

Ronald Storrs and Mısırlızade Necati: The Governor's Encounter with the 'Thirteenth Greek'

ALTAY NEVZAT¹

Abstract

Relations between British colonial administrators and the Turkish Cypriots are commonly portrayed purely through the rigid framework of subservience and collaboration. Furnishing evidence through a micro-historical study of the relationship which developed in the late 1920s between Governor Ronald Storrs and Turkish Cypriot political leader Mısırlızade Necati, the paper proposes that this familiar portrayal is misleading and overlooks significant cases of conflict between the British authorities and prevailing Turkish Cypriot political forces. The argument is supported by a wider analysis of the two men's formative experiences and in particular of the 'public school spirit' inculcated in Storrs as invariably in other British administrators also. Based upon such analysis it is suggested that such dispute went beyond the solely personal and that the conflictual relationship that arose in this instance was largely a consequence of the colonial inability to adequately adapt to the novel force of Kemalist nationalism in Cyprus.

Keywords: British imperialism, colonialism, Cyprus, education, Kemalism, nationalism, Turkish Cypriots

Both in the pertinent historiography and in the common psyche of contemporary Turkish and especially Greek Cypriots, lies a powerful tendency to view, as conscious, constant and masterful, the British endeavours to manipulate the political forces in the colony of Cyprus. With the effects of this proficiency are sometimes also associated the rise of conflicting nationalisms and more generally the political woes of their isle.² Corollary propositions, sometimes implicit and more

1 A previous version of this paper was presented in Turkish at the 4th Symposium on Leading Turkish Cypriots in History, held at the Eastern Mediterranean University, 12-13 October 2006; The author also wishes to thank the anonymous reviewers of this article for their constructive suggestions which have helped enhance the final version of the work.

2 A recent study by Hadjipavlou found that, 'Almost 80% of Greek Cypriot interviewees believe that "divide-and-rule" policy of British colonialists contributed very much to the creation and perpetuation of the Cyprus conflict, as against 47% of Turkish Cypriots', and that a further 12% of Greek Cypriots and 22% of Turkish Cypriots believed it contributed 'somewhat'. M. Hadjipavlou (2007) 'The Cyprus Conflict: Root Causes and Implications for Peacebuilding', *Journal of Peace Research*, Vol. 44, No. 3, pp. 352-354; See also Y. Papadakis (2005) *Echoes From The Dead Zone: Across the Cyprus Divide*, London: I.B. Tauris, pp. 52, 64-65, and R. Bryant (2006) 'On the Condition of Postcoloniality in Cyprus', in Papadakis, Y., Peristianis, N. and Welz, G. (eds), *Divided Cyprus: Modernity, History, And An Island in Conflict*, Bloomington and Indiana: Indiana University Press, p. 62.

frequently attributable to Greek Cypriot sources as well as those more instinctively critical of the colonial, are that the Turkish Cypriot political elite functioned as a collaborationist prop to shore-up British rule and that it was the British who in fact encouraged the development of a Turkish national identity among the island's Cypriot Muslims in order to neutralise the growing threat of majority Greek nationalism to their rule.³

The troubled case of Sir Ronald Storrs and his relations with the Turkish Cypriot communal leader Mısırlızade Necati is one episode that illustrates how British authorities actually proved incapable of successfully managing the political challenges with which they were confronted in Cyprus and essentially acted, albeit to the imperial detriment, in a manner provoking the rising political tide of Turkish nationalism. It demonstrates also how, rather than continually operating as colonial collaborators, Turkish Cypriot political elites could and did sometimes display the capacity and will for confrontation with the colonial power coupled with the further potential for cooperation with other colonised communities.

Little indication as to the thought behind Storrs' appointment to replace Malcolm Stevenson as Governor in Cyprus is available from either colonial archives or from Storrs' personal papers and autobiography. His selection as Governor was a bit unusual, though not wholly exceptional, in that he had not risen through the ranks of the Colonial Service itself but rather had begun his career in the 'Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service'. Here he had started out as an adviser in the Ministry of Finance in Egypt, soon climbing in rank and eventually being drafted in as governor of Jerusalem during the War.⁴ Storrs' previous postings, 'had made him known to a wide circle of influential persons in Britain', and he also possessed potential patrons through the aristocratic connections devolving from his mother's side.⁵ It has been suggested that such influences may have assisted his elevation to the governorship of his first Crown Colony.⁶ Certainly it had not hurt that the year prior to his appointment he made a most positive impression on Leo Amery, the Secretary of State for the Colonies, acting as the minister's personal guide during an extended visit to Palestine. Amery noted that Storrs had been able to charm and befriend leading figures of all hues, whether, 'Arab, Jew or Greek'; a welcome skill for a governor replacing the universally unpopular Malcolm Stevenson.⁷

3 See, for example, P.M. Kitromilides (2011) 'Relevance or Irrelevance of Nationalism? A Perspective from the Eastern Mediterranean', *International Journal of Politics, Culture and Society*, Vol. 24, p. 60.

4 A. Kirk-Greene (2000) *Britain's Imperial Administrators, 1858-1966*, Basingstoke: Macmillan Press, pp. 68, 83-84.

5 His mother was the great-granddaughter of the Earl of Kilmorey. For further detail on Ronald Storrs' lineage see R. Storrs (1943) *Orientalisms* (definitive edition), London: Nicholson and Watson, p. 1.

6 G.S. Georghallides (1985) *Cyprus and the Governorship of Sir Ronald Storrs: The Causes of the 1931 Crisis*, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, p. 2 and 3n.

7 L.S. Amery (1953) *My Political Life. Volume Two: War and Peace, 1914-1929*, London: Hutchinson, pp. 320-324, and G.S. Georghallides (1979) *A Political and Administrative History of Cyprus 1918-1926: With a Survey of the Foundations of British Rule*, Nicosia: Cyprus Research Centre, p. 18.

Yet even if his route to the governorship of Cyprus was somewhat unorthodox and dependent to some extent on his contacts, Storrs, in terms of educational and cultural background, matched the ideal type colonial appointment. Storrs, above all, was a 'nurtured' gentleman whose elite public school education had equipped him with the character and values that the Colonial Office top brass believed would hold any decent imperial officer in good stead. And here, in fact, lies much of the explanation for *Storrs'* failings. For, while he might not be exempted from all personal criticism, Storrs was himself the product of a particular process of socialisation and outlook on Empire that the overseas services actively sought for assignment. So, as will be explained at various junctures in this exposition, there were besides the personal, more systemic reasons also for the malfunctioning of British policy in Cyprus.

As to Storrs' remit in Cyprus, with the island's uncertain future status having apparently been conclusively settled by the Treaty of Lausanne (with Greece and Turkey both conceding to its conditions), Cyprus had finally been declared a Crown Colony in 1925.⁸ There was maybe no striking urgency in the agenda which the Colonial Office expected Storrs to manage, but overlapping with the diplomatic function of regaining public confidence, Storrs, it was expected, would soon put to work to spur the island's economic development. This, as Colonial Office officials had long admitted, had been unjustly hindered due to the burdens of the Turkish Tribute payments that were exacted from the populace of Cyprus and transferred to the Treasury in London.⁹ With Cyprus now a Crown Colony, the material advance of the island and its inhabitants took on priority; not only being deemed economically and politically expedient, but also, in the words of Amery himself, to now comprise, 'a more definite moral responsibility'.¹⁰ But it was not to be any economic advance of the Storrs' governorship which left its historic mark as much as it was the culmination of his period of rule in Government House, in crisis and conflict with both Greek and Turkish Cypriots. Regarding the latter, his chief adversary was to be Mısırlızađe Necati.

'Worthless', 'nonentity', 'a man of straw', 'weak', 'irresponsible', 'bought', 'small Turk' ... and, perhaps most revealingly, 'the Thirteenth Greek'. These are but a few of the recorded, somewhat paradoxical and undoubtedly offensive words with which Sir Ronald Storrs found it appropriate to describe Mısırlızađe Necati. Storrs is known, at least in private, to have on occasion used less than flattering epithets for even some of those with whom he was more closely allied, (referring quite patronisingly to the Turkish Cypriot political leader Münir Bey, for example, as 'the good fat Turk' and similarly to the Greek Cypriot Mayor of Nicosia as, 'a not disagreeable bandit'),¹¹ but such common behaviour barely explains the intense hostility which Storrs reserved for Necati.

8 Amery (1953), *op. cit.*, p. 367.

9 *Ibid.*, pp. 367-368.

10 *Ibid.*, p. 367.

11 Storrs' hand-written notes on a list of dinner guests for the evening of 16 October 1930. The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1956) from Pembroke College, Cambridge, BOX IV, Folder I, Cyprus, 1927-1931, Letters.

Here the author seeks to address the causes of Storrs' violent dislike of Necati, not only through contrasting the two men personally, but also through an analysis of the significant role that Necati played in disrupting Storrs' game plan for the island whilst Governor of Cyprus; Complimentary purposes are to highlight the reasons lying behind Storrs' approach, not so much to Necati as an individual, but to the rising force that he represented and more generally to expose the systemic foundations of the faults and limitations which became detrimental to colonial relations with the very Turkish community upon which the British often saw themselves as relying for support in maintaining their rule.

