PROTRACED SOCIAL CONFLICT ANALYSIS AND CYPRUS: AN ASSESSMENT

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Abstract
The end of the Cold War saw the development of numerous theories of identity-based conflict. One of the first proponents of such an approach was Edward E. Azar, who constructed his theory of Protracted Social Conflict as a typology that could be used to transform and resolve ‘protracted’ and ‘intractable’ conflicts through Track Two negotiations. The conflict in Cyprus has been defined as a type of protracted social conflict and although parts of the model have been used to analyse its emergence, development and persistence, it has never been applied in its entirety to ascertain to what degree, if at all, its variables find application to the Cyprus case. It is the purpose of this article to provide a total assessment of the theory of Protracted Social Conflict, thus identifying whether or not and to what extent it remains a useful framework with which to analyse the conflict in Cyprus.

Keywords: conflict analysis, Cyprus, Edward E. Azar, identity, protracted social conflict

Introduction
The purpose of this article is to apply Edward E. Azar’s analytic framework of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC) to the Cyprus conflict in an attempt to ascertain whether this particular conflict can indeed be classified as such. Although most commentators seem to readily accept that the Cyprus conflict merits its description as a PSC, no attempt has been made to test whether or not (and to what extent) the case study corresponds to this particular typology. It is this gap between the framework provided by PSC and practise (that is to say its full application to the case study of the Cyprus conflict) that this article will attempt to fill. Thus, by analysing the model in relation to the political and historical situation that created and fuels the Cyprus conflict, an assessment of the framework’s applicability to the particular situation will be offered. While it may be argued that such an examination might be superfluous, since it is ‘obvious’ that the conflict in Cyprus can be categorised as a PSC, the authors maintain that evaluations of applicability (whether positive or negative) must come after, rather than before, the relationship
between the framework (in its entirety) and the case study has been examined. Thus, the general premise upon which this article is founded is the need to test hypotheses in order to ascertain their validity regarding situations that they claim to clarify; the main argument being, that in order to provide a more thorough assessment of a particular analytic framework, all of its variables need to be taken into consideration before a positive (or negative) conclusion can be made regarding its applicability and value with reference to a particular case. Regarding PSC and its application to the Cyprus conflict however, this has not been done, in the sense that studies utilising the theory of PSC as the framework for analysing the Cyprus conflict apply only some of its variables before concluding that this particular conflict merits its description as a PSC. The authors argue that a more complete assessment of PSC as it relates to the Cyprus conflict (again whether positive or negative) can be achieved by examining the framework in its entirety (that is to say, by considering all of its variables), rather than by the dominant approach which is based on partial application.

The testing of theories can be divided into two broad types: experimentation and observation, with the latter allowing for further sub-division into large-n analyses and the case study method. Concerning PSC and its relation to Cyprus, none of these have been undertaken. Although Azar himself carried out a large-n analysis of PSCs and concluded that at least sixty conflicts can be described as such (including the case of Cyprus) very few instances exist that individually test the examples Azar cites as evidence for his suppositions. While one might argue that deduction supplies a fourth method of theory testing and coupled with Azar’s large-n analysis this provides confirmation enough that the conflict in Cyprus is indeed a PSC, the authors do not consider this last method to be a valid test of theory and do not agree that it enables an assessment of PSC for the Cyprus case. As mentioned previously, this has been the predominant method preferred when analysing this particular conflict with most authors unquestionably accepting both Azar’s large-n analysis conclusions as well as his methodology and then proceed to define Cyprus as a PSC without actually testing whether this is indeed so. In order to rectify this, the authors propose to test the framework of PSC in relation to Cyprus using the case study method. The main reasons for this choice do not rest solely with the fact that this article concerns itself with a particular case-study (the conflict in Cyprus) – and hence any other variety of theory-testing would detract from the main purpose – but also because testing theories through case studies allows for process tracing whereby “… the investigator explores the chain of events … by which initial case conditions are translated into outcomes”. Thus, “… a thorough process-trace of a single case can provide a strong test of a theory” enabling a reliable assessment of it.

In order to evaluate the applicability of PSC to the Cyprus conflict this article will use Azar’s exposition of it as presented in his book The Management of Protracted
Social Conflict: Theory and Cases. Each of the points made will be analysed with reference to the historical development of the conflict making this paper a descriptive piece of research that seeks to straddle the divide between exploratory and explanatory studies regarding the conflict in Cyprus. While it may be argued that Azar’s own research in relation to cases of protracted social conflict covers all of these three stages, the claim made herein is that while this holds true for some conflicts (namely the cases of Lebanon and to a lesser extent the conflict in Northern Ireland), the same cannot be said for Cyprus. Thus, this article is divided according to Azar’s three PSC ‘sections’ as presented in Table 1.

Table 1: Edward E. Azar’s Theory of Protracted Social Conflict (PSC)

- Genesis
  - communal content
  - human needs
  - governance and the state’s role
  - international linkages

- Process dynamics
  - communal actions and strategies
  - state actions and strategies
  - built-in mechanisms of conflict

- Outcome analysis
  - deterioration of physical security
  - institutional deformity
  - psychological ossification
  - increased dependency and cliency

Each will be examined separately and analysed according to Azar’s general explanations concerning the preconditions, activation and outcomes of conflicts of a protracted social kind. The issues as to whether or not and to what extent the conflict in Cyprus merits its description as a PSC will be examined in the conclusion.

As a final point, the authors accept that both historical events and analyses purporting to explain them are open to interpretation. For the purposes of this article, while every attempt has been made to objectively present events and explanations and vigorously test them according to the parameters of PSC analysis (based on secondary sources), the authors concede that the methods adopted and the examples provided are open to question (like most other social-scientific works).
Thus, although this article is envisioned as a useful addition to the PSC and Cyprus conflict literatures and a reliable test of the framework of PSC in relation to the specific case study (the conflict in Cyprus) its arguments and methods remain open to debate. Indeed a similar point can be made regarding this article’s choice of Azar’s PSC as a framework for the Cyprus conflict since it is accepted that this particular model is just one of a variety of ways which can be used to analyse the Cyprus conflict. However, its continued use in the research concerned with this particular case (as well as a number of others) as a tool with which to unreservedly categorise the Cyprus case as a PSC – despite the fact that a full application of the framework is lacking – is an issue that the authors believe merits consideration. Lastly, there appears to be some variation in describing Azar’s PSC as a ‘model/framework’ or ‘theory’, depending on how broad or narrow one’s definition of a theory is. For the purposes of this article the more neutral terminology of ‘model’ or ‘framework’ will be used when referring to PSC; the reasons for this being directly related to deficiencies of PSC analysis which will be briefly discussed in the conclusion.

