RECONCILIATION AND SOCIAL ACTION IN CYPRUS: CITIZENS' INERTIA AND THE PROTRACTED STATE OF LIMBO

Nicos Trimikliniotis*

Abstract

This paper will attempt to chart a normative framework for action for a social politics of reconciliation via a course for citizens' action across the ethnic divide of Cyprus. It will attempt to consider the context and content of reconciliation in Cyprus at this time and examine the various 'routes' to reconciliation, in terms of locating their theoretical, philosophical and ethical points of reference. Whilst 'reconciliation' is something that normally takes place after a settlement, the groundwork (conceptual, political and societal) needs to begin whenever the potential is there: the protracted state of limbo that characterises the Cyprus problem as well as the opening of the checkpoints in April 2003 make the ideas of rapprochement, reconciliation and cooperation realisable en mass immediately. Also, the idea of 'anchoring' the reconciliation processes to the specific context of Cyprus is essential if the project is to survive, expand and be legitimised in the eyes of 'ordinary' people, institutions and political forces. The paper aims to locate the possible common threads that permeate the various 'routes'; whilst at the same time it locates the limits and boundaries of 'common' elements. Moreover, the paper attempts to 'demystify' and deconstruct the concept in terms of the potential for 'transformation' of this particular ethno-national conflict. In this, we need to appreciate (a) the multi-dimensionality of ethno-national conflict within class-divided societies which manifest themselves in tandem with other contestations and (b) evaluate the processes by which ideas about 'reconciliation' become hegemonic, the role of social forces and the state(s). The paper then examines the potential for action by citizens and examines the tension within the concepts of citizenship, community, ethnos/nation and any project of 'reconciliation'.

Introduction: The State We are In

The paper poses a series of questions which are best understood as 'aporias' to be addressed at the level of theory but above all at the level of praxis – as challenges for action to shake off citizens' inertia – that results from the uninspiring times we live in and the events we have witnessed of late. (a) Can we speak of reconciliation

before a 'solution' during the current impasse? (b) Can there be a 'common thread' between the religious and the non-religious agendas of 'reconciliation'? (c) Are there any 'new spaces' for action for citizens via social movements and initiatives, parallel to the usual political initiatives? (d) Can we speak of 'social politics' that will meet and challenge the 'ethno-communal' boundary to pave the way for a trans-ethnic and trans-communal politics of citizenship? (e) Can protest politics overcome the ethnic divide and meet the 'ethic of reconciliation' as Sitas (2004a, 2007) defines it, to transform the 'dialectic of intolerance' into a new climate of dialogue and understanding? (f) Can we go beyond Cypriot and 'European universalism' that is not to use "the rhetoric of power", as Wallerstein (2006) calls it, in order to reconstruct a 'Cypriot version of a "universal universalism" (Wallerstein, 2006) that is properly anchored in the local but sufficiently ecumenical, open, anti-racist and internationalist capable of uniting without subordinating?

Before we enter this debate this paper will first attempt to define the current post-Annan, post-accession era. When we are speaking about the potential for reconciliation, the definite point of rupture is 23 April 2003, when the first check point at Ledra Palace was opened. In fact the opening of the checkpoint crossings moved the experience of reconciliation to a different level, qualitatively and quantitatively speaking, from that of politically engineered and socially exclusive encounters, to something tangible, live and potentially a mass phenomenon with the promise of societal transformation (see Trimikliniotis, 2003b). Yet, following the referenda of April 2004 a strong sense of disappointment and disillusionment made reconciliation a difficult affair. We can begin to theorise this encounter by reference to an 'aleatory materialism' of an 'underground current'[1] in a 'glocalised' Cypriotic popular context. This paper attempts to consider the potential for reconciliation in the post-Annan and post-accession era, when the political climate of Cyprus seems to have temporarily 'stabilised' without a settlement in what we can refer to as an uneasy sense of 'unsettlement'. There is no immediate solution to the Cyprus problem in sight, but there are important changes taking place around us as witnessed in the contradictions, contestations and possible actor transformations that may well be precursors to regional and local transformations:

Firstly, in Turkey, the showdown between Erdogan's AKP and the Kemalist army is a crucial development for the future of Turkey's accession, its internal reform and of course the Cyprus problem. The rekindling of the 'Kurdish question' with the danger of Turkish army incursions in northern Iraq is fermenting a nationalistic climate in Turkey and strengthens the hand of the 'deep state' and the army in Ankara. However, this is an internal power-struggle that is causing unease in the region and its outcome will influence not only the geopolitical agenda but also the ideological and political forces in the region and beyond: Anagnostopolou's ambivalent assessment that Turkey is perhaps entering a stage of democratic

"coming of age" is an interpretation worth taking seriously.[2] In any case, the current EU ambivalence over Turkey's accession to the EU, especially after the election of Sarkozi in the French Presidency, is in turn creating more uncertainty and instability in Turkey and potentially may undermine the prospects for utilising the accession process to achieve progress in the Cyprus problem. This period can be perceived as a 'negative' time for reconciliation, rapprochement and reunification, because it puts matters on hold.

Secondly, we have what might be termed a sense of Cypriot 'Euro-disappointment' after the accession of a divided Cyprus to the EU:[3] neither of the two communities has managed to alter the 'power equilibrium' to its advantage at the expense of the other via the EU. In this sense the so-called "European solution" to the Cyprus problem, proposed as an alternative to the Annan plan, has proved to be a failure. The apparent break down of the Greek-Cypriot policies of diplomatic recognition games via protocol as well as the legalistic routes with masses of court action at Strasburg[4] is generating further disappointment. With a maximalist approach of trying to bury the Annan plan, the Greek-Cypriot side has isolated itself in the EU and managed to lose its European allies. It is no coincidence that by 2006 they resorted to the so-called 'Campari process': at best this is a mere technocratic management of a slow process of 'Twain-ization' of the unrecognised 'TRNC'. In turn the Turkish-Cypriot side, instead of charting a route towards rapprochement and reconciliation, and possibly having lost patience and thinking they can cash in on the 'Yes' vote, is engaged in a war of words and nerves, which frustrates and irritates ordinary Greek Cypriots by allowing for rapid economic development at the expense of Greek-Cypriot properties.

Thirdly, for the first time since the opening of the checkpoints we have evidence of certain negative predispositions creeping in on both sides, which is beginning to take a more racialised form. We have witnessed a racist attack on Turkish-Cypriot students at the English school in November 2006, plus other racist incidents, i.e. neo-Nazis such as EFEN, Chrysi Avgi and Grey Wolves marching on the streets of Nicosia. A continuation of the current impasse generates fodder for such phenomena. Nevertheless, there are also interesting initiatives of resistance to the nationalist/racist upsurge that cannot be ignored.[5]

Finally, the Greek-Cypriot elections in February 2008 are fuelling a new dynamism in politics in the south, as the 'underground contest' between the 'soft no' and 'hard no' (see Trimikliniotis, 2006a) has now manifested itself as a political rupture with the decision of AKEL to support Demitris Christofias as the candidate for the Left. The rank and file of the party have overwhelmingly backed their General Secretary rather than Tassos Papadopoulos and the insistence of DIKO and EDEK to support Papadopoulos to run for a second term has resulted in the dissolution of

the ruling alliance, which has governed since 2003. This is forging a new atmosphere in the debate on the future of Cyprus, in both the south and the north, irrespective of the final outcome (see Trimikliniotis, 2007c).

Can We Speak of Reconciliation During the Current Impasse?

The referendum results are correctly viewed as a blockage to any prospect for a settlement and, at least in the short term, they block any prospect for a societal reconciliation. As a direct vote of ordinary people who expressed their will, it was the overall majority who voted 'No' from the Greek-Cypriot community, irrespective of whether the Greek-Cypriot political leadership called upon the people to reject the plan, that made the qualitative dimension of the current impasse quite distinct from previous ones. This is one issue that should be fully appreciated by peace, reunification and reconciliation activists and actors.

The Cypriot situation is hardly 'ordinary': it is in fact best described in the terms of Agamben (2005) as a permanent 'state of exception' par excellence.[6] In this particular 'state of exception', the need to elaborate a 'civic' 'sociality' by active citizens or 'actizens' to initiate actions from below may well complement and kick-start a 'social politics of protest' as a normative tool-kit. Given that the impasse may last a long time, which means that partitionism is likely to become entrenched deeper by the day, it is suggested that there ought to be a 'rethink' of how to create conditions for the citizens of both communities to get together and draw on different traditions that may play a role in such action; to engage in serious dialogue as to what the goals of such action might be. 'Reconciliation' is the concept it should aim to examine and it should do so by considering a set of aporias as the potential, the content and the method of getting there.[7] Can we really speak of reconciliation before a solution? Can we speak of reconciliation in the current climate, when we are witnessing the forces of divergence and partition consolidating their grip on our societies? The answer is both conceptual and conjunctural. At a conceptual level we should consider the theorisation of processes and experiences from other countries and observe the lessons we can draw from them. At a conjunctural level, we need to analyse the current political situation in Cyprus to ascertain how a process of reconciliation is to be achieved, and we should thus begin with the latter.

The prolonged state of limbo; this 'protracted stalemate', 'phoney war' of an 'unsettled' situation is manifesting an atmosphere of unease. It seems so difficult and 'unique' after the results of the referenda in 2004. A 'check-mate' composed by a Greek-Cypriot 'No' and a Turkish-Cypriot 'Yes' blocks the future as we appear to be stuck in a time warp. We are often reminded of the referendum result, which appears to confirm our worst fears of the opposing 'visions' turned nightmares for both of the island's communities. The current impasse situation may not be a

'unique' Sartrean 'Hois Clos' (No Exit) as it first appears. We have been in this situation before. In fact Cyprus experienced a stalemate decades earlier. In 1987, in the days of the 1980s stalemate, the late Kutlu Adali, a Cypriot writer and journalist asked:

> "Is it possible to think of lasting peace in a divided country? ... Is it possible to arrive at lasting peace while [on] both sides of the country, each and every day, the flames of war are fanned by the seeds of destruction that are sowed because of national celebrations?"[8]

Adali had no problem answering without any hesitation in the affirmative. Today we pose the same question, albeit in a more differentiated international and regional environment. In this sense the debate has 'moved on'. We have a unique opportunity which was not available before, even though, as the various opinion surveys show,[9] there is general disappointment regarding the prospect of a settlement. This sounds paradoxical as one would assume that if there is hostility and scepticism about the prospects of solution, there is logically hostility towards 'reconciliation' which can be interpreted as 'reconciling oneself with partitionism and the legitimation of the barbed wire'. However, this does not seem to be the case. A number of indicators as well as very different types of studies to be discussed indicate that whilst there is an increase in the sense of insecurity and 'phobia' within both communities and a 'hardening' of opinion as to the chance of a solution in the near future, one of the few areas where there is clear support, is for reconciliation. We can observe a kind of 'soul-searching' emerging; a rethinking and reflexivity over the prospect of a reconciliation commission to be set up and a need to revise the way the two sides evaluate the past. In support of this, this paper refers to research findings as to why Cypriots at this particular point of impasse seek reconciliation when there is no immediate prospect of the solution essential for any meaningful reconciliatory process to take place.

A study directed by Ari Sitas on the prospects of reconciliation, co-existence and forgiveness in Cyprus illustrates this point (see Sitas and Latif, 2007). The study was conducted in 2005-2006 with qualitative and quantifiable themes consolidated into an open-ended and exploratory research schedule. It involved in-depth interviews which focused on the experiences, historical and contemporary, of two generations – 50 year olds who were in the prime of their youth in the early 1970s and their "children" who were born after 1974.[10] Based on observations the only 'hard variables' that were found to be significant were class/stratification; ethnicity; gender; age; religion and refugee-status. In terms of the 'softer' and 'experiential variables' – what seemed very significant were consumption of cultural, media-linked and symbolic goods; educational experiences; civic involvement; contact with and exposure to cultural 'others' and traumatic experiences of war and

violence. The study argues that the distinction between 'hard' and 'soft' variables is important in sociological work. The 'hard' variables denote those situations that people can do very little about, i.e. they are born in or are defined by them. The 'soft' variables are experiential and involve degrees of choice, personality and social character. As for the prospect of reconciliation now, they find that:

> "There is a strong opinion that the status quo is preferable. To this can be added the opinion that the consequence of the An[n]an Plan's referendum is the cementing of the status quo and therefore, of "closure." This is not the majority opinion on either side of the divide. Most G/C and T/C especially those who have been affected directly by the harsh years, think that there are "openings" and that there are cracks in the cement of the current status quo. There are six:
>
> a.   that substantive dialogue is possible between members and institutions and associations of civil society;
> b.   there is an open-ness to some form of co-existence;
> c.   there is an open-ness towards forgiving;
> d.   there is a convergence about social norms;
> e.   there is an open-ness to more economic co-operation;
> f.   there is an open-ness towards a solution."

However on the crucial question of 'how soon?', their answer is rather pessimistic:

> "Unfortunately, not very soon: there are serious concerns about security. Somehow, the status quo also does not seem to offer security but its abandonment is wracked by fears. Both women and youth tend to be less convinced about prospects. As long as women feel more insecure than men and as long as the youth is not committed to change, problems will arise in any process of changing. […]
> Any fast move at the same time will leave behind what is an inalienable insecurity: the insecurity of women on both sides of the divide, the primary home-makers and pillars of both societies. They are the most insecure on all aspects: from reconciliation, co-existence (especially so, on this crucial dimension) and forgiveness. It would also leave behind the most vulnerable sections of the existing working-class."

Another study conducted by social psychologists from the University of Cyprus, Panayiotis Stavrinides, Stelios Georgiou, and Katerina Christou (forthcoming) aimed to identify the fears and hopes that the people of the two Cypriot communities have towards coexistence and to examine their fears and hopes in relation to other social/psychological factors such as ideology, and national identity and demographic variables (gender, education, income).[11] The results of this study

show, as expected, that Greek Cypriots are more fearful and less hopeful towards coexistence as they seem less accommodating toward the idea of coexistence. Higher fears and lower hopes create a rather complex picture which needs to be understood. They pose a set of crucial questions which open up the debate around the question of reconciliation:

> "What are the causal mechanisms of fears and hopes? Are they the result of personal and collective experiences? Our study shows a linear relationship between fears and hopes with age. That is, the older generations, with more out-group contact (prior to 1974 events) tend to be less fearful and more hopeful. This finding particularly is consistent with contact hypothesis (…) which suggests that the more the contact with the out-group the less the stereotypical approach takes place. Social and contextual parameters are also related to fears and hopes."

They proceed to rationalise what their results illustrate and concur with the findings of Sitas and Latif (2007) to the extent that they also establish the explanatory links between the 'hard variables' (structures and institutions of society, ideology, class, religion etc.) to the 'soft ones' (contact etc). Moreover, their findings show that the need for reconciliation groundwork is essential if we are to move forward. In general people need to rise above their 'fears' in order to feel confident to take up the constructive risk of co-existence within a common federal state – particularly for those on the Right or the nationalist camps:

> "Traditionally right-wing ideology is associated with nationalism and chauvinism. In our case, in both communities, this assumption seems also to be valid. People who identify themselves with right-wing politics tend to be more fearful and less hopeful. … nationalism and conservatism are more likely to be indicators of a support for stagnation and the status quo rather than taking the risk of creating a common state and sharing power, geography and institutions. It is, therefore, likely to be the case that these people project to the out-group feelings that might not actually be real, but rather serve as rationalising their stand why things should not change."

Finally, survey research that has been conducted since 2004 reveals strong indications that Cypriots are deeply concerned about the absence of a solution[12] and there is significant support for being critical and reflective on issues regarding the past and inter-communal killings. In an interesting survey, Lordos and Faiz (2005) with a sample of 1,000 persons from each community, discovered that more than 63 per cent of Greek-Cypriot and over 73 per cent of Turkish-Cypriot interviewees support the immediate forming and operation of a common Reconciliation Commission to record the common history of the Cyprus problem including the ethnic crimes committed during the past fifty years.[13] This may appear

a somewhat surprising finding given that there is a hardening of general opinion to the prospect of an overall solution.[14]

The overall conclusion is that there is something about the particularity of the Cypriot context which requires that we look beyond the general schemas, i.e. 'first solution, then reconciliation' to consider how we utilise the unique situation we are in, where there has not been any serious inter-communal violence for some years. There is an opportunity for meeting and exchanging ideas and experiences but there is still no solution. Cypriot society on both sides of the divide seem ready to begin the long and painful process that requires a serious dialogue regarding the terms of the debate, the means and ends and how far it can be advanced given the current indefinite state of limbo.

Locked in a De facto Partition:
An Impasse Riddled with Contradictions but with Potential for Groundwork for Reconciliation

In light of the above this paper sketches some basic considerations that should serve as the foundation for building the arguments on how to 'route' and 'anchor' the Cypriot road to reconciliation in its own traditions and socio-political and economic realities.

The opening of the checkpoints in 2003 allows us to meet, albeit in a controlled manner. Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots meet, exchange ideas, struggle, date, interact; many even work together. After the initial hype of the opening first days of the sealed borders since 1974, as well as the shock of the Referendum results in 2004, we now need to establish some sort of 'balanced' approach to the relations between the two communities (see Trimikliniotis, 2003a, 2003b, 2006a) so that Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots may begin to "see each other more clearly", as Loizos (1998) analysed.

Following the Greek-Cypriot 'No' and the Turkish-Cypriot 'Yes', and its aftermath, we may finally be able to shake off our idealised view, the mystical view for some and the demonised view for others. We may begin to rid ourselves of the distorted view of each other; we may view each other beyond the 'ethnic lenses'. The opening of the crossings contributed to the replacement of totalising discourses about the 'other' by individualising discourses.[15] In any case, there are no angels; all sides have made past mistakes; some committed crimes and atrocities; but no community can claim to have 'clean hands'. It is time to de-communalise and 'disaggregate collective victimhood' as David Officer aptly reminded us'.[16] In this context there is a strong case for engaging in a meaningful dialogue to properly understand one another and permit a sense of reconciliation that is appropriate to

our environment. This is not an easy process as social subjects often organise their collective existence and justify their political perceptions precisely 'around loss and sorrow', which are powerful conservative forces instead of leaving these behind. There is an effort 'to energetically retain the reasons which perpetuate these or even reinvent new ones as they fantasise that only in this way they can justify their existence' (Gavriilides, 2006). In Cyprus, 'memory' is organised and subordinated to the 'national cause' of the two opposing dominant nationalisms. Even the tragic and universally recognised issue of the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot missing persons has been used and abused by the two sides in a praxis of political 'mnisikanein', as Paul Sant Cassia (2005) has brilliantly shown: 'mnisikanein' is the Greek word for the practice of not letting go of the evil suffering of one's past and it is associated with a craving for revenge.

Memory, however, is politically organised. The role of the state via education attempts to organise memory according to its own interests and political expedience (see Hobsbawm and Ranger, 1990; Hobsbawm, 1990): hence the myth of the 'golden age' of 'peaceful coexistence' (see Kyrris, 1980). Interestingly even some 'Cypriotists' who are admittedly a fluid and complex group,[17] construct their own memory of the past that emphasises harmony and peaceful coexistence, while it understates conflict. Whatever conflict remains admissible is attributed to foreign agency, leaving little room for taking responsibility for the past. This is the case particularly among Greek-Cypriot nationalists.

'Europe', this rather strange 'polity-creature', provides us with both an opportunity and a challenge – a danger even. Its very ambiguity in essence contains the traditions of global oppressor (Europe's colonial past; imperial role; racism and wars; and capitalistic nature) as well as the liberation ideals (labour struggles, democracy, human rights, multi-cultural traditions, emancipatory ideals and solidarity). How do we position ourselves and how do we create the spaces for a 'common belonging' that is open to both Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike? Moreover, how can a European Cypriot space be open to the non-Cypriot 'Other' in a way that is in-line with a non-racist, trans-ethnic and trans-national vision for the future? The presence of over 100,000 non-Cypriots, who work on the island cannot be ignored.

Nevertheless, it should be recognised that the complexity of the Cyprus conflict requires an appraisal of the various dimensions of a multi-dimensional problem. To speak of 'reconciliation' also requires a holistic approach at a diplomatic and political level as well as at an institutional and societal level. To speak of reconciliation from the point of view of citizens, which is the prime task of this paper, requires an awareness of other dimensions and approaches to the resolution of the problem. As analysed elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2000b), the Cyprus problem

cannot be detached from the wider international issues that surround it; these issues form an integral part of the problem itself. It is precisely due to this reason that many sound analysts plus the majority of Cypriot political actors perceive the role of the 'international factor' to be crucial to the resolution of the problem (Attalides, 1979; Hitchens, 1997). The Cold War was a prime determining force in the fortunes of the people of Cyprus, as is the re-configured 'order' since. The involvement of the UN goes back to 1964 with the formation of UNFICYP (United Nations Force of Cyprus). The problem did not start in 1963, as projected in the Turkish-Cypriot official view, nor did it start in 1974, as perpetuated by the Greek-Cypriot official view – it was present with the emergence of the Cyprus Republic in 1960 and it passed through various phases and escalations.

Often the role of the 'international political actors' is invoked in Cypriot political discourse in different shapes such as 'foreign powers', 'the powerful of this world', and 'imperialism'. Views on the 'nature' of the problem vary. Two extreme positions are taken by those who perceive it solely as an 'ethnic conflict' between the two communities; and those who view it as an international conflict and consider the ethnic dimension as more or less a diversion from 'the real' issue. It has been correctly pointed out that the conflict in Cyprus cannot simply be seen as externally imposed nor is it merely a 'generic ethnic antagonism' (Anthias, 1987, pp. 187-188). The conflict is one of multiple levels.[18]

To understand the Cyprus problem involves the examination of some 'internal' dynamics and processes, such as class, ethnicity, power, and nationalism as well as 'external' (or adjacent) to the Cypriot State, such as international treaties, laws, interventions from other countries, in particular Greece, Turkey, Britain and NATO, which is under US hegemony; regional and world politics. The division between 'internal' and 'external' should never be viewed as rigid or as neatly demarcating these processes in reality. Attalides' study from the point of view of 'nationalism and international politics' provides a complex approach to the study of the problem(s) of Cyprus (Attalides, 1979), indeed "… the Cyprus problem represents a classic example of the interplay of domestic and international politics".[19] The Cyprus problem then ought not to be perceived merely as a problem of irredentisms; we ought to understand it as a rather multi-faceted and multi-layered conflict, which encapsulates – especially since 1974 – a dispute among national States, as well as an 'ethnic conflict', in the 'nation-state dialectic' of Cyprus.

What are the implications of the above for 'reconciliation'? The very notion of 'reconciliation' must be properly adapted to the wider notion of attempting to overcome, and transcend the Cyprus problem. Reconciliation should thus be seen as an essential and integral part of the resolution, i.e. processes whereby the transformation of the conflict can occur, in which the driving force and defining

characteristics engender institutional and societal changes in attitudes, perceptions, and praxis.

The question of 'timing', i.e. whether it is possible to only speak of reconciliation in the narrow sense of a 'Commission for Truth and Reconciliation' (like the South African TRC) or the wider sense which takes a longer-term approach to social, cultural, psychological and political processes of reconciliation is crucial. However, there is a strong case for arguing that the processes ought to be discussed before a settlement, and initiatives should begin beforehand, but they can only be truly operational during and after a settlement.

We turn directly on the issue of reconciliation.

Which Truth? What Truth and Reconciliation?

The term 'reconciliation' became relevant to Cyprus via the Annan plan proposal for a Reconciliation Commission. Moreover, the interesting exchange in a public lecture by Aris Sitas (2004a) and Djelal Kadir (2004) soon after the referenda served as an introduction in the public discourse of the concepts of reconciliation in Cyprus. As a continuation of that debate it was proposed in a paper that the issue of truth and reconciliation in Cyprus ought to be approached in a way that draws upon both the international as well as the local struggles and traditions, in an effort to critically integrate the knowledge and experiences and allow for reflectivity.[20] The attempt was to briefly sketch the means, goals and ultimate objectives in a manner that is open-ended and non-exhaustive to contribute towards a debate on a subject that has not received due attention.[21] The paper drew upon some of the debates over the South African 'Truth and Reconciliation Commission' (TRC) (see Asmal et. al., 1997; Gibson, 2004; Bronkhort, 1995) and elsewhere, where 'truth commissions' have been developed (Hayner, 2001) in order to locate a number of issues that are relevant in the case of Cyprus. The central concepts employed were those of 'anchoring', 'rooting' and 'embedding' issues to Cypriot traditions. The paper attempted to think through the initiative and referred to a number of preconditions for consideration, if the Cyprus 'Reconciliation Commission' is to succeed. Article 11 of the Foundational Agreement of the UN Plan refers to the creation of a 'Reconciliation Commission' that would be 'independent' and 'unbiased' and whose mandate would be 'to promote understanding, tolerance and mutual respect between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots'. It proposed a civic initiative that would lead to the logic of a Reconciliation process 'from below': the social foundations upon which such initiative would rest, if and when it could be launched. Three issues were raised:

- First, it is necessary to initiate an open democratic debate between and across, within and beyond the communities without 'fear' and prohibitions:

A debate whose terms will be set by a common will for 'reconciliation'. 'Truth', or anything nearing this very difficult and vastly loaded term, can only emerge if we have the eyes and ears to accept it and comfort it. Society must be ready for it; of course such a process cannot and will not engage everyone, certainly not everyone positively; there are likely to be reactions, denunciations and condemnation of such initiatives. It is crucial to bear in mind the fundamental ambiguity and contestation of the notion of 'truth', a debate that dates back to the arguments between Socrates and the Sophists about whether there can be 'objective truth'.

- Second, the Cyprus 'reconciliation' process must draw on international experience and accumulated knowledge by adapting the procedures processes and institutional frameworks to our own experiences in our own context. This ought not to be a mechanistic or dogmatic 'copy' but should elaborate and build upon the spirit, not the 'letter' of other experiences without fear. We need to engage with others, learn from civil society involvement abroad, and engage with peace activists, intellectuals and experts from Greece, Turkey[22] and from every corner of the globe.

- Third, it is necessary to appreciate both (i) the institutions, processes, aims, successes and failures as well the historical contexts that shaped such initiatives elsewhere – from Chile to South Africa, and (ii) our specificities, our own context – which is no easy matter. The Cyprus problem is 'known' by Cypriots from their day of birth almost. They should engage with each other to be able to critically perceive it from different points of view, from different perspectives and properly compare it with other historical parallels. The author insists on anchoring it to personal experience because the project must acquire its own legitimacy to be successful. The Cyprus problem arouses a multi-layered and multi-dimensional effect on people and it is used and abused on a regular basis for different purposes (see Trimikliniotis, 2003a, 2005a, 2005b).

With regard to the question of 'anchoring' reconciliation to the Cypriot context, three historical traditions for peace action and reconciliation refer to:[23]

- First and foremost, the historical common struggles of the Labour movement, which was named rapprochement. This by far contains the most powerful human memories and real social ties that keep the 'All-Trade Union Forum' going in spite of the centrifugal forces that want to pull it apart.

- Second, there is a tradition of cosmopolitan liberalism, which is rather weak, but nonetheless virtuous calls for tolerance and understanding emerged in Cyprus by 'Greek-Cypriot realists' in the 1960s after the inter-communal strife of 1963-1967 (see Attalides, 1979). This was connected to

popular beliefs of 'peaceful co-existence' and rural or village 'traditional life' (Trimikliniotis, 2000b).

- Third, there is a new tradition of new social movements and civil society organisations that emerged in the late 1980s and 1990s. These consist of social movements, women's groups, youth groups, students who studied abroad, conflict resolution groups, NGOs and 'activistic' initiatives. Finally, it is time for the social, economic, cultural, psychological as well as political foundations for the perceptions and practices of Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot society to be considered in post-referendum Cyprus. Only if we study properly the shifts of opinions and the kinds of issues that concern the 'communities' at a communal, social, class, age, gender and individual level will we be able to decipher the course of action that needs to be taken for the purpose of understanding and developing the cause of reconciliation further.

As discussed earlier such studies are beginning to emerge. An opinion poll that shows support for the setting up of a reconciliation commission (as provided in the Annan plan) appears enthusiastic to rethink the way history is taught in schools. Perhaps there is room for reflexivity, critical thinking and social action after all.[24]

Whose Reconciliation and What Kind of Reconciliation?

The concept of reconciliation itself is in question here. Essentially this is a political issue of strategic importance because it would determine the territory: What reconciliation? Whose reconciliation and between whom? Who is claiming the term and for what purpose?

In another context Anthias and Lloyd (2002) refer to the blurring of the boundaries between 'anti-racism', which had the connotations of 'vanguard action', of radical black activists, and 'multi-culturalism', which was viewed as the domain of 'soft' liberal perspectives. The contestation is about who claims what and how the projects are defined in combating racism in society. In a similar vein, the concept of 'reconciliation' in the context of Cyprus seems to be uncontested and equally disliked by both nationalists, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike. This is hardly surprising as their projects for ethnic purity are based on the denial of any space or belonging to the land of the 'Other'. It was possibly either ignored or frowned upon by the political Left for being 'too soft' or 'too liberal', or for failing to capture 'the imperialist dimension' of the Cyprus problem. Primarily, the Left appears to be disinterested in such concepts at this stage: reconciliation may seem like a 'diversion from the course of solution, as the Left has always referred to the need for rapprochement between the two communities'. It is thought that in the

context of Cyprus it is inappropriate because 'Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots get on well and it is foreign powers that divide us'; The hostility towards US models is well-known; it may be considered to be merely another American style 'conflict resolution gimmick' that fails to appreciate the essence of the Cyprus problem, relegating the problem to mere generic ethnic antagonism between two groups.

Interestingly, even more ecumenical intellectuals such as the Cypriot academic Djelal Kadir felt that the very concept which claimed that 'reconciliation' is a term 'historically and pragmatically inappropriate' for Cyprus because it was "appropriated by the Hellenised Cyprus Republic" to realise the Greek-Cypriot hegemonic project:

> "The command cohort of realpolitik on the Island of Cyprus has already compromised the term by making 'reconciliation' a sine qua non of any settlement. The current regime of the Hellenic Republic of Southern Cyprus insists on the whole island – north and south – RECONCILING itself to what they consider as certain historical realities, no matter [what] the legality or criminality of their genesis. This is at the heart of the obsession of the regime in Southern Cyprus with jurisprudential technicalities and legal protocols. These are compensatory gestures for the regime's own questionable legality. RECONCILIATION, then, is a term that has been appropriated and corrupted by one of the interested parties to the conflict."[25]

Having rejected reconciliation altogether, Kadir proposes as an alternative 'co-existence, distributive justice and co-governance' and engages in an interesting critique of Sitas' paper (2004a; 2004b; 2007).

This paper is of the view that the reasons given for opposing reconciliation are precisely the reasons why reconciliation is essential, and it is crucial to begin talking in these terms as a matter of urgency. Also the alternative concepts, which define a space, a discourse, an ideological formation, and an historical praxis cannot fully capture the very essence of reconciliation. As for the term co-existence, it strikes as odd that Kadir would prefer the term 'co-existence' without any 'reconciling' of the past or the present relations. Co-existence could mean separate co-existence, almost with no interaction at all: a wall in the middle can achieve the minimum of 'co-existence'. It is no wonder that the term was invoked by separatists in the past. It is even more surprising, however, that this particular word be chosen given the fact that the term Peaceful Co-existence was the title of one of the best known clichés about the past relationship of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots.[26] This is not a claim to reify the past merely as a history of 'ethnic antagonism since time immemorial', hence operating as apologetics for the divisive status quo; nor that 'we lived happily without any problems in the past', with the obvious policy implication that we can (and indeed should) return to some 'mythical status quo ante' of

'peaceful co-existence'. The point is that Cypriots must actively engage with each other to define the terms and framework for taking responsibility about their common future.

'Conflict resolution' is a recent tradition in Cyprus. It has a respectable international scholarly literature on peace-building and theorising. In the Cyprus context, however, it prompts connotations of the experience at embassy workshops of, 'controlled environment', 'elite-based selectivity' or leadership activities that are viewed with implications by Cypriots. Moreover, its application to Cyprus has been poor and naïve (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a and 2000b). On the other hand, rapprochement, at least in its rather old formulaic and symbolic form, appears to have run its course. On certain occasions it may even appear to have reified its historical significance to almost becoming a kitsch term that relegates inter-communal relations, (i.e. real human relations with their 'ups' and 'downs') into some empty and frozen-in-time symbolic acts of superficial significance in the reality of open borders today. Rapprochement however, remains the major historic reference point that has flamed the operation of inter-communal solidarity as an educational and ideological antidote of ethno-communal irredentism, separatism and chauvinistic racism. Nothing can take that away as history is a major social force and living memories and education has produced identities of thousands of Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots alike, with their own martyrs, heroes and foes in what has for decades been the 'subaltern' history of Cyprus. The most significant section of society for the purposes of drawing support for peace and reunification comes from the historic Left, whose political and ideological education is ingrained with the notion of rapprochement and common struggles between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots, as mentioned above.

The argument of Sitas (2004a, 2007) is that reconciliation is essential for transformation of conflict, in transcending the 'ethno-communal' and 'ethno-national' divide. It is interesting to see the translation of the term in Greek. It is usually translated in two ways: either as συμφιλίωση, which is derived from συν [adjacent or connecting word] and φιλία [philia] which refers to the process of developing friendship, or as συνδιαλλαγή, which refers to a compromise or a point of 'rest'; a restoration of a friendly or harmonious relation; a return to calmness; even a coming to terms with something bad. The word is derived again from συν and διαλλαγή which means predisposition toward the spirit of compromising and consensus. The English verb to 'reconcile' refers to finding a mutually acceptable solution between two sides that were previously in conflict.

The view that "'truth' is a less pressing matter in the Cypriot context than it may be in parts of the world where wounds are more recent", whilst recognising the "need for closure for many who have lost loved ones and desire an accounting", is

controversial (see Kaymak in this volume). His argument that "the process of ascertaining reparations in the Cypriot context would prove divisive as the members of the respective communities would prefer a higher price for their particular grievances and the costs of such a process might prove too prohibitive for the economy" is something the author cannot agree with, although the case is cogent for stressing the 'reconciliation' element rather than the 'truth' element of the South African model. In other words, the investigation of the truth about the missing, tortured and murdered is not exhausted by the investigations of the 'Committee for the Missing Persons'. This is a wider process of an historical enquiry into the individuals, institutions, material forces processes and ideologies which produced and reproduced such criminal practices (See San Cassia, 2005). Nevertheless, this paper would still be inclined to stress the 'broader sense' of reconciliation that allows a society to properly 'move on', to 're-imagine a united Cyprus' and properly re-construct its Demos, to borrow Kaymak's terms (Kaymak, 2005). This should be done, however, when the past has been dealt with and without losing the country's 'historical consciousness' that is paramount to rebuild a 'peoplehood'. This brings us to questions raised by Ahmet Hidiroglou (2005, 2006) about the need to develop a pan-Cypriot language for understanding one another, as the essence of a multi-cultural identity in the movement of building a new Cyprus for all. This paper agrees that the 'Yes' in the referendum is not enough, and the 'No' is not eternal. History did not end on 25 April 2004 with the counting of the results, as some would like us to believe. We can and must learn from the past. Indeed we have no choice if we are serious about reconciliation, reunification and peace.

It is not merely what does this or that term or concept mean at the level of generality or abstraction, but how it is defined, refined, shaped and anchored in political and social praxis. Can reconciliation capture the 'popular imaginary' to become a force to be reckoned with and play the catalytic role that it promises? What political and social forces will engage in the negotiation and the contestation as to the content, meaning and form of the 'Cyprus reconciliation processes? What social forces (class, party, organisations, social or other movements and state intuitions) claim the concept? Depending on who claims it, the concept will be punctuated with the according orientation and content. So far, as we have demonstrated, no significant political force has 'claimed' it. This is why it is important to consider whether a civic initiative based on citizens' activism and peace protest may be able to 'take the lead' at least in these early stages. This hardly means 'defending the purity' and 'keeping it away' from politicians and political engagement in general. On the contrary, this civic initiative must engage all actors for peace in society. The first one that comes to mind is the trade union movement, with its inter-communal ties; the 'Platform this Country is Ours' in the north; youth and women's organisations; teachers and inter-communal intellectuals' etc. The political process will follow: how does one engage the state and civil society? This

highlights the issue of the debate, State vs. NGOs. It is the view of the author that the perception of the processes of citizens' action should be 'totally autonomous' and somehow be 'sealed away' as problematic from the political parties. The argument that there is always something 'benign' and 'noble' in the NGO sector is just as naïve and misleading as the statist perspective which demonises NGOs as some sort of US plot.[27] In fact there are NGOs and NGOs, as there are political parties, initiatives and individuals of different calibre, aims, philosophies and practice: in the same way that every political party is not fascistic, so every NGO is not an instrument of imperialism. The very concept of 'non-governmental organisation' expresses the non-specificity of this creature which is defined in negation or at least outside the Government (i.e. the State). It is a question of autonomy, a subject that Althusser (1969) discussed elaborately in his classic study of ideology in terms of 'relative autonomy' and elaborated further in the works of Poulantzas (1968, 1974, 1975 and 1980).[28] In any case, the point here is merely to touch upon a crucial issue that must be debated in the future as this is certainly a poor paradigm of the 'state', and as a result it is a very poor paradigm of the 'non-state actors' such as NGOs/CSOs (Civil Society Organisations), civic organisations and social movements.[29] We require a nuanced approach to 'civil society' that fully takes the particularities of each society into account (see Panayiotou, 1999, 2005; Constantinou, 2002, 2003a, 2003b; Trimikliniotis, 2003c, 2006a) if we are to be reflexive about social action for citizens in the direction of reconciliation. There is a significant civil society in Cyprus, albeit peculiar and subject to its own historical developments and structural constraints (see Panayiotou, 1999). The CIVICUS[30] study shows that as far as Greek-Cypriot society is concerned:

> "the structure of civil society is considered 'slightly weak',[31] […] the environment in which civil society is located was judged as 'relatively enabling'[32] and the extent to which civil society practices and promotes positive social values was considered 'relatively significant';[33] the impact of civil society on society at large was judged to be 'moderate'.[34]"

In fact one of the areas where there is great room for improvement is inter-communal action:

> "Bi-communal cooperation between Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, as well as citizen participation in bi-communal events, seems to be very limited, with 82 per cent of survey respondents saying that they had not participated in any kind of bi-communal activity during the last year. Furthermore, 57 per cent of civil society stakeholders who took part in a separate study said that less than 20 per cent of CSOs have participated in an activity jointly organised with a Turkish-Cypriot organisation. The few examples of bi-communal cooperation that do exist mostly involve cultural events, discussions, research, exhibitions and other similar events (Executive summary, p. 6)."

With reference to the structure of civil society in the Turkish-Cypriot community, the report notes that "apart from the huge mass demonstrations for and against the Annan Plan – civic participation in civil society remains limited." It further states that "whereas a significant proportion of Turkish Cypriots belong to a CSO or may have undertaken some form of non-partisan political action, volunteerism, especially within civil society organisations (CSOs), is fairly low." Participation in bi-communal events is reported to be "also low, although in this case the relative paucity of co-sponsored or organised events may be a contributing factor". The report continues:

> "Another challenge for a healthy structure of civil society is the exclusion of significant social groups such as minorities, poor people, and workers, if not 'settlers' from Turkey in CSOs. Women were equally represented in their level of involvement in CSOs; however, men predominantly hold leadership positions. During the time leading up to the referendum on the Annan Plan, support for the Plan was galvanised by ad hoc umbrella organisations. To the extent that these umbrella organisations exist, they have proven effective. A major inhibitor for the establishment of more formal umbrella organisations is legal constraints, since specific legal provisions for their establishment do not exist. Thus, aside from sports federations, which are numerous, such organisations are limited. Finally, inadequate levels of resources, be they financial, human or infrastructural, continue to hinder the development of civil society. Less problematic than usually assumed appears to be the environment in which civil society operates. Despite the presence of tens of thousands of troops from mainland Turkey, as well."

Civil society is intimately connected to the particular nation state formation in Cyprus and the question of nationalism. We are dealing with highly complex phenomena: nationalism takes different shapes and forms and manages to transform itself. The role of the media is crucial in the shaping of public opinion, and nationalist ideology is a major distorting force. Nationalism as a political ideology (Hobsbawm, 1990) and 'a theory of political legitimacy which requires that ethnic boundaries should not cut across political ones' (Gellner, 1983, p. 1) is a major force in history. Whether 'ethnic', 'civil' or 'cultural' nationalism is an exclusivist ideology, see Balibar (1991). Interestingly, in the 1960s, Greek-Cypriot nationalists treated the Cyprus constitution with disgust as the Greek-Cypriot nationalists did the Annan plan in 2004: the Annan plan, was demonised and exorcised like a foreign plot disaster intending to impose foreign interest on the will of the Cypriot people, i.e. the majority who are Greek Cypriots, ignoring the fact that the Turkish Cypriots are their equals (Christophorou, 2005). Of course the 1960s and 1970s are quite different from today's world, even if there are still powerful imperial forces around. The context is different but nationalism tends to totalise, and a-historicise, and makes all sorts of connections. After all, there is something of an inherent totalitarianism in any notion of 'the nation', be it the Greek or Turkish nation, or indeed the specific

'national communities' (Milios, 2007). Therefore, when discussing reconciliation in Cyprus we must be aware that even the 'new' or 'post-national' formation or 'multi-ethnic Cypriotness' may well generate its own exclusionary and totalitarian forces. Anthias and Yuval-Davis' (1983; 1992) formulation is highly relevant here: 'whenever there is a delineation of boundaries, forces of exclusion are set in motion'.

Reconciliation: A 'Novel' Politics of Protest?

Having considered some issues regarding the nature of Cypriot civil society in the context of a divided society, we turn to the question of trying to anchor or root reconciliation or however we term the societal process of dealing with the past and the future based on cooperation and understanding. The central issue when considering potential social politics of reconciliation as a civic initiative is to evaluate the role of mass organisations. The trails or marks of labour struggles and the political shadow of the 'other scene' are there and this is an issue that requires special reflection, without of course transforming it into a kind of sectarian labourist perspective in search of some misguided 'class purity'. When thinking about reconciliation we cannot ignore the class issues involved in terms of the orientation and the kind of commonalities being looked for. There are, of course, alternative routes to reconciliation, but to ignore the labour dimension is to eliminate a most powerful force, that has not fully exercised its power.

What is the role of 'ordinary people', as social actors, in order to arouse motivation in the reconciliation process in Cyprus? It is a theoretical response to a very practical question, an 'activistic' question that involves popular participation on an everyday basis, in promoting reconciliation as a novel 'politics of protest', to quote the peace activist Reuver Kaminer (1996). This allows for theoretical intervention, not as a 'deus ex machina' from one's 'Olympian throne', but more akin to 'organic intellectuals', to use Antonio Gramsci's conception (1972), whereby 'intellectuals' are identified as carriers and articulators of politics, within a movement, particularly for the 'subaltern' groups in building the 'counter hegemony'.

Any notion of 'politics of protest' is intimately connected to the question of citizenship and power; in other words how one understands citizenship and directs popular participation/action. Although this paper critically approaches with caution such notions as 'citizenship', particularly those conceptions that entail a sort of 'celebratory' tone, of the 'happy and bubbly culture' variety that assume that individuals are all totally free and equal, this paper instead advocates a notion of 'citizenship' that is reformulated to take into account the differentials in power, wealth, class, gender, race etc. When it comes to peace initiatives, particularly whereby 'the politics of protest' take the form of anti-nationalism and/or anti-

partitionism, the concept of 'Cypriot citizenship' is extremely fruitful or at least it can be. On a normative level what this paper suggests are anti-nationalist peace politics that contains certain key elements:

First, it is anti-nationalist – challenging the various kinds of stereotypes that were and still are produced from the divided and historically opposing allegiances to 'national projects', historically deriving from both 'Enosis' and 'Taksim'. The recent debates over 'the right to difference', multi-culturalism and the experience of European anti-racism are crucial points of reference. In the context of Cyprus it also signifies some sort of federal arrangement. But this is not enough.

Second, it builds on the notion of Cypriot independence, building on the historic legacy of anti-colonialism and anti-imperialism, drawing on 'third worldist' approaches on the one hand and the notion of 'popular sovereignty' on the other. This can act as a basis for unity between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Here it needs to open up even further to cover non-Cypriot migrants (see Trimikliniotis, 1999, 2007a).

The third pillar is connected to the social struggles and the notion of equality. The question of class, gender and power is connected to the struggle for a peaceful and united (federal) Cyprus. Historically, the labour struggles are a central reference point for the 'tradition' of peaceful coexistence, whereby class is able to transcend 'national' or 'ethnic barriers' (see Attalides, 1979; Katsiaounis, 2000). In any event from the 1970s it has been shown very convincingly that this has been the case. Anthias and Ayres (1978, 1983) have illustrated that:

> "… ethnicity can be seen to have the ability to articulate different ideological discourses and to represent different class political interests" (Anthias and Ayres, 1983, p. 65).

Some of these elements were articulated at times, and with varying degrees of success and consistency, in the case of Cyprus.[35] This is an aspect that shows the potential for linking the so-called 'ethnic' and/or 'national' to the social. Moreover, the argument of this paper takes a step further: class has the potential of bypassing or articulating beyond ethnic division. It thus offers a vision as well as the 'transformation programme' that is capable of articulating a new kind of politics with the capacity to mobilise people from both communities in order to achieve it. This was alluded to by many writers of the immediate post-1974 literature, but it was never taken up properly in terms of a protest politics (Kitromilides, 1977, 1979; Markides, 1977; Anthias and Ayres, 1978, 1983).

Meaning, Content, Essence:
Alternative Routes to Reconciliation

This paper contends that there are multiple paths to reconciliation and peace. The key is to attempt to coordinate the alternative traditions and not fuse or subordinate them into a single 'ideology', but to attempt to understand the position each one stems from. The importance of the Left is where the author springs from. This has been developed elsewhere (Trimikliniotis, 2000a, 2000b, 2006a). This paper will next try to engage with the theoretical, ethical and religious links of the subject.

It may be observed that there is something 'religious' in the ethical origins of reconciliation which atheists or agnostics may find questionable. However, the concept of reconciliation is embedded within every religion or non-religious, ethical, moral and philosophical outlook, albeit in different shapes, intensity, importance and centrality. In the same way that conflict and contest, historically speaking, is present in all structures of society, 'reconciliation' equally attempts to partially seek 'order' and calm in conflict situations. In this sense there are elements of it everywhere.

Christian Routes of Meeting the 'Other'

In Christian theology it seems the 'doctrine' of reconciliation is no peripheral matter. According to Karl Barth, it is via 'the work of reconciliation' that 'the covenant is fulfilled' and this is at 'the heart of the subject matter of Christian faith' (Barth, 2004, pp. 3-4). It is no coincidence that it was Desmond Tutu who became the personification of the TRC, insisting that 'God has a Dream' and whose vision is so deeply ingrained in Christian convictions (Tutu, 2004). In the case of Cyprus, the Orthodox version of the Christian doctrine has been taken up by the Bishop of Morphou. His preaching of love and reconciliation, peace and reunification has put him ahead of other church (and indeed political) leaders.

The notion of covenant can be traced back to the Old Testament as 'morally grounded pacts with God'. It served as the basis of the sixteenth century Protestant Reformation[36] right through to modern liberation theology, the 'civil rights movement' and Desmond Tutu's Christian 'Rainbow-ism'. The stress placed on individual responsibility, free will and equality before God is the basis of activism for peace, democracy, human rights and anti-oppression and anti-poverty. In Tutu's terms 'God has a Dream' – this serves as the basis for existence, a source of strength, inspiration and hope for the achievement of a better world: reconciliation is the route to the achievement of the divine Dream (Tutu, 2004).

The Orthodox Christian tradition is quite different from other Christian traditions. It is based on the communion of persons before God; there is no notion of 'the

individual' in the original Greek Canonical texts. The individual (άτομο) is a modern insertion that is derived from modern liberal and constitutional thought in the context of individual human rights. The biblical reference – apparently the person, (πρόσω-πο) hence the route to reconciliation – is necessarily a different one from that of Christian reformist denominations. 'Free will' is of course central to each person's route to Theosis (Θέωση), the union with God in a mystical sense, via his/her total devotion of serving the deeper essence of existence: serving the divine aims of Love (Αγάπη), totally and unconditionally. The emphasis, however, is on the personal relationship between (hu)Man and God as mediated through personal relations among persons in a communal arrangement, which are necessary but not enough to satisfy the kingdom of Heaven.[37]

The Bishop of Morphou, Neofytos, is undoubtedly the most articulate and forward-looking advocate of reconciliation, whose point of reference is the Orthodox Christian doctrine as interpreted by an ecumenical, multicultural and multi-faith perspective of tolerant and peaceful co-existence. Whenever possible, the Bishop loses no opportunity to preach on the need for reconciliation, co-existence, respect, tolerance and love for the 'Other' as the 'essence of Christianity': Nationalism is thus declared to be 'a sin'.[38] He calls upon priests and imams to 'become the bridges upon which Cypriots will reunite';[39] he invokes Apostle Paul, Ayios Ioannis the Theologian or Ayios Ioannis Sinaitis, as well as Jean-Paul Sartre and calls upon religious leaders to make 'the robe (cloth worn by clergy) into a flag of reconciliation, co-existence, peace and forgiveness';[40] he is in regular contact with local imams in the region of his Bishopric, as well as ordinary Turkish Cypriots, with whom he has developed an unprecedented rapport. The author has witnessed this on several occasions. Europe has become an important point of reference; however, the Bishop does not naively invoke uncritically some Europeanness as though it is an 'unqualified human good'. On the contrary, he articulates the case for an open multi-cultural and multi-faith Europe that Cypriots, Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots can and must join:

> "Europe, which at some point wanted to conquer the diversity of other people with the Crusades or Colonisation, has reached a point today that is attempting to [become] a group that overcomes national differences. It was mediated of course by a process that lasted for centuries and has passed from many negations which were painful, and many times, bloody.
>
> After two world wars, after Fascism and Nazism, Europe today is attempting to build a unity that overcomes national differences and conflicts … All of this effort is governed by the idea that wants Europe to be a multi-cultural space … [where] different cultures, languages and attitudes, different religious beliefs co-exist …".[41]

He does not have any delusions about the current state of affairs and the gap between declarations and the harsh reality of everydayness across Europe:

> "Some could however consider that this still remains an idea, since in reality there are still national differences, as well as phenomena such as xenophobia, racism and discrimination against minorities.
>
> Such a critique is indeed valid. However what is important is that the European Union has formed a framework of principles, of values. It has a clear aim: to achieve a synthesis via diversity. The extent to which this is achieved depends, to a large degree, on the maturity of the societies of Europe and the citizens themselves. For the implementation of these principles [it] is not only an issue of laws and regulations, but it is a matter of will, political maturity. And a matter of spiritual maturity, I would say".[42]

He does not hesitate to grapple with the most difficult issues such as immigration, including calling on acceptance of 'illegal' migrants, the settlers issue and even commends the positive aspects of the Ottoman Empire for being multi-faith and multi-cultural.

In Orthodox Christianity, the societal frame of reference is a small-scale community of worshippers where relations remain inter-personal and not a large-scale society made up of anonymous individuals. It is no accident that the Greek word for 'society' (koinonia) also means 'communion'. This fundamental difference in perception somehow coincides or at least brings to mind certain images of traditional communal society of the sociological distinction between societies that exhibit 'mechanical' as opposed to 'organic' solidarity (Durkheim), as well as the anthropological distinction between 'hot' and 'cold' societies (Levi-Strauss). Orthodox Christianity is a 'personalistic' and 'communalistic' religion.[43]

This paper refers extensively to the discourse of the Bishop of Morphou, the youngest and perhaps most charismatic of all bishops, in the Weberian sense, to indicate that matters are changing after all. For a bishop to be able to speak in these terms, even if he does appear a maverick among other conservative, nationalistic church leaders, he does mark a new beginning. We may be able to communicate with this church, even though some reservations are retained as to the role of religion on the subject.

The Inherent Difficulties of a Religious Agenda for Reconciliation in Cyprus

There are inherent difficulties when attempting to advance via the religious route in the case of Cyprus, although it would be a mistake to consider that the religious

agenda for peace is somehow inferior or less important. On the contrary, given the historical importance of the Cyprus Orthodox church as the main vehicle for Greek-Cypriot irredentist nationalism, it would be an important boost to peace if the Church plays a constructive role in promoting peace, reconciliation and reunification, rather than rally conservative forces to 'defend the nation from the non-believer or Muslim 'Other' – especially when the role of the church today is diminishing in essence.

In the case of Cyprus, the fact that religion symbolises a divisive point between the ethnic communities creates all sorts of problems in attempting reconciliation via a 'religious agenda' (Sitas, 2004a). Moreover, the fact that there is a strong secular tradition, even an anti-religious tradition in large sections of the population, and in particular in the Turkish-Cypriot community, whose vast majority are agnostics, non-believers or plain atheists, makes any 'religious agenda' for reconciliation inherently problematic. Additionally, the current international climate of Islamophobia of Western countries following the September 11/2001 attacks makes a 'religious agenda' for secular, and non-religious masses of Cypriots and, in particular, Turkish Cypriots (suspicious of any re-invented 'religious revival'), extremely perplexing but also inherently problematic. If such an agenda is to emerge, it ought to attempt to cross cut the religious/faith boundaries. Derrida's effort to call a singular point of reference for Judaism, Christianity and Islam resulted in the term 'Abrahamist' (Derrida, 2001, p. 22). Derrida's formula was to invent an experimental term that would cross the Christian-Judaism-Islam divide. Forgiveness is an essential element of reconciliation and hence Derrida's formula may be useful for religious and non-religious agendas alike. The 'Abrahamist' tradition is for Derrida (ibid., p. 28),

> "complex and differentiated even con[f]lictual – is at once singular and on the way to universalisation though where [there is a] certain theatre of 'forgiveness' puts in place or brings to light."

Reconciliation requires a 'theatre' of forgiveness, (i.e. a space for the public performance of forgiveness). We are far from having such a 'theatre' at this moment in Cyprus. But is it possible to speak of this 'tradition'? What about the religious-secular divide? The answer remains ambivalent and doubtful but one may be open to persuasion.

Citizens, Communities and Subjects:
Spaces for Reconciliation and Social Action

What is the potential for citizenship within the Cypriot context? 'Citizenship' has become a 'buzzword' in academic discourse over past years. Along with the shift away from 'structural' to the individual and the more personal aspects, it has come

to denote the potential, at least in theory, of the 'liberal dream', as first expressed in the French Revolution: 'Liberté, Equalité, Fraternité'. Furthermore, in the so-called 'post-modern' epoch of 'identity politics', it has come to express, in a somewhat transformed manner, the potential for popular participation within national, even supra-national structures, hence the notion of 'global citizen', 'European Citizen' etc. There are, however, inherent tensions within the concept and context it operates that cannot be ignored. Nonetheless, this paper will subsequently argue that once subjected to a critique of its underlying (liberal) assumptions, the concept of citizenship has a radical potential that could and should encapsulate the notion of the 'social' potential. Taking into account the wider conflicts, on the basis of class, ethnicity and gender, the concept is a useful tool in the 'transformation', rather than 'resolution' of ethnic conflict and overcoming the ethnic/national barriers that may exist in society. The example of Cyprus illustrates the above, as the 'production' of an ethnically divided Cypriot citizen served to reinforce and perpetuate the conflict over the Cyprus Republic. In the context of trying to re-unite Cyprus on a federal basis, the concept of 'citizenship' is of pivotal importance. Citizenship can play a key role in demolishing the barriers erected over the years of conflict. While the processes of 'globalisation' and 'Europeanization' are taking place, it allows for differences, respect and tolerance; simultaneously drawing on all those that unite, in the wider context of the social struggles for equality, development, popular participation and the process of 'democratisation' in society.

It is possible to distinguish different Weberian 'ideal types' of citizenship that derive from different traditions and have different class politics (although they may well draw upon cross-class support). We schematize the two basic positions of the role of citizens, the liberal democratic model and the Marxist critique. The 'conservative' approach is part of the liberal-democratic model, but accepts the basic rules of the capitalist game/exploitative relations. Stuart Hall and David Held (1989, p. 175) usefully distinguish between what they call 'citizenship's three leading elements such as (a) membership, (b) rights and duties and (c) real and participatory rights'. The same writers' critiques of liberal notions of citizenship are as follows:

1. The extent to which individuals under capitalism are actually 'free' is highly questionable. It is the social conditions that shape the conditions within which one is able to exercise his or her 'freedom'.
2. The very definition of 'freedom' itself also defines how 'rights' are understood. The 'New Right', for example, is only concerned with defining the parameters of isolated individuals in market places and refuses to consider any concept of social rights. Or, on the other side, if we take another extreme example, we can see how the neo-fascist British National Party invokes in its political discourse the so-called 'rights for whites', but

>   the selectivity and one-sidedness of 'rights' is the subject of another paper (Trimikliniotis, 2007b).

3. On the one hand, negative definitions of citizenship show how illusory and irrelevant rights can be for most people and how, on the other hand, citizenship rights reflect the current state of affairs and the status quo in society.[44]

The above criticisms should not be taken to mean that the notion of citizenship should be rejected altogether. On the contrary, we are obliged to think and rethink the concept and extend it to make the concept fit the purpose of action – a politics of citizens' action that transcends the traditional middle-class underpinnings, is grounded in Cypriot experience and encompasses an all-embracing activist-based programme for inclusion and participatory democracy in the context of building the climate for peace and reconciliation and thus overcoming and countering the nationalistic hegemony in both communities.

Inevitably, the 'politics of reconciliation' is intrinsically related to collective and individual rights in the specific arrangements of polities. This issue was raised by Balibar (2002, p. 17) in a different context when referring to European citizenship and the proposal to adopt the 'European Constitution' across the EU:

> "The issue is to decide what kind of status and rights (civil, political and social) the inhabitants of this new political entity would individually and collectively enjoy".

The framework for Cyprus is the formula of bi-zonal, bi-communal federation and we know that it will be based on the UN plan (re-negotiated and fine-tuned in a manner that will address the concerns of both sides). We ought, however, to move beyond the diplomatic arena and begin to use imagination, something our society has not been used to doing in the past, as Kaymak (2005) aptly points out; the popular imaginary as well as 'sociological imagination' (to use Mills' expression) must go beyond the 'diplomatic straightjacket'. This is why we should attempt to deconstruct the notion of 'citizenship' and disconnect it from its 'communal' umbilical chord. The Cyprus context of subordinated Citizenship to 'Community' should at last be questioned, not in a way that satisfies neither hegemonic majoritarianism (i.e. the Greek-Cypriot nationalistic project that displaced Enosis),[45] nor ethno-communal unilateralism (i.e. the Turkish-Cypriot nationalistic project that displaced Taksim).[46]

We can begin to connect theoretically the relation between citizenship and community in the specific context of Cyprus. Balibar (2002, p. x) aptly points out that,

"'Community' and 'citizenship' have had a problematic relationship since the origins of political thought. (The Greeks had only one word to express the[s]e two aspects: politeia, whence we derive our 'politics' as well as our 'police'. But this meant that the contradictions were located within this single concept, and conferred on it an immediately 'dialectical' meaning.)"

An attempt to redefine both 'citizenship' and political 'community' is proposed: to make citizenship trans-communal as argued elsewhere (see Trimikliniotis, 2000a; 2003a, 2003b, 2005a) and create a notion of a 'social imaginary' (Castoriades, 1975, 1994) without an 'imagined community', i.e. articulating the idea in a manner that exceeds both ethno-communal 'Community' (as defined by the Cyprus Constitution) as well as national citizenship itself. These are not, however, straight-forward matters; they are by definition contradictory, transitional and ambiguous, but absolutely essential for social and political action. Balibar (2002, p. x) vigorously defends this politics of community and citizenship, and rightly so:

"I defend the idea that the contradictory nature of notion of political community (which requires both unity and diversity, conflict and consent, integration and exclusion, substantial identity and openness to indefinite change) reflects a tension not only between the real and the ideal, or between the self-assertion and deconstruction of community as such – or the opposite requirement of 'identification' and 'disidentification'. My thesis is that democratic politics is a difficult, 'ambiguous' art of combining the opposed terms of identification and disidentification (including identification with the universal), and for that reason it remains permanently exposed to turning into its opposite."

This matter brings us to the fundamental issue addressed here – citizenship and reconciliation. Since citizenship in the Republic of Cyprus has been construed as communal, a total ethno-communal fixity of identifying exclusively with one community and only via this community are citizenship rights realised and exercised, we ought to locate a course of action that does not pass through this problematic relation. We may reinvent a novel public sphere, a modus operandi and 'rules of engagement' that 'inject' each of the communities with enough energy to 'overflow', from one into the other so that the questioning and the challenge of ethno-communalism takes place and a new mutuality and reciprocity begins – whether it be projects on history and the past, or education and geography; environmental issues or resource management; gender politics etc. Above all the notion of reconciliation requires that both communities engage in an attempt to imagine a community without a communal centre and hence go beyond the ethnic community: we can then stretch out the community boundaries to define a new territory of trans-communal citizenship that is meaningful and opens up spaces for action.

Dead End Note and Beyond

With the accession to the EU, one finds a constant re-emergence of the European dimension within Cypriot politics. This requires us to think about the effects of Europeanization on reconciliation, which is often constructed as the opening of a sphere of belonging to both Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots. Aris Sitas refers to 'a third space' (Sitas, 2004a, 2007), but this is not universally accepted as Kadir (2005) points out. This paper does not share his perspective, it is well known that from the beginning of the 'European course' of Cyprus' accession to the EU this expression by the Greek-Cypriot politicians was justified in political terms, of acting as 'a catalyst for solution' whilst opposed by Turkish-Cypriot partitionists. Nevertheless, today under Talat, the Turkish-Cypriot leadership's claims to 'Europeanness' are equal to that of the Greek-Cypriot claims and this creates an emerging interesting situation, even if the 'neutrality' of this 'third space' is somehow distorted as both 'official' sides contest for the EU's favour. There is a common point of reference and the EU could become more of a 'broker' and an acceptable point of reference for both sides – in parallel always to the UN. Some on the Greek-Cypriot extreme Right refer to the EU as an alternative to the UN, but they cannot be taken seriously. Europeanism remains an ambivalent and contested reference point and as such it requires a clear strategy so that the 'exclusionary' elements remain in check and the 'commonalities' between Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriots are developed.[47]

We are still left with the practical issues, the processes and procedural matters that could materialise reconciliation into a socio-political force within its own right. A force that might draw political groups, individuals, citizens, 'denizens' (i.e. not full citizens), Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots into a new politics of protest and reconciliation. A politics that should not conceal or avoid conflictual issues and contentious points of debate or, historically speaking, dark points in history such as taboos – but, a politics that might open up spaces for debate, exchange and genuine reconciliation. A reconciliation that could at least lead to a 'simphiliosis' of Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; that might transform the ethnic into a social so that the other struggles could continue.

For Sitas (2004a), although in the end there is no middle route, he does recognise that in spite of contextual differences between Cyprus and South Africa, they have to choose 'the logic of reconciliation or the logic of fragmentation'. There is, however, a possible third route: the infinite perpetuation of the current state of limbo. In these conditions Sitas, understandably to some extent, states that 'you cannot have reconciliation without a solution first (a just solution which is 'functional' and 'viable' that is). He continues to expound that we cannot have a solution because 'people are not ready for it'; and people may eventually be 'reconciled' to

the fact that there is no reconciliation and no solution. But then again there may be a way out for actizens. Irrespective of the theoretical origin, the concept of reconciliation is essential if we are to secure any form of 'resolution', 'settlement', 'transformation' or solution to the Cyprus problem. 'Reconciliation' must be debated, developed and legitimised by the Cypriots before and after a settlement. Even if there is no settlement in the immediate future, or the current impasse continues indefinitely into the future, it is essential that the process of reconciliation begins. There is a special role for those people involved in articulating the case for settlement and peace, to also speak out in terms of reconciliation. The 'organic' and 'traditional' intellectuals, as Gramsci (1972) puts it, have a special role in this mission.

In the current state of affairs, what can ordinary citizens do? How can ordinary people go beyond the stalemate by creating spaces, modes of action and engage in processes that generate cooperation and potentially common institutions? How can popular energy be channelled into a force for reconciliation, mutual understanding and reunification? We can state with certainty that the potential for cooperation and understanding has not been fully realised and the will of a trans-communal community that overcomes community barriers has not been activated yet. Of course this requires a vision for the future that is not some nostalgic 'restoration of an imagined golden age' which can somehow be brought back to life by 'reverting back' to the naïve perceptions of what it means to be a 'true Cypriot'. All nationalistic projects and ideologies ought to be dissected. The 'majoritarian' hegemonic traditions of Greek Cypriots either disguised as implied Hellenised Cypriotism, or others based on perceptions derived from the old notions of self-determination, (i.e. simple majority decision-making) as well as the various partitionist bi-communalisms which are variants of ethno-national communalism, must be rejected. The ideological search for transcending such arrangements that go much further in the direction of achieving a 'universal universalism', to use Wallerstein's concept, and synthesise and respect particularism but equally accept solidarity in a truly internationalist perspective, is most imperative for Cyprus. This paper is less inclined to borrow Held's 'cosmopolitan democracy' (Held, 1995), as Erol Kaymak (2005) does,[48] but prefers the concept of 'multi-ethnic' or 'trans-ethnic citizenship' or 'actizenship'. This is perhaps the direction for critical thinking, social action and political engagement. Such processes ought not to be seen as alternatives to the historical social and political institutions; rather they are best perceived as operating in parallel with them, both within and beyond mass organisations such as trade unions, youth and women's organisation movements and NGOs. In short, anything that captures the imagination of the people to enhance the struggle for a common reunited society and federal state cannot but be activated.

––––––––––––––––

———————————

Notes

1. Drawing and adapting the Althusserian somehow enigmatic but vastly imaginative work on 'The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter' see Althusser, 2006.
2. Sia Anagnostopoulou «Η Τουρκία σε κρίση ή σε φάση μιας δραματικής 'ενηλικίω-σης'», Sunday Avgi (Κυριακάτικη Αυγή), 20 May 2007.
3. This is supported also by various opinion polls and the Eurobarometer after the initial enthusiastic support for EU accession.
4. The case Xenides-Arestis vs. Turkey (application no. 46347/99) represents an example of the ECHR using its authority to resolve hundreds of disputes in a mass-claims process: the court awarded damages in line with the celebrated Loizidou case. See: [http://www.cyprus.gov.cy/moi/PIO/PIO.nsf/All/CF3E836BC3F3336EC2256DC300799C23/$file/European%20Court%20of%20Human%20Rights.pdf?OpenElement], but both sides are trying to interpret the decision, with Greek-Cypriots arguing that the decision requires an effective remedy of restoration of properties and compensation for the loss of use, while the Turkish press is arguing that the case affirms the use of an internal compensation commission within the 'TRNC' to resolve the claims. It seems that fear of 'floodgates' has resulted in the Court tending to recognise the compensation board that may put an end to the thousands of potential Greek-Cypriot cases going to Strasburg. Arestis involved the deprivation of property rights as a result of the continuing division of Cyprus and the Turkish occupation of northern Cyprus. Arestis is a Greek Cypriot who lives in Nicosia, the capital of Cyprus. She owns land, houses and a shop in northern Cyprus but has been prevented from living in her home or using her property since August 1974 as a result of the continuing division of Cyprus.
5. See *Περιπέτειες Ιδεών* τ. 8, Πολίτης, 31 December 2006.
6. The notion of 'state of exception' or 'state of emergency' in the context of Cyprus was advanced in a number of papers by the current author such as «Δημοκρατία και Πολί-τες στον 21ον Αιώνα: Η Κυπριακή Πολιτότητα Ενάντια στον Αυταρχικό Κρατισμό», Πανεπιστήμιο του Πολίτη, Intercollege, 7 December 2006.
7. I would like to thank Avishai Ehrlich for his comments and his insight into the issues of conflict, war and reconciliation.
8. Adali, a journalist for the daily newspaper Yenidüzen, was murdered on 6 July 1996. He used his column to oppose the division of Cyprus. The excerpt is taken from an article published in 1987 and quoted in a tribute to his life 9 July 1998 (published in Parikiaki, London, 14 July 1998).
9. Opinion shifts were discussed in Trimikliniotis (2006b).
10. The study consisted of 170 interviews with 100 persons aged 50 years; 50 of the

generation of their children. Using the principle of "complementarity" and "proportionality", an equal number of Greek and Turkish Cypriots, of Men and Women and of Refugees/Non-Refugees were interviewed.

11. The participants incorporated 409 Cypriots (231 Greek Cypriots and 178 Turkish Cypriots) randomly selected from both urban and rural areas of the island.

12. The latest study, carried out on behalf of IKME by NOVERNA in May 2007 with 804 interviewees and 6 focus groups, shows that over 50 per cent of Greek-Cypriots are concerned about non-solution, and as time goes by the matter is likely to worsen.

13. See Φιλελεύθερος 2 July 2006 and 'Building Trust' [www.cyprusopolls.org], p. 32.

14. This was the subject of a Seminar organised by RECONCILIATION and KADEM which examined 'Recent Developments in the North: Shifts in Public Opinion?', Muharrem Faiz on the Turkish-Cypriot public opinion and Nicos Trimikliniotis on the Greek-Cypriot opinion, under the general title 'The Divergent Tendencies in the Two Communities and the Prospects for Solution' Limassol 12 May 2006.

15. This posed a threat to the legitimacy of views expressed by the nationalist media and may explain the unease with which G/C journalists reported people's accounts of their individual experiences in the north. I would like to thank Marios Sarris for pointing out this issue.

16. Seminar titled, Truth: The Road to Reconciliation? An Analysis of the Model and its Implementation in Countries with a History of Violent Conflict, organised by the Forum for Inter-communal Dialogue for Active Citizens for Peace in Cyprus and the Neo-Cypriot Association, 4 December 2004, Goethe Institute, Nicosia.

17. Some research has been carried out on Cypriotism such as Panayiotou, 1996, 1999, 2005; Peristianis, 1994; Mavratsas, 1998; Papadakis, 1993; Trimikliniotis, 2000a. In general it refers to various categories – Greek-Cypriot people who supported independence and rapprochement with Turkish-Cypriot people, who were the first to point to the massacres of Turkish Cypriots in 1963 and in general refused to claim 'nationhood' or use the term 'nation'. Social scientists have preferred to use the term "Cypriotists" and "Cyprocentric", which is juxtaposed to "Grecocentric" and "Turcocentric" illustrating their differentiated views from their 'national-oriented' opponents and the fluidity of the category. I would like to thank Andreas Panayiotou for pointing out that there should be a more nuanced approach to Cypriotism.

18. Hitchens (1997, p. 158), refers to four main but related questions of which the Cyprus problem consists: 1) The relationship between Greek Cypriots and Turkish Cypriots; 2) The long-standing differences between the states of Greece and Turkey; 3) The time factor – Hitchens was writing during the Cold War period; (today this would mean the politics of the 'New World Order'); 4) The place factor (the regional strategic importance of the island).

19. Coufoudakis, 1993, p. 41.

20. In December 2004, a few months after the referenda, a paper was presented which covered these issues and it was then elaborated further in Trimikliniotis (2004).

21. The Greek paper is called «Αλήθεια, Ποια Συμφιλίωση; Βειώνοντας την 'Αλήθεια και συμφιλίωση' στο Δικό μας Απαρτχάιντ».

22. A number of other ethical questions were also raised such as (a) Can we have true reconciliation without 'justice'? (b) Can we have reconciliation without trust and all the consequences of this (i.e. punishment of the culprits)? (c) Are the people ready to face the 'truth' when for years they were blocked from knowing and thinking? (d) Truth, but whose truth? It is here that we are forced to go back to the debate, between Socrates and the Sophists: Is truth objective and subjective? (e) Does the 'truth' (or truths – the question is better left open) lead to reconciliation and tolerance?

23. The questions were raised in Nicos Trimikliniotis (2000a, 2000b).

24. See Timikliniotis (2006a) for a critical review on perceptions on reflexivity, critical thinking and social action in the context of Cypriot civil society.

25. An updated and elaborated version of his original paper is published as a commentary article in this issue of The Cyprus Review (see Kadir, 2007). Interestingly, even in his UNESCO lecture Kadir (2004) avoided the term and used different terms.

26. The book Peaceful Coexistence in Cyprus under the British Rule (1878-1959) and After Independence, by historian Costas Kyrris, was published and distributed freely by the Cyprus Republic PIO in 1977.

27. A classic example of this is the Turkish-Cypriot journalist Sener Levent in numerous articles in the newspapers Afrika and Politis.

28. Of course the context and problematic of the time was not about NGOs but about the questions of class struggle, the party and the capitalist state.

29. The issue of NGOs and the state is elaborated in Trimikliniotis, 2003b. Recently Petras and Veltemeyer, 2001, argued that at least in the Latin American context "NGOs are at the service of imperialism".

30. CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Cyprus – Executive Summary An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus, A Map for the Future, 2005. We are informed that "due to the de facto division of the island and the segregation of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, it was necessary to undertake two separate studies. The two project teams (Intercollege for the southern part and the Management Centre of the Mediterranean for the northern part of Cyprus), followed the same methodology and the implementation of each project stage was conducted in parallel." The study for the Greek-Cypriot community was carried out by Stathis Mavros and by Erol Kaymak for the Turkish Cypriot society.

31. The results of the scores given by the PAG are portrayed in a diagram, plotting the scores for the four dimensions: structure, environment, values and impact. The highest possible score was three and the lowest possible score was zero. As far as structure is concerned it is given a score of 1.3.

32. It is given a score of 2.1.

33. It is given a score of 1.9.

34. It is given a score of 1.8.

35. Katsiaounis (2000) notes that the Left in Cyprus, KKK, AKEL and 'the popular movement' was not only a social movement that had no 'national element', as Attalides (1986) seems to be implying in an important paper on political parties in Cyprus but it was at the forefront of the struggles for national self-determination of Cyprus.

36. Elazar, D.J. (1998) Covenant and Constitutionalism, the Great Frontiers and the Matrix of Federal Democracy, Vol. 3, New Brunswick, Transaction Publishers.

37. I would like to thank Marios Sarris for the clarifications of this point.

38. Interview with the Turkish-Cypriot journalist and writer Sevgul Uludag, Yeni Duzen, 17 April 2003. He publicly condemned nationalism invoking the relevant decision of the Ecumenical Patriarchy of Constantinople in the nineteenth century.

39. Speech at Ayios Mamas, Morphou, 1 September 2004.

40. Interview for Greek-Cypriot newspaper Alitheia, 21 April 2005.

41. Bishop of Morphou «Διαφορετικότητα και Ταυτότητα» ["Diversity/Difference and Identity"], Part A, Alitheia, 29 July 2005.

42. Ibid.

43. I would like to thank Marios Sarris for showing me this dimension of Orthodox Christianity.

44. The famous quote by Anatole France is indicative: "The law in its majestic equality gives every man, prince and pauper alike, an equal right to sleep under the bridge and eat at the Ritz" (quoted by Hall and Held 1989, p. 178).

45. This is the 'new' Greek-Cypriot nationalism that aims to 'reintegrate' the Turkish Cypriots in the Republic and tacitly reduce their status merely to that of a 'minority'.

46. This is the 'new' Turkish-Cypriot nationalism that focuses on 'economic autonomy', 'direct' or 'free trade' – 'European representation with no ties with the Greek Cypriots' etc.

47. The issue of Europeanization has been a critical issue and is increasingly dominating the literature on Cyprus (see Theophylactou, 1995; Trimikliniotis, 2001a, 2001b; Tocci, 2004).

48. Fore a critique of liberal cosmopolitanism see Trimikliniotis 2007b.

Bibliography

English Bibliography

Agamben, G. (2005) State of Exception. London, University of Chicago Press.

Althusser, L. (1969) 'Ideology and Ideological State Apparatus' in Lenin and Philosophy. London, Verso Press.

———. (2006) 'The Underground Current of the Materialism of the Encounter' in Matheron, F. and Corpet, O. (eds.), Philosophy of the Encounter. Later Writings, 1978-1987, translated and introduced by G.M. Goshgarian. London, Verso.

Anthias, F. (1987) 'Cyprus' in Clark, C. and Payne, T. (eds.), Politics, Security and Development in Small States. London, Allen and Unwin.

Anthias, F. and Ayres, R. (1978) 'National Liberation and the Struggle for Socialism – The Case of Cyprus', Capital and Class, Special Edition of Conference, Vol. 1.

———. (1983) 'Ethnicity and Class in Cyprus', Race and Class, Vol. XXV, No. I.

Anthias, F. and Lloyd, C. (2002) 'Introduction: Fighting Racisms, Defining the Territory' in Anthias, F. and Lloyd, C. (eds.), Rethinking Anti-racisms, From Theory to Practice. London, Routledge.

Anthias, F. and Yuval-Davies, N. (1983) 'Contextualising Feminism – Gender, Ethnic and Class Divisions', Feminist Review, No. 15, pp. 62-76.

———. (1992) Racialised Boundaries. London, Routledge.

Asmal, K., Asmal, L. and Roberts, R.S. (1997) Reconciliation through Truth: A Reckoning of Apartheid's Criminal Governance. Cape Town, David Philip Publishers/Oxford, James Currey Publishers/New York, St. Martin's Press.

Attalides, M. (1979) Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics. Edinburgh, Q Press.

Balibar, E. (1991) 'Racism and Crisis' in Balibar, E. and Wallestein, I. (eds.), Race, Nation, Class: Ambiguous Identities. London: Verso.

———. (2002) Politics and the Other Scene. London, Verso Press.

Barth, K. (2004) The Doctrine of Reconciliation. London/New York, Continuum.

Bronkhort, D. (1995) Truth and Reconciliation, Obstacles and Opportunities for Human Rights. Amsterdam, Amnesty International Dutch Section.

Castoriades, C. (1975) 'The Social Imaginary and the Institution' in Curtis, D.A. (ed.), (1997) The Castoriadis Reader. Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 196-217.

———. (1994) 'Radical Imagination and the Social Instituting Imaginary', Curtis, D.A. (ed.), (1997) The Castoriadis Reader, Oxford, Blackwell, pp. 318-337.

Christoforou, C. (2005) 'Greek-Cypriot media since 1960 – Dividing or Reconciling the people?', Cyprus After a Solution – Reconciliation and Citizenship: A Trans Communal Concept for Social Action, Conference organised by SIMFILIOSI and IKME-BILBAN, 23 July 2005, Goethe Centre, Nicosia.

Constantinou, M. (2002) 'Constitutional Learning for Cypriots in the Light of the Swiss and EU Experience: A Sociological Perspective Inducing Reflexivity in the Turkish-Cypriot Constitutional Vision', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 14, No 2 (Fall), pp. 13-44.

———. (2003a) 'Constitutional Learning for Cypriots in the Light of the Swiss and EU Experience: Theoretical and Practical Stakes of Federalisation', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 15, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 13-66.

Coufoudakis, V. (1993) 'Cyprus, the Commonwealth and the United Nations since 1960', Conference Paper, Cyprus: From Ottoman Province to European State, organised by the Cyprus Research Centre and the Institute of Commonwealth Studies, ICS 28 Russell Square, London WC1, 20-21 September 1993.

CIVICUS Civil Society Index Report for Cyprus-Executive Summary An Assessment of Civil Society in Cyprus, A Map for the Future, 2005.

Derrida, J. (2001) 'On Forgiveness', On Cosmopolitanism and Forgiveness. London/New York Routledge.

Gellner, G. (1983) Nations and Nationalisms. Oxford, Blackwell.

Gibson, J.L. (2004) Overcoming Apartheid – Can Truth Reconcile a Divided Nation? Cape Town, South Africa, HSRC Press.

Gramsci, A. (1972) 'Selections from Prison Notebooks' in Hoare, Q. and Nowell Smith, G. (eds.), Selections from Prison Notebooks. London, Lawrence and Wishart.

Hall, S. (1989) 'Introduction' in Hall, S. and Held, D. (eds.), The Idea of the Modern State. Milton Keynes, Open University Publications.

Hayner, P.B. (2001) Unspeakable Truths, Confronting State Terror and Atrocity. New York/London, Routledge.

Held, D. (1995) Democracy and Global Order. Cambridge, Polity.

Hidiroglou, A. (2005) 'Multicultural Identity and Reconciliation in Cyprus', Cyprus After a Solution – Reconciliation and Citizenship: A Trans Communal Concept for Social Action, Conference organised by SIMFILIOSI and IKME-BILBAN, 23 July 2005, Goethe Centre, Nicosia.

Hitchens, C. (1997) Hostage to History, Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger, 3rd Edition. London, Verso.

Hobsbawm, E.S. (1990) Nations and Nationalism since 1780. Cambridge, Canto.

Hobsbawm, E.S. and Ranger, T. (1990) 'Introduction', Hobsbawm E.S. and Ranger, T. (eds.), The Invention of Tradition. Cambridge, Canto.

Kadir, Dj. (2004) 'On the Ethics of Coexistence in Diversity', UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development, 21 May 2004. Nicosia, The University of Cyprus.

———. (2007) 'Truth and Reconciliation on Cyprus Will Be Possible, When …', The Cyprus Review - Special Issue on Reconciliation, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 163-169.

Kaminer, R. (1996) The Politics of Protest. Brighton, Sussex Academic Press.

Kaymak, E. (2005) 'Re-imagining a United Cyprus ', Cyprus After a Solution – Reconciliation and Citizenship: A Trans Communal Concept for Social Action, Conference organised by SIMFILIOSI and IKME-BILBAN, 23 July 2005, Goethe Centre, Nicosia.

Kyrris, C. (1980) Peaceful Coexistence. Nicosia, PIO.

Kitromilides, P. (1977) 'From Coexistence to Confrontation: The Dynamics of Ethnic Conflict in Cyprus' in Attalides, A. (ed.), Cyprus Reviewed. Nicosia, Cyprus.

———. (1979) 'The Dialectic of Intolerance: Ideological Dimensions of Ethnic Conflict' in Worsley, P. and Kitromilides, P. (eds.), Small States in the Modern World: Conditions for their Survival, Revised Edition. Nicosia, Cyprus, New Cyprus Association and Cyprus Geographical Association.

Loizos, P. (1998) 'How Might Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots See Each Other More Clearly?' in Kalotychos, V. (ed.), Cyprus and Its People, Nation, Identity, and Experience in an Unimaginable Community, 1955-1997. Oxford, Westview Press, pp. 35-52.

Lordos, A. and Faiz, M. (2005) 'Options for Peace: Mapping the Possibilities for a Comprehensive Settlement in Cyprus', at:

[http://www.cypruspolls.org/OptionsForPeaceTextAndCharts.pdf], accessed June 2005.

Markides, K.C. (1977) The Rise and Fall of the Cyprus Republic. London, Yale University Press.

Milios, J. (2007) 'The Inherent Totalitarianism of the Concept of Nations: The Example of the

Greek Nation and the Reconciliation Process of Cyprus', The Cyprus Review, Special Issue on Reconciliation, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 181-186.

Panayiotou, A. (1999) 'Island Radicals: The Emergence and Consolidation of the Left, 1920-1960'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of California, Santa Cruz.

Papadakis, Y. (1993) 'Perceptions of History and Collective: A Study of Contemporary Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Nationalism'. Unpublished PhD Thesis, University of Cambridge.

Poulantzas, N. (1968) Political Power and Social Classes. London, NLB.

———. (1974) Fascism and Dictatorship. London, NLB.

———. (1975) Classes in Contemporary Capitalism. London, NLB.

———. (1980) State, Power, Socialism. London, New Left Books.

Sant Cassia, P. (2005) Bodies of Evidence, Burial, Memory and the Recovery of Missing Persons in Cyprus. New York/Oxford, Berghahn Books.

Sitas, A. (2004a) 'Beyond Racism: The Ethics of Reconciliation and the Reality of Reconciling', UNESCO Universal Declaration on Cultural Diversity (2001), World Day for Cultural Diversity for Dialogue and Development, 21 May 2004, University of Cyprus, Nicosia.

———. (2004b) Voices that Reason – Theoretical Parables. South Africa.

———. (2007) 'Reconciliation and Transformation: Lessons from South Africa?', The Cyprus Review, Special Issue on Reconciliation, Vol. 19, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 171-179.

Sitas, A. and Latif, D. (2007) Prospects of Reconciliation, Co-Existence and Forgiveness in Cyprus – A Research Report. Nicosia, PRIO.

Stavrinides, P., Georgiou, S. and Christou, K. (forthcoming) 'Running Head: Correlates of Coexistence – Psychological Correlates of Coexistence: The Case of the Two Cypriot Communities', Research paper, Faustmann, H. and Varnava, A. (eds.), The Failure to Reunify Cyprus: The Annan Plan, the Referendums of 2004 and the Aftermath, London, IB Tauris.

Theophylactou, D.A. (1995) Security, Identity and Nation Building – Cyprus and the European Union in Comparative Perspective. London, Avebury.

Tocci, N. (2004) Europeanization and Ethnic Conflict: Can Accession to the EU Work as a Catalyst for Solution or Partition in Cyprus? Aldershot, Hampshire, Ashgate Press.

Trimikliniotis, N. (1999) 'New Migration and Racism in Cyprus: The Racialisation of Migrant Workers' in Anthias, F. and Lazarides, G. (eds.), Into the Margins: Migration and Exclusion in Southern Europe. London, Avebury.

———. (2000a) 'The Role of State Processes in the Production and Resolution of "Ethnic" and "National" Conflict: the Case of Cyprus'. Unpublished PhD thesis, University of Greenwich, UK.

———. (2000b) '"Conflict Resolution" or "Rapprochement": Alternative or Complementary Models for Citizen's/Popular Action in Cyprus?' Paper at 3rd Annual Academic Conference, Cypriot Society: Continuity and Change, Association of Sociologists of Cyprus, Intercollege, Nicosia, Cyprus, 14-16 April 2000.

―――. (2001a) 'The Location of Cyprus in the Southern European Context: Europeanization as Modernisation', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 13, No. 2 (Fall), pp. 47-73.

―――. (2001b) 'Europeanization – What Potential Does it Have in the Resolution of the Cyprus Problem?', European Journal of Cyprus, Vol. 1, No. 1, (Summer), pp. 49-78.

―――. (2003a) 'Ulus Otesi: Cok Uluslu Cok Kulturlu Federal Kibris Vataslik Potansiyeli', Hasguler, M. and Inatci, U. (eds.), Kibrisin Turuncu. Istanbul, Anka.

―――. (2003b) 'The Challenge of Freedom of Movements: The Radical Potential' IKME (ed.), Cyprus After a Solution – Left Policies. Nicosia, IKME.

―――. (2004) 'Which Truth, and What Reconciliation – Anchoring the Process of Truth and Reconciliation to our own Traditions and Some Thoughts on "Our Own Apartheid"', Conference paper for Truth: the Road to Reconciliation? An Analysis of the Model and its Implementation in Countries of Historic Violent Conflict organised by the Forum for Inter-communal Dialogue for Active Citizens for Peace in Cyprus and the Neo-Cypriot Association, 4 December 2004, Goethe Institute, Nicosia.

―――. (2006a) 'A Communist's Post-modern Power Dilemma: One Step Back, Two Steps Forward, "Soft No and Hard Choices"', The Cyprus Review, Vol. 18, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 37-86.

―――. (2006b) 'Recent Developments: A Shift in Greek-Cypriot Public Opinion?' Paper for Seminar titled, The Divergent Tendencies in the Two Communities and the Prospects for Solution, organised by RECONCILIATION – KADEM, Mediterranean Hotel, Limassol, 12 May 2006.

―――. (2007a) 'Nationality and Citizenship in Cyprus since 1945: Communal Citizenship, Gendered Nationality and the Adventures of a Post-Colonial Subject in a Divided Country' in Bauböck, R., Perchinig, B. and Sievers, W. (eds.), Citizenship Policies in the New Europe. Amsterdam University Press.

―――. (2007b) 'Populism, Democracy and Social Citizenship: Discourses on "Illegal Migration" or beyond the "Fortress" versus "Cosmopolitanism" Debate' in Berggren, E., Likic-Brboric, B., Toksöz, G. and Trimikliniotis, N. (eds.), (forthcoming 2007) Irregular Migration, Informal Labour and Community: A Challenge for Europe. Maastricht, Shaker.

Tutu, D. (2004) God Has a Dream: A Vision of Hope for our Time. London/Sydney/Auckland/ Johannesburg, Rider.

Uludag, S. (2005) Cyprus: The Untold Stories. Mannheim and Möhnesee, Bibliopolis.

Wallerstein, I. (2006) European Universalism, The Rhetoric of Power. New York, New Press.

Greek Bibliography

Attalides, M. (1986) «Τα κόμματα στην Κύπρο 1878-1955», Κυπριακά: Διαλέξεις Λαϊκού Πανεπιστημίου, Vol. 2, Nicosia, pp. 125-152.

―――. (1993) «Παράγοντες που διαμόρφωσαν την Κυπριακή κοινωνία μετά την Ανεξαρ-τησία», Λαϊκό Πανεπιστήμιο, Διαλέξεις Λαϊκού Πανεπιστημίου 3, Κυπριακή Ζωή και Κοινωνία, Λίγο μετά την Ανεξαρτησία και μέχρι το 1984, Λευκωσία, σελ. 216-235.

Constantinou, M. (2003b) «Η πολιτική κοινωνιολογία του ελβετικού συστήματος», Εξ

Υπαρχής (Ιανουάριος 2003) και *Θέσεις* 83.

Gavriilides, A. (2006) *Η Αθεράπευτη Νεκροφιλία του Ριζοσπαστικού Πατριωτισμού, Ρί-τσος-Ελύτης-Θεοδωράκης-Σβορώνος*. Athens, Futura.

Hidiroglou, A. (2006) «Κίνημα για μια νέας Κύπρο με καρδιά την Πολυπολιτισμική της Ταυ-τότητα», Περιπέτειες Ιδεών, τ. 4, *Πολίτης*, at: [http://www.reconciliationcy.org/10.pdf], accessed on 4 April 2007.

Katsiaounis, R. (2000) *Η Διασκεπτική 1946-1948, Με ανασκόπηση της Περιόδου* 1878-1945. Nicosia, Κέντρο Επιστημονικών Ερευνών.

Mavratsas, C. (1998) *Όψεις του ελληνικού εθνικισμού στη Κύπρο*. Αθήνα: Κατάρτι.

Panayiotou, A. (1996) 'Κυπριωτισμός'. Unpublished study for the New Cyprus Association.

Panayiotou, A. (2005) «Συνοριακές εμπειρίες: ερμηνεύοντας τον πατριωτισμό της Κυ-πριακής Αριστεράς» στο Τριμικλινιώτης, Ν. (επιμ.), *Το Πορτοκαλί της Κύπρου*. Αθή-να, Εκδ. Νήσος.

Peristianis, N. (1994) «Δεξιά-Αριστερά, ελληνοκεντρισμός-κυπροκεντρισμός: το εκκρεμές των συλλογικών ταυτίσεων μετά το 1974» στο Περιστιάνης, Ν. και Τσαγγαράς Γ. (επιμ.), *Ανατομία μιας μεταμόρφωσης. Η Κύπρος μετά το 1974 – κοινωνία, οικονομία, πολιτική, πολιτισμός*. Λευκωσία, Intercollege Press, σελ. 123-156.

Petras, J. and Veltmeyer, H. (2001) *Η παγκοσμιοποίηση χωρίς μάσκα, ο ιμπεριαλισμός στον 21ον αιώνα*. Αθήνα, ΚΨΜ.

Trimikliniotis, N. (2003c) «Το Ελβετικό Σύστημα, το Σχέδιο Ανάν και η Ομοσπονδοποίηση της Κύπρου: Για Ένα Αριστερό Συνταγματισμό» *Θέσεις*, Τεύχος 83 at: [http://www.theseis.com/76-/theseis/t83/t83.htm] and *Εξ Υπαρχής* (Ιανουάριος 2003).

———. (2005α) «Προς Μια Υπέρ-Εθνοτική Έννοια του Πολίτη: Η Κύπρος Πέραν του Έθνους – Κράτους», στο Τριμικλινιώτης, Ν. (επιμ.), *Το Πορτοκαλί της Κύπρου*. Αθή-να, Εκδ. Νήσος.

———. (2005b) «Το Εθνικό Ζήτημα, η Αριστερά και το Κυπριακό: Αντιμπεριαλισμός Ή Αντί-Εθνικισμός;», *Θέσεις* 92, June-September 2005.

———. (2007c) «Η Εξουσία, το Εθνικό και Κοινωνικό Ζήτημα: Η Ώρα της Κυπριακής Αρι-στεράς;» *Θέσεις*, Τεύχος 101 (forthcoming).