

THE 'OTHER' CYPRIOTS AND THEIR CYPRUS QUESTIONS

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Abstract

The island of Cyprus has a multicultural population. Today, besides its native Greek, Turkish, Armenian, Maronite, Latin Cypriot and Gypsy population, it is also the home of Anatolians, who have gradually settled on the island from Turkey since 1974; Pontians who came from Georgia via Greece together with various other immigrants since the 1990s; the Jews; and the British. Despite this diversity, a solution to the Cyprus problem is still under the monopoly of Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot aspirations, with a resolution oriented between either a bi-zonal/bi-communal federation or a liberal democratic unitary state. This paper presents the so far little pronounced 'Other Cypriots': the Armenians, the Maronites, the Latins, the Gypsies as well as the newcomers, the Turkish settlers, the Pontians, the immigrants, and their socio-economic and political problems. In so doing, it aims to draw attention to the necessity of multicultural politics in today's governing policies, and in future settlement efforts of the Cyprus conflict.

Keywords: Cyprus Question, Cypriot Maronites, Cypriot Armenians, Cypriot Latins, Pontians, Turkish settlers, the British, the Cypriot Jews, the Cypriot Gypsies

A Note on Terminology

The northern part of the island will be referred to as the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC), acknowledging the fact that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except by Turkey.

Homogeneity has never been a reality for any polity (Soysal, 1994, p. 189). The national model still serves as a link to the past in order to justify the present and to reinforce national identity and state sovereignty (Kastoryano, 2002, p. 4). However, descendants of the immigrants and the ethnic and religious minorities challenge this model and claim their inclusion into the political community and decision-making mechanisms. The polities thus find themselves in a new situation where they are obliged to negotiate identities. "But, identities are not commodities and are therefore difficult to negotiate." (ibid.).

Multicultural politics claim to overcome this difficulty. They focus on the multiple allegiances of individuals, and are based on the recognition of differences and the promotion of cultural specificities within the larger national community. Although a stimulating project, multiculturalism creates worries on the assumption that it politicises ethnicity. "Every identity or cultural difference is about setting a boundary therefore every claim to difference is at the same time a claim to homogeneity, or a claim to disregarding other differences within the group." (Akan, 2003, p. 72).

Instead, Habermas calls for a constitutional patriotism which proposes a liberal political culture according to whatever differences exist in multicultural societies, and bases citizenship on the socialisation of the actors in the framework of a common political culture (Habermas, 1998). On the other hand Kymlicka maintains that liberal states treat culture in the same way as religion, something which people should be free to pursue in their private lives, but which is not the concern of the state (2001, pp. 23-24). He thus argues that the idea that liberal-democratic states or civic nations are ethno-culturally neutral is manifestly false, such as English (Anglo-Saxon) descendants dominant in the US, and the French in France, etc (ibid.). Kymlicka further maintains that in the countries which have adopted robust forms of immigrant multiculturalism and/or multinational federalism – which are amongst the wealthiest in the world, – minority rights have helped promote equality between majority and minority groups, reducing relations of ethnic hierarchy or domination/subordination (ibid., p. 3). So far it is the absence of rights or not granting these rights, rather than granting them, which have triggered ethnic conflicts (ibid., pp. 36-37).

Nevertheless, claims of culture as the basis of differential rights can in fact be manipulated for political and economic means. This can become a conscious mobilisation of cultural differences in the service of a larger national or a transnational project (Appadurai, 1996. p. 5). As Akan underlines, it is also important to look at state nationalism, rather than liberalism, which constitutes a threat to cultural diversity (Akan, op. cit.).

The European Union works in a number of complex ways so that state authorities become more accommodating with minority demands. Most EU states after having pooled their sovereignty in Brussels, have agreed to decentralise power to minority groups. The EU has also provided opportunities for stateless nations to project their identities within a wider political space (Keating and McGarry, 2001, p. 10). Regions within states have been allowed to cooperate across state frontiers, and to establish multiple channels of access to Brussels. Should these measures fail, the EU may even provide an insurance mechanism to ensure that secession is peaceful and it carries minimum economic costs, as long as the successor states are all contained within the Union (ibid.). However, one

important thing to remember is that identities have not been fully negotiated within the EU either. National identities of various forms are strongly present in the EU and are far from having disappeared (Connor, 2001; Antonsich, 2007).

The clear reality is that complex ethnic compositions of polities are further changing under the pressure of global waves of migration, and Cyprus is no exception to that. Migrant groups as well as native ethnic minorities claim their political and socio-economic rights and inclusion. Surprisingly, this dimension to the Cyprus conflict has been little investigated by researchers. It has been also neglected by policy-makers. It seems, however, vain to aspire for a sustainable settlement to the Cyprus Question as it has been presented to date without the inclusion of the Others' Cyprus Questions and taking into account the present multicultural structure of the island.

According to the 2001 census, in the Cypriot territories controlled by the Republic of Cyprus (RoC), the population is around 689,565 inhabitants. 618,455 are Greek Cypriots, 1,341 are Armenians, 3,658 are Maronites, 279 are Latins, 360 are Turkish Cypriots and 64,811 are non-Cypriots. The low number of Turkish Cypriots is due to the fact that the vast majority have lived in the north of the island since 1974 in the territory which has become the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus (TRNC) since 1983. Concerning the numbers quoted for other Cypriot communities, their community leaders declare different numbers to the ones announced by the RoC authorities.

The RoC was founded as a consociational democracy in 1960. Its constitution set up two communal chambers for the two principal communities: Turkish and Greek Cypriot, granting each the authority to draft laws, impose taxes, and determine all religious, educational, and cultural matters. The same constitution defined the Maronites, the Armenians and the Latins (Catholics) as religious groups, and not as minorities. These religious groups had the right to appoint a representative in one of the two communal chambers and they opted, during a referendum in 1960, to be included in the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber. With the downfall of the consociational Cyprus Republic in 1963, the Greek Cypriot Communal Chamber was abolished by the Greek-Cypriot authorities and its functions were transferred to the Ministry of Education in 1965. Since that time, representatives of the religious communities each hold a seat in the House of Representatives of the unitary Republic of Cyprus under Greek-Cypriot administration, but without the right to vote. However, the House of Representatives, before taking any decision on questions concerning the religious groups must consult the representatives of the religious groups via a Parliamentary Commission.