Assessing the Analytic Framework of Protracted Social Conflict

In the opening pages of The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases Azar differentiates between conflicts of a ‘protracted social’ kind and other typologies of conflict prevalent during his time of writing. Epigrammatically, PSC is a framework made up of three, interlocking, broad ‘sections’, the existence and development of which serve to situate a given conflict within the category of a PSC. These broad ‘sections’ (clusters), each with a number of ‘sub-points’ (variables), have been presented previously in Table 1. As is evident from the aforementioned figure, PSC presents its clusters in a progressive fashion, Azar himself writing that ‘Genesis’ “…identifies a set of conditions that are responsible for the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones” (that is to say preconditions); ‘Process Dynamics’ “…elucidate[s] factors which are responsible for the activation of overt conflicts” and ‘Outcome Analysis’ representing conditions that generate and reinforce such protracted social conflicts. In most instances where PSC is used as a typology of conflict, both in the case of the Cyprus conflict and other instances, the first cluster – ‘Genesis’ – is generally the one relied upon as a way of providing evidence for the existence of a PSC situation, implying that if this set of preconditions is met, then the conflict in question can adequately be described as a PSC. This is perhaps unsurprising since it can be argued that this particular cluster was Azar’s most influential contribution to conflict analysis during the late 1970s-1980s as it identified factors (like human needs) that were lacking in analyses of conflict of the time. However, singular reliance on this particular cluster has the tendency to enable a positive application of the PSC typology to virtually any conflict which is not overtly inter-state. Although it is true that at the time of
Azar’s writings the distinction between international (between states) and intra-national (within states) conflict was a noteworthy conceptual reassessment by a number of scholars (including Azar) which has influenced contemporary understanding of the subject, its unrestricted use risks making it a model of convenience rather than a truly useful analytic tool. Indeed it can be posited that Azar’s own large-n analysis suffers from precisely this issue since PSC conveniently explains ‘at least sixty cases’ that defied explanation by the dominant concepts of conflict at the time. As a result, this article proposes to use the framework of PSC in its original form since, it is argued, this method can provide both a more conclusive assessment of its applicability as well as a more explicit identification of its strengths and weaknesses in relation to the Cyprus conflict.

### Genesis

Azar begins his model of PSC by tracing “… the pattern of causal relations among … conditions which give rise to a specific protracted social conflict”.14 In this stage, which he calls ‘Genesis’, Azar identifies four variables which serve as the preconditions for “… the transformation of non-conflictual situations into conflictual ones”.15

### Communal Content

The existence of two or more communities in a given society, does not automatically lead societies into a conflict setting. The requirement for the fragmentation and eventual development of a situation of a PSC within a multi-communal society or at least the factor that increases the potential for such a situation (PSC) to arise is usually associated with the emergence of politically active communities within such a society. Azar identifies two antecedent conditions affecting this dynamic: a colonial legacy and “… a historical pattern of rivalry and contest among communal actors”.17 The disjunction between state and society in post-colonial territories and the fact that more often than not a single community (or coalition of communities) controls the machinery of state and is (or is perceived to be) unresponsive to the needs of the other group(s) in such a setting thus increases the chances for the development of a PSC, provided that communities are politically active.18

Cyprus can be described as a bi-communal society made up of Cypriots that perceive themselves as belonging to two larger, ‘off-shore’ cultures – Greek and Turkish. Cypriots that identify themselves with Greek ‘ethnic markers’19 (Greek-Cypriots) comprise the majority, while Cypriots that identify themselves with Turkish ‘ethnic markers’ (Turkish-Cypriots) are a minority (albeit a sizeable one). As an aside, but one that illustrates the effects that ‘ethnic markers’ (which are always subjective) can have on community and inter-community perceptions and misperceptions, Cypriots (both Greek and Turkish) not only exhibit cultural features
that are distinct from the broad cultures of their ‘motherlands’ but have also developed a shared culture between themselves, a fact that is generally ignored by members of both communities due to the blinkered outlook fostered by each community’s nationalistic propaganda.\textsuperscript{20} Cyprus’ colonial legacy, whereby the British deliberately applied a policy of ‘divide and rule’, sharpened divisions between the two communities. The rivalry and contest between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots was further accentuated during the 1950s\textsuperscript{21} and the struggle for Enosis (1955-1959), which was a purely Greek-Cypriot struggle that aimed at ‘union’ with Greece but eventually led to the independence of the island. In this sense, the struggle was a failure since not only was it unsuccessful in achieving its aim but, it can be reasonably argued, resulted in a state whose creation was not foreseen, or indeed sought by either of the two communities.\textsuperscript{22} The detachment of both communities towards the newly created Republic of Cyprus is, according to Costas Constantinou, “The most disturbing thing about being a Cypriot [since] … one can only be a Greek or a Turkish Cypriot … Being simply and singly Cypriot is a constitutional impossibility”.\textsuperscript{23} Thus, the communities’ identification with their respective ‘motherlands’, rather than with their state (which was considered by segments of both communities as an artificial creation – at least in the beginning) meant that in no way could a distinct ‘Cypriot’ identity be generated that could lead to a harmonious coexistence between them. Additionally, the overwhelming presence of Greek-Cypriots in state institutions and the perception, by Turkish-Cypriots, of the apparatus of state as being used by the Greek-Cypriot community to further its own ends to their detriment, increased (in the first years after independence) polarisation along communal lines.

**Human Needs**\textsuperscript{24}

Although security, development and identity needs\textsuperscript{25} and their satisfaction are vital components in the development of a PSC, their deprivation per se is not enough to lead communities into a protracted social conflict situation. The tipping factor appears to be the access that each community has to political and financial power as well as “… by the level of acceptance of each community”.\textsuperscript{26} In cases where needs and grievances of a given community are not recognised or dealt with by political elites or the majority community and a community has no real access, or perceives itself as being denied such access, to political and/or financial power, the likelihood of a PSC developing are increased.

