Lessons from the Past for the Future

EMILIOS SOLOMOU AND HUBERT FAUSTMANN

‘However professionally skeptical we may be about learning from the past, there is no doubt that we try to do it all the time.’

James J. Sheehan, President of the American Historical Association in 2005

Abstract

This paper will explore how, during the course of the Cyprus Problem, factors like lost opportunities, absence of political realism, political polarization, sentiments and ideological constraints contributed to perpetuate as well as complicate the dispute. Foreign involvement added to the complexity of the issue. By looking at crucial junctures of modern Cypriot history, the paper aims to provide historical insights as to how lessons from past mistakes can contribute to a successful reunification of the island. Which insights from the past could be utilized to contribute to the viability of a future agreement?

Introduction

Views about the ability to learn lessons from history vary widely. They range from George Bernard Shaw’s aphorism, ‘We learn from history that we learn nothing from history’, to Winston Churchill’s verdict, ‘Those who fail to learn from history, are doomed to repeat it’. Moreover, in public discourses, history is regularly used to guide us morally and practically on how to act. Current policies are regularly justified or criticized by political actors referring to the past. Or to put it in the words of the President of the American Historical Association in 2005 James J. Sheehan: ‘Historical analogies, comparisons, and metaphors are all around us; they are a source of collective wisdom on which we must rely.’¹ We, like many historians, believe that if approached with caution, some lessons from the past can be learned; and this applies not only to similarities but also to differences.² Nevertheless, we are fully aware that historical analogies are problematic for obvious reasons. Each historical situation is unique,

² ibid.
depending on time, place, structures and protagonists. But historical problems and patterns re-emerge in partially or totally changed settings. In this sense, history repeats itself and it does not.

We do claim that within the history of Cyprus, situations and problems emerged that are similar enough to allow conclusions as to how historical mistakes of the past can help to avoid similar mistakes in the future. Within this essay we restricted ourselves to developments within the framework of modern Cypriot history as the reference point for the analyses. This has the advantage of eliminating many problems that derive from the transfer of historical experiences from one country to another. But even such an approach does not eliminate the pitfalls inherent in any historical analogy. Moreover, even if the mistakes of the past are ‘correctly understood’ and the ‘right’ lessons are learned this will not necessarily prevent failure.

This policy paper will therefore explore how during the course of the Cyprus Problem, factors like lost opportunities, absence of political realism, political polarization, sentiments and ideological constraints contributed to perpetuate as well as complicate the dispute. By looking at critical junctures3 of modern Cypriot history, the policy paper aims to provide historical insights as to how lessons from past mistakes can contribute to a successful reunification of the island. Therefore, we chose aspects of a solution where we believe lessons from the past of Cyprus could be applied for the benefit of a viable reunification.

Moreover, any judgement on what constitutes historical mistakes is a highly subjective one, not just on an individual level but also on a group level. What is a lost opportunity or a mistake for one side is often the right choice or a successfully avoided bad development for the other. This clearly applies to Cyprus. As the benchmark for the assessment of various aspects of Cypriot history we chose officially proclaimed policy goals. For the period prior to independence we consider lost opportunities or mistakes events that could have led to either union with Greece (enosis), a better prospect for enosis or at least a Greek Cypriot majority-ruled, independent Cyprus. From a Turkish Cypriot point of view, we assume that the community hoped for British rule to continue, the preservation or enhancement of their status as a minority/community, and, after 1956, for the partition of Cyprus (in Turkish taksim). For the period 1960 to 1974, Greek Cypriot policy goals were either enosis or at least a Greek Cypriot majority-ruled, independent Cyprus. During the intercommunal talks from 1968 to 1974, Turkish Cypriots

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aimed for local autonomy in Turkish Cypriot populated areas.4

After the forceful division of the island in 1974, as a result of the Turkish invasion, enosis disappeared as a political goal for the vast majority of the Greek Cypriot population. Instead they pursued reunification, but there was no consensus on the kind of reunion. It ranged from Greek Cypriot majority rule in a unitary state, to a federation based on political equality.5 The policy of the Turkish Cypriot leadership ranged from the official position of reunification based on political equality within a bizonal, bicommmunal federation, which emerged gradually between 1974 and 1977, to the preservation of partition aiming at full recognition of the ‘TRNC’. Repeatedly, Turkish Cypriots used the unification of the northern part of the island with Turkey as a threat.6

An obvious problem for such an approach is that the official goals were not shared by all members of either community during all periods. Even the two authors of this text do not always agree on what events constitute lost opportunities or historical mistakes. This is another reason why we chose to follow the official line of both sides. Even this methodological choice did not eliminate the problem that we essentially applied our own subjective judgement of the past by looking with the benefit of hindsight at events that could have led to a ‘better’ outcome for either community or for Cyprus as a whole. As far as the reunification of the island is concerned, our benchmark will be which lessons can be learned from the past for the viability of a bizonal, bicommmunal federation. We try to make recommendations which in our view could contribute to a functional and functioning, peaceful, reunited Cyprus.

