

CYPRUS AND EAST MEDITERRANEAN SECURITY PROBLEMS: NEW DEVELOPMENTS – OLD PROBLEMS*

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Abstract

We posit a former 'Loose Bipolar Model II' prior to the end of the Cold War now temporarily replaced by a 'unipolar' model with the US as sole remaining superpower. This unipolar system is clearly in transition and unstable as the absolute power of the US declines even as its military power increases. We further posit a set of concentric 'levels': a world, a regional, and a 'local' level.

Why is Cyprus important geopolitically? Because of its location and propinquity to two metropolises: Greece and Turkey. Thus Cyprus serves as an 'anchor' which has dragged Athens and Ankara to the brink of war. Thus rapprochement between Athens and Ankara has trumped abstract justice for Cyprus as viewed from both capitals. But it failed to persuade Greek Cypriots who opted for 'half a loaf' policy: safe entry into the European Union as preferable to the terms offered by the UN on 24 April 2004. They saw the Annan Plans (I-V) as tilting too far to the Turkish Pole. The Turkish Cypriots supported the Referendum for its economic and political advantages of reunification and improved living standards.

*With the Greek Republic of Cyprus in the EU and the Turkish Cypriots left out, Ankara will have to decide which of three routes it will follow: **Status quo**, **Annexation**, or **Renegotiation** of Annan Plan V and the security situation in the Eastern Mediterranean. We believe the AKP-led government will choose renegotiation as part of its Kemalist yet moderate Muslim stance. Yet despite its remarkable rapprochement with Greece and reforms to join the EU, Cyprus remains a thorn in it's and the EU's side. The stringent changes required for EU membership may yet destabilise it. Those changes will necessarily include a fairer distribution of power between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots since Cyprus is neither Switzerland nor Belgium. We hope the major powers and Athens will help.*

"Something there is that doesn't love a wall....
Before I built a wall I'd ask to know
What I was walling in or walling out,
And to whom I was like to give offence.
Something there is that doesn't love a wall,
That wants it down."
- Robert Frost, *Mending Wall*, from *North of Boston*, 1913.

Athenians to the Melians: "we recommend that you should try to get what it is possible for you to get, taking into consideration what we both really do think; since you know as well as we do that ... the standard of justice depends on the ... power to compel and that in fact the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept."¹

The End of the Cold War and the New Global Configuration

We see a former 'Loose Bipolar Model II,' since two superpowers dominated the international system. We must add that a subset of 'non-aligned' states flourished to the mutual dismay of Washington and Moscow. Each superpower constantly tried to 'turn' these states including Cyprus and add them to its bloc so as to create Kaplan's Model III, 'the Tight Bipolar Model.' Ironically, this 'Bipolar Model' was only half true since the USSR was only a superpower **militarily**, since economically it was a 'dual economy' with only the defence sector enjoying world-class status. Economically the Soviet Union was outclassed, confronted by overwhelming economic competition from North America, Western Europe, and Japan. Unfortunately for the world (and Greece and Cyprus) this fundamental fact was not clearly understood in a strategic sense by many American leaders, many of whom seemed obsessed by an unrealistic fear of 'The Evil Empire.' Evil it surely was, in our view, but weak it also was; for it was never able to feed its people properly, even though Tsarist Russia (with about the same acreage) was a major grain exporter. Nor was its Gulag system an effective use of human resources or scientific genius, while even the 'free sector' of Soviet society was remarkably inefficient in its use of labour and materials, nor was the empire strengthened by its need to repress Eastern Europe and the CIS countries.

Clearly, Cyprus under Makarios was one of these 'non-aligned' states much to the impotent fury of Washington. Indeed Makarios was often considered, absurdly in our view, as 'The Castro of the Mediterranean' despite allowing U-2 spy flights from British Sovereign Base Areas (SBA's) and operation of UK and US electronic monitoring stations in the Troodos Mountains. The fact that AKEL, on which he depended for maintaining his position, was extremely independent and Euro-Communist (like the Italian and Spanish CP's and unlike the French CP) was not generally appreciated in Washington. Indeed AKEL's record is quite erratic even to

supporting current Cyprus President Tassos Papadopoulos' 'No' views on 24 April 2004 watershed Referendum on reunification of Cyprus, a 'nationalist' position in opposition to its Marxist class origins! The US view was also ironic: all Communist parties were alike just as all Communists were identical. The Cold War was ignorantly seen as a primordial struggle between Good and Evil, a Manichean moralistic crusade in which external parties had to choose - somewhat akin to the current Washington view of states 'assisting' terrorists. To Andrei Zhdanov and John Foster Dulles, the Cold War was a zero-sum-game with but one victor. Both followed the Leninist adage of '*kto kogo*' (who will kill whom) despite George F. Kennan's plea that the Cold War was being over-militarised by Washington.

We suggest that the current world system is unstable with the **absolute non-military power** of the US clearly declining and its trade deficit rising; even as the EU's euro and Japan's yen rise in relation to the former unchallengeable dollar, while China emerges as the next superpower.

Thus we live in a Unipolar world in transition. Moreover, a series of concentric 'levels' can be posited of which the largest is the outer or world level previously occupied by the US and USSR. After, the USSR's disintegration, it is now occupied solely by the US whose primacy is under severe challenge even by non-state actors such as Al-Qaeda.

The next or regional level is occupied by regional powers such as the three Guarantor powers of the 1960 Cyprus Constitution: Britain, Greece, and Turkey. Finally, Cyprus, the Aegean, the Balkans, and the Middle East comprise the third or local level and vibrate to the tones emanating from the world and regional levels. Alexis Alexandris cogently summarises the relationship of the regional to the local Ring by noting that "While Greece considers itself as the gate of the European Union in the new Balkans, the Turks are convinced that the post-Cold War environment has opened up new foreign policy options in a region stretching from the Adriatic Sea to the Central Asia republics of the former Soviet Union ... The geographical boundaries of Greek-Turkish rivalry include the Balkans, the Caucasus and the Middle East. Thus Ankara accuses Athens of forming an anti-Turkish alliance with Syria, while Turkey flirts with Albania and FYROM at Greece's northern backyard. The Greeks openly regard Turkey as their main threat, citing troop build-ups in the Thracian border and the presence of the [Turkish-GC] Fourth Army on the Aegean coast. For its part, the Turkish military cites the Greeks as the reason that these troops cannot be transferred eastwards to tackle the Kurds."² Alexandris observes that "An examination of the Greek-Turkish minority question cannot but include, beside Thracian issues, the future of the Ecumenical Patriarchate, the regime of local self-government for Imbros and Tenedos provided by Article 14 of the Treaty of Lausanne, [also-GC] some formula ... So that the

native Greek Orthodox population may be repatriated in [sic-GC] Imbros and Tenedos" Alexandris concludes "The property rights guaranteed by the Treaty of Lausanne to the deported Istanbul Greek nationals should also be re-examined."³