Storrs' Earlier Years in Cyprus and the Mounting Turkish Cypriot Challenge to Colonial Authority

At least as enthusiastically as previous British administrators of the island, if not more so, Storrs dutifully set out to improve the island's lot as he best saw fit. Amongst other endeavours he worked hard to promote its products and services in overseas markets (from Cyprus cigarettes to a nascent tourism) and supported the founding of a Chamber of Commerce.¹² Probably most significantly, though, it was under Storrs' watch, following his numerous personal interventions that the home authorities finally conceded to provide an extra £32,800 annually as aid to cover the remaining cost of the notoriously unpopular Turkish debt charge with which the island was encumbered.¹³ Even in pursuit of such efforts, however, Storrs' attitude to the people of the island was often revealed as rather condescending, commonly flaunting, 'the guardian spirit of paternalism', the roots of which Kirk-Greene finds discernible, 'in the formative structures and codes of the public school authority system'.¹⁴ In a private letter soliciting support from George Lloyd, Storrs, characteristically appealed, 'If you ... could even now intervene on behalf of my Islanders, tiresome though they are beyond belief, you would perhaps be fortified in your resolution by the remembrance that they represent, however unworthily, yet after all a British colony'.¹⁵

That the Turks in particular might from the outset have been relatively sceptical about Storrs' attitude would be understandable. Storrs was not only a self-declared life-long Philhellene upon whom the Greek Government had bestowed the title of Commander of the Order of St Saviour

12 See Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 487-488, 498, and G.S. Georghallides (1988) *Cyprus, British Imperialism and Governor Sir Ronald Storrs*, Nicosia: Zavallis Press, pp. 24-25.

13 Sir G. Hill (1952) *A History of Cyprus; Volume IV The Ottoman Province The British Colony, 1571-1948*, edited by Sir Harry Luke, Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, pp. 476-477; Indeed, on this occasion, Storrs had been greeted at Limassol upon his return from a trip to Rhodes by the members of the Legislative Council (Greek and Turk) who pronounced their joint gratefulness: 'for the great care and consideration which prompted your appeal to relieve Cyprus from the heavy burden of the Turkish Debt charge'. Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 478.

14 Kirk-Greene (2000) *op. cit.*, p. 282.

15 Storrs to GL, 15 November 1928. The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1956) from Pembroke College, Cambridge, BOX IV, Folder 1, Cyprus, 1927-1931, Letters.

and who, albeit a decade after having left the island, had apparently quite intently toasted, 'for the union of Cyprus with Greece'.¹⁶ In addition, Storrs was the associate of none other than Colonel T.E. Lawrence (aka 'Lawrence of Arabia') reviled by the Turks, but regarded by Storrs as, 'a loyal, unchanging and affectionate friend', to whom he insensitively offered a position in the Cyprus administration as Director of Archaeology.¹⁷ It was in Arabia that the two men had first worked together for British military intelligence to bring down the Ottoman Empire, and while Lawrence turned-down this newer offer, had it been accepted it might well have been considered an affront by the Turkish Cypriots.¹⁸

It was not though, as has been suggested, that, 'Storrs was a Philhellene who therefore confronted throughout his term as Governor the popular movement initiated to protect the national identity of the Turkish Cypriots and restore their rights'.¹⁹ While Storrs clearly and passionately admired the ancient Greeks, and may also have held some latent sympathies with Greek Cypriot aspirations for *enosis*, (if not for any effort to forcefully achieve it under his watch!); this does not appear to have directly motivated his actions towards the Turkish Cypriot community.²⁰ Nor is it wholly accurate to argue, as does Gazioglu, that he therefore, 'Supported obstructive initiatives to prevent the spread on the island of Atatürk's reforms', for at least in one instance, regarding the use of the Latin alphabet, he actually furnished his support, (on one account as a result of İsmet Paşa's personal intervention).²¹ The leading publication of the Turkish Cypriot Kemalists actually thanked the governor personally for his implementing the necessary changes.²² Were it not for the introduction of this reform, lines of exchange with Kemalist Turkey would no doubt have been strained. Children forced to use the old script would no longer have had access to the textbooks of Istanbul publishers, or adult readers to other Turkish publications. This might also have been expected, therefore, to have hampered the dissemination of Turkish nationalist sentiment. Nevertheless, it is additionally true that Turkish Cypriot Kemalists had already organised to voluntarily teach the new Latin characters to the public prior to Storrs' official decision and had Storrs followed a confrontational path on this matter he was liable to have faced

16 Georghallides (1988) *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 31.

17 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 22-23.

18 See T.E. Lawrence (1962) *Seven Pillars of Wisdom: A Triumph* (reprint of 1926), London: Penguin Books, pp. 56-57.

19 A.C. Gazioglu (1997) *Kıbrıs Tarihi: İngiliz Dönemi (1878-1960)* [The History of Cyprus: The British Period (1878-1960)], Lefkoşa: Kıbrıs Araştırma ve Yayın Merkezi, p. 62.

20 Storrs himself remarked, 'Even the political extremists must, I thought, realize that a British Governor, however Philhellene, was not appointed to give away portions of the Empire'. Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 478; See also Georghallides (1988) *op. cit.*, pp. 23, 31.

21 Gazioglu (1997), *op. cit.*, p. 62 and H. Behçet (1969) *Kıbrıs Türk Maarif Tarihi (1571-1968)* [The History of the Education of the Turks of Cyprus], Lefkoşa: Halkın Sesi, p. 314 and 314n.

22 Münir Bey *et al.*, to Colonial Secretary, 27 March 1930. SA1/1320/1928.

substantial opposition that could well have inflamed, rather than contained, the Kemalist surge.²³ Indeed, in other areas such as the replacement of the fez with the hat, Storrs' obstruction of Kemalist reforms only served to steel their supporters.²⁴

On taking up his post at the end of 1926, Storrs had found the three Turkish members of the Legislative Council amenable to his preferences and policies and had quickly built a fine rapport with their leading figure, Director of the Evkaf and newly elected member of the Council, Mehmet Münir. Not only did Storrs get on famously well with Münir himself, but the other two Turkish members were beholden to Münir, virtually guaranteeing that Storrs could rely upon their support too.²⁵ Eyyub was once a leading nationalist figure who had in December 1922 collected signatures so, 'that the Island may be abandoned and restored to the recent national government of Turkey which is the original master of the Island'.²⁶ He had later, however, become a passive supporter of British policy in the Council, following the lead of Münir.²⁷ On the other hand, Mahmut Celaleddin, regarded to have been a generally more pliable figure, was a relative of Münir.²⁸ The comfort possessed in carrying these three legislators appears to have made Storrs initially oblivious to the progressive challenge of Kemalism in Cyprus, and of growing public opposition to Münir and his faithful pro-British stance.

As expounded in depth elsewhere: 'Storrs [soon] set to work, in collusion with Münir, to bring under centralized control the autonomous or semi-autonomous institutions of the Moslem Turks'.²⁹ The Evkaf in particular, already under British domination in the mid-1920s, became ever more the chosen vehicle through which the British ventured to stamp their authority, albeit indirectly, over the Moslem community.³⁰ Perhaps most critically for the Turkish Cypriots, it was under Storrs that the traditionally autonomous institutions of the Müftülük and Kadılık were disbanded and their functions brought under the control of the Evkaf that Münir led; this despite communal opposition and despite the fact noted by Storrs himself that Münir supposedly had liberty to oppose any of the Governor's views, 'except where the Evkaf department is directly

23 Minute by C.H. Hart-Davis, 10 April 1929. SAI/1320/1928.

24 See, for example, Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 23 March 1932. CO 67/244/8.

25 Nicholson bluntly informed London that Münir, 'controls the votes of his two colleagues'. Nicholson to Secretary of State, 20 December 1928. CO 883/8.

26 Dr Eyyoub to Stevenson, 11 December 1922. SAI/1273/1922.

27 For a discussion as to why this may have been so see A. Nevzat (2005) *Nationalism Amongst the Turks of Cyprus: The First Wave*, Oulu: Oulu University Press, pp. 288-289.

28 Attachment to Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12 March 1930. CO 67/233/14.

29 A. Nevzat (2010) 'Securing the Office of Müftü: Nationalism, Religion and the Turks of Cyprus', in Aktar, A., Kızılyürek, N. and Özkırmlı, U. (eds), *Nationalism in the Troubled Triangle: Cyprus, Greece and Turkey*, Basingstoke: Palgrave Macmillan, p. 163; For a more detailed consideration of the Turkish nationalist approach to the Müftülük in Cyprus see also Nevzat (2010) *passim*.

30 *Ibid.*, pp. 163-164.

concerned'.³¹ In Gürel's words: 'By striking against these institutions the British administration was in a way depriving the Turkish community of its fundamental institutions of leadership and representation'.³²

Having been appointed to direct the Evkaf in addition to leading the Moslem contingent in the Legislative Council, Münir was thereby to become the principal agent of British policy *vis-à-vis* the Moslem Turks. In time, he came to hold charge of virtually every other significant Turkish Cypriot power-base (from educational committees to representation on the Museum Board). Importantly, Münir was also an appointed member of the inner circle Executive Council that advised the Governor on policy. So reliant did Storrs become on Münir that when during an extended period when Storrs lay incapacitated by ill health, Acting Governor Reginald Nicholson proceeded to have tendered Münir's resignation from this Council, Storrs would not let the matter lie. Upon his return, he overruled Nicholson and reversed his decision, re-appointing Münir and justifying his decision to London by declaring that Münir was 'invaluable' and 'independent'.³³

Storrs viewed those leading the Kemalist movement in Cyprus as but a handful of ungrateful, disloyal troublemakers, disassociated from any social underpinning. And he did so even more than with those championing the *enotist* cause. Subsequently, he also apportioned blame to the activities of the first Turkish Consul, Asaf Bey, whom he accused in his memoirs of, 'creating a small but active element of opposition to the loyal Turkish majority'.³⁴ Certainly Asaf did in some ways assist the island's Kemalist movement and even campaigned on behalf of Mısırlızaade Necati and his allies,³⁵ but Asaf was a contributing factor to, rather than the font of early Turkish nationalism in Cyprus.

