

The Realism of Utopia: Towards an Anti-Nationalist Critique of Imperial Policy in Cyprus, 1960-2010

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Abstract

Two Marxian categories/imperatives are employed here in order to examine critically the fundamentals of the Cyprus issue over the last fifty years: the imperative of anti-imperialism and that of anti-nationalism. But by not confining itself within Marxian discourses by applying the concept of 'garrison-prison state' (Harold Lasswell) to the case of Cyprus, this article advances the thesis that at least since 1960 the Cyprus issue has been ruled by a regime alien to the interests of Cypriot society. This regime refers to the (paralegal/illegal) set of Treaties and agreements, whether in force or not, violated or not, that have been produced from the late 1950s to the present day and which pertain to a 'garrison-prison state' of affairs – primacy of hard security interests as against that of human security, of NATO powers as against that of Cypriot political forces. Every negotiation that is taking place within this framework does not lead to a new Cypriot polity freed from nationalist bureaucratisation of the political game and imperial interference in it. Instead, the article proposes, a new approach is necessary by way of launching a new constituent phase on the island, dissolving both political entities, thus disentangling Cypriot society from the evil forces of imperialism and nationalism. This is a tall order for sections of Cypriot society, both Turkish and Greek, which still want to believe in the realism of utopia.

Keywords: nationalism, imperialism, 'garrison-prison state', NATO

Introduction

A Marxian, anti-nationalist critique of international policy in Cyprus is long overdue. Past agreements or drafts of them that have failed to come into force, such as the 'Set of Ideas' by Boutros-Boutros Ghali (1992), have either been criticised on nationalist grounds or, those embracing them, could hardly escape the class boundaries of political liberalism and NATO bias. This is certainly a defect of Cypriot Left forces, both Turkish and Greek, inasmuch as over the last 50 or so years have accommodated themselves with the ruling security system of the Eastern Mediterranean, underestimating such powerful forces as those of domestic nationalism and foreign imperialism.

But a Marxian critique of nationalism and imperialism in Cyprus is necessarily a critique of realism/neo-realism in IR theory: for an island so heavily securitised by three NATO forces

(Britain, Turkey and Greece) and so much watched by nuclear Mediterranean powers, such as the USA and Israel, it is necessary to redress this balance of power by bringing Cypriot society and class struggle at the heart of any analytical or political undertaking. Notions of *human security* could also be deployed in order to facilitate an understanding of the Cyprus issue on the basis of a people-centred analysis of conflict, suffering and healing. Yet any undertaking of the kind does not necessarily dictate fixation to a strictly Marxian theoretical apparatus. On the contrary, critical scholarship in general benefits from the operationalisation of concepts that draw from other schools of thought and theoretical traditions, including that of realism/neo-realism, insofar as the framework in which they are deployed is historically and theoretically coherent. We will be drawing upon a non-Marxian concept, that of the 'garrison-prison state' – first developed by sociologist Harold Lasswell in the late 1930s – in order to advance an anti-nationalist and anti-imperial critique of international policy in Cyprus over the last fifty years or so. We will come to realise that more than a time-frame figuring an anniversary, let alone a landmark, those last fifty years of the Republic of Cyprus are rather consubstantial with a *regime*: the regime of the primacy of imperial/NATO interests over the interests of the Cypriot people via fomenting domestic nationalism. Here, one issue stands out: whereas imperial interests can very well accommodate and absorb nationalist politics and vice versa – in this instance nationalism and imperialism feed each other – a coherent critique of them, let alone a real Left political project operationalising this critique, is bad news for both reactionary projects. A Left project in general should aim at that, and the Cypriot Left in particular should take stock of this.

First, we will define the concept of the 'garrison-prison state' and examine the way in which this can be applied to the case of Cyprus. Second, we will shed light on the Annan Plan, showing that it was a project that could hardly go beyond liberal consociationalism, while simultaneously serving the hard security interests of NATO powers – including those of Greece and Turkey – thus ignoring the vital interests of Cypriot people as a whole. Finally, we shall be making some suggestions outlining certain principles upon which a new, post-imperial and post-nationalist, democratic Cypriot polity can be built.

