Inclusiveness and the Perceived Legitimacy of Peace Treaties: Findings from a Survey Experiment in Northern Cyprus

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Abstract
Participation at the negotiation table for finding peace agreements can be conceptualised as a peacebuilding function of civil society but studies which measure the impact of civil society's participation at the negotiation table are distinctly scarce. Do people perceive inclusive peace treaties to be more legitimate? The study focuses on this question by gathering and analysing data from 400 Turkish Cypriots. The survey experiment suggests that inclusiveness does not influence the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. The implications of this finding for conflict resolution are discussed.

Keywords: civil society, Cyprus, legitimacy beliefs, peace-making, peacebuilding, peace negotiations, peace treaties

Introduction
Decades ago, Johan Galtung differentiated between negative peace and positive peace: 'Negative peace which is the absence of violence, absence of war – and positive peace which is the integration of human society' (Galtung, 1964, p. 2). Peace research has evolved extensively since Galtung made this distinction. Peacebuilding, a term that takes social and psychological aspects of conflict into the core of its definition, has become a buzzword in peace studies. Simply put, peacebuilding refers to any kind of intervention that leads to sustainable peace (Bush and Duggan, 2014; Fast and Neufeldt, 2005). Sustainable is a keyword that may differentiate peacebuilding from other concepts such as peacekeeping and peace-making. Peacekeeping is used only to define activities that enable a state to transform from an environment of war to one of negative peace. It is usually conducted by foreign soldiers, for instance, the United Nations (UN) troops. These

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troops endeavour to deter the recurrence of violence and supply local people with their immediate needs such as food, water and shelter. On the other hand, peace-making goes a step further than peacekeeping. Peace-making deals with diplomatic activities, which involve negotiations that are aimed at finding a peaceful settlement between enemies.

It should be stressed that peacebuilding covers interventions that can be classified under peacekeeping and peace-making, but advances it further. It also includes interventions aimed at reshaping a society towards the goal of achieving positive peace. Peacebuilding interventions specifically focus on tackling the root causes of conflicts. If a conflict is caused by environmental degradation, then environmental protection can be classified as peacebuilding. Similarly, if negative rhetoric in history books is one of the root causes of conflict, interventions aimed at changing the content of these books can be classified as peacebuilding. Therefore, peacebuilding interventions denote a set of activities that try to transform a conflict-torn society into a peaceful society by addressing the sources of it.

It should be noted that peacebuilding is used in post-conflict contexts more than in civil war settings. The reason for this is because in civil war settings, peacekeeping and peace-making precedes in urgency when juxtaposed with peacebuilding. Focusing on the root causes of conflict becomes much more relevant once major violence stops. However, it should be noted that peacebuilding, by using the definition above, also covers activities that are classified under peacekeeping or peace-making. For that reason, peacebuilding emerges as a wider concept which includes both peacekeeping and peace-making activities but with the addition of other activities which centre on the derivatives of conflict in post-conflict settings.

By using the term ‘post-conflict country’, it may not always be clear what is exactly meant (Call, 2008). It may refer to a setting where major violence comes to an end. Likewise, it may also refer to a setting where a peace agreement has been signed after the end of a civil war. As a final point, it may refer to a setting with an apparent military defeat of one side to the conflict (ibid.). The first definition is more appropriate than the second or third because the ending of major political violence has certain consequences which can be appreciated in all of these settings (Call, 2008; Diehl and Druckman, 2010).

According to the Special European Union Programmes Body (SEUPB) report (2007), the interest in the evaluation of peacebuilding increased with the growth in the number of peace negotiations and recognition of the inadequacies of the existing approaches. The United States Institute of Peace counts 40 peace agreements between 1989 and 2005 world-wide. The problem in most of these cases is that these agreements did not result in positive peace but rather intermittent violence, crime, economic hardships, suspicion toward former enemies and public dissatisfaction with life and politics. This suggests that a comprehensive peacebuilding approach which focuses on the root causes of conflicts can better address problems in countries which experience violent
conflict. Unlike peacekeeping and peace-making interventions in which civil society actors have either limited or no contribution, civil society emerges as one of the main actors in peacebuilding interventions. Recently, peace researchers moved beyond describing only what civil society has done in single-case studies and defined and differentiated between different peacebuilding functions of civil society (Marchetti and Tocci, 200; Barnes, 2009; Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010). Nevertheless, peacebuilding literature is clearly short of studies that measure the effectiveness of civil society’s peacebuilding roles. Evaluation of the effectiveness of peacebuilding interventions is absolutely necessary (Çuhadar-Gürkaynak et al., 2009).

