

GREEK CYPRIOT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERACTING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

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Abstract

It has been postulated that increased contacts between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots should result in increased optimism regarding the ability of the two communities to interact. This work uses a multivariate model to test whether this, indeed, has been the case. The findings suggest that contacts between the two major communities on the island have fostered increasingly optimistic views of interacting with Turkish Cypriots. Interestingly, there is little evidence that demographic characteristics of respondent are useful in predicting a person's optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots. The data for the analysis is taken from a May 2004 survey of 1,000 Greek Cypriots.

Between 1974 and 2003, a United Nations monitored zone physically separated the Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots on the island of Cyprus and there were few social or business interactions between members of the two major ethnic groups. Then, in April 2003, the leadership of the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot statelet declared that it would not impede visits to the areas under control of the Republic of Cyprus. The floodgates were opened and large numbers of citizens from both communities began crossing the United Nations' "Green Line" to visit areas in the other entity. The UN still monitors the Green Line but now Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots interact on a daily basis – many Greek Cypriots visit the tourist sites, casinos, and restaurants in the unrecognised Turkish Cypriot statelet in the north and many Turkish Cypriots work, shop, and study in the areas controlled by the internationally recognised government in the south.

But have increased contacts led to increased perceptions of the ability of the two ethnic groups to live together peacefully? What are the correlates of those who are most optimistic or pessimistic about living and working together? In order to answer these questions, we investigate likely causes for various preferences via an econometric analysis of the data gathered from a recent survey.

Previous Works

There is a substantial literature written about the politics of Cyprus and the Cyprus Problem (see Attalides, 1979; Hutchence and Georgiades, 1999; Joseph, 1999, 1997; Kyriakou, 2000; O'Malley and Craig, 1999; Peristianis, 1998; Richmond, 1999, 2001, 2002; Stravrinides, 1975; Theophanous, 1996, 2000). Such literature generally delves into explaining the sources of the Cyprus Problem with the normative goal of exploring the internal or external structural changes that will ensure a sustainable solution to the Cyprus Problem. Often, external players are cited as the cause of the Cyprus Problem (see, for example O'Malley and Craig, 1999) or the EU or UN are seen as critical players that can allow for a sustainable solution to the Cyprus Problem (see for example Peristianis, 1998; Theophanous, 2000).

Despite the voluminous literature written on the Cyprus Problem and the ethnic clash on the island, there has been little or no quantitative analysis of the perceptions of one ethnic group of the other. Instead, authors tend to make generalisations of the bargaining positions of the two ethnic groups that inherently suggest uniformity in positions. An exception to this is Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004) in which two waves of surveys were fielded, one before the liberalisation of the crossing of the Green Line and one following the liberalisation of the Green Line in April 2003. The surveys asked Cypriots of both the Greek- and the Turkish- Cypriot communities to rate perceptions of the reconciliation between the two communities on the island and their feelings about pursuing a business relationship with a person of the other community in the near future. The intention of the study was to test the notion of contact theory – the notion that when peoples interact, they will have more optimistic perceptions of their ability to interact with the other ethnic group.

Yildizian and Ehteshami's (2004) major finding is that the increased movement of people across the Green Line has encouraged the development of more optimistic views of interaction between the communities, supporting the notion of contact theory. However, this work has several methodological weaknesses. The major methodological weakness is that the authors assume that they have tested contact theory because time had an impact on interactions between people of the different ethnic groups. Essentially, the assumption is that time caused contacts. However, this overlooks the real notion that the contacts are not distributed evenly throughout the island. Furthermore, there are many different types of interactions that were not explored. The work only explored the notion of the ability to reconcile the peoples and to do business together – there are many other types of interactions that can take place. Finally, this work did not use a sophisticated design, allowing for control variables.

In this work, we look into the data collected in a recent survey to learn if contact theory has been effective among Greek Cypriots. We explore the spatial aspects of contact theory. In addition, we explore several other explanatory factors that may play a role in explaining pessimism/optimism regarding interacting with another ethnic group. The study is somewhat exploratory, looking for possible explanations as to what causes the variations in views of dealing with another ethnic group in Cyprus. Such research has important practical implications for those who study the Cyprus Problem and are seeking reasonable measures to solve the long-standing political and social divisions on the island, since it should indicate the degree of success that fostering contacts between the ethnic groups has accomplished in setting the stage for reconciliation between the ethnic groups.