When analysing the case of the Cyprus conflict, it becomes evident that both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots experienced, in the first instance, feelings of physical threat. The existence of armed, communal-based groups on the island (for instance EOKA B’ and TMT) that terrorised members of the ‘other’ community as well as members of their own, added to both communities’ feelings of physical insecurity. These perceptions increased further with the withdrawal of Turkish-Cypriots from
government and their physical isolation in ‘ethnically pure’ enclaves and the creation of parallel modes of governance. Thus, Turkish-Cypriots’ isolation due to perceptions of deprivation instituted by the Greek-Cypriot controlled administration and the failure of the government (and the Greek-Cypriot community in general) to alleviate and deal with real and perceived grievances led to a situation where access to social institutions was denied or made impossible by the actions of both communities.27 “Access to social institutions (that is, effective participation in society) is a crucial determinant for satisfying physical needs” writes Azar.28 These perceptions of insecurity (on a variety of levels) have persisted to this day since the presence of 40,000 Turkish troops on the island acts negatively on Greek-Cypriots’ sense of physical security, while the disparity between the economies of both communities feeds Turkish-Cypriots’ sense of financial insecurity since the fear exists that their community’s lack of financial power might deprive them of a status of equal citizenship (in the case of a solution) and in a worse case scenario might limit their access to political rights and power. Thus, at no point since 1963 have either community’s human needs been conclusively resolved, or even addressed.

Governance and the State’s Role 29

There exists the potential that events under this variable generally lead to crises of legitimacy concerning the governing power and authority of a given government in that the community (or communities) that perceive themselves as being deprived of their needs will fail to recognise the regime as representing them. In addition, the policy capacity of the state, which is related to its effectiveness and ability to govern (that is to say formulate and implement policies) is also of importance since state failure to carry out daily aspects of governance will prevent it from responding to the needs of its various constituents. These variables provide the link between governance and the state’s role and human needs discussed previously30 and represent the endogenous factors influencing a conflict’s movement towards a PSC typology.

In the case of Cyprus, the 1960 agreements that established its independence were perceived very differently by the two communities on the island. On the one hand, the Greek-Cypriot community considered the constitution to be ‘unworkable’ and in need of some kind of reform. The Turkish-Cypriots on the other hand, while acknowledging certain limitations in the constitution, generally perceived it as guaranteeing their status and existence on the island.31 This difference of opinion regarding the founding document of the Republic of Cyprus came to a head in 1963 when, Archbishop Makarios’ attempts to amend certain provisions were perceived by the Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot side as biased, one-sided efforts to shift the balance in the Greek-Cypriots’ favour. As a result, not only did violence break out soon thereafter but a crisis emerged regarding the legitimacy of the governing authority with each community conducting its affairs separately.32 A by-product of
this was the inability of the state to govern effectively and in a manner that could have been considered ‘fair’ by members of both communities.

**International Linkages**

Azar develops this precondition with exogenous factors affecting the possibility of a conflict becoming a PSC in mind. In the same way that the previous variable, ‘governance and the state’s role’, is used to identify domestic factors, ‘international linkages’ is designed to highlight external aspects affecting a potential PSC and can be divided into two types: economic dependency and political and military client relationships. Both of these affect the autonomy of the state and its ability to satisfy a variety of needs sought by some of its constituent communities.

International linkages of both types can be observed in the development of the conflict in Cyprus. In this instance, the powerful relationships between the Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities and their respective ‘motherlands’ – Greece and Turkey – created a situation whereby each of the Cypriot communities became in essence a client of Greece or Turkey (depending on their ethnic affiliation). On the one hand, Greece has always considered Cyprus (and its population) to be a far-flung extension of ‘Hellenism’ and as such has placed issues on the island at the core of its foreign policy, providing economic, political and military aid to the Greek-Cypriot community. The attempt by the Greek military regime to oust Archbishop Makarios by instigating a military coup in 1974 illustrates this point. Considered to be opposed to Greece’s policy on the island and Makarios’ attempts to chart a more independent path for Cyprus on the international stage, led the Greek junta, with local Greek-Cypriot backing (composed of Greek officers and members of the paramilitary EOKA B’ group) to orchestrate a military coup that eventually failed but provided Turkey with a pretext of invading the island ostensibly in fulfilment of its responsibilities under the Treaty of Guarantee in 1974.

Likewise, in the case of the Turkish-Cypriot community, Turkey has always been considered to be their defender and guarantor of their safety and existence. Although motivated in part by intangible notions similar to those of Greece – a ‘bastion of Turkishness’ under siege by Greeks – Turkey’s involvement on the island has been primarily one of strategic interest. Particularly since the 1950s onwards and due to Cyprus’ proximity to Turkey’s southern ports and (according to its military) the country’s ‘soft underbelly’, the island has been perceived as being of major geo-strategic importance to Turkey’s security. Turkish economic, political and military assistance to the Turkish-Cypriot community mirrors that of Greece towards the Greek-Cypriots and the country’s covert military assistance to TMT has been extensively documented (as has Greek covert military assistance towards EOKA B’).
The two ‘motherlands’ have by and large, manipulated politics and the local population on many occasions for their own interests (although it can be argued that the opposite is also true to a certain extent). It can be reasonably argued that the emergence of intense nationalism within the Cypriot communities can largely be attributed to them. While this has subsided somewhat (especially in the case of Greece, Greek-Cypriots and a not insubstantial minority of Turkish-Cypriots), there still exists an intense feeling of ‘Greekness’ or ‘Turkishness’ displayed by certain segments of the respective communities on the island. Testament to this is the fact that until a few years ago many more Greek or Turkish flags, as opposed to the Cypriot flag, could be found fluttering in the island’s breeze.

