MODELS OF COMPROMISE AND 'POWER SHARING' IN THE EXPERIENCE OF CYPRIOT MODERNITY

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Abstract

There are two arguments running through this essay: Analytically the goal is to look into the experience of Cypriot modernity in order to explore what kinds of compromises/accommodations/forms of "power sharing", have been developed in order to address conflicts involving issues of identity. Methodologically there is an effort to develop a social-historical interpretative framework in which identity is seen as a form of subjectivity constructed and contested on the terrain of social and political conflicts. The empirical focus will be on periods of social upheaval during the past two centuries in relation to cultural (production of subjectivity/identity) and political (power sharing) forms. It is suggested that we can discern three basic models of compromise which manifested themselves as de facto sociological realities rather than as legal texts.

Introduction

The "solution" to the Cyprus problem is usually seen in terms of legal clauses (of the new constitution, of guarantees) and in this context efforts to understand the possible implications of a suggested solution tend to focus on values (justice, respect) and textually defined efficiency (functional solution, security guarantees). It is proposed in this essay to look at the socio-historical reality through which modern Cypriots were shaped (and which they shaped through their social action), in order to see how they managed to mediate or settle conflicts – to see, that is, the "repertoires of compromises" available in the "collective unconscious" of historical consciousness. And since cultural-political identity (in its national form) is considered the key variable distinguishing the two opposed communities today, the focus will be on the construction of subjectivity and identity conflicts. The empirical focus will be on the G/C (Greek Cypriot) community but the relation with the T/C (Turkish Cypriot) community will be a key variable in examining the construction of subjectivity and the relative and transitional form of identity conflicts.

Studying identity conflicts, though, is not innocent in Cyprus – politically and culturally. Academically the issue of identity is at the centre of an ongoing

intellectual (and indirectly political) debate – whether identity should be seen in "natural" or historical/contextual terms. A lot of the bibliography stemming from the past tends to take for granted the rhetorical claim of G/C nationalism that the majority of the island's inhabitants were/are people of the same identity for "three-thousand years". This view has not been the only one historically. Marxist and liberal political texts and practice pointed to more relativist interpretations of identity formations and to a different relation of culture (the nation) and politics (state) – rather than the identification proposed by nationalism. And in terms of social science, there has been a growing body of literature in anthropology and sociology which has focused on the construction of identities – and their inevitable historical relativity and contextual fluidity. But ironically, for a political context in which almost everybody agrees on the need for a multicultural society and polity, the "natural" identity paradigm continues to dominate in education and to a degree in internal political discourse. Thus the article which follows has a de facto second argument running through it – it is an effort at historicising the issue of identity as subjectivity constructed, articulated, and contested in a historical framework determined by class, status and power conflicts.

In empirical terms we will examine three social-historical conflicts in the twentieth century but the historical trajectory will trace the developments since the nineteenth century in an effort to outline the systemic background of analogous compromises achieved on the level of class conflict. The exploration in each period/conflict will move along three levels of analysis: the systemic referring to trends in the world system and regional geopolitics, the structural level which will focus on apparatuses (church, school) producing/shaping/articulating subjectivity, while on the situational level the focus will be on the forms of identity conflicts and their impact on everydayness. This emphasis on everydayness will lead to the exploration of de facto sociological realities in relation to models of "compromises"/"power sharing" rather than textual, legal documents.

The Transition to Modernity: The Modernisation/Adaptation of the Church and the "Transitional" Model of Compromise (1750-1920)

Modernity is usually viewed as an age in which reason (or the principle of rationality) becomes dominant in society. The rise of a conceptual framework and a worldview based on rationality/science implies the displacement of traditional values and norms which were based on a religious worldview. The difference between the two "ages/epochs" is not only cultural: Modernity heralds, through its revolutions (symbolically the French and the Russian one), the establishment of the principle of equality (on the basis of a discourse proclaiming the "sameness" of all human beings) as an organising principle in opposition to the organising principle of hierarchy which dominated traditional society. The concepts of modernity and

tradition are too broad and methodologically and theoretically under scrutiny. Yet they can be used as indicators of broad trends. One of the problems raised by critics of sharp differentiations is the lack of pure forms of the traditional and the modern since, especially in the process of transition/modernisation, there are a variety of mixed forms. And this is significant for our study here as we will see – thus in order to describe a model between traditional and modern, the term "transitional" will be employed.

In Cypriot history the two centuries from the middle of the eighteenth to the middle of the twentieth century were periods of intense social conflicts: class/economic and cultural (religious or national) identity seemed to compete for dominance. There were three class revolts (1760-1833, 1900-1910, 1920-1950) which at times coincided with conflicts over cultural forms of identity (1900-10) but the key cause of these class movements (of peasants, urban poor, and modern working class respectively) seemed to be, the relation of Cypriot society to the capitalist world-economy and the progressive incorporation of the economy of the island in the broader structures of the world system.

Let us begin, therefore, with the causes and forms of class identity, the related class conflicts and the corresponding compromise models. On the systemic level in the period 1750-1910, the "Ottoman feudal" system was being "incorporated" in the capitalist world-economy. According to Wallerstein incorporation was the "moment"/process by which a "zone" which "was at one point in time in the external arena of the world-economy came to be, at a later point in time, in the periphery of that same world-economy."[1] Inside Cyprus during this period there was, according to Kyrris,[2] a change in the internal class structure with the emergence of a section of the bourgeoisie based on tax collectors. The period from the uprising of 1765 in support of popular demands for taxation relief, to the triple uprising in 1833 was a particularly rebellious one. A key moment was 1804 when the peasants, without leaders from the elite, besieged Nicosia. The uprisings were multicultural – Orthodox Christians, Muslims and Linovamvaki [3] participated according to reports.[4] And then suddenly the uprisings stopped after 1833. It took almost one-hundred years (1931) to see widespread uprisings again. Almost a century of relative peace must have had a cause. The major change seems to have been the emergence of small-ownership as form of a "land-regime".

Smallholders according to Katsiaounis[5] emerged out of the division of communal lands – a process which was part of broader trends in the Ottoman Empire as the work of H. Inalcik points to, but which was also particularly "successful" in the "province of Cyprus":

> "Piecemeal reforms, aimed at securing smallholders in their position as users of Miri land, were nevertheless promulgated during the 1840s and 1850s. …

> In the province of Cyprus the intention that such a role [of the state as a guarantor of the 'full right of the peasant' to his land] should be undertaken by the state was manifested by the establishment of the Defteri Hakani or Department for Sale and Registration of Land, at about … 1853."[6]

The fact that Cyprus became a "sea of land proprietors" in the period 1830-1878 had broader implications. The land-regime of smallholders, to begin with, precludes the dominance of a plantation model which had been established, according to Wallerstein, in other areas incorporated at the same historical "moment". In this sense one might say that the lower classes in Cyprus had been spared the worst organisational forms of control and extraction of surplus. And actually if one looks at the economic conditions on the island between 1833 and 1878 it would seem that the improvement was significant and noticeable for all classes: in the 1830s the Sultan was contemplating giving away Cyprus as a troublesome place, while by the 1870s the relative peace on the island and its comparatively prosperous status were among the incentives for the British in choosing it – in contrast to Crete for example. Was there a compromise among the different classes which "gave something" to the lower classes and pacified them? On the institutional level there were the Tanzimat reforms and it can be argued that the improvement of the conditions on the island was in part due to the successful implementation of reforms by the Governors assigned to Cyprus. Yet beyond the tendency/ability of individuals we have to see that in a period in which other areas were feeling the strains of exploitation, the Cypriot lower classes seemed to be doing better – to the point of abandoning their riots and actually emerging as smallholders when the British took over the administration of the island. Thus it would seem reasonable, in the framework of an ongoing historical class conflict, to consider the growth of smallholdings as a de facto compromise. And this compromise had a transitional "character": small-ownership was a step in the direction of modernisation (as opposed to feudal land-regimes) but it was done, and maintained, within the context of traditional institutions and culture – such as the protection of owners against land expropriation by moneylenders.[7]

We now move to the cultural conflicts which centred on the hegemonic institution/apparatus of subjectivity construction/articulation, the church. The church was a major actor in class relations (landowner, tax collector) and it was often the target of popular criticism[8] and revolts, as in 1804. But the church's power legitimacy did not derive so much from economics, as from culture. Its primary product was ideology: the construction and articulation of cultural subjectivity – the identity of the Orthodox Christian, the Romios. The temporal imagery of this identity drew its framework from biblical narratives and centred on Byzantium as its "glorious historical moment", while its spatial boundaries extended from the Balkans to the west, to the east Mediterranean/Middle East, and to Russia in the north.

