of the constituent states³

The constituent states would "sovereignly exercise all powers not vested by the Constitution in the federal government," and "there shall be no hierarchy between federal and constituent state laws." Article 2 (2) states:

... the constituent states shall participate in the formulation and implementation of policy in external relations and the European Union affairs on matters within their sphere of competence, in accordance with Cooperation Agreements modelled on the Belgian example. The constituent states may have commercial and cultural relations with the outside world in conformity with the Constitution.⁴

During the course of the intercommunal negotiations spanning many years the Turkish Cypriot leadership, together with Ankara, insisted that the retention of Turkey's rights as a guarantor was a *sine qua non* of any acceptable settlement. Accordingly every UN-sponsored settlement proposal has provided that the 1960 Treaty of Guarantee shall be retained. While unhappy over this, Greek Cypriot leaders tried to ensure that the guarantor powers (read Turkey) be constrained from

acting unilaterally, as happened in 1974. Furthermore, they argued that no Turkish or other foreign troops be allowed to remain on the island, even as they accepted that the withdrawal of Turkish troops (estimated at 35,000 in 2004) would take place over several years. In addressing Greek Cypriot concerns, the Annan plan provided several restrictions on the Turkish (and Greek) contingents that would be stationed on the island and provided for the continuing stationing of the UN Peace Force with additional duties to monitor the staged withdrawal of Turkish and Greek forces.^s In the final analysis, while the Annan plan fell short of satisfying Greek Cypriot security needs, Turkish Cypriots and Turkey were prepared to accept its security provisions.

Saying No to Turkish Influence

Although keen to retain Turkey's security blanket, many Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' in the 2004 referendum partly because they hoped EU membership would diminish their heavy dependence on Turkey, and thereby reduce Ankara's influence in the Turkish community. Many Turkish Cypriots have complained that Ankara has been directly involved in formulating policy and has interfered in the administration of the *TRNC*. Ankara has been widely blamed for the policy of allowing Turkish citizens to enter the *TRNC* without passports, which resulted in the arrival of thousands of poor unemployed Turks into the *TRNC* in search of employment. Most Turkish Cypriots believe that this influx has spawned many social problems including an increase in the incidence of crime in northern Cyprus. Labour groups have complained that the willingness of mainland Turks to accept lower wages than the local population has undercut the employment of Turkish Cypriots in the service and construction sectors of the economy.

Similarly, there have been misgivings regarding the authority of the Turkish military stationed on the island. For instance, in voicing a perennial grievance of many Turkish Cypriots, the centre-left parties have periodically called for an end to the military's control of the *TRNC* police force. Before the controls on movement of Turkish and Greek Cypriots across the Green Line were lifted in April 2003, Turkish Cypriots who wanted to participate in bicomunal activities and visit the south complained of excessive restrictions imposed on them by the Turkish military authorities. As a report by the Economist Intelligence Unit put it in 2000:

Although the administration of President Denktash firmly supports the Turkish presence and accepts Turkish guidance in many aspects of domestic policy affairs, opposition to Turkish involvement in the Turkish Cypriot society at large, as epitomised by the slogan 'This Land is Ours' is considerable.⁶

For some Turkish Cypriots, the authority exercised by Turkish governments and the military has been all the more unpalatable because of the latter's almost unflinching support for the policies of President Denktash and centre-right parties that

have dominated coalition governments. The close relationship between Ankara and Denktash has generated substantial controversy among Turkish Cypriots. The centre-left parties, the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and the Communal Liberation Party (TKP), have regularly criticised the seemingly unqualified support of Ankara for the *TRNC* leader.

Erosion of Support for Denktash

Denktash has led the Turkish community for nearly forty years. He has been the intercommunal negotiator since 1968 and has won six consecutive presidential elections (as president of the Turkish Federated State of Cyprus in 1976 and 1981, and as president of the *TRNC* in 1985, 1990, 1995 and 2000). His charisma, strong nationalist credentials, and political skills helped him forge a strong consensus in the Turkish community over many years, and retain Turkey's support for his policies. It was upon his initiative that the *TRNC* was founded in 1983, and he has ardently sought to achieve its recognition.