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5 See the opinion polls published by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SeeD) for the support of various forms of a solution to the Cyprus problem since 2014: http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/seed-library?searchword=polls&ordering=newest&searchphrase=all, accessed on 3 April 2017.

Education Based on Truth and Reconciliation

When the British took over in 1878 they were unwilling to assume paying expenses for education and left it to the two main communities to provide for the education of their respective communal groups. The communal leaders responded by bringing teachers from their respective ‘mother countries’ to the island7 or sending Cypriots to be trained there. Along with the educational systems, the curricula, the textbooks and the teachers that were imported from outside came the respective narratives of the ‘other’ ethnic group as the ‘barbaric’ historical enemy. From the beginning the educational systems of both communities were developed separately from each other, with a few English language schools as the only places of common education (The English School, Nicosia since 1900 and the American Academy in Larnaca since 1908).8 This separation was maintained and institutionalized at the time of independence with the establishment of two Communal Chambers in charge of the respective educational systems,9 and the influence of Greece and Turkey on the educational systems through the provision of textbooks and teachers continued.

The breakdown of the constitutional order and partial separation of both communities in 1963-1964 intensified the hostile perception of each other within historical discourses in schools. The events were used to strengthen ethnic identities and to project the other as the enemy either as rebels against the lawful Republic of Cyprus or as usurpers of the rights of the Turkish Cypriots. From an educational point of view, the situation became worse because there was no formal communication or coordination of any kind between the educational authorities of both communities anymore. In 1965, based on the Law of Necessity and after the Greek Cypriots unilaterally abandoned their Communal Chamber, a Ministry of Education was established.10 In theory, it was a ministry for both communities, in practice a ministry exclusively in charge of Greek Cypriot education.

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7 Until the foundation of modern Turkey in 1923, the reference point for the Muslim community was the Ottoman Empire and education was essentially religious education.
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The events of 1974 aggravated the hostile narrative even further: ‘the barbaric, murderous, rapist Turk’ vs. the ‘the barbaric Greek Cypriot oppressors’.11 The codename ‘Attila’, used by Turkey for the military operation, epitomises for the Greeks the ruthless character of the invaders. The narrative in the south gradually separated the ideas of the good, but oppressed Turkish Cypriot compatriots vs. the evil, occupying Turks and culturally different settlers.12 Not much of this filtered formally into the educational system, since the narrative of Cypriot history within the Greek Cypriot educational system largely stopped with the death of President Makarios in 1977. The period since was covered extremely briefly and in very general terms. What was cultivated in separate publications and aimed at primary school pupils was an emphasis on ‘Δεν Ξέχνω’13 (‘Then Xehno’ or ‘I don’t forget’ [the invasion and the lost north]). Turkish Cypriot education after 1974 focused on legitimising the partition of the island on the basis that ‘the two communities on the island cannot live together’. The traditional Greek Cypriot narrative of the Hellenic character of Cyprus was countered by a Turkish Cypriot emphasis on the Ottoman/Turkish character of Cyprus.14

Laudably, during the period 2008-2010, when Demetris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, two moderate leftist politicians, led their respective communities, both sides attempted to change the textbooks with the aim of bringing the two communities closer together. In the north, the new books were introduced in 2009 but only used briefly, since they were abolished during the Eroglu period (2010-2015), while in the

south the attempt failed and the old textbooks remain in place until today.¹⁵

There are marked differences in the political orientation of the teachers on both sides of the divide, which also has an impact on how Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot children are taught. In the north the predominant segment of the teachers belong to the political left or centre-left, which is traditionally moderate and very supportive of reconciliation and reunification efforts. For this reason they are more receptive to the changes necessary in a reunified Cyprus. The Greek Cypriot teaching body represents the political diversity of the community and contains therefore more teachers who provide narratives less conducive to reconciliation and reunification. They are less likely to be so receptive to the changes needed.¹⁶

There are four main approaches by which educational systems and societies deal with intergroup violence. The first is to turn this conflictual past into a taboo which is not referred to. The second is based on selective memory where states or groups remain silent about their own wrongdoing, present their actions in a positive light and/or perpetuate victimization discourses of their own group or state. The third aims to ‘overcome conflict by a simplistic understanding of a single peaceful narrative of co-existence, which often follows outdated and unhistorical conceptions of essentialist identities as a tool for nation-building’.¹⁷ The fourth and most promising approach, transformative history teaching, aims at ‘critical understanding of the conflictual past through the cultivation of historical thinking, empathy, an overcoming of ethnocentric narratives and the promotion of multiperspectivity’.¹⁸

As far as education is concerned, lessons from the past seem to have been clearly learned. In 2016 a bicommunal technical committee on education was set up to suggest ways through which ‘education can contribute to conflict transformation, peace, reconciliation and countering of prejudice, discrimination, racism, xenophobia and extremism’.¹⁹ The committee was tasked with ‘devising a mutually acceptable mechanism for the implementation of confidence building measures in schools of the two educational systems and promote contact and co-operation between students and