The cultural regimes (and their boundaries) in this period, however, were not essentially strong. Kyrris has argued that the community of Linovamvaki emerged (earlier than 1750) out of Orthodox Christians who chose to follow Islam rather than be under the exploitation of the church. The very existence of the Linovamvaki, the general peaceful coexistence, and the common uprisings are enough testimony that by the eighteenth-nineteenth century religious identities did not essentially provoke conflict. In the most tense episode of the first half of the nineteenth century, the hanging of the archbishop and part of the Christian elite in 1821, it is significant to note that the event did not develop into massacres on the popular level. And despite the events (which may be seen as the result of elite rivalries over power) the lower classes joined hands again in 1833 for the common uprisings. It would seem that when class identity emerged (in moments of crisis and tensions) it could easily accommodate/put aside religious differences. The broader common/unifying framework (common language,[9] customs etc.) seemed to be stronger than the inevitable antagonism produced by the exclusive monotheism of the church and the mosque.

In this context the church faced legitimation problems in relation to its subject population. But there were also internal problems in relation to the content itself of the subjectivity produced/articulated. In the broader context of the Ottoman world, the beginning of the nineteenth century was the period in which the historical conflict between two forms of cultural identity unfolded in the Orthodox millet – between modern nationalism and the traditional worldview of Romiosini.[10] In Cyprus the conflict may have origins also in this period,[11] but the key conflict came in 1900-1910. Katsiaounis[12] views it as being analogous to the French revolution while Attalides[13] sees it as the climactic conflict between two factions of the Christian-to-become-G/C community: the moderates and the intransigents. Kitromilides actually links directly, those two factions to the clash of Hellenism and Romiosini which was being waged in the broader area of the East Mediterranean and the Balkans – having as the two rival symbolic centres of power, Athens (the Greek national state) on the one hand, and Constantinople/Istanbul (the seat of the Patriarchate) on the other. On the face of it, the conflict of 1900-1910, the "Archbishopric issue" as it came to be known, was a fight between two bishops over who would become archbishop. But precisely because the church was also a de facto institution of local government of the Orthodox Christians, the conflict inevitably took dimensions beyond the conscious will and desire of the participants.

Some incidents in this conflict which split the Orthodox Christian community sharply will be referred to in order to highlight the broader (cultural and historical) dimensions of this identity conflict and the relation of the rival Christian factions to the Muslim community. A major incident in the first years of the conflict was the accusation that the bishop of Kitium was a Free Mason. The celebrated "Masonic

issue" was taken to court eventually, but as such the conflict revealed the biases of each camp: on one side the camp of the bishop of Kyrenia developed a discourse on defending tradition against "dangerous infiltrators". Indicative of this discourse was the invitation of a preacher named Teknopoulos, who came to Cyprus to offer his rhetorical services to the traditionalist camp – since the other camp had a clear advantage in this respect.[14] The discourse of Teknopoulos seems to have expressed well the dangers/problems that the traditionalist defenders, Romiosini, perceived as coming from the modern world of nations – as expressed in the society of the Greek national state. According to reports his preaching included the following denunciation:

> "Greece unfortunately is in a moral and national decadence, in which there is no other Christian nation … Three-quarters of the Greeks are animal thieves. Greeks are liars and cheat in trade ... Greek prime ministers … are arrested as embezzlers. The Professors at the University teach materialism."[15]

The modernisers/nationalists responded by claiming their own loyalty to the Christian tradition – linking it with Greekness. Thus they counter-accused the bishop of Kyrenia as being under the influence of "protestant teachings" – implying an identification of the traditionalists with the British. The most modernising demand of the nationalists, that of popular participation in the selection of the new archbishop, was, thus, couched in references to the early church's practices.

How did the two factions see the Muslim community? We have noted already that the relation of the two religious communities in the early part of the nineteenth century was friendly. In relation to the general climate of the late nineteenth century it is worth commenting on the well known poem by Vasilis Michaelides, I 9i Iouliou tou 1821, which narrates symbolically the events of the hanging of the archbishop and other members of the Christian elite when the Greek revolution/war of independence broke out. The poem was written in the latter part of the nineteenth century and it has acquired a status analogous to that of a G/C national anthem both institutionally (through its use in school curricula, ceremonies etc.), and thematically. It is a narrative linking implicitly the fate of Cypriot Christians-G/Cs to the events in Greece, but by virtue of the fact that it is written in the Cypriot dialect/language it provides also a distinction/differentiation/autonomy for Cypriots. From the beginning the poem invokes the presence of a "good" Cypriot Muslim who is juxtaposed to the "bad" Governor. The very presence of a redeeming Muslim-T/C even in a poem intended to be a national/nationalist epic is characteristic of the relation of the two communities. During the inter-Christian clash of the first decade of the twentieth century there were at least two major instances invoking Muslims-T/Cs. The first case was actually a reaction to the problems in the cooperation of legislators from the two communities which arose as a result of the progressive rise of the enosis ideology: in that context, in 1903, the bishop of Kitium made an appeal

for bicommunal unity whose spirit was captured in a phrase destined to become very controversial subsequently: "Cyprus should be for the Cypriots" said the, otherwise, leader of the nationalist camp. The nationalist bishop had no trouble articulating the phrase at that conjuncture. Decades later, in the 1960s and early 1970s, for example, the same phrase, even though logical as an expression of the interests of the islanders, would be denounced as treasonous in the sense that it could be considered as betraying Greek national identity. But in 1903 Greek nationalism was a rising modernising ideology whose primary opponent inside the G/C community were the traditionalists who were in power. In the 1960s, on the contrary, Greek nationalism was an ideology expressing vested interests and its questioning provoked moral panics. This climate of considering the Muslims-T/Cs as some form of "neutral neighbours" was well expressed in another incident in 1908 when the two Christian-G/C factions failed repeatedly to agree on a G/C candidate for Nicosia mayor, and thus a Muslim-T/C was elected for the first (and only) time as Nicosia mayor.[16] This situation of sharp division in which the T/Cs would be considered as potentially better than G/C opponents, has been repeated as a practice (around 1948)[17] and as rhetoric (around 1974) throughout the twentieth century.

How did the conflict in the church end? It was a compromise which can be taken as a transitional model of adaptation to modernity in cultural-institutional terms. On the surface the nationalists won. By 1910 Greek nationalism was triumphant and the bishop of Kitium was elected archbishop after a new church charter was introduced by the British and voted by the Legislative Council – in opposition to the decision of the Patriarch in Constantinople/Istanbul.[18] Yet behind the seemingly clear victory the de facto reality was more complex – the ideological victory of the nationalists was achieved within a structure of power (the church) which had its own dynamics and which eventually shaped ideological discourse (and social action) accordingly. To begin with, the defeated bishop of Kyrenia was given a ceremonial post. And actually when the newly elected archbishop died in 1916, the old traditionalist was elected as archbishop with the support, in part, of some of his staunch opponents in the past.[19] But these ceremonial figures would not be that significant if it was not for the deeper structural reality. The compromising ideological discourse was what came to be known as ellinohristanismos – and as such it was imported from Greece in the framework of the ideology of the Meyali Idea.[20] In both societies it functioned in an analogous fashion whether in the 1840s or in 1910. In terms of historiographic narratives of subjectivity, ellinohristianismos was a framework mediating the differences (and opposition until then) between the ancient Greek past (which was considered until then as idolatry) and the Byzantine middle ages (the "glorious past" according to the church, but not according to the modernising adherents of the Enlightenment). In the new transitional narrative, the two periods (antiquity, Byzantine Empire) were

considered as continuous – part of the history and evolution of the Greek nation. In Cyprus there was also a historiographical shift which is indeed impressive if one compares the narrative of the eighteenth century "Chronological History of the Island of Cyprus" by Archimandrites Kyprianos, with the narratives that came to dominate official historiography in the twentieth century: Cyprus from an autonomous country tracing its origins to either the Bible or mythical Kings-Gods, was transformed into an archetypical colony from even ancient times, tracing its culture and origins to migrations or influences from the area ruled by the Greek Kingdom.