A further external factor in the international linkages of the conflict in Cyprus can be found in the direct involvement of the United Kingdom during the colonial period (as well as in the post-independence period up to present). In pursuit of the ‘interests of Empire’ the British stoked extreme nationalist sentiments particularly with regards to the Turkish-Cypriot community as it was perceived to be a ‘natural’ ally in its attempt to repress Greek-Cypriot opposition. An illustration of this can be seen in the formation of the ‘Auxiliary Police Force’ (επικουρικοί – epikourikoi) composed exclusively of Turkish-Cypriots which on occasion were used to break-up Greek-Cypriot demonstrations in support of Enosis and took part in British counter-insurgency operations against EOKA, thus associating that particular community with ‘the enemy’ in the eyes of Greek-Cypriots. This policy of ‘divide and rule’ is a strategy that was implemented to varying degrees by most former colonial powers. The importance of Cyprus for the United Kingdom is proven best through the latter’s retention of two Sovereign Base Areas on the island (obtained through the Treaty of Establishment) in order to meet its strategic needs.

Finally, the direct involvement of the United States on the island during Cyprus’ formative period represents the final international linkage affecting the conflict on the island. The Republic of Cyprus came into existence at a high-point of the Cold War and in a geographic area that was (and is) of strategic importance to the US. The Cold War paranoia of the ‘Communist threat’ and the ‘Domino theory’; the island’s proximity to the Middle East and the Suez Canal; as well as its location at the south-eastern extremity of Europe’s southern flank (in strategic terms), resulted in increased attention by the US. The presence of three North Atlantic Treaty Organisation (NATO) members on Cyprus – the United Kingdom, Greece and Turkey – meant that the US had direct access to the island which it could use to counter potential Soviet Union intervention, for example through its ties with AKEL – the Greek-Cypriot communist party whose popularity was on the rise. However, the former situation was as much a threat as it was a boon since it increased the possibility of an armed intra-NATO clash between Greek and Turkish troops over the island thus weakening the Alliance’s southern flank. In order to avoid such an
outcome the US became actively, both covertly and overtly, involved with events on the island. A stark example of this direct involvement is the fact that certain members of the US administration supported (or at least condoned) both the Greek-instigated coup against Makarios, perceived as the ‘Castro of the Mediterranean’ and the Turkish invasion, both in 1974\(^38\) (although this last point has recently been disputed by Claude Nicolet in his book United States Policy Towards Cyprus, 1954-1974).\(^39\)

**Process Dynamics**

According to Azar, the existence of the four precondition variables discussed previously (individually or collectively), do not automatically result in a conflict situation becoming a PSC.\(^40\) The progression of a conflict from its latent stages (expressed by the preconditions in the ‘Genesis’ section) to a more overt phase requires a set of ‘activation’ variables whose ‘interactive effects’ are ‘key determinants’ in its development as a PSC, a cluster that Azar terms ‘Process Dynamics’.\(^41\)

**Communal Actions and Strategies**\(^42\)

This first ‘activation’ cluster highlights the actions and effects that “… the organisation and mobilisation of communal groups, the emergence of effective leadership, the strategies and tactics of this leadership, and the scope and nature of external ties …”\(^43\) can have on ‘triggering’ a previously latent conflict into becoming a protracted social one.\(^44\)

In the case of the Cyprus conflict the initial triggers can be traced to events of the late 1950s and are directly related to British policies of ‘divide and rule’. An example cited previously and applicable to this variable as well, was the formation of the ‘Auxiliary Police Force’ used to counter both Greek-Cypriot demonstrators and EOKA activities. It can be reasonably argued that these street battles and operations against a Greek-Cypriot paramilitary organisation (that had the support of broad sections of the Greek-Cypriot community) were the first instances in which individual Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots resorted to physical violence against one another and perceived these experiences collectively. Although there were instances of physical violence between Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots in the past (pre-1950s), these sporadic and individual acts of violence had not been ‘collectivised’ and did not ‘spill-over’ into multiple, broader issue areas in the same way that they did in the 1950s and post-1950s period. The main reason for this is the elementary level of politicisation among the pre-1950s Greek- and Turkish-Cypriot communities which did not allow for the type of collective organisation, mobilisation and victimisation that became possible in the late 1950s-1960s. Clashes between Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriot riot police and counter-
insurgency forces (the Auxiliary Police Force) resulted in retaliation from EOKA which killed its first Turkish-Cypriot police officer in 1956, an action that led to rioting by Turkish-Cypriots who destroyed Greek-Cypriot property. This sequence of events illustrates Azar’s identification of how individual, ‘trivial events’ can become ‘turning points’ whereby “… individual victimisation is collectively recognised” which subsequently tends to find expression as ‘collective protest’. Following Archbishop Makarios’ attempts to modify the constitution in 1963, a further series of riots erupted – the second wave of intense inter-communal violence (after the events of 1958-1959). Furthermore, ‘collectivised’ grievances and perceptions of insecurity resulted in the creation, within both communities, of ultra-nationalist groups, who having acquired (covert) financial and military support from their respective ‘motherlands’ – Greece and Turkey – were both ready and eager to resort to violence at the slightest provocation. The first instance of this (the ‘trigger’) came on 21 December 1963 when a Greek-Cypriot policeman and two Turkish-Cypriot civilians were shot dead by Turkish- and Greek-Cypriot paramilitary members respectively. The incident sparked a major crisis that developed into overt, communally-based violence. From this point onwards (late 1963) and until August 1964, the conflict in Cyprus went through its most violent phase (prior to the Turkish invasion of 1974). Several hundred civilians from both communities were killed, wounded, kidnapped and held hostage. These events, which fuelled the protractedness of the conflict in Cyprus simultaneously consolidated and generated (to a lesser degree) the emergence within communal paramilitary groups of leaderships who were opposed to any type of reconciliation between the two communities and tended to perceive events according to a worst case scenario (making them essentially ‘inside/outside total spoilers’). Thus, the power struggle within the Greek-Cypriot community between supporters of Makarios and George Grivas (who received support from Greece) was an obstacle that prevented the Greek-Cypriot community from adopting and implementing a coherent, unified policy and resulted in intra-communal violence (the climax of which was the coup of 1974). On the other hand, the power struggle within the Turkish-Cypriot community between Kutchuk and Rauf Denktash ended in victory for the latter, whose organisation (TMT) espoused a secessionist agenda that was in tune with Turkey’s irredentist designs for the island and resulted in the extinguishment of more moderate Turkish-Cypriot opinions regarding the developing Cyprus conflict.