Data and the Tests

The College of Tourism and Hotel Management commissioned CYMAR Market Research Limited to interview one thousand Greek Cypriots to learn about public opinion relating to rapprochement between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots following the April 2004 Annan Plan referendum. Respondents were between the ages of 18 and 65 and there were no older respondents in the sample because it was carried out as part of a commercially available omnibus study in which no modifications of the sample could be made. One-thousand Greek Cypriots were surveyed in face-to-face interviews at their homes throughout the government-controlled areas of the island.

CYMAR used stratified multistage sampling to find respondents. In the first stage, CYMAR divided up the population into urban and rural areas in accordance with the government's population census of 2001. Urban areas were divided into areas of roughly the same size (approximately 1,000 inhabitants). As a result, the greater urban area of Nicosia was divided into 209 areas, Limassol into 161, Larnaca into 72 and Paphos into 45. Forty-five urban areas and fifteen rural areas were chosen. The urban areas were chosen by random methods while the probability of being chosen as a rural area was proportionate to the size of the population of the village.

Within each area chosen in the sample, random methods were used, as much as possible to locate the households from which to find respondents. Starting points were found with the assistance of a computer programme designed for the purpose. Interviewers went to every n^{th} household to commence interviews. At each household a respondent was chosen from the adult with the most recent birthday. To ensure that interviews had taken place, 15 per cent of the respondents were contacted by telephone to confirm that a CYMAR interviewer had visited them in the course of the research. No refusal rates were reported or recorded, and CYMAR

reported no particular problems during the course of the fieldwork. In general, the interviews seem to portray a generally representative view of the population in terms of gender, district, and urban/rural location.

One weakness of the study is that it was performed as part of an omnibus with a commercial organisation. An omnibus service is a package offered by commercial market research firms that allows multiple organisations or individuals to carry out a collective study on the general population. The strength of such a study is that the costs are minimised since the study is shared with a number of persons or organisations buying questions on a survey. This is a benefit for those who only want to ask a few questions of the general public. This is also beneficial to the analyst who has questions and some access to funds but does not have available professional data collection services. The weakness, however, is that the market research firm determines the sample frame and methodology. In this study, for example, the research excluded those over 65 years of age, probably because most commercial interests are not interested in older respondents. Despite these weaknesses, the generally representative sample of data collection and the large number of observations remain the strengths of the study, allowing everyone a reasonable amount of security in the knowledge that data are generally representative of the population of the government-controlled areas of Cyprus and that the resulting patterns found within the data are "real."

Optimism Regarding Interactions

The degree of optimism regarding the ability of the Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot communities to coexist is the dependent variable for this analysis. Survey respondents were given a list of activities that indicated different types of interactions between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. The list of activities presented were "work together," "live together in neighbourhoods," "socialise," "intermarry," and "do business together." The respondents were asked how long they thought it would take for the two groups to live together successfully and peacefully. The possible responses to the question were "never," "ten years or less," "five years or less," "three years or less," and "one year or less." The responses were coded on an ordinal scale with "never" coded as "1" and "one year or less" coded as "5". The survey responses reflect the respondents' optimism regarding the ability of the two peoples to coexist peacefully and interact on these different dimensions. Higher numbers indicate greater levels of expressed optimism. Table 1 below illustrates the dispersion of the data.

Table 1. Frequencies of Valid Responses (%) and Mean Score

	N	Never (1)	10 years or less (2)	5 years or less (3)	3 years or less (4)	1 year or less (5)	Mean
Work Together	995	6.8	8.3	12	19.4	53.5	4.04
Live as neighbours	988	11.6	14.6	18.9	29.6	25.3	3.42
Share a social life	993	14.4	15.8	21.6	23.6	24.7	3.28
Intermarry	987	54.2	24.2	11.4	5.2	5	1.82
Share businesses	991	17.3	20.1	19.2	21	22.5	3.11

Note: Figures may not add up exactly to 100 due to rounding.