But the institutional/structural framework was different from the Greek experience and the local church came out much stronger than the corresponding Greek one. The church of Cyprus had been autonomous since early Byzantine times and this independence often made the church a local administrative institution. It certainly played this role during Ottoman times in relation to the Orthodox Christian millet. The church of Cyprus found itself in a different institutional/structural framework with the coming of the British. The end of certain rights upset the church elite from the beginning, but in broader terms what was more significant was the structural role of the church. In the traditional/Ottoman world of the millets the autocephalous church of Cyprus had a clearly defined role and privileges. In the modern transformation inaugurated by British colonial rule, the church found itself "lacking" as a traditional institution vis-à-vis the new secular administration established by the British. The crisis of 1900-1910 eventually helped modernise the church: it transformed it into an arena of politics and a type of public sphere for the G/C community, as the elections for the archbishop implied the adoption/adaptation by the church of a practice introduced in Cyprus by the British.[21]

This modernisation made the church adapt as a transitional institution/ apparatus. The term "transitional" refers, in this context, more to products of a reform rather than radical revolution, and thus in historical terms it combines elements from tradition and modernity. The adaptation of the imported ideology of enosis is a characteristic example. In cultural terms enosis can be seen as an adaptation of the Orthodox Christian imagery of re-union of humanity and divinity in the Second Coming. But in institutional terms there was little potential benefit (of power, status or economics) for the church as an apparatus, in the realistic (as opposed to the rhetorical proclamations) annexation/enosis of its dominion (Cyprus) to the Greek state. In political terms the church adopted enosis as an ideology against the British colonial state, but also as a cultural claim to being equally civilised as the colonising West – and subsequently as an ideology against the Left. But the fact that the institution of the church followed its structural interests eventually is abundantly evident in the history of the church after 1960 when

Makarios became the symbol of independence. Before the 1930s, for example, when the church had adopted the rhetoric of enosis, but was still controlled by the “dynamics of the past” (symbiosis with the colonial state/“British-Greek friendship”), its prelates talked and signed petitions about enosis but did not come in direct/militant/subversive confrontation with the British. By contrast as the church modernised and a new generation of prelates took over, the confrontation with the British became open as the cases of Makarios III and Leontios demonstrate. Institutions have their own structural dynamics. Even though nationalism seemed victorious after 1910, in effect it legitimised (by modernising) a local institution which sooner or later would have produced phenomena like Makarios III – i.e. symbols of the island’s autonomy/independence – once, that is, the church could control (or impose its hegemony) on the secular modern apparatuses of the state. The phenomenon of the archbishop/president of the 1960s-1970s, in this sense, may have owed part of its appeal to Makarios’ “charisma”, but this “charisma” appealed to and derived its legitimation from, the success of the church in establishing its hegemony over the state.

There was another cultural legacy of the compromise: the ‘residuals’ of Romiosini – i.e. “left-over” cultural dynamics and realities in everyday life which continued to exist and followed diverse paths of adaptation. These trends were not essentially all conservative as the trends expressed by the circles around the bishop of Kyrenia.[22] Romiosini, for example, represented an old world in which modern nationalism was not the predominant theme – and thus coexistence with Muslims was more understandable. And since Cypriot reality was bicommunal till the 1960s, some “residuals” resonated more with the existing reality than with the nationalist discourses which were still trying to mould reality in their image. These residuals found themselves in an alien cultural and institutional totality and their survival depended on Cypriot everydayness. Thus they expressed (by virtue of their structural position) localist “feelings” – such as the retention of the Cypriot dialect/language. In politics the residuals of Romiosini became fluid realities which influenced different factions/wings. The Left, for example, even if not culturally related to religion, was clearly influenced by these residuals. The work of Pavlos Liasides[23] is a good textual testimony to this leftist mutation of Romiosini.

In effect what the compromise inaugurated under the cloak of ellinohristianismos was the beginning of what we may call the modern Greek-Cypriot “nation” – an imaginary community which referred initially to the church as a form of a proto-state. The ethnarch/archbishop was de facto the symbolic and realistic leader of this imaginary community. Unless we take this into consideration we will not be able to understand the seemingly sudden reversion of Cypriots to independence in the 1960s.[24] What Makarios, and the groundswell of support for him, represented (and expressed) was based on the underlying reality of this

"Christian-transformed-Greek" community which was, however, solidly based/ "rooted" in Cyprus. This "nation" matured (but did not articulate its own autonomous discourse) in the 1960s and 1970s, and seems to be speaking in its own voice recently.

Modern Crisis and Class Revolt: Negative Integration and the Modern Subculture of the Left, 1920-1950

The church was in a transitory stage during the first decades of the twentieth century. If, on the one hand, the crisis of 1900-1910 mobilised the Christian-G/C community in conflicts within the institution/apparatus of the church, on the other hand there seems to have existed still a crisis of legitimation – which one can trace back to the class role of the church as a landowner. This crisis was evidenced in the 1920s when an economic crisis created a volatile socio-political climate. In the decades to follow, till the 1950s, the church had to struggle with a resurgent class movement which was more similar to those in the 1760s-1833 period rather than the crisis in 1900-1910 in which class conflict was articulated in the context of the conflict of subjectivities and leaders within the church. But there was a decisive difference from the 1760s-1833 period. The new class movement did not just respond to a new development in the relation of the island to the world system. There was also an ideological discourse (communism) which proposed a form of social change within the dynamics of modernity. The Left was a form of Cypriot modernity, and it affirmed the basic principles of the age: equality, progress, belief in rationality/science/education. In this sense the church had a new rival – and a rival based on a discourse claiming in many key areas a different, clearly modern (rather than transitional) subjectivity. Thus a new identity split emerged in the Christian-G/C community: between aristeri/dexii (leftists/rightists).

We shall investigate first the crisis (which had systemic roots) and then the conflict of the two institutions/structures (the church and the Left) which produced the competing forms of identity/subjectivity. The 1920s witnessed the crisis of the regime of smallholdings – available research traces the 1920s crisis to the expropriation of smallholders by the moneylenders.[25] In order to understand the context, it will help if we consider the period in terms of the dynamics of "peripheralisation" which followed "incorporation" in the capitalist world-economy. According to Wallerstein peripheralisation "involves a continuing transformation of the mini-structures of the area in ways that are sometimes referred to as the deepening of capitalist development."[26] The immediate cause of the crisis of the 1920s was a fall in agricultural exports after the war. The indebted peasants suddenly found themselves at the mercy of the moneylenders – tokoylifi. Similar crises in the world economy did not affect Cyprus that much earlier, because in part the island was not so dependent on the world economy and trade (it was still in the

process of "incorporation" rather than "peripheralisation"), and in part the Ottoman legal structures punished debtors but they did not permit the transfer/confiscation of property. The British transformed the institutional/legal framework, rationalising it in capitalist terms and thus "deepening capitalist development": the moneylenders could take/sell the land of indebted peasants. Thus the coalescing of a fall of external demand for Cypriot agricultural products, with the new colonial framework on land property, brought an economic and social crisis of unprecedented proportions. The crisis was reflected politically in the middle of the 1920s, in the swinging of voters towards more moderate politicians on the national question who promised to work on socio-economic reforms. But towards the end of the decade, as the hope for reform declined, it was radicalism (of the Left and the Right)[27] which took the upper hand. The communist party circle, which was formally organised in 1926, started to spread. It is noteworthy that the communist party gained this growth in a period in which it was (in comparison with its subsequent positions) radically confrontational in ideology – it proclaimed openly both its atheism and its condemnation of nationalism and union with Greece. In 1929 there was the first mass uprising in the new export industry of the island, mining, where the Cypriot working class was obtaining its "mass experience of the proletariat". The uprising at Amiantos mine was ascribed to the communists but it was mostly spontaneous – showing the climate of the times.

The Left became the cultural-political space which expressed this militant class consciousness as it became an ideological identity. This identity came immediately into conflict with the hegemonic subjectivity expressed by ellinohristianismos. This discourse accused the Left of atheism, "materialism", and lack of "national ideals". The climax of these cultural-economic-political confrontations came in 1948 but the tension had been building up from much earlier. The communists in the 1930s had lowered the banners of ideological confrontation (in an effort to achieve "popular unity" in mobilisations), but still both their activists, and the worldview they represented, "accepted" (rather than endorsed "passionately") the national identity discourse which had become hegemonic in the G/C community. Two incidents from 1940 may help illustrate the underlying realities and tensions during that period.

1. When the Italians bombed a Greek submarine in August, there was an effort to collect money for the military needs of Greece – this in itself was an old practice dating from the beginning of the twentieth century. The communists in the trade unions, however, were cold on this:[28] their antagonism to the Greek nationalist/pro-fascist government was coupled with their dislike of the ideology of the Right (ethnikofrosini) which centred on the subjectivity of ellinohristianismos.
2. On October 29 when the news of the attack of Italy on Greece became known, high school student demonstrations broke out. One might have

expected G/C students to mobilise/demonstrate, but according to the press of the period[29] the demonstrations were actually bicommunal – and so were the gatherings of adults in the afternoon.

