

# NEGOTIATING OUT OF FEAR AND FEARING TO NEGOTIATE: THEORETICAL APPROACHES TO THE ENDING OF THE CYPRUS CONFLICT

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This commentary sets out to explain the problematic nature of the main approach relating to mediation and negotiation in light of efforts aimed at conflict settlement in the Cyprus dispute, since the inception of the United Nations mission in Cyprus in 1964. It maintains that the main approach to the ending of the dispute in Cyprus, that of mediation and negotiation, which is located in the realm of high politics, has itself been drawn into the issues of the dispute as a result of some of the actions and policies of the disputants and their sponsors. I conclude, to a certain extent, that neither side in the dispute should lay blame for the failure of the United Nations to bring about a solution, without first reassessing its own approach to the peacemaking operation and asking if it has been committed to a compromise, or whether they have viewed the United Nations peacemaking as a way of minimising compromise and avoiding making the costly concessions a solution would entail.

United Nations' peacemaking in Cyprus has fallen victim to a typically Realist vision of the process in which settlements are based on coercion, or at the very least, hard bargaining, and are prone to short-termism.<sup>1</sup> While it is commonly argued that the intention underlying the international communities' approach to United Nations' efforts in Cyprus has merely been an expression of great power interests in the region (and therefore the United Nations operation should be reassessed in terms of its coercive potential), it also appears that there are dynamics within the conflict situation which have promoted the same conflictual vision within the relationship between the two Cypriot parties, even at the negotiation table. This anomaly has also been observed in other conflict situations in which mediation has played a role, such as between Israel and Egypt or the Palestinians, or in ex-Yugoslavia.<sup>2</sup> The essence of this dynamic is that regardless of the international communities' perception of the objectives of a mediation effort, what is as significant is the perceptions of the two parties of what they desire from such a process. From this arises the proposition that mediation is as much dependent on the views of the parties which are in conflict, as on the skill of the third party in opening up channels of communication, re-allocating the resources of the two sides for a settlement, or merely enforcing its own vision of a solution or that of its sponsors. From this standpoint, and

after thirty-two years of United Nations' mediation, good offices, and negotiation, it must be asked what has motivated the two sides to negotiate in the forum of the United Nations and if this motivation has necessarily been directed at the search for a compromise. If not, this would explain why after three decades, the potential for conflict in Cyprus to spark a wider conflict still exists, as the events of 1996/97 have shown.

The standard perspective from the point of view of mediation theory is that the two sides take part in negotiations as they desire a settlement (rather than a resolution) to the conflict. Moreover they have accepted that they cannot 'win' in open conflict, and are not able to negotiate without the assistance of a third party. From this point of view, the mediator need only find the formula for third party activity most suited to the conflict environment in order to enable the two sides to decide on a mutually acceptable exchange of concessions, in return for a solution which would bring stability and security.<sup>3</sup> Of course this is a substantial task, and in practice and in terms of theoretical approaches there are weaknesses and difficulties in implementation. Particularly in a case such as Cyprus, it is difficult to argue that both sides were actually in a position to identify a need for mediation when conflict broke out 1964. If the two sides are required to have accepted that a hurting stalemate existed from which a mediated settlement could extract them, then clearly this was not the case. At the local level, the Greek-Cypriot side was dominant, until the arrival of UNFICYP in 1964. In 1974, the Turkish-Cypriot side was dominant, with the aid of Turkey, (and were it not for the Security Council, General Assembly, and Secretary General), would have clearly 'won' the conflict. With respect to this point, it becomes clear that the United Nations could also be viewed by the two sides, not just as being an aid to a settlement of the problem, but also as an obstacle, at different points in time to either sides' main objectives. Without a position of hurting stalemate, it is difficult to accept the argument that both sides wanted a settlement:<sup>4</sup> it is more likely in this case, that they viewed third party intervention as something to be moulded for the furtherance of their quest of their initial objectives. It is a problematic proposition that both sides automatically altered their initial objectives as a consequence of United Nations' involvement in the problem.