However, Denktash's political support declined even before his last election as president in 2000. Growing opposition to his policies became especially pronounced since the UN Secretary-General submitted his settlement plan for Cyprus in November 2002. Although he declared himself to be above party politics, most Turkish Cypriots associated Denktash with the centre-right parties that led the government in the *TRNC*.⁷ The centre-left parties argued repeatedly that Denktash was not interested in achieving a federal solution and that he was bent on integrating the *TRNC* with Turkey. His frequent arguments that geopolitical interests of Turkey should be protected in any agreement provoked criticisms among many Turkish Cypriots that he was more interested in Turkish rather than Turkish Cypriot interests.

When the Annan plan was submitted at a time of imminent EU accession many Turkish Cypriots worried that their president's refusal to accept it would close the doors to their EU accession. Denktash's stance provoked unprecedented demonstrations among Turkish Cypriots in favour of EU membership and calls for his resignation as the negotiator for the community. Since the introduction of the Annan plan, some influential long-time backers of Denktash joined his critics in castigating him for his obduracy during the negotiations on the Annan plan. The influential Turkish Cypriot newspaper *Kıbrıs*, traditionally a strong supporter of the Turkish Cypriot leader, was among those who declared their support for the Annan plan as opposed to Denktash's policy. Similarly, the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, long a bastion of Denktash loyalists, played an energetic role in promoting the benefits of the Annan plan. In one of the largest demonstrations, an estimated 60,000 Turkish Cypriots (almost a third of the entire Turkish community)

marched on 14 January 2003 calling for negotiations based on the UN plan and Turkish Cypriot accession to the EU.⁸ It is widely believed that the *TRNC* government's surprise decision to *remove* restrictions on Turkish and Greek Cypriots for travel across the Green Line was a gambit intended largely to relieve the political pressures on the Turkish Cypriot leader by the pro-Annan opposition. Denktash's diminished political influence became apparent again when a substantial majority of Turkish Cypriots rejected his warnings and *voted* in *favour* of the Annan plan in the April 2004 referendum.

Justice and Development (AK) Party's Cyprus Policy

The pro-Annan groups in the *TRNC* were greatly encouraged by the policy change that Ankara adopted with the election of the Justice and Development (AK) party in *November 2002*. Before the AK party assumed power, Denktash could count on Turkish governments to support his policies. He was particularly successful in forging a close working relationship with such Turkish leaders as Suleyman Demirel and Bulent Ecevit who led several governments in Ankara. The coalition government that Ecevit headed prior to the AK party assuming power, tried unsuccessfully to dissuade Brussels from proceeding with Cyprus' accession by warning that granting membership prior to a settlement would close the doors to future possibilities of reuniting the island.

However, when the AK (Justice and Development) Party came to power in Turkey on 3 *November 2002* with a comfortable parliamentary majority, it signalled a serious intention to achieve Turkey's EU membership and that it would pursue a different Cyprus policy than its predecessors.⁹ Thus Ankara responded mildly when the EU Copenhagen summit in December 2002 ignored Turkish entreaties and endorsed Cyprus's membership. In a bid to improve prospects of securing an early date for Turkey's accession talks with the EU, Recep Tayyip Erdogan, the leader of the AK Party, unsuccessfully tried to persuade Denktash to accept the plan that UN secretary-general Kofi Annan presented to the parties on 11 *November 2002*. Predictably, Denktash was unwilling to sacrifice the *TRNC* and insisted that the Turkish Cypriot constituent state envisaged in the Annan plan should be entitled to exercise sovereignty: this was unacceptable to Greek Cypriots.

The stage was set for a contest of wills between the Erdogan government and the Turkish Cypriot leader. As leader of an unrecognised small state sustained by Turkey, Denktash might have been expected to accede to the wishes of the Erdogan *government*. However, as in previous dealings with Ankara, his supporters within the Turkish political establishment strengthened his hand with politicians and high-level bureaucrats who might apply pressure on him. In Turkey, Denktash has enjoyed enormous prestige as a vigorous defender of Turkish Cypriot rights and of

Turkish interests. He has cultivated political ties with influential Turks in many walks of life, including the military, the foreign policy establishment, political parties, and the media.