National identity/Greekness was hegemonic but as Mavratsas puts it[30] there was an experiential difference in the relation between institutional-structural reality and hegemonic discourse: "in everyday life, the average G/C is integrated in local Cypriot institutions which in most cases differ significantly from the corresponding Greek ones". In this Cypriot everyday reality, the 1940s was the key decade in which the basic institutions of subsequently modern Cyprus were established. Thus the imported national identity was faced with the tradition of local class resistances and also with a context in which bicommunal boundaries were still relaxed.

By the middle of the 1940s the Left developed into a major political force, and as the prospects for the post-World War period seemed fluid, there were twists which revealed also the practical politics of power behind the messianic rhetoric of enosis. As the war seemed to be coming to an end the Left in Greece seemed to be emerging as a major (indeed the key) player in resistance politics. In this context, the Cypriot Left moved closer to the idea of enosis.[31] August 1944 was revealing. The colonial secretary came for a visit to Cyprus to assess the situation. It was the Left which organised mass protests to demand union with Greece – the Right abstained, insisting that such demands should be raised only after the war. But when the civil war started in Greece, revealing the geopolitical reality coming out of the Yalta agreement/division of spheres of influence, the Cypriot Left became less enthusiastic.[32] When in 1947 the British responded to the growing popular mobilisations (of which the Left was the main organiser) on the island by offering a constitution for self-government, the Left participated in the talks. The split in the leadership of AKEL on the issue – especially after the change of policy in 1949 from the strategy of "self-government" to "enosis and only enosis" – has been at the centre of a growing historical debate which focuses on the proposed constitution as "the first lost chance" for avoiding the subsequent bloodshed/tragedy. Yet the period can be analysed more fruitfully if we look at the issues involved (constitution/self-government and change of policy/slogan of anti-colonial struggle) in relation to the split between experienced reality and hegemonic discourse in a historical context of political and cultural conflicts in the process of modernisation.

1. Political dimension: Constitution/Self-Government/Civil Rights and Participation. The Left had been consistently demanding rights and practical reforms thus a constitution was a response, a framework, which was well within leftist demands. The Left mobilised and demanded rights, representation, and in general popular participation. It was to be expected that the historic leadership of the party/movement from the beginnings of

the 1940s would see in the discussions for a constitution the chance to expand the "rights of the people" – and forms of securing power for the "people's movement". In this context (of leftist demands for the expansion of participation and democratic politics) we should note also the active involvement of the Left in the archbishopric elections of 1947. In that case the Left was continuing the conflicts of the 1900-1910 period over popular participation, by demanding the participation of the Left/"people's movement" in the ethnarchic council – the body talking on behalf of the G/C community. The Right, by contrast, which monopolised power in both the church and the colonial state,[33] was reluctant to accept "opening" of the political sphere to further participation.

2. Cultural discourse: Geopolitical strategy vs. metaphysical discourse: The issue of leftist shifts on self-government and enosis in the late 1940s should be seen more in the context of the geopolitics of the era, rather than taking rhetorical enoticism at face value. Even when the Left argued for enosis its discourse was more geopolitical and strategic (in terms of broader struggles "against imperialism" or in favour of "peace") rather than metaphysical and messianic[34] as the discourse of the church. There was, in this sense, a cultural clash of ideological perceptions in relation to anti-colonial strategy. Thus the period of 1947-1948 saw a bitter conflict not only over discussing a legal document, a constitution (and its function or prospects) – it was actually an intense clash of identities. In the "great strikes" of 1948 and in the split of leftist and rightist organisations and institutions which spread all-around Cyprus in that year, there was something akin to the clashes and splits of 1908. In this case it was ellinohristianismos/ethnikofrosini vs. laiko kinima/communism.

In this context in 1948 the Left found itself fighting (and under attack) as the Right and the colonial authorities were trying to marginalise the communist "people's movement". This led to the development of a leftist subculture which solidified its boundaries in the 1950s – especially in the late 1950s during the period of attacks by EOKA nationalists against the Left. Football is probably the most obvious example of that separation which endures till today – like the coffeeshops/silloyi which dot most central squares in villages and urban "neighbourhoods". If one looks at the electoral results of the Left from 1960 till today, it is actually impressive how its percentages seem stable. It is as if the Left is not only a political space but also a subculture reproduced through community and family bonds. In some way, it can be called a "political ethnic community".[35]

And what is the result of this new confrontation? In this case we did not have a compromise integrating the two opponents but rather the de facto coexistence of two distinct cultural-political "spaces"/subcultures. The Left and the church

continued to coexist sometimes as rivals and sometimes, actually, cooperating. But it was the church (and the Right which functioned within its apparatuses and discourses) which retained power. A new institutional model of compromise emerged which may be called "negative integration". In this model the Left was allowed to function/exist but was excluded from power. This model of "coexistence but exclusion from power" is not unique to Cyprus. The term "negative integration" was used by G. Roth in order to describe the position of the Social Democrats in imperial Germany.[36] But one may also easily use the Italian experience after 1945 as an example. The model can be juxtaposed with models of systematic violent mass persecution of ideological opponents like in the Greek civil war. The soccer association actually provides a good indication of the development of this model in Cyprus. Leftist teams created a new league in 1948 after being practically expelled from the official league. By 1953 the two leagues (the right-wing controlled one, and the leftist one) were united. But the "union" was implemented actually on the terms of the Right – the leftists were re-integrated in a way which led to a situation in which leftist fans felt that the authorities/referees were biased against their teams. This exclusion from political power, however, was not the total picture. As rumour has it, part of the problem of the rightists in football was that the leftist teams drew much bigger crowds of spectators than the rightist teams. There was, thus, a practical and an economic dimension to it. In broader terms the Left by its very presence (and given its exclusion from the administration of power) became a de facto influence in two realms – economic and foreign policy – where its framework, we might say, became hegemonic or achieved hegemonic compromise.

Let us investigate the dynamics in the economic realm first. On the face of it, the leftist union, PEO, which led and organised solidarity around the strikes of 1948, did not win – or at least the mining union.[37] But the demands of the leftist unions became subsequently accepted as de facto reality by the employers – and of course by the right wing union which was competing for the same membership pool. In the 1960s, as the historical trade union leader Ziartides has noted/acknowledged,[38] the agenda of the leftist unions was largely adopted by the post-colonial government – and especially by the then Minister of Labour Tassos Papadopoulos. Nevertheless the Left remained excluded and despite all his indebtedness to the Left, Papadopoulos continued to favour, for example, right wing unions in the public sector. But the key dimension to observe in this context in relation to "compromise models" is how the excluded part of society managed through its practice, to create a form of institutional hegemony in this realm. And in economic terms what the Left managed to construct through its mobilisations and de facto presence, was a social democratic model for the control of the effects/consequences of the capitalist market.

In terms of foreign policy, the shift was much more visible and thus it attracted American concerns which led to the coup of July 1974. The Right in Cyprus after

an extended period of adhering to Anglo-Greek friendship,[39] embarked on the anti-colonial revolt of 1955-1959, under the leadership of the rejuvenated modernised church which the image of Makarios represented. This anti-colonial shift was in part the result of pressures from the Left.[40] In the 1960s Makarios moved even more in the direction of the suggested policy of the Left from the late 1940s/early 1950s: relations with the socialist bloc and the anti-colonial/anti-imperialist movements and regimes in the Arab world. The Left pressed its political agenda through mass mobilisations which Makarios needed in his conflicts with the extreme right wing and the interventions of the Greek State in the 1960s. And the very fact that the Left was excluded from power, allowed him to use elements from both (rightist and leftist) discourses. The Left first and Makarios subsequently (expressing politically the Centre and sectors of the Right), realised that the “non aligned” policy served the interests of the islanders better in the systemic reality of decolonisation and in, general terms, post World War II global politics. But internally, in terms of the hegemonic discourse on subjectivity on West-East relations, it was a compromise. Makarios’ policy of “We belong to the West – We belong to the non aligned movement” represented the articulation of this consciousness of border experience and policy.[41] In terms of time-space variables it was a compromise between the aspired temporal goal – progress, development towards the western modern model – and the geopolitical reality of the East, of having to “fight for your rights”, of the colonised who rebels. The metaphysical goal (descended from Orthodox Christianity) of “union with the divine/sacred” was, thus, translated and secularised in the goal of “reaching”/“becoming like”, advanced societies. The aesthetics and rhetoric of “becoming civilised”/advanced like “them” (ex-colonial power, rich etc.), were expressed by the Right, while the Left expressed more the demand for realistic practice/reform/change in the here and now of the decolonising/developing East.