The designation 'religious group' is, however, no longer accepted by the European Union to which the RoC adhered in May 2004. The Armenian and the Maronite communities support this change of status, as well as a stronger participation in the political life of their country. Nazeret Armenagian from the Cypriot Armenian community declares, for example, that a large number of the Armenian community do not want the right to vote in the actual Parliamentary elections, but would like to be consulted over a future solution to the Cyprus problem.¹ On the other hand, Benito Mantovani, the representative of the Latin community in the House of Representatives and the honorary consul of Italy in Cyprus, emphasises that the religious groups should not have the right to vote on political matters but only on issues concerning the community.

"It is dangerous for a small community to engage itself in politics. I don't make political declarations. According to the European Union legislation, the situation is going to change for us and we are going to have the right to vote, but this necessitates the formation of a political party; which will create problems".²


The 2001 European Council and the Consultative Board on the Convention for the protection of national minorities report considers the three religious groups in Cyprus as minority groups. Also, the UN Annan Plan for a federal solution in Cyprus referred to the groups as minorities. Furthermore, it proposed to provide these groups decision-making rights by granting them a vote in the Parliament, and an official minority status (Annan Plan Annex I, Part III, Article IV). The Constitution of the future United Republic of Cyprus referred to two communities (Greek and Turkish Cypriot), and three minorities (Latin, Maronite and Armenian).

The Maronite Cypriot Community

During the Ottoman period, the Maronite church was under the jurisdiction of the Orthodox Church but in 1849, the Maronite patriarch of Lebanon obtained the right from the Sublime Porte to re-establish the Maronite church under the control of its own bishops, thanks to the considerable help of the French consul in Cyprus at that time. Throughout the British period the Maronites enjoyed economic prosperity, constructed schools and churches, and their political rights were consolidated. According to the census of 1960, there were around 2,752 people living in four principal villages: Kormakitis, Karpasia, Asomatos and Ayia Marina. According to Antonis J. Hadji-Roussos, the parliamentary representative of the Maronite community, today with its 6,000 inhabitants, the Maronites are the most numerous Cypriot community after the Greek and Turkish Cypriots and most of them are land owners.³ In the aftermath of the tragic events of July and August 1974, all of the Maronite villages were retained under Turkish control. Today, only 150 Maronites

with an average age of 70 years live in Kormakitis. Two of their other villages, namely, Asomatos/Özhan and Ayia Marina/Gürpınar, are used as Turkish military barracks.

Map I: Maronite churches and villages



Even after the opening of the crossing point between the RoC and the TRNC, only the older inhabitants and those who have family ties can enter these villages to organise Sunday masses. Since December 2004, the Maronite community has taken action against these restrictions and has formed the Maronite Movement for Peace in order to obtain the right to regain their places of worship.

Photo 1: Interior of the café in Kormakitis. Atatürk's photograph is displayed between the photographs of the Cypriot Maronite leaders. (Photo taken by Emel Akçali in April 2004).



The majority of the Maronite community lives either in Nicosia and its surrounding area or in Limassol. Hadji-Roussos underlines the danger of assimilation of the Maronite community to the Greek-Cypriot community, notably because of mixed marriages and education availability. The Maronites have their own elementary school, but no secondary school. Most of them send their children to Greek-Cypriot high schools and the majority of their youth speak only Greek. They would like to possess their own secondary school, or to benefit from governmental subsidies so that they can send their children to private Catholic schools. Some Maronites suggest that this danger of assimilation would be reduced if they lived within the Turkish-Cypriot community for the obvious reason that there would be fewer mixed marriages taking place (Interview with Hadji-Roussos). However, in order to seriously confront the danger of assimilation, it is crucial for them to regain their villages in the TRNC. This is the principle reason why the majority of Maronites supported the Annan Plan, which not only granted them minority status, but also provided for their right to return to their villages. Had the Plan been accepted, these villages would have been incorporated in the constituent Greek-Cypriot state of the United Cyprus Republic. However, a section of the Maronite community would prefer that their villages were granted autonomous status in the case of a bi-zonal and bi-communal solution to the Cyprus Question.

Although the Annan plan failed, the claim of the Maronite community for representation in the RoC government and the electoral system prevails. In general they have requested:

- decentralisation of powers;
- constitutional autonomy of local and regional administrations in which prerogatives concerning fiscal, touristic, judicial affairs and transport can be shared with the central authority;
- arrangement of mechanisms for conflict prevention and resolution by judicial means, negotiations, mediation, arbitration and naming a mediator for minorities.

The Maronite community has also asked for legislative arrangements which would protect the rights of the minorities and favour their recruitment in the public service, notably in the judiciary system. Besides their political dimension, these claims also reflect the economical worries of the community. Traditionally, civil servants receive high salaries and benefits in Cyprus. Working as a civil servant is also a way for Cypriots to secure jobs for their children in high-paid positions within the bureaucracy. Government jobs are almost exclusively occupied by Greek Cypriots in the RoC and by Turkish Cypriots in the TRNC. A large number of Maronites are refugees who have abandoned their agricultural land on the northern side of the island and they do not have secure jobs in officialdom. Unemployment is thus higher among the Maronite community than in other confessional groups.⁴

The Armenian Cypriot Community

The Armenian community began migrating to Cyprus in the sixth century, but the community was not actually formed until the beginning of the twentieth century with the arrival of refugees from Anatolia, often from the cities of the Çukurova region: Adana, Kozan and Tarsus. Today, there are around 3,000 Armenian Cypriots on the island who live in urban areas and are located especially in Nicosia, Larnaca and Limassol. Since most of the Cypriot Armenian community hails from Anatolian origin, those who are 50 years of age or older still speak Turkish with an accent of the continent. During a meal with a Cypriot Armenian family we observed that the family members watched Turkish TV channels which were broadcast from Turkey and they prepared dishes analogous to those of the Çukurova region in Turkey. However, this observation cannot be counted as an extrapolation.

