‘What kind of state are we in when we start to think of the state?’ 1 Cyprus in Crises and Prospects for Reunification

BARBARA KARATSIOLI

Abstract
Partitioned Cyprus has known two major crises in the last ten years: first, the 1999–2001 Turkish Cypriot crisis, and second, the Greek Cypriot watershed since 2009. Both have significantly transformed the identity and imaginary of the state. Given that crisis is a field of subjectivation and changing forces, can social movements go so far as to challenge the division and create the conditions for reunification? The 2002 Turkish Cypriot protests have claimed reunification whilst affirming the Turkish Cypriot people’s sovereignty. How does this movement spill over to affect the rapprochement ‘on the border’ and Greek Cypriots more generally? As the crisis strikes Greek Cypriots, and state sovereignty is rapidly contested through EU intervention, can Greek and Turkish Cypriots engage together towards reunification and the creation of a new state? Can we imagine a new state when in a state of crisis?

Keywords: crisis, identity, state, sovereignty, peace, austerity, rapprochement, Cypriotism, protests

Cyprus is currently experiencing its greatest economic crisis since the 1930s. That was a time of global recession and dismantlement of the British Empire, a crisis that Cypriots experienced from the perspective of a colony. The crisis brought about new sets of identities and oppositions which have dominated Cypriot politics until today: Left vs. Right, Greek Nationalism vs. Turkish Nationalism and, of course, the anti-colonial struggle (Karatsioli, 2009). The dynamics led to the creation of the Republic of Cyprus (RoC) in 1960 and the partition of the island in 1974. The current capitalist crisis strikes a partitioned island, an ‘unsettled state’.

Crisis being a field of changing forces, we aim to understand the transformations of identity and the prospects for reunification in the two sets of crises affecting Cyprus in the twenty-first century: the Turkish Cypriot economic crises in 1999 and 2000 and the Greek Cypriot crisis beginning in 2009. The article does not assume a direct relationship between economic crises and

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peace potentialities. It aims instead to understand how social movements at times of economic crisis can challenge the division and create the conditions for reunification in such an ‘unsettled state(s)’ as Cyprus. This cannot be achieved outside an analysis of the economic, political and social aspects of two sets of crises and their relation to the global economic crisis and its European versant.

In this study, rather than make a symmetrical analysis of the two societies, I follow the major transformations starting from the 2002 Turkish Cypriot protests. In the first part of the article, the politico-economic transformations that progressively led to the protests are mapped out. Then, unveiled, are the ways in which Turkish Cypriot protests set in motion transformations ‘on the border’ that affected the rapprochement groups, cross border circulation and the peace process. The third part points to the internal divisions that the peace process introduced in the Greek Cypriot community that tether the economic crisis with mobilisations for economic justice. Changes in state, identity and sovereignty are also noted together with the role of the elites in the progressive dispossession of sovereignty across the article. Finally, I trace the possibilities for state transformation at a time when Turkish and Greek Cypriots face austerity.

‘State’ is already a complicated concept, and the Cyprus case, especially its contested sovereignty, adds significantly to these complexities (Constantinou, 2010). To speak of the state in what follows, I abandon the idea of theorising it. Rather, my aim is to understand ‘what kind of state are we in when we start to think about the state?’ (Butler and Chakravorty Spivak, 2007, p. 3). What conditions does each community face when they promote reunification? What motivates them? What fails?

Turkish Cypriot Crisis: From Global Disconnection to Political Equality

The 2002–2003 Turkish Cypriot protests marked a turning point in the recent history of Cyprus, with Turkish Cypriot claims for reunification within the European Union (EU) challenging, and then bypassing, the local political order deeply rooted in the pro-taksim struggle (Sonan, 2007) by appealing directly to the international community. Their claims for a United Cyprus gained the community a measure of international recognition which their illegal state had never enjoyed, and paved the way to the successful completion of the Annan Plan negotiations.

In economic crises since 1999, the Turkish Cypriots initiated protests in 2000 to denounce the economic, political and military dependency on Turkey, but claims for a United European Cyprus overrode all other protests by 2003. With Turkish Cypriot sovereignty and identity under duress, they engaged in prospective action towards a United European Cyprus and retrospectively redefined their (Turkish) Cypriotness. This double movement outgrew the crisis and the protests and prompted academics to reflect on the state, identity and sovereignty as these relate to the

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2 The Taksim struggle aimed for the separation of a part of the island to unite with Turkey. It was a counter-movement to Greek Cypriot Enosis which aimed for the union of the whole island with Greece.
Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey. Researchers sought the roots of the protests in the autonomy of the Turkish Cypriot political process from Turkey and ‘Turkishness’ (Trimikliniotis and Bozkurt, 2012) and the separation of Cypriotness from the pro-taksim ‘all-encompassing Turkification process’ (Kizilyurek, 2002).

It is suggested here that Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey relies on the synergy between factions of Turkish capital and the local pro-taksim bourgeoisie, with Turkish Cypriot governing authorities playing a notable role in sustaining Turkish military rule through the active negotiation of (their) local privileges (Tahsin, 2012). Drawing on research undertaken during the crisis, this study indicates that the breakdown of the pro-taksim project and the concomitant questioning of dependency result from the increasing economic and political exclusion of the Turkish Cypriot people from the ‘taksim’ project throughout the 1990s. Essentially, Turkish Cypriots protested their enclavisation by a pro-taksim project that had progressively become dissociated from them.

Since the 1950s, factions of Turkish capital had supported the pro-taksim struggle and the development of a local commercial bourgeoisie in Cyprus (ibid.). In the aftermath of partition, they worked with the Turkish government to sustain the Turkish military forces deployed in Cyprus and the local political structure. In the absence of a self-sufficient economy, Turkish government aid covered the budget deficit and infrastructure projects and privileged public sector growth and employment, thus attaching production to short-term investments. Loyalty of the population to the new pro-taksim structure was insured by ‘constituency clientelism’, that is, through state subsidies protecting markets and benefits (i.e. redistribution of Greek Cypriot goods) provided by the state to entire social classes (Sonan, 2007).

Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey was also founded on ethnic kinship (Bahcheli and Noel, 2010), and the sustainability of the relationship called for the Turkification of local structures and demographics. This, however, met with progressive cultural and political differentiation. Lacher and Kaymak (2005) underscore the role of local bureaucracy in the proclamation of sovereignty in 1983, whilst cautiously noting the discrepancy between reality and sovereignty in the absence of recognition. Taking the analysis one step further, Navaro-Yashin (2012) suggests the ‘falsehood’ of the ‘made-up state’ is not impeding the affective construction of the state. People engage in a process of making-and-believing/believing-and-making of the state in which administration holds a significant role. In their retrospective readings of the state and state building, Turkish Cypriots and academics are elevating the process of the Turkish Cypriot affective construction of the state to shadow but not question the declaration of the ‘TRNC’. This Turkish Cypriotness in the making of the state, by the people and the administration, is central to the current quest for political equality and affirmation of Turkish Cypriotism, a recognition that they claimed and achieved through the protests, and one that the state failed to ensure. Was there in the

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3 Transfers of public revenues are the main factors determining the fluctuations in economic growth for the long term. For a more elaborate account of the economics of that time see Bozkurt in this issue.
declaration of the state the greater need for recognition of the Turkish Cypriot community, its right to self-determination and its political equality with Greek Cypriots, which goes beyond the recognition of the state? These analyses work against the idea that the declaration of the ‘TRNC’ is an initial act of progressive isolation from the international community and marks an increasing dependency on Turkey (Ker-Lindsay and Faustmann, 2009).

Interestingly, the declaration-invalidation of the state seems to have had a positive effect by slowing down the neoliberalisation of the northern part of Cyprus. Unable to immediately access the strong public sector without impairing the struggle for self-determination and recognition, the neoliberal project for a ‘free zone area’ with low taxation and state intervention for Turkish companies, was initially unattainable. Neoliberal foundations were laid nonetheless: the 1986 ‘economic co-operation’ protocol and the subsequent development plans sustained a shift to the service sector and to the expansion of financial institutions by 1992.

In my analysis, the 1990s marked a progressive Turkish Cypriot enclavisation causing the failure of the Taksim project. The notion of ‘global disconnection’ (Ferguson, 2001), that is the abjection and rejection of the locality by the outside, allows us to grasp the Turkish Cypriot people’s exclusion from the benefits of globalisation and of the pro-taksim project. Their separation and exclusion from the world market and political recognition leads to their enclavisation. Meanwhile, their capitalist elites’ interests remain globalised. As such, the concept does not contradict dependency, but rather it reflects the class structural position in this dependency.

The collapse of the production sector in the north of Cyprus, the famous Poly Peck crisis which also caused the crash at the London stock market in 1990, is emblematic of the globalisation and prosperity of pro-taksim elites at the expense of the increasing exclusion of the larger Turkish Cypriot community. The crisis left one-third of the local active population jobless. It affected exports, particularly to the UK, and accelerated the passage from production to the service sector that had started in 1986. This was also heavily impacted by the 1994 embargo imposed on non-RoC certified export goods by the European Court of Justice; goods now exported/imported via Turkey were overtaxed. The embargo was one of the most effective actions of the RoC against the declaration of the ‘TRNC’ in the course of the Europeanisation of the Cyprus conflict. It is the crucial moment where the effects of declaration start to have consequences on the Turkish Cypriot people.

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4 It is interesting to note that the Left objected to the adoption of a constitution – but not to the declaration of the state (Hatay, 2005).
5 Y. Navaro-Yashin (2012) reports a ‘sense of suffocation’, an ‘open-air prison’ that people experience due to prolonged living in northern Cyprus.
6 The Poly Peck crisis involved Asil Nadir, a close friend of Denktash, who controlled an essential part of the Turkish Cypriot production; his bankruptcy led to a decrease in agricultural exports. The crash in the London stock market was caused by a capitalisation too high for real assets.
The RoC’s EU candidacy approval and Turkey’s rejection in 1990 trapped Turkish Cypriots between two competing processes of European integration: exclusion/isolation promulgated by Greek Cypriots vs. Turkish integration. Their global disconnection did not avoid Turkish Cypriots the neoliberal politics that powered integration. A protocol signed in 1992 set up an ‘economic co-operation area’ to enhance macro-economic co-operation between Turkey and northern Cyprus. Property laws were also changed to facilitate the delocalisation of casinos to Cyprus, exploiting the absence of recognition in the northern part of the island. At the same time, the turn to the service sector favouring higher education, construction and tourism, attracted Turkish capital and competitive labour from Turkey and transformed the demographics – spurring fears of Turkification (Trimikliniotis, Ioakimoglou and Pantelides, 2012; Hatay, 2008). The 1994 Turkish crisis increased economic stagnation; at the same time, the economic and fiscal protocol announced in the same year sought to achieve the complete integration of commerce, economics and fiscal matters and the partial integration of defence and security and foreign policy (Taçsın, 2013; Bozkurt, 2013a). By 1997, Turkish Cypriots were in the streets protesting ‘an annexation which does not tell its name’ (Ali Anar KTÖS).

Fears of solvency dominated the second half of the 1990s, with Turkification posing an ‘existential threat to the community’ at so many different levels: military intervention in the affairs of the state, press censorship, violence exercised by the police and the Grey Wolves (a paramilitary organisation mainly composed of Turks), and easy attribution of citizenship to Turks (even brought in to vote on election days). The murder of journalist Kutlu Adali in 1996 is an example of the violence. Silenced by violence and at the polls, Turkish Cypriots were stripped of their distinct Turkish Cypriot identity and state. A Turkish Cypriot active in rapprochement pointed out:

‘Turks are given nationality, they vote. He (Denktash) doesn’t even let us travel, our vote doesn’t count, we have no value. Speaking of Turkish Cypriots who manage to leave, Denktash even went up to declaring that ‘for one Memet (Turkish Cypriot) who leaves, ten other Memet (Turks) will come’.”

By refusing to acknowledge that Memet – Turk – cannot be taken as a value for Memet – Turkish Cypriot – Denktash denies individual and collective value or recognition to Turkish Cypriots. Put otherwise, the essence of the ‘existential threat’ lies foremost in their own leader’s rebuff of the individualisation/individuation of the community, leading to despair and social criticism (Descombes, 1996).

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7 Yücel in Sonan (2007) employs the notion of existential threat in regard to the ‘economic-political-social chaos’ that marked the crisis. In this article, ‘existential threat’ relates to fears of solvency which preceded but also extended to the crisis.
Sonan (2007) suggests, ‘it was the personal power struggle between the two leaders of the nationalist camp that triggered the collapse of the politico-economic structures that had sustained the taksim project’ (p. 11). Admittedly, the 1999 extension of the Turkish banking crisis to Turkish Cypriot bank subsidiaries triggered significant losses in deposits that the government agreed to guarantee. However, the Turkish bailout of the local economy soon became conditional upon Denktash’s return to power. The belated and unwilling implementation of the austerity measures in the public sector that accompanied the package released after Eroğlu – Ulusal Birlik Partisi (UBP) [The National Unity Party] withdrawal from the 2001 elections precipitated the government to halt all payments to depositors to insure public sector salaries. Following on from the collapse of the Turkish economy as a consequence of an IMF and EU austerity programme in 2000, the devaluation of the Turkish Lira by approximately 30% in 2001, accentuated the adversities of the monetary union and dependency on Turkey.

