Cyprus: Conflict Resolution through Europeanisation?
Most Recent Experiences and Perspectives

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Abstract
Since September 2008 the leaders of both ethnic groups in Cyprus have been looking for a solution for the island’s long-standing conflict. Anyone wishing to evaluate the chances of this new initiative must recall the experience of the failed unification and reconciliation plan of Kofi Annan. As this plan connected the goal of conflict resolution with the perspective of accession to the European Union (EU) this article pursues the question of the extent to which Europeanisation promotes a solution of the Cyprus problem. For this purpose the theoretical concept of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is introduced. The prospects of success of the current process of negotiation – according to this concept – are dependent on two factors set against a backdrop of experiences with the Annan plan: firstly, President Christofias must succeed in changing the attitude of his compatriots and the Greek Cypriot media against compromises and concessions from a negative one to positive by means of a massive publicity campaign. Secondly, in Turkey not only the government but also the military and the diplomats must support the results of the negotiations.

Keywords: Cyprus conflict, conflict resolution, mediation, European integration, Europeanisation

Since 3 September 2008 the leaders of both ethnic groups, Dimitris Christofias and Mehmet Ali Talat, have met on a regular basis to revive negotiations in their attempts to find a solution for the Cyprus conflict. It is to be a solution “made by Cypriots for Cypriots”. If the negotiators reach an agreement, separate referenda are intended to be held on the result of the negotiations. Anyone wishing to evaluate the chances of this new initiative must recall the experience of the failed unification and reconciliation plan of Kofi Annan. This plan was approved by the Turkish Cypriots, but rejected by the Greek Cypriots. In contrast to all prior mediation attempts, this plan had had a unique selling point: it connected the goal of conflict resolution with the perspective of accession to the European Union (EU). This perspective is also significant in the current negotiations: should the unification plan be successful, the Turkish Cypriots would be EU citizens.

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not only de jure, but also de facto. This article pursues the question of the extent to which Europeanisation promotes a solution of the Cyprus problem. The prospects of success of the current process of negotiation – according to these hypotheses – are dependent on two factors set against a backdrop of experiences with the Annan plan: firstly, President Christofias must succeed in changing the stance of his compatriots and the Greek Cypriot media against compromises and concessions (as had been asked of them by the Annan plan) from a negative attitude to a positive one by means of a massive publicity campaign. Secondly, in Turkey not only the government but also the military and the diplomats must support the results of the negotiations. This article pursues first the question of why the Annan plan, connected with the perspective of Europeanisation as identified then, was not successful. For this purpose the theoretical concept of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is introduced. Finally, the current negotiations and their conditions for success are addressed. It would be worthwhile to examine the ongoing process of negotiations on the basis of the Hexagon of Conflict Settlement more in detail but due to lack of information currently this must be left to future analysis.

The “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”

The year 2004 opened a “window of opportunity” for Cyprus: on 24 April votes were held in separate referenda on Kofi Annan’s unification and reconciliation plan, and the accession of Cyprus to the EU was planned for the 1 May – doubtless a one-off chance for resolution of the conflict through Europeanisation. In order to assure success for conflict settlement through Europeanisation, the parties in a conflict would have had to be willing and in a position to resolve an existing conflict within the framework of European standards and values, procedures and institutions. Europeanisation can be understood as a “processes of a) construction, b) diffusion and c) institutionalisation of formal and informal rules, procedures, policy paradigms, styles, ‘ways of doing things’, and shared beliefs and norms which are first defined and consolidated in the EU policy process and then incorporated in the logic of domestic (national and subnational) discourse, political structures and public policies.”1 Formal values and norms are incorporated in the treaties of the EU, informal ones can be identified within the decision-making processes.2 To date the EU

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resembles to a greater extent the model of a consociational democracy. As far as conflict settlement is concerned Europeanisation implies that conflict partners are not focusing on their perceptions of an “ideal” solution of the conflict but are willing to compromise and to make use of EU institutions and procedures for the purpose of conflict settlement. That is all the more relevant when the EU offers membership to conflicting partners. The author does not exclude the possibility that parties in a conflict are prepared and willing to resolve the conflict in another way – either bilaterally or with the support of international organisations.