¹⁵ Turkish Cypriot Educational Administration, Cyprus History [in Turkish] Vols 1–3, Nicosia 2004.
¹⁶ Turkish Cypriot teachers are members of the leftist Cyprus Turkish Teacher’s Union (KTOS), which is very active in bicommunal events. The unions for Greek Cypriots is POED (primary school teachers) and OELMEK (secondary teachers), and they tend to be right wing. Within OELMEK there are splinter groups which represent different approaches, however, the strongest group is clearly right wing.
¹⁸ ibid.
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tutors from the two communities’. Three working groups were set up, one was to search for best practices in the literature, the second was tasked to establish a framework of contact between teachers and students and the third was supposed to look into ‘the educational policies that can be promoted in a bicomunal federation, with a view to consolidate peaceful co-existence’.  

It is encouraging that members of the committee were involved in a report entitled ‘Recommendations for the History Teaching of Intergroup Conflicts’, published in 2017, which endorses the development of ‘historical literacy’ through the use of Transformative History Teaching. Should their views prevail and the effort succeed, it would be a very positive step towards the viability of a reunified Cyprus. It is hoped that history education in a reunified Cyprus will propose syllabi that create mutual understanding, cooperation and reconciliation. This effort should also provide for history textbooks that cover the period since 1960 to be changed in a way which does not hide the dark sides of modern Cypriot history, in particular the inner- and intracommunal conflicts since the 1950s.

Narratives need to be shaped by a multi-perspective approach reflecting the various groups involved. The absence of a multi-perspective analysis will otherwise provide fertile ground for one-sided approaches. True reconciliation needs a narrative that includes self-criticism and the admission that one’s own side made mistakes and committed atrocities. The aim should be to allow for an open debate about the past. Visits by members of the other community to talk about their experiences could be a means to improve the understanding of the other community, particularly in the absence of mixed classes. Schools on both sides should create institutionalized partnerships with schools of the other community and organize joint activities based on the assumption that only regular contact can reduce prejudice. Teaching the other community’s language should be introduced. This is also explicitly demanded within the Technical Committee’s terms of reference. We suggest that Greek or Turkish should be taught at the latest from a secondary level and the teaching of English as a ‘neutral’ language for intercommunal contact and exchange should be strengthened and start from a primary level. Whatever the institutional arrangement, close cooperation between the educational authorities of both sides should aim at unified standards and


21 Cost IS 1205, ‘Recommendations for the History Teaching of Conflict Groups’.


as similar curricula as possible. On tertiary educational level, all universities in Cyprus should offer programmes which at least include courses in English that are required for students from both communities.

**Joint Activities**

Currently there are far too few contacts and joint events between members of both communities. Those that take place are usually attended by more or less the same people, most being bicomunal activists or belonging to the political left. Another hindrance on top of this preaching-to-the-converted problem in such events is the recognition issue which prevents official cooperation between state institutions, municipalities and even universities. Moreover, particularly in the south, contacts and friendships with people on the other side are often accompanied by social stigmatization. Most of these obstacles would disappear in the event of a settlement.

Moreover, any solution scenario so far includes the return of refugees and therefore the recreation of mixed villages and towns. This return to the past should be complemented by getting both communities to have as much contact as possible through joint activities in all areas of society, be it professional, cultural or social. These contacts are likely to reduce prejudice and create trust, closer relationships and a feeling of togetherness as a grass-root component, strengthening the viability of reunification. The impact of such contact depends on the number of participants as well as proper management of activities in order to constructively deal with conflicts and disagreements. In the beginning it is very important that these kinds of activities are politically encouraged to overcome social stigmatization often accompanying bicomunal contacts today.

**Opposition to the Settlement**

As shown in the polls conducted by the Centre for Peace and Sustainable Democratic Development (SeeD) on the stand of the so called rejectionist parties on both sides of the divide, there will be many parties and people which, for various reasons, will oppose any feasible settlement. A clear distinction needs to be made here between those who might be willing to resort to violence to cause destabilisation and those who will oppose the new state of affairs through democratic means.

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24 Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development, http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/, accessed on 2 May 2017. The parties commonly projected as rejectionist in the south are DIKO, EDEK, The Citizens Alliance, Solidarity Movement and ELAM. In the north, it is UBP and DP. Moreover, there are groups within most parties in Cyprus that are also likely to object to any feasible unification deal.
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Marginalization and Criminalization of Violent Political Radicals