The absence of borders, political or economic, with Turkey’s state or deep state and the corruption and intransigence of the Turkish Cypriot pro-taksim governing elites unleashed an unprecedented series of protests. Already in July 2000, the This Country is Ours Platform (Bu Memleket Bizim Platformu) channelled concerns into a demonstration against the increasing intervention of the army in the affairs of the Cypriot State and the censorship sustained by the local leadership.8 Slogans read: ‘This country is ours’ and ‘Denktash resign’. In August 2001, a meeting for peace (Barisha yürüyüş mitingi) made claims to ‘Cypriot-ness’ in slogans such as ‘I’m not Greek, I’m not Turk, I’m Cypriot’, alongside others calling for a ‘United Cyprus’. Still others promoted peace: ‘Cyprus belongs to Cypriots’ or ‘Peace for Cyprus’.9

Turkey’s official EU candidacy status in 2000, with conditionality on an agreement on Cyprus, led Denktash to renew his stand for Turkish integration – the only way to Europe – by refusing to enter peace negotiations (Yesilada and Sozen, 2002). His attitude was pivotal to the rise in numbers in rallies, from 8,000 people gathering in 2000, to 60,000–75,000 people (almost all Turkish Cypriots) by December 2002, each and every one turning against Denktash. They accused him of stifling the political and economic development of the northern part of Cyprus and the Turkish Cypriot community more generally (Ker-Lindsay, Faustmann and Mullen, 2011).

In the main, Turkish Cypriots emerged from their ‘global disconnection’ as agents of change of their structural position. The EU served as a catalyst because the Turkish Cypriots were undergoing a profound transformation (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005). A new emanating local bourgeoisie promoted a ‘fairer’ competition between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot capital for the development of a local economy (IŞAD). Ali Erel, President of the Chamber of Commerce

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8 Akinci’s Toplanma Kurtuluş Partisi (TKP) [Communal Liberation Party] proposal to attach the local police force and fire brigade to the Ministry of Interior, not to the Turkish Cypriot Armed Forces directed by a General in the Turkish Army (Ulusoy, 2009).

9 The use of English on the protest banners indicates that Turkish Cypriots aimed for international visibility.
(KKTO), became the dominant economic voice among the protestors and the rising bourgeois fervently supporting a European solution of the conflict and pacification through Greek and Turkish Cypriot capital and market co-operation. At the same time, the Turkish bourgeoisie, wary of the prospects of global collaborations in the European solution of the Cyprus question, withdrew its support of the pro-taksim elite, which effectively broke the synergy at the basis of the Taksim project.

Turkish Cypriot claims for social justice were less revolutionary and more informed by fair integration in the global market. Democratisation and liberalisation, they sensed, would improve local capital investment opportunities and induce the new liberal local bourgeoisie to resist the conservative forces and military rule. It was a victory of Left pro-reunification politics and liberal national economics. Reconciliation with Greek Cypriots, under a European democratic development and integration in the world economy, would avert Turkish Cypriot absorption into Turkey. With Turkish Cypriot sovereignty threatened, the peace process offered a means to insure the political identity of the Turkish Cypriot community through a federal solution. In the end, the sovereign will of the Turkish Cypriot people gained them the political equality they had aimed for. Turkish Cypriots did not sacrifice sovereignty for federalism but were taking steps to insure the recognition of their Turkish Cypriotness.

The ‘Border’ in Tension: Cypriotism(s) in Rapprochement

The earlier demonstrations set in motion broader dynamics directly engaging with the ‘border’ as they spilled over to the Greek Cypriot side. The strong involvement of Turkish Cypriots – active in the rapprochement movement in the organisation of the protests and the ‘Cypriotist’ claims for peace – directly appealed to their Greek Cypriot counterparts. For over a decade, rapprochement had been central in re-establishing contact, initiating reconciliation and inducing the interconnectedness of the two societies. Input from Greek Cypriot youth at that time clearly epitomised those transformations: Having embarked on rapprochement they had joined a process of ‘no return’ since the relations established with Turkish Cypriots differentiated them from their community and created a need to act upon this identity, or in support of the Turkish Cypriots and band together in their claims for peace. Moreover, broader transformations issued from the protests including the opening of the Green Line and the concomitant re-establishment of contact and mobility. The Annan Plan, endpoint of the resumption of peace talks, also had a pivotal effect on the relations between the two communities and the renegotiation of identity, territory and sovereignty.

Re-examining the Turkish Cypriot mobilisations from the ‘border’, we may ask if they prompted the hegemonic rise of ‘Cypriotism’ as a credible alternative to Greek and Turkish nationalisms; a way out of partition and into reunification. Did rapprochement raise Cypriotism to a dominant form of identification? What effect did mobility, contact and interaction have on the articulation of common political claims in the search for peace?
**Cypriotism of the Elites, Rapprochement of the People**

The emergence of the rapprochement movement in the early 1990s was as much related to the planted seeds of Cypriotism as to the shifts in global politics privileging security and peace in the Middle East\(^\text{10}\) and RoC’s application for EU membership.

According to Loizides (2007), ‘Cypriotism’ takes the Cypriot identity as a primary one: it represents an attachment to a civic identity, to common traditions and symbols and actively promotes reconciliation. It aspires more often than not to Turkish Cypriotism and Greek Cypriotism, ‘ethnic community’ nationalisms, which ‘focus on the aspirations of the interests of a specific ethnic community in the island’ (ibid.). Greek Cypriotism has narrow expectations and no defined idea of solution. But ‘Cypriotism’ is difficult to analyse within the rapprochement or beyond. It is an identity in the making, a work in progress.

Rapprochement did not create a Cypriotist identity from scratch but was borne out of the meeting of two Cypriotisms. Turkish Cypriotism – already highly politicised since the 1980s – represents the federalist position espoused by the Left, which builds in opposition to the hegemonic taksim ideology. Meanwhile, an incipient Greek Cypriotism is built on the margins of the political, albeit with the support of both the Left and the Right. Intrinsically, Greek Cypriotism, much more than Turkish Cypriotism, is formed ‘on the border’ and builds on the rapprochement. Cypriotism develops as a form of civic nationalism strengthening the state but with seemingly little connection or influence by the marginal neo-Cypriotism and the New Cyprus Association’s promotion of the identity as such, as Loizides suggests.