Since Europeanisation has with time become something of a “catch-all” term, this term must be operationalised. The Hexagon of Conflict Settlement provides a useful theoretical framework for this. The Hexagon consists of six variables (see figure 1). The “Level of Europeanisation” is the determining one of those variables. The level of Europeanisation is the key determining factor to identify the probability of conflict settlement through Europeanisation. As described above, Europeanisation refers to norms, values, procedures and institutions. The other variables can only play an obstructive or facilitating role in the process of conflict settlement. Among them, the “Actor EU” is characterised as an intervening variable. The other four variables are added to the model as modifying variables. These variables are “Conflict Perception”, “Conflict Intensity”, “Economic Interdependence” and “External Actors”. To avoid misunderstandings from the very beginning of this paper, the level of Europeanisation has nothing in common with “European maturity”, meaning a country’s grade of readiness to be or to become a member of the EU. With the level of Europeanisation no differentiation between “good” or “bad” Europeans is made. The determining variable only concerns a conflict party’s ability and will to settle a conflict by Europeanised logic of acting. To make it clear: When it is argued in the following text that the Greek Cypriots did not follow an approach of Europeanisation when they had to decide on the Annan plan, this does not disqualify the Greek Cypriots as being uninspired by European ideals or as not meeting the Copenhagen criteria of EU membership. It means that the Greek Cypriot side did not link the Annan plan with the Europeanisation approach as described above. The first part of this text will analyse the situation in 2004. When it is argued by Greek Cypriot leaders that a reunification can be reached on a more solid base when Cyprus is a member of the EU, this constellation must be subject of an analysis in the future.


4 The “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement” is the result of a research project (funded by the Volkswagen Foundation from 2005 until 2008 at the Jean Monnet Chair of the author) that aimed to specify the impact of Europeanisation on conflict settlement. The main research interest was the central question of the conditions under which parties in a conflict manage their conflicts through Europeanisation and lead their conflicts to a final solution. The focus of the empirical analysis was laid on three different cases: the Greek-Macedonian name dispute, the Aegean conflict and the Cyprus question. For the theoretical concept and more empirical data see H.-J. Axt, O. Schwarz and S. Wiegand (2008) Konfliktbeilegung durch Europäisierung ... op. cit.
Before the fruitless efforts for conflict resolution within the framework of the Annan plan are analysed with the help of the Hexagon, it should first be shown how the Greek and Turkish Cypriots envisage a resolution of the conflict which would be “ideal” from their point of view. For the Greek Cypriots the following are essential: a return to the pre-1974 status quo though modified into a (bi-zonal and bi-communal) federal state with strong powers, consideration for the numerical disparity between the Greek Cypriot majority and the Turkish Cypriot, transferral of the Acquis Communautaire (personal freedom of settlement, right of establishment, and acquisition of property), returning of property instead of compensation, complete retraction of the Turkish troops’ comprehensive return of the settlers to Anatolia and an end or at least modification of the Treaty of Guarantee. For the Turkish Cypriots the following are particularly important: equal political rights of both ethnic groups, a strong position of the “constituent states”, recognition of two separate peoples with different cultures, religions and languages, restrictive handling of personal freedom of settlement, right of establishment and acquisition of property, compensation for property instead of return, as well as maintenance of the Turkish troops and a Turkish right to intervene as a guarantee of safety. For a successful resolution of the Cyprus conflict within the framework of Annan’s plan, both parties in the conflict would have had to be prepared to make concessions and to accept the political cost incurred.

We will begin the analysis of the failure of the Annan plan with the modifying variables of the Hexagon. Two variables can be noted here which proved to be helpful for conflict resolution:

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6 The Greek Cypriot side had accepted prior to Annan Plan V that more than 40,000 settlers could stay.
The intensity of conflict between both ethnic groups has been (and is) relatively low. Even when the Green Line was opened in April 2003, there were hardly any serious incidents. Principally it is assumed that a conflict settlement is facilitated when both parties abandon the usage of violence. The United Nations Forces in Cyprus (UNFICYP) no doubt contributed to the prevention of large-scale violence. Riots of nationalist zealots at the Green Line, however, could not be prevented. According to the “Conflict Barometer” of the Heidelberg Institute for International Conflict Research (HIIK) the Cyprus conflict can be characterised as a non-violent manifest conflict on a low level of intensity.

As far as the external actors were concerned their policies were largely coherent when it came to the Annan plan. The United Nations, Greece, Turkey, Great Britain and the USA supported the initiative of the General Secretary. An essential condition for a successful conflict resolution is to be seen in the mutual coordination of the external actors’ activities. Only an efficient and complementary strategy for settling conflicts can be beneficial for the resolution of a conflict. The bilateral differences between Greece and Turkey did not hinder both countries to endorse the Annan plan. Turkey clearly was driven by the motivation to avoid all that might have interfered with the attempt to start accession negotiations with the EU. So, the Turkish government did no longer side with Rauf Denktash and his preference for a “two state solution” as it had done in the past but gave support to Mehmet Ali Talat. Turkey’s calculus proved successful, the EU started negotiations with Turkey on 3 October 2005. Greece was hindered in playing a more important role as national elections were held on 7 March 2004 and the government of Kostas Simitis was replaced by a new administration headed by Kostas Karamanlis. As far as Great Britain and Greece are concerned it must be noted that both countries are member states of the EU; they have participated in the internal decision-making of the EU, and the key decisions with respect to Cyprus have been made unanimously in the EU. Greece especially, managed to insert into the Helsinki European Council Presidency Conclusions, a provision that solving the Cyprus problem was not a precondition for Cyprus to become a member of the EU. When Greece is subsumed as an external actor here, it refers to the national foreign policy activities of Athens during the process of negotiations on the Annan plan.