Between 1955 and 1974, groups who were willing to pursue their political goals through violent means often dominated the political scene and were responsible for violence between and within each community. Moreover, this violence was legitimized and justified by large parts of the elites and large sections of the media, or at least, the media, public and elites remained indifferent. While the use of violence in some instances could be justified, its use facilitated polarization and radicalisation within the communities and directly or indirectly contributed to the alienation and separation of the two communities. Here the lesson from the past has already been learned, which is a major achievement that is not too common in ethnic conflict. There seems to be an overwhelming consensus on both sides of the divide that violence is not an option anymore. In the few instances where isolated violent incidents occurred after the 2003 opening of the Green Line, which separates both parts of the island, they were immediately condemned by all political parties and firmly dealt with. It is essential that this consensus survives and permeates a post-solution Cyprus. The political culture of a reunified Cyprus needs to be based on the practice that the limits of political confrontation are the viability and functioning of the state. Any act of politically motivated violence should not be legitimized by the elites or the media and needs to be prosecuted by the state irrespective of ethnicity and condemned by the political elites and public opinion. Moreover, each community should make it its moral obligation to be in the lead and to be seen as dealing firmly with the violent extremists of its own community.

The Need for Constructive Opposition after a Settlement

At the time of writing, one could expect that in the south the Democratic Party (DIKO), the Movement for Social Democracy (EDEK), the Greens, the Citizens Alliance and extreme right wing National Popular Front (ELAM) are very likely to oppose any feasible solution to the Cyprus Question. In the north the National Unity Party (UBP) and the Democratic Party (DP) belong to the same category. In case of a successful reunification of the island after a referendum, considerable parts of the population of both sides and the majority of parties (though obviously not the majority of the voters) will be opposed to the new state of affairs. While at least some

25 For the development of the Greek Cypriot party system until 2008, see Christophoros Christophrourou, ‘The Evolution of Greek Cypriot Party Politics’, in James Ker-Lindsay and Hubert Faustmann (eds), The Government and Politics of Cyprus, Oxford; Peter Lang, 2008, pp. 83–106. For the recent positions of the various parties on the island on the Cyprus Problem, see the monthly newsletter of the Friedrich-Ebert-Foundation in Cyprus available at FESCyprus.org.

26 See the opinion polls published by the Centre for Sustainable Peace and Democratic Development (SEED) for the opposition to various forms of a solution to the Cyprus problem since 2014. Avail-
of the reasons for their objection are likely to be justified and understandable, it is obvious that fundamental opposition to the new ‘Unified Cyprus’ will be a source of instability that will threaten the viability of the new political system. For the sake of the viability of a solution and for the sake of future generations, those opposed to the new state of affairs need to respect the result, embrace the compromise and struggle for changes within the system rather than fundamentally oppose and sabotage it. Unlike 1960, when a settlement was imposed on Cyprus which neither side, and in particular the Greek Cypriot one, felt any allegiance, and people therefore tried to sabotage it, the new reunified Cyprus would be the result of a legally binding agreement between both communities, legitimized through two referenda endorsing the agreement. Any opposition to the new order should therefore be characterized by responsibility and respect for the decisions taken. Opposition should limit itself to ways to improve the new state but should not attempt to destroy it. Clearly, this is a recommendation based on a moral line of argument and should not be misunderstood as an attempt to muzzle any opposition. The state of affairs, in particular in the first years after a reunification, is likely to be so fragile that populist, irresponsible opposition is extremely dangerous and detrimental for the stability of the political system.

No Destabilization from Outside Powers

As far as the Cyprus Problem is concerned, many Cypriots perceive that outside powers which are not their respective ‘mother countries’ play a negative and destructive role in pursuit of a settlement (with the notable exception of many Greek Cypriots’ perception of Russia). In fact, the majority of Cypriots see the role of their respective ‘mother countries’, Greece and Turkey, as destructive and negative as far as aspects of modern Cypriot history are concerned. For Greek Cypriots, this applies clearly to the Greek masterminded coup d’état against President Makarios in 1974; many Turkish Cypriots are critical of the role Turkey has been playing in the last decades through its dominance over Turkish Cypriot affairs and its policy of Turkification in the north which includes the massive influx of Turkish settlers. As far as the other main outside powers are concerned, Greek Cypriots in particular predominantly see Britain and the US as destructive and hostile outside powers, while they perceive Russia to be their steadfast and loyal ally since the 1960s.

From an historical point of view, a far more differentiated picture needs to be

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27 Ibid.

28 For both Cypriot communities’ perceptions of Turkey, see Rebecca Bryant and Chrystalla Yakhinthou, *Cypriot Perceptions of Turkey*, Istanbul: Tesev Publications, 2012.
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drawn as far as the role of outside powers is concerned, though many aspects of outside involvement remain disputed amongst historians and political analysts.\(^29\) What can be safely said is that, whatever outside power one looks at, there are examples of positive or negative impacts each has had on Cyprus. This verdict is further complicated by the fact that there is often no agreement if a specific involvement should be seen as positive or negative. For example, the Russian veto against a UN enforcement of the security provisions of the Annan Plan in Chapter 7 of the UN Charter (which enables the use of military force in cases of non-compliance) is seen as a positive move by opponents of the Annan Plan and as negative outside involvement by its supporters.