Early on, the rapprochement was polyhedral, with no leader, representative or board to determine its activities, many of which relied on committed individuals who supported or were at least facilitated by the collaboration of factions of the Turkish Cypriot Left and the Greek Cypriot Left and Right\(^\text{11}\) (Karatsioli, 2009). Teachers, factions of capital, students, civil servants, villages and unions progressively turned to rapprochement. For the Left, especially AKEL, engagement in rapprochement signalled a renewal with its historical role as a party for both Greek and Turkish Cypriots, an alliance of the people. For the Right, the time called for change and the building of a (European) future that would necessitate the revision of the past.

Rapprochement’s main political aim during the 1990s was to create the conditions for contact as no form of direct contact (letter, phone or other) had bridged the divide since 1974. This involved UN-facilitated meetings in the Buffer Zone and USAID training programmes abroad; in addition, EU and local initiatives led to an increase in bi-communal activities, cultural meetings, and union meetings at the turn of the twenty-first century (Hadjipavlou-Trigeorgis, 1993). The territorialisation of the activities in Pyla/Pile, a Buffer Zone village easily accessed by both

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\(^\text{10}\) One assumption underlying the shift in global politics was the power of liberalisation for conflict resolution (B. Karatsioli, ‘Unsettled States, Peace and Capitalism: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel–Palestine’ (forthcoming [b]).

\(^\text{11}\) On the positions of DISY on rapprochement, see Constantinou and Papadakis (2001).
communities, is a seminal example: it creates the bases for regular meetings sustaining the creation of a sense of community.\textsuperscript{12}

From the official peace talks to the unofficial meetings, recognition, as Constantinou and Papadakis (2001) point out, was crucial. As cross-ethnic contact was hitherto perceived as both treacherous and damaging to the respective communities’ interests, inter-personal exchanges were generally an un-reflexive transmission of the community’s claims (\textit{ibid}). Yet, drawing on ‘Cypriotist’ ideals, the rapprochement brought together Turkish and Greek nationalist ideals and more or less Greek or Turkish Cypriotist versions of history. Identity was constantly negotiated in relation to past politics of respective communities. Reflexivity was an integral part of the process. Activities such as the ‘history path’ challenged the dominant nationalist versions of history, gradually replacing them with a ‘shared history’ of conflict. In this process, the Turkish Cypriot version enjoyed ‘equality’ with the dominant (official) Greek Cypriot account. For the most part, discussions either dealt with the past or with everyday family life,\textsuperscript{13} avoiding or abandoning political matters for fear of implicit political recognition, validating the ‘invalid’ state (\textit{ibid}) or discovering the political ‘normality’ of the other side.

In sum, the rapprochement movement did not (re)think or act to influence ideas – as an actor of political change. Rather, it promoted the (re)discovery of the ‘other’ anchored in the past, with a clear avoidance of the political present and future. Although fixed in yesteryear, Cypriotism was a projective civic identity: If ‘Resolution’ was not in the peoples’ power, peaceful contact was. Rapprochement was a step towards a post-resolution peaceful co-existence.

Nonetheless, the other’s present was difficult to attain, largely because of the fear of implicit recognition. Even when the Turkish Cypriot crisis was no longer a main topic of discussion, Greek Cypriots feared discovering the politics in the northern part of Cyprus; they did not want to understand the plural engagements of the Turkish Cypriot resistance or see their actions outside the scope of rapprochement.

Unemployment, increased energy prices, the higher cost of living, the surtax and the army blockades of Pyla/Pile (Karatsioli, 2005) had become clear indicators of the oppression suffered by Turkish Cypriots. The mere presence of the Turkish Cypriots at meetings was a signifier of resistance to, and rejection of, the authoritarian regime. The complexity of the politico-economic situation escaped Greek Cypriots; considering Turkish Cypriots as generally poor, they reacted in a paternalistic (and minimalist) fashion by simply handling the costs of Turkish Cypriots at their meetings. They acted in compassion, reproducing in that way the unequal relations that structures pre-war Cyprus and pursues in the unequal development and unequal international position (recognised vs. non-recognised structure), avoiding discussions on the broader context in fear of

\textsuperscript{12} All information is taken from the author’s anthropological doctoral research on bi-communal groups 2000–2004.
\textsuperscript{13} Unlike other groups, the bi-communal choir relied on a common Cypriot repertoire in both languages as it enacted an already existing Cypriot (cultural) identity.
conceding equality with them.14

The November–December 2002 protests radically changed perceptions. Urgent meetings were organised around a common incentive to think of grounds for action across the divide. Long-term members of the reconciliation movement had experimented at length with imported (and limited) forms of contact (Hall-Cathala, 1990), but they were now called on to politically act together, not to rediscover their history or claim their common culture and not to wait for a ‘solution’ stemming from the peace talks as explained earlier, but to initiate a movement for change: to make peace. They needed to think outside the frame of fixed activities, to question the ‘movement’ and its nature, and to reconsider the ways to act together in society.

Greek Cypriots sought to support the movement by organising rallies across the divide but faced both numerical and ideational difficulties. AKEL’s initiative for a rally at the Green Line on 4 January 2003 brought together members of the rapprochement from both the Right and Left. Many were disenchanted when the protest turned into a pre-electoral campaign supporting DIKO’s presidential candidate Papadopoulos. Unlike the Left, AKEL, and the Right, DISY, the centrist, DIKO party, has never engaged in rapprochement and was opposed to bi-communal affairs (Peristianis, 1995). This event was an early sign of disjunctive rather than a joint struggle, bringing in traditional pro-division forces from the Greek Cypriot side at the very moment when Turkish Cypriots were demonstrating against theirs.

‘Peace in the Hands of People?’

Crossing the Green Line to the Annan Plan Referendum

Papadopoulos’ election to the Presidency in February 2003 was followed by Denktash’s bold strategic move, a unilateral ‘confidence building measure’ to open the checkpoints in April, after rejecting the United Nations (UN) proposal to put the plan to a referendum in March. Turkish journals portrayed Denktash as a messenger of peace, as he brought down the last wall dividing a European city. In reality, his motivation was to counter the destructive effects of the economic crisis by creating a Greek Cypriot (capital) influx. He sustained that Turkish Cypriots had less need of a political change and more need of an improved economy. Interestingly, Greek Cypriots rushed to the checkpoints by the thousands. The situation was ‘the closest to anarchy’ Cyprus had ever encountered since 1974. The RoC played the role of the ‘absent state’ (Demetriou, 2007), uniting with the army to warn that it could not ensure the security of Greek Cypriots who crossed.