On the other hand, however, with respect to the modifying variables, attention must be drawn to the following facts which proved to be counter-productive:

Often it is an essential part of the nature of conflicts that the conflict perceptions of the parties involved are not compatible with each other. The perception of the Cyprus conflict has been and still is highly contradictory between the two ethnic groups. While the Greek Cypriots –
particularly remembering the Turkish invasion of the year 1974 – perceive Turkey to be the
main security problem, the Turkish Cypriots almost exclusively remember the events of 1963
(Christmas riots) and 1964, and perceive the primary threat as being the Greek side that
wished to deprive them of their political equal rights. It is assumed that conflict settlement is
brought about when both conflict parties agree with their perception of the conflict item.
Disagreement on this point obstructs conflict settlement.

- The low level of economic exchange across the Green Line did not produce any positive
effects relating to economic interdependence. A high degree of economic interdependence
between the conflict parties – that is the argument – is seen as a positive impetus on the
process of conflict settlement. There are enough empirical evidences to show that the risk of
conflict escalation sinks the more both sides in a conflict carry on a trade with each other. In
addition, there is an apparent de-escalating effect when both conflict parties maintain high
degrees of trade interaction. What has been the situation in Cyprus since 2004? Even after
a slight revival of domestic trade in Cyprus from 2003 onwards (the opening of the Green
Line), its scale remains relatively negligible in both relative and absolute terms. According to
Greek Cypriot sources, between August 2004 and mid-May 2005 north Cypriot goods
amounting to a value of approximately €1.1 million were delivered to the Republic of
Cyprus. The Green Line trade from north to south was then in the region of approximately
€100,000 per month. The biggest deliveries to date have been vegetables, construction
materials and paper products. By way of comparison: the imports of the Republic of Cyprus
in 2006 totalled an average of US$483.33 million per month. Hence north Cypriot goods
have only reached the south to a very small extent, but conversely almost no products at all are
"exported" into the Turkish Cypriot part. Only in March 2005 was there agreement in the
north regarding the delivery of goods from the south, and the publication of a corresponding
list of goods was announced. This makes it clear that to date trade between the two parts of

12 Since 2004-2005 (the time span which is analysed in this part of the article) interdependence has increased to some extent as trade has risen. The total trade value which crossed the Green Line from north to south amounted to €6.1 million (1 May 2008 – 30 April 2009). The value of trade from south to north amounted to €1.1 million in
Cyprus has played an absolutely negligible role, and no substantial political effects can be expected from it in the sense of any strengthening of interdependencies.

Among all six variables of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”, the actor EU has the most important influence on the process of Europeanisation together with the level of Europeanisation. This variable is, therefore, characterised as the intervening one. If we wish to assess the role of the European Union as an intervening variable, the fact that conflict resolution through Europeanisation has failed in the case of Cyprus must be viewed as a grave factor. The EU gave political support to the Annan plan and assisted the UN as the main mediator to make the Annan plan compatible with the Acquis Communautaire of the EU. On the other hand the EU offered the chance of accepting Cyprus as a member, but it did not attach the condition that Cyprus first had to solve the conflict and attain reunification. Admittedly this gave the Turkish Cypriots a strong incentive to support the Annan plan. For the Greek Cypriots, however, this was not the case as EU accession was guaranteed even without any solution of the ethnic conflict. The fact that the EU did not give conditional acceptance of accession to Cyprus was ultimately due to the threat made by Greece that it would otherwise block the whole eastern expansion of the EU by veto.

If on the one hand we must see the conduct of the EU as being responsible for the failure of the conflict resolution through Europeanisation in the case of Cyprus, on the other hand the same is also true with regard to the level of Europeanisation of the Greek Cypriot ethnic group (see below).

If the instruments available in the EU are differentiated according to “compulsory” and
“connective impacts” as interpreted in literature, the following can be noted: In accordance with the concept of “compulsory impact”, in the case of Cyprus the EU certainly tried to make use of “carrots”. The EU used the most attractive offer available to it — that of membership. This, however, occurred in an asymmetric manner — it appealed positively to the Turkish Cypriots. The same cannot be said for the Greek Cypriots as they could be sure of being accepted into the EU regardless, which is also the reason why the government did not feel obliged to rally citizens to a positive verdict in favour of the Annan plan. The guarantee of financial aid (“connective impact”) may initiate and deepen contacts between participants in a conflict and in positive cases such contacts can lead to the establishment of trust. The EU tried particularly to promote bicomunal contacts and dialogue forums, but such initiatives were often countered by the demand of the Greek Cypriot authorities to represent the Republic of Cyprus alone and the insistence of Turkish Cypriots to participate in their official TRNC capacity.