There is a misconception in the literature that civil society refers to ‘civil’ actors as actors that are inherently and functionally ‘good’ (Kumar, 1993, p. 377). But this is far from the truth. Klu Klux Klan, Al Qaida and the like, are also civil society actors. Almost no one would argue that killing people simply because of their ethnicity or faith can count as peacebuilding. Therefore, it would be erroneous to understand civil society as inherently ‘good’. This type of actor actually ‘spoils’ peace rather than builds it (Stedman, 1997). What makes any organisation or any actor a part of civil society is their distinctiveness from family, business and the state. As soon as an individual acts collectively with other people outside their family, business and the state, this person becomes a part of civil society (Spurk, 2010). This does not mean that civil society cannot be related to family, business and the state. A civil society organisation (CSO) may have connections with the state, but in order to be defined as a civil society organisation, it should not be organised under the state apparatus (ibid.). That said; since political parties compete to become governmental actors, they cannot be defined as civil society organisations.

One study which took important strides toward measuring civil society’s peacebuilding functions is Paffenholz (2010). Based on eleven case studies conducted by country-expert researchers, Paffenholz (ibid.) presented the results of the first extensive study on the effectiveness of civil society’s peacebuilding roles along with enabling and disabling factors for their effectiveness. This study is, arguably, the single comprehensive academic study which has tried to measure effectiveness and discover which factors influence effectiveness. Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) define seven different peacebuilding functions: One of these being advocacy. Advocacy, whether it is public advocacy (outside lobbying) that involves demonstrations, press releases and petitions or non-public advocacy (inside lobbying), which is one-on-one communication with the policy-makers, can be used to influence governmental authorities (Paffenholz and Spurk, 2010).

Additionally, Paffenholz and Spurk (2010) include the civil society’s efforts at the negotiation table during peace-treaty negotiations as part of advocacy. This study will assess the possible effects of this inclusion on the durability of peace. Yet, it should be
noted that the role of civil society at the negotiation table cannot be classified as advocacy because the aim is not necessarily to influence the governmental authorities. The literature shows that the main effect of having civil society at the negotiation table is the increased legitimacy of peace treaties, which in turn, contributes to durable peace (Nilsson, 2012). Conversely, Kanol (2015) tested this causal mechanism behind the positive correlation between civil society being at the negotiation table and durability of peace with a survey experiment in the southern part of Cyprus. Unexpectedly, the author’s data suggested that having civil society at the negotiation table does not have a meaningful effect on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties.

This study extends Kanol’s (2015) study to the northern part of Cyprus by conducting a survey experiment with 400 Turkish Cypriot subjects. In the next sections, studies published on inclusion and its possible effects on legitimacy beliefs are reviewed, the methodology is discussed, the results of the survey experiment conducted in the northern part of Cyprus are presented and the implications of the findings are debated in the concluding section.

**Inclusive Decision-Making Processes and Perceived Legitimacy: A Literature Review**

Most scholars perceive civil society participation at the negotiation table as a positive action (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008; Nilsson, 2012; Zanker, 2013; Chigas, 2014; Paffenholz, 2014). Wanis-St. John and Kew (2008) look at the correlations between the level of civil society participation during the making of 25 peace treaties and the durability of peace. The authors suggest that ‘we see that high or moderate civil society involvement in peace negotiations appears to be strongly correlated with sustained peace in the peacebuilding phase. These findings suggest that a strong relationship exists between direct and indirect civil society participation in peace negotiations and successful peacebuilding’ (Wanis-St. John and Kew, 2008, p. 30). Nilsson (2012) conducts an empirically stronger analysis and comes to the same conclusion. The author looks at 83 peace agreements in 40 different conflicts. Using duration analysis with control variables, she finds that inclusive peace treaties are more likely to create sustainable peace.