A 'Garrison-prison State' Endorsed by the UN

The break-up of the Soviet Union had given rise to a set of USA policies leading to the setting-up of *garrison-prison states* in East-Central Europe, Central Asia and the Middle East/Caucasus zones.¹ Not that this trend is a parthenogenesis pertaining to the end of the Cold War – far from

1 On the concept of the 'garrison-prison state', see Harold Lasswell, *Essays on the Garrison State*, edited and with an introduction by Jay Stanley, New Brunswick 1997. The concept was put forward by Lasswell in the late 1930s in an essay entitled 'Sino-Japanese Crisis: The Garrison State Versus the Civilian State', and was further elaborated in his 'The Garrison State' essay, published in the *American Journal of Sociology* in January 1941. Lasswell develops the thesis that 'perpetual crisis is likely to reverse the trend of historical development from progress toward

that. In essence, it is a modern historical trend, which for the eastern Mediterranean region could be said to have been inaugurated in 1948 with the recognition of Israel, a garrison-prison state *par excellence*. It then followed 1960-1963 Cyprus – some could say in 1958 with the Macmillan plan² – and, in a more incisive and pervasive manner, in 1974 with the security formation of northern Cyprus in the wake of Turkey's two military advances and the permanent stationing of its troops there. These types of state, whose formation is conducive to an organic and perpetual crisis caused by a complex articulation of external and internal agencies, are considered to be as much ethnically pure and militarily strong as possible. A garrison-prison state highlights the position of 'the experts on violence' against that of the 'experts on business', to use Lasswell's terminology. In this respect, one could see the USA as a state with 'garrison-prison state' tendencies itself, particularly during historical periods in which security branches of the state (i.e. the Pentagon) dominate over those of diplomacy (i.e. the State Department). Arguably, such a period was that under the Bush junior administration (2000-2008). In post-Cold War settings, this line of thinking is deemed to serve the USA and Israeli security interests in creating a range of buffer zones/enclaves regulated by friendly garrison-prison states surrounding Russia and China, thus interposing between Russia and the French/German axis, on the one hand, and between Russia and China in Central Asia, on the other. We should also mention the most recent attempt to fragment the greater Middle East – two such cases being Afghanistan and Iraq – thus additionally serving Israeli interests, simply because territorial fragmentation of the Middle East further impedes Arab unity, while facilitating the stationing of US military bases and other agencies of control and manipulation of those states by the USA. Iran and/or Pakistan may also follow suit. The post-Cold War predilection for garrison-prison states only seems to be realised if the regime/state in question (e.g. Saddam's Iraq, Milosevic's Serbia) disobeys the suggestions of the global security master, i.e. the USA. Turkey might also become a target of this USA power calculus, given its large Kurdish population and its periodical opposition – at times really courageous – to USA/Israel ventures in Mesopotamia, Persia and the Levant. In our view, Cyprus falls within this analytical framework and historical trend: 'consociationalism', 'partnership states' and other such etiquettes are but intellectual exercises aiming at a sophisticated legitimisation of neo-imperial and neo-nationalist policy which, in a curious way, Israel/Palestine and Cyprus inaugurated for the Eastern Mediterranean during the Cold War. It is not Turkey or Greece, Turkish Cypriots or Greek Cypriots that favour such 'liberal' solution to the Cyprus issue. It is Anglo-Saxon neo-imperial security interests in the Eastern Mediterranean that pushed and keeps pushing this 'liberal' policy in Cyprus *via* Turkey and other NATO powers, such as Greece. Here, wrongly, societies are viewed as appendages of business and

a world commonwealth of free men, *toward* a world order in which the garrison-prison state reintroduces caste bound social systems'.

- 2 We would like to point out that the Macmillan Plan was quickly rejected by Makarios, describing the idea of 'partnership' at the state level as imposition of a 'triple condominium' on Cyprus. It is also significant to remember that the Labour opposition at the time criticised the plan as deeply divisive.

political elites serving especially the agendas of those elites, whether imperialist or nationalist, or even both.