The Conflict Parties’ Level of Europeanisation

Among all six variables, that are relevant for the settlement of conflicts through Europeanisation, the level of Europeanisation is the most important factor. In general, Europeanisation processes are either the result of a “calculus approach” or a “cultural approach”. The first one is interpreted in literature mainly as rational choice-institutionalism, whereas the second one is framed in the context of sociological institutionalism. Contrary to the assumption that decisions are mainly driven by cost-benefit-calculations James March and Johan Olsen argue that decision making in institutions does not derive from a “logic of consequences” but from a “logic of appropriateness”.


17 Although the northern part of the island is referred to as TRNC in this essay, it is acknowledged that the TRNC is not recognised by the international community except Turkey.


Normative and cognitive Rules are internalised by individuals. A “calculus approach” is dominated by actors’ cost-benefit calculation, the “cultural approach” is the result of a process of social learning whereby actors accept and identify with European norms and values. Sure enough there is also the third possibility that at least one party does not choose a Europeanisation strategy consciously and prefers other forms of conflict management. When Europeanisation processes are the result of a calculus approach, the outcome is more short-range and dependent on external offers or threats. Calculus driven Europeanisation is only an option as long as it promises gains and has no value by itself that brings sustainability and reliability with it. When conflict parties follow a cultural orientated Europeanisation approach by contrast, they expect not to gain benefits in a short-term perspective. Rather they are persuaded that a conflict management through Europeanisation will realise benefits in the longer perspective. In this context the management of conflicts through European norms, values, and actions is seen without an alternative and is outstanding. In the following section the logics of conflict management of the governments, the parliamentary actors, the media and the citizens of both communities will be classified as non-Europeanised, following a “calculus” or a “cultural approach”. The basic assumption of this classification is that a cultural level of Europeanisation of both conflict parties maximises ceteris paribus the chance of a final peaceful conflict settlement through Europeanisation.

The Greek Cypriots

As far as the government is concerned, the President plays the dominant political role, especially with respect to intercommunal affairs. Outside of Cyprus it was scarcely noticed that 16 February 2003 was something akin to an early referendum for the Annan plan. It was on this day that Tassos Papadopoulos emerged as victor from the presidential elections and was able to replace Glafkos Klerides, who had been in office since 1993 and had been a supporter of the Annan plan. Even in the past, Papadopoulos had displayed himself as a more hard-line oriented politician who was less prepared to compromise on the Cyprus issue. The fact that the solution to the island’s problem was to consist of a bicomunal, bi-zonal federation in which – with regard to political rights – majority and minority relations were to play no part, in other words the fact that the Turkish Cypriots as an ethnic group were to have the same political influence as the majority population of Greek Cypriots, was unacceptable for Papadopoulos. His understanding of democracy was tied to the idea that the majority should have the decisive influence.

During the negotiations on the Annan plan it was noticeable that the Greek Cypriot president – as far as could be perceived by the outside observer – energetically verbalised the
standpoints and interests of his own ethnic group, but contributed little to finding compromise solutions. Papadopoulos’ preferences apparently lay not in aiding the Annan plan to come to a successful conclusion, but instead in first securing EU accession for Cyprus, and then from his strong position to attain a solution of the Cyprus issue according to Papadopoulos’ own desires. Alvaro de Soto, the special adviser of the UN Secretary General on the Cyprus issue, blamed president Papadopoulos for having ensured, through his speech on 7 April 2004, that the Greek Cypriots rejected the Annan plan. According to de Soto this speech had a “galvanising effect” against the acceptance of the unification plan. The president spent “55 minutes outlining its flaws and barely five seconds on its advantages.” Instead of trying to gain support for the compromise, Papadopoulos strengthened the expectation among Greek Cypriots that a resolution of the Cyprus issue was possible which fit their ideal of a perfect conflict resolution to a great extent. The attitude taken by the government must be evaluated as not following a Europeanisation approach.