Alexandris provides a detailed list of Greek concerns about apparent Turkish revisionism in the Aegean with which we are forced to agree by his logic and facts: "Since 1974, there is a consensus in Greece based on the perception that Turkey is pursuing revisionist objectives, seeking to impose a shared sovereignty and resource utilisation in the Aegean, in spite of various multilateral treaties and the customary international law." (*Ibid.*, p. 4) Among the further issues he lists in the Aegean are the delimitation of the Aegean continental shelf, (p. 5), the extension of Greek territorial limits according to the UN Law of the Sea (LOS), (p. 6), the Greek-Turkish Aegean airspace and control dispute including FIR (Flight Information Region), (pp. 7-8), Greek-Turkish NATO command structures (p. 8-9), the military status of the Aegean islands and the Turkish Aegean Fourth Army, (pp. 10-11) and Greek-Turkish relations regarding their mutual roles in Turkish entry into the European Union (p. 13). Indeed, Alexandris' paper is so complete, that one could recommend it as the basis for the Greek Government's negotiations with Turkey on a 'Big Package' *rapprochement*:

From our point of view, his meticulous list of complaints against Ankara *circa* 1996 clearly demonstrates the linkage between the regional and local geopolitical rings listed *supra*. He also includes Cyprus (pp. 13-20) "Although Cyprus continues to burden Greek and Turkish foreign policy agendas" (p. 13) and is indeed "both the cause and victim of a recrudescence of a Greek-Turkish antagonism" (p. 13). Thus Cyprus interacts on several levels and certainly involves the world level: "On another level, the Cyprus question is an international problem, for the settlement of which the Secretary General of the United Nations, in cooperation and co-ordination with the United States and the European Union, has been offering his good offices since the 1960s" (p. 13).⁴

Even as US non-military power has generally declined **absolutely**; its power has increased **relatively** owing to the disintegration of the USSR and the break-up of Eastern Europe and Yugoslavia into competing nation-states each dominated by a single 'custodial ethnic elite.' Many of these states are seeking a road to national unity as is Turkey.

More importantly, the EU, gradually coalesced from a strictly Iron and Steel Community under Jean Monnet and Robert Schumann, into a vast customs union. Now it has moved into the monetary field (the European Monetary Union), and is just starting to develop a fundamental aspect of a loose confederation: via a 'National Defence Identity'.⁵ Contrary to many analysts, we feel the US has done everything it can to **assist** this process, a policy which we find difficult to reconcile

with their view of the US as a 'hegemonic power'. Yet by the Cold War Manichean policies of Acheson and Ball, Cyprus was to be 'cantonized' rather than assisted to become a single international state. The current 'Bush Doctrine' of permanent, preventive and pre-emptive war has also crippled US multilateral efforts in Cyprus. Clearly an over-reliance on compulsion extends to a counterproductive 'tilting' toward Ankara in the Annan Plan version V. Thus Annan V permanently forbids any amendments to the proposed Cyprus 'Main Articles' via PART VI, article 37:2 (p. 38)

Annan V gives Ankara most of what it has sought for the last 30 years in the North. Meanwhile it gives the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) very little in return except for a spurious 'reunification' of two separate, non-integrated states and a modest reduction in the area of the North (37% down to 28%). As Tassos Papadopoulos, the RoC President noted, "**there isn't much left to give**" on the Greek Cypriot side.

It is true that the current Bush Administration seems as anxious as the Clinton and first Bush administrations to see a settlement of the Cyprus and Eastern Mediterranean issues. The problem is that its view is less nuanced and sophisticated than the Clinton or first Bush administration's view. Thus great pressure from Washington and the UK was placed on Athens and Nicosia to accept Annan V 'as is' without the major changes required to be viable, effective, and fair to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots.

Athens also pressured the Greek Cypriot's to accept the Plan without essential changes since it has interests external to Cyprus, primarily *rapprochement* with Ankara. We must not forget that Athens **twice** rejected British offers to give all of Cyprus to Greece – once under Venizelos and once at the beginning of World War I (16 October 1915). Finally, Turkey pushed for acceptance of the Annan Plan since it gives most of what Ankara and the 'TRNC' leaders have long demanded: recognition of a Turkish State in the North with sovereign immunity of that state from the weak, rotating central government provided by the Plan. In exchange the Plan asks only that the North give up about 9% of the land which it took by armed force in 1974 in clear violation of Turkey's obligations under Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee as well as the precepts of international law and US-Turkish agreements. These bilateral agreements provided that the arms given to Turkey would not be used except for NATO defence. And brutal as the Athens Junta was in 1974, it was no threat to NATO militarily – only to the Greek people, the Greek Cypriots, and RoC President, Archbishop Makarios.

Signs of a constructive 'paradigm shift' in relations between Athens and Ankara include the exchange of rescue efforts by Greek and Turkish rescuers⁶ which also, however, contains a warning by Professor Thanos Veremis at Athens University

who doubts that the 'logjam' in relations can be broken since "the Turkish military is highly conservative and it wants to preserve its political power."

But foreign governments, Kinzer concludes, including the US, "are encouraging the countries' new-found friendship"⁷ and US President Clinton received Turkish PM Bulent Ecevit and visited both Turkey and Greece. The EU held crucial summit meeting in Helsinki and Turkey is "hoping that Greece will help persuade the 15-nation Union, many of whose members have been critical of Turkey's human rights record, to add Turkey to its list of prospective members."

Though war between nation-states is still perhaps the major problem in international relations, we suggest that Realists overlook the importance of economics and apotheosise, in our view, the importance of military capabilities. We have discussed 'dual state' powers such as the ex-USSR already. We agree with Paul Kennedy's views on the endemic 'overextension' of empires as a result of 'side payments' and the gradual 'hollowing out' of their domestic strength. As noted earlier, we find his comments apply also to the US⁸ and its policy toward the Third World. Certainly, US efforts to obtain Ankara's help in sending troops to the north of Iraq at the beginning of the current Iraq War suggest the failure of 'side payments' together with the growing democratisation of Turkish political culture. Despite Washington's pressures, the AKP and the Turkish General Staff were unable to persuade the Turkish Parliament to cooperate and send the troops prior to the invasion of Iraq.

We would stress the remarkable development of Greece in recent years into a mature civil society⁹ together with the concomitant efforts of the Europeans (including Greece) to develop both a joint Monetary (via the EMU) and European Security and Defence Identity. We note the EU slowly and painfully setting up an independent but integrated European pillar within NATO. This 'pillar' would be capable of acting autonomously from NATO in certain situations, say in ex- Yugoslavia or other localised European areas or even the Middle East. That is, Greece and the other European democracies would be 'separable but not separate' from NATO's integrated command structure within a common WEU framework.

Such a new European Defence Identity would clearly have profound effects on the strategic shape of Eastern Mediterranean affairs including Greek-Turkish relations and the Aegean and Cyprus disputes and probably exert a stabilising effect both on the Balkans and Turkey's Middle East neighbours. For the EU, the price would have to include entrance of Turkey as a full member.