State Actions and Strategies
Azar highlights the effects that the response of the state can have on conflicts of a ‘protracted social’ type. Although the theory of PSC concentrates on state strategies of coercive repression or instrumental co-option it does allow for the possibility of accommodation policies backfiring, due to communities’ (or segments thereof) perceptions of the conflict as a ‘zero-sum game’ “… in which winners and losers can be differentiated”.

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It can be objectively argued that the nascent state of Cyprus had been saddled with an ‘odd’ constitution (at best) which paralysed its ability to carry out meaningful, effective policies that could be accepted by both communities. This precluded the kind of ‘state actions and strategies’ which Azar associates this specific variable with, thus making actions and strategies of coercive repression by the state difficult to employ. However, as mentioned previously, the theory of PSC makes allowances for instances where genuine accommodation can be misperceived as well as occasions where state actions and strategies can be perceived by one side as being driven by policies of instrumental co-option. Makarios’ ‘13 Points’ are a case in point and probably the only action/strategy that can be realistically defined as ‘state initiated’ by the communally fragmented polity that was the Republic of Cyprus during the period 1960-1974. The constitutional problems of Cyprus’ founding document, the mistrust between the political elites of both communities as well as the negative effects that their dependency and cliency on their respective ‘motherlands’ had on their action and strategy selection have been extensively analysed. As a result, the unilateral drafting by Makarios of thirteen constitutional amendments, which he considered to be an attempt at ‘genuine accommodation’, was perceived on the one hand, by members of the Greek-Cypriot community as inimical to the greater goal of Enosis with Greece (an outlook still espoused at the time by supporters of Grivas and veterans of EOKA) and on the other, by members of the Turkish-Cypriot community, as an attempt at ‘instrumental co-option’ aimed at centralising and maximising state power in favour of the Greek-Cypriot community. As mentioned previously, the existence of ‘total spoilers’ in both communities who controlled (to varying degrees) the actions and strategies adopted by their respective communities served to accentuate differences of opinion and it can be argued, due to the very nature of ‘total spoilers’ would misperceive and misrepresent any attempts at genuine accommodation as threats to their security and/or survival.

Built-in Mechanisms of Conflict

Although the previous two ‘activation’ variables exhibit self-sustaining dynamics, Azar also identifies “… the perceptions and cognitive processes generated through experience of conflictual interactions” as promoting confrontational communal and state actions and strategies. Thus, the misperceptions, stereotyping, polarisation and ‘tunnel-vision’ exhibited by communities in conflict towards one another is both responsible for, but also a product of, the aforementioned two variables.

Negative perceptions of the ‘other’ are evident in the case of the Cyprus conflict from its inception until today. Following the events, initially of 1963-1964, 1967, and subsequently the Turkish invasion of 1974, as a natural consequence of the pain, suffering and loss, that both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots experienced (albeit at different points in time), hostile sentiments in both communities towards the ‘other’
developed and were perpetuated by both official (government) and non-official (societal) means. Slogans such as ‘a good Turk is a dead Turk’ and ‘Hands extended on Turks will be broken’ are indicative of this climate of hostility. Additionally, the manipulation of communal (mis)perceptions from segments of the mass media (such as radio and television programmes and magazines and newspapers) ‘nurtured’ these negative images and stereotypes designed to dehumanise ‘the enemy’. Mistrust of the ‘other’ is only abetted by the complete segregation of the two communities. Azar writes that as a result of this ‘close-mindedness’ and blinkered outlook “… proposals for political solutions become rare, and tend to be perceived by all sides as mechanisms for gaining relative power and control”, thus illuminating the psycho-sociological undercurrents through which Makarios’ constitutional amendments were viewed and which persisted throughout almost every single one of the initiatives and negotiation attempts that followed the aftermath of the Turkish invasion and aimed at a solution of the Cyprus conflict (1977, 1979, 1984-1985, 1988, 1992, 1998, 1999-2004).

Outcome Analysis

Having described the preconditions and variables ‘activating’ protracted social conflicts, Azar ends his model by introducing the outcomes that “… generate (and are further reinforced by) the following conditions:”, deterioration of physical security, institutional deformity, psychological ossification and increased dependency and cliency that are in turn responsible for the protractedness of PSCs.

Deterioration of Physical Security

Azar identifies this variable as the ‘most obvious’ consequence of any protracted conflict situation which, apart from physical casualties also entails economic deterioration. This simultaneous existence of physical and economic deterioration has as a consequence the deprivation (for all communities involved) of the resources for realising their ‘basic needs’ and serves to perpetuate a conflict situation.

For purposes of analysis, the deterioration of physical security experienced by the two communities can be divided (crudely) into three periods – 1958-1959, 1963-1974 and 1974 onwards. In the case of the second timeframe (1963-1974), it can be argued that the Turkish-Cypriot community’s physical security increasingly worsened. As a result of the 1963-1964 inter-communal clashes approximately 350 Turkish- and about 200 Greek-Cypriots were killed and several hundred were wounded, harassed and kidnapped (presumed dead). The question as to who exactly is to blame for these casualties is irrelevant (both empirically and conceptually) since violence by both communities during this period, both inter- and
intra-communal, created a climate of insecurity that was blamed on the ‘other’. While Turkish-Cypriots can be said to have borne the brunt of this deterioration in physical security, the fact that Turkish fighter-jets attacked Greek-Cypriot military and civilian personnel (killing 55 and wounding 125) on the north-western coast of the island (Kokkina/Tylliria), in 1964 accentuated Greek-Cypriot notions of insecurity. This was the first time that Turkish (proper) military action had taken place in Cyprus since the island’s independence and raised the spectre of a Turkish invasion thus increasing Greek-Cypriots’ sense of physical insecurity. Between 1963 and 1970 around 25,000 Turkish-Cypriots and 500 Greek-Cypriots had become refugees in their own country. After the events of 1963-1964 all Turkish-Cypriot refugees were transferred (both willingly and unwillingly) into ‘ethnically pure’ enclaves thus fostering a ‘siege mentality’ that increased Turkish-Cypriots’ sense of deteriorating physical security (and negatively affecting their outlook with regards to other, broader issues). This was reinforced by the events of 1967 when an additional 26 Turkish-Cypriots were killed by supporters of Grivas and the National Guard in the villages of Ayios Theodoros and Kophinou. Continued attacks, restricted mobility and lack of food and medication in the Turkish-Cypriot enclaves increased the community’s sense of insecurity.68