In the parliament only the DISY party (Dimokratikos Synergasmos, Democratic Assembly) supported the Annan plan. The President’s party DIKO (Dimokritiko Komma, Democratic Party), EDEK (Eniaia Dimokrati Enosis Kentrou/Kinima Sosialdemokratikon, United Democratic Union of Centre/Movement of Social Democrats) as well as AKEL (Anorthotiko Komma Ergazemenou Laou, Progressive Party of the Working People) were against the Annan plan. AKEL presented itself in a rather contradictory manner. More than other parties, AKEL had been engaged in bi-communal initiatives in the past. AKEL’s leader Dimitris Christofias created the slogan that he was in favour of a “soft No” towards the Annan plan in order “to cement the Yes” for a better settlement of the conflict. AKEL had supported the election of Papadopoulos as President, and on the other hand Christofias was elected as the Parliament’s speaker. This fact may have had an influence on AKEL’s rather incoherent behaviour. It became evident that the Greek Cypriot parties, apart from DISY, did not follow an approach of Europeanisation.

The same must be said with respect to the media. About ten newspapers in Greek language appear regularly in the Republic of Cyprus. Among them only two papers made positive comments on the Annan plan: “Alithia”, as a newspaper with a restricted circulation, and “Politis”, which is estimated to be No. 2 among all newspapers. “Alithia” is affiliated to the DISY party.

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24 There is a huge debate about the alleged or real pro-Turkish/Turkish Cypriot bias of the Annan plan in its five versions. For the Greek Cypriots this was one of the major reasons to reject the plan and not to open the way for conflict settlement through Europeanisation. The perspective of EU membership was a lever to overcome the No-say tradition among Turkish Cypriots.
whereas “Politis” declares itself to be independent. When it came to the Annan plan, all the other newspapers saw more negative than positive aspects. They thereby strengthened an already existing critical and negative mindset among the Greek Cypriots. The fact that “Politis” did not follow the mainstream had consequences: The paper lost the majority of its advertisements, and the Orthodox Archbishop Chrysostomos I blamed “Politis” for being a “Greek-speaking Turkish newspaper.”

As many opinion surveys have confirmed impressively, the Greek Cypriot people also opposed the Annan plan, for three main reasons: firstly because of security regulations, secondly because of property regulations, and thirdly because of the prospective restrictions on freedom of settlement. In the evaluation of the Annan plan, the question as to what extent the acceptance of European values and norms as well as the handling of the conflict through European institutions would have eased resolution of the conflict between the ethnic groups, was not paramount.

Rather, the question was always whether the Annan plan corresponded to participants’ ideas of an ideal conflict resolution or not. Seen in this light, the Annan plan demanded too many compromises for the overwhelming majority of Greek Cypriots. The Annan plan was, therefore, unable to succeed because among the Greek Cypriots:

- only 14.7% saw the bicomunal federation as being an “ideal solution”;
- 76% saw it as necessary for the Turkish troops to be retracted more quickly,
- 60.7% found a one-sided right of intervention unacceptable,
- 40.2% did not want to have international judges sitting in the highest court,
- 42.9% were against permanent restrictions on freedom of movement,
- 50.2% supported territorial adjustments on a larger scale in favour of the Greek Cypriots,
- 63% advocated more generous returning of property,
- 74.7% wished to bring back more settlers to Anatolia than provided for in the Annan plan
- 72.7% perceived the costs for a reunification of Cyprus as being too much to be passed on to the Greek Cypriots.

As regards a unified Cyprus, the Greek Cypriot side understood this to mean that the state would then be a successor of the Republic of Cyprus, and that according to the Acquis Communautaire the freedoms of establishment, acquisition of property and the return of refugees...
should be restricted as little as possible. Compared to this, less importance was attached to the fact that orientation towards the EU also held an offer for conflicts to be resolved in accordance with norms and values aimed at compromises. The Greek ethnic group did not pursue any policy of Europeanisation in 2004. Whether they will adapt such a policy now that Cyprus has become a EU member is an open question and will be the subject of future analysis.

The Turkish Cypriots

On the Turkish Cypriot side a clear strategy of Europeanisation was pursued with regard to the Annan plan. Here the calculation of EU membership for the Turkish Cypriot ethnic group was clearly of primary importance. It was therefore a “calculus approach” towards Europeanisation:

In the government Rauf Denktas, who was against the Annan plan, was challenged by Mehmet Ali Talat, who wanted to secure EU accession by agreeing to the plan. The president in the north of Cyprus had a position which was not as strong as that of the Greek Cypriot president. Only his strong charismatic aura and his uncontested position as leader of the ethnic group (backed by Turkey) had secured Denktas an absolutely dominant role when it came to negotiations between both ethnic groups. However, Denktas had lost this position since the Turkish Government backed him no longer and the Turkish Cypriots had begun in increasing measure to express a favourable attitude towards the Annan plan and the EU perspectives tied in with it. This allowed Prime Minister Talat greater freedom to act. The parties which emerged as victors of the elections of 13 December 2003 were those which had shown a positive attitude to the Annan plan. In contrast to Denktas, Talat described the Annan plan as the “best plan” that could be attained. Hence Talat was in accordance with the mood among his compatriots and was able to gain something like “cultural hegemony”.