A growing body of literature on mediation has talked of the tendency of the disputants to be highly critical of the mediator and the process, and of the turn towards what has been described as 'directive mediation', in order to force the disputants to make difficult concessions required to reintroduce a co-operative *status quo*.<sup>5</sup> This seems to be symptomatic, not of the failure of the traditional concept of the neutral mediator who was able to educate, open channels of communication or to use his own resources to encourage settlement, but to be symptomatic of the tendency of the disputants to view the objectives of the mediation process very differently to those of the mediator or his sponsors. What is being suggested here is that the assessment of traditional peacemaking was flawed in so much as the tendency of mediation to fail in situations such as Cyprus led to the point of view that traditional

peacemaking could only be effective if it harnessed a substantial reward for the two sides or if it beat them into submission. The irony of this approach was clear to those academics who had set out to fundamentally challenge the Realist perception of the world.

To argue that traditional mediation has failed because it only produces settlements imposed from the outside, (thus negating the mediator's traditional role) tends to ignore the reason why settlements needed to be imposed from the outside. But if we reject the '*outside-in*' view of international mediation (which concentrates on the role of the mediator and the various techniques he uses), and view the environment in which mediation takes place from the '*inside-out*', (from the point of view of the disputants and their sponsors), we may have a clearer understanding of why mediation has failed in Cyprus.<sup>6</sup>

### **The Disputants' View of Peacemaking: Facing the Demon**

From an 'outside-in' point of view, we tend to assume that the objective of mediation is to find a compromise settlement. This assumption is based on the fact that a more harmonious situation cannot exist in the *Realpolitik* vision of the world. If we reverse the perspective, however, and look from the inside-out, the picture is very different. In a situation such as Cyprus where the relative positions of the two sides do not reflect their relative power, but reflects the intervention of the international community in the form of the United Nations in 1964 and 1974, can we assume that both sides aim at a compromise solution through the good offices of the Secretary General?<sup>7</sup> Or were the disputants motivated to accept a peacemaking mission because it was viewed as a device through which time could be gained for reorganisation? Was mediation viewed by the disputants as being potentially coercive and in support of one side or other, or as a face saving device. Was mediation viewed as an agent of legitimisation or empowerment?<sup>8</sup> Or finally, was mediation merely viewed as a relatively cost free method of continuing the dispute and avoiding or delaying the costly concessions entailed in a possible compromise solution?<sup>9</sup>

That the United Nations' operation was accepted by the parties in order to aid them in the search for a compromise solution is in itself a difficult assumption. When UNFICYP was introduced to Cyprus and when the peacemaking operation was established concurrently in 1964 by Security Council resolution 186, there was an observable interplay of interests in the Security Council at that time which disrupted the process of establishing a United Nations force and set up a series of dynamics which was to result in the hindrance of the peacemaking operation. The complex process of negotiation which occurred behind the scenes in the Security Council between the United Kingdom, the United States, the USSR, Greece, Turkey and to some extent, Makarios' government at the time, was indicative of the conflictual nature of the relationship between the two Cypriot parties and their motherland sponsors.<sup>10</sup> Yet I would suggest that the prime motivation for the establishment of the United Nations' operation in Cyprus in 1964 stemmed from the inter-

ests of the Western Alliance in preventing a damaging Greco-Turkish conflict over Cyprus, rather than dealing with the difficulties of the two Cypriot sides. According to this logic, all that was therefore needed in Cyprus was an effective peacekeeping operation which would dampen the conflict. The establishment of a peacemaking operation was very much peripheral and as a result, little attention was paid to the necessities of successful mediation between two sides of an intra-state conflict, or to the international level of the conflict with respect to Turkey's objectives.

Both sides viewed the establishment of both a peacekeeping and a peacemaking operation through a conflictual lens. For the Greek-Cypriot side, it was hoped that UNFICYP would help them re-establish order at their direction. For the Turkish - Cypriot side, they believed that UNFICYP's role was to help them effect a return to the conditions of the 1960 Treaties, and to protect them against the attentions of Greek-Cypriot extremists. It soon became clear that the peacekeeping force was under the control of the Secretary General and would not become an arm of one side or the other.<sup>11</sup> While it was comparatively easy to prevent the peacekeeping force from becoming politicised, the same was not true of the peacemaking operation. However, the acceptance of the peacemaking operation revealed some significant insights into the positions of both sides. For the Greek-Cypriot side, with control of the government and the institutions of state, the presence of a peacemaking operation gave credence to the position of the Turkish-Cypriot side, whom they in contrast viewed as 'rebels.' For the Turkish-Cypriot side, the fact that a peacemaking operation had been established by the Secretary General meant that their position as a party to a conflict had been recognised internationally. This was of great importance to a party which was essentially involved in a 'recognition game'<sup>12</sup> which had begun with Denktash's protestations over the Security Council's recognition of Makarios' Government as representative of the Republic of Cyprus in March, 1964.