A glance at the history of Cyprus clearly indicates the long historical record of outside interference. As Cyprus possesses no significant military capabilities, it had been controlled since antiquity by outside powers, which were attracted by its resources or geostrategic location. As far as the emergence of the Cyprus Problem is concerned, outside involvement started with the Ottoman's conquest of the island in 1571. The Ottoman period saw the creation of a Muslim community on the island, which under the Ottoman millet system was a separate community. When the British took over the island in 1878, the religious divide and gradual adoption of different national identities by both communities prevented the Muslim community from assimilating. Moreover, the British administrative structure maintained the population categories of Christian and Muslim. This policy facilitated Britain's divide-and-rule policy that was implemented once Greek Cypriot nationalism became a threat to Britain's continued rule.

The dispute between the Greek Cypriots and their colonial rulers intensified in the 1950s, culminating first in Greece appealing to the United Nations in 1954 for Cyprus's right of self-determination, followed by a violent anti-colonial struggle from 1955 to 1959. Faced with the internationalization of the dispute, Britain's divide-and-rule policies included Turkey's involvement to counterbalance Greece's claims in 1954. It was a Greek-Turkish agreement over an independent Cyprus and its political order that formed a new and unwanted state.

Under the Treaty of Establishment of the Republic of 1960, Britain secured two sovereign military bases and other facilities in Cyprus, which continue to exist to the present day. Moreover, the role of Greece, Turkey and Britain was enshrined in the new constitution in the Treaty of Alliance (stipulating a permanent military presence of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus) and the Treaty of Guarantee (providing for a joint or unilateral right to intervene in the event of a breach of the Treaty). Arguably, both Greece and Turkey could live with the 1960 compromise and were predominantly status quo powers until the situation became tense again. Once the constitutional order broke down in late 1963, Greece and Turkey supported their respective sides and oscillated between moderation, escalation or even, in the case of Turkey, repeated threats of invasion, although in 1964, Greece was involved in a conspiracy to overthrow Makarios. Turkey supported the Turkish Cypriots’ fallback position to partition the island should the 1960 arrangement falter. Once negotiations resumed in 1968, it seems that both the Greek junta and the Turkish government were willing to make the necessary concessions to allow for a settlement, which seems particularly true for the Turkish side if one looks at the result of the first bicommunal and later four partite talks between 1968 and 1974. However the year 1974 is the most notorious for the destructive involvement of Greece and Turkey in Cyprus. The Greek junta masterminded the coup against Makarios which was followed by the Turkish invasion and partition of the island in 1974.


33 Clerides, My Deposition and Dekleris, Κυπριακό, Η Τελευταία Ευκαιρία.

34 For the most relevant accounts of 1974 in English see: Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cy-
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After 1974, outside powers played a prominent role in the attempts to resolve the Cyprus problem. While all outside powers, since the High Level Agreements of 1977 and 1979, have paid lip service to a solution of the Cyprus Problem, their constructive or destructive involvement in various phases of the Cyprus talks is too complex to be analysed here. Suffice to say that all are accused by segments of the two communities of serving their own interests rather than promoting a viable solution. This suspicion, be it justified or not, has hindered progress on the Cyprus question and could be a hindrance for a post-solution Cyprus.

The fact that the recent round of talks had been labeled ‘negotiations by Cypriots for Cypriots’ is the evidence for Cypriots’ general distrust of outside actors. This format was chosen because of the reaction Cypriots had to the role the UN (and many thought the US and the UK) played in filling in the blanks in the Annan Plan (i.e. determining the outcome on issues where the negotiating parties could not agree). The majority of Greek Cypriots are firmly convinced that the UN did not act fairly, and ever since then the Greek Cypriot leadership has rejected any involvement of an outside power in the negotiations, including the possibility of having a say in the provisions of the settlement.

All sides are aware that talks by Cypriots for Cypriots are more or less a myth given Turkey’s influence. However, Greek Cypriot (and Turkish Cypriot) leaders are adamant that all provisions of a deal need the formal approval of both community leaders as well as the endorsement of both communities in simultaneous referenda. This successful assertion of Cypriot control over the negotiation process might pose an additional obstacle to a possible solution of the Cyprus Problem. It is fair to argue that even with the best intentions, which are clearly currently in place on both sides, without outside mediation, they will be unable to make the concessions necessary for a deal. Therefore, outside mediation is in all likelihood a necessity for an agreed solution. However, the moment outside involvement is revealed, significant proportions of the population and the so called rejectionist parties will reject the deal and these specific provisions


36 Varnava and Faustmann, Reunifying Cyprus; Palley, C., An International Relations Debacle.
as the outcome of outside intervention and conspiracy. This is a basic dilemma in any attempt to solve the Cyprus conflict. 37

This resentment of outside involvement – be it historically justified or not – poses additional problems for outside powers to be constructively involved, as they inevitably will play a role in any agreement on the Cyprus question. Their role will exceed any formalized involvement of outside powers within a modified Treaty of Guarantee which might be part of a future settlement. An additional problem is that all three guarantor powers have in different ways failed to adhere to the Treaty of Guarantee thereby discrediting themselves as future security providers. Whether or not Turkey and Greece are guarantor powers, it is still of paramount importance that they play a stabilizing role after a solution and use their influence to constrain those forces opposed to a settlement. Ideally outside powers should act in the best interest of both Cypriot communities by at least agreeing that a functioning Cyprus is the ultimate goal. Should outside powers become part of a solution in the form of a modified Treaty of Guarantee or any other form, we suggest that any arrangement needs to minimize the chance of any of them abusing their rights. It would be preferable to have an efficient multilateral mandate or international organization, like the EU, UN or NATO, to act in case of reoccurrence of violence or breakdown of constitutional order.