In this sense (if we take the Right to represent power/hegemony and the Left practical everyday politics), from the sixties onwards we can discern a split in society between hegemonic rhetoric (as articulated by the educational apparatus and the media – since the church as a space had lost its primacy as a structure of subjectivity)[42] and everyday reality. At the level of everydayness, residuals from previous transformations (Cypriot language) and new trends (consciousness of independence/Cypriot consciousness) remained a vibrant reality which was, however, excluded from hegemonic discourse: they were not recognised as existing entities – except as dangers. Just like the Left in the political realm: Hegemony of one discourse on one hand and de facto autonomy for a counter-hegemonic subculture on the other.

Cleavages of Modern Subjectivity: The Fluidities between the Homogeneity of School Subjectivity and Separation/Partition (1950-1980)

From the middle of the twentieth century onwards, the key conflict on subjectivity shifted from cultural vs. economic/class, to cultural (national) vs. political (identity of citizen). The Greco-Christian discourse (ellinohristianismos) on subjectivity which the church and the upper classes sponsored and promoted came into conflict with the empirical everyday reality of independence. Thus the conflict that we noted above (between hegemonic/right wing discourse and leftist/everyday practice) became broader and, in many ways, came to define the period 1960-1974. Before proceeding though, we need to clarify the significance of the subjectivity of ellinohristianismos for status hierarchy and conflicts. The Greco-Christian identity, as perceived, was a historical compromise and a form of identity used against the class consciousness of the lower classes. Yet there was another dimension which made it the key framework within which G/Cs identified themselves and their internal relations with those of the world around them. Greekness meant a ticket to the "civilised people" of the world (i.e. the West which claimed ancient Greece as its intellectual ancestor) while at the same time it was a form of internal status differentiation. A key variable in this differentiation was the use of language. The Cypriot language/dialect[43] was claimed as a "branch" of the "tree" of the Greek language – thus legitimising G/C claims to be Greeks. But this "branch" was then considered (in modernity) to be a remnant of the past – and a "polluted" one as such with words and expressions from other "barbaric languages".[44] Thus language lessons became a centre piece of the educational apparatus – but the language status ladder spread much beyond the school classroom. In class terms the middle and upper classes "refined" themselves (and claimed a higher status) by speaking closer to the Greek idiom. Teachers, professionals, even people living in the city vs. people living in the village, defined their relation to others (and themselves) via the language idiom/expressions they adopted in everyday life and in specific contexts. There was, of course, resistance – but this resistance (like Cypriot consciousness in this period) was not ideological and did not assume the offensive except among the milieu of the lower classes where "Greek talk" (kalamaristika) was ridiculed as a form of middle class "hypocrisy" or "softness". In general the Cypriot linguistic form was on the defensive – but it survived as part of a broader everydayness which was distancing itself from the official discourse of Greekness.

As Gellner[45] noted nations are constructed through the mass educational system which diffuses a homogenous print form/variant of high culture into the everyday reality of the "people". In Cyprus, the concepts (and contents) of national narratives and frameworks had been imported from Greece and Turkey and thus instead of (the construction of) a Cypriot nation[46] we had two rival ethnic communities claiming to be part of the nations of neighbouring states. By the 1960s

Cypriot identity was almost eclipsed from the hegemonic discourse – Cyprus officially, even in its constitution, was inhabited by Greeks and Turks and three small religious minorities. The imported nations were, of course, based on the traditional religious millets of the Ottoman Empire. But the new national division was imposed more through the school classroom than the space of the church or the mosque. An incident in the late nineteenth century cited by Kyrris is indicative of the differences constructed by the school. In Kilani, a major village/administrative centre in the Limassol area, the Muslims complained about the new schools supported by the British, since their children could not understand the language of teaching – Turkish. Once the Cypriot language was designated as dialect and thus not appropriate for teaching the “high ideas” of the school curriculum, then one of the key bonds keeping Christians and Muslims together was excluded as a variable from education. English appeared in this context as the only language in which both communities could communicate without translation and mediation. But the school classroom was not only a place where language re-education affirmed power and separation – it was also a place where imported national histories and geographies nearly eclipsed Cypriot time/history and space/geography.

Let us examine the broader systemic context. In the late nineteenth century, the integration of Cyprus in the British Empire (and the expansion of British control to Egypt in 1882) confirmed the rise in the geopolitical significance of the area due to the opening of the Suez Canal. After World War I, Cyprus became even more significant as a base in a geopolitical area put under the western “Franco-British” mandate, and which was becoming a key source of energy/oil for global industry. After World War II and the end of colonialism in the Arab world, Cyprus increasingly emerged as a form of border/frontier colony initially, and then a state. The move towards independence (even in the form of mobilisations for “full self-government” in 1948) represented the consciousness of this border position. The key historical moment for the area came in 1956 when Egypt nationalised the Suez Canal, and despite re-capturing militarily the canal, the Anglo-French coalition was eventually forced to withdraw. At that moment, historically, the Soviet Union and the United States emerged as the new contenders for dominance in the area. The United States was in the advantageous position to have “inherited” from the British the hegemony of the world capitalist system while the Soviet Union was still re-industrialising after World War II. But the Soviets had the ideology which was adopted or referred to as a mobilising model for anti-western claims to political independence and autonomous economic development. It was, in that context, the revolutionary model of the East which claimed/promised that it would surpass the West in modernising.

In terms of economic conflicts the Left shifted its focus from internal class conflicts into claiming a political strategy based on the geopolitical dynamics of anti-colonial/anti-imperialist movements. Internally, the acceptance of the agenda of the

leftist unions led to a form of social peace/compromise in class terms. And the key issue became how to draw capital from outside – through trade, tourism or development aid. The opening to other markets (and the strategic alliance with post-colonial Arab states and the socialist bloc) led to a significant growth. Nevertheless this growth was increasingly controlled by the G/C community (via its elite) which in addition to being the majority, (including, as such, much of the local bourgeoisie) it came to control also (or probably more appropriately, it usurped) the state apparatuses in 1963-1964.

The division of the two communities and their military confrontation in the period 1955-1974 became the decisive characteristic of the period after the middle of the century. In effect the de facto partition which had been established in education spread/diffused, one might say, to the rest of society. Already from 1960 the new constitution stipulated a separation in educational apparatuses. And in this case the G/Cs who tended usually to argue for unified forms of the state (in which case they hoped that they would dominate due to their majority numbers) were as adamant as the T/C nationalists, on the need to preserve the separate/partitioned nationalist character of education. Education, its codes, linguistic forms, historical narratives (which included now the EOKA mythology) was becoming part of a process legitimising power and status.

In the G/C community there was, as already noted, a new cleavage around the emergence of "Cypriot consciousness" – a term used to describe support for independence and distancing from the discourse of Greek nationalism. In part the cleavage was a result of the regime of negative integration and the consequent autonomy of the Left. The new form of identity (Cypriot political consciousness/ subjectivity) first emerged to a large degree within the Left. One can discern a shift in leftist political and literary discourse from the late 1940s towards a growing emphasis on Cyprus.[47] A decisive moment must have been the late 1950s when the masses/subculture of the Left experienced the anti-communist death squads of EOKA which represented militant enoticist nationalism. A poem[48] from this period by Pavlos Liasides (who expressed everyday leftist discourse on the village level) is indicative. In the poem, which is dedicated to one of the assassinated leftists, Liasides paints a picture of the dead activist somewhere between a "people's hero" and a "Christian saint" but the most interesting part comes at the end where in condemning war violence, he is rather clearly rejecting the Greek national anthem for a new future anthem which will praise/recognise 'love'/αγαπi, not war.[49]

But the educational apparatus of the post-colonial state adopted and articulated the official hegemonic discourse of ellinohristianismos (which was the legitimising ideology for the Right's claim to power), and thus Cypriot consciousness was excluded – whether it was coming from the Left or the liberal Centre.[50] As such the

existence of one hegemonic discourse (expressing class and status interests) which excluded other existing (ideological) discourses from the state apparatuses was not something unique to Cyprus in the period – and in the specific geographical/geopolitical area. Yet in Cyprus there was a contradiction between the hegemonic ideology and the ongoing historical reality, which was analysed perceptively by Th. Papadopoulos from the early 1960s. In a seminal article[51] he noted the clear contradiction between the (alleged) historical cultural continuity of Hellenism in Cyprus, and the historical-institutional reality which was leading to different sociological and political realities. The G/Cs believed, and were taught to believe, that they were Greeks and that their goal should be union/annexation to Greece. But Cyprus, as Papadopoulos noted, had a different historical trajectory than the lands comprising contemporary Greece – and this different historical experience was finding its expression in the new reality of the independent state. That state needed its own legitimation, while ironically the "educational apparatus" was propagating in part the legitimation of Greek cultural/political identity – and thus annexation to the Greek state. The key apparatus producing/articulating subjectivity was partially functioning on colonial patterns – albeit here on a cultural rather than a direct political form of colonialism. And there was an internal "root": Greekness was perceived as a form of being civilised – a form of "white mask" to cover a "dark skin", to paraphrase Fanon.