A further dynamic which was influential in the early days of mediation in Cyprus was related to the balance of force between the two sides. For the Greek-Cypriot side, (as long as Turkey was kept out of the equation), they were in a position to 'win' the conflict. Much of Makarios' motive for accepting a peacekeeping force from the United Nations, rather than a force gathered from NATO countries, was his belief that the presence of the United Nations would prevent Turkey from invading Cyprus. However, when UNFICYP arrived in Cyprus, and it became clear that it would not simply enable Makarios' Government to prevent the Turkish-Cypriot side from rebelling, the dynamics of the situation became subtly different: UNFICYP may have become viewed at a certain level of preventing elements of the Greek-Cypriot side from attaining their objectives. In a sense the conflict was frozen on the ground, at a position where the Greek-Cypriot side were dominant. Yet freezing the conflict in this way would have been viewed as benefiting the Turkish-Cypriot side.

Because of these dynamics, the conflict moved to the level of mediation and ne-

gotiation, setting a precedent that has been followed ever since. In its primary form, the two sides were in dispute over the objectives of the mediator, and the tools that he had at his disposal. For example, was Tuomioja, the first mediator to which the two sides agreed, to create a new solution, which would support Makarios' desire to abrogate the Treaties? Or would he base a solution on the 1960 Treaties, which would be in line with the Turkish-Cypriot position? Was he allowed to make suggestions, or merely to help at a procedural level? The Greek-Cypriot side saw the former as favouring its position, as the mediator's responses would be conditioned by Security Council resolutions and the United Nations' Charter. The Turkish-Cypriot side were determined, with the help of Turkey, to prevent the mediator from making suggestions as it clearly felt that this would be detrimental to its position. The Turkish-Cypriot side wanted the mediator to operate at the procedural level, and were able to force this to happen by rejecting the report of the United Nations mediator, Galo Plaza in 1965, and objecting to the fact that he had made suggestions for the settlement of the problem which may have favoured the Greek-Cypriot side. Of course, his suggestions were based on the afore-mentioned Security Council resolutions and the United Nations' Charter. However, the Turkish-Cypriot side was then able to reject the United Nations' mediator and as a result mediation moved to the less direct level of the good offices of the United Nations' Secretary General and his representatives. This development has been symptomatic of the tendency of the two sides in the dispute to feel that the United Nations' Security Council, General Assembly and Secretary General should support its positions, or alternatively were biased against them. A pattern of conflict seemingly emerges, therefore, from the process of peacemaking in that its many aspects, procedural or otherwise, became politicised and came to be viewed by the two sides as tools for point-scoring over the opponent.

While the Turkish-Cypriot side were initially successful in limiting the direct involvement of the United Nations' mediator, and ultimately in ending this role, they have not been successful in constraining the lesser forms of the peacemaking operation. However, the success they had in ending mediation has enabled them to have more control over the process of peacemaking and therefore its outcomes: this is where the significance of the politicisation of peacemaking lies. If one of the parties gains a level of legitimisation for their position, or a level of control over the process, then this strengthens their position *vis-a-vis* the third party and their opponent.

For the Turkish-Cypriot side, though, the fact that United Nations' Security Council and General Assembly resolutions have constantly supported the Greek-Cypriot side has been a difficult obstacle, which they have failed to overcome. This serves to illustrate the inevitable connection between such resolutions and the two sides' views of the United Nations' peacemaking operation. Far from viewing it as neutral, both sides have been aware that the Greek-Cypriot side has far more support than the Turkish-Cypriot side. Greek-Cypriot negotiating positions have generally been

vindicated by the General Assembly and the Security Council, whereas the Turkish-Cypriot positions have rarely been vindicated; but the fact that they are recognised as a disputant in the conflict has been of significant benefit to the Turkish-Cypriot community with respect to the entity it has tried to establish, and to the formulation of its objectives. Yet this also has had certain negative consequences, in that it has led to a perception of bias amongst the Turkish-Cypriot side as to the intentions of the Security Council, the General Assembly and the Secretary General and his representatives. When their positions become untenable in the light of international condemnation through United Nations resolutions, the Turkish-Cypriot side has frequently rejected the United Nations' right to comment on Turkish-Cypriot positions as a whole. For the Greek-Cypriot side, the failure of the Security Council to implement its resolutions has been indicative of the great power interests in the region which have weakened the consensus they have received in the United Nations.