The origins of Turkish nationalism in Cyprus are quite often still sought in the 1950s and perceived solely as a reaction to the climax of demands for *enosis*. Yet it had been developing its first rudimentary roots on the island from the early twentieth century onwards, largely as a consequence of interactions with the wider Turkish world beyond the island's shores. Ideas and sentiments of nation and nationalism had initially begun to permeate the consciousness of certain members of the more educated urban elite through the Young Turk movement. Some Turkish Cypriots had actually been active in this movement during studies and residence in Ottoman

31 *Ibid.*

32 Ş.S. Gürel (1984) *Kıbrıs Tarihi, 1878-1960: Kolonyalizm, Ulusçuluk ve Uluslararası Politika, I. cilt* [The History of Cyprus, 1878-1960: Colonialism, Nationalism and International Politics, Vol. 1], Ankara: Kaynak Yayınları, p. 172.

33 Storrs to Secretary of State, 7 May 1930. CO 67/235/13.

34 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 501.

35 See, for instance, H.D. Purcell (1969) *Cyprus*, New York/Washington: Praeger, p. 243 and Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, p. 467; See also J.A. McHenry (1987) *The Uneasy Partnership on Cyprus 1919-1939: The Political and Diplomatic Interaction between Great Britain, Turkey and the Turkish Cypriot Community*, New York: Garland Publishing Inc., p. 134.

Turkey. Others, (as will be remarked upon further below), were influenced by Turkish schoolmasters who came from the 'motherland', through clubs and associations and through the written media including Young Turk journals published and disseminated in Cyprus.³⁶ It was in the 1920s, however, when, (notwithstanding the disillusionment and sense of abandonment resulting from Lausanne), an incipient Turkish nationalism began to spread amongst the broader Turkish Cypriot populace under the impact of the Kemalist success in Anatolia. Its diffusion was facilitated to an increasingly educated and literate people through the schools, and again, importantly, through the press. The popular *Doğru Yol* and *Söz* newspapers and periodical *Ankebut* were prime examples of post-World War One publications that championed the nationalist idea and proudly communicated the initiatives and exploits of Mustafa Kemal in Anatolia to their readers in Cyprus. As early as 1921, while battle still raged precariously between irredentist Greek forces and Kemal's armies, a poem published in *Ankebut* had, for instance, boldly commenced:

Anatolia is the hearth of the Turks,
And Cyprus is a part of it,
Could the flag of the Greek be raised,
While there exists the red standard of the Turk.³⁷

A year later, with the Kemalist armies now approaching victory, the same publication conveyed Kemal's words to the 'great noble Turkish nation' and adorned its copy with a handsome sketch of the leader of said nation, hailing him as '*Our Commander-in-Chief*'.³⁸

The leading Kemalist Turks of Cyprus opposed the traditionalist and conservative manner of rule over them that Storrs and Münir saw fit and were increasingly willing to make their opposition known and felt to a receptive public. The loyal and submissive Moslem population that Storrs (and many others in the Colonial Service) wished to perceive the Turkish Cypriots as being, was gradually being transformed into a more politically demanding and less subservient force which wanted, amongst other things, to have its modern Turkish identity highlighted as opposed to traditional Islamic identity. In defence of Storrs' inadequacy in fully fathoming such change it might be granted that even with hindsight this transformation is still not fully appreciated. For example, having noted how Storrs recognised the 'Greekness' of the Greek Cypriots, one prominent contemporary scholar still makes a fundamental error when he says: 'By the same token, Storrs accepted the Turkishness of the Turks, and his "administrative tactics" led him to flit from a Greek social gathering, where he liked to display his considerable classical learning, to some Turkish reception where a sprig of green would be worn in his white lapel'. Green, was of course

36 For reference to the early Young Turk impact see Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 147-152.

37 *Ankebut*, 23 October 1921.

38 (Emphasis added). *Ankebut*, 13 September 1922.

the traditionally espoused colour of Islam. Were Storrs to have commonly pandered to the Turkishness of the Turkish Cypriots, to their burgeoning 'national' identity he would instead have been sure to have worn red!³⁹

An early warning sign should have been detected in the summer of 1928, when Storrs took a leading role in the organisation of celebrations of the fiftieth jubilee anniversary of the British occupation of the island. In his memoirs Storrs recounted that, 'the Turks compensated ... for the relative absence of Greek spectators by running a special train of Moslem sportsmen from Famagusta', to make up for the shortfall of local participation resulting from a Greek Cypriot boycott.⁴⁰ He failed to mention here, however, that participation in the celebrations also became an issue in the Turkish Cypriot community and that a manifesto signed by four Nicosia councillors, (Fadıl Korkut, Şevket Bahçe, Mehmet Necmi (Avkıran) and Dr Pertev), protesting the celebrations, pronounced: 'The day on which the Turkish flag was lowered from the bastions of Cyprus is for the Turks of Cyprus not a day of festivity, but a day of mourning'.⁴¹ While the masses did not in this case *all* follow their lead, these pioneering anti-colonial nationalists nevertheless symbolised the fundamental shift underway in Turkish Cypriot politics. A new generation imbued with Turkish nationalist sentiments, modern values concerning political representation, and ample political skills, was now to make progressive difficulties for the British policy of depending wholly upon the traditional Moslem elite in the face of Greek Cypriot opposition.

Interestingly, on this occasion, Misırlızade Necati was not one of those who had supported the boycott, and had in fact supported and campaigned for the Evkaf camp's call to participate in the festivities, albeit on the premise that to do otherwise would be to play into the hands of the Greeks. 'What a strange outcome', reflected Korkut, 'that the Legislative Council elections would bring Storrs and Necati into confrontation just a short while after this event'.⁴² Indeed, it was to be in alliance with the very same municipal councillors that Necati was to spearhead the campaign of a Kemalist trio of Turkish Cypriot candidates to replace the pro-British forces in the Legislative Council in the elections of 1930.

Storrs should perhaps have also taken greater notice of his sometimes more perceptive deputy, Reginald Nicholson. In a confidential despatch sent to the Secretary of State in December 1928, while standing in for Storrs as Acting Governor, Nicholson had already forecast trouble ahead, alerting London:

39 R. Holland (1998) *Britain and the Revolt in Cyprus, 1954-1959*, Oxford: Clarendon Press, p. 9.

40 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 488-489.

41 F.N. Korkut (2000) *Hatıralar* [Memoirs], edited by Fedai, H. and Altan, M.H. with a foreword by Fedai, H., Famagusta: Eastern Mediterranean University Press, p. 68.

42 *Ibid.*, p. 36; Further correspondence, comments and articles related to the position of the Turks of Cyprus during the celebrations can be found in SA1/623/1928.

'Neither is it certain that Government will invariably be able to count upon the votes of all the Turkish members. Signs are not wanting of a determined movement, supported if not directed by foreign agencies, in favour of introducing in Cyprus the reforms recently carried out in Turkey and the cleavage between the Old and New Turks is already in process of breaking down the solidarity of the Turkish community.

It is not impossible that an adherent of the new school may displace one of the present Turkish members at the next election and, in that event, that he might throw in his lot with the Greek majority whenever his party saw any advantage in such a course.'⁴³

The comparative abilities of others to sometimes grasp realities more astutely than Storrs and personal animosities aside, it was, however, the wider, more essential gulf between Storrs and Necari based upon their cultural and social underpinnings which truly hampered Storrs' ability to adequately negotiate the escalating challenges of the Turkish nationalists in Cyprus.

Sources of Confrontation between 'Old Boys' and 'New Turks'

Eldest son of an Anglican priest, later to become Dean of Rochester, much of Ronald Storrs' earlier upbringing and socialisation was the product of an elite public school education, first at the illustrious Temple Grove and then, even more formatively, as a boarder at the more pastoral institution of Charterhouse, one of the nine uppermost 'Clarendon Schools' which consistently provided the 'cream of the crop' for colonial service.⁴⁴ With respect to those of Storrs' generation, Heussler wrote: 'Of the three major stages in the development of the character and capacity of the typical English civil servant – family, Public School and university – there can be little doubt that the Public School stage exerts the most lasting and coherent influence.'⁴⁵ It was especially at schools of the calibre of Charterhouse, where pupils and future imperial masters learnt the ropes and experienced the, 'deliberate inculcation of character, loyalty, hierarchical respect, service and self-discipline'.⁴⁶ Of the public schools taken together it has been entered that they, 'not only instilled in a boy the qualities required by that imperial class which the expanding empire needed but also taught him the art of imperial administration: "he learned, in short, to rule".'⁴⁷ Of Charterhouse, one noted present-day observer studying the architecture of the school's memorial chapel more recently remarked: 'Its geometric spires and minarets proclaim complete confidence that

43 Nicholson to Secretary of State, 6 December 1928. CO 67/227/4.

44 For a brief historical introduction to the Temple Grove School see *sn. sa*; The other eight members of the Clarendon cluster were Eton, Harrow, Merchant Taylors, Rugby, St. Paul's, Shrewsbury, Westminster and Winchester. Kirk-Greene (2000) *op. cit.*, 293n.

45 R. Heussler (1963) *Yesterday's Rulers: The Making of the British Colonial Service*, Syracuse: Syracuse University Press, p. 92.

46 Kirk-Greene (2000) *op. cit.*, p. 10.

47 *Ibid.*, p. 14.