On the other hand, it can be argued that during the period 1974 onwards, it was the Greek-Cypriot community that experienced a heightened sense of physical insecurity. As a direct result of the Turkish invasion of 1974, approximately 150,000-165,00069 Greek-Cypriots fled their homes in the northern part of the island (thus becoming refugees in the south). In addition about 3,000 people (mostly Greek-Cypriot civilians) were killed and approximately 1,587 Greek-Cypriot individuals went missing (most of who are still unaccounted for). Around 70 per cent of the island’s economic resources were lost70 and ever since, the Greek-Cypriot community has had to live with the threat of a renewed outbreak of violence due to the stationing of about 40,000 Turkish troops in the northern part of the island. Additionally, the Greek-Cypriot community bore the brunt of the immediate post-conflict physical and social reconstruction effort of the territory that it found itself occupying (albeit with large amounts of foreign financial assistance).

Institutional Deformity 71

Situations of PSC generally result in the collapse of social, economic and political institutions, thus adding to the ‘protractedness’ of a conflict and the increase and solidification of inter-communal divisions because structures that can be used to fulfil communities’ access needs either cease to operate or operate ineffectively. As with most of the variables of the theory of PSC, institutional deformity operates both as cause and effect regarding the continuation and increasing intractability of a given conflict.72
As mentioned previously, the constitution of the newly formed Republic of Cyprus was perceived very differently by members of the two communities. However, the dysfunction of the young state and the difficulties it experienced at constitutional implementation have probably more to do with the inability and unwillingness of the leaderships of both communities to cooperate on any meaningful level rather than as a cause of any real or imagined deficiencies of the founding document. Consequently, the machinery of governance was (at best) constantly paralysed and deadlocked thus unable to satisfy the needs of either of the two communities. Following the withdrawal of the Turkish-Cypriots from the government in the aftermath of the 1963 events, the two communities created in essence separate administrative and governance structures whereby Greek-Cypriots conducted their affairs through the established governmental machinery, whereas, Turkish-Cypriots conducted their affairs (at first) under the office of the Vice-President and eventually created their own administrative structures in 1967.

These divergent structures not only impeded the ability of the Republic of Cyprus to provide basic services in an equitable manner (or one that could be perceived as such) but perhaps more importantly associated the state with a particular community. Thus, the Republic of Cyprus and its government and governance structures were linked to the Greek-Cypriot community (that began to exhibit a steadily increasing connection towards the state), while the Turkish-Cypriot community, because of the aforementioned, viewed the Republic as a means through which Greek-Cypriots could consolidate and expand their control over them, thus increasing their deprivation, a perception that still exists (in certain circles) to this day.

**Psychological Ossification**

The result of a continuing conflictual situation generally “… entails a vicious cycle of fear and hostile interactions among communal contestants”. Thus, stereotypes and misperceptions of the ‘other’ are perpetuated and often reinforced by the continuation of a conflict that breeds misattribution of motives (and hence cultivates misperceptions) and worst case analyses between members of communities in conflict. Indeed, this variable illustrates the outcomes of the cognitive processes already examined in the ‘built-in mechanisms of conflict’ included by Azar in his ‘Process Dynamics’ stage.

In the case of the Cyprus conflict communal recriminations, ethnic stereotypes and generally hostile misperceptions directed at members of the ‘other’ community, that developed as a result of the events of the period 1960-1974 (although it can also be argued that their emergence occurred even before, during the 1950s), continue to persist. The physical separation of the two communities on Cyprus from 1964 onwards (and ‘frozen’ by the Turkish invasion of 1974) abets this process of negative labelling. The result has been that certain members from both
communities (including members of their political elites who are responsible for generating a solution) are not prepared to concede communal wrongs and examine historical and political events (both past and present) objectively since both Greek- and Turkish-Cypriots consider their communities to be the exclusive victims of events of the Cyprus conflict. This has resulted in the “… attribution of evil intentions to the other …” and makes any form of reconciliation and/or transformation (which are thorny processes in themselves) even more difficult since proposals originating from one or the other community are looked upon with suspicion by their counterparts.

Increased Dependency and Cliency

In this variable, Azar makes the general point that communities in situations of PSC exhibit a tendency to increasingly rely on sources of external support, thus attracting third parties which tend to exercise increasing levels of decision-making power. The effect of this variable on cases of PSCs leads to “… communities suffer[ing] further loss of access and control over their lives”.

Regarding the Cyprus conflict, while this is indeed a valid general point to make, the details of this particular case illustrate that this variable does not behave as explicitly as Azar describes it. It is accepted that both communities on the island experienced increasing as well as decreasing levels of dependency and cliency, to varying degrees and at different points in time. While the Turkish-Cypriot community can be said to have steadily increased its dependency on the Turkish state throughout the period 1960-1974, since 1974 onwards the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) can arguably be described as a ‘client’ or a ‘protectorate’ (in the true sense of the words) of the Republic of Turkey. Indeed, due to the real or perceived deficiencies of the Republic of Cyprus at the time of its birth to cater to Turkish-Cypriot needs, the community came to rely on the military, financial and political support of Turkey, something that has continued ever since. This client status is vividly illustrated during negotiation attempts between the two communities since Turkish-Cypriot negotiators or elites constantly need to secure some sort of approval from the government (and military) of the Turkish state as part of any decision-making process.