We now move our attention therefore to compromises achieved within the apparatus of education – and the related discourses. The educational apparatus in the G/C community was the product of multiple influences – and, thus, it was less homogenous than one might have expected.[52] In its origins in the nineteenth century, education was financed by local communities and the church but the latter demanded control and influence over it.[53] When the British assumed control of the island, they laid the foundations of modern mass education. After the 1920-1930 period the colonial authorities also became involved in efforts to control the curriculum and limit the influence of nationalisms – which, in the case of the Greek one at least, started to produce symptoms outside the boundaries of "Anglo-Greek friendship" such as the riots of 1931. From the 1920s to the 1940s, when the church and the British colonial state were in conflict over the apparatus of education, teachers emerged at times as an autonomous force.[54] It is noteworthy, for example, that the leader of the moderate reformists[55] in the 1920s who supported social and economic reforms started as a teacher, had extensive involvement in educational matters, and was even involved in early trade union organising.[56] And two prominent members of AKEL's leadership in the 1940s (F. Ioannou and A. Adamantos) also came from the teaching profession – with F. Ioannou being a general secretary of the teacher's union too. The church fought vehemently the presence of leftists in schools and it issued calls for spying and reporting to the authorities on "communist teachers" from the late 1920s. But the antagonistic

relation between the church and the colonial authorities on the one hand, and the general turmoil of the period on the other,[57] did not help the church's efforts. In effect the church was apprehensive not only of teachers but also of the new ideas of modernity which were surfacing from the educational apparatus as Loizos commented.[58]

In the great class confrontation of 1948 the church and the British also found themselves in the same trenches of the anti-communist crusade in the educational apparatus: the schools started to be "cleared" of leftists.[59] Ellinohristianismos seemed to be on the path for absolute hegemony – especially in secondary education. The British tried to control the nationalism of the Right, but it was evident that what concerned them most (in the broader framework of the Cold War) was the Left. The church itself moved ahead decisively with its own bodies of "monitoring/policing" the educational apparatus. In 1948 the katihitika (church classes/lessons designed to promote religious, and, in that context, nationalist and anti-communist discourses) were introduced, while Makarios III inaugurated a body (the educational council of the ethnarchy) assigned to watch the school apparatus.[60] The fact remains that EOKA used the katihitika as a recruiting pool, while the pool from which demonstrations were organised in support of the church organised armed group[61] was attributed to the secondary education sector and both were a consequence of the above. In the 1960s a new split emerged in the seemingly homogenous G/C school apparatus: between those loyal to the state, Makarios and ultimately independence, and those loyal to enosis and the cultural/political identity linking Greekness to the Greek state – which had its own influence in Cyprus through the provision of textbooks and the education of secondary school teachers. Also, the new conflicts were not only ideological/political – but involved issues of status often within the Right[62] itself: if in the 1940s it was the ideas of modernity which seemed to threaten the church as an apparatus, in the late 1960s status conflicts were translated into resentment against English higher education, language etc. As Loizos put it:

> "Crudely stated, the less English one knows, the more ideologically important Hellenism becomes; the more one is committed to Hellenism the more important it becomes to denounce the 'dilution' or 'contamination' of Greek culture by English or American influence, whether in education, in dress, personal style, sexual mores, political values or anything else that comes to mind."[63]

The military defeat of 1974 brought a shift in the form of the subjectivity promoted by G/C education. This time, the shift was more of a compromise, recognising the multiple forces and influences interested in and being affected by, the educational apparatus. As far as historiography is concerned, as Papadakis[64] noted, the G/Cs shifted from a narrative in which the T/Cs were at best a "left-over"

problem, into a narrative of "peaceful coexistence". This shift was not a new invention. It was part of the repertoires of attitudes towards the T/Cs which have been "available" to the G/Cs historically. It may not have been much in evidence during the period 1955-1974 but one could see it in the climate of the period which produced Michaelides' poem noted earlier, or which produced leftist bicommunal organising. A period, that is, in which national identity was not essentially the key identity conflict on the island.

The compromise which emerged in the late 1970s completed the shift to G/C subjectivity in which Greekness was the cultural and Cypriot the political identity – thus incorporating rather than resolving the conflict of the two rival forms of subjectivity of the pre-1974 period. The historiographical focus progressively added some references to the labour movement, for example, but the idolisation of EOKA (albeit as precursors/heroes of the independent state now) was maintained. The responsibility of the Greek state was shifted to the "bad guys/traitors" of the junta of 1967-1974, and Makarios' supporters' front in the pre-1974 period was vindicated as the "democratic and patriotic" position. The contradictions in the new narrative were left to be resolved by adult society – as the Left and the Right advanced their own narratives in the public sphere. In this new regime of compromise, the Greek state became publicly less intrusive in the political sphere (accepting the slogan/line "Cyprus decides and Greece supports") but it was still a force very much involved in educational policy – as it was in the military via the Greek leadership and officers of the National Guard. One of the Cypriot ministers of education, actually, acknowledged that the University of Cyprus (proclaimed by Makarios in the pro-Cypriotist post-1974 climate) was delayed till the 1990s because the Greek embassy and successive Greek governments did not want such a university[65] which might "dehellenise" the island – meaning, among other things, that it could act as a rival to the Athens-based educational monopoly on high school teacher education. But the fact that this view was supported by Cypriots (even in the 1990s) and that educational reforms in the 1970s faced intense internal institutional opposition, should also remind us that apart from the cultural colonialism of the Greek state, "Greek subjectivity" was a key asset in internal status conflicts.

In broader terms we may call the compromise that emerged after 1974, as a Reform (analogous to the class compromise which emerged after 1948 and in part to the ideological/cultural compromise of 1910) which to some extent mediated the gap between official discourse and reality, but it adapted hegemonic discourse rather than overturned it. The split and the gap moved now onto a new level – internal and external. Externally the G/Cs, who monopolised the state, emphasised their Cypriotness – and thus their openness to the T/Cs. However, internally what was cultivated even in the inconclusive tension of the educational apparatus was a G/C identity. But this Greek Cypriotness was more akin to a spectrum with a fluidity

(depending in conjuncture) in identifications rather than a set of fixed positions. And despite the nationalist comeback of the 1990s, the shift seems to have been decisive: if a G/C nation was born institutionally (but not as a consciousness) after 1910, then this "nation" matured as a political entity in the conflict with the Greek state in the period 1960-1974, and began to articulate its own discourse on subjectivity after 1974. Papadopoulos' pre-referendum TV speech in 2004 was a carefully crafted message appealing exactly to this imaginary community – and as an indication of the shift, it was the presidential palace (symbolising the resistance of 1974) which acted as a background and not any religious symbolism any longer.

Thus we may say that in broader terms the apparatus of education was an arena of conflicts/contests but its use by the dominant groups in order to promote their ideologies led to separation/partition – starting from the minds of the pupils and spreading/materialising in the real geographical separation of 1974. In a comparative framework one can observe that when the educational apparatus was dominated by one force (nationalism and its adherents) the results promoted further separation – the projection, that is, of the school model on the rest of society. When, on the other hand, education was more open to (or had to deal with) competing influences, the educational apparatus was more flexible, open to compromise, and in general there was a tendency (at least) to mediate the absolutist message of national separation.

Epilogue

In terms of compromise frameworks we may discern three "models" from our historical discussion:

1. Adaptation/transformation which we saw in the transition to modernity. In that case cultural identity managed to modernise and incorporate conflicting perspectives.
2. The second model is negative integration. This is related more to compromises in which there are also economic/class issues – we saw it after 1948, but one can argue that an analogous model was also at work after 1833. In this model conflict is visible in ritual but is frozen. It manifests itself in the existence of rival subcultures but there is also a clear hegemony and a form of autonomy for the rival/oppositional popular culture which is integrated by adoption of part of its agenda by the power structures.
3. The third model is separation/partition which spread, as indicated, from school curricula to geographical division. In this case the two opposing identities confront each other in an incomplete/unresolved conflict. Within the rival, separated alleged homogeneities, there are other/new forms of cleavages (civil vs. national identity, local vs. western/"civilising"

discourses/experiences) which create fluidity in identifications. This fluidity can be seen as the development of residuals but also as a new phenomenon which has been produced by differentiation of power in modernity and the emergence of multiple power centres.