It is perhaps crucial here to point out that imperial powers, with varying degrees of success, have always recruited local political and business elites to carry out their regional security and class policy. This is especially the case with Greece, a weak social formation with a large comprador bourgeoisie and without its own industrial-productive base, and with a political class ready to serve great power interests.³ As the late Peter Gowan points out, the contribution of world system theorists, but also of Trotski and Braudel, to understanding this type of imperial-comprador-political relations is paramount: 'This insight', Gowan says, 'is fundamental for an understanding of the history of imperialism, including the history of British imperialism. One simply cannot begin to grasp how this small island of Britain managed, for example, to dominate a country like India, without understanding this massive cooption of Indian social elites into the system'.⁴

The legal trajectory for a solution to the Cyprus issue since 1958-1960 has been characterised by great power interference and imposition of illegal schemes alien to the interests of Cypriot society. In pedigree, the inserted constitutional triarchy (the three guarantor powers) in the arrangements of 1959-1960, was merely a reflection of the British imperial policy of 'divide and rule' on the island during the EOKA struggle. The Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee contravened the very charter of the UN. Article IV of the Treaty of Guarantee, signed on 16 August 1960, states that 'in the event of a breach of the present Treaty, Greece, Turkey and the UK undertake to consult together (...). Insofar as common or concerted action may not prove possible, each of the three guaranteeing powers reserve the right to take action with the sole aim of re-establishing the state of affairs created by the present Treaty'. But this provision contravened article 24 of the UN Charter and was completely overridden by article 103. Article 24 states that 'all members [of the UN] shall refrain in their international relations from the threat or use of force against the territorial integrity or political independence of any state, or in any other manner inconsistent with the purpose of the UN'. Article 103 also affirms that 'in the event of a conflict between the obligations of the members of the UN under the present Charter and their obligations under any other international agreement, their obligations under the present Charter still prevail'.

Moving forward in time, the Ghali 'Set of Ideas' of 1992 was a step further to legitimising the partition work the British had begun in the 1950s. And the five Annan plans were the crowning of all such illegal efforts. Having reinforced the Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee, Annan-V was over 9000 pages long, complicated and muddled, and a true legal labyrinth

3 On this subject, see my 'The Left and the Crisis of the Third Hellenic Republic, 1989-1997' in D. Sassoon (ed.) (1997) *Looking Left*, London: I.B. Tauris.

4 P. Gowan (2010) 'Interview' (with M. Newman and M. Bojcum) in his *A Calculus of Power*, London: Verso, pp. 233-234.

poisoning the Cyprus *acquis* with all conceivable previous illegalities.⁵ The plan legitimised Britain's and NATO's colonial rights in and around Cyprus, while legally embedding Turkey's and Greece's security interests there. The Cypriots themselves were left separated into two garrison-prison statelets – what Annan, rather euphemistically, called 'constituent states of the United Cyprus Republic'. In this forty-five year old (il)legal trajectory and international imbroglio, only one UN plan made serious sense: that produced by UN mediator Galo Plaza in 1964-1965. Turkey argued that it was pro-Greek Cypriot, which is absolutely true, but if it had been supported by Britain and the USA, it could have given a politically functional and socially anti-racist solution to the island's problem of central governance, excluding both *enosis* and *taksim*, thus facilitating the mingling of the Cypriot population. More to the point, the Plaza blueprint would not have contravened the charter of the UN, something which all schemes since 1959 have been doing, the Annan plan being the most outrageous and illegal of all. In other words: the Cypriot *acquis* over the decades has gone from bad to worse and it has taken on the characteristics of a *regime* constraining all social forces that opt to operate within its analytical or political boundaries. It is little wonder that some have even tried to blend it with the European *acquis*, by way of legitimising substantive derogations.