Each type of interaction attempts to measure a different dimension of familiarity and intimacy with Turkish Cypriots. The expectation is that working together and socialising would be less offensive to Greek Cypriots than marriage. Indeed, marriage was the dimension to which Greek Cypriots showed the highest degree of pessimism. It is likely that religion and ethnic distrust would make intermarriage and sharing businesses the more difficult for them to be optimistic about. We now turn to the likely explanatory variables to help explain the variations.

Independent Variables

1. Distance to Checkpoints in Nicosia

Contact theory stipulates that contacts between ethnic groups should lead to an alleviation of ethnic frictions. To measure this, one method is to assume that time played a role in allowing for contacts, as Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004) have done. However, there is a spatial element in Cyprus, since Turkish Cypriots must cross over the Green Line in few places. Half of the crossing points are in Nicosia, therefore, the distance to checkpoints is one way to measure the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots, and thus contacts with Turkish Cypriots, in the Republic of Cyprus. Nicosia is, in many respects, a bicomunal city. Turkish Cypriots work, shop, study, and socialise in areas under government control in Nicosia because of its proximity to the crossing points to the Green Line. Although there are other crossing points in the Famagusta district, those Turkish Cypriots who cross over generally just cross into the areas under the control of the Government of Cyprus during the day for work alone.

To measure this diffusion of contacts, we have measured each respondent's home from Nicosia, assuming that the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots into the Republic

of Cyprus is related to driving distances and that Nicosia is the major crossing point. Because the survey data indicate only the district in which the interview with the respondent took place, each district was measured in terms of driving distance in kilometres from the main city in the district, according to the Cyprus Tourism Organisation's data. Nicosia is coded as zero, Limassol 83, Paphos 143, Larnaca 45, and Famagusta 80. These figures are not perfect measures of residential distances from the Green Line's crossing points and do not reflect the exact driving distances of many of the respondents in each of the districts. However, they give a rough indication of distance from the Green Line and thus a reflection of probable contacts with Turkish Cypriots. We expect shorter distances will correlate to higher amounts of optimism and longer distances with lower amounts of optimism.

II. Refugee Status

Refugee status is another hypothesised attribute to influence optimism/pessimism toward interacting with Turkish Cypriots. The refugees have undergone a very different life experience than non-refugees and, arguably, may therefore have greater antagonism towards Turkish Cypriots. The refugees are coded with a dummy variable with "1" representing refugees and "0" representing non-refugees, according to their self-description. Around 39 per cent of the respondents to the survey reported being refugees. It is expected that refugees will show less optimistic views towards interacting with Turkish Cypriots.

III. Age

It is expected that younger respondents will show greater pessimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots because they have not had the ability to interact with them, until quite recently. Older respondents, it is expected, will show greater optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots, since many of them grew up in an environment in which there was not a political division of the island and may well remember days in which both communities interacted on a daily basis. Respondent age is measured in years, according to self-reporting. The mean age of the respondents in the sample is 44. The expectation is that older respondents will exhibit more optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

IV. Education

The highest education level achieved is also a consideration in the analysis as there may be some influence on attitudes. The highest education level achieved is based on self-description and denoted as "1" for those with a primary education, "2" for a secondary education and "3" for a tertiary education. We expect that those with additional education will be more optimistic, on the assumption that higher levels of education will lead to greater critical thinking, thus undermining the nationalist educational curriculum in primary schools.

V. Gender

Gender may also play a role in perceptions of "the other." Males are indicated with a "1" and females with a "0". Since the survey was generally representative of the population, about half of the respondents were male. We expect that males will display less optimism, as nearly all of them have experienced military service, in which they have been inculcated with nationalist ideology.

VI. Visiting the "other" Cyprus

A continuous variable derived from the question "*how many times have you visited the occupied areas?*" Responses were grouped into five categories, '0', '1', '2', '3' or '4+'. Forty-seven per cent of the respondents said they had never visited the occupied areas while 20 per cent said that they had only been once. Around 12 per cent of the survey respondents reported that they had travelled to the occupied areas twice. Eight per cent reported travelling there three times and 13 per cent reported travelling there four or more times. With about half of the respondents reporting never to have crossed the Green Line, there is the suggestion that there is a political bias for not crossing the line, possibly because they do not want to be near Turkish Cypriots. The expectation is that those who have crossed the most frequently will illustrate higher levels of optimism towards interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

VII. Socioeconomic Status

It is also hypothesised that socioeconomic status is an influence on political and social attitudes. The expectation is that those respondents with a higher socioeconomic status will be more pessimistic regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots, because they are the ones who benefit from the political and social status quo on the island - political and ethnic separation. Socioeconomic status is classified on a scale from A to E, with A being the highest tier of the spectrum and D and E the lower tiers. For the survey, interviewers classified each respondent into the categories of A or B, C1, C2, or D or E. Higher numbers express higher socioeconomic status. The expectation is that the higher levels of socioeconomic status will be indicative of less optimism.