Paffenholz (2014) suggests that scholars should now accept that inclusion is beneficial and focus more readily on different ways to include civil society at the negotiation table. Nevertheless, recent findings suggest that it might be hasty to move away from looking at the impact of inclusion. Zanker (2014) asserts that in order to speak about legitimate peace agreements, civil society, which is present at the negotiation table, should represent the real interests of the people. People should identify their selves with those representing them at the negotiation table, and there should be awareness of what civil society is actually doing while participating in the arbitration process. Kanol (2015)
conducts a survey experiment with 337 Greek Cypriot participants and finds that when subjects read about inclusion of civil society at the negotiation table during the dialogue process of a hypothetical peace agreement in Cyprus, their perceived legitimacy of the peace agreement does not significantly vary. Looking at other research which explores the relationship between decision-making types and perceived legitimacy, caution is also recommended against moving away from inclusion/exclusion discussion just yet.

Procedural fairness theory suggests that fair decision-making procedures determine how people are to react to authoritative decisions (Lind and Tyler, 1988; Tyler et al., 1997). In spite of the confidence of political philosophers who argue that participation and deliberation are fairer procedures (Manin, 1987; Barber, 1984; Cohen, 1997) and create better epistemic results than representative procedures (Estlund, 2008; Bohman, 2009; Goodin, 2008; Habermas, 1996), empirical findings are mixed.

Morrell (1999) found that there was no significant difference in legitimacy beliefs between two groups differing in the level of participation. Similarly, Gangl (2000) found that after providing the subjects with different definitions of fair and unfair procedures, the ‘people have voice’ procedure was not conceived to have more legitimacy but in fact, statistically it had insignificant less legitimacy. De Fine Licht (2011) found that direct decision-making compared to representative and expert decision-making did not have a significant positive effect on the perceived legitimacy of health care policies and Hibbing and Theiss-Morse (2002a; 2002b) discovered that giving an opportunity to voice opinions did not make a positive difference to the subjects’ legitimacy beliefs about the outcome and satisfaction. On the contrary, the subjects were actually frustrated when they were allowed to have a voice but this voice was not taken into consideration, thus reducing satisfaction with the outcome. However, when the subjects had the opportunity to influence the outcome after being given a chance to voice their opinions, their legitimacy beliefs increased (Hibbing and Theiss-Morse, 2002b). A similar conclusion was also reached by the non-experimental statistical analysis of Ulbig (2008). This author found that ‘voice’ alone did not make any difference. Only when the citizens’ voice could actually make a difference did legitimacy beliefs significantly increase (Ulbig, 2008).

Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson (2012) found that subjects did not bestow more legitimacy upon the decision-making arrangements they chose in comparison to arrangements that were chosen exogenously by the experimenters.

Other studies have produced more optimistic results. Persson, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2013) argued that both direct voting and deliberation have separate positive effects on legitimacy beliefs. But, when direct voting is present, deliberation had no meaningful impact on legitimacy beliefs. The results of Cavalcanti, Schläpfer and Schmid’s (2010) field experiment suggested that participation had a positive effect on the implementation of common decisions. Sutter, Haigner and Kocher (2010) found that when people were
given a choice to decide on the institutions endogenously, they were more likely to cooperate. Grönlund, Setälä and Herne (2010) also detected that subjects were more willing to engage in collective action after deliberating on energy policy. Using vignettes, De Fine Licht, Naurin, Esaiasson and Gilljam (2014) compared reactions to different forms of decision-making and pinpointed that students attributed most legitimacy to deliberative types of procedures. Comparing legitimacy beliefs between direct voting, electing representatives and expert decision-making, Esaiasson, Gilljam and Persson (2012) found that direct decision-making created the highest legitimacy beliefs. Such a result is supported by other studies such as Bowler, Donovan and Karp (2007), Gash and Murakami (200), Esaiasson (2010) and Olken (2010).

In some of these studies the discovery of positive impact of participatory types of decision-making procedures on legitimacy beliefs is encouraging but overall we see that results are at best, mixed. Moreover, it is not certain whether generic findings about decision-making processes and legitimacy beliefs can be generalised in relationships between inclusive/exclusive peace treaties and legitimacy beliefs. The only study which specifically tests this relationship is Kanol (2015) and this author found evidence in favour of the null hypothesis.