In the case of the Greek-Cypriot community its increasing dependency and cliency on Greece mirrors that of the Turkish-Cypriot community vis-à-vis Turkey during the period 1960-1974. Although, as mentioned previously, Makarios did attempt to distance Cyprus from Greece, especially politically and militarily and adopt a more independent, ‘non-aligned’ policy, the growing rift sharpened Greek-Cypriot intra-communal tensions and resulted in attempted assassinations and eventually the junta-instigated coup of 1974. This period (1960-1974) thus reflects Azar’s conclusions reached regarding this variable (to some extent). However, in
the post-1974 period and despite the ‘protractedness’ of the Cyprus conflict, the Republic of Cyprus exhibits a decreasing dependency and cliency in relation to Greece. While it is true that in the years immediately following the Turkish invasion, Cyprus can be said to have been dependent on the financial goodwill of third countries and aid organisations and the political assistance of the Non-Aligned block at the United Nations, this type of dependency is very different from the relationship between segments of the Greek-Cypriot community and Greece during the period 1960-1974 and it certainly cannot be described as cliency in any form. In addition, while it is true that the relationship between the Republic of Cyprus and Greece has continued to be one of ‘close cooperation’, as evidenced during the former’s accession negotiations for entry into the European Union, the relationship between the two is currently “… one of equals and not, any longer … one of dependence … [something that] Greece has … come to respect and accept”.

While the previous analysis of the relationship between the Cypriot communities and their respective ‘motherlands’ can be said to generally correspond to this particular variable, as alluded in the opening sentences of the second paragraph, the specific circumstances of the conflict in Cyprus indicate that this is only partly the case. Although both Cypriot communities exhibited some form of dependency on their respective ‘motherlands’, the opposite is also true since both Turkey and Greece found themselves ‘hostage’ to political developments on the island at different points in time. The result of this ‘mutual dependence’ means that the strict definitional application of the ‘patron-client’ relationship highlighted by this particular variable is only partly accurate.

**Conclusion**

From the preceding analysis it appears that as a whole, Azar’s framework of ‘Protracted Social Conflict’ is a valid description of the conflict in Cyprus in the sense that the majority of variables are accurately mirrored in the development and progression of this particular case. However, two variables – ‘state actions and strategies’ (under Process Dynamics) and ‘increasing dependency and cliency’ (under Outcome Analysis) – have been identified which although do not explicitly fail in their application do not conform (to varying degrees) to the ‘ideal’ criteria of PSC analysis. In the first instance – ‘state actions and strategies’ – Azar focuses on two kinds of state policies that exhibit the potential of ‘activating’ latent conflicts – coercive repression or instrumental co-option – neither of which adequately portray the situation in Cyprus. However, as Azar himself has stated, this variable allows for situations whereby the state might adopt strategies of genuine accommodation which might nevertheless fail due to their being misperceived, thus making it relevant for the Cyprus conflict (irrespective of one’s understanding of historical and political circumstances). The second instance – ‘increasing
dependency and cliency’ – is more problematic in the sense that Azar seems to imply that continued ‘protractedness’ of a conflict automatically results in the development of such a relationship. As the assessment has shown this is only partly the case since it can be argued that although in the beginning both communities exhibited some form of dependency (and possibly cliency) on external actors – the ‘motherlands’ of Greece and Turkey – as the conflict progressed one of the two communities (the Greek-Cypriot) displayed decreasing levels of this variable. However, it can still be used to accurately describe the relationship between the Turkish-Cypriot community and Turkey, as well as the association of certain segments of the Greek-Cypriot community (namely ultra-nationalist elements such as EOKA B) and Greece. Thus, although still applicable, it is to a considerably lesser extent than that (presumably) envisioned by Azar.

The two aforementioned deficiencies of the PSC framework as it relates to the Cyprus conflict are indicative of the more general problem exhibited by the model. It needs to be remembered that ‘Protracted Social Conflict’ analysis was developed by Azar specifically to highlight features of the conflict in Lebanon and to promote a particular method of conflict resolution (Track II problem-solving workshops). Although the model emphasises that “... the source of such conflicts lay predominantly within and across rather than exclusively between states …” its over-reliance on identity ignores factors and processes that influence its development and expression. For instance, economic and territorial grievances are also causes of conflict, which however, tend to be expressed in terms of identity preservation as a way of extending their appeal. Thus, in any given conflict there is likely to be an interaction of underlying (potentially non-identity related) motives that fuel the dispute and which PSC, in its original form tends to overlook (it can be argued that the Israeli-Palestinian dispute is such a case). Furthermore, while PSC generally succeeds in highlighting the “... blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors” in cases of ‘protracted social conflict’, the framework relies on the existence of the state and its ability to respond to certain situations (thus illustrating how its actions affect the conflict situation). The expectation of the existence of such a state structure in cases of ‘protracted social conflict’ obviously influences the extent of a successful application of PSC analysis to a number of cases. Although during the time of Azar’s writings the concepts of ‘failed’ or ‘failing’ states had not fully crystallised, the problems of using PSC analysis to describe such instances where there is a disintegration of state structures and authority, had become clear. Somalia after 1991 as well as Afghanistan during 1992-1996 are two cases where the referral to state structures, ‘the state’s role’ and ‘state actions and strategies’ becomes an exercise in futility (although it could still be argued for both cases that prior to 1991 in the case of Somalia and 1992 for Afghanistan, PSC analysis is still applicable). The final (main) criticism of Azar’s PSC framework relates to its prescriptive aspect which is based
on the promotion of problem-solving workshops as a method of addressing ‘protracted social conflicts’. Previously, Track I diplomacy – with all its ‘state-centric’ baggage – had been the dominant method of conflict resolution; the conceptual innovation of PSC and other ‘second generation’ approaches (of which PSC is one example) being that they prompted a “… shift away from reliance on state security as the goal of peace processes and the order that they recreate, to versions of human security”.89 However, as mediation in the case of the conflict in Cyprus has shown, Track II diplomacy, while arguably useful, has not had the effects desired by its proponents since “Tracks I and II exist in the same reflexive and mutually constituted environment and are therefore victims of the same shortcomings”.90

When assessing PSC analysis for any case study it is worthwhile taking the previous critiques into consideration as they identify the limits to which PSC can be applied. However, it is argued that the strength of PSC comes from its use as a framework – in order to break down a case study into manageable portions thus assisting in the identification and analysis of features – rather than a theory (implying prediction and prescription). In this sense, the analytic framework of protracted social conflict offers a useful structure with which to highlight areas that might benefit from more multi-dimensional conflict resolution approaches as well as an informative outline which can be used to illustrate a given conflict’s development.