The conditions for the ‘opening of the barricades’, I sustain, were created by the Turkish Cypriot protests. Not so much by specific claims addressed to the authorities (Navaro-Yashin, 2012) but by the fact that the protesting Turkish Cypriots never broke down the ‘border’ by

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14 The so-called Cypriot economic miracle that is the ‘recovery’ achieved by the dispossessed and expropriated Greek Cypriots by the mid-1980s opposed the slow almost quasi-inexistent ‘development’ experienced by Turkish Cypriots.
massively and physically crossing it. Greek Cypriots had a radical misconception of what breaking down the ‘Line’ meant; their romantic idea of reunification relied on their political imaginary of peace, as the return of the Turkish community to the recognised state. Like East Germans a decade earlier, Turkish Cypriots were expected to ‘break down’ the ‘Cold War’ wall. Since the 1990s, however, Turkish Cypriots crossed daily for employment, but never left as Denktash pointed out. Their loyalty to their community, albeit not necessarily to the taksim project, was a substantial factor in solidifying the ‘border’.

Contact and interaction raised expectations that the two peoples would subscribe to the Annan Plan. Thus, the Greek Cypriot rejection of the Plan generated a major shift in the position of the two communities at the negotiating table. Turkish Cypriots had demonstrated their will for a common state and a European future through protests and at the polls and were now ‘enjoying an augmentation of their position’ (Lacher and Kaymak, 2005, p. 148). Turkey, no longer held responsible for the absence of a solution (ibid.), could delink the question of European integration and the Cyprus question. Already enjoying economic growth, Turkish Cypriots continued to pursue change by electing Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi (CTP) [The Republican Turkish Party] with the support of the alliance (Tahsin, 2013) that had emerged during the Annan Plan, in political alliance with the Right-wing Democratic Party (Sözen, 2006).

From this point on, Greek Cypriot unwillingness would be considered the obstacle to finding a solution (Christoforou, 2005). The victory of the traditional and conservative forces of the centre nationalist DIKO party at the time when Turkish Cypriots were finally moving towards peace, made rejection even more unjustified. This was a major blow to two decades of rapprochement, peace initiatives and the reinstatement of contact. Conversely, what made Greek Cypriot rejection most disturbing was the rabble-rousing speech of President Papadopoulos – granting him the role of a ‘true leader’, along with the predatory stance of the emerging hegemonic ‘No’ identity to the pro-Annan camp, and followed by the celebration of rejection as victorious resistance.

The predacious character of the evolving rejectionist identity shadowed fears about the future of the state and Cypriotness. If in the 1960s, the state had the dangerous potential to dilute ‘Greekness’ and replace it with ‘Cypriotness’ (Demetriou, 2014), the state-to-come had the potential to dilute ‘Cypriotness’ by dissociating civic from national identity. Here, Cypriotness refers to Greek Cypriot identification with the Republic, a nation-state for Greek Cypriots, a permanent ‘state of exception’ (Trimikliniotis, 2010), and a legal denial of Turkish Cypriots. The RoC was Greek Cypriot’s arm against Turkish Cypriots. Hence, Papadopoulos’ rejection of the Annan Plan was a reassuring affirmation of the (Greek) Cypriotness of the state. The rejectionist vote reflected Greek Cypriot’s trust in the state and the government for the renegotiation of the terms of reunification and the future of the state.

15 As regards going from security, insufficient inducement, failure to understand the changes in the international opinion, failure of the international community to sustain public support undermined with extension of the time frame.
Unlike Turkish Cypriots who rejected their government and 'state' and sought a new state featuring political equality, Greek Cypriots generally put trust in the state and identified with it and its decisions about the conflict. Turkish Cypriots had already undergone a consequential transformation before taking to the streets and claiming a United European state. But crossing the Green Line, visiting their dispossessed lands, and engaging in relationships with Turkish Cypriots were far reaching steps in the long journey of Greek Cypriot identity transformation. Simply stated, Greek Cypriots were not given sufficient time for transformation. They were expected to follow in the movement that Turkish Cypriots had initiated but for the Greek Cypriots, the renegotiations of identity and sovereignty were only beginning. 'Peace' and the perspective of a new state partake in the radicalisation of identities. Federalism had been a significant political claim dividing the Turkish Cypriot community – since the 1980s leading them to rapprochement by the 1990s; it also led to the internal division inside the Greek Cypriot society, between the reunification position and the rejectionist position.

The crossings radically transformed the nature of the rapprochement movement creating a shift from telling history to living history. Its members experimented with the ‘normalisation’ of their relations. They discovered each other’s lives through house visits and excursions and ‘shared the island’. Having always assumed that the ‘solution’ would precede contact and societal reconciliation, the occurrence of the reverse raised expectations. The Partition had always prevented Turkish and Greek Cypriots from acting together and had become the justification for the absence of change. Now, Greek Cypriots were discovering the limits of their mobilisation; they shared the same fears as Turkish Cypriots.

The failed referendum cast a shadow over the prospect of a ‘solution’. Disappointment was sharp in the rapprochement movement with the rejectionist vote of Greek Cypriot Left-wingers. Some denounced the Greek Cypriot vote as supporting partition and Denktash; others saw it as regressive or as sentimentality winning over rationality. A young Turkish Cypriot student yelled at his friend: ‘How on earth can a “democratic” state have no civil society whereas, we have one under military law?’

To many this was the end of experimentation and the beginning of disillusionment, but I argue against the premise of a general decline of ‘Cypriotism’ (Sonan, 2007). The rapprochement movement may be in decline, that is, the form of ‘artificial movement’, but Cypriotism is surfacing in new and unexpected forms. In other words, as the artificiality of the movement’s pre-defined forms of interaction dissolves, new forms appear, drawing from, yet going beyond formal agreements and renegotiating ‘shared beliefs’. This is not the ‘dissolution’ of Greek Cypriot or Turkish Cypriot identities but the renegotiation of Cypriotism(s).

Aspirations for change and the creation of a new democratic common state were not abandoned. Recourse to justice by Turkish Cypriots to defend their rights and challenge the (Greek) Cypriotness of the state were among the actions directly involving participation in the state. Levent vs. Cyprus and others, and Erel vs. RoC in 2006, claimed the right to vote for the
Turkish Cypriot community regardless of which part of the island they inhabited. Their aim was to establish the conditions for a ‘common practice of democracy’ for a state ‘from below’. To Erel, a democratic state was the basis for economic development and liberalisation of the economy. By challenging the RoC’s long-lasting ‘state of necessity’ (Trimikliniotis, 2010), they challenged Greek Cypriot appropriation of the RoC, laying the ground for the 2014 Euro-elections and the joint candidacy of DRASI/EYLEM. Greek and Turkish Cypriot factions of capital, active in rapprochement, promoted cross-Line trade with Ali Erel, a leading figure setting up bilateral relations and ensuring EU trade regulations were followed. Ensuing failures in the collaboration between the two centres of capital were situated in political concerns (Hatay, 2008).