Charterhouse educates men who are destined to rule the universe'.⁴⁸ This was indeed what the overseas services' chief recruiters put their trust in. From their perspective, 'the importance of Public Schools as sources of recruitment', was essential for, 'Colonial officials were not just civil servants with a serious duty to the nation ... their responsibility for protecting and guiding native peoples in primitive societies was unique. They were the bearers of civilization, the custodians of a sacred trust'.⁴⁹ Notwithstanding any status and 'character' associated with his family's aristocratic ties, which were relatively removed anyway and no longer the primary construct of overseas imperial service, Storrs was a shining example of the 'nurturing', of the 'elitist moulding' of the public schools that was supplemented, 'actively but less pressingly, in the universities'.⁵⁰ Yet as Heussler and Kirk-Greene have both underlined, while the public schools reliably delivered the 'character-building' values of loyalty and honesty and instilled the self-confidence, 'the habit of ready authority which was often looked on as ... the trait of the imperial administrator', they were also inclined to, 'undervalue the qualities of imagination, sensibility and critical ability'.⁵¹

From Charterhouse, Storrs had followed the almost predictable educational trajectory of a prospective imperial officer to Oxbridge. He reinforced the usual foundations of regard for the ancients of Greece received in British public schools generally, and at Charterhouse even more robustly, by proceeding to study the classics at his father's old college of Pembroke.⁵² After graduating he returned to Cambridge for an extra year to study Arabic, having been recruited in the meantime to join the 'Anglo-Egyptian Civil Service'. Though in comparison to the much larger and more institutionalised Colonial Service, the Anglo-Egyptian was considered to have been, 'less of a career, less of a Service', rewarding direct appointments could be had there all the same.⁵³ This was, therefore, an opportunity he could be pleased with, for as with other, 'sons of landed or formerly landed families', such placements acted, 'as guarantees of continued status for their families', and, 'Within the Oxbridge world', in particular, appointment to Egypt, 'was a prized position'.⁵⁴

Necati, on the other hand, was not a character likely to agree with the elitist and aristocratic airs of the Charterhouse and Cambridge-educated, classicist Storrs who had developed, 'notions of

48 Roy Hattersley, 'Private Pleasure but no Public Virtue', in *The Guardian*, 17 July 2007.

49 Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, pp. 82-83.

50 Kirk-Greene (2000), *op. cit.*, pp. 9, 16-17.

51 *Ibid.*, p. 13 and Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, p. 89.

52 Storrs (1943), *op. cit.*, pp. 1-2, 10.

53 Kirk-Greene (2000) *op. cit.*, p. 70.

54 *Ibid.*, p. 67 and Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*; Storrs' family appeared to have maintained a fair but not very lavish standard of living, most of their more ancient aristocratic ancestors' family wealth having long since been depleted. Storrs notes proudly his mother's thriftiness, and of his great-grandmother, Lady Anna Maria Needham, jovially relates that she, 'was fortunate enough to have been twice smuggled out of a Debtors' Prison in a coffin'. See Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 1, 4-6.

cultural and national superiority', through, 'the conventional English upper class education of his time'.⁵⁵ Emanating from a politically inclined family whose defiant members had faced-off against pro-British Evkaf candidates before, Necati was educated at the İdadi school in Nicosia, where many of the period's leading Turkish nationalists first developed their nationalist sensitivities. The İdadi, (later to become the Turkish Lycée), was certainly not Charterhouse, but was similarly formative of the beliefs, attitude and manner of Necati. It was the most modern and advanced of the island's Turkish educational establishments, following a secular curriculum modelled on that of its counterparts in mainland Turkey that contrasted with the relatively more provincial and religiously-oriented education traditionally proffered by the island's other schools. In addition to the imported texts followed by its pupils, many of the school's masters, particularly the more senior, also came from Turkey. Necati graduated in 1915, by which time pre-Kemalist Turkish nationalism was already making its mark. Indeed, while the permeation of Kemalist nationalism through schoolteachers in the Turkish Lycée (Storrs preferred to have it called the 'Moslem' Lycée) during the 1920s is quite widely documented, it has also been contended that, 'in the pre-World War I era the Ottoman authorities required that any teachers to be seconded for service in Cyprus had to be supporters ... of the pan-Turkist Türk Ocağı'.⁵⁶ As Landau explains, the very founding objective of the 'Türk Ocağı' (or 'Turkish Hearth') was to extend Turkish and pan-Turkish nationalism especially through education and by mobilising public opinion.⁵⁷ The membership and activities of the Türk Ocağı have been shown also to have been linked to those of the Kardeş Ocağı (or 'Hearth of Brethren') and its forerunners in Cyprus.⁵⁸ Moreover, the social influence of such schoolmasters was not confined to the cadres of the İdadi alone, but actually proliferated from therein, for it was the very graduates of this school who typically ended up staffing the more junior Turkish schools around the island.⁵⁹

Necati's interaction with such early nationalists and his socialisation at the İdadi did not cease either upon his graduation for he returned again later in a temporary role lecturing on Ottoman history and was to become closely associated with the Kardeş Ocağı too.⁶⁰ The latter, in fact, was to ardently campaign on his behalf in his famed electoral success of 1930.⁶¹ As with growing numbers of the younger generation of Turkish Cypriots, Necati was thus imbued with the Turkish nationalist sentiment and buoyed, by the self-assurance and pride of fellowship with the new

55 Georghallides (1988) *op. cit.*, pp. 18-19.

56 Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 208-209, 302.

57 J.M. Landau (1995) *Pan-Turkism: From Irredentism to Cooperation*, 2nd edition, London: Hurst and Co., p. 41.

58 Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 182-183, 361-365.

59 *Ibid.*, p. 302.

60 *Ibid.*, pp. 302, 361, 364-365, 378.

61 *Ibid.*, pp. 361, 364-365, 378, 426.

dynamic Kemalist nation-state of Turkey, as opposed to being weighed and downtrodden by subject affiliation with its aloof but decrepit Ottoman predecessor. Necati was of a modern breed of Turk; a clearly ambitious, charismatic, determined and rather stubborn young man who felt destined to become a populist politician, a 'champion' of his nation, and was not unwilling to spend a small fortune of his personal inheritance on a well-planned electoral campaign that contended with colonial authority and ultimately dethroned its chief advocate Mûnir.⁶² Several years Storrs' junior, this youthful Turk was somewhat of a firebrand who was unwilling to pay traditional deference to age or authority and was not culturally anglicised in a manner with which Storrs could associate. On the contrary, the very conversation of this foremost example of the unfamiliar 'New Turk' referred to by Nicholson was indirectly conducted with Storrs by means of translation.⁶³

Necati was neither from the stately imperial mould of Turk, to which Storrs had paid his respects in his preservation of the burial ground of the Cyprus born (and buried) Ottoman Grand Vizier Kamil Pasha, recording on his engraved epitaph that he was, 'A Great Turk and a Great Man';⁶⁴ Nor was he of the class of 'gentleman' to which Mûnir belonged and further aspired to. In supporting his legal training in England, Storrs' predecessor Stevenson had explained not just that Mûnir possessed, 'an excellent knowledge of English', and was, 'a very able official', who already had under his belt, '15 years' service in the Treasury Department', but also that Mûnir was the son-in-law of the island's Müftü, came from, 'one of the best local Turkish families', and was overall of exceptional 'social standing'. It was in British interest, Stevenson had argued, for one such as Mûnir to be financially supported in such undertakings.⁶⁵ It was also more broadly comprehensible that it would be Mûnir rather than Necati to whom Storrs would attach his loyalty and camaraderie. 'The domestic social hierarchy', Heussler observed, 'transferred its spirit to the colonies', where, 'Officials found native aristocrats worthy of one kind of treatment and other natives worthy of another. This was not discrimination in the usual unsavoury sense but simply a matter of following habit and the line of least resistance'.⁶⁶ As Cannadine reflects: 'From one perspective, the British may indeed have seen the peoples of their empire as alien, as other, as beneath them – to be lorded over and condescended to. But from another, they also saw them as similar, as analogous, as

62 Korkut (2000) *op. cit.*, pp. 39-40.

63 M. Necati Özkan (1967); This and other information was recorded by Necati in an extensive interview conducted by the Turkish Cypriot educationist Ali Süha in the mid-1960s after the former had retired from politics. The only known tapes of the interview are held by the Necati Özkan Foundation in Nicosia which kindly granted the author access. The author of this article has suggested to the Foundations' administrators that the tapes be digitalised, both to ease access for future researchers and due to the real danger of deterioration of material stored in this now aged technological medium.

64 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 496-497.

65 See Nicholson to Secretary of State, 7 September 1927. CO 67/203.

66 Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, p. 98.

equal and sometimes even as better than they were themselves'.⁶⁷ British imperialists such as Storrs thus appreciated, 'status similarities based on perceptions of affinity', an affinity that Storrs could establish with a respectable man of status the likes of which were possessed by Mûnir, but not with the 'little Turk' Necati.⁶⁸ Cannadine elucidates further in an associated vein:

'Britons came from what they believed to be a hierarchical society, it was natural for them, when doing business or negotiating power, to search for overseas collaborators from the top of the indigenous social spectrum, rather than from lower down, whom they supported, whose co-operation they needed, and through whom they ruled. The British chose the allies they did abroad because of the social conditioning and social perceptions they brought with them from home.'⁶⁹

Storrs' approach to Necati was not interpreted by the Turkish Cypriot nationalists as a purely incidental and personal affair either, but rather as a reflection of a more general posture towards their community. Believing as they did in their national credentials and popular legitimacy they saw Mûnir as being used simply as a minion to govern over base people. One early Turkish Cypriot nationalist, Faiz Kaymak, was to bitterly complain of the era that the island's Turks were ruled over somewhat like a 'tribe' by its 'chieftains'.⁷⁰ Paralleling the more commonly documented Greek Cypriot dislike of being branded by the British in a similar category to the Empire's Asian and African subjects, an irate Korkut was to write specifically of Governor Storrs that he, 'considered us a herd lowlier than the Negroes of Africa'.⁷¹

Support for the proposition that Storrs was indeed, on one level at least, an enduringly prejudiced orientalist is unequivocally given by Edward Said himself. Said, in fact, classes Storrs as a model 'Orientalist-cum-imperial agent' who ultimately, 'expressed the traditional Western hostility to and fear of the Orient'. While it is hard to retroactively fathom the degree to which Storrs' Orientalism may have been a root cause of his extended and vehement dislike of Mısırlızade Necati, rather than it being a more private abhorrence associated with Necati's having caused

67 D. Cannadine (2001) 'Ornamentalism', *History Today*, Vol. 51, No. 5, p. 14.

68 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 502.