VIII. Party Preference

Party preference may influence different views on the world and thus differences in opinions and perceptions on interacting with Turkish Cypriots. For this analysis, those who said they would vote for AKEL, DISY, and DIKO for the elections to the European Parliament were used. About 20 per cent of respondents reported they were AKEL voters, about 18 per cent DISY supporters, and about 12 per cent DIKO supporters. The respondents are marked with a dummy variable, indicating their voting preference for these three parties. We expect some differences based upon party affiliation, since party affiliation is a reflection of a person's political philosophy.

IX. Preferences for a Division

Political preferences for a solution to the Cyprus Problem may also play a role in influencing perceptions of interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Survey respondents were asked "what do you think the best permanent solution for the island is?" Responses were coded as "like now/status quo," "two separate states," "federal solution," or "unification." About 16 per cent of the respondents said that they favoured the status quo while 13 per cent stated a preference for a two state solution. About 15 per cent stated a preference for a federal solution and 51 per cent felt that unification was the best solution. The remaining respondents did not have a preference, did not know, or refused to answer. The status quo response and the two separate states response are coded together for this analysis, since both responses imply that political division is the preferred solution to the Cyprus Problem, either via a de facto separation or a recognised legal separation of the states. A dummy variable indicates those who want separation and division. We expect that those who would desire division would be less optimistic regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots, since separation implies irreconcilable differences between the communities.

Findings

Two different methods were used to analyse the data. First, standard OLS regressions were used to analyse the data, since this is the method most familiar to social scientists, although it may not necessarily be the most correct approach because the dependent variable is ordinal. Therefore, a second approach was used, a Maximum Likelihood Estimation (MLE) approach, more specifically, Ordered Logit. Ordered Logit was used because it is the correct approach given the ordinal nature of the dependent variable. The outcomes of the two approaches will be compared following the analysis using both methods. Because there were some refusals or "don't know" responses to some of the dependent variables, a number of cases could not be incorporated into the analysis.

Table 2 (opposite) illustrates the output of the OLS models. The models show some strengths and weaknesses. As a start, all the intercepts are statistically significant, thus allowing for estimations for the dependent variables. However, the A-squares and adjusted A-squares are low, meaning that the models at best can only explain about 16 per cent of the variation of the dependent variables.

GREEK CYPRIOT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERACTING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

Table 2. Optimism of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots - (OLS Coefficients with T-ratios in parentheses)

	Work Together	Live as Neighbours	Share Social Life	Inter-marry	Share Businesses
Intercept	4.546*** (18.893)	3.833*** (14.499)	3.636*** (13.937)	2.078*** (9.001)	2.963*** (11.001)
Distance to Nicosia	-.008377*** (-10.471)	-.003614*** (-4.119)	-.006948*** (-8.011)	-.003427*** (-4.465)	-.005197*** (-5.805)
Refugee	-.0598 (-.743)	-.0269 (-.305)	.05 (.572)	-.0477 (-.618)	-.002337 (-.026)
Age	.00036 (.12)	-.002698 (-.811)	.002733 (.829)	-.00688** (-2.357)	.004864 (1.431)
Education	-.119 (-1.391)	-.09516 (-1.009)	-.125 (-1.346)	.08227 (1.003)	-.0004354 (-.005)
Males	.271*** (3.65)	.144* (1.776)	.239*** (2.98)	.111 (1.566)	.271*** (3.264)
Visiting Occupied Areas	.09737*** (3.545)	.03511 (1.164)	.02487 (.833)	.02744 (1.04)	.09049*** (2.938)
Social Status	-.04606 (-.791)	.02942 (.461)	.055 (.871)	-.01402 (-.252)	.05099 (.783)
AKEL	-.01815 (-.184)	.089 (.824)	.102 (.952)	.165* (1.75)	-.01664 (-.151)
DISY	.0559 (.549)	.151 (1.350)	-.044 (-.398)	.0029 (-.03)	-.147 (-1.289)
DIKO	.0357 (.298)	.0746 (.570)	.122 (.936)	.121 (1.045)	.155 (1.154)
Prefer Division	-.444*** (-4.993)	-.731*** (-7.488)	-.902*** (-9.349)	-.243*** (-2.85)	-.969*** (-9.739)
R-square	.165	.083	.163	.047	.161
Adjusted R-square	.156	.073	.154	.036	.151
N	995	998	993	987	991