For Turkey it would clearly require paying two high prices: First, resolution of the Cyprus and Aegean disputes with Greece. But this would mean that Turkey would

have to follow Greece's example begun by Papandreou and almost completed by Simitis via his 'New Balkan Profile': good relations with Ankara's European and Balkan neighbours. But then Turkey would be free to deal with her less altruistic neighbours: Syria, Iraq, and Iran while pursuing the Kemalist dream of a secular Turkey as a fully accepted partner of the Western democracies.¹⁰ Second, Turkey would have to develop domestic policies to meet the *aquis communautaire* and Copenhagen standards of the EU in such areas as the economy, and political and human rights for all citizens, including Kurds.

Would Turkey be prepared to pay such heavy prices? We believe it will have little choice for the alternative is to be 'marginalized' as a Third World power and experience a tragic descent into the miasma of a secular military dictatorship such as Iraq, or – even worse from the Kemalist elites' point of view – become another Iran and suffer the victory of the hated Muslim fundamentalist extremists within Turkey such as Necmettin Erbakan.

Thus we suggest the present period of US unipolar dominance is likely to be challenged further by rising new aggregations of power including the EU and the European 'pillar' of NATO, Japan and South-east Asia, and later on China, etc. We also believe that Russia will gradually 'get its act together' and once more become a major player in international politics. At the present time, Russia is almost totally preoccupied with its domestic problems and tragic, futile war with Chechnya. Consequently, it is most unlikely that it will be able to play much of a role in the former Turkic republics of the ex-USSR or do much in the Eastern Mediterranean beyond offer to provide arms or stuff Cypriot banks with dubiously-obtained cash from looted assets in Russia.

But with the disintegration of the Soviet Union, the Greek-Turkish policy of the US evidently did not, change fundamentally. Tragically, US policy remained on course as Professors Van Coufoudakis and Phillippos Sawides argue. US **interests** remained the same as did the **policies** intended to defend them. Annan V suggests clearly that in the case of the Eastern Mediterranean, US policymakers had 'forgotten nothing and learned nothing.' Acheson I and II, Ball, the NATO Plan, and other policies pursued by the US clearly were intended to achieve 'double *enosis*' with consequent partition of Cyprus.

But that existing partition has not led to a lessening of tensions between Athens and Ankara, and division of Cyprus via a 'Hispaniola Partition' has clearly **not** brought about any lessening of the bitter hatreds of the parties involved.

This failure of US and UK policy, we believe, was clearly **not** recognised by Foggy Bottom and Whitehall. The problem is 'What is to be Done?' (*Sto delar?*)

now, after the disastrous failure of Annan V. We still believe that the only real solution is a 'Big Package' agreement between Athens and Ankara similar to that achieved by Paris and Berlin in the 1950s or between Venizelos and Ataturk in the 1930s. But that agreement will have to take Greek Cypriot needs more fully into account and not egregiously tilt toward Ankara only. It is not widely known, but Ataturk recommended Venizelos for the Nobel Peace Prize in that period.

Thus the 'Theory of Continuity' which is so well developed by our friends, Van Coufoudakis and Philippos K. Savvides, is still relevant.¹¹ We suggest that both scholars make an irrefragable case with respect to the period from the early days of the Cold War through the Nixon Administration. Henry A. Kissinger clearly and admittedly 'tilted' toward Turkey in the grim 'July Days' of 1974 and the subsequent invasion of Cyprus by Turkish forces. He and his administration did nothing to prevent the totally illegal and continued occupation of northern Cyprus (37%) by Turkish troops as well as the importation of some 35-40,000 Anatolian settlers which illegally changed the demography of the area in clear violation of customary international law as well as Treaty obligations freely accepted by Turkey, i.e., Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the London-Zurich package and the Lausanne Treaty of 1923. The former required any of the Guarantor Powers, after consultation (which Turkey did with the UK) in case of unilateral intervention, to re-establish the situation *ante-bet/um*. That is, each guarantor power "reserved the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing a state of affairs created by the present treaty" (Art. IV of the Treaty of Guarantee). This clearly Turkey did not do, rather in August 1974 it began a further advance from occupying about 3% of Cyprus to some 37% after its own recalcitrance led to the failure of the Geneva meeting of the three Guarantor Powers: Greece, Turkey, and Great Britain.

US Policy

The Clinton foreign policy team of Secretary Albright, UN Ambassador Holbrooke, Secretary Cohen and President Clinton had rather different ideas about the goals of US power in the Eastern Mediterranean. As Secretary Albright noted in greeting Cypriot Foreign Minister Ioannis Kasoulides on 6 June 1997, "The United States' goal remains to encourage a Cyprus settlement that establishes a stable, bizonal federation, with adequate security guarantees for all." She noted further: "**What we seek (sio-GC) is the reunification of Cyprus. We believe that the division of the island (of Cyprus-GC) is unacceptable ... We continue to support the establishment of a bi-zonal, bi-communal federation. We will do everything we can to bring the process forward.**" (balding added-GC)¹² Did they really mean it? We cannot know for certain since they did not reunify Cyprus. But the subsequent administration clearly returned to the 'Melian' formula for Cyprus.

For the Greek and Turkish Cypriots have been left out in the cold by the world's powers including Athens, Ankara, London, and Washington. Thus the interests of the Cypriots have been overlooked in favour of a more humane version of the Melian formula: "... the strong do what they have the power to do and the weak accept what they have to accept." However, the 'weak' [Greek Cypriots] refused to accept their fate and vote 'Ochi' (no) preferring to protect their perceived interests at the expense of the Turkish Cypriots by entering the EU and thus 'importing' the Cyprus problem into that somewhat ramshackle organisation already burdened by many other serious issues. The Greek Cypriots by 76% voted "kalo pente kai sto xeri para deka kai karteri" ["a bird in the hand is worth two in the bush."] It was a practical if bitter decision whose effects have yet to be worked out. At best it will be renegotiated and the Turkish Cypriots will be brought into a fairly united Cyprus – at worst it may presage permanent bifurcation of Cyprus via a 'Hispaniola' settlement like that between Haitians and Dominicans – two cultures, two languages, two states.

The US leadership clearly does not believe that the current 'Hispaniola Formula' is both dangerous and counterproductive. Yet it adds little to Turkish or Greek or Cypriot or American or UK or world security. But with an apparent Greco-Turkish rapprochement underway, neither the US as a superpower, nor London, nor the EU nor UN need fear that Cyprus' division will likely trigger an eventual disastrous Greco-Turkish conflict. If Europe (the EU) and America move together, Turkey will either join in or be marginalized and that would run directly counter to the Kemalist *Weltanschauung* of the Turkish military and civilian elite. It would be a *denouement* which could not but arouse alarm among Turkish decision-makers. For Turkey needs Europe, and Europe needs a reformed Turkey as a full partner in the EU, EMU, revised WEU, Balkan peacekeeping force, and NATO.

Other Sinners

In our view, all sides to the Cyprus tragedy made serious and unnecessary policy misjudgements which led to great suffering for all Cypriots, Greek and Turkish. The polemic between the 'National Narratives' of the Greek and Turkish peoples of Cyprus with their subtexts might not have been so devastating if the two peoples had not been together on an island the size of the US state of Connecticut.