69 *Ibid.*, p. 15.

70 F. Kaymak (1968) *Kıbnı Türkleri Bu Duruma Nasıl Düştü?* [How Did The Turks of Cyprus Come To This Point?], İstanbul: Alpay Basımevi, p. 9.

71 Korkut (2000) *op. cit.*, p. 70; As Bryant highlights with reference to commentary in the Greek Cypriot press of as early as 1889, 'the Greek Orthodox majority in the island claimed not only to possess European ancestry but even that they were the real ancestors of Europe', and did not wish to countenance that the English rule over them in like manner as they did the Africans and Asians. Bryant (2006) *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49; Likewise, Holland notes a more general sense of demeanment felt by Greek Cypriot nationalists by the posting to Cyprus of countless British officials who had previously served in 'backward' African colonies. Holland (1998) *op. cit.*, p. 14. That this was the case was in some ways hardly surprising considering that such a high proportion of posts were in Africa. See Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, p. 3.

humiliation and disruption to his plans of action, Said at least suggests another relevant, broader context through which to appreciate Storrs' conduct. And, Mısrılızade Necati, (the epithet 'Mısrılızade', by the way, indicating the familial association of Necati with forefathers from – an even more oriental? – Egypt), could conceivably as a result be considered a particularly explicable target of Storrs' warped chauvinism.⁷²

The Kemalist Electoral Coup and 'Ungentlemanly' Conduct

There is much that might be said of the election campaign of 1930, in which Necati defeated Münir Bey by a handsome margin, his colleague Zeka Bey replaced Celaleddin Efendi, and the third within the Kemalist trio, Ahmed Said came within a whisker of unseating Eyyub who held on by only twenty-four votes.⁷³ The focus here though must lie on Storrs' reaction to the challenge.

No sooner were the results in than Storrs began accusing Necati of having, 'secured his election by a very lavish disbursement of money'.⁷⁴ Necati did indeed spend a large sum on the campaign, some of which he frankly revealed later had been used for less than orthodox purposes, including the finance of moles placed to spy on the Münir camp. Necati disclosed in his own words that as:

'the days of the election neared, I had a spy too ... Halum Agha's Remzi Bey. This man was Münir's friend whom he liked a lot. I helped him, I gave [him] money, but I requested only that, "you should not leave Münir Bey's side and you should write me a journal [of his activities ...] and post it [to me] so that I know [what he's doing and planning]". And he did this loyally.⁷⁵

Nevertheless, trying to explain away Necati's success in elections simply on the basis of corrupt electoral practice was really an attempt by Storrs to conceal his own inability to assess the strength of Necati's support and the concomitant opposition to Münir's pro-British stance.⁷⁶ Storrs, like virtually all colonial administrators, genuinely had little faith in electoral politics in Cyprus, (presumably more so because he did not like the results!). Belonging to a, 'deeply conservative ... nation emphatically not dedicated to the proposition that all men (let alone women) were created equal', he, as with his peers, it could be argued, was not either a great admirer of democratic elections in principle.⁷⁷ 'The root of the matter', Storrs wrote, 'is that election by

72 EW. Said (1979) *Orientalism*, New York: Vintage Books, pp. 237, 245-246.

73 See Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 29 October 1930. SAI/1430/1930.

74 Storrs to Secretary of State, 12 March 1931. CO 67/238/11.

75 Necati also admits to having his supporters spread false propaganda in the villages and also of posting misleading letters to Münir under an alias. Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*

76 Necati defeated the incumbent, Münir, by 1,993 to 1,553 votes. Enclosure in Storrs to Secretary of State, 29 October 1930. SAI/1430/1930.

77 Cannadine (2001) *op. cit.*, p. 13.

popular vote has been proved, in every single way in which it has been tried for all forms of general and local administration, to be in Cyprus a failure. Elections without exception have resulted in nothing but disorder, corruption and demoralization and have failed to produce representation which is not a mockery.⁷⁸ Yet, as he himself acknowledged, corrupt electoral practices were in Cyprus the norm rather than exceptional, and Mûnir had the capacity that Necati lacked, to mobilise Evkaf resources, a valuable source of patronage that the British had conceded previously played a role in electoral campaigns.⁷⁹ Indeed, it has been claimed that Storrs himself directly intervened in the electoral process in favour of Mûnir, interjecting, for example, with the managers of mining concerns so that they lean upon Turkish Cypriot employees to oppose Necati.⁸⁰

So concerned had Necati been by the danger of Storrs meddling in the elections that he apparently requested of the Parliamentary Undersecretary of State, Dr Drummond Shiels, that he be present to bear witness to the final stages of the electoral process.⁸¹ British administrators displayed some unease at the fact that Shiels did actually bring forward his expected visit to the island to coincide with the last leg of the election campaign.⁸² This rearrangement appears to have been more welcomed, however, by Necati and his allies, Korkut reflecting: 'According to the belief held by our community at the time, had Doctor Shiller [sic] not been present in Cyprus, it was not inconceivable that Storrs would have acted more aggressively towards us and disrupted the elections'.⁸³

Whatever the still disputed original inspiration for Shiels' 'unofficial' visit, there is little doubt that the defeat of Storrs' protégé, the staunchly pro-British Mûnir at the hands of the young, inexperienced and brash Kemalist, was a serious blow to the Governor, and one that was compounded by the presence of his Colonial Office superior. In fact, before long London was openly expressing a loss of faith in the ability of its Governor to read social and political developments pertaining to the Turks of Cyprus. Shortly after his eventful visit to Cyprus, having been informed of new disputes between Raif Efendi (another of the class of early Kemalists and the father of Rauf Denktaş) and the Storrs-Mûnir duo, Shiels commented:

'I must confess that I have the feeling that the Gov[erno]r is influenced in his outlook by his great admiration of and personal friendship for Munir Bey. He was much disappointed at his non-success in the elections. ... The Greeks are fairly solid against the Gov[ernmen]t, and the Turks have been helpful to the Gov[ernmen]t, the Leg[islative] Council being

78 Storrs to Shuckburgh, 12 March 1930. CO 67/233/14.

79 The electoral utility of Evkaf resources had also been recognised at an earlier date in relation to Mûnir's predecessor. See Clauson to Bonar Law, 6 November 1916. CO 67/182.

80 Korkut (2000) *op. cit.*, pp. 38-40.

81 Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*

82 Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, pp. 381-383.

83 Korkut (2000) *op. cit.*, p. 40.

constituted as it is, it is very important that the Gov[erno]r should not appear to side with one section of the Turks in the split which has taken place. I know it is for the best reasons that he is drawn to Munir bey's party – because they are strongly pro British – but we don't want the other section made more anti-British, as they may become if Munir Bey's party is too much backed up at Gov[ernmen]t House.⁸⁴

In the aftermath of the elections tensions continued to mount. Storrs was already stressed by the unwelcome election of a more nationalist contingent of Greek Cypriot legislators.⁸⁵ But it was his relationship with Necati that was for some time the principal thorn-in-the-side for the still incensed governor. This he reflected in a series of despatches to London in which he confirmed that Necati was, 'in the forefront of the Kemalist anti-Government movement'. Alleging that Necati was responsible for instigating violent rioting among Turkish Lycée students on the eve of the election, Storrs reported that Necati's activities were being kept under close police surveillance.⁸⁶ Necati, however, denied any such responsibility and maintained that the commotion experienced at the Lycée was solely the natural exuberance of a new generation of Turks greeting his electoral triumph. Over the following weeks the events at the Lycée continued to be the subject of a string of official communications largely focused on condemning Necati. On the one hand, it was almost as if the issue were being purposefully strung out, perhaps as a pretext to try and rein in the feisty and unpredictable budding legislator before he wrought more serious damage to colonial interests and to the Governor's prestige. On the other, the Governor's persistent pursuit of what he perceived to be indiscipline engendered by Necati at a school mastered by English schoolteachers was explicable also in terms of his own socialisation. 'The unique contribution of the Public Schools to the forming', of colonial officers, writes Heussler, 'was to tolerate any sort of eccentricity so long as it did not violate the tenets of gentlemanly behaviour.'⁸⁷ It was a line which Necati's uncouth behaviour had insolently crossed and for which he needed to be harshly chided. This Storrs sought to do with little reference to his mother's entreaties upon learning that her son had risen in rank within the Charterhouse's cadet corps. Lucy Storrs had written: 'We are so glad you are a Sergeant: do use your privileges with mercy.'⁸⁸

Colonial Secretary Henniker-Heatton had first tried a softer, more flattering approach, inviting Necati to afternoon tea and proffering his warm congratulations on Necati's success. The polite atmosphere began to sour, however, when he persisted in a line of questioning as to Necati's political plans. Necati claimed that when he pushed Henniker-Heatton to be more forthright the latter finally asked plainly whether Necati intended to maintain a vote in accordance with the

84 Minute by Dr Drummond Shiels, 26 May 1931. CO 67/238/11.

85 Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, pp. 380-381.