Given the poor historical record of the security arrangements for Cyprus and the security dilemma of the Cyprus Problem (Greek Cypriots want Turkey out of the island as a safeguard against another Turkish intervention. Turkish Cypriots want Turkey’s involvement as a guarantor and ideally with a military presence to safeguard against the Greek Cypriot majority and a repetition of the 1963 events) the security issue remains one of the most difficult aspects to tackle.

Although there was a gentleman’s agreement between the Greek and Turkish governments at the time of independence that Cyprus should join NATO, this never materialized. The Republic of Cyprus opted instead to become a founding member of the Non-Aligned Movement and remained officially neutral during the Cold War. This enabled Makarios to play the Soviet Union against Western designs for the island but also invited external conspiracies against the President that almost resulted in his overthrow by the US, Britain and Greece in 1964. 38 It also left Cyprus in a security vacuum that allowed the Greek coup and the Turkish invasion to happen, without the island having any effective external protection. This is arguably still the case.

The UK, Greece and Turkey are obliged, under the Treaty of Alliance, to protect Cyprus against an attack by any other outside power, although, such a threat does

38 Nicolet, United States Policy Towards Cyprus; Richter, A Concise History of Modern Cyprus.
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not currently exist. Cyprus has more to worry about internal violence between the two communities, a war between Greece and Turkey or political and military interventions by Greece or Turkey. Clearly, a policy of non-aligned neutrality does not provide sufficient safeguards against those threats, as demonstrated in 1963, 1967 and 1974. Arguably, had it been possible for Cyprus to join NATO after independence, as originally envisaged, any military intervention by Greece or Turkey would have been very unlikely if not impossible, given NATO’s policy of no war between NATO members, guaranteed by the US. Clearly the island needs a mutually trusted security provider (EU or NATO) against external threats. NATO membership for a reunified Cyprus as a security provider could be acceptable to Greece, Turkey, the US and the UK and might be a way out of this dilemma.

However, the Greek Cypriot political left, in the form of the Progressive Party of Working People (AKEL), which represents moderate pro-solution forces, whose support is a necessity in any referendum, is adamantly opposed to such an arrangement and so is the majority of the population on both sides. AKEL’s opposition is based on their historical loyalties towards the Soviet Union and staunch anti-NATO sentiments stemming from the Cold War. Moreover, Russia has made it clear that it will oppose any solution that included NATO membership for the island, as Russia still perceives the alliance as its primary adversary. The political left in Cyprus could come to understand that their opinion about NATO being a capitalist opponent of communism during the Cold War is outdated and they could accept it as the only powerful security provider available for the island, which is the view of the other parties. Many will oppose anything that offends Moscow, firmly believing that Russia is needed to counterbalance Western designs. As justified as this may be, the only options left are weak security arrangements or far reaching rights for the parties directly involved, which proved to be so detrimental in the past.

The EU is not a likely alternative, because it does not have an army with which it could intervene in Cyprus should there be civil strife. Moreover, Turkey, which is not a member (and will not be in the foreseeable future), does not trust it. The EU’s only options would be to issue strong political responses from its members and to impose economic sanctions on any aggressor, which would nevertheless provide some level of deterrence since the sanctions could be severe.

A UN guarantee remains a scenario with all the weaknesses associated with effective UN involvement needing the approval of all five permanent members of the Security Council. Since at least one is likely to support or protect the aggressor, the question

remains how effective such a security umbrella could be.

A proposal for a more comprehensive security system encompassing human security was proposed in 2017 by the Cypriot NGO SeeD. This project contains many promising and interesting new and innovative ideas aiming at supporting domestic resilience as the prime provider for security and attempting to minimize the need for external intervention. It rightly promotes strong and impartial domestic institutions and emphasizes preventive measures, early warning systems and quick responses to domestic security threats. However, it has so far failed to provide convincing ideas of how Cyprus would defend itself from any threats posed by other countries.⁴⁰