But the British used one people against the other in classic '*divide et impera*' imperial policy to maintain their control over the island when in fact they only needed two SSA's, Akrotiri and Dhekelia, for their reduced role as a European regional power. Ironically the Cyprus tragedy might have been avoided had the British given more weight to realistic political and less to unrealistic security needs in the Eastern Mediterranean. Indeed it is a tragedy that little trans-ethnic 'Cypriot nationalism' ever developed, for in our view there is no 'Cypriot nation' – only two

ethnic communities: one Greek and one Turkish. In my various trips to Cyprus, I never saw a Cypriot flag, only Greek on one side of the Green line and Turkish on the other. I doubt if many Greek Cypriots know what their flag looks like and they have, as far as I know, no national anthem. Pollis is correct in suggesting that British colonialism bears much responsibility for the lack of a Cypriot sense of 'nationhood.' Still we doubt very much that such a hybrid nationalism could have emerged in the cruel world of Middle East and Eastern Mediterranean politics: for Cyprus has been the object of foreign intrigues since Neolithic times. As Markides suggests pessimistically regarding Turkish-Cypriot (T/C) nationalism:

As early as 1914, [T/C-GC] leaders protested ... against Greek agitation for *enosis*. And in December 1949, only six years before the EOKA struggle had started, about 15,000 Turks marched through the Turkish quarter of Nicosia cursing Enosis and hurling insults and threats at the [G/C's-GC]. Cyprus never became a "consociational democracy" like Switzerland ... owing to the failure of political will of both elites [G/C and T/C-GC].

Markides concludes as do we with the sad negative conclusion that "Nothing short of a 'cultural revolution' can establish the *internal preconditions* [ital. added-GC] of a lasting intercommunal peace."¹³

Those 'preconditions' just do not exist in the view of Professor Thomas Ehrlich of Stanford; they "could only develop if supported by pressures from without."¹⁴ We would suggest that the EU and the US should seriously consider ways to help provide additional external support by adding to the strength of internal Cypriot forces on both sides of the Green line which are willing to push for a 'bizonal, bicomunal, federal' solution brokered by the UN and supported by the Western democracies including Greece. Joseph S. Joseph comments in similar negative fashion:

Despite four centuries of coexistence and physical intermingling, the [G/C's and T/C's-GC] remained separate and distinct ethnic groups divided along linguistic, religious, cultural, and political lines. The preservation of their ethnic identity could be attributed to ... loyalties with Greece and Turkey. *With the establishment of the [RoCJ], the ethnic and political fragmentation inherited from the past were institutionalised and incorporated into the state apparatus and the political process.*

Communal dualism became the foundation of political structures and practices that prevented the development of ... common patriotism, joint Cypriot consciousness, and unifying political culture supportive of the Cypriot state [ital. added-GC)].¹⁵

For a contrary view, blaming primarily British policy for the lack of a common Cypriot nationalism, cf. Adamantia Pollis.¹⁶

We conclude that although Whitehall's policy in Cyprus exacerbated the problem of intercommunal relations for reasons of *raison d'etat*, Britain was **successful** in this policy because of **pre-existing conditions of communal division**. Moreover, mainland Greeks and Greek-Cypriots (G/C's) seemed never fully to take into account in their strategic calculations that Turkey was only forty miles away while Greece was four hundred miles away. The continued struggle for *enosis* was bound to produce a bitter response from Ankara. Their huge majority of 80% vs. 20% blinded them to these strategic realities with tragic results. They understood *their* Pole for they were surrounded by it. But they failed to consider the Turkish Pole.

President Makarios himself committed a second Greek policy failure on 30 November 1963 when he unilaterally proclaimed his famous '13 Points' which in effect unilaterally revised the London-Zurich Agreements with disastrous results. We admit that those Agreements were rigid, that "The 1960 Constitution was a peculiar and highly rigid one that, in the final analysis, proved to be unworkable." But that begs the question, "could the Constitution have been made to work absent Greek (EOKA, EOKA B!) and Turkish (TMT) extremism?" But Makarios clearly, unilaterally, and illegally revised the London Agreements and the 1960 Constitution with disastrous results.

Indeed, one must ask, "Where were the reformers (on both sides) on Cyprus? Where were the Jean Jaures, the Mahatma Gandhis, the Martin Luther Kings, the Ibrahim Rugovas? Why was there until recently no Cyprus branch of the Greek Amnesty International or Akim Birdal's Turkish Human Rights Association?" The answer, we suspect, involves the depth of the ethnic divisions and the regnant political culture of Cyprus. Even the then President and Vice President of the Republic of Cyprus made little effort to 'reach across' to the 'other' community and build a sense of common Cypriot nationalism. The ultimate reality of Cyprus remained the 'we-they' distinction of separate ethnicities.

In cataloguing Greek policy failures we must also include Ioannides' fatal errors of judgement in beginning the 'July Days' by trying to overthrow the elected leader of the Cypriot people, President and Ethnarch and Archbishop Makarios. The Junta's inability to realise Turkey's propinquity to Cyprus is a bit mind-boggling in retrospect, but must be included in Greek errors of contributing to the Cyprus tragedy.

Finally, the Greek side must take some responsibility for the activities of General George Grivas (Dighenis) who died on 27 January 1974. Grivas is rarely mentioned in Greek or Greek-Cypriot national narratives. Rarely is he given responsibility for contributing to the pathological fear of Greek Cypriots which we observed on the part of Turkish Cypriots and which we believe was made indelible by the 'July Days'.

Nor were we Americans without guilt in the Cypriot tragedy. Perhaps then US Ambassador to Greece, Henry J. Tasca, was correct: the brutal leader of ESA, (*Ethniki Stratiotiki Astinomia* or Greek Military Police) was only a 'cop'. But that hardly relieves Tasca in our view from the responsibility of dealing with him. Diplomats are not entitled to choose the leaders of countries to which they are accredited and simply walk away.

Tragically, it is widely believed by many Greeks and Turks as well as by some foreign students of Eastern Mediterranean affairs that the US Government financed EOKA-B! despite its bloodthirsty practices toward patriotic but dissenting Greek Cypriots. Whether the US helped finance TMT is also not clear, but it certainly followed similar practices toward its dissenting majority. Again, absent convincing evidence, a 'Scotch Verdict' must suffice until the files are available.

Moreover, there is the counterproductive role played by President Nixon in sending his Vice President, Spiro T. Agnew, to visit the Junta leadership in Athens and Nixon's Secretary of State and former Special Assistant for National Security, Henry A. Kissinger's dubious statecraft before and during the 'July Days' of 1974. Kissinger's vaunted *Realpolitik* seemed to backfire as both America's allies, Greece and Turkey, responded negatively to his 'tilts' – first toward the Greek Junta, then toward Ankara. He did not even follow the dictates of Bismarkian *Realpolitik*, which never **required** that the manipulator of the balance of power should not consider at all the deeply felt wishes of the manipulated. But Kissinger seemed oblivious to both Greek and Turkish national feelings. For after Congress instituted a boycott on US arms to Turkey, the Turks closed down US bases in Turkey while America's best friend, the wise though conservative Greek Prime Minister Karamanlis, withdrew Greece from the military arm of NATO. He was the same Greek leader who advised Makarios *against* proclaiming his 13 Points discussed earlier. We conclude that the 'July Days' of 1974 brought little credit to US statecraft or then Secretary of State Kissinger, for it is rarely the goal of prudent diplomacy to infuriate one's closest allies. Once again, US policy seemed oblivious to strongly felt local needs, and seemed unnecessarily dominated by short-term security considerations at the expense of regional alliance and local political needs.