With the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish rejection of the Galo Plaza report it was clear that even in the midst of peacemaking, conflict was endemic. While traditional theoretical approaches to negotiation recognise that both conflict and co-operation must exist for negotiations to succeed, approaches to mediation have tended to view the process as being separate to the conflict under discussion. Yet from the perspective which an examination of the peacemaking efforts in Cyprus provides, it seems that peacemaking itself became a forum for the conflict to continue.

With the start of the intercommunal talks in the late 1960s, similar tendencies can still be traced. Because of the failure of Plaza, the Secretary General was very careful not to become involved in the issues of the dispute, but rather to fulfil his role of good offices merely by helping on procedural matters and with the practicalities of negotiation. The fact that this was the case was viewed as a victory for the Turkish-Cypriot side, as they had managed to keep the involvement of the United Nations, which they viewed as biased against them, to the minimum of good offices. Even so, conflict still arose over procedural and practical matters. When the intercommunal talks began, difficulties arose over the venue for the talks. The Turkish-Cypriot side wanted them to occur in a 'neutral venue' away from the direct attentions of the Secretary General, whereas the Greek-Cypriot side would have been happier had they been 'in the international spotlight'.<sup>13</sup> For the Greek-Cypriot side, particularly Makarios, both defeats were bitter failures because they had viewed the direct intervention of the Secretary General and his representatives, backed by the Security Council and General Assembly resolutions, as a form of leverage which could be used in their favour.

When discussions began in Vienna in 1975 between the two sides, similar dynamics were evident, and have provided a constant thread throughout the protracted negotiations. Procedural issues such as venues, the presentation of proposals and maps by both sides, the nature of the process of discussion and the level of involvement of the Secretary General and his representatives have been constant

sources of competition between the two sides. The impact of United Nations' resolutions became doubly significant after the Turkish invasion of 1974 as the Greek-Cypriot side realised the value of the internationalisation - through the peacemaking process - of the dispute as a means to place the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish side under pressure, first over the issue of the US arms embargo against Turkey in the mid-to-late 1970s, and then over human rights issues and Turkish-Cypriot intransigence at the negotiating table in the 1980s and 1990s. The Turkish-Cypriot side's response to this was to refuse to negotiate under such pressure in an effort to persuade the Greek-Cypriot side that such a tactic was counter-productive and merely made the Turkish-Cypriot position less flexible. As a consequence, once more, the peacemaking operation became drawn into the issues of the dispute. The Greek-Cypriot side has continued to view their ability to receive support in the General Assembly and Security Council as a means to create pressure for the opposition, but have also increasingly been aware of the abstract nature of such pressure.

From the Vienna talks to the failure of several rounds of talks between Denktash and President Kyprianou in New York in the mid-1980s, the two sides' views of United Nations' peacemaking remained similarly conflictual and the Secretary General and his representatives continued to be forced to tread a very fine line between making a decisive input to the ideas in circulation and merely operating at a procedural level. The general tendency was that the Greek-Cypriot side would endeavour to move the talks deeper into the framework provided by the Secretary General and Security Council resolutions, while at the same time searching for alternative methods for the implementation of such resolutions. The Turkish-Cypriot sides objectives were the reverse: indeed Denktash frequently called for the talks to be moved away from the United Nations peacemaking operational environs to direct talks between the two sides. This was clearly motivated by a perception that this would empower the Turkish-Cypriot side with respect to their positions, once more indicating the tendency to view the United Nations operation as part of the conflict environment.