Can a fourth model (or a combination of the above) be reached? Partition in the sense of "hard"/absolute geographical division cannot really function in the age of electronic communication. But historical reality is complex and predictions cannot be part of an analysis like this. The author would rather offer a concluding commentary by elaborating briefly on three generalisations (related to the three levels of analysis employed) that can be gleaned from our exploration into identity formations, shifts and conflicts:

1. Situational: In the historical experience of modern Cyprus there has been a multiplicity of identities and identity-conflicts. The key characteristics of this modern reality were transitional (rather than stable, "natural" and trans-historical) forms of identities, which were shaped by social conflicts and material or ideal (as in status) interests. The conflict between G/Cs and T/Cs was not the only one, and as such it has been mediated by other forms of identity conflict and transformations. In this context it could be expected that the current ethnic division, even though it will probably continue to be of significance, will not remain essentially the decisive fault line of future differentiations: there are already new forms of identity conflicts and differentiations developing (European – Easterner, Cypriot – Outsider) which may become dominant in the future.
2. Structural: Even though transitions and identity shifts are characterised by conflicts, we observed that a key characteristic of Cypriot experience has been a tendency for compromise. These compromises were often de facto realities rather than signed documents. Thus in the current context one should watch not only for the processes of negotiations and the clauses of UN plans, but also for the empirical, everyday, de facto realities which are taking place. The very fact, for example, that G/Cs and T/Cs now move across the island relatively freely, and thus experience in their everyday lives the existence of two distinct cultural-political regions (thus unity but also autonomy in space), is an effective way of experiencing the spatial reality of a bizonal federation.
3. Systemic: Historically a lot of the internal Cypriot shifts in the cultural, economic and political spheres were/are contingent on the "contexts" (dynamics, structures, situations) surrounding the island. A key dimension, in this framework, has been/is its border status. In this context, it seems that apparatuses (and forms of identity) which were under multiple (internal and external) pressures/influences, tended to be more open.

Notes

1. Wallerstein, Immanuel (1989) The Modern World-System III. The Second Era of Great Expansion of the Capitalist World-Economy. San Diego, Academic Press, p. 129.
2. Kyrris, Costas (1984) 'Anatomia tou Othomanikou Kathestotos stin Kipro 1570-1878' in I Zoi stin Kipro IH – IΘ Eona. Lefkosia: Ekdosi Dimou Lefkosias.
3. The Linovamvaki were a social group/community among the lower classes which adhered to both religions (Islam and Christianity). Under the pressure of national polarisation it disappeared in the twentieth century.
4. Cited in Kyrris (1984). For a popular song preserved among T/Cs which praises the linovamvakos (according to Kyrris) rebel of 1833, Giaour Imam ("he hits, the Ottomans run to leave"), see: Hamza Irkad (1999) 'Ta Dimotika Trayoudia den lene Psemata' in Hate, No. 2, p. 49.
5. Katsiaounis, Rolandos. (1996) Labour, Society and Politics in Cyprus during the Second Half of the Nineteenth Century. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre.
6. Katsiaounis (1996), p. 30.
7. Katsiaounis (1996), pp. 31-33.
8. See Kyrris (1984) and Katsiaounis (1996) references to Cypriot popular poetry of the Ottoman Empire.
9. "Common language" refers to the Cypriot linguistic form which developed during Byzantine, Latin, and Ottoman times, and which may be said to belong to the "family of Greek languages/dialects" (for the use of the terms see endnote 44). It seems that this was the language used (or at least understood) by the majority of the locals. The example of the Muslims of Kilani discussed subsequently is indicative of the fact that this language was used by people beyond the boundaries of the Orthodox Christian community (See: Kyrris, Costas (1988) 'Ta "Mousoulmanika Sholia" stin Kipro meta to 1878 os Parayon Ethnoyeneseos tis Tourkokipriakis Kinotitos' in Entos ton Tihon, No. 37, pp. 18-19). There were also other local linguistic forms used by religious communities (the most significant historically was the language form used by Cypriot Muslims which may be said to belong to the "family of Turkish languages/dialects"), or regional forms such as the alleged linguistic form/code used in the region of Tilliria (katsouvellika) of which today we have only a few remnants in music/song. The relation (of use, interaction, but also of power) between the different linguistic forms on the island before the twentieth century needs to be studied in a comparative framework in order to comprehend the range of multiculturalism in Cyprus before the twentieth century and the subsequent process of nationalist homogenisation.
10. For an analysis of the conflict, see: Kitromilides, Paschalis (1989) 'Imagined Communities and the Origins of the National Question in the Balkans' in European History Quarterly, Vol. 19, No. 2, pp. 149-194.
11. At the beginning of the nineteenth century there were different factions competing for church leadership and at the lower levels of the church hierarchy, there were even figures like Ioanikios the monk, who was one of the leaders of the 1833 uprisings – alongside an Imam.

12. Katsiaounis (1996).
13. Attalides, Michalis (1986) ‘Ta Kommata stin Kipro’ in Kipriaka 1878-1955. Lefkosia, Ekdosi Dimou Lefkosias.
14. Its chief ideologue was a Greek national who came to Cyprus as a teacher, N. Katalanos.
15. Lymbourides, Achilleas (1985) Meletes yia tin Anglokratia stin Kipro. Nicosia. The written reports were published by the opponents of Teknopoulos. The issue was taken to the Holy Synod and after the supporters of the bishop of Kyrenia refused to dissociate themselves from the alleged preaching/rhetoric, the bishop of Kitium withdrew from the Synod.
16. There were negative comments in the press, but one should note this choice/decision (for a T/C mayor) precisely because this was also a period in which enosis nationalism was on the rise and it was already creating some tension among the two communities – in 1912 there were, limited still, bicommunal fights in the shadow of the Balkan wars. And there were reports about tensions related to the rise of the enosis movement from the 1890s.
17. A typical example was the fact that during the split/separation of soccer teams in the period 1948-1953, into two rival leagues, T/C teams continued to participate in the ‘official’ league which was controlled by the nationalists.
18. This “end” is interesting in itself. The modernisers/nationalists took power practically with the help of the colonial power. Despite their disagreements both the nationalists and the British functioned and acted within the logic of a modern institutional framework. The Patriarch, on the other hand, denounced the decision to let the Cypriots choose their archbishop by pointing to the dangers of this trend for the unity-under-the Patriarchy, of Orthodoxy/Romiosini. He pointed out, for example, the possibility of Arab demands for local control of the Orthodox Patriarchates in their area.
19. The shift is well represented in the change of positions of Katalanos. The broader framework was related to the clash in Greece between the modernising social forces which rallied around Venizelos and the defenders of the transitional model established in the nineteenth century around the institution of the monarchy.
20. According to Kitromilides the ideology of the Meyali Idea was developed in the 1840s in the newly formed Greek Kingdom as a form of compromise (invoking “national unity”) in the process of the construction of the Greek nation. This ideology shifted the internal identity conflicts of the Kingdom to its external arena – to the efforts to annex/liberate areas from the Ottomans which “belonged” to the imaginary community of the new Greco Christian nation. In this context the Meyali Idea functioned as a culturally colonial ideology.
21. Priests tended to be involved in secular politics and participate as candidates in the elections for the Legislative Council.
22. The Kyrenia camp remained a conservative bastion, even after the victory of Greek nationalism. It became the voice of the ultra conservatives (but in a Greco-Christian framework now) and fanatical anti-communists – till 1974. Its chief ideologue was P. Ioannides.