**Breakdown of the Cyprus Miracle:**
**From the National Tragedy to European Intervention**

Greek Cypriots marched out of the Annan Plan and into the European Union heartened because they had denied Turkish Cypriots a share in the Greek Cypriot post-1974 economic miracle and direct access to the global market. Like many small states, the RoC had insured a place in the global capital circulation through offshore finance services, the major sector of Cypriot employment since the 1980s. A downturn of the Greek Cypriot economy was inconceivable. Even losses in the 1999 stock market crisis affecting a considerable number of middle-class households were rationalised as ‘normal’ in EU integration and the liberalising economy process; financial speculation was never questioned.

From 2004 to 2009 both parts of Cyprus experienced significant economic growth, though by the time the RoC joined the Eurozone in 2008, the subprime crisis had already engulfed the European centre, notably Germany, France and the UK. In 2009 Cypriot bankers, the golden boys of banking, began speculating on the Greek debt with the assurance of the unbreakable Cyprus economic miracle: That is to say, they were purchasing the ‘risk’ of the European centre, notably German banks, and moving it to the periphery (Panayiotou, 2013). As the banking debt accumulated, the newly-elected AKEL government whose politics toward financial capital were ambivalent at best (Charalambous and Ioannou, forthcoming) or even neoliberal (Ioannou, in this issue) was called on to bail out the banks. The following restructuring of the state infrastructure to support the changes of the banking sector was accompanied by the rapid rise of the public debt (Panayiotou, 2013). Banking speculation remained unhampered as the real estate bubble burst

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16 The 2004 win of Aziz vs. RoC, a Turkish Cypriot who had lived in the territory under the effective control of the Republic, triggered this movement.
17 AKEL asked to delay the referendum in order to coherently introduce the plan to Cypriot society.
18 The scandals surrounding political party and political figures first pointed towards interests of the centre nationalist DIKO, then to DISY and ultimately to AKEL. Their implications in the crisis and benefits are still under investigation.
resulting in increasing unemployment in the construction industry. Real salaries diminished after 2010, along with consumer buying power.

The snowballing economic insecurity was poorly addressed by the Leftist government (Charalambous and Ioannou, forthcoming) and the constant denial of the economic crisis was met by an aggressive media campaign waged by the affluent and strong banking sector. Mistrust in government culminated with the July 2011 accidental explosion of containers of explosives stored at the Mari Naval Base which destroyed the island’s main power plant nearby. The loss of military life along with civilian firefighters who were killed at the scene and the country plunged into darkness, prompt comparison of the Mari national tragedy with the 1974 national and military tragedy.

Charalambous and Ioannou (forthcoming) call this ‘a nodal political moment, a turning point with ramifications of quasi historical nature for the RoC. Indeed, within days, Greek Cypriots took to the streets, protesting night after night outside the Presidential Palace. Neo-Nazis, Cypriotists, Greek nationalists, neoliberals all rallied against the President, holding him accountable for the national tragedy and for the increasing economic degradation and political insecurity. The first and most organised to mobilise was ELAM (National Popular Front), an anti-Turkish, anti-migrant neo-Nazi nationalist party affiliated with Golden Dawn in Greece. Created in 2008 as a knee-jerk response to the ever growing contact with Turkish Cypriots and to the rise of the Left in government, it found its full expression in the protests. Attired in black at the forefront of the protests its party members waved gigantic Greek flags, defending the Greekness of the island against all enemies: communists, Turkish Cypriots and foreigners. Outside this organised presence, new dispositions were discernible and groups in gestation, notably a group of youngsters reviving the Enosis ideal. Influenced by their own families’ history of enosist sentiment, they aimed not to revive the goal of uniting Cyprus with Greece but to argue for the corrected-ness of that goal in past history and for the positive lessons it implies for the present. While they connected to a bigger Greek ethnic identity, at the same time they connected it to civic Cypriot identity. Assembled in kindred spirit, they followed in their parents’ footsteps – some of whom had fought with EOKA or EOKA B – by studying and practicing international law to support justice for Cyprus. A strong (Greek) Cypriot state was an essential part of the wider Greek ethnic identity. Turkish Cypriots, like the communists, threatened these ideals and the state. Some were also active in the re-emerging rejectionist citizens’ organisations that had fuelled the anti-Annan movement in 2004, a multi-vocal identity which had turned into a ‘pre-emptive rejectionist’ voice: its past rejection of the Annan Plan defined all future responses to peace plans. The most striking aspect was Cypriot civic identity in the broader Greek cultural one.

19 Cyprus under the Christofias government was likened to Greece under Troika, and Greek Cypriots at the Presidential Palace protesting the ‘insecurity’ with the Greek Indignados at Syntagma, protesting European austerity.

20 The ideological proximity and differences on the make of all these groups requires further exploration.
Amidst the nationalist protestors were rapprochement activists promoting reunification and peace as the way out of all loss of military life. Hitherto unnoticed were neoliberal elites, heads of multinational corporations, big international account bankers and so forth who were outraged by the political tragedy and startled by Moody’s downgrading of Cyprus, just days after the explosion. Some of them, mostly bankers, called for a Troika ‘rational’ intervention. Members of the AKEL party were there as well, many seeking justice for the deceased. Others, alongside Leftist groupuscules, had offered their support to the President.

The protests unravelled the deep crisis of the state hyphenated by the Left in government. Following the explosion, the military joined opinion groups and media to criticise the President, triggering accountability to swiftly shift from the army, itself under attack, to the President. They praised the bravery of those who died in the line of duty, inspired by their national Greek ideals, especially at a time of crisis in the army’s defence occasioned by the disappearance of the clear-cut ‘Line of Division’ and the infiltration of the enemy. The checkpoint crossings had further implications which gave rise to a general crisis of the state apparatus, involving both the military and the judiciary. Greek Cypriot crossings to the ‘unrecognised’, ‘occupied’ part of Cyprus escaping the Republic’s control spawned a significant crisis in the judiciary. It now needed to regulate the crossings. The Annan Plan was threatening in two senses: it created a crisis of Greek Cypriot statocracy, that is of the Greek Cypriot identity as the unique ‘Cypriot state identity’ and compromised the state’s ideal of peace: Its international recognition also as the Cypriot state ruled by Greek Cypriots is an essential aspect in the pursuit of legal justice.