**Not Static but Evolutionary Constitutional Order**

The 1960 Constitution was the result of the political compromise made between Britain, Greece, Turkey and the two Cypriot communities. In order to avoid undoing the power-sharing arrangement between the two communities, the constitution did not allow the political order in the new republic’s core components to evolve.⁴¹ The new status of the Turkish Cypriot minority as a second community, which was almost politically equal to Greek Cypriots, was safeguarded by giving it far-reaching veto powers within a consociational arrangement. While this rigid constitutional arrangement was intended as to protect the minority against Greek Cypriot attempts at enosis or majority rule, it nevertheless led to deadlocks and perpetuated the division of Cypriots into two communities, preventing an emergence of a Cypriot identity. It ultimately caused political deadlock in 1961 when Turkish Cypriots blocked vital tax legislation to ensure the implementation of pending issues from the transitional period, like having 30% of public servants from the Turkish Cypriot community, having separate municipalities and establishing a Cypriot army, and finally contributed to the breakdown of the constitutional order in 1963.⁴²

The dilemma between safeguarding the political equality of the Turkish Cypriots and maintaining a functioning political system will always be a challenge for the stability of a reunified Cyprus. One lesson we have learned from the past is that any constitutional arrangement must have efficient mechanisms to prevent or resolve deadlocks. A second

⁴⁰ The report is forthcoming and will be published on the SeeD website: http://www.seedsofpeace.eu/index.php/seed-library?searchword=polls&ordering=newest&searchphrase=all.
⁴² A selection of relevant readings in English for the events of 1963 include Richter, H., *A Concise History of Modern Cyprus*; Ker-Lindsay, *Britain and the Cyprus Crisis 1963-1964*; Nicolet, *United States Policy Towards Cyprus*; James, *Keeping the Peace in the Cyprus Crisis*; Patrick, *Political Geography and the Cyprus Conflict*. 

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Lesson is that a new agreement should include consensual modifications (based on separate majorities in the parliament) to allow for domestic political order to evolve which the 1960 Constitution did not. This should remain an internal affair for Cypriot stakeholders to handle on their own, without outside veto rights.

In the end, it is not so much the constitutional order that matters for the viability of a reunified Cyprus but rather the political leadership and the creation of a political culture based on good will and the determination not to wreck the functioning of the state. Complex power sharing arrangements can work if the parties agree to make it work, as it is the case in Switzerland or Belgium.

Avoidance of Political Destabilization through Immigration

Since 1974, mainland Turkish immigrants have led to a conspicuous demographic transformation, masterminded by Turkey and some Turkish Cypriot elites. This has become and will remain a threat to the Turkish Cypriot community’s existence and is a perceived threat to the Greek Cypriots. Greek Cypriots fear that many might remain loyal to Turkey and therefore act as a ‘fifth column’ for Ankara within a reunified Cyprus. Turkish immigrants also complicate the property aspect of a Cyprus settlement, since they have no property on the island which could be used to compensate a Greek Cypriot who owned their current housing prior to 1974, making any settlement much costlier.

It is clear for both Cypriot communities, and therefore a lesson learned, that politically sensitive immigration needs to be regulated in order not to artificially upset the ethnic balance. In the current negotiations, a permanent 4:1 ratio between the two main communities seems to have been agreed.

It is important that all those immigrants who will be allowed to stay after an agreement (particularly the so-called Turkish settlers) need to be fully integrated into Cypriot society and accepted as equal citizens by both communities. It is to the benefit of both communities not to create an isolated or discriminated group within a reunified Cyprus but rather to make them citizens of the Republic who embrace the island as their home. This is the most promising strategy to minimize the fifth column effect. Integration here does not mean forceful assimilation but the creation of loyal citizens of the Republic in the sense of Habermas’ constitutional patriotism, which is defined as ‘the loyalty of all citizens, whatever their ethno-cultural affiliation, to their shared state, with its constitutional-legal principles and the rights and obligations these embody as well as its democratic institutions and procedures.’

43 Habermas here quoted from: Sotos Shiakides, ‘Confronting the Challenges of Multicultural Coexistence in Cyprus: The Habermasian Perspective’, in Psaltis et al. (eds), Education in a Multicultural
Identity Transformation

When it was established, the Republic of Cyprus had a difficult start for a number of reasons. One was the absence of Cypriots who were emotionally committed to the new state. In short, the Republic was without republicans. From the late 1960s until the island’s partition in 1974, Greek Cypriots gradually embraced the purely Greek Cypriot Republic of Cyprus whereas most Turkish Cypriots developed loyalties towards the separatist entity they set up, ultimately calling it the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ in 1983. After reunification both communities will have to find ways to develop loyalty towards the new state. The viability of the new political order, the willingness to compromise and to make it work can only be achieved if the overwhelming majority of both sides, and on a general and an elite level, embrace the new state of affairs.

Therefore, gradually and voluntarily, people’s loyalties and links to the respective ‘mother countries’ need to be subordinated to their loyalty to the new common state for the benefit of the inhabitants of this island. In other words, constitutional patriotism in a Habermasian sense needs to be backed up by a sentimental dimension, which allows the fostering of a Cypriot identity for all citizens of the Republic. Identities cannot be artificially imposed but are nevertheless socially constructed, and in this sense ‘Cypriotness’ as an ‘imagined community’ should be fostered as a first identity on a voluntary basis without denying the historical links or communalities with Greece and Turkey.