Following their arrival from Anatolia, the Armenians settled in Turkish-Cypriot quarters, especially in Arap Ahmet in Nicosia next to the actual Green Line. During the bloody events of 1963, they abandoned these quarters and settled in Greek-Cypriot areas. However, when the situation calmed down, these quarters were inside the newly formed Turkish-Cypriot enclaves and their homes, their primary school, Mélikian-Ouzounianne and the Apostolic Church of Sourp Asdvadzadzin remained under Turkish-Cypriot control. After the rigid partition of the island in 1974, their monasteries, including Makaravank-Sourp Magar situated in the

Pentadaktylos region and Ganchvar Sourp Asdvadzadzin in Famagousta, were also lost.

Today, almost all Armenian Cypriots live amongst the Greek-Cypriot community and many intercommunity marriages have taken place between them. Despite this, Bedros Kaladjian, the representative of the Armenian Cypriot community in August 2005, whose parents were natives of Adana in Turkey, explained that the Cypriot Armenians do not speak or write well in Greek because their education is delivered in their own language and in their own schools, and they pursue higher education in either Great-Britain or in the United States. In consequence, very few of them seek a career in the civil service and most opt for liberal professions, i.e. in business, or as doctors. Kaladjian also affirmed that the majority of members from this community, who reside in Nicosia, voted yes for the Annan Plan because they cherish good memories of their relationships with the Turkish-Cypriot community and still have properties in the TRNC or on the Green Line that they hope to recover. There is an outspoken affinity between Armenian and Turkish Cypriots who cohabited in the same quarters until 1963, and have since rekindled friendships by visiting one another following the lifting of restrictions on crossing the buffer zone. Moreover, the Armenian community members still retain the Turkish language.

**Photos II and III: Armenian monasteries
Makaravank and Sourp Magar, now in ruin, situated in
Pentadaktylos (photos taken by Emel Akçali, in April 2004)**





The Cypriot Armenians publish their own journals: Keghart is published by the Armenian Church and there is also Artsahank, and Azad Tsain, plus a website [www.hayem.org]. One principal issue for them during the RoC legislative elections in May 2006 was the closure of the Melkonian School in 2005. This unique Armenian boarding high-school in the Eastern Mediterranean was closed down due to the lack of funds. Armenian Cypriots declare that the Melkonian School is vital for their community.

The Latin Cypriot Community

The Latins almost all disappeared from Cyprus with the arrival of the Ottomans in 1571. However, during the decline of the Ottoman Empire, a considerable number of Catholic European merchants and bank employees migrated to the island particularly from Italy, France, Dalmatia (actual Slovenia and Croatia), Spain and Austria. The Republic of Cyprus Constitution designated this community as a Latin religious group. Today, Benito Mantovani, the official representative of the community, maintains that the principle objective of the community is to incite the maximum number of members to register themselves officially in order to increase their statistics. According to the official numbers of 1991, there were 290 Latin Cypriots in Cyprus. This number has since increased to 700. According to Mantovani, however, a study conducted by Catholic priests indicates that the number of Latin Cypriots is 2,000 and there are about 5,000 other Roman Catholics residing in Cyprus. This number could rise to 13,000, if foreign workers of Catholic faith, primarily Filipinos, are also included. Catholics, who have recently settled in Cyprus, can register themselves as members of the Latin community once they receive Cypriot nationality. The community, via their representative, has also made a request to the RoC government to substitute the name of their community from Latin to Roman Catholic.

The Latin Cypriots have their own weekly radio programme which is broadcast by the state channel RIK 1. They also have their own educational establishments. Their oldest institution is the Terra Santa College founded in 1646 in Nicosia, which accepts students of all faiths and all nationalities. The Latin community also uses the Saint-Mary school in Limassol founded in 1922, and the nursery, Pera Chorio, in Paphos. Their churches include:

- The Saint-Cross, on the Green Line in Nicosia and a chapel of the Terra-Santa College;
- The Saint-Catherine, in Limassol;
- The Saint-Mary of Grace and the chapel of Saint-Joseph church, in Larnaca.

Furthermore, two orthodox churches have been donated to the Latin community in Paphos and in Polis. Catholic churches also exist in the TRNC. There is one in Kyrenia and another in Famagusta in the service of approximately ten families. The Latin Cypriots and the Turkish Cypriots have in the past enjoyed commercial exchanges but no inter-marriages have taken place.

Photo IV: The Catholic church of Sainte-Croix, on the Green Line in Nicosia (taken by Emel Akçali, in October 2006)



The majority of Latin Cypriots are merchants, doctors, bankers ... Few are civil servants. They speak Greek and some Italian. According to Mantovani, the main problem today for the Latin Cypriot community is the absence of financial resources in order to maintain their churches and retain their priests. Only four catholic priests out of many actually receive a salary.

The Turkish-Cypriot Community in the RoC

The High Level Vienna Agreements between Makarios and Denktash in 1977 remain the legal source that regulates the relations between the Greek-Cypriot administration and a few hundred Turkish Cypriots residing in the Republic of Cyprus; and the Turkish-Cypriot administration and a few thousand Greek Cypriots and Maronites residing in the TRNC. Since then, the two administrations have allowed the free and voluntary transfer of these residents from one side to the other; their access to education in their own language, to health care and freedom of worship. From April 2003, the Greek-Cypriot government ceased to keep statistics regarding Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus, courtesy of the liberty of circulation for all Cypriots and the end of the obligation for Turkish Cypriots to signal their installation to public authorities. There are, however, few Turkish Cypriots who have decided to reside permanently in the RoC following the opening of crossing points on the demarcation line.