The advent of the Left in power politicised the internal division that had emerged with the Annan ‘prospect of peace’ and the creation of a new state. Despite its rejection of the Annan Plan alongside Papadopoulos, AKEL’s historical cutting-edge position on rapprochement and reunification in addition to its absence from the nationalist struggle, made its government spurious. Its rise in power signified the reunification camp as being potentially threatening to the rejectionist majority. With the Left in government the state retreated from its traditional judicial/legal actor role, forcing the citizens to take over the legal struggle, this time against the Presidency. The strong lawyer implication in the protests was telling: first-texting for mobilisation and launching a signature campaign for the President’s resignation and impeachment.

‘As long as the state is not democratic this will happen again and again’

The State in Europe and Austerity

By 2011, the Left was in crisis across the island. Much like CTP, AKEL downplayed its Left-wing politics. Elected at a time of economic growth, CTP took a moderate turn, pointing to the limitations imposed by the military rule and dependency on Ankara and EU support. Just one
year after its election in 2006, CTP implemented the Structuration and Support Programme for Sustainable Economy, the first project in a series of successive economic programmes (2006–2008, 2008–2010 and 2013–2015) that deepened the on-going privatisation of the public sector underway since 2000. The (reform) conditionality principle ensured Turkey’s deeper intervention in the economic and political structure of northern Cyprus, with an appreciably increased presence of Turkish capital in infrastructure and state enterprises to the detriment of the interests of local capital (Moudouros, 2013a). By 2009, the real estate bubble had collapsed and neoliberal austerity brought down the alliance that had been built during the protests and extended to an electoral coalition with the Democratic Party. The election was won by UBP; however, its pursuit of neoliberal austerity measures provoked its electoral loss in 2013. In the current situation, the old partners, the Northern Cypriot Businessmen (IŞAD) and the Chamber of Commerce (KKTÖ), are divided on the competition between Turkish and Turkish Cypriot capitals (Bozkurt, in this volume).

With Adalet ve Kalkınma Partisi (AKP) [Justice and Development Party] in power in Turkey, the northern part of Cyprus was now included in neoliberal restructuration in line with Turkey’s 2001 IMF agreement guidelines (Bozkurt, this volume; Moudouros, 2013a, 2013b; Tahsin, 2013). In spite of having gained political recognition as a community, Turkish Cypriots failed to disengage from Turkish dependency. Yet dependency was transformed, as ethnic kinship, a basic ingredient of this relationship, or even Turkification for that matter, had become irrelevant for Turkey. The ‘motherland–infant-land’ relation was stripped of national significance and the two became purely economic relatives. Özal’s vision of a ‘free zone area’ in the 1980s was put into action by Erdogan (Tahsin, 2013). The ‘common economic area’ opened the north of Cyprus to Turkey’s neo-colonial practices. As Ali Erel said, ‘as long as the state is not democratic this will happen again and again’.

But as we cross the Green Line, we must wonder how protected a democratic state is during the current EU crisis. Even before the end of 2011 the AKEL government, wary of the structural reforms accompanying EU loans, resorted to a bilateral loan from Russia, with only interests attached. The untamed banking speculation and the rapid accumulation of sovereign debt, especially during the Mari protests, forced the government to resort to the European Stability Mechanism (ESM) in 2012 and the subsequent Memorandum of Understanding that same year laid the groundwork for neoliberal economic restructuring, much like those in northern Cyprus or in Greece. At that stage, only anarchists and Left groupuscules protested the signature, with the majority adhering to the idea that the Referendum would ‘end insecurity’.

The newly elected DISY’s compliance was decisive in the Euro Group’s assault on Cyprus sovereignty on 16 March 2013. Again likened to the 1974 war, the European Central Bank (ECB) had indeed resorted to warfare tactics, waging a politico-economic ‘pre-emptive’ war against the sovereign state (Karatsioli, forthcoming [a]). To enforce the ‘bail-in, bailout’ agreement between President Anastasiades and the EU, the ECB declared an indeterminate monetary blockade on
Cyprus, and all transactions by the Central Bank of Cyprus were interrupted. By coercing the 'bail-in, bailout' on this small economy, the ECB also aimed to enforce new measures at the European level. To 'bail-in' €5.8 billion in order to be 'bailed out' for €10 billion Cyprus needed to tax, amongst other, deposits under €100,000. When the country's democratically elected Parliament rejected the agreement, the ECB threatened to withdraw its permission to the Central Bank of Cyprus to apply Emergency Liquidity Assistance (ELA) unless an IMF/ECB programme was in place a week later to assure the solvability of banks. Putting a brave face on the situation, the government signed the agreement and celebrated it as the 'end of insecurity caused by the Left'.

The undermining of democratic institutions at both the European level and in the periphery by the European economic and technocratic management of the crisis did not prepare Cypriots for the resultant neoliberal economic plunder and violent lockout of their small island economy. Blinded by the economic miracle, the rapid post-war prosperity, their 'servicing' position in financial capitalism, and their loyalty to neoliberal values and efficiency, they believed their fate would differ from other European countries in crisis, Greece in particular. But the exercise of democratic decision-making over the state’s economic future was retrieved from the hands of the government, and the local economy was redesigned to fit the needs of global capital. The restructuring of the economy led to increasing rates of unemployment (especially in the banking sector), gender inequalities (more women than men were forced to resign), destruction of all prospect of employment for the younger generation, and the dismantlement of the middle class. Sacrifices made by the 'war-generation' to secure the future of the next generation suddenly vanished into thin air. Meanwhile, the muckrakers of local politicians and mostly of capitals had fled Cyprus in the days preceding the lockout. The complicity of all three political parties and politicians with the banking sector has, since 2011, been everyday news.

The same multi-voicality as in 2011 applied: ELAM, again was amongst the first to mobilise; the initially reluctant AKEL, now in opposition joined in, and at the forefront were the first concerned – the bankers and the public service sector. By 2014, the mobilisation became sectoral, resembling that of northern Cyprus, the most strident being the protests of the semi-privatised government services and the most profit-making organisations such as CYTA.