The parties who were in favour of accepting the Annan plan and were represented in the parliament, CTP (Cumhuriyetçi Türk Partisi, Turkish Republican Party) and BDH (Barış ve Demokrasi Hareketi, Movement for Peace and Democracy) were largely able to prevail against their rivals from the UBP (Ulusal Birlik Partisi, National Unity Party) and DP (Demokrat Parti, Democratic Party). In the parliamentary elections of 13 December 2003 those parties who had expressed support for the Annan plan were able to win. On 13 January 2004 Talat was elected Prime Minister. He replaced Derviş Eroğlu, who was among the opponents of the Annan plan. On one hand Talat’s deputy Serdar Denktas, who simultaneously functioned as Foreign Minister, took a clearly critical position towards the unification initiative of Annan. On the other hand the BDH party under Mustafa Akinci also expressed support for the Annan plan. Like Talat, the


29 The distribution of seats in the parliament elected in 2003, with around 50 members of parliament, was as follows: CTP 19, UBP 18, BDH 6 and DP 7 seats. Speaking purely in terms of numbers, a coalition between the two pro-
parties CTP and BDH also supported a course of Europeanisation, according to the “calculus approach”.

In the media the position of the supporters of the Annan plan was more strongly represented
than that of the opponents. While negotiations were taking place on the Annan plan, the media
in the north of Cyprus reported intensively. The same was true for the electronic media: “In
the immediate weeks leading up to the referendum, Turkish Cypriot radio and television
channels broadcast debates and question-and-answer sessions on the Annan Plan several
days of the week”.30 “Kibris” can be seen as being the newspaper with the greatest circulation and influence. Its circulation exceeds that of all other newspapers together. Along with “Afrika”, which is admittedly much less widely distributed, “Kibris” expressed support for the Annan plan and the EU perspective. “Kibris” found its way into the camp of the supporters in a surprising manner. The newspaper was a supporter of the Denktaş course for a long time, but switched sides and supported the negotiation efforts of Kofi Annan.31 The mass demonstrations in northern Cyprus may well have played an important role in determining this. Among the supporters a decisive argument was that the plan of the UN General Secretary satisfied the desire for equal political rights held by the Turkish Cypriots. In this respect the referendum was seen as an act of self-determination. The fact that northern Cyprus was under the control of Turkey was criticised sharply again and again. A few examples of this are: when Denktaş stayed away from the negotiations in Bürgenstock – this was criticised by the press. “Kibrisli” wrote that the “trick” had been in vain, because Greece and particularly Turkey with their Prime Minister had been present.32 In the newspaper “Afrika”, massive doubt was cast over whether Denktaş had pursued the negotiations “with good intentions”, as every night on television he had made an appeal for a “No” campaign, and behind the scenes he had organised demonstrations against peace and unification.33 It can therefore be noted for the majority of the media that they supported a course of Europeanisation according to the model of the “calculus approach”.

And in the people a clearly utilitarian trait was expressed, as the general agreement with the
Annan plan was connected to the hope of gaining a higher standard of living as soon as they

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for a Reunited Cyprus Put in Perspective’ in Turkish Daily News, 4 May 2004 [http://
www.turkishdailynews.com.tr/].
31 See T. Bahceli (2004) ‘Saying Yes to EU Accession: Explaining the Turkish Cypriot Referendum Outcome’, The
33 See Press and Information Office, Turkish Press, Turkish Mass Media Bulletin 06.-07.-08.03.2004
became a member of the EU. This is confirmed by corresponding surveys. According to Lordos, Kaymak and Faiz, 69% of the Turkish Cypriots saw the prospect of EU membership as a decisive motive for a positive attitude towards the Annan plan: “For Turkish Cypriots, an indirect aspect of the Annan plan was that it would immediately render them full members of the European Union. This factor was indeed a prime determinant of referendum vote: For Turkish Cypriots the Annan plan referendum was partly a referendum on EU accession”. With regard to the question of what motivated the desire for a solution of the Cyprus problem, answers ranged from the pursuit of better economic conditions – mentioned most frequently – followed by the desires to have a stronger international voice, to avoid the risk of a war and to enjoy the benefits of EU membership. Above all, on the Turkish Cypriot side the following motives were connected with a resolution of the Cyprus conflict: “To become members of the European Union, to escape economic isolation, to become ‘the masters of their own house’, to overcome the risk of another war, to be re-united with the Greek Cypriots (secondary motive), to be able to return to ancestral homes that are now in the south (secondary motive)”.