By the 1990s and the discussions over the confidence building measures, (CBMs) the culmination of the struggle between the two sides over the mode, means, and procedure of United Nations peacemaking was reached when the Secretary General, Boutros Boutros Ghali, for the first time since Galo Plaza was able to give his own proposals and suggestions in order to move the process forward. While this was probably against the wishes of the Turkish-Cypriot and Turkish sides, the level of international pressure for a solution on them was substantial. Perhaps there was an element of miscalculation on their part, in that they perceived that negotiations were taking place with respect to the CBMs, rather than a holistic package for settlement. The result of this more dynamic United Nations involvement was that the Secretary General was forced to try ever more coercive methods to bring the sides to agreement, and was ultimately forced, because of the personal

level of commitment and the investment he had in progress, to lay the blame directly on the Turkish-Cypriot side for intransigence and for defying the wishes of the international community. In this, though, he also compromised the impartiality and validity of his mission of good offices,<sup>14</sup> and may have compromised this for future Secretaries General.

The events of 1996/97 on both a regional and on a local level have aptly illustrated the dangers of such an approach to mediation and negotiation. Had the two sides been committed to a compromise solution, and had they been willing to take the political and personal risks associated with making concessions, a solution may have been reached before now. It is rational to assume that the two sides' approach to the process of peacemaking has been derived from their conflictual relations with each before the United Nations arrived in Cyprus. It must be asked what the Secretary General or the Security Council can do about this problem. Yet it seems not really to be their problem in many ways, as the basic assumption that two sides accept mediation or good offices in order to find a solution is fair: the problem lies in the two sides' perceptions of what they can achieve in the negotiation scenario in terms of their initial objectives. With respect to this, it appears that both sides, but particularly the Turkish-Cypriot side, must accept a higher degree of initiative in terms of ideas and procedure from the mediator, the Secretary General or his representatives, or the protracted stalemate will continue indefinitely.

### **The Final Question**

In the light of the above analysis, the question still remains: what did the two sides feel that they would gain from United Nations' mediation or good offices and why did they attempt to draw the third party into the political issues of the conflict? In the answer to this question lies a significant proposition about the concepts associated with theoretical approaches to peacemaking. It appears from the analysis of the interaction of the disputants with the United Nations' peacemaking operation that they viewed it as one of the following. Firstly, the United Nations' peacemaking operation was viewed as an agent of legitimation for the respective international and internal positions of both sides, and then as an agent of the legitimisation of their negotiating positions. From this leads the proposition that both sides were searching for an ally which would reinforce their positions and aid them in their quest for their objectives. As a result, there has been little voluntary movement from their initial objectives, especially on the part of the Turkish-Cypriot side. If the United Nations has been viewed as an agent of empowerment or disempowerment, this indicates that one or both sides had little intention of a compromise, but instead intended to minimise the concessions which a final solution would require them to make. The consequences of this has been that the *status quo* has become preferable to both sides, than to further concessions and a resultant solution.

The United Nations' peacemaking operation has also become viewed as an agent of internationalisation, particularly in view of the direct link between Security

Council and General Assembly resolutions and the negotiating positions of the Greek-Cypriot side, which such resolutions have tended to support. Yet in some ways this has also been counterproductive and has prompted the Turkish-Cypriot side to move towards ever growing levels of intransigence. The disputants may have been motivated to accept a peacemaking mission because of their view that it was a device through which time could be gained for reorganisation. But it was more likely that the Greek-Cypriot side in particular saw it as strengthening their hand against Turkish intervention, particularly in 1964. The logic of this was that with United Nations' involvement in the search for a solution, it would be very difficult for Turkey to find a sufficient excuse to intervene. This held true but Turkey was to find sufficient justification, as far as Turkish policy makers were concerned, in the actions of the Greek junta in 1974. Mediation was also viewed by both sides as being potentially coercive and in support of one side or other. The Galo Plaza affair illustrates this in that the Turkish-Cypriot side was determined that the mediator would not be allowed to make his own suggestions, as they were afraid of the 'weight' of his words. The Greek-Cypriot side was determined, and has been ever since that the reverse would hold. This was clearly because they considered such an intervention as strongly in their favour.

It appears that overall, the views of the two sides of peacemaking have evolved into a perception that it was a relatively cost free method of continuing the struggle for concessions from the opposition while avoiding making the costly concessions entailed in a possible compromise solution. For the Turkish-Cypriot side, the continuation of the peacemaking mission has been detrimental to their cause: they would have been happy if the peacemaking operation had lapsed and recognition of their entity had begun to accrue. Yet for the Greek-Cypriot side, the protracted negotiations had the added benefit of preventing this from occurring while keeping their positions on the issue fresh in the minds of the international community.