The state and Greek Cypriot identity, already in crisis since the re-establishment of contact with the enemy and tethered by the island’s economic downgrading, Greek Cypriots have now been dispossessed of their sovereignty by the EU institutions. Having first been dispossessed of their state sovereignty, they were then rejected by the global economy – their specialised financial services economy was deemed redundant (Bauman, 2004) – and after that the employees of the larger sector in the island were judged disposable or unneeded. A decade earlier, Turkish Cypriots had themselves experienced that same redundancy, only as an existential threat and fear of political disappearance. Turkish Cypriots are vulnerable: their protests, their vote for the Annan Plan, and the change of politics in Turkey make the Cypriot question no longer one of national significance.
At this juncture, the dispossession of sovereignty and the progressive de-democratisation of the country is a shared experience. By 2013, both parts of Cyprus were ‘united by austerity’ (Bozkurt, 2013b) and subject to the same neo-colonial practices, either directly through the EU or Turkey. What is the prospect of peace, given the current situation? Dispossessed of their sovereignty can Greek and Turkish Cypriots enter into prospective action towards the creation of a common state?

**Closing Thoughts: A Prospective of The State: Cypriotism and Social Justice**

In his introduction to the revised edition of Poulantzas, *State, Power and Socialism*, Keucheyan (2013) maintains that the ultimate objective of the critical scientist (historian in the text) is to produce a *history of the possibilities*, to show that ‘the real and the possible are constantly disjoint and other realities than the one that happened are conceivable’. Taking this tone, I propose to conclude with a critical thought on the pathway to the reconciliation of the irreconcilables, peace and social justice.

In only a decade, Cyprus has known two major crises. First, the 1999–2001 Turkish Cypriot crisis affected Cyprus through Turkey (Asian crisis), with consequent neoliberal structural adjustments ever since. Second, the deep financial capitalist crisis affecting most of Europe in 2008 reached Greek Cypriots in 2009.

The claims for peace during the Turkish Cypriot crisis came from a society already in transformation. They were making claims for a United European State, at a time when their sovereignty as a people was under duress, after undergoing a ‘global disconnection’ that excluded them from global and local benefits. Fears of integration prompted Turkish Cypriots to take to the streets and assert their claim for economic justice and political recognition. Their ideas of sovereignty were based less on the state’s recognition and more on the community’s sovereignty and equality with Greek Cypriots. The political recognition gained by their community mobilisation contributed to the amelioration of their economic situation and a shift in pro-EU and reunification elites. They remain, however, economically subordinated to the vicissitudes of the Turkish economy and politics for their economic and political present and future.

As they have been internally divided on reunification since the 1980s, the Turkish Cypriots perceived an opportunity in the rapprochement movement. They entered with their ideas of a federalist state and of shared sovereignty, previously constructed to run counter to Taksim. Greek Cypriots were different; they constructed their Cypriotist identity primarily in the rapprochement and only peripherally in their society. Vested in the revision of the past, the rapprochement vaguely engaged in discussions on the ‘solution’, an idea with no meaning for Greek Cypriots.

As the Green Line opened and crossings were facilitated, the prospect of a common state became real. With this imminent possibility, Greek Cypriot sovereignty was constrained. A minority accepted the peace plan, which introduced a violent division in Greek Cypriot society; a number of conservative groups united to create an emerging rejectionist identity, progressively
becoming ‘pre-emptively-rejectionist’; last of all, the rise in power of the Left in 2008, triggered the creation of the far-Right. The 2011 Mari national crisis brought to the fore the crisis of the state and solidified the rejectionist identity. By 2013, Greek Cypriots following EU intervention in Cyprus were dispossessed of their sovereignty and adopting structural reforms imposed on them by the EU. Turkish Cypriot dependency on Turkey had, at the same time, taken on a new form: stripped of its ethnic aspect it was now merely an economic affiliation undergoing neoliberal restructuring, much the same as the Greek Cypriot phase.

With enforced reforms on both sides, Cyprus became a site of exploitation for capitalism, marked by neo-colonial relations for Greek and Turkish Cypriots. At this time of global undermining of democratic institutions, when both communities share the same conditions, what is the prospect of peace?

The recent Turkish Cypriot economic crisis initiated a significant breakthrough towards peace. With the more recent Greek Cypriot economic crisis, many see (or imagine they see) an equilibrium between the two societies, and one that may create an opportunity for peace. To this end, the UN stepped in immediately after the Cyprus lockout to press peace on Greek Cypriots. President Anastasiades, a supporter of rapprochement, posited peace for the market. Hydrocarbon exploitation will likely be the main source of income for the RoC in the near future, but is this reason enough for Greek and Turkish Cypriots to co-operate and seek peace (Varnava and Faustmann, 2009)?

Even if we take the Annan experience as instructive – a ‘possible’ that did not happen; points to a solution pressed on people and not of the people; part of a global change towards technocratic notions of peace and the state – Turkish Cypriots expressed their will for change, but Greek Cypriots were excluded from the process for the Plan to meet with the EU deadlines. How do we go beyond the Annan Plan to reunify Cyprus (ibid.)?

Yet a peace process should be an active process involving all levels that allow people to transform their politics and economy and rethink sovereignty. In the current global situation when sovereignty is threatened/annihilated, can we not support a new state and peace based on social justice? It can set the tone for a new state paradigm. Peace and state building can be a way out of the crisis and a way into further democracy. In this sense, instead of inheriting a sense of sovereignty – a state – Greek and Turkish Cypriots can work together to create a sovereign state to lead them out of the structural adjustment crisis. Can we rethink the issues of territory and sovereignty and question the right of property? In future, can we rethink power-sharing, property, and return and negotiate it in a process not pressed by time, hence engaging with expectations of welfare and unification? In other terms, can we rethink also a federal structure founded on social justice instead of excluding it?

Rapprochement failed to create ‘a society on the spot’ but it has introduced pronounced changes in Cypriot society which reinforce Cypriotism. Against the forces of division in Greek Cypriot society, other forces look for ‘peaceful coexistence’ outside the official and marketised
relations. The emancipatory possibilities of grassroots factions such as the OBZ Movement (Karathanasis and Iliopoulou in this issue) are usually downplayed, but such groups are the proof of a changing Cypriot identity, one that rejects the traditional political division and aims to transform society. Cypriotism, here takes the form of all the above: anti-capitalist and anti-imperialist, it creates the conditions for ‘peace from below’ and actively engages in street action for transformation, breaking with traditional politics and economics. In this, the broader social engagement should not be downplayed, as localised efforts across the divide aim for transformation. Having said that, to privilege and encourage them, we must ‘decolonise’ our own understandings of peace. We cannot exercise peace as ‘power over’ the people; we need to rethink it in terms of ‘power’ to privilege sustainable forms of peace.

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——— (forthcoming [b]) ‘Unsettled States, Peace and Capitalism: Cyprus, Northern Ireland, Israel–Palestine’.