Notes

4. Ibid., p. 64.
5. Ibid., p. 65.


10. Azar argues for the creation of a typology of conflict analysis (PSC) that takes into account the fact that “… many conflicts currently active in the underdeveloped parts of the world are characterised by a blurred demarcation between internal and external sources and actors. Moreover, there are multiple causal factors and dynamics, reflected in changing goals, actors and targets. Finally, these conflicts do not show clear starting and terminating points.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, p. 6.

11. Ibid., p. 7.

12. Ibid., p. 9.

13. Ibid., pp. 15-16.


15. Ibid.

16. “Perhaps the most significant factor related to a protracted social conflict is the communal content of a society. If a society is characterised by multicommunal composition, protracted social conflicts are most likely to arise”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, p. 7.

17. Ibid.

18. Ibid; Oliver Ramsbotham, Tom Woodhouse and Hugh Miall, Contemporary Conflict Resolution: The Prevention, Management and Transformation of Deadly Conflicts, pp. 85-86.


21. When both can be said to have become politically active.

22. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., p. 77.


24. “The most obvious ontological need is individual and communal physical survival and well being. Individual or communal survival is contingent upon the satisfaction of material needs … Grievances resulting from need deprivation are usually expressed collectively. Failure to redress these grievances by the authority cultivates a niche for a protracted social conflict”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict: Theory and Cases, pp. 7-9.
25. Oliver Ramsbotham et al., op. cit., p. 86.
27. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., Chapter 6.
29. “Most states which experience protracted social conflict tend to be characterised by incompetent, parochial, fragile, and authoritarian governments that fail to satisfy basic human needs”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 10.
30. Ibid., pp. 10-11.
33. “Formation of domestic social and political institutions and their impact on the role of the state are greatly influenced by the patterns of linkage with the international system”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 11.
34. Ibid., pp. 11-12.
35. For Greek support to EOKA B’ see: Makarios Droushiotis, EOKA B’ & CIA – To ellinotourkiko parakratos stin Kypro [EOKA B’ & CIA – The Greek-Turkish para-state in Cyprus]. For Turkish support to TMT see: Spiros A. Athanasiades, Fakelos TMT [TMT File].
36. Michael A. Attalides, Cyprus, Nationalism and International Politics, p. 47.
38. Christopher Hitchens, The Trial of Henry Kissinger, pp. 77-89; Christopher Hitchens, Hostage to History: Cyprus from the Ottomans to Kissinger.
41. Ibid.
42. “A protracted social conflict remains latent until some effective triggers begin to operate … Initially a trigger may, but need not be, a trivial event … [which] tends to become a turning point at which the individual victimization is collectively recognised … Collective recognition of individual grievances (or incompatible goals) naturally leads to collective protest. Collective protest is usually met by some degree of repression or suppression. As tension increases, the victimised communal groups begin to draw the attention of their constituents not only to the event itself, but also to a broad range of issues involving communal security, access, and acceptance needs … The spill-over of the event into multiple issues increases the momentum for organising and mobilising resources”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 12.
43. Ibid., p. 14.
44. Ibid., pp. 12-14.
47. Ibid.
51. “A protracted social conflict can be resolved or at least kept latent if the state accommodates communal grievances and improves the satisfaction of communal needs in the initial stage … [B]ecause of the norm of ‘winner-take-all’ which still prevails in multicomunal societies [a]ny authentic accommodation or concession may be perceived as a sign of defeat”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 14.
52. Ibid., p. 15.
54. Amendments to the constitution which “… were necessary in order to remove some of the obstacles which prevented the Greeks and Turks of Cyprus from co-operating in a spirit of understanding and friendship”. Norma Salem, op. cit., p. 122.
57. Ibid.
58. “… who pursue total power and exclusive recognition of authority and hold immutable preferences: that is, their goals are not subject to change”. Stephen John Stedman, op. cit., p. 10.
59. “Conflicts associated with communal identity and fear of marginalisation or loss of communal integrity, tend to involve an enduring antagonistic set of perceptions and interactions between and among communal groups and the state … In a situation of limited or proscribed interaction, the worst motivations tend to be attributed to the other side. There is little possibility of falsification, and the consequence is reciprocal negative images which perpetuate communal antagonisms and solidify protracted social conflict”. Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 15.
60. Ibid.
63. Ibid.
64. Ibid., pp. 16-17.
65. “This is the most obvious consequence, exacerbating initial conditions of insecurity through further loss of life and means of support … A vicious cycle of underdevelopment and conflict deprives not only the victimised communities, but also the dominant groups, of the economic resources for satisfying basic needs.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 16.
66. Ibid.
69. The United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) estimates that approximately 165,000 Greek-Cypriots and 45,000 Turkish-Cypriots were displaced as a result of the Turkish invasion. The United Nations High Commissioner for Refugees (UNHCR) – based on statistics provided by the Cypriot communities – puts that number at 200,000 and 65,000 respectively. However, the latter figures are generally considered to be too high.
71. “Degeneration of socio-economic and political institutions, which makes the satisfaction of communities’ access needs virtually impossible, occurs in two distinctive ways. One is de facto paralysis of political institutions … [and] the other … is further fragmentation of the broader social fabric … As conflict protracts … communal cleavages become petrified, and the prospects for cooperative interaction and nation-building become poor.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 16.
72. Ibid.
73. See ‘Governance and the State’s Role’ and ‘State Actions and Strategies’.
75. Van Coufoudakis, op. cit., p. 5.
77. Ibid.
78. Harry Anastasiou, op. cit., pp. 582-583.
79. Ibid., p. 583.
80. “As conflict protracts, communal actors rely more and more on support and aid from others and thus external actors are systematically drawn into the conflict. Decision-making power is increasingly exercised by external actors, so that communities suffer further loss of access and control over their lives.” Edward E. Azar, The Management of Protracted Social Conflict, Theory and Cases, p. 17.
81. Ibid.
82. ‘The Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’ (‘TRNC’) proclaimed its independence on 15 November 1983 and is recognised only by Turkey.
84. Ibid., p. 5.
85. Ibid.
87. Ibid., pp. 117-125.
89. Oliver P. Richmond, Maintaining Order, Making Peace, p. 130.
90. Ibid., p. 131.

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