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

In terms of testing contact theory, it seems that the distance to Nicosia is one of the best indicators of optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Distance to Nicosia is negatively correlated with optimism toward dealing with Turkish Cypriots on all measured dimensions. This means that those who live further from Nicosia tend to have more pessimistic views on interactions with Turkish Cypriots.

This suggests that the contacts made and the diffusion of Turkish Cypriots has made a positive impact on optimism on all dimensions.

Many of the other independent variables fail. We see that refugee status, education, and social status play no significant role whatsoever in influencing the perceptions of optimism regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots. Age does play a role in influencing perceptions on intermarriage between the communities, with older respondents being less optimistic that marriages between the two communities will be commonplace. Males, it seems, are more optimistic than females regarding their views, contradicting our expectations on all five dependent variables, although not all are statistically significant. All in all, though, it seems that males are more optimistic regarding working together, living together in neighbourhoods, and sharing social lives and businesses to a statistically significant degree.

The indicator for visiting the occupied areas is also a meaningful indicator but for only two of the dependent variables in the analysis - working together and sharing businesses. However, it should be added that all the coefficients are positive, indicating that those persons visiting the occupied areas show a predisposition toward optimistic perceptions of interactions with Turkish Cypriots, although there is indication that it is statistically significant for only two of the independent variables.

Political party preferences appear to play little or no role in conditioning opinions regarding optimism/pessimism on interacting with Turkish Cypriots. However, there is indication that AKEL supporters display more optimism on intermarriage and DISY supporters more optimism on living as neighbours. Otherwise, party preferences fail miserably in explaining the dependent variables in the analysis.

Finally, the preference for a division plays a role in shaping views on optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. It seems that those who prefer a division show a systematically pessimistic view on interacting with Turkish Cypriots for all the dependent variables measuring optimism toward interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Those who prefer division are more pessimistic regarding interacting with Turkish Cypriots systematically.

The findings of the models using Ordered Logit show mostly the same findings as the OLS findings, as shown in Table 3 opposite. What is interesting is that the pseudo-A-squared values given in the Ordered Logit regressions are strikingly similar to the ones found in the OLS regressions. What is also interesting is that the two independent variables that were consistently statistically significant in the models run with OLS regressions were also consistently statistically significant in the models run with Ordered Logit. The independent variables measuring distance to Nicosia and preferences for division are systematically related to the dependent variables in each of the regressions run, whether it is using an OLS or an MLE

GREEK CYPRIOT PERSPECTIVES ON INTERACTING WITH TURKISH CYPRIOTS

approach. Of the 55 boxes in the matrix only two of them were different in a meaningful way. In the Ordered Logit regressions the role of education in conditioning the dependent variables for working together and sharing a social life are statistically related, while in the OLS regressions, this was not so. Otherwise, there were virtually no differences in the findings using the different approaches.

Table 3. Optimism of Interactions with Turkish Cypriots - (MLE Coefficients with significance levels in parentheses)