UN Negotiations for Cypriot Reunification¹⁷

UN negotiations to reunify Cyprus have been prolix, difficult, and tedious as well as unproductive. We shall therefore try to summarise them with cruel brevity, reserving our conclusions for the UN plan, known popularly as Annan Plan V rejected by 76% of Greek Cypriots and accepted by 65% of the Turkish Cypriots.

The major landmarks include;

1. The 1977 Makarios-Denktash meeting
2. The 1979 Kyprianou-Denktash Communiqué
3. The 1984 Proximity Talks
4. The 1985-1986 UN Draft Framework Exercise
5. The 1988-1989 Talks
6. March 1990-April 1992. Security Council (SC Res.) Resolution 649, 13 May 1990
7. April 1992 - the S-G's 'Set of Ideas'. S-G Boutros-Ghali's April 1992 report
8. 1992-1994 CBM's: On 19 November 1992 the S-G called for CBM's
9. The 1997 Talks
10. On 24 January 1998 the Paphos air base became operational for Greek fighter planes and the S-300 missiles were intended to protect the base. On 16 June, Athens sent six planes to the Paphos air base and Turkey responded on 18 June by sending six planes to the 'TRNC'. Cypriot troops in Russia completed their S-300 training with a test-firing of their new weapons, whereupon US Secretary Albright asked Clerides to reconsider the S-300 purchase, to store the missiles outside Cyprus, or to replace the order with shorter-range SA-15's. On 29 December 1998, Clerides decided not to deploy the missiles on Cyprus. UNSC S/Res.1251 stated that the UN goal was a Cyprus with a single sovereignty comprising two politically equal communities in a biz-bic federation.
11. The 1999-2001 Proximity Talks. Clerides and Denktash met on 4 December 2001 for the first time since August 1997. They agreed to begin direct talks with no preconditions, all issues on the table, and to continue until a comprehensive settlement was achieved. Denktash proposed Belgium as a model for foreign affairs and Switzerland as a model for domestic matters. These events led to the current situation: the Annan Plan as amended five times or Annan V.

The Annan Plan V – or Mark Twain's Stew

On 16 January 2002 Clerides and Denktash met with de Soto and agreed to hold intensive peace talks beginning 21 January at the Nicosia Airport, a UN base but closed to other air traffic. They agreed there would be no final agreement until all issues were settled. On 29 April, Denktash proposed a Cypriot 'Partnership State' to be based upon the two now existing 'states' on Cyprus. This would, of course, imply legal recognition of the 'TRNC' which the UN and other states had never done since it was illegally created by Turkey and recognised only by Turkey which had established it. In fact, this idea of Denktash's was incorporated into the Annan V and was rejected by the Greek side. After the rejection, the Greek-controlled RoC entered the EU on 1 May with the *legal* and *de jure* right to control the North though no *de facto* control over the Turkish-Cypriot controlled area occupied by 35,000

mainland Turkish troops with up to 100,000 mainland Turkish settlers brought in by Ankara in part to take over formerly Greek-Cypriot farms, orchards, and businesses.

Each 'partner' would retain authority over its domestic affairs in the **Denktash Plan** and both would set up a 12-member Council consisting of two presidents and five representatives from each ethnic group. Thus Denktash would win his long 30-year battle for recognition of the 'TRNC state' diminished by 9% of its territory along with equal representation in his Council as to members and "Co-Chairs even though the Turkish Cypriots are only 18% of the island's population while the Greek Cypriots are about 80%".

Under **Annan V**, however, executive power would be vested in a Presidential Council of six members elected by special majority in the Senate and approved by majority in the Chamber of Deputies based on relative populations of the two 'states' but reserving a minimum of one-third of the membership from each 'state'. This would guarantee the Turkish Cypriots at least one-third of the Council membership or two Council members.¹⁸ Decisions of the Presidential Council would be by 'consensus' – a rather strong leap of faith given the history of the 1960s London/Zurich Agreements and subsequent events. If 'consensus' failed it would take decisions by simple majority provided this majority included at least one member from each 'state'. This would give the Turkish-Cypriots an opportunity to 'veto' any governmental decisions with one vote in the Council.¹⁹ The Presidential Council in Annan Plans I-V seems to be an 'executive board' of the proposed United Cyprus State and recalls Jeremy Bentham's bitter comment: "A board, my Lord, is a *screen*.... What is everybody's business is nobody's business; what is everybody's fault is nobody's fault, by each one the fault is shifted off upon the rest...".²⁰

Oddly enough, the judicial arm of the United Cyprus State (The Supreme Court) would have the power to resolve disputes within the Presidential Council including 'deadlocks' within federal institutions if this is indispensable to the proper functioning of the federal government.²¹ Thus the *judicial branch* (Supreme Court) is empowered to impose *executive decisions* on the *executive branch* or any other 'federal institution'.²²

Even more anomalously, however, the Cyprus Supreme Court would have three non-Cypriot judges "until otherwise provided by law".²³ Thus *foreign nationals* might well cast the deciding vote in the Supreme Court on behalf of the Presidential Council since the other three Court members are to be drawn equally from the two 'constituent states.' Can one imagine any other government in the world in which non-citizens are so empowered? This plan seems to violate the very essence of

'sovereignty' elsewhere proclaimed in the Annan Plan and defined by many, including the inventor of the idea, Jean Bodin in *Six Books of the Republic*, as "the right to say what the law is."

In the executive or Presidential Council, The Annan Plan closely follows the Denktash proposal also, but reduces the number of members to six (two of whom have to be Turkish-Cypriots) with the Co-Chairs termed 'non-voting members'. However, these 'non-voting members' appear to be 'equal' and may place an item on the agenda of the Council.²⁴ Again, the Denktash proposal is repeated in the Annan Plan largely intact, violating the Greek population 'Pole' in favour of the Turkish propinquity 'Pole'. Clearly, the UN Plan represents another clear Turkish minority victory over the Roe Greek-Cypriot majority.

Mark Twain once gave his recipe for 'horse and rabbit stew' composed of 'equal parts': one horse and one rabbit. The UN Plan seems to follow his recipe in its draft Constitution. A joint parliament would have an equal number of members from each side but here the Plan proposes two houses, one based on population (the Chamber of Deputies) while the other has equal membership from each 'state' (the Senate). Both houses would have forty-eight members with the Chamber of Deputies reserving a minimum of one-quarter of the members from each 'constituent state'.²⁵ Again, the Turkish Cypriots receive 25% of the votes with only 18% of the population.