Method

Unlike observational studies, experiments enable researchers to randomly assign subjects into treatment and control group(s) in order to make sure that the statistical findings are not contaminated by well-known problems like specification error and endogeneity. If subjects can be randomly assigned into treatment and control groups, researchers can be certain that they do not have an unexpected finding due to confounding variables or reverse causality. Therefore, this study uses Kanol’s (2015) survey experimental design to capture the effect of inclusiveness on the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. Unlike lab experiments, survey experiments rely on vignettes where subjects are randomly assigned into different groups reading different texts or questions. If the texts are designed properly and the randomisation process is successful, the researcher can be sure that the differences in means found between the treatment and control group(s) are really due to the psychological effect of reading the diverse texts presented to them.

The experimental study was conducted in the northern part of Cyprus. Cyprus was divided as a consequence of intercommunal strife which broke out in the second half of the 1950s and continued until the island was partitioned in 1974. Turkish Cypriots seceded and promulgated their own state in the northern part of Cyprus in 1983. To date, the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus – TRNC’ is an unrecognised state, acknowledged only by Turkey. Like every causal relationship tested with experimental studies, the external validity based on a single case study is questionable. It is, nonetheless,
possible to generalise findings by running meta-analyses of the results derived from a significant number of studies in different contexts. This study contributes to this endeavour by using a study in a context other than the southern part of Cyprus where the only experimental study on this topic was conducted (see Kanol, 2015).

Due to funding issues, the researcher was unable to gather data from a representative sample. The sample is non-probabilistic; however, it includes all kinds of people as shown in table 1. The researcher enlisted the help of a research assistant to gather data in the Köşklüçiftlik region of northern Nicosia, which is the most crowded region of the city. The research assistant randomly distributed the questionnaires to the subjects and asked each one to carefully read the texts presented to them before answering a short questionnaire.

After reading a paragraph which invited the treatment group – comprising of 200 Turkish Cypriots – to consider that a hypothetical agreement had been found, the group was asked to complete a survey. The subjects were notified that this hypothetical agreement had been found as a result of negotiations between the presidents of the two sides along with the active participation of 50 representative civil society organisations. A further 200 Turkish Cypriots were assigned to a control group where the participants were given the same text but with no information on the active involvement of civil society organisations. Perceived legitimacy was measured for all respondents following the readings of texts about a hypothetical agreement. The short texts presented to the subjects were as follows:

**Treatment Group**

‘Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.’

**Control Group**

‘Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.’

The respondents in the treatment group were coded as 1 and the respondents in the control group were coded as 0. Using the means of such vignettes enabled the use of a simulation to measure the legitimacy beliefs of the wider society depending on the participation of civil society organisations in peace-treaty negotiations.

legitimacy. Kanol (2015) used three questions in order to measure perceived legitimacy. The average of the same three measures was used in this study to construct a perceived legitimacy index. The first statement used for calculating the perceived legitimacy index is: ‘the decision was taken in a fair way’ – ‘strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 strongly agree’. The second statement used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: ‘please indicate what you thought of the outcome’ – ‘not satisfied at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely satisfied’, and the third question used to calculate the perceived legitimacy index is: ‘how willing are you to accept the decision?’ – ‘not willing at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 completely willing’. Cronbach’s alpha (0.99) shows that the perceived legitimacy index is perfectly reliable.

The questionnaire also asked the participants to give information about their age, gender, level of education, region of residence, religiosity, ideology, trust in CSOs, trust in Greek Cypriots, and vote intention in a future referendum following the reading of the short texts provided. Age is an interval variable. Gender is a dichotomous variable. Females are coded as 0 and males are coded as 1. Education is measured by asking the participants about their last degree obtained. The 6-point scale begins with no schooling and ends with a postgraduate degree. Ideology is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented left and 6 represented right. Regions of residence are coded as 5 dummy variables – Nicosia, Famagusta, Kyrenia, Morphou and Trikomo/Iskele. Religiosity is measured on a 7-point scale. Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number from 0 to 6 where 0 is used to code the respondents who are not religious at all and 6 is used to code the respondents who are very religious.