The Annan Plan(s) Reinforced the 'Garrison-prison State' of Affairs in Cyprus

The Hellenic plan was to achieve Cypriot EU membership, regardless of whether a solution to the island's division was found beforehand. Yet Cyprus' entry to the EU could have been delayed until such time as Turkey received satisfaction on Cyprus, including its own EU membership. But Greece, breaking with its post-war subservient conservative traditions, threatened to veto the EU's eastward enlargement, so the thought was ruled out. This left one course open for the Anglo-Saxons: to use the UN to supervise talks between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots, a process that kicked off at a G8 summit in summer 1999. It pointedly ignored both the legal (Greek)-Cypriot government and the UN Security Council itself. The Security Council simply came to rubber-stamp an Anglo-Saxon decision, committing Annan to initiate, oversee and conclude the process. Thus, in November of that year,

'Kofi Annan presented the two sides with a twenty-point "non-paper" containing fundamental principles to guide the resolution of the problem. This "non-paper" included the commitment that the comprehensive solution would be presented for ratification by separate and simultaneous referenda in both communities. The referenda would provide through democratic means the legitimisation and approval of the comprehensive solution. The idea of the referenda was not new. It first appeared in 1992 in the secretary-general's "set

5 Same as the European *acquis*, the Cypriot *acquis* can be seen as the accumulation of all legal documents, international Treaties and other legal material, whether bilateral or not, concerning the Cyprus issue and which has been accumulating from the 1950s onwards.

of ideas". The referenda would be held on the outcome of the negotiated agreement on the Cyprus question. In 2004, however, the matter that was presented to the referendum vote was the disputed product of the secretary general's arbitration and not the product of negotiations between the parties. [the shift] in the secretary-general's role from the offer of "good offices" to arbitration was not apparent at the time'.⁶

Strict timelines were set, the aim being to sort out Cyprus before it became a member of the EU.⁷ The first plan was produced punctually by David Hannay and Tom Weston (the State Department's special coordinator on Cyprus), just a few weeks before the EU summit in Copenhagen (December 2002) – the venue where the EU would assess the outcome of negotiations with the Greek-led Republic: A UN Peruvian functionary by the name of Alvaro De Soto fig-leafed the whole operation. The coordination among them was perfect – 'not a cigarette paper could have been slipped between their positions', Hannay said self-indulgently – but they miscalculated the responses from the Cypriot society.⁸

Annan-I became Annan-II and then Annan-III in a bout of horse-trading that was becoming increasingly internationalised in the run up to the war against Iraq. The Greek Cypriots accepted all three plans, but not Denkrash – who at some point was unwell and had no credentials to endorse or sign – and Turkey. With its Middle Eastern role looming large, and with its generals restless not to concede more to the pro-European bloc led by Erdogan, Turkey's deep state realised that it was a good time for bargaining.

Turkey, under the new leadership of Tayyip Erdogan and Abdullah Gul, gave a new impetus to Turkish European diplomacy and vocation, presenting a mild, democratic and serene profile, as opposed to the macho politics of its previous, more or less, pro-Kemalist elites. This began winning over the Europeans, as the new ruling group in Turkey appeared willing to launch – and did – the kind of liberal reforms the Europeans wanted, particularly on human rights issues. Erdogan wanted a diplomatic solution to the Cyprus issue and appeared to be drifting away from the maximalist security positions of Denktash and the Turkish military. The Europeans liked it a lot, particularly the Left, but at the same time Turkey was under pressure from the USA to concede to American troops the right of passage, and flight from its South-eastern provinces to attack Saddam from the north. This Turkey opposed through a lack of votes in the Grand Assembly, but

6 V. Coufoudakis (2006) *Cyprus: A Contemporary Problem in Historical Perspective*, Minneapolis: University of Minnesota Press, pp. 28-29. Coufoudakis, despite giving powerful arguments in favour of the plan's rejection, he fails to put forth a post-nationalist comprehensive alternative *outwith* the historical imperial perimeter crystallised in the plan.

7 We follow here the narrative by C. Palley (2005) *An International Relations Debacle: The UN Secretary-General's Mission of Good Offices in Cyprus, 1999-2004*, Oxford: Hart Publishing, pp. 23 ff. This account, deeply pro-Greek, is nevertheless accurate in its blow-by-blow description of events and remains the only available for consultation in English to date.