The European Court of Human Rights (ECHR) passed a judgement in June 2004 that the Greek-Cypriot government violated the right of a Turkish Cypriot to register on the electoral list of legislative elections of 2001. The 1960 Constitution authorised separate votes for the two communities, but the Greek-Cypriot government unilaterally abolished this article within the framework of Doctrine of Necessity.⁵ It thus concluded in 2001, that the Turkish Cypriots living in the Republic of Cyprus can exercise their voting rights only in the TRNC. This is valid reciprocally for the Greek Cypriots and the Maronites residing in the TRNC. The ECHR has attributed around 3,500 euros in compensation to the plaintiff and demanded from the government of the RoC that it modifies its electoral law to prevent a contradiction with the European Convention of Human Rights. During the legislative elections in the RoC in May 2006, Mustafa Akinci, the leader of the Turkish-Cypriot political party, BDH (Peace and Democracy Movement), and a group of Turkish Cypriots, including Ali Erel, the ex director of the Turkish Cypriot Chamber of Commerce, claimed their voting rights, but this demand was rejected by the RoC government who justified its refusal by the absence of a solution to the Cyprus Problem – a fortiori when the claimers continue to reside in the TRNC. The group declared that they would then press charges in the ECHR and in February 2006, the RoC government finally concluded that only the Turkish Cypriots who reside in the territories controlled by the RoC can be candidates or electors.⁶ Following this decision, the Turkish-Cypriot poet, Neşe Yaşın – who resides in the RoC – presented herself as a candidate of the Greek-Cypriot liberal political party EDI, in the legislative elections of May 2006.

Until recently, the government of the RoC considered the Ghurbetis, the Muslim gypsies residing in the RoC as Turkish Cypriots. The Turkish government has announced that it finds this policy discriminating.

The Pontian Community

The Pontians from Georgia began to migrate to the RoC after obtaining Greek nationality, following the disintegration of the USSR. According to Raoul Tschadises, the General Secretary of the PanCypriot Pontian Association in Paphos, there are around 20,000 Pontians who reside in the RoC, and half of them are in Paphos⁷ The Pontians are able to participate in local elections just the same as Greek citizens do, and furthermore they have almost the identical rights as Cypriots. Tschadises claims, however, that all the Pontians will be eligible to obtain Cypriot nationality.

The Pontian community had left the Turkish cities of Kars, Trabzon and Erzurum to settle in regions in Georgia next to the Turkish frontier in the nineteenth century. According to Tschadises, the Pontians still speak Turkish in family circles besides Russian, Greek and Georgian. They like to listen to Turkish singers from the mainland such as Ibrahim Tatlis and they enjoy playing Turkish music during their wedding ceremonies. Although they are Christian, most still pray in Turkish. They prefer not to be involved with Cypriot politics, and since the opening of the crossing point they have established links with Turkish settlers in the TRNC who originally arrived from the Black Sea region in Turkey – the region which frontiers Georgia.

Tschadises collaborates with the Greek-Cypriot newspaper Adesmeftos in Paphos, to address problems confronting his community. In June 2004, during a demonstration staged by Pontians because allegations had been made that two Greek-Cypriot police officers had beaten up a Pontian in Paphos – the police used tear gas to disperse the crowd and this resulted in the injury of four police officers and four Pontians. Following this event, the RoC Ombudsman's annual report in July 2004 confirmed the Pontians' complaints that they had been subjected to harsh treatment from the police. The Ombudsman recommended the establishment of a commission, composed of civil servants and representatives from NGOs to control the functioning of the police. The report noted that other foreigners had also pressed charges against the Greek-Cypriot police for similar reasons.

Immigrants in the RoC

The Republic of Cyprus' (RoC) economy has been expanding for the past fifteen years. This development has necessitated a huge labour force to sustain the off-shore enterprises, services, construction and the tourist industry. The RoC government thus modified its immigration policy in 1990 in order to bridge the gap in the labour force by attracting foreign workers to the island. Throughout the 1980s, many Palestinians and Lebanese, particularly businessmen fleeing the war in their

countries, relocated themselves in the RoC in order to reap benefits from the fiscal advantages and create possible off-shore companies. Throughout the 1990s Russian and Serbian businessmen who were interested in forming off-shore businesses in Cyprus also began to arrive. During this period, the RoC welcomed Ukrainians, Pontians and Eastern Europeans as well who arrived to fill the vacancies in the service sector. Furthermore, as young Cypriots returned to their country after studying abroad – many accompanied by new foreign brides and husbands – a large number of their spouses have since obtained Cypriot nationality. Thus, these internal and external factors, have transformed the RoC from an emigration to an immigration country (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, 2005, p. 4).

Today, “over a population of 740,000 [summarized in 2005 Doros Theodorou, the Minister of Justice], we have around 150,000 foreigners: one third of this number are here legally, another third illegally and the rest includes other EU nationals. In total, the foreigners constitute one fifth of the population and almost a quarter of active workers” (Simon, 2006).

Immigrants who do not have permanent residence in the RoC, originally arrived from former Yugoslavia and the Soviet Union bloc, i.e. Serbians, Russians, Ukrainians, Géorgians, Moldavians ... and Southeast Asia: Filipinos, particularly women, Sri Lankans, Indians, Pakistanis and Chinese. And from the Middle-Eastern countries: Syrians, Lebanese and Iranians (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, op. cit.). Moreover, around 5,000 TRNC nationals cross the Green Line daily to work in the territories controlled by the Republic of Cyprus. Thus their number has increased with the liberty of circulation between the entities, since 2003.⁸ The Greek and Pontian immigrants holding Greek nationality could enter, reside, and work freely in the RoC, in compliance with a bilateral agreement between the governments of Greece and the Republic of Cyprus, even before the RoC's adhesion to the European Union. This agreement, in fact, allocates almost the same rights to Greek nationals as Cypriots and does not consider Greeks to be immigrants.