The characterisation of the peacemaking process in Cyprus as being prompted by a fear of losing and yet also containing an element of fear with respect to making concessions, appears to be accurate. The most significant insight provided by this statement lies in its redirection of the foci of analysis with respect to peacemaking away from the traditional assessment of the role, resources, and skills of the third party, to an analysis of the objectives of the disputants in the light of the fact that they may actually not view the conflict as being over. Negotiating out of fear, but fearing to negotiate has led to a situation in which mediation and negotiation became part of the conflict environment, resulting in the failure of significant and protracted efforts to bring peace to Cyprus and the Eastern Mediterranean. Consequently, the violent events of 1996 in Cyprus, and the stand off between Greece and Turkey were predictable, as the *status quo* was just an illusion of stability; none of the underlying issues had been addressed or resolved. Perhaps now the time is ripe for a reassessment by both sides in the conflict of its approach to the United Nations' peacemaking operation, rather than a reassessment of the operation itself. An understanding that both sides have viewed the peacemaking operation as part

of the conflict environment may lead to a new approach to negotiation by both parties, which in itself may give rise to a solution.

### Notes

1. For a critique of this vision, see John Burton: *Conflict and Communication*, London: Macmillan, 1969. Burton himself admitted that the framework he had suggested was unlikely to become operational.

2. See, for example, T. Princen: *Intermediaries in International Conflict*, Princeton UP, 1992.

3. For the debates revolving around techniques of mediation see Allesbrook, M.: *Prototypes of Peacemaking*, Chicago; London: St James Press, 1986, Assefa, H.: *Mediation of Civil Wars*, London: Westview Press, 1987, Bailey, Sydney Dawson: *How Wars End: The United Nations and the Termination of Armed Conflict 1946-1964*, Oxford: Clarendon Press; Vol. 1 & 2, 1982, Bendahmane, D.B.: *Perspectives on Negotiation: Four Case Studies and Interpretations*, Centre for Study of Foreign Affairs, Foreign Services Institute, US dep. of State, 1986, Bercovitch, J and Rubin, J.Z.: *Mediation in IR: Multiple Approaches to Conflict Management*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992, Burton, J.: *Resolving Deep Rooted Conflict: a Handbook*, Lanham, London: UP of America, 1987, Evans, G.: *Cooperating for Peace*, Allen and Unwin, 1993, Jabri, V.: *Mediating Conflict Decision-making and Western Intervention in Namibia*, Manchester University Press, 1990, Lall, AS (ed.): *Multilateral Negotiation and Mediation*, New York; Oxford: Pergamon Press, 1985, Mitchell, C.R.: *The Structure of International Conflict*, London: Macmillan, 1981, Miall, H.: *The Peacemakers*, Basingstoke: Macmillan, 1992, Sandole, D.J.D. and Sandole Staroste, I (eds): *Conflict Management and Problem Solving*, Frances Pinter, 1987, Sandole, D.J.D. and Sandole Staroste, I (eds): *Conflict Management and Problem Solving*, Frances Pinter, 1987, Skjelsbaek: 'The United Nations Secretary-General and the Mediation of International Disputes', *Journal of Peace Research*, Oslo: Universitetsforlaget, vol. 28, no.1, February 1991, Wall, JA: 'Mediation', *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, Ann Arbor: University of Michigan, vol. 25 no.1, March 1981, Webb, K: "Third Party Intervention and the Ending of Wars", *Paradigms*, Canterbury: UKC International Relations Society, vol. 9, no.2, Winter 1995, 1994, Young, O.R.: *The Intermediaries: Third Parties in International Crises*, Princeton UP, 1967, Zartmann I and Berman, MR: *The Practical Negotiator*, New Haven; London: Yale UP, 1982.

4. Modelski argues that there are two basic conditions for a settlement in an intra state war; they are stalemate and a rearrangement of resources. Stalemate can be achieved by international action, George Modelski, "International Settlement of Internal War" in Rosenau, James Nathan (ed.): *International Aspects of Civil Strife*, Princeton: Princeton University Press, 1964, p.143-4. Henry Kissinger believed that only a war without victory or defeat could contain the seeds of a settlement. During the October War between Israel and Egypt in 1973, he constantly switched his sup-

port from side to side in order to exhaust them, leaving them little choice but to negotiate. John G. Stoessinger: *Why Nations Go to War*, St. Martins Press: New York, 6th edition, 1992, pp.165-6.