It is hard to disagree with the conclusion of the American Hellenic Institute's (AHI's) conclusion that the Annan Plan "creates a minority veto for the 18% Turkish Cypriot minority" and that this veto would apply to:

1. Adoption of laws concerning taxation, citizenship, and immigration;
2. Approval of the budget; and
3. Election of the Presidential Council [the executive-GC]

We are also compelled to agree with the AHI conclusion that **"This arrangement is clearly undemocratic, a recipe for stalemate, and harmful to all Cypriots."** We further agree with the AHI's conclusion that "The Annan Plan is a more complicated version of the 1959-1960 London-Zurich agreements imposed on the Greek Cypriots by the British during the Cold War" and that "Political paralysis in the exercise of executive power will be the result" for "The Annan Plan vetoes exceed the minority vetoes of the London-Zurich ... agreements which vetoes led to the breakdown of the Cyprus constitution."²⁶

In sum, the Annan Plan veers too far to the Turkish 'Pole' of Propinquity and too far away from the Greek 'Pole' population. It is simply the wrong 'mix' of democracy

and protection for legitimate minority rights. **In our judgment it should have been rejected** as it was. The UN drafters should return to their table and develop a fairer constitution - for this one is worse than that of 1959-1960 which clearly failed.

An additional serious contribution to the 'democratic deficit' of Annan V is the "highly complicated, ambiguous, and uncertain regime for resolving property issues and is based [apparently-GC] on the principle that real property owners even ultimately be forced to give up their property rights which would violate the European Convention on Human Rights and international law."²⁷ Granted that the property restitution issue is excruciatingly complicated, nevertheless we feel either restitution or full and fair compensation should be addressed more effectively than is done in Annan v.²⁸

This also raises the vexed question of the estimated 100,000 mainland Turkish settlers who were brought into the North by Ankara to take over businesses created and operated by Greek Cypriots before the invasion. International law specifically forbids changing the demographic structure of a conquered land as it forbids illegal conquest in general and specifically via Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee of the 1959 Agreements (which, *inter alia*, are incorporated into the Annan Plan V. The 'phased withdrawal' of all Greek and Turkish troops from 2011-2018 is a potentially good idea, but it does not deal with the illegality of Turkish military occupation since 1974 of 37% of Cyprus.²⁹

A further politico-juridical problem is the Annan Plan's 'derogations' from the Copenhagen standards as well as the detailed 70,000 pages of the *acquis communautaire* which reasonably should apply to *all* of Cyprus – upon the entry of Cyprus into the European Union. A cursory reading of the Annan Plan does not suggest that these standards apply and this adds to the democratic deficit if not to the legal tangle incident to the Annan Plan after entry into the EU.

Among the alleged contradictions of the Annan V with the Treaty of Rome (which established the EU in 1957) are:

- Art. 3 by denying refugees freedom of movement, of goods, of persons, services, and capital.
- Art. 8 by denying refugees the right to vote and stand as potential candidate(s) for municipal elections; and by denying refugees the right to vote and to stand as candidate(s) in elections for the EU Parliament in the Member State in which they reside.
- Art. 48 by preventing free movement of workers.
- Arts. 52 - 53 by preventing refugees from setting up their own businesses in the North; and

Art. 59 by preventing refugees from providing services in the North.

In addition, Annan Plan V apparently violates Articles 1, 8, and 13 of the European Convention of Human Rights on protection of property, right to respect for private and family life, home, and correspondence, and right to an effective remedy. It is not clear how Annan Plan V would deal with these apparent 'derogations' or violations of the European Convention of Human Rights.

Finally, there remains one very serious structural anomaly regarding the 'freezing' of the Main Articles of the Annan Plan V. In statements by UN and Western diplomats the public was repeatedly told that the Annan Plan is based upon the model of the Swiss Confederation (really a Federation) as to domestic legal structure and the Kingdom of Belgium for external or foreign relations. Yet a study of either Switzerland or Belgium reveals both linguistic and ethnic differences requiring many adjustments and amendments to the constitutional order of these countries. Yet Annan V (Part VI, in Art. 37, paragraph 2, p. 3) apparently 'freezes' the proposed United Cypriot State constitution in Annan V **forever**. It states: "**The Basic Articles of this Constitution cannot be amended.**" This means that later experience and wisdom cannot be adopted via the amendment of the current Main Articles of the proposed Cyprus constitution.

Yet in the constitutions of Switzerland and Belgium, the models for Annan V, have been changed and amended many times as experience and wisdom accumulated over the centuries.³⁰

Yet the Annan Plan forbids **forever** any amendments or changes to the 'Main Articles' of the Plan.

In assessing the Annan Plan, we conclude that its courageous drafters, after years of effort and hundreds of pages, have constructed a juridical and constitutional order designed for gridlock, for failure, for impotence. And such a design is not democratic, not workable, and not fair for either group of Cypriots. As such it cannot last – and certainly not without major amendment.

We therefore regretfully conclude that the UN drafters and the governments which supported them - the UK, US, and Turkish - should go back to the drawing boards and create a constitution which more fairly operates between the two Poles: the Greek population Pole and the Turkish legitimacy Pole. We regretfully recommended that the Republic of Cyprus enter the EU alone until the UN can redraft a fairer constitution. Much of the work has been done and is incorporated in the Annan Plan V. What is needed is an Annan Plan VI fairer to both groups which will work. The risks to both

Greeks and Turks by rejecting Annan V on 24 April 2004 were outweighed by a supine acceptance: the 76% Greek-Cypriot vote was justified even though the Turkish Cypriots were left in the cold.

Quo Vadis?

The Republic of Cyprus was admitted to the EU on 1 May 2004 together with nine other candidates including Malta and many Central or East European countries. Greece, which chaired the military aspects of the meeting and succeeded Denmark as Chair, indicated it would veto the admission of any new EU members if Cyprus were *not* admitted. Turkey, on the other hand, threatened to annex the North if the Republic *is* admitted to the EU. Turkish Cypriots clearly wanted reunification of their island as large demonstrations in the North in favour of EU membership for all of Cyprus occurred between November 2002 and February 2003. With an income disparity of \$5,623 per person in the North vs. \$16,400 in the RoC, the Turkish Cypriots had a clear economic reason for demanding reunion.³¹

Moreover, the \$250 million per year 'subsidy' from Ankara was neither enough nor targeted to help properly. But they desperately wanted to end their isolation which had lasted since 1964. The economy was in bad shape, banks had collapsed, unemployment and emigration were high, and repression included thirty-one bombings, with the major opposition newspaper (*Avrupa/Afrika*) bombed twice and its journalists arrested. Opposition parties in the North (YBH and CTP, TKP, trade unionists, businessmen, and peace activists) were also threatened with death. According to several sources, the National Security Council in Ankara and the Chief of Staff of Turkey had carried out 'psychological war plans' one of which was code named, 'Operation Falcon.' Fascist 'grey wolf' thugs were imported from mainland Turkey and an ultra-nationalist UHH (Ulusal Halk Hareketi) group was formed to oppose reunification efforts by 'This Country is Ours' which was composed of forty-one NGO's in the North in 2000.³²

Some analysts stress the role of the Turkish General Staff in Ankara (Tuerk Genelkurmay Baskanligr or TGB), their role in the Turkish Armed Forces (Tuerk Silahlı Kuwetlerin or TSK), and the Turkish National Security Council or Milli Guvenlik Kurulu or MGC. All these agencies evidently felt that Turkish security would be seriously jeopardised "by Turkey's military withdrawal from [Cyprus]".³³

Conclusions

We hope and believe that the moderate Islamicist AKP government of Recep Tayyip Erdogan will restart negotiations under UN auspices rather than carry out the threat of turning the North into the 81st province (villayet) of Turkey. Of course if the

Erdogan government were to fall, annexation of the North might occur but that would mean a provisional end to Turkey's hopes ever to join the EU and consequently appear counterproductive to the Kemalist forces in Turkey including the military.