86 Storrs to Secretary of State, 12 March 1931. CO 67/238/11.

87 Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, p. 104.

88 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 6.

Government lead, or else to collude with Greek Cypriot legislators. Necati states that he was so angered that he walked out of the meeting after responding that he could not be 'bought' and that he would, 'stand wherever I see the interests of my nation'.⁸⁹ Henniker-Heatton now advised Storrs that he should intervene and plainly spell out to Necati, 'that the only course now left for him is to try to repair the damage he has caused', which he could only do, 'by apologizing to the Headmaster and throwing what influence he carries on to the side of discipline'.⁹⁰ A few days later Necati was indeed sent for by the Governor. In the presence of the imposing Chief Commandant of Police, Colonel Gallagher, Governor Storrs sternly reprimanded Necati regarding his behaviour at the Lycée and implied more serious consequences if he did not correct his ways. Storrs recorded of Necati that he had 'caused' Necati, 'to apologize, on the spot, v[ery] humbly', to the school's headmaster Mr Grant.⁹¹

The pro-Münir Hakikat newspaper, alleging access to inside information, unsurprisingly reported Storrs' version of events and in a belittling manner stated that a jittery Necati had, 'prayed to be pardoned!'⁹² It was perhaps being presumed that Necati, having received a strong dose of discipline, as well as reproached within both the four walls of the Governor's Office and publicly, would be browbeaten into silence. Necati was not, however, cowed and provided a very different story as to the goings on at Government House.

'They thought I was a child ... they would scare me. That day was the 28th of October. The following day was Republic Day [the anniversary of the establishment of the Turkish Republic]. "Will you go to Larnaca to pay your respects to the Turkish Consul?" [the Governor asked]. "Of course I will go, as I always do", I said. "Will you address the crowds if they gather in Nicosia?" [he asked]. "We'll see", I said ... "I will make up my own mind what I will say on such national days".'⁹³

The following day Necati not only made a public address but also visited the school which was the centre of controversy and was welcomed there by students singing the Turkish national anthem.⁹⁴ He proceeded also to petition the Secretary of State for the Colonies, then Lord Passfield, 'strongly protesting' against the insulting treatment meted out to him by Storrs.⁹⁵ Storrs also persisted in conveying his own negative views and concerns regarding Necati whom he now

89 Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*

90 Minute by Henniker-Heatton, 25 October 1930. SAI/1420/1930.

91 Minute by Storrs, 30 October 1930. SAI/1420/1930.

92 See Hakikat, 'Necati Bey offered an apology to the Headmaster of the Lycée before His Excellency the Governor', and 'Necati Bey's Apology Communicated to the Students', undated extracts translated from Hakikat, in SAI/950/1926; See also 'The Question of Interview'. Extract from Hakikat 25 November 1930. SAI/ 950/1926.

93 Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*

94 *Söz*, 6 November 1930.

95 Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*, and Nedjari to Secretary of State, 5 November 1930. SAI/1420/1930.

described as 'irresponsible' and 'a weak character'. More ominously he cautioned London that: 'In view of his adherence to the "turkish nationalist" creed, which is of recent growth and, I believe, extraneous origin, I am quite unable to foretell what his attitude in the Council will be. Indeed the objectives of the movement which he represents are by no means clear.'⁹⁶

Although Storrs' dislike of and appetite to demean Necati had apparently not abated, an extended evaluation of the political situation which he sent to London six months later, did suggest that Storrs was finally drawing firmer conclusions regarding the implications of the political rise of Mısırlızade Necati. He notified Passfield that:

'The attitude of the Greek members, always disagreeable and sometimes trying, has been ineffective for so long as the Government could rely on loyal Turkish cooperation. This is no longer available as the Greeks, taking advantage of personal and party rivalries within the Turkish community, have been enabled to buy or otherwise persuade a recently elected Turkish nonentity, Nejatı Bey, to vote with them ... There is every reason to suppose that Nejatı Bey can be counted upon for full participation in all steps taken to embarrass the Government. He has recently joined Mr. Theodotou, a Greek member of Council of the extreme left wing, in moving a resolution for the abolition of the post of Director of Education as at present constituted and for substituting therefore a Greek and a Turkish Director. No ardent supporter of the Union movement could wish for anything better and if the resolution is brought under debate it would of course be carried. Nejatı Bey has travelled through the country stirring up Turkish national feelings. On the 1st May he assembled a meeting of Turks from all parts of the Island to appoint a Mufti as political and religious leader and a committee to take over the Evkaf Department. This meeting, composed of some 140 persons, was entitled a National Congress and manifestos, of which I enclose copies, were issued by the Central Committee and the "Mufti." ... As recently stated by [Member of the Executive Council] Mr. Stavrinakis the constitution now centres round the person of the worthless Nejatı Bey.'⁹⁷

In essence, Stavrinakis and Storrs were right. Under a different constitutional system Necati might have been more easily ignored and the forces he represented more easily side-lined, at least in the short term. Yet, the relatively liberal scheme of government that the British had foreseen for Cyprus, including as it did a delicately balanced elected majority for its legislative division, meant the colonial administration could ill afford a permanent rupture with Necati and his faction if it wished to maintain its unbridled command.⁹⁸

96 Storrs to Secretary of State, 29 October 1930. SAI/1430/1930 and Storrs to Secretary of State, 19 November 1930. SAI/1420/1930.

97 Storrs to Secretary of State, 4 June 1931. CO 67/239/14; For a more detailed exposition of post-election developments and the 'The Turkish National Congress of Cyprus' see Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 373-398.

98 Georghallides (1988) *op. cit.*, pp. 13-14.

The Threat to the Constitutional System and 'the Thirteenth Greek'

The conventional colonial system of manipulating the balance in the Legislative Council had in the case of Cyprus anticipated the opportunity of combining the three Turkish votes with those of the nine appointed British officials (and the Governor's own casting vote) and thereby countering the twelve Greek representatives' votes. The truth that such computations had not always materialised in practice and the fact that when they had turned out as originally calculated it had appeared (as it no doubt felt) rather undignified for the imperial overlords to seem beholden to the Turkish minority, had led to considerable soul-searching in colonial quarters. Intensive communications regarding constitutional revision that would eliminate the need to rely on this balance were conducted between London and Nicosia during the second half of the 1920s onwards. Multiple variations of the basic proposal to guarantee a majority of members be officially nominated rather than popularly elected went back-and-forth, but came to naught when Lord Passfield finally decided that the time was not appropriate for any such change.⁹⁹ The previous three elected Turks had been largely accommodating of Storrs' agenda, but Storrs was clearly less optimistic regarding prospects with Necati. The greatest immediate threat in Necati's election was therefore the possibility that he might cooperate with the Council's Greek members in opposition to the colonial government's policies and thus, in Storrs' words, become, 'the Thirteenth Greek', who, 'voted with the traditional enemies of his race'.¹⁰⁰

Indeed Necati had openly conceded that he was willing to work together with the Greek political class during his electoral campaign. He had in fact publicly applauded some of the bold positions taken in contravention of the Governor's wishes by the Greek members of the Legislative Council which he contrasted with the slavish obedience of Münir. Addressing his own electorate he had said:

'If the members of the Legislative Council and especially our Turkish Members of the Legislative Council did not co-operate with the English Members, this would not have happened. Although the Greek Members of the Legislative Council always try for the benefit of the Island, they are always defeated because they are 12 united votes, but the Turkish and English members are [with the Governor's casting vote] 13. The leader of our members of the Legislative Council, Munir Bey, never raises any objection in the Legislative Council. ... Munir is serving as a Member of the Legislative Council since 5 years. I want you to tell me what good he has done to any of you?'¹⁰¹

99 See Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, pp. 154-197, 248-252, 280-292; See also Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 329-338.

100 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 502.

101 Attachment to Local Commandant of Police to Chief Commandant of Police, 4 September 1930. SA1/1576/1929/1.

Necati had promised that upon his own election, the British would no longer be able to count on the vote of the leading Turkish legislator.¹⁰²

Storrs was for some time evidently dejected by the outcome of the election. In a personal letter drafted to his friend Philip Graves, with whom, in his younger days, he had shared lodgings when the former was working as the Cairo correspondent of the *Egyptian Gazette*, Storrs grumbled:

‘You find me dragging my budget with rough strife through the iron gates of a newly elected and unusually crapulous Legislative Council. The Greeks have purchased one of the three Turkish members upon whose vote I ultimately rely for the passing of any legislation.’¹⁰³

Nevertheless, Storrs’ unsubstantiated accusation that Necati had been ‘bought’ by the Greeks again masks reality. What Necati, quite legitimately was willing to do was find common ground with Greek Cypriots in opposition to certain government policies; but he certainly gave no ground on what might be considered core ‘national’ issues. Indeed, it was this unresolved fundamental divergence between the Greek and Turkish nationalists who won the elections in 1930 that Storrs might have exploited if he had not burnt his bridges with Necati and his supporters; if he had been more politically astute in recognising their growing strength and courting their support; if he had in fact been able to show the ‘adaptability to changing circumstances’, that conservatively educated former public school boys were least prone to do. ‘Single-minded and unflinching in the performance of duty’, explains Heussler:

‘Old Boys were just as single-minded in their attitudes towards any phenomenon or movement which was unfamiliar or irregular to them. If they were incorruptible they were also unreceptive to criticism and unimaginative in the face of changing circumstances. Up to 1920 in most colonies this was not particularly important; in fact it can be argued that the attitudes of the [public school] prefect were exactly what was needed to bring order to primitive, tribal anarchy. Colonial government was such as to demand more persistence in the face of hardship than adaptability to changing circumstances.’¹⁰⁴

As Georghallides puts it:

‘Storrs’s unwillingness to adapt the nexus of Anglo-Turkish political relations to the reality of the election of two Kemalist deputies and the ensuing disputes with the Turkish leaders had, from the Greeks’ point of view, a beneficial effect on the work of the Council. Although Nejadi showed himself to be as opposed to the prospect of *enosis* as his immediate predecessors, Munir and Irfan beys, he broke ranks with the British on communal matters

102 *Ibid.*

103 Storrs to Graves, 26 November 1930, (draft). The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1956) from Pembroke College, Cambridge, BOX IV, Folder 1, Cyprus, 1927-1931, Letters. See also Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 48-49.