23. P. Liasides was one of the major poets who wrote in the Cypriot linguistic form. His work has been hailed by some critics as a form of native born futurism in its thematic concerns. Still the basic text with which he worked for a long time was the Bible – even if his work was beyond religious concerns. His references and codes were built on the concepts of the traditional world of Romiosini.
24. Attalides, Michael (1979) Cyprus Nationalism and International Politics. St. Martin's Press, New York. See, especially chapters four and six for the structural roots of the rise of the phenomenon of Cypriot consciousness, and the multiple and contextual meanings of the hegemonic discourse of enosis.
25. See, for example: Georgallides, S. G. (1978) A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926, With a Survey on the Foundations of British Rule. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre.
26. Wallerstein (1989), pp. 129-130.
27. Indications of the radicalisation on the Right were the nationalist slogans which characterised the uprising of 1931. In itself the uprising started over a dispute between the Governor and the Legislative Council, but it exploded "out of control" when the "masses" joined the initially civil protests of the elite.
28. Ziartides, Andreas (1993) Horis Fovo ke Pathos. Nicosia.
29. Mahlouzarides, Panayiotis (1985) Kipros 1940-1960, Imeroloyio ton Exelixeo. Nicosia, Cyprus, pp. 5-6. Mahlouzarides cites a Reuters' report and local newspaper articles – at the end he notes that the newspaper Eleftheria has been his main source.
30. Mavratsas' work focuses primarily on the 1990s, but as a framework it can be applied from earlier on. See: Mavratsas, Caesar (1998) Opsis tou Ellinikou Ethnikismou stin Kipro. Athens, Katarti, p. 172.
31. When the illegal circles of the communist party and some of their allies organised AKEL as a legal party in 1941, the general line of the Left shifted from independence into an acceptance of "self-determination" which implied enosis. In part this was an effort to create the openings for popular unity/laiki enotita. But on another level, of course, the Left was functioning in a context already determined/shaped by the imported national identities.
32. For a study of the shifts in emphasis on Greece, Cyprus and enosis in the rhetoric of the Left, see the study of the speeches of A. Adamantos: Panayiotou, Andreas (2001) 'I Dimosia Ekfrasi tou Kiprokentrismou tin Dekaetia tou 1940'. Ex Iparhis, No. 27-28.
33. In a rhetorical move the Left suggested to the Right in 1947 to abstain from consultations with the British, if the Right agreed to a call for resignation of its leaders/members from their appointed posts in the colonial apparatuses.
34. See Attalides (1979).
35. For a discussion of the concept see chapter 6 in the unpublished thesis: Panayiotou, Andreas (1999) Island Radicals: The Emergence and Consolidation of the Cypriot Left. University of California, Santa Cruz.
36. Roth, Guenther (1963) The Social Democrats in Imperial Germany: A Study in Working Class Isolation and National Integration. New Jersey, Totowa.

37. For a good analysis of the conflicts and their results, as well as extensive references to the climate created by the newspapers of the period, see: Katsiaounis, Rolandos (2000) I Diaskeptiki, 1946-1948. Nicosia, Cyprus Research Centre.
38. In his memoirs Ziartides (1993) had critical comments on Papadopoulos' views and perceptions on the Cyprus problem and the T/Cs. Yet he also acknowledged the "close relation" of the then Minister of Labour and the leftist unions.
39. This framework which appeared as soon as the British arrived, had been very strong (especially for the Cypriot elites – nationalist or not) until the 1920s. The uprising of 1931 revealed the underlying rifts, but still many of the leaders of the Right remained until the 1950s exponents of the thesis that the "national issue" could be resolved within the confines of the alleged geopolitical "friendship". A typical case was T. Dervis, the leader of the right wing party KEK which was the main rival of AKEL in the municipal elections of the 1940s-1950s.
40. The British were very clear on this when they declared AKEL and other leftist organisations illegal in 1955. According to the colonial announcement the leftists were the ones who started the subversion of law and order.
41. Panayiotou, Andreas (2005) 'Sinoriakes Empiries: Erminevontas ton Patriotismo tis Kipriakis Aristeras' in Trimikliniotis, N. (ed.), To Portokali tis Kiprou. Athina, Katarti.
42. Makarios continued to be both archbishop and president, but his practice showed a steady emphasis on the political/state role rather than the church/religious one. In this context modernisation continued, and the church as a space was respected but was also losing ground to other apparatuses.
43. The terms "language" and "dialect" are used concurrently since this is a reference to discourses. For the linguistics of Greek nationalism, the Cypriot linguistic form is a dialect. Yet, it might be considered a language (albeit without a state backing it) if one compares it with other linguistic forms (of Slavic, Scandinavian, or Germanic languages) which might have passed or were considered as "dialects", but have become accepted (after being adopted by a state) as "languages". The view that the Cypriot language is threatening "panhellenic"/kini Greek, has been articulated by Menelaos Christodoulou. See: Christodoulou, Menelaos (1993) 'I Simerini Fasis tis Ellinikis Ylossis en Kipro' in Ellados Fthoggon Heousa. Nicosia.
44. This logic of linguistic "pollution" and the need of "cleaning" has been a key dimension behind the effort to change the local, regional names/toponimia in maps. The issue indeed caused a major uproar in the early 1990s when the cleaning campaign reached the names of the municipalities in the Nicosia area (Latsia, Ayladjia).
45. Gellner, Ernst (1983) Nations and Nationalism. Ithaca, Cornell University Press.
46. For that possibility see: Panayiotou, Andreas (2001) 'I Katastoli tis Dinatotitas Emfanisis Kipriakou Ethnous ton 19o Eona'. Ex Iparhis, No. 22-23.
47. For a study indicating analogous shifts among the most well known leftist poets, Anthias and Pierides, see: Peonides, Panikos (1981) 'T. Pierides – T. Anthias, I Kipros sto Eryo ton dio Piiton' in Tomes se Themata Loyou. Cyprus.
48. The poem was made into a song during the 1990s and it has become especially popular in leftist cultural, political gatherings.

49. The name of the poem and its last verse are se ynorizo ayapi (I recognise you love) in juxtaposition to the opening verses of the Greek National Anthem se ynorizo apo tin kopsi tou spathiou (I recognise you from the cutting/blade of the sword).
50. The most well known liberal position had been expressed by Lanitis: see, Attalides (1979).
51. Papadopoulos, Theodore (1964) I Krisis tis Kipriakis Sinidiseos. Nicosia.
52. A typical example was/is the difference between primary and secondary education. In secondary education the church managed to retain power, while in primary schools British control created a different set of emphases and criteria. See: Persianis, K. Panayiotis (1978) Church and State in Cyprus Education. Nicosia. And: Polydorou, P. Andreas (1995) I Anaptixi tis Dimotikis Ekpedefsis stin Kipro 1830-1994. Nicosia.
53. The church in the nineteenth century, as an institution of Romiosini, was involved in issues related to the curriculum. See, for example, Katsiaounis' (1996) discussion of the new modern/scientific curriculum introduced by Katalanos (one of the seminal leaders of Greek nationalism) in opposition to the traditional one favoured by the church.
54. Polydorou (1995).
55. Supporters of Venizelos in the broader politics of the imaginary community of Hellenism.
56. Y. Hadjipavlou started as a primary school teacher and subsequently studied Law and he became a lawyer. He was editor of the magazine/journal Ayoyi of the "Pancyprian Teachers' Association" in the early 1920s. He was also the "founder" of a workers' club, Paneryatikos.
57. And the presence of the bishop of Paphos, Leontios, as the acting archbishop, did not help the conservatives either. Leontios kept the lines of communication with the Left open.
58. Loizos, Peter (1986) 'Allayes stin Domi tis Kinonias' in Kipriaka 1878-1955. Lefkosia, Ekdosi Dimou Lekosias.
59. See Katsiaounis (1996) for the calls from the ultra conservatives for a broader "clean up".
60. The officially declared goal was to watch British efforts, but the church was, in that context, establishing its hegemony in broader terms – and in relation to its internal opponents, the leftists. In 1950, for example, six students were expelled "for ever" from the Pancyprian Gymnasium because they were leftists – and the damning evidence was leaflets and books, some of them of poetry. The headmaster of the school was the subsequent Minister of Education, C. Spiridakis.
61. In the urban mobilisations of the period 1955-1959, even if semi-legal, the Left held the upper hand through the organisations of the trade unions (which remained legal). Pro-EOKA demonstrations in the cities were organised by high school students – and as Grivas' diary reveals, this was a planned strategy.
62. It can be seen as a conflict between the "popular Right" (at times associated with the discourses of the extreme right wing) and the elite or middle class wing of Right (which tended to be more liberal). Loizos, in describing this conflict, refers to the critiques of Sampson against Clerides in the elections of 1970.

63. Loizos, Peter (1974) ‘The Progress of Greek Nationalism in Cyprus: 1878-1970’ in Choice and Change: Essays in Honour of Lucy Maier. London, Athlone.
64. Papadakis, Yiannis (1995) ‘20 Hronia Meta Apo Ti? I Pollapli Noimatodotisi tou 1974’ in Peristianis, Tsangaras (ed.) Anatomia Mias Metamorfosis. Nicosia, Intercollege Press.
65. Christofides, Andreas (1993) ‘I Ylossa sta Mesa Mazikis Enimeroseos’ in Ellados Fthoggon Heousa. Nicosia.