Legally, the Republic's admission to the EU means its sovereignty will *de jure* be island-wide, including the North, since only *de facto* does Ankara control the North and no country other than Turkey has recognised the North as a 'state' in international law.

Thus the thirty-year agony of partition may remain, but the entire security situation will change dramatically. Turkish foreign policy will be seen by all as having provisionally failed in its efforts at a 'two-state' solution on the Island. Turkey will be confronted by several major choices - all painful. Three scenarios seem possible and we list them in order of their probability.

First, a **Status Quo** Policy under which the present situation is maintained as much as possible with minatory gestures and a vast public relations campaign of threats and a general circling of the wagons. Over-flights of Greek and Greek-Cypriot airspace could be expected as well as further reinforcements of the 35,000 Turkish mainland troops on Cyprus. Such a policy would, ironically, indicate a victory for the sophisticated elites in the military and National Security Council (MGK) since it would preserve the 'bargaining chip' card discussed above. It would have the advantage of delaying further the painful and enormous domestic changes in Turkish society required by modernisation and subsequent entry into the EU. Its costs would include a continuation of the present unacceptable status quo with all its dangers of further 'Imia-Kardak' Greco-Turkish conflict but attenuated by *rapprochement* between these two NATO allies as supported by the US and UK. It is unlikely therefore to lead to escalation and a situation which neither Ankara nor Athens could control. It would not resolve the Cyprus problem, but might permit an **Aegean settlement** which is evidently more important to Athens than a Cyprus agreement.

Second, **Annexation**. Turkey may respond as it has threatened: Annex the North and move away from the West toward its neighbours. This option has considerable costs. It means giving up the chance to join the EU for the foreseeable future. It also violates the basic Kemalist elite's desire to move toward the West as noted in the introduction. It would also mean the 'hard liners' had won, since it would mark a serious and dramatic diplomatic defeat which could hardly be concealed and might lead to domestic upheaval between the Westernisers and Islamicist nationalists. It would lead to an exacerbation of the 'brain drain,' native Turkish Cypriots driven abroad by economic and fiscal problems imported from Turkey as

well as by the dramatic and painfully obvious differences in living standards between the Greek Cyprus and the North. Finally it would mean giving up the possibility of any arrangement for reunification of the Island which is an important bargaining chip in dealing with Greeks, Greek Cypriots and the US, EU, and UN. This 'bargaining chip' of pretended interest in a peaceful non-partitioned federal settlement (the so-called 'biz-bic' [bizonal-bicommunal federal] solution) has served Ankara's and Denktash's tactical diplomatic needs very well. Since the North is *already* annexed *de facto* to mainland Turkey, annexation would be a confession of weakness that Ankara could not resist domestic political pressures to annex officially what it has already annexed unofficially.

Third, **Fulfilment**. Turkey may begin major and real domestic change in cooperation with the EU and US. The costs of this policy are also very high. Even with a 'Marshall Plan' by the EU and US for Turkey, the vast problems of modernisation of Turkey will be enormous; while the striking differences between the Greek-controlled South and the Turkish-controlled North of Cyprus will likely grow even larger. The GDP per capita of the Republic is approximately \$16,400 per year; the corresponding figure for the North as noted earlier is only \$5,263. The social costs are likely to be enormous, possibly even leading to a breakdown of the current power structure in Turkey. The domestic changes required would be comparable to those instituted by Ataturk upon the founding of the Turkish Republic in the 1920s. They might well lead to an 'Iran Reaction' of Islamic fundamentalism by the population, similar to that in Iran under the Ayatollah Khomeini or the Taliban- Al Queda rise in Afghanistan, i.e., the ascent to power of the hated Islamic fundamentalists in Turkey, the *bete noir* of the Kemalist dream which is anathema to military and Kemalist civilian elite alike.

We suggest that in the long run, the first scenario, the **Status Quo** Policy is the most likely with the second, outright **Annexation** the next most likely – and unfortunately the third or **Fulfilment** Policy the least likely since it would require the greatest vision and renegotiation of the Eastern Mediterranean *status quo*. A constructive and imaginative US-EU Marshall Plan for Turkey might change the probabilities somewhat. But unlike Europe, which required only re-establishing a pre-existing economic and social status quo after WWII, Turkey requires building up from the grass roots. A US which is opposed to 'nation-building' and a Europe which is turning inward and more conservative, are unlikely to be willing to provide the necessary help.

Thus we cannot be sanguine about fundamental reform in Turkey or of reunification of Cyprus - especially in the short run. We are, however, very sanguine that the Republic of Cyprus will take its proper place as a European state with its fellow EU countries. That admission will transform the Eastern

Mediterranean security situation in fundamental ways. Moreover, reunification may well come later after admission of Cyprus has become embedded into the architecture of the New Europe. It is only regrettable that Turkey is unlikely in our view to join the EU soon or end the division of Cyprus - for Turkey needs the EU, and the EU needs a reformed Turkey. Moreover, the US and UK in drafting Annan Plan V have apparently not helped but merely confirmed the 'Continuity Theorists' in their pessimistic if accurate view of Western policy toward Cyprus.

We do believe, however, that EU action in opening trade between the RoC and the North in Cyprus as well as RoC efforts to attenuate the isolation of the Turkish Cypriots may lead to a gradual disintegration of the Green Line (the 'Wall') of rigid demarcation. It may lead to a slow reunification of the island, removal of Turkish troops and resolution of the even more difficult problems of relative property rights and the Turkish presence of an estimated 100,000 Turkish settlers on Cyprus brought over in violation of international law to occupy former Greek-Cypriot-owned properties.

Notes

* This article is based in part on a paper originally delivered before the 9th Annual Conference of the Association for the Study of Nationalities held on 16 April 2004 at Columbia University in New York City under the rubric, 'Greece and Turkey Security Dilemmas.'