The positive evaluation of the Annan plan was also reflected in the numerous demonstrations and initiatives on the part of civil society which took place in favour of the unification of the island. On 14 March 2002 around 60,000 Turkish Cypriots, representing around one-third of the entire population, had already demonstrated in support of the mediation efforts of Kofi Annan and EU accession. Mass demonstrations repeatedly took place under the slogan “This Land is Ours”. In August 2002, eighty-six Turkish Cypriot organisations, with a total of 38,000 members, had signed a common statement called “Common Vision”, which characteristically began with the sentence: “We support the direct talks aimed at finding a political settlement in Cyprus and the European Union membership of the new Partnership State that will be formed with the solution … In order to solve our problems, we need a solution to the Cyprus problem and EU membership …”. It must therefore be concluded that Turkish Cypriot society followed a course of Europeanisation corresponding to the model of the “calculus approach”.

As demonstrated in table 2 the Hexagon of Conflict Settlement assumes that the probability to settle a conflict through Europeanisation is the highest when both conflict partners prefer a

34 In the evaluation of the surveys the problem arose that it could scarcely be distinguished whether the informants were Turkish Cypriots or immigrants from Anatolia.
37 See A. Lordos and M. Faiz: Getting to “Yes”. Understanding Greek Cypriot and Turkish Cypriot Public Perceptions Concerning a Possible Solution to the Cyprus Problem, [http://www.wiltonpark.org.uk/documents/Lordos FaizPresentation.pdf].
38 See The Common Vision of the Turkish Civil Society [http://www.dzforum.de/0501001.php].
cultural approach of Europeanisation. If both sides prefer a calculus approach the probability is considered to be moderate, and if no Europeanisation can be identified on both sides it is assumed that the probability of conflict settlement is non existent. Considering the situation in Cyprus the following must be noted: The fact that only the Turkish but not the Greek Cypriots took advantage of the chance to understand the Annan plan as conflict resolution through Europeanisation ultimately led to the failure of the Annan plan. While the Greek Cypriots did not hope for a resolution of the conflict through Europeanisation, the Turkish Cypriots did, although with a clearly formed “calculus approach”. It is concluded that this configuration was unable to lead to a successful resolution of the conflict.

Table 2: Probability of Conflict Settlement through Europeanisation

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The Current Negotiation Process

Since 3 September 2008 a total of twenty-nine rounds of negotiation have taken place between the leaders of the two ethnic groups. Six intercommunal working groups on the topics of government, EU, property, security, economics and territory have been set up. Seven working groups are working on aspects of criminality, trade, cultural heritage, crises, humanitarian activities, health and the environment. The atmosphere for negotiations, by Cypriot standards, is unusually constructive and familiar. From time to time, of course, the conflicts of interest become clear, as for instance when Talat insists on the continued presence of Turkish troops or the role of Turkey as a guarantor power as well as the principle of the “virgin birth of the new state” or when Prime Minister Eroğlu stated that it is impossible to compromise on the Greek Cypriots’ proposals on the issue of property as that would imply that the “two states” principle would be removed. The same applies for statements of Christofias when he emphasises again and again that any conflict resolution must be compatible with the Acquis Communautaire of the EU, implying the right, which is unacceptable for the Turkish Cypriots, to free settlement and acquisition of property in the north. On 23 May 2008 Talat and Christofias agreed on basic principles of the reunited Cyprus. Both leaders committed themselves to a “bi-zonal, bi-communal federation with political equality, as defined by relevant Security Council resolutions. This partnership will comprise a Federal Government with a single international personality, along with a Turkish Cypriot
Constituent State and a Greek Cypriot Constituent State, which will be of equal status. As observers noted, progress was made with the working groups concerning government, EU and economy. On the other sensitive issues like security, territory and property no obvious progress was made.

As regards the current moods of both ethnic groups, the EU perspective still seems to be attractive among Turkish Cypriots, even if there is disappointment with relation to the fact that the EU has been unable to fulfil the hopes it had fed of direct trade and comprehensive financial help. While in early 2007, 67% of respondents still spoke positively about the EU, in the autumn it was only 55%. The polls indicate that the Turkish Cypriots are far less supportive of a future settlement and the concessions made in the Annan plan. The parliamentary elections of 19 April 2009 gave the UBP a majority of 44.02%, so that Derviş Eroğlu, who was one of the opponents of the Annan plan, became the new Prime Minister – a setback for the will to compromise and for Talat, but one which did not change the fact that he remains responsible for intercommunal dialogue. The judgement of the European Court of Justice in the “Orams” case revived resentment against the EU. The fact that the EU suspended eight items in the accession negotiations with Turkey is also commented on negatively by Turkish Cypriots. Talat stated that the opening of the Turkish ports for ships and aircraft from the Republic of Cyprus as demanded by the EU would be evaluated as a step backwards in Cyprus negotiations. Statements like this made it clear that Talat followed a policy which was more in line with the policy of Turkey after the Annan plan failed. As far the Greek Cypriots are concerned, President Christofias presents himself as being much more flexible and willing to compromise than his predecessor Papadopoulos was. The fact that the Greek Cypriot side insists so much on the implementation of the Acquis Communautaire of the EU is not interpreted in the north as faithfulness to the EU, but as the attempt to pursue the traditional goals of unlimited property acquisition and settling in northern Cyprus. As far as the media and the public are concerned, they remain unchanging in their rejection of a unification plan which demands compromises such as those stipulated in the Annan plan.