Trust in CSOs is measured with the following question: ‘on a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust do you have for civil society organizations in your country?’ Respondents were asked to put a circle around a number between 0 and 6 where 0 represented no trust at all and 6 represented complete trust. Trust towards Greek Cypriots is measured on a 7-point scale. Asked if Greek Cypriots can be trusted, the respondents were asked to put a circle around a number on a 7-point scale which varies from 0 that implies that they cannot be trusted to 6 which implies that they can be trusted. Moreover, voting intention in a future referendum is measured on a 7-point scale. The respondents who were intending to definitely vote ‘no’ are coded as 0 and the respondents who were intending to definitely vote ‘yes’ are coded as 6. The full questionnaire can be found in the Appendix. The sample size is large (N=400) and there are 7 categories in the scale used to measure the dependent variable. Therefore, using Ordinary Least Squares (OLS) regression analysis is acceptable.

Results

Table 1 presents the number of observations, means, standard deviations and minimum and maximum values for the independent, dependent and control variables. The number of observations is completely the same for both the treatment and control groups. The average
perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty is high. Most respondents have strong trust in CSOs. Age variance is large and there is absolute equality in the sample with regard to gender. The sample is comprised of slightly left-wing people who are predominantly secular, slightly distrustful toward Greek Cypriots and slightly more likely to vote ‘no’ in a future referendum. The mean value for level of education is 3.36 and the median respondent has an undergraduate degree. A vast majority of the respondents reside in Nicosia (66%). The remainder are from Famagusta (10%), Kyrenia (15%), Morphou (5%) and from Trikomo/Iskele (5%).

Table 1: Descriptive Statistics

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Variable</th>
<th>N</th>
<th>Mean</th>
<th>SD</th>
<th>Min</th>
<th>Max</th>
</tr>
</thead>
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<tr>
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<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<td>2.17</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<td>Age</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>37.9</td>
<td>13.7</td>
<td>18</td>
<td>80</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Gender</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.45</td>
<td>0.5</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Education</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>3.36</td>
<td>1.12</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>5</td>
</tr>
<tr>
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<td>0.48</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Famagusta</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.1</td>
<td>0.3</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.15</td>
<td>0.36</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphou</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Iskele/Trikomo</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>0.05</td>
<td>0.21</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>1</td>
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<tr>
<td>Ideology</td>
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<td>2.36</td>
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<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
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<td>1.03</td>
<td>1.2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
</tr>
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<td>Trust GCs</td>
<td>400</td>
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<td>1.97</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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<tr>
<td>Vote intention</td>
<td>400</td>
<td>2.51</td>
<td>2</td>
<td>0</td>
<td>6</td>
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</table>

Table 2 presents the results of the OLS regression analysis. Trust in CSOs could not be introduced in the statistical model since it has a perfect correlation with perceived legitimacy. Pearson's correlation between trust in CSOs and perceived legitimacy is 0.99. Furthermore, the author had to choose between including either trust in Greek Cypriots or vote intention in a referendum in the model since these also had a perfect relationship, thus triggering a multicollinearity problem. Therefore, only trust in Greek Cypriots was
included in the model. It should be emphasised that the analysis was run with both variables and these variables have a very similar effect on the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty (not only p-values but Beta values as well). Excluding these variables do not pose any problems to the validity of the statistical model because the randomisation process was successful. The randomisation process was tested by looking at the correlations between the independent variable and the control variables. None of the correlations are significant at the 90% confidence level. Since a region is a nominal variable, dummy variables are created and Nicosia was kept as the base in the regression analysis.

The statistical model in table 2 explains up to 46% of the variation; hence, the explanatory power of this model is quite successful. Taking 95% confidence level as the threshold, we see that older, more educated and secular Turkish Cypriots who tend to trust Greek Cypriots are more likely to perceive the hypothetical peace treaty as more legitimate. Turkish Cypriots from Iskele/Trikomo region are less likely to perceive the hypothetical peace treaty as more legitimate. As regards the independent variable of interest, we find no meaningful effect of being in the treatment group on the perceived legitimacy of the hypothetical peace treaty. The p-value is only 0.93 and the Beta value is only 0.01.