	Work Together	Live as Neighbours	Share Social Life	Inter-marry	Share Businesses
Distance to Nicosia	-.0144*** (.000)	-.0049*** (.000)	-.0098*** (.000)	-.00644*** (.000)	-.00714*** (.000)
Refugee	-.110 (.429)	-.069 (.578)	.0544 (.661)	-.049 (.713)	-.00997 (.936)
Age	-.0008 (.866)	-.00233 (.618)	.00379 (.419)	-.0135*** (.007)	.0046 (.316)
Education	-.244* (.089)	-.15 (.259)	-.223* (.091)	.184 (.198)	-.0524 (.691)
Males	.454*** (.000)	.21* (.066)	.307*** (.007)	.165 (.181)	.361*** (.002)
Visiting Occupied Areas	.201*** (.000)	.0579 (.174)	.0371 (.383)	.0206 (.648)	.128*** (.003)
Social Status	-.0663 (.495)	.048 (.589)	.104 (.245)	-.0213 (.824)	.0923 (.303)
AKEL	-.0921 (.580)	.094 (.536)	.156 (.307)	.238 (.141)	.0291 (.848)
DISY	.156 (.376)	.233 (.138)	.00522 (.973)	-.136 (.428)	-.148 (.345)
DIKO	.0775 (.703)	.0836 (.650)	.168 (.364)	.211 (.291)	.235 (.202)
Prefer Division	-.630*** (.000)	-1.00*** (.000)	-1.269*** (.000)	-.459*** (.003)	-1.366*** (.000)
Cox and Snell A-square	.176	.08	.16	.052	.159
Nagelkerke A-square	.191	.084	.167	.057	.165
McFadden A-square	.075	.027	.055	.022	.054
N	995	998	993	987	991

*p<.10, **p<.05, ***<.01 (1-tail)

Conclusions

The data analysis supports the findings of Yildizian and Ehteshami (2004). Indeed, it seems that contacts between the two ethnic groups have made the public more optimistic toward interactions between the groups. This finding has significant implications for creating an atmosphere of reconciliation between the two major ethnic groups on the island. If optimistic attitudes towards coexistence, cooperation, and reconciliation are necessary preconditions for a solution to the Cyprus Problem, then contacts between members of the two major ethnic groups seem to be a vehicle to promote the preconditions.

Despite the improved design of a test of contact theory, there are still some weaknesses that future research should investigate. First, future work should try to test contact theory in both political entities on the island. It may be that contact theory works better among one community than another. Second, future work should intentionally be designed to test contact theory by asking respondents to rate their interactions with people from the other community. The present use of distance to the crossing points is useful but is definitely not the definitive measure of contacts with people from the other community.

Apart from the findings regarding contact theory, the conclusions show that few of the demographic variables seem to play any role in conditioning the attitudes towards interactions with Turkish Cypriots. The major demographic aspects examined (refugee status, socioeconomic status, and education) play no major role in influencing optimism/pessimism regarding interactions with Turkish Cypriots. Age only plays a role in forming opinions regarding intermarriage between members of the two major communities. The only demographic variable that seems to play a systematic role is gender with males appearing to be more optimistic on three of the five dimensions appraised in this analysis.

The most intriguing outcome from the research is that those who prefer a division on the island are also those who have a more pessimistic view on interactions with Turkish Cypriots. This means that political attitudes toward the best solution to the Cyprus Problem are linked with attitudes regarding interacting with people from the other major ethnic community on the island. Another interesting finding is that political party preferences seem to play no role in conditioning perceptions of the ability of both communities to interact successfully and peacefully.

A criticism of the research in general would be that the survey took place during a very "political" time in Cypriot history. The survey's fieldwork took place less than a month after the Annan Plan referendum and during the same month as entry into

the EU and a few weeks before Cyprus' first elections for the European Parliament. Research should be repeated again with similar questions and methodology to determine whether this very "political" period may have influenced the way in which Greek Cypriots perceive the issue of interacting with Turkish Cypriots.

In addition, future research should incorporate measures of religious and national animosity into a model. Religious aspects and the nationalism should be explored, since they may play a large and important role in perspectives on the other. Perceptions of the incompatibility of Islam and Orthodox Christianity or the incompatibility of Turkishness and Greekness may be at the root of the problem.

At any rate, this analysis has made some contributions to the study of interactions between the two major ethnic communities on the island of Cyprus. It has tested contact theory and supported the hypothesis that contacts lead to more optimistic views on interactions between the communities and has done so using a multivariate analysis with a large number of observations. Hopefully, future analysis will be effected to delve further into the question of contacts in Cyprus because attitudes towards interacting with members of the other major ethnicity surely play an important role in setting up the preconditions for a meaningful and stable solution to the Cyprus Problem.

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