8 Hannay's version of events is deeply flawed and one-sided – see his *Cyprus: The Search for a Solution*, London: I.B. Tauris, 2005.

there was an overall Turkish strategic calculus for this stance. The USA-UK, having enforced two no-fly zones in southern and northern Iraq in the 1990s, had at the same time assisted the Kurds in building their institutions in their northern regions, something that was anathema to the Turkish Kemalist elite. With the victorious Anglo-Saxon troops in Northern Iraq in alliance with the Kurdish anti-Saddam forces of *peshmerga*, the Turks rightly changed their minds. The worst scenario for Turkey would have been the initiation of a messy war, and a process whereby Iraqi Kurdistan could receive state recognition around a territory encompassing the oil-rich zones of Kirkuk and Mosul. It was a time of hard bargaining for Turkey, which at the same time wanted to streamline its financial crisis by seeking an IMF loan. Cyprus, once again, was used as a bargaining chip. State Department official Daniel Fried, in the presence of his colleague Mathew Bryza, spoke as follows to an audience of Greek Americans in Washington DC on 12 June 2003:

‘When we were trying to persuade Turkey to allow the passage of our troops through its territory into northern Iraq, we offered Turkey two incentives: several billion dollars in grants and loans and Cyprus in the form of the Annan plan.’⁹

Yet, despite the compromising stance of the Greek Cypriot side, none of the three plans satisfied the Turkish overall strategic calculus. Indeed, Denktash turned down all three versions, disappointing Clerides, the liberal-conservative President of the Greek-led Republic. Clerides accepted Annan-I as a basis for negotiation and indicated that he would be willing to accept Annan-II prior to the Copenhagen EU Council in December 2002. Annan-III came into being after Papadopoulos won the elections, against Clerides, in February 2003. It expired at The Hague the following month, again because of Denktash’s intransigence. On 10 March 2003, Annan himself announced, ‘we’ve come to the end of the road’. Well, not quite.

With the Greek-led Republic on the threshold of the EU, the Annan conception and its international cohort began to move once more. Papadopoulos’ nationalist politics seize the opportunity by sending a letter to Annan asking him to become involved yet again, so that Cyprus can join the EU as a united country. But the international cohort was assisted by the toppling of Denktash, giving hope to the Turkish Cypriots – and Erdogan – that the Annan conception and its accompanying benefits could be endorsed. This, it should be noted, was strengthening Erdogan’s democratic hand against Kemalism, certainly a highly desirable development for regional, European and global politics, but the Annan plan was supposed to solve the Cyprus issue, not the Turkish one.

But thus far, no serious negotiation had taken place between the Greek and the Turkish Cypriots; the UN arbitration was binding and all three plans were concocted; and this all was happening without any authorisation from the Security Council. As far as the EU was concerned, its influence in steering the various exogenous actors involved, such as De Soto, was non-existent,

9 *Cyprus Weekly*, 5-11 August 2005, p. 3. These are the words by Bryza himself.

despite the fact that all versions of the plan circumvented the European *acquis*, thus requiring insertion of unusual derogations – such as on freedom of settlement. Time was running out for Erdogan, who had made entry of Turkey into the EU the top priority of his cabinet. Yet, he had received two pledges from Prodi, who had visited Ankara on 15 January 2004: a) Settling the Cyprus problem is not a precondition for Turkey's EU accession negotiations; b) whether a settlement is reached or not, the next step would be the lifting of the embargoes against the TRNC^{10,11}

The Guarantor powers (Turkey, Britain, Greece) and their poor relatives, the Turkish and the Greek Cypriots, were summoned to the White House. Thus, a fourth edition of the plan was finalised by the Americans, while last-minute adjustments took place after the Bürgenstock meeting in Interlaken, Switzerland. There, Constantine Karamanlis junior, the nephew of Karamanlis who negotiated the 1959-1960 settlements, met with Papadopoulos and one must be naive to assume that Karamanlis said to Papadopoulos nothing or that he should not accept the plan (Papadopoulos, the new President of the Greek-led Republic, was a Makarios loyalist in the latter's cabinets of the 1960s). Thus, on the last day of March 2004, we arrive at Annan-V, a non-negotiable item, which was to be tested with the two separate referenda on 24 April, before the official entry of the Republic into the EU on 1 May. So much for procedural matters. Substance was just as bad.