Given Denktash's strong backing in Turkey, Erdogan had to tread carefully in challenging him, but a change in Cyprus policy also meant confronting long-held assumptions in Turkey. For many years Turkish governments emphasised the island's proximity and strategic significance as a key consideration for Turkey: the powerful military were reported to be reluctant to withdraw the large military contingent on the island and forsake a military advantage *vis-a-vis* Greek Cypriots and Greece. In addition, the Turkish political establishment and public opinion have traditionally viewed the protection of Turkish Cypriot rights as a national imperative. Indeed previous governments in Ankara were accused of abandoning Turkish Cypriots and the interests of Turkey whenever they contemplated policy compromises.

In spite of the political risks in changing course on Cyprus, Erdogan succeeded in overcoming the Turkish Cypriot leader's opposition to the UN blueprint. In February 2004, he compelled Denktash to resume negotiations with his Greek Cypriot counterpart based on the Annan plan, and to accept the binding arbitration of the United Nations Secretary-General if no agreement could be reached. In spite of the declaration of neutrality by Ankara in the course of the referendum campaign in the *TRNC*, there was no doubt that – unlike Denktash – the Turkish government preferred a 'yes' vote.

By charting a different course on the Cyprus issue, and prevailing over Denktash and opponents of the Annan plan in Turkey, Erdogan won considerable acclaim internationally. He was also able to weather domestic criticism that he was sacrificing vital national interests and betraying Turkish Cypriots in return for the uncertain prospect of EU accession for Turkey.

It must be stressed, however, that unlike his predecessors, Erdogan's hand was strengthened by several factors. To begin with, his government was the first in more than a decade that commanded a parliamentary majority. This enabled him to act with greater confidence than former coalition governments that shuffled in and out of office regularly. Secondly, Erdogan's party forged a stronger consensus on the desirability of pursuing EU accession than its predecessors. Thirdly, the AK party assumed power at a time when the Turkish public's support for EU membership was high. In a survey conducted in 2002 in the midst of a major economic crisis that began two years earlier, seventy-four per cent of the respondents stated that they would endorse Turkey's membership should a vote be conducted on the issue.¹⁰ Fourthly, the AK party's rise to power coincided with a weakening of Denktash's

stature not only in the *TRNC* but also in Turkey. As the prospects for Turkey's EU path improved, criticisms of Denktash became commonplace, with numerous commentators complaining that the Turkish Cypriot leader's rejection of the Annan plan was hurting the vital interests of Turkey. Finally, and most importantly, for all the resentment it caused by its policy that appeared to favour Greek Cypriots, the EU enhanced Turkey's prospect for EU membership at its summit meetings in 1999 and 2002, and thus provided the Erdogan government with a powerful incentive to pursue EU membership.

Economic Problems and Anticipated EU Benefits

The economy has always been the Achilles heel of the *TRNC* even though its economic performance has not been uniformly poor. Bolstered by generous Turkish subsidies, the north's economy did well enough for *TRNC* officials to boast that the \$4000 per capita GDP of Turkish Cypriots in 2002 represented a threefold increase since 1977.¹¹ The main problem for the *TRNC*, however, has been its failure to achieve sustained levels of economic growth as the economy alternated between periods of growth and recession. Additionally, with its currency pegged to the Turkish lira, north Cyprus experienced similarly high levels of inflation that has characterised the Turkish economy for many years. Poor employment prospects prompted thousands of Turkish Cypriots to emigrate, and more recently, seek employment in the south. By contrast, Greek Cyprus has had to import labour from overseas for its thriving economy and Greek Cypriot per capita income is four times higher than that of Turkish Cypriots.