104 Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, p. 101.

regarding which he was in conflict with the authorities; and on other issues joined the Greeks for a perceived common good.¹⁰⁵

For the Kemalists within the fledgling Republic of Turkey, laden as they were with numerous more pressing issues at home and recognisant through their 'National Pact' that Cyprus lay beyond the boundaries of their new nation-state, the question of Cyprus and even of its possible union with Greece was then hardly even of peripheral importance.¹⁰⁶ However, the prospect of *enosis* was much more disquieting to, and ardently resisted by those who were actually resident in the periphery. The fate of Turkish communities in Crete and in the Balkans upon these territories' transfer to Greece had long reverberated with Turkish nationalists on the island and they would continue to struggle for several decades to overcome the physical and psychological constraints of the National Pact in terms of drawing political support from the authorities of mainland Turkey.¹⁰⁷ Such context, it could be posited, provided the opportunity for the British to maintain the alignment of the new Turkish Cypriot leadership which in the final analysis still retained dependence on upholding the British obstacle to *enosis*.

True, as Storrs had earlier conveyed, even with Theodorou Necati could find common ground that at times perturbed the British.¹⁰⁸ True also that many of Necati's Greek Cypriot counterparts, had consistently made calls for the election of Turks less beholden to the colonial authorities, but Necati was by no means their 'puppet' as Storrs and others would have believe.¹⁰⁹ As written elsewhere:

'It was this very same "puppet" who shortly before joining forces with the Greeks to defeat the Government in the critical spring session of 1931, had adamantly insisted in the Legislative Council that Greece had no claim to Cyprus, that its geographical and historical attachment was to Turkey, and to the fury of the Greek members of the Council that, "as this island is part of Asia Minor those who are strangers in it may go to Greece[!]". And while Necati did not, in the face of the cries for *enosis*, openly call for an end to British rule, he did demand that the rights and autonomy of the island's Turks should be respected.¹¹⁰

Yet Storrs largely overlooked the still existent possibilities for conciliation and continued to choose conflict with the ascendant Turkish nationalist wing. Envisioning an alternative path of compromise and reasonable concessions he may well have caused them to adjust to their new-

105 Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, p. 638.

106 See Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 257-258.

107 *Ibid.*, 271-272; See also Amery (1953) *op. cit.*, p. 368.

108 Henniker-Heatton to Secretary of State, 7 August 1931. SA1/698/1931.

109 Unfortunately several British scholars unquestioningly followed Storrs' lead, notably Sir George Hill. Based upon the sole testimony of Storrs, Hill described Necati, somewhat nonsensically, as, 'a puppet whom the Greeks, thanks to the intrigues of the Turkish Consul Asaf Bey, had got elected to the Council'. Hill (1952) *op. cit.*, p. 460.

110 Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, p. 399.

found political status in a manner more agreeable to and favourable for British rule. Perhaps blinded by the self-confidence that had been fostered in his youth and that was typically considered a prerequisite for any high-ranking imperial administrator, he stubbornly stuck to the old rather than reaching out to the new.¹¹¹ Just days after the Turkish Cypriot electorate had signified a virtually seismic shift in its allegiance Storrs had indignantly re-appointed Münir to the colony's governing Executive Council. Then, 'Continuing to defy Münir Bey's critics', he proceeded a few weeks thereafter to bestow upon Münir, 'the insignia of an officer of the British Empire during the ... official opening of the spring session of the Legislative Council, to which Münir no longer belonged[!]'¹¹² Except that with Kemalism having weakened the sanctity of traditional lines of authority and Kemalist leaders claiming authority for their roles through popular legitimacy and appeals to the national, the orthodox lines of power through which Storrs and others had tried to govern over Cyprus' Moslem Turks were no longer dependable.

Storrs should further have contemplated the greater possibilities at this point in time for an alliance, however ephemeral, between Greek and Turkish political figures due to the opportune external conditions of Graeco-Turkish reconciliation. After the pains of the bitter war in Anatolia had subsided, the two states and their leaders, Venizelos and Kemal, had by 1931 'buried the hatchet', reciprocal state visits had been undertaken and treaties of friendship and cooperation signed.¹¹³ These developments did not go wholly unnoticed in Cyprus where the leaders of the two national communities came to openly acknowledge that it would be paradoxical, even disloyal, for them to be in confrontation on the island at a time when their national centres were moving in such sync. Indeed, on both sides, the newly emerged opportunities for a merger of political platforms were being publicly ascribed to.¹¹⁴ Necati had made clear that he was prepared to champion a movement of more comprehensive cooperation with the island's Greeks against the Colonial Government and had even pledged to do so during a conference with Archbishop Kyrillos.¹¹⁵ An encouraging international environment had created a special opening for rapprochement, and gradually, with persistence, leadership and compromise an overriding and shared 'Cypriot' political identity paving the way for a unified perspective on the future post-colonial political status of the island might have evolved. Nonetheless, the island's Greeks and Turks still seemed quite far away from resolving the most deep-seated of their nationalist divergences. As such, presuming it was his goal to ward off the potential threat to British rule, there

111 Kirk-Greene (2000) *op. cit.*, pp. 276-277.

112 Cyprus Blue Book (1930), p. 108 and Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, p. 477.

113 M. Gönübol and C. Sar (1974) *1919-1938 Yılları Arasında Türk Dış Politikası. Olaylarla Türk Dış Politikası* [Turkish Foreign Policy in the Years From 1919-1938. Events and Turkish Foreign Policy], Ankara: Ankara Üniversitesi Siyasal Bilgiler Fakültesi Yayınları, pp. 72-74.

114 See, for example, Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, pp. 418-420, 474, 476.

115 *Ibid.*, p. 483 and Özkan (1967) *op. cit.*

was still perhaps space for Storrs to woo back Cyprus' new Turks and forestall the loss of a valuable alliance.

Regardless, Storrs failed to aptly appreciate this and a fairly predictable crisis ensued when, as the impact of the Great Depression began to bite, Storrs' efforts to raise new taxes were voted down in the Legislative Council by the dreaded Greek-Turkish alliance. Turkish historian Gürel, describes Necati's simply having voted with the Greek Cypriot members as 'remarkable' and the Greek Cypriot historian Doros, states, 'For the first time on 28 April, 1931, a Turkish representative ... voted with the Greek members in the Legislative Council'.¹¹⁶ In fact, this was definitely not the first time such cooperation had occurred, it had happened on multiple occasions.¹¹⁷ What is truly 'remarkable' is that Greek/Greek Cypriot and Turkish/Turkish Cypriot historians and frequently British authors and even administrators too, believed and reflected this to be the case. Perhaps there is also an echo of the common Turkish misperception that the politics espoused by the Turks always diverged with that of the Greeks, and of the common Greek misconception that all Turks were always under the British thumb.¹¹⁸ Yet, it had been only a few years earlier, at the start of such a renewed bout of constitutional debate in 1926, that Colonial Office civil servant Alexander Fiddian wrote of multiple precedents of the elected members of the Legislative Council joining forces to block the Government's initiatives. He commented: 'When I took over this Department in February I was agreeably surprised to see that there was very little evidence of real friction between the Administration and the Elected Members, and it is only fair to say that a period of comparative calm in the internal politics of Cyprus is a development which the history of the Island ... gave one no reason to expect'.¹¹⁹ What was special though about this instance of intercommunal cooperation of the political elites was that it came at a critical juncture, had popular reinforcement and was not founded on an *ad hoc* basis. Necati and his supporters were prepared it seemed, to enter a sustained period of coalition with their Greek Cypriot compatriots.

To tackle the crisis Storrs now forced austerity measures through by Order-in-Council, completely ignoring the will of the peoples' representatives and enraging both Greeks and Turks. Reacting in his leading editorial column under the heading of 'The Government Brandishes its Fist', Remzi Bey had written in Söz:

116 Gürel (1984) *op. cit.*, 134n, and A. Doros (1955) *Cyprus in History: A Survey of 5,000 Years*, London: Zeno Publishers, p. 350.

117 Nevzat (2005) *op. cit.*, pp. 122-125, 216-217, 321.

118 Already at the turn of the century High Commissioner Haynes-Smith had written to London that, 'The Constitution of the Legislative Council was based on the idea that there would be a proper balance of parties in the island, because when the Turkish members agreed with the Government the two would form a majority. This safeguard', he wrote with exasperation, 'has not worked in practice'. Haynes-Smith to Chamberlain, 28 November 1901. CO 883/6, pp. 360-336; It should also not be forgotten that only the day before Storrs set foot on the island the Turkish members of the Legislative Council led by Mehmet Münir had again acted in concert with the Greeks on a similar matter. Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, p. 456.