On the very day of the working class, 1 May, which coincided with Cyprus' EU entry, the Greek-led Republic would have had to abolish itself and change its name, which was tough for Papadopoulos and Christophias alike, the latter being his powerful Communist ally, leading the AKEL party, which once opposed the EC/EU as a capitalist club. In its stead, two constituent states of 'equal status' would be formed – one Turkish and one Greek Cypriot – subject to no hierarchy of laws and administrative/executive units. The two states would be called 'United Cyprus Republic' – as in a Spanish wedding, the new appellation did not replace the old but encompassed it.

The senate (the upper house) would be equally divided, 50:50, between Greek and Turkish Cypriots (this and many other points came straight from Ghali's 'Set of Ideas'). At the component level state, the lower house, seats would be 'distributed on the basis of the number of persons holding internal component state citizenship of each component state', provided that each such state 'shall be attributed a minimum of one quarter of the seats'.¹² That meant that the Turkish

10 See Palley (2005), fn. 7.

11 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.

12 K.A. Kyriakides (2004) 'Legitimising the Illegitimate? The Origins and Objectives of the Annan Plan' in V. Koufoudakis and K.A. Kyriakides, *The Case Against the Annan Plan*, London: Lobby for Cyprus, p. 25. Kyriakides' criticism of the illegalities of the Annan schemes is one of the most accurate accounts available to date – the author teaches Law at the University of Hertfordshire.

faction would be not less than 25% of the total. Annan's scheme provided that parliamentary (lower house) decisions, in order to be valid, needed the approval of both houses, with simple majority of members present and voting, including one quarter of senators present and voting from each constituent state. For particularly specified matters, a special majority of two-fifths of sitting senators, from each component state, would be required. Thus, as Kyriakides pinpoints, 'although the word veto does not appear in the Annan Plan, the Turkish Cypriot members of parliament will effectively have a veto over all legislative decisions if they voted *en bloc*'.¹³ In this context, it is legitimate to argue that Turkey, via the political services of its Turkish Cypriot component state, could lay claims on the policy of Cyprus as a whole. But this was an Anglo-Saxon and, indeed, NATO arrangement: no such claim could be laid by Turkey on Cyprus, had it not been previously agreed by the USA serving her specific policies in the region at any given conjuncture.

There would be no President or Prime Minister, but a 'Presidential Council' composed of four Greek Cypriots and two Turkish Cypriots. They would have to be elected by a 'special majority', requiring two-fifths of each half of the senate. The rotating President of the Council would have no casting vote, carrying no special status as President of the Republic. All Council members 'shall be equal' and if they failed to reach consensus, then the Council would make decisions by simple majority, which in all cases must comprise at least one member from each component state. Time and again, and although the word 'veto' does not appear anywhere in the plan as in the 1959-1960 constitutional arrangements, the Turkish members of the Council would effectively have had a veto if they voted *en bloc*. Disagreements and proceedings following vetoed items would be delegated to foreign arbitration: a Supreme Court, composed of three Turks, three Greeks and three foreigners would have to approve and decide upon a course of policy action.¹⁴ There is no face-saving wash here – did anybody say that neo-colonialism cannot be so openly crude?