Most Russian and Serbian immigrants are employed in the off-shore sector; the majority of the Filipino and Sri-Lankan immigrants work as domestics, and the remainder are engaged in the tourist, commercial, industrial, agricultural and construction sectors. Their rights are guaranteed by the RoC Constitution and the European Convention for Human Rights: adhesion to political formations, to associations and labour unions, to take part in street demonstrations, etc. However, these rights have not incited them until today to adhere to, or participate in, unions or associations en mass. The detailed survey conducted by Trimikliniotis and Demetriou regarding the situation of the immigrants indicates that they suffer a hostile environment and racial discrimination in Greek-Cypriot society, as well as

from a repressive legislation (Trimikliniotis and Demetriou, op. cit.). Discrimination appears in the work market, education, housing, and in the media (Trimikliniotis, 2002-2005). Some NGOs have attempted to defend the rights of the immigrants, courtesy of European laws and funding.

In January 2006, the government of the RoC, adopted the European directive to reinforce the status of the foreigners. However, according to Doros Polycarpou – the director of KISA (Action for Equality support and anti-racism in Cyprus), and an NGO defending the rights of the immigrants – there has not been any improvement on this issue. It has, in fact, resulted in the refusal of some workers' immigrant residence permit renewals because they have been employed for more than four years on the island. Immigration laws in the Republic of Cyprus date back to the British colonial period and ignore the social rights of immigrants. This, according to Polycarpou, incites immigrants to illegal practices. The RoC nevertheless, is not the only new member of the European Union to neglect this directive. The Greek-Cypriot authorities have made it public that once the directive is adopted, the criteria for application of Cypriot nationality will request knowledge of the Greek language, accommodation, employment and good health.


The European Union has, at the same time, imposed certain constraints on the RoC on immigration issues. In order to harmonise with EU criteria the RoC introduced visa entry requirements to Russian Federation nationals and this move created tension between the RoC and Russia. The EU also pressurised the RoC to become more restrictive on visa delivery to nationals from Syria, Lebanon and Israel. For a period during the Israeli bombardment of Lebanon in the summer of 2006, only those Lebanese refugees holding EU or North American passports were able to enter the RoC or use the island in transit, despite the RoC being the only exit from their war ravaged country.

The Annan Plan also posed a problem to the EU because it incorporated certain incompatibilities with the *acquis communautaire*; notably the visa free entry conditions for Turkish citizens to the future United Republic of Cyprus.

The Situation in the Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus

Outside of Turkey, Cyprus has the principal insular concentration of Turks in the Mediterranean.⁹ According to the last *de facto*¹⁰ census conducted on 30 April 2006 by the TRNC authorities, the Turkish-Cypriot population has increased from 200,587 in 1996 to 264,172 inhabitants in 2006 – in other words, 31 per cent. These numbers, in fact, confirm the demographic growth projections of 1994.

Graph I: The demographic growth projections in TRNC, 1994-2025¹¹



The strong de facto demographical growth is largely due to the increase in the number of immigrant workers in the past twenty to thirty years. The numbers have escalated, according to official statistics, from 20,000 to around 45,000, while the number of foreign students in the TRNC has risen from 12,000 to 29,000. The number of foreigners who have purchased second homes in the TRNC has also increased significantly in the last ten years and there has been rapid urbanisation since the 1980s. Thus, the questionnaire of the 2006 census included a response to the number of air-condition units or swimming pools purchased by each family in order to determine future needs with regard to electricity and water supplies. However, the principal objective of this census was to calculate the exact number of Turkish Cypriots and to determine, by subtraction, the number of the population known as Turkish settlers who originally arrived from Turkey.

The number of the Turkish-Cypriot population, especially after the partition of the island in 1974, is the subject of an ardent debate, because of the conditions under which the TRNC was born and the massive arrival of the Turkish settlers in this entity. The numerical weight of Turkish settlers constitutes one of the principle obstacles presented by the Greek-Cypriot side prior to a solution to the Cyprus Question and it is one of the most ventilated subjects on the international platform.

Turkish Settlers in the TRNC

As for the TRNC side, in the aftermath of the 1974 partition of the island, Turkey encouraged numerous Anatolian families to settle in the northern part of the island by promising them housing and agricultural land. A large proportion of these families came from the Mediterranean region, notably from the cities of Adana, Silifke, Anamur, etc., from the Black Sea region, or they are Kurdish families from the southeast of Turkey. Most of the people who migrated in 1974, obtained TRNC citizenship. There are also Turkish students, and immigrant workers who currently reside in the north. Ahmet Zeki Genç, one of the settlers originally from the Black Sea region, came to the island at the age of ten and is actually president of the Cultural Association of the Black Sea in the TRNC. His family suffered economical

hardship in his native village in Turkey, thus, he did not hesitate when the Turkish state offered to settle the family in a house with a cultivable piece of land in Cyprus.¹² He underlined that his family was actually abandoned by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities once they had settled on the Karpasia peninsula; the most northern region of the island where transportation and health facilities, etc., were almost non-existent.

The distribution of these people was conducted according to their place of birth. For example, those originating from the interior of Turkey were installed in the villages of Mesaoria, and those from the Black Sea region were placed around Kyrenia and on the Karpasia peninsula. However, according to historian Nuri Çevikel, from a settler Anatolian family, the relocation of the settlers was not realised in an organised manner as had been the case during the Ottoman period.¹³ Moreover, only a few of the settlers were educated or skilled and were disadvantaged because they were unable to find a voice to defend their rights in Turkish-Cypriot society. This drawback created a cleavage between natives and settlers.

The number of settlers has been estimated between 100,000 and 111,000 according to some international reports and Greek-Cypriot researchers (Copley, 2000, pp. 7-9; Associated Press, December 1998; Kadritzke, 1998; Ioannides, 1993, pp. 34-56; Rossides and Coufoudakis, 2002, p. 140). These estimations were calculated by the difference between the number of arrivals and departures to the TRNC since 1974. The Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Finance of the RoC carried out a demographical study in 1997, using its available data on the number of Turkish Cypriots together with data published by the TRNC institutions and Turkish-Cypriot media.¹⁴ Scenario 'A' of this study considered the birth rate and the mortality rate of Turkish Cypriots similar to the rest of the Cypriot population. It took into account the rhythm of the Turkish-Cypriot departures until 1974 and the data published by the TRNC, on their arrivals and the departures since. Scenario 'B' took into account the statistics on the birth and mortality rates of Turkish Cypriots published by the TRNC authorities since 1975. It took the emigration rhythm of Turkish Cypriots as a basis. According to Scenario 'A', the study reached a total of 89,200 Turkish Cypriots, and according to Scenario 'B', a total of 85,000. The number of Turkish settlers was then obtained by subtracting the number of Turkish Cypriots from the total population of the TRNC, according to the 1996 census. The result was 109,000 settlers, according to Scenario 'A' and 117,700, according to Scenario 'B'.