1. Thucydides, *History of the Peloponnesian War*. London/NY, Penguin Books, 1954, Book Five, 89, pp. 401-402, [bolding added-GC].
2. Alexis Alexandris, 'Greek-Turkish Relations: A View from Athens,' Draft MS presented 12 June 1996 to the US Institute of Peace, Washington, DC, pp. 2-3.
3. *Ibid.*, p. 26.
4. *Ibid.*
5. Louis R. Golino: 'European Union Links up with NATO,' *Providence-Journal* article of 29 September 1999, p. 86.
6. *New York Times* article by Stephen Kinzer, of 13 September 1999, p. 1, 'Earthquakes Help Warm Greek-Turkish Relations'.
7. Kinzer, *Ibid.*
8. For Paul Kennedy's views on the inevitable overextension of empires, the 'grim' Soviet dilemma, the importance of economics, and the US decline in absolute *even* as its relative power increases, see *The Rise and Fall of the Great Powers, Economic Change and Military Conflict from 1500 to 2000*. (NY, Vintage Books, 1987-1989), pp 513-514. For John Meersheimer's thoughtful review of the 'Realist' vs. the 'Liberal' schools of international relations, cf. *The Tragedy of Great Power Politics* (NY/London, W. W. Norton and Co., 2001), pp. 1-27

9. Cf. Adamantia Pollis, 'Modernity, Civil Society, and the Papandreou Legacy,' *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 1997; cf. also Theodore C. Kariotis (ed.), *The Greek Socialist Experiment, Papandreou's Greece 1981-1989* (NY, Pella, 1992).
10. "The West has always been prejudiced against the Turks ... but we Turks have always consistently moved toward the West ... In order to be a civilized nation, there is no alternative." Kemal Ataturk as cited in William Hale, *Turkish Foreign Policy 1774-2000* (London, Frank Cass Publishers, 2000), p. 38.
11. Phillipos K. Savvides, 'US Foreign Policy Toward Cyprus: Is the "Theory of Continuity" Still Relevant?', *Journal of the Hellenic Diaspora*, 1998, Vol. 24, Number 1, pp. 31-59.
12. Press remarks of 6 June 1997.
13. Kyriacos C. Markides, *The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic* (New Haven, Yale University Press, 1977), pp. 21-23 and 186 *passim*.
14. Thomas Ehrlich, 'Cyprus: The Warlike Isle; Origins and Elements of the Current Crisis,' *Stanford Law Review*, Vol. 18, No. 5 (May 1986), p. 1089.
15. Joseph S. Joseph, Cyprus, *Ethnic Conflict and International Concern* (NY, Lang, 1985), pp. 241-242.
16. 'International Factors and the Failure of Political Integration in Cyprus' in *Small States and Segmented Societies* (NY, Praeger), pp. 44-83; also *Ibid.* 'Intergroup Conflict and British Colonial Policy, The Case of Cyprus' in *Comparative Politics* (July 1973), pp. 576-599.
17. The Annan Plan V may conveniently be found at <http://www.cyprus-un-plan.org/>.
18. The Council (Part V, sec. B, Art. 26, paragraphs 1-10, pp. 31-32.
19. *Ibid.*, paragraph 7, p. 32.
20. Jeremy Bentham in *The Radical Reform Bill (1819)* as reprinted in A. Dunsire, *Administration, the Word and the Science* (NY, John Wiley and Sons, 1973), p. 64.
21. Part V, Section D, Article 36, paragraph 6. Such decision requires "application" by the President or Vice President of either Chamber of Parliament, the Attorney General or the Deputy Attorney General, or a member of the Presidential Council. In case of "deadlock" of these worthies would surely so apply based on Cyprus' past history of communal strife.
22. *Ibid.*
23. Main Articles, Article 6, paragraph 2.
24. Part V, Section B, Article 26, paragraphs 1, 7, 8. By paragraph 7, a voting member may delegate his/her voting right to a non-voting member. In any event, by paragraph 6, both one-third of voting and one-third of non-voting members "must hail from each constituent state" despite the fact that only 18% of Cypriots are Turkish Cypriots.
25. Part V, Section A, Article 22, paragraphs 1-4.
26. Press Release of 19 February 2004 – No. 6, 'AHI ALERTS PRESENT GEORGE W. BUSH OF GREEK AMERICAN ORGANIZATIONS' CALL FOR CHANGES IN THE ANNAN PLAN IN THE INTERESTS OF THE US' by Gene Rossides, general counsel of the American Hellenic Institute on behalf of AHI, AHEPA, The Hellenic American National Council, the Cyprus Federation of American, the Panepirotic Federation of America, the Pan-Macedonian Association of America, p. 2. See also the Statement by the Pancyprian Association of America on the Annan Plan of 27 February 2004 which also calls for rejection as "unjust, undemocratic, and dysfunctional."
27. *Ibid.*, p. 3.
28. Attachments 2-4, pp. 106-132.
29. Annan V, Main Article 8, paragraphs 1-6, pp. 11-13.

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30. *Political Handbook of the World, 2000-2002*, edited by Arthur S. Banks, *et al.*, Binghamton, NY, CSA Publications, pp. 102 ff. (Belgium) and 1062 ff. (Switzerland).
31. Income figures from US Agency for International Development web page <http://usaid.gov/counti:y/ee.cy/> > p. 1. Also see Seagull Eluding in *Seuddeutsche Zeitung* (Munich-SPD), 21 April 2004. Compare his figures with those drawn from the USAID web site.
32. Gregory R. Copley, 'Cyprus: Blaming the Victims, Missing the Point,' editor, *Defense & Foreign Affairs Strategic Policy, May 2004*. Copley does not consider that Turkey might well have **legitimate** security concerns regarding the North of Cyprus considering the propinquity of Mersin and southern Turkey to Cyprus, the placement of oil pipelines nearby, etc. Copley also connects the MGK and TGB views to Turkey's concerns about US actions in Iraq and he argues dubiously that "It has become clear that there was no real understanding of the TGB's underlying strategic imperatives on the part of US, UN, UN and Greek officials who were pushing the governments of Turkey and Cyprus into achieving a settlement ..." Finally, he does not consider the role of AKEL, the Communist Party of Cyprus which joined Tassos Papadopoulos of the moderate-right DISI and the Greek Cypriot Orthodox Church (!!) in a united front to demand a 'No' vote on Annan V. No wonder one participant-analyst who prefers anonymity calls Cyprus the "Land of Absurdities". (*Cyprus Discussion List; [Cyprus@mit.edu] 27 Aug 2004*).
33. Cf. Pavlos Andronikos in MGSA-L@uci.edu of 23 August 2004 (Andronikos@froggy.com.au). Also George Baloglou (baloglou@Loswego.edu) 24 August who contends, "The Anglo-American authorship of the Annan Plan was publicly and shamelessly admitted at a public meeting in Washington on 26 June by Daniel Fried, a senior US State Department official who now works for the US National Security Council: "When we were trying to pressure Turkey to allow the passage of troops through its territory into northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives: several billion dollars in grants and loans, and Cyprus in the form of the Annan Plan." It should be noted that the White House spokesman, Mr. Boucher seems to deny this contention in saying: "There is no connection between Iraq and the Annan plan". But Mr. Boucher did not specifically deny Fried's work on the Annan Plan nor Lord David Hannay's support of that plan. Thus the question remains muddled, pending opening the diplomatic files or clear denial of US and UK work on the exact wording of Annan Plans I-V.