Overcoming the Left-Right Divide amongst Moderate Parties

The left-right polarization within the Greek Cypriot community is a legacy of domestic rivalry which started in the 1920s and escalated during the Greek Civil war of 1946-1949 and violent confrontations during the EOKA period. Moreover, the communist party, AKEL, still accuses the Democratic Rally (DISY), the main party of the political right, of harbouring EOKA B members who are held partially responsible for the coup against President Makarios in 1974, during which left-wing partisans and Makarios supporters were arrested or killed. This hostile polarization currently makes it impossible for the two ‘moderate’ parties in the Cyprus question, who represent

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about 70% of the electorate, to formally cooperate in governmental coalitions. Because the hardline parties do not support a solution, there is a structural need for close cooperation between AKEL and DISY in stabilizing an agreed solution, particularly during the transitional period and the first years after reunification. Therefore, the internalized perception that the ‘left’ and ‘right’ are natural opponents needs to be replaced by a more pragmatic approach that allows for formal or informal political coalitions of the two big Greek Cypriot parties for as long as this is necessary in a post-solution Cyprus.

The Turkish Cypriot community, like the Greek Cypriot community, also experiences left-right polarization, including a violent period of assassinations of leftists by members of the political right during the 1950s and 60s. Leftist and moderate Turkish Cypriots were also prosecuted in an attempt to prove that the two communities could not live together and that the partition of the island was therefore a necessity.47 This is an additional dimension within the Turkish Cypriot community. The Turkish Cypriot left (like its Greek Cypriot counterpart) has fostered a tradition of cooperation with the other community. This cannot be said about the parties of the Turkish Cypriot right and centre. For the Greek Cypriots, DISY, itself a deeply divided party, as far as moderates and hard-liners are concerned, had at least since its inception a moderate, pro-solution leadership that is open to cooperating with moderate Turkish Cypriot parties. The so-called parties of the Greek Cypriot political centre (DIKO, EDEK, The Citizens Alliance, Solidarity Movement) and the Turkish Cypriot right and centre (UBP and DP), as hard-liners in the Cyprus question, are either not open or find it difficult to cooperate with moderate Turkish Cypriot parties.48 However, given the above, political cooperation between AKEL, DISY, and the Turkish Cypriot left, in the form of the Republican Turkish Party (CTP) and Communal Democratic Party (TDP), is possible and desirable to stabilize a post-solution Cyprus irrespective of the left or right political orientation.

Conclusion

As we have hopefully demonstrated, the tumultuous past of Cyprus offers plenty of lessons for the future. The current division of the island that was brought about by various actors through violence and bad political choices is visible proof of the many

48 Kudret Ozersay’s recently formed but very popular People’s Party might be added here. However, due to its short existence and absence from parliament, its capability to cooperate with the moderate parties remains to be seen.
mistakes political actors and ordinary people have made in the past.

Maybe the most important lessons to be learned is that, like the 1960 arrangement, a reunified Cyprus will not be the realisation of the political dreams of one of the communities but rather a complicated, painful compromise. If Cyprus is reunified it will probably be the result of Greek Cypriots grudgingly accepting it as the least bad solution given the alternatives of permanent partition and Turkification of the north. Similarly, for Turkish Cypriots it is the best feasible option, since international recognition of the ‘TRNC’ is unlikely and complete Turkification, if not even annexation by Turkey, is resented by the overwhelming majority of the Turkish Cypriots. The challenge after a reunification will be to embrace the new political order and to attempt jointly to transform the political arrangement into a good one through an evolutionary process.

Those supporting the status quo or maximalist solutions of the dispute must be aware that the status quo does not mean an unchanged situation on the ground. No solution of the dispute will lead to the marginalization and gradual disappearance of the Turkish Cypriot community and the Turkification of the north; this will result in the transformation of one part of the island into at least a de facto and possibly de jure Turkish province. Moreover, the Greek Cypriot dominated Republic of Cyprus will remain in an open and unresolved dispute with the regional hegemon Turkey.

It is against the backdrop of this development that a compromise solution becomes a political necessity if one does not want to formally negotiate the partition of the island or accept the Turkification of the north. Inevitably, given the power-sharing arrangement in the form of a bizonal, bicomunal federation, the new state will be plagued by many problems in the beginning. At best a reunified Cyprus is likely to function in the early years like Belgium, which is shaped by great difficulties in running the country, but is functioning reasonably well due to the EU framework and the consensus that politically motivated violence is not an option. In order to achieve this, there is the need to foster a new political culture that all political disputes have a limit for escalation: no violence, no destruction of the state, and no jeopardisation of the functioning of the state. While many will perceive any feasible solution as a painful compromise, the outcome needs to be embraced as something positive, as a deal that ends, or at least minimizes, the losses of the past and allows for a better common future and the resolution of a conflict with the regional hegemon.

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