Turkish Cypriot officialdom routinely blames the economic embargo and boycott by the Greek Cypriot government for the adverse economic conditions in the *TRNC*. The economic and trade boycott has certainly hampered their economy, particularly its citrus exports and, especially, the more promising tourist sector. The Turkish-Cypriot administered area has some of the most attractive coastline on the island; unlike the south where intensive hotel development has blighted the coastal environment, the north boasts of an unspoiled habitat. However, the boycott of the Turkish Cypriot airport by virtually all airlines because of the political ban on scheduled flights to the *TRNC* has taken a heavy toll. In 2000, the north received 433,000 tourists (of whom 348,000 were from Turkey), compared with 2,686,000 in the south.¹²

Yet, while blaming the embargo, many Turkish Cypriots have also castigated their governments for the poor handling of the northern economy. Their dissatisfaction became increasingly manifest as north Cyprus experienced a major economic downturn in late 1999 at about the same time as the EU appeared determined to proceed with the island's EU accession. As the *TRNC's* economic

crisis deepened in 2000, increasing unemployment levels and sharply reducing the purchasing power of Turkish Cypriots, Turkish Cypriot confidence in the ruling centre-right parties weakened. In a timely demonstration of EU benefits that would be available to Turkish Cypriots, on 30 January 2002 the EU Commission proposed to allocate 206 million euros, for 2004-2006, in order to help northern Cyprus reduce the economic gap with the south.¹³ Having had to contend with high levels of unemployment, young Turkish Cypriots voted for the benefits of EU citizenship, particularly greater job prospects and greater mobility. According to Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay, a disproportionate number of young Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' in the 2004 referendum.¹⁴

Intense Debates of the Annan Plan

From the time that the UN plan was introduced in November 2002, the Turkish Cypriot media, political parties and civil society organisations became immersed in a thorough discussion of its provisions. As Ann-Sofi Jakobsson Hatay reported:

The Turkish Cypriot community started to seriously engage with the Annan Plan at a much earlier stage than the Greek Cypriots. There are several reasons for this but one of the most important was the Turkish Cypriot parliamentary elections held in December 2003. The elections had been staged as a pre-referendum on the Annan plan and the intrinsically linked issue of EU membership. The Annan plan/EU factor dominated the election campaign, producing two camps: rejectionists and advocates.¹⁵

Jakobsson Hatay further stated:

By the time of the 24th of April referenda the Turkish Cypriots had already been on an educational journey pertaining the Annan Plan for at least six months. In the immediate weeks leading up to the referendum, Turkish Cypriot radio and television channels broadcast debates and question-and-answer sessions on the Annan Plan several days of the week.¹⁶

It should be noted that the Annan plan was by no means the first comprehensive settlement proposal that Turkish and Greek Cypriot communities were required to consider for endorsement. However, it was by far the most detailed and can be said to have addressed all of the issues that mattered to the two communities. Its presentation followed years of patient effort by United Nations mediators, and influential third parties (viz. the EU, the United Kingdom, and the United States) joined in the diplomatic effort to secure its endorsement by Cypriots of both communities. Indeed, the US, UK, and EU emissaries who

actively encouraged the endorsement of the plan were accused by anti-Annan groups on both sides of interfering in the internal affairs of their community.

Not the least, in an unprecedented development, both Ankara and Athens supported the plan, although in the latter case the New Democracy government of Costas Karamanlis (elected to office a mere six weeks before the referenda in Cyprus) did not endorse it with the same enthusiasm as its predecessor. In the past, rejection of the UN-sponsored plans for settlement did not mean that radical consequences would follow. By contrast, much more was at stake for the Cypriots in the referenda held on the Annan plan. The requirement to submit the plan to referenda was meant to prod the Cypriots to carefully consider their options.

In the Turkish Cypriot case, there was very considerable anxiety that forsaking the Annan plan for EU accession would shut them out of the EU and deny membership benefits, thereby relegating them to an uncertain and bleak future. Aware of the strong Greek Cypriot objections to the plan on the grounds that they are too favourable to the Turkish community, most Turkish Cypriots were convinced that if the Annan plan was not endorsed, Greek Cypriot leaders would insist on much tougher terms (than those in the UN plan) before supporting future accession of northern Cyprus. It is also possible that in the April 2004 referendum some Turkish Cypriots voted 'yes' strategically, as they fully expected Greek Cypriots to reject the Annan plan. But one should note that a majority of Turkish Cypriots had already shown their receptivity to the plan by casting their votes for pro-Annan parties in the parliamentary elections in December 2003.