5. T Princen, *op.cit.*, p.9. Princen has also made a useful distinction between the various types of mediator and their methodology. He describes a mediator with no interests a neutral mediator, and one with indirect interests, a principal mediator. If there are direct interests, then the third party becomes a disputant. For the principal mediator, there are three main bargaining dynamics Firstly, the mediator can bargain directly with a disputant to strike a side deal. Secondly, it can force concessions from one side by making a coalition with the other. Thirdly, it can make a three way deal, firstly with one disputants' who then makes a deal with the other. However, for the principal mediator, its own interests are always pre-eminent. For the neutral mediator, bargaining is out of the question as it functions only to change and facilitate the disputants continuing interaction. The intermediaries basis of influence is firstly, the ability to reconfigure a bargain, secondly to make proposals and finally to be able to pool information. The principal-neutral framework suggests that as conflicts evolve over a period of time, they can best be approached by using a combination of intermediaries, the neutral mediator being useful for starting talks, the principal to effect a cease-fire, the neutral to convene preliminary negotiations which can then be wrapped up by the principal, *ibid.*, pp.25-41.

6. It must not be forgotten, however, that such views may be inaccurate and subject to misperception.

7. For example, John Burton assumes that the bargaining positions of the adversaries are not modified or restrained by the introduction of United Nations peace-making. J. Burton, "The History of Conflict Resolution", J. Burton and Azar, E.A.: *International Conflict Resolution: Theory and Practice*, Wheatsheaf Books, 1986, p.156.

8. A.J.R. Groom and K. Webb (1987) define empowerment as the following: "Empowerment may be defined as a third party activity of conferring power on a weaker party in a conflict perceived as asymmetric with the aim of making the weaker party a 'realistic' negotiating power". A.J.R. Groom and Webb, Keith: "Injustice, Empowerment, and Facilitation in Conflict", *International Interactions*, vol.13.no.3. This also raises the issue of disempowerment of the stronger side rather than empowerment of the weaker. It may be more effective to actually disempower both sides, although it is likely that reducing (and increasing) power may be very difficult to achieve.

9. There are some indications in some of the literature relevant to this debate. For example J.A. Wall: "Mediation", *Journal of Conflict Resolution*, vol. 25 no.1, March 1981, p.162.

10. R. Denktash, Interview with the author (18 January 1996). Denktash stated that he had been told by the United Kingdom and U.S. representatives that he should not worry as they would interpret the text of the Security Council resolution-

this, he stated, was a serious mistake. Also see M. Moran: *Sovereignty Divided: How the Turkish-Cypriots were deprived of their Constitutional Rights*, Cyprus Research and Publishing Centre, (Research Series no.17.), Nicosia, December 1995, p.11. Moran claims that had the Turkish side, the United Kingdom and the US got the resolution that they wanted, serious doubt would have been thrown on the legitimacy of Makarios' government. See also D.S. Bitsios, : *The Vulnerable Republic*, 2nd. edition, Institute for Balkan Studies: Salonica, 1975, p.148, for an account of the backstage manoeuvring which led to the adoption of the resolution. However, Charles Gaulkin, United Nations Press Officer, (interview with the author), stated somewhat contradictorily that the United Nations could not get involved in changing the status of the Republic. Charles Goulkin, Spokesman of UNFICYP, 1985-1991, 1995, 30 January, 1996

11. See S/5950.

12. H. Assefa, *op. cit.*, p.15. Assefa argues that this may provide a reason why the United Nations should not become involved in such situations. George Modelski argues that the mere opening of talks benefits the insurgents as it confers on them legitimacy and equality. George Modelski, *op. cit.*, p.131.

13. See, for example, *Cyprus Mail*, April 10, 1968, p.1. and p.4. At the end of April, Kuchuk stated that the United Nations could not help find a settlement, but could help bring the two sides together. *Cyprus Mail*, April 30, 1968, p.1.

14. Edward Newman: "Cyprus and the United Nations Secretary-General", *The Cyprus Review*, Intercollege, Nicosia, vol.7, no. 2, Fall 1995, p.88. Newman argues that as a consequence of the association of the Secretary-General with the ostracism of the Turkish-Cypriot side, his classical and innocuous third party role of good offices may be compromised.