119 Minute by A. Fiddian, 1 December 1916. CO 67/219/14.

'While all the Governments on the face of the world defer their most cumbersome measures to allay the calamity of this frightful crisis ... there is no doubt that [our] Government's decision to follow this path will cause despair and alarm among the general public of Cyprus and cause the elected representatives to think at length as to whether or not to continue to sit in the Legislative Council. We believe it is questionable whether there is any need or benefit left in returning to the Council for it is now openly evident that votes given to reflect the desires and objectives of the people have no importance or value.'¹²⁰

Problems for the Administration were compounded when it was exposed that Storrs had been economic with the truth when announcing a few years earlier that the Tribute had been ended, (concealing that the surplus paid by the Cypriots had been appropriated by the British Treasury, and would not be returned!). With conditions on the island rapidly deteriorating under the impact of worldwide economic crisis, circumstances were ripe for some form of political upheaval.¹²¹

Perhaps, from a public perspective, an effort to further a common cause and develop fully a common programme of anti-colonial resistance to be shared by Greek and Turkish Cypriots alike would have been more opportune. Indeed, this was a path that Necati seemed amenable to and that at least some Greek Cypriots did consider.¹²² Instead, however, it was with the call for *enosis*, utterly rejected by the Turkish Cypriots, that Greek Cypriot political leaders, encouraged by the Greek Consul Kyrou, chose to raise the standard of resistance and as such there was no way that the Turkish Cypriots would partake in their efforts.¹²³ In his epic study of the era Georghallides ultimately acknowledges that it was the inability of the more moderate Greek political class to take advantage of this opportunity which permitted those more radical to project their own, more exclusive, schemes and agenda.¹²⁴

The October Revolt that followed did not result in *enosis*, but was nevertheless a source of embarrassment for the colonial regime and its chief administrator on the island, particularly with the burning down of Government House, the Governor's residence and workplace.¹²⁵ The

120 *Söz* 17 September 1931.

121 McHenry (1987) *op. cit.*, p. 86 and Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 503-504.

122 Georghallides' records, for example, the support for such a scheme expressed by the established Greek Cypriot politician Ioannis Kyriakides. Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, pp. 668-669.

123 For Kyrou's role see P. Terlexis (1968) 'Greece's Foreign Policy and Attitude towards the Problem of Cyprus'. A Dissertation in the Department of Politics Submitted to the Faculty of the Graduate School of Arts and Science in Partial Fulfilment of the Requirements for the Degree of Doctor of Philosophy at New York University, pp. 73-80, Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 503-509, Storrs to Secretary of State, 21 October 1931. CO 67/237/11 and Storrs to Secretary of State, 22 October 1931. CO 67/240/13.

124 Georghallides (1985) *op. cit.*, p. 640.

125 This led to the loss of many of Storrs' prized personal possessions, and unfortunately also (as in the case of a later fire that destroyed Necati's home) to the loss of possibly valuable materials such as letters and notes that might have been of assistance to contemporary historians. See Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 512-513, Storrs to Secretary of State, 16

attempted insurrection was quelled quite quickly, but together with the burning of colonial buildings and flags, much of Storrs' pride and reputation also went up in flames.¹²⁶

Conclusion

In evaluating Storrs' interaction with Necati we must recognise of the latter that he was no political innocent, that he was able to employ Machiavellian political tactics and that he was motivated, like nearly all political leaders, by a combination of factors including that of personal ambition. Necati's defiance of Storrs and his triumph in the elections of 1930 were an early high-point in his career, possibly its most remarkable, and the spectacular heights of which he never again quite reached despite continued active political involvement over the next quarter of a century. For Storrs, on the other hand, his inadequacy in Cyprus essentially marked the end of what had appeared to be quite a promising career that might well have seen him reach newer heights had he been able to complete his tour of duty on the island more successfully. His inability to develop appropriate and effective remedies to deal with the changing nature of Turkish politics in Cyprus can be attributed to manifold causes:

Storrs was probably too loyal to Mūnir with whom he established a personal friendship and on whom he relied over excessively, going so far as to refer to him as, 'the indispensable and permanent Ataturk of Cyprus'.¹²⁷ Displaying the continued hold of the value of loyalty instilled (maybe too far) as part of his self-described 'public school spirit' Storrs later declared that he was, 'a pro-man and not an anti-man. ... But if I were put up against a wall and ordered on pain of death to be anti-something I should (swiftly) declare myself anti-ingratitude and anti-disloyalty'.¹²⁸ It was not that Mūnir Bey could not be an effective administrator or lacked capacity, for he was undoubtedly a talented man too; but he lacked the popular appeal of a more charismatic leader such as Necati and was not fully in touch with the transformation of the society from which he emanated; he was certainly much more distant, if not wholly averse to the Kemalist line than Necati. It might be argued that Mūnir's official powers and status were continuously bolstered by

March 1932 The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1956) from Pembroke College, Cambridge, BOX IV, Folder 2, Cyprus, 1932, Letters; One of those to make personal donations of artistic, literary and/or archaeological material to try to recompense Storrs for his loss was T.E. Lawrence. See R.W. Storrs (1940) *Lawrence of Arabia, Zionism and Palestine*, New York: Penguin Books, p. 17.

126 Georghallides states that: 'In spite of a good start, Cyprus was to destroy Storrs' reputation as a competent Governor and to thwart his hopes for a major promotion either in the Near East or in India'. Georghallides (1988) *op. cit.*, p. 23. In private correspondence Storrs also expressed that he would, 'have liked Ceylon' and his overoptimistic belief, 'if I have merited anything it is a move, and a move upward'. See Storrs to GL, 3 December 1931 (copy) The Papers of Sir Ronald Storrs (1881-1956) from Pembroke College, Cambridge, BOX IV, Folder 3, Cyprus, 1931. The Burning of Government House.

127 Storrs (1943) *op. cit.*, pp. 492-493.

128 *Ibid.*, pp. 11, 437.

Storrs so that he might possess the means to repel the Kemalist challenge, but, despite the warnings of his colleagues, he was also in the process turning Münir into a 'puppet' in the eyes of his own people.¹²⁹

Somewhat related to the above, Storrs failed in practice to show the *savoir-faire* and skill necessary to communicate on a productive basis with Turkish Cypriots that did not necessarily possess the deferential cultural vocabulary to which he was accustomed. Necati's brash and bold, demanding personality may have been personally repugnant to his more aristocratic, perhaps conceited approach. If, however, he was half the diplomatic genius – the skilful manipulator of native peoples described by Lawrence as, 'the most brilliant Englishman in the Near East' – presenting, 'a lesson to every Englishmen alive of how to deal with suspicious or unwilling orientals', then one would have expected Storrs to have been able to reach out even to Necati.¹³⁰ Maybe such praise need be tempered by Lawrence's further potentially contradictory observation that Storrs was possessing of an, 'intolerant brain [that] seldom stooped to company'.¹³¹

Again in an associated manner, Storrs failed miserably to appreciate the growth of Turkish nationalist sentiment in Cyprus, of which Necati's success was, partially at least, a consequence. For Storrs, till it was too late, the Kemalists were only an irksome nuisance, but little threat to the allegiance of the Moslem Turkish masses. True, following the October Revolt, expressions of Kemalism were cracked down upon just as systematically as those of Greek nationalism, but by then, in both cases, such repressive measures were too little too late, in fact prone to backfire. 'Aloofness from the general populace, which was characteristic of Public School boys', and which tended to follow them thereafter, was no doubt also a cause of Storrs' inability to fathom the true extent of the popular 'winds of change' that were transforming Turkish Cypriot society.¹³²

In terms of 'backfiring', Storrs' efforts to demote and centralise under the purview of the Evkaf the Turkish Cypriots' traditional communal institutions of Müftü and Kadi, as well as his insistence on providing British oversight over the Lycée, actually became a sore bone of contention between the new Turkish Cypriot leadership and the colonial authorities, not just during Storrs' tenure, but for many years thereafter. Discontent was augmented by the sharp contrast with the much greater autonomy of comparative Greek Cypriot institutions. Little was achieved by these moves save furnishing opponents with tangible issues around which to coalesce their opposition.

Furthermore, Storrs failed to factor in the impact of warmer relations between Greece and Turkey that began to emerge at the close of the 1920s and that should have cautioned greater finesse and flexibility in his policies. Accusations that Necati was pro-Greek, or even 'the Thirteenth

129 See, for example, Nicholson to Secretary of State, 31 December 1928. CO 883/8, p. 27.

130 Lawrence declaring with admiration also that it was, 'nearly impossible to resist him for more than a few minutes'. Lawrence (1962) *op. cit.*, pp. 56, 71.

131 *Ibid.*, p. 65.

132 Heussler (1963) *op. cit.*, pp. 112-113.

Greek' may have been particularly detrimental to this novice politician's chances at a different point in time, but in an era of Graeco-Turkish accord they did little to stain Necati's political reputation.

It was largely then and as a result of such failures, that Storrs lost the basic colonial hold over the Turkish Cypriot community that he had been fortunate enough to arrive to. It can legitimately be contended further that the particularly harsh terminology which Storrs used to deride Necati, if partially a reaction to what was perceived as Necati's insolence, was also partly reflective of Storrs' own subconscious recognition of his failure; failure to recognise and deal appropriately with who Necati was and what he represented; it was an inner acknowledgement of culpability. Ultimately, Necati was not an adequate scapegoat for Storrs' own sense of guilt.

And yet, underlying all of the above must be determined not simply the personal errors or weaknesses of one individual man, but witnessed also the broader deficiencies of the British imperial outlook and over-reliance on the values and spirit of the public school system in the staffing of empire. Whether it be the guilt that he felt for failing in duty, the sense of being trumped by an inferior, the inability to gauge and the inflexibility to respond to changes in circumstance, the cultural ineptness of communicating with outsiders beyond the circle, or excessive fidelity to those within, in each can be determined the imprint of a systemic flaw. Thus Storrs in the final analysis was a victim not only of 'the thirteenth Greek', but of the conservative, elitist system in which he was rooted.

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