Conclusion

The strong Turkish Cypriot endorsement of the Annan plan is explainable by a convergence of factors. The referendum of April 2004 was held during a period of considerable Turkish Cypriot pessimism concerning the future economic viability of the *TRNC*. Offering better economic prospects and an end to their isolation, in the midst of a major economic crisis, the attraction of the Annan plan was considerably enhanced. However, although the lure of economic prosperity as EU citizens was a major factor, Turkish Cypriots also calculated that they would be able to enter a new era on the island without greatly sacrificing their security. While foreclosing independent statehood, the plan offered Turkish Cypriots a credible alternative. Thus, the abiding merit of the Annan plan for many Turkish Cypriots was that they could avail themselves of the anticipated material benefits of reunification and EU citizenship while exercising a wide measure of autonomy. Last but not least, by endorsing the Annan plan, Tayyip Erdogan's AK party government in Turkey influenced the referendum outcome in an important way, emboldening those in the Turkish Cypriot community who favoured the plan to overcome the opposition led by veteran Turkish Cypriot leader Denktash.

Notes

1. For a useful study of the elections see Ali Carkoglu and Ahmet Sozen 'Turkish Cypriot General Elections of December 2003: An Appraisal' (translated for publication in *South European Society and Politics* in fall 2004).

2. Greek Cypriots object to what they believe confers the right of unilateral intervention to guarantor powers. The Turkish government relied on the following provision of the Treaty of Guarantee to justify its military intervention (or invasion, according to Greek Cypriots and Greece): "In the event of any breach of the provisions of the present Treaty, Greece, the United Kingdom, and Turkey undertake to consult together, with a view to making representations, or taking the necessary steps to ensure observance of those provisions. In so far as common or concerted action may prove impossible, each of the three guaranteeing Powers reserves the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs established by the present Treaty". For the text of the Treaty of Guarantee, see Conference on Cyprus: Documents Signed and Initialled at Lancaster House on 19 February 1959 (London: H. M. Stationery Office), 1964.

3. See the (revised) UN plan, < <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org1>>.

4. *Ibid.*

5. See 'Matters to be submitted to the UN Security Council for Decision' in the UN plan.

6. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, December 2000.

7. Centre-right parties either formed governing coalitions or became senior partners in coalitions with centre-left parties.

8. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, 31 January 2003.

9. Turkish leader Recep Tayyip Erdogan declared: "I am not in favour of the continuation of the policy that has been maintained in Cyprus over the past 30-40 years... We will do whatever falls on us. This is not Denktash's private matter." *New York Times*, 2 January 2003.

10. The same survey reported that Turks expect EU membership to usher a higher standard of living. Carkoglu, A. and Kirisci, K., '*Turkiye Dis Politikasi Arastirmasf* (Survey of Turkish Foreign Policy), The Departments of Politics and International Relations, Bogazici University, March 2002.

11. *Financial Times*, 11 December 2002.

12. Economist Intelligence Unit, *Country Report: Cyprus*, December 2002.

13. Commission of the European Communities 2002, *Regular Report on Cyprus' Progress Toward Accession*, at <www.europa.eu.int/comm/enlargement/report2002/cy_en.pdf>.

14. Ann-Safi Jakobsson Hatay "'Oxi" and "Evet": the People Deliver Their Verdict on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus, 29 April 2004', *TFF Forum* (Transnational Foundation for Peace and Future Research), 12 May 2004.

15. Ann-Safi Jakobsson Hatay 'Popular Referenda and Peace Processes: the Twin Referenda on the Annan Plan for a Reunited Cyprus Put in Perspective', *Turkish Daily News*, 4 May 2004 (Internet edition).

16. *Ibid.*