**Table 2: OLS Regression Analysis**

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th></th>
<th>Beta</th>
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<td>Education</td>
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<td>0.09</td>
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<td>0.06</td>
<td>0.28</td>
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<td>Kyrenia</td>
<td>0.25</td>
<td>0.28</td>
<td>0.23</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Morphou</td>
<td>0.46</td>
<td>0.24</td>
<td>0.39</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Iskele/Trikomo</td>
<td>-1.44</td>
<td>0.01***</td>
<td>0.48</td>
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<td>Ideology</td>
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<tr>
<td>Religiosity</td>
<td>-0.37</td>
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<td>Trust GCs</td>
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<td>Intercept</td>
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<td>R-squared</td>
<td>0.46</td>
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INCLUSIVENESS AND THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF PEACE TREATIES

Conclusion

Evaluating civil society’s peacebuilding functions has gained prominence recently not only among practitioners but academics too. Being at the negotiation table can be understood as a peacebuilding function of civil society as some suggest that its participation will make peace negotiations more representative and peace treaties more legitimate. Similar to Kanol (2015), this study used a survey experiment with the aim of exploring the relationship between civil society’s participation at the negotiation table and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties. This research complements Kanol’s earlier study by gathering data in the northern part of Cyprus. It improves upon the former work by surveying a more representative sample. Although the sample is non-probabilistic, it does include various types of people, and not simply students. Therefore, the sample is more representative of the wider population. Regardless, the results did not change. There seems to be no relationship between inclusiveness and the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties.

These findings have important implications for negotiation strategies in countries which have suffered from civil war. In Cyprus, for instance, the UN Secretary General’s Special Adviser, Espen Barth Eide, mentioned the critical nature of civil society in finding a peace agreement and attaining a ‘yes’ in the referendum (Cyprus Mail, 2015). Yet, it is not clear what exactly the role of civil society at the negotiation table is. With respect to being at the negotiation table, if civil society’s participation does not affect the perceived legitimacy of peace treaties, does this mean that its participation would not affect positive peace? Not necessarily.

This study does not explore the perceived legitimacy beliefs of civil society actors participating at the negotiation table. If their participation at the negotiation table positively affects their legitimacy beliefs, it is again an empirical matter to explore how this effect influences positive peace. Neither does this study examine the possible positive impact of inclusiveness on the epistemic quality of peace treaties. On the other hand, Cunningham (2013) states that the inclusion of many actors at the negotiation table may actually slow down and even block the negotiation process. One can argue, therefore, that more research is needed to examine the multiple potential effects of inclusiveness on peacebuilding, taking into account the complexity of the causal processes.

References


INCLUSIVENESS AND THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF PEACE TREATIES


INCLUSIVENESS AND THE PERCEIVED LEGITIMACY OF PEACE TREATIES

Appendix

Control Group
Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders of both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

Treatment Group
Suppose that after intense negotiations between the leaders of the two sides and active participation of 50 representative civil society organizations from both sides for three months, a reunification agreement is agreed upon. The leaders and most civil society organizations from both sides stated that they are satisfied with the agreement.

If there was such a situation, what would be your reaction to the following statements/questions?

1) The decision was taken in a fair way.
   Strongly disagree 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Strongly agree

2) Please indicate what you thought of the outcome.
   Not satisfied at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely satisfied

3) How willing are you to accept the decision?
   Not willing at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Completely willing

   Now I will ask you some general questions.

4) On a scale from 0 to 6, how much trust would you say you have in Civil Society Organizations in your country?

   No trust at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Complete trust

5) Age:
   .......

6) Gender:
   Female 0 Male 1
7) What is the highest educational level that you have attained?
   0 No schooling
   1 Primary school
   2 Secondary school
   3 High school
   4 Undergraduate
   5 Postgraduate

8) In which region are you residing?
   Nicosia
   Famagusta
   Kyrenia
   Morphou
   Trikomo/Iskele

9) In political matters people talk of ‘the left’ and ‘the right’. How would you place your views on this scale?
   Left 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Right

10) How religious do you consider yourself as?
    Not religious at all 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Very religious

11) Overall, would you say that Greek Cypriots can be trusted?
    No, they cannot be trusted 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 Yes, they can be trusted

12) If there was a referendum tomorrow, how would you vote?
    I would definitely vote no 0 1 2 3 4 5 6 I would definitely vote yes