These deeply dysfunctional, cumbersome and destabilising provisions, encouraging all sorts of ethnic rancour and religious separatisms to flourish again and again, and aiding all kinds of wheeling and dealing between the regional powers and the Anglo-Saxons in the ultimate service of neo-imperial arrangements, were topped up with the reinforcement of the illegal Treaties of Establishment, Alliance and Guarantee, which, among others: a) concede the right to the Guarantor powers (Turkey, Britain and Greece) to intervene in the internal affairs of each constituent state; b) concede the right to Britain to unimpeded access to the waters corresponding to the Sovereign Base Areas (SBAs) – these 'trampolines for Iraq' – as Perry Anderson called them – as well as in, around and over Cyprus; and c) concede the right to Turkey and Greece to have permanently stationed troops on the island, with no guarantees for the enforcement of the

13 *Ibid.*

14 Other key institutions in which foreign nationals would have had important powers included the Reconciliation Commission, the Central Bank, the Relocation Board, the Property Court and the organs of the Property Board.

provision for the withdrawal of the bulk of their troops over a period of years, in case they had refused to do so for whatever conceivable reason – for instance if the Europeans blocked Turkey's EU membership.

The Force of Utopia: Founding Principles for a New Cypriot Polity

Cypriot society has been and is being ruled by a *regime* that pertains to a 'garrison-prison state' of affairs in which the security interests of NATO powers prevail massively over any other interest. This regime is regulated by a rather 'paralegal' set of Treaties and agreements, whether in force or not, violated or not, and for which we reserved here the term 'Cypriot *acquis*'. The first task of the Cypriot Left, both Turkish and Greek, is to opt out of the logic of this regime and denounce the Cypriot *acquis* as a security construction which undermines the fundamental freedoms of the Cypriot people, such as that of movement and settlement.

The second task of the Cypriot Left is to initiate a massive educational campaign for all peoples of Cyprus in order to deconstruct the superstructures of nationalism, separatism, ethnic segregation and imperialism at all levels, socially, culturally and, above all, politically. This is a tall order, as the myth that there exist 'two nations' in Cyprus, a notion so dear to nationalists on both sides, has to be demolished. Yet this second task should be seen *pari passu* with a third one, namely with the materialisation of the arduous project of the dissolution of both bureaucratic entities on the island as the *conditio sine qua non* for a post-nationalist, post-imperial new polity. For this to happen, a prolonged *constituent phase* is necessary advancing internationalism and class solidarity against nationalism and nationalist education, and popular unity and Cypriot 'Constitutional patriotism' – a Habermasian phrase often used in the scholarly work by Niyazi Kizilurek – against imperial interference.¹⁵ We put the issue this way because the anti-nationalist (liberal) Left in Cyprus and elsewhere forget the villain of imperialism, whereas the anti-imperial (conservative) Left in Cyprus and elsewhere forget the evil of nationalism. In this respect, the so-called issue of settlers and refugees is not a huge problem to tackle inasmuch as the central issue is not that of separation into two states, but rather that of unification, democratisation and social solidarity and mingling of people.¹⁶ But the issues of the British bases, of the Turkish army and security personnel, as well as of the Greek air base in Paphos and perhaps other forces that Greece may have on the island, are issues about which the Cypriot Left must deal with in an uncompromising manner during the proposed constituent phase. In other words, the Treaties of Guarantee, Alliance and

15 For a scholarly discussion in this direction see the excellent collection of articles on a Cypriot Constitutional Convention edited by Andreas Auer for the *Journal of Balkan and Near Eastern Studies*, Vol. II, No. 4, December 2009.

16 Towards this analytical perspective one should read the excellent text by A.M. Agathangelou and K.D. Killian (2009) 'The Discourse of Refugee Trauma: Epistemologies of the Displaced, the State, and Mental Health Practitioners', *The Cyprus Review*, Vol. 21, No. 1 (Spring), pp. 19-58.

Establishment should be scrapped once and for all, and that is something worth fighting for. Put another way, the constituent phase towards a new Cypriot united polity should be seen as a radical departure from the regime of subsumption to foreign imperialism and domestic nationalist forces, while simultaneously designing the new democratic contours of it. Time and again, this is a tall order, not least because the locomotive that feeds the two political bureaucracies that exist on the island are precisely a multiple combination of imperial/NATO backing, nationalist ideology and comprador interests. In this respect, when all is said and done, it may well be reminded – with apologies to Marx and Lenin – that what we have called here *Cypriot regime/acquis* cannot be reformed. Indeed, as Marxian utopias dictate, it can only be smashed.

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