One other method totalled the arrivals and departures of the Turkish citizens to and from the TRNC, as well the increase in their number. The number of settlers in 1996 in the north was therefore estimated around 80,000, according to the data of 1994. The reports of the studies also concluded that because of the increase in the

number of Turkish settlers, the number of Turkish Cypriots diminished, and they constituted nearly half of the population of the TRNC. Moreover, if 35,000 Turkish military forces were added, the Turkish-Cypriot community, according to the reports became a minority in relation to Turkish settlers.

The studies on the Turkish-Cypriot population, conducted by the Greek-Cypriot side, noticeably influenced European research on the matter. In 2003, Jaakso Laakso, a Finnish rapporteur, reflected the same views in a report that he prepared for the Parliamentary Assembly of the Council of Europe.

“It is a well-established fact that the demographic structure of the island has been continuously modified since the de facto partition of the island in 1974 as a result of the deliberate policies of the Turkish-Cypriot administration and Turkey. Despite the lack of consensus on the exact figures, all parties concerned admit that Turkish nationals have been systematically arriving in the northern part of the island. According to reliable estimates, their number currently amounts to 115,000.

The settlers come mainly from the region of Anatolia, one of the less developed regions in Turkey. Their customs and traditions differ in a significant way from those in Cyprus. These differences are the main reason for the tensions and dissatisfaction of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot population who tend to view them as a foreign element.

In particular, the Assembly expresses its concern at the continuous outflow of the indigenous Turkish-Cypriot population from the northern part. Their number decreased from 118,000 in 1974 to an estimated 87,600 in 2001. In consequence, the settlers outnumber the indigenous Turkish Cypriot population in the northern part of the island.

In the light of the information available, the Assembly cannot accept the claims that the majority of arriving Turkish nationals are seasonal workers or former inhabitants who had left the island before 1974. Therefore it condemns the policy of ‘naturalisation’ designed to encourage new arrivals and introduced by the Turkish-Cypriot administration with full support of the Government of Turkey. The Assembly is convinced that the presence of the settlers constitutes a process of hidden colonisation and an additional and important obstacle to a peaceful negotiated solution of the Cyprus problem.”¹⁵

Laakso’s report was prepared following the Motion for an order presented by M.M. Demetriou, Christodoulides, Hadjidemetriou and others in April 2000. It was prepared by using a number of sources, including official statements from the Greek-Cypriot authorities as well as from Turkish-Cypriot opposition leaders. The Rapporteur has carried out two fact-finding visits to Cyprus where he met Greek-Cypriot authorities. During the preparation for the first visit it was planned that the

Rapporteur would also meet the political leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community. Unfortunately, this part of the visit was cancelled by the hosts at very short notice due to a religious holiday which lasted the whole week. The Rapporteur’s proposal to meet at an alternative date was also rejected. Concerning the second visit, the political leaders of the Turkish-Cypriot community made it clear from the very outset that they did not wish to receive the Rapporteur, on the grounds that the pre-agreed title of the Report, “Colonisation of the Turkish settlers of the occupied part of Cyprus”, was biased.

The Greek-Cypriot community understandably fears a disruption of the demographical structure of the island, to the benefit of the Turkish settlers who would then influence the elections according to their aspirations. According to the study of Mete Hatay, a Turkish Cypriot researcher, the estimations on the supposed number of settlers obtained by totalling the difference between the arrivals and the departures to and from the TRNC, crossed with the projections of birth rates of Turkish Cypriots, do not include temporary residents, students, immigrant workers or tourists in the TRNC, or those Turkish Cypriots who used to travel with Turkish passports (Hatay, 2005). These estimations also excluded people who arrived as Turkish nationals, but after obtaining TRNC nationality they parted with their new administrative documents. “Consequently, evaluations which go from 117,000 to 130,000 are excessively exaggerated,”¹⁶ Hatay’s research actually determined that the Turkish settlers constitute only 25-30 per cent of the total population of the voters in the TRNC (ibid., p. 57), a finding which corresponds to the census results of the TRNC in 2006. Hatay’s study equally suggests that the vote of the settlers between 1981 and 1998 was largely determined by social and economical problems and more by local politics than by ideological or national themes like the Cyprus Question. His conclusions, therefore, question the claim that Turkish authorities have been influencing the election in the TRNC by the intermediary of the settlers.

According to the survey conducted by a Greek-Cypriot researcher Alexander Lordos in 2005, numbers concerning Turkish citizens who have settled in TRNC since 1974 are as follows: (Lordos, 2005):

Table I: Turkish citizens who have settled in TRNC since 1974

Turkish Citizens who came in the 1970s	32,500
Turkish Citizens who came in the 1980s	13,500
Turkish Citizens in the 1990s	9,000
Turkish Citizens who came since year 2000	4,000
TOTAL	59,000

Lordos' study does not have information about how many of these people have actually obtained TRNC citizenship. These numbers do not include 'illegal immigrants', either – Turkish Citizens who came to the TRNC in the 1990s when the requirement to present a passport was lifted from them. According to Lordos' study, the illegal immigrants are estimated to amount to about 40,000, but he does not present the source of this information.