42 The case concerns a Greek Cypriot who is seeking to regain possession of his land in Lapta, north Cyprus which is currently occupied by the Orams. See ‘Raised Voices and Increased Opposition from North Cyprus Community’, The Observer 12.06.2009 [http://www.observercyprus.com/observer/News Details.aspx?id=4040].
Current surveys in both parts of Cyprus suggest that there continue to be contrary perceptions and interests, but also some convergent attitudes between the two ethnic groups. Concerning these surveys Turkish Cypriots mistrust Greek Cypriots, the EU and the international community, whereas Greek Cypriots mistrust Turkey, bringing to the fore the double-minority characterisation of the conflict. On the other hand Greek and Turkish Cypriots tend not to identify themselves as Greeks or Turks exclusively, and both communities share an affinity to Cyprus. It is interesting to take note of the perceptions regarding the locus of political control within the other community: the Greek Cypriots note that the Turkish Cypriots are mere puppets in the hands of Ankara, whereas the Turkish Cypriots perceive that the Orthodox Church in the Greek Cypriot Community is somehow an equal partner of the president and the National Council in the formulation of Cyprus problem policy. This reflects a narrative that has been frozen in time since the early days of the conflict. Both sides are rather pessimistic regarding the actual peace process: only 18% of Greek Cypriots and 13% of Turkish Cypriots express unambiguous hope about a positive outcome. Among Turkish Cypriots support for federalism is waning. Support for an ‘ideal’ two-state solution has increased since the failed referendum of 2004. Greek Cypriots on the other hand consider a unitary state solution satisfactory. Under these circumstances a federal settlement might be a compromise for both sides. As shown in table 3 both sides do not converge on the most sensitive issues such as veto rights in the decision-making process, property, settlers, security, residence and census.

### Table 3: Sensitive Issues between Greek and Turkish Cypriots

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Issue</th>
<th>Acceptance</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Each community should have the right to unilaterally block any decision or legislation of the federal government that it considers to be incompatible with its own communal interests</td>
<td>41%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>The property issue should be solved primarily through restitution, so that affected individuals will regain control of their properties as they had them before the events of the Cyprus problem</td>
<td>91%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>All people who came from Turkey after 1974, including their descendents, should return to Turkey after a settlement. The only possible exception is the case of those who have married Turkish Cypriots and the children of such mixed marriages</td>
<td>65%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>After the settlement, Cyprus should be fully demilitarised. All foreign troops should withdraw and all Cypriot armies should be disbanded</td>
<td>66%</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>In the context of a settlement, all, or almost all of the Greek Cypriots should live in the Greek Cypriot state, while all, or almost all of the Turkish Cypriots should live in the Turkish Cypriot state</td>
<td>27%</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

Whereas confidence-building measures such as fighting organised crime, bi-communal sporting events, protecting cultural heritage, reconciliation committees and Turkish Cypriot EU harmonisation are widely accepted by both communities, it is important to note that the acceptance of compromises as they were incorporated within the Annan plan and as they will reappear in one form or another in a new settlement plan is more opposed by the Greek Cypriots. Nine per cent of the Greek Cypriots could imagine that the compromises laid down in the Annan plan could be the basis of a future settlement, whereas 29% of the Turkish Cypriots answered positively in this respect – both figures are not promising ones. This is the foundation upon which perspectives for the coming future can be elaborated.

Perspectives

Of course, at the present time it cannot be predicted whether, and in what way, the process of negotiation which began in 2008 will succeed. The analyses carried out with the help of the “Hexagon of Conflict Settlement”, in combination with the current opinion polls, makes two conclusions seem highly plausible.

Firstly, the attitude of the Greek Cypriots towards concessions to the Turkish Cypriot side is still very critical. This is expressed particularly in the attitude towards the Annan plan. Even if it is currently emphasised again and again precisely in the south that the current negotiations are to bring different results from those contained in the Annan plan, in view of the heterogeneous interests of the two ethnic groups, compromises will have to be found which mirror the philosophy of the Annan plan. The compromise-making possibilities are, after all, not limitless