Finally in April 2006, the CTP (Republican Turkish Party) and DP (Democratic Party) coalition government in the TRNC conducted a census, in compliance with the '2010 Advice on the Population and Housing Census' of the United Nations European Economical Commission and the Statistical Department of the EU. According to this census, the de jure population of the TRNC is estimated to be 256,644, and the number of settlers and their descendants who have obtained TRNC citizenship is 40,536. The census spreads as follows:¹⁷

Table II: TRNC population according to the April 2006 census

178,031 out of 256,644 or 69.4 %	have Turkish Cypriot citizenship
145,443 out of 178,031 (132,635 out of 145,443)	were born in Cyprus (have Turkish Cypriot parents or parent)
27,728 out of 178,031	were born in Turkey
2,435 out of 178,031	were born in UK
2,425 out of 178,031	were born in third countries
78,615 people	reside in TRNC but don't have TRNC citizenship.

Life style divergences appeared between Turkish Cypriots and the Turkish settlers when they arrived, because of the latter's traditionalism, relative conservatism on religious matters and dress code. These divergences are not, however, that apparent with the new generation of settlers, who have been born in the TRNC. Despite a great number of marriages between Anatolians and Turkish Cypriots, it cannot yet be intimated that a total integration of the first generation of settlers into Turkish-Cypriot society has taken place. Those who were born in Turkey and came to Cyprus after 1974 remain attached to their country of origin. Many still construct houses in their cities or villages of origin with the intent to return and live there later. According to the historian Nuri Çevikel, the Turkish settlers' villages have always been neglected by Turkish-Cypriot authorities and unemployment is much higher in these villages. He affirms that he, personally, could not even buy a pair of glasses until the second year of high school because of financial constraints.¹⁸

Those among the Turkish settlers who have become TRNC citizens, have formed political parties within their own communities because they estimate that Turkish-Cypriot political parties, including the leftist ones, only become interested in them during election periods, without associating them as decision-making. Nuri Çevikel also notes the absence of true solidarity among the Turkish settlers. He affirms that regionalism has developed among them and manifests itself by the creation of regional associations: Association of the Black Sea natives; Association of Adanians; Association of Hatayers. In the 1980s, the Turkish Embassy in the TRNC, which is the only embassy in this entity, formed two political parties to his devotion, TBP – Türk Birliği Partisi (Turkish Union Party) and YDP – Yeni Doğu Partisi (Renaissance Party), because of the recriminations of the Turkish settlers towards UBP and Rauf Denktash, and to prevent votes being lost to the opposition. Despite this, 30 per cent of the settlers' votes were captured by the opposition. Thus, contrary to the misconceptions, Çevikel affirms that "the tendency of the settlers' votes has always followed the vote of the native population". In 2003, the settlers' representatives announced that they would vote for the opposition, i.e. for CTP. With one more seat in the Parliament, CTP became the strongest political formation in the TRNC. However, despite being a political party of the Left, CTP has disappointed the settlers because it is perceived as making distinctions between Turks and Turkish Cypriots. In 2004, Çevikel, formed YP – Yeni Parti (The New Party) which includes in its programme, "taking care of the settlers' problems" and stipulates that they also have a voice regarding the resolution of the Cyprus Problem. For example, no-one asked their views during the preparation of the list of 45,000 settlers within the framework of the negotiations of the Annan Plan. Their request for making the list public has also not been met.

"The list resembles that prepared by the Gestapo during the Second World War. If the departure takes place according to people's will, it's good, but otherwise, it's a political assassination in the name of the settlers" (Interview with Çevikel, 2005).

Yeni Parti has not found a favourable echo among the settlers, because of their mistrust towards preceding political parties formed by settlers. Furthermore, at the moment, there are only three members in the TRNC parliament originally from Turkey.

Greek Cypriot and Maronite Communities Living in the TRNC

Today there are 403 Greek Cypriots and 140 Maronites in the TRNC who can only participate in the elections on the Greek-Cypriot side. To date, there is still no Greek-Cypriot or Maronite member in the TRNC parliament. The Greek-Cypriot side nominated representatives for these two communities living in the north, but

these representatives have not been recognised by the Turkish-Cypriot authorities. The Turkish-Cypriot authorities have, in the past, brought suits in the name of common law against journalists who criticised the government's policies concerning the voting rights of Greek Cypriots and Maronites living in the TRNC.

Cypriot Communities Residing on Both Sides of the Island

The Jewish Community

The Roman Empire forbade the Jews to locate in Cyprus. It was during the Ottoman Empire that this community started to settle on the island after their expulsion from Andalusia – first in other territories of the Empire and then in Cyprus. Jews also found refuge on the island during and after the Second World War, but the British did not give them permission to immigrate to Israel at that time and confined them to two internment camps. A large number of them have, however, settled in Israel following the country's foundation. Today the Jewish community of Cyprus totals about 3,000 persons who originally came from Russia, Lebanon and Syria. Although they live on both sides, they inaugurated their first synagogue on the island in September 2005 in the resort of Larnaca. The reasons which brought them to settle in Cyprus differ from one person to another. Some left Israel because of the ongoing insecurity in the country, others came to spend their retirement on the island and some remain for professional purposes.

The Gypsy Community

Three groups of gypsies live in Cyprus: the Ghurbetis, who are turcophone Muslim gypsies, the Mandis, who are Grecophone Christian Gypsies and the Romans who arrived from Anatolia after 1974. All these groups speak the dialects, Ghurbetcha or Romançe (Romani). The ethnonyms 'Roma' or 'Rroma' are not employed by the Cypriot Gypsies (Marsh and Strand, 2003, p. 1).

The majority of the Ghurbetis chose to live in the Turkish enclaves between 1963 and 1974 and in the TRNC after 1974. They have also participated in the armed struggle against EOKA. In 1974, several among them became prisoners for a few months in Larnaca, before being extradited to the TRNC. The Christian Gypsies were equally deported to the Republic of Cyprus territories by the TRNC government. The Gypsies residing permanently in Cyprus are estimated to be between 2,000 and 3,000, to which we should add the temporary presence of "Romanlar" of Anatolia, in the summer: musicians, basket weavers, fortune tellers, other traditional crafts and some small gypsy communities from Greece, who sell handcraft objects in the surrounding villages of Limassol (Allen, 2000). The majority of gypsy families have been sedentarised in the TRNC, but there are between 400 to 500 nomad gypsies around Paphos, Larnaca and Nicosia.

The Christian and Muslim gypsies have conserved strong ties between each other. The Ghurbetis from Güzelyurt (Morphou) recount how their sons and daughters who have immigrated to London have been helped by the Mandis (Marsh and Strand, 2003).

Some Gypsies living in the TRNC filed complaints in 1994 before the European Court of Human Rights against Turkey, because of arbitrary arrests and the demolition of their houses in the north of the island.¹⁹ The TRNC government has defended itself by arguing that these Gypsies were “fake asylum seekers” in Europe, and that they migrate to southern Cyprus for a few months in order to be eligible to receive unemployment allocations, and return to northern Cyprus to live on the money they receive on the other side. When the money runs out, then they migrate again. The RoC declared in 2001, Gypsies “... will no more obtain charity from the government and state housing” (Hellicar, 2001). A Greek-Cypriot minister even warned about spies which might exist among them. According to the press, they are also largely perceived as the “... profitters” and are rejected by the Greek-Cypriot population (ibid.). The ECHR has concluded that there is real discrimination against the Turkish-Cypriot gypsies carried out by the TRNC authorities. Information of mistreatment of Gypsies in the RoC also multiplied after a group of Ghurbetis had been beaten up, in 2001, by Greek-Cypriot army officers because they crossed over the Green Line into a south Famagousta region.²⁰ Today, European Union measures protect the Gypsies’ rights all over the island.

The British Community

Cyprus is one of the favourite destinations of the retired or well-off British citizens. A considerable number of them have purchased property, either as principal or secondary housing. Some of them suffer the consequences of the property conflict over the island because they bought properties belonging to Greek Cypriots in the north and face charges. Others in the TRNC have obtained TRNC nationality and participated in the campaign and the referendum for the Annan Plan in April 2004. It was interesting to observe that some of them who have bought properties belonging to Greek Cypriots have supported the ‘No’ campaign for the Annan Plan and hauled up the TRNC flags in front of their houses, as a sign of their ‘No’ vote.

Conclusion

As exposed in this study, besides the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots there are other Cypriots and each of these communities has been dealing with a different Cyprus Question. It is essential for the Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot communities and their political leaders to acknowledge this reality and become more sensitive to this dimension of the Cyprus conflict. Many people within the national majorities all around the world refuse to accept the legitimacy of minority identities, whether

native or immigrant. This probably relates to the fact that there is still not a polity model that can accommodate conflicts based on identity and the complex and asymmetrical socio-economic realities of the contemporary world (Keating, 2001, p. 41). However, today, the state can re-negotiate the sovereignty issue, by offering or enlarging the scope of political and socio-economic inclusion. It can also provide opportunities for multiple identities to develop by revising the education curriculum to include the history and culture of minority groups, recognising their holidays, training police officers, social workers and health care professionals to be sensitive to cultural differences in their work, developing regulations to ensure that minority groups are not ignored or stereotyped in the media. In this sense, multicultural politics are unavoidable in today's governing policies, and in future negotiations for the settlement of the Cyprus conflict.

Notes

1. E-mail exchange with Dr. Nazeret Armenagian, Adana – Nicosia, March 2006.
2. Interview with Benito Mantovani – Limassol, August 2005.
3. Interview with Antonis J. Hadji-Roussos – Nicosia, June 2005.
4. Statement of Ioannis Poyiadjis, a Maronite candidate appointed to the Maronite representative seat in the RoC legislative elections in May 2006. *Cyprus Mail*, 7 May 2006.
5. In the aftermath of the “withdrawal” or the “expulsion” of Turkish Cypriots from the RoC government in 1963, the Greek-Cypriot side introduced seven modifications in the Constitution, by presenting them in conformity with the Necessity Doctrine that they have adopted. These modifications were the fusion of the Supreme Court and the Constitutional Court, the abolition of the Greek Cypriot communal chamber and the creation of a Ministry of Education, unification of municipalities, unification of the police force, creation of an army, extension of the serving term of the President of the Republic and the deputies, the suppression of separate elections and the seat of vice-presidency to the Republic which was held by a Turkish Cypriot.
6. *Official Gazette of the RoC*, No. 4068, 10 February 2006.
7. Interview with Raoul Tschadises – Paphos, August 2005.
8. Interview with the Minister of Interior, Andreas Christou – Nicosia, June 2006.
9. Crete had a strong Turkish/Muslim population concentration until the end of the nineteenth century when their number was no more than 120,000. Later, in 1923, with the Lausanne Treaty and the population exchange between Greece and Turkey, this population diminished from Crete as well. Only a very small minority remained in the Dodecanese (in Rhodes and in Kos).
10. The census is composed of all persons present in the country, including the tourists on the day of the census.

11. Data received from the TRNC State-Planning office.
12. Interview with Ahmet Zeki Genç – Kaplica, May 2005.
13. Interview with Nuri Çevikel – Nicosia, June 2005.
14. 'Estimates of Turkish Cypriots and Settlers from Turkey, 1974-1996 The Department of Statistics of the Ministry of Finance of the RoC, August 1997. Data obtained from the Printing Office of the RoC.
15. 'Colonisation by the Turkish Settlers of the Occupied Part of Cyprus' Doc. 9799, 2 May 2003, Report of the Committee on migration, refugees and demography, M. Jaakko Laakso, Finland, Group of the Unified Left Européenne accessible on: [<http://assembly.coe.int/Documents/WorkingDocs/doc03/eDOC9799.htm>].
16. Interview with Mete Hatay – Nicosia, June 2005.
17. [www.devplan.org-TRNC State Planning department].
18. Interview with Nuri Çevikel – Nicosia, June 2005.
19. Judgement in the case of Cyprus vs. Turkey, ECHR Press Release, 10 May 2001, No. 241.
20. [<http://www.tcn-cy.freeuk.com/brutal.htm>], cited in Marsh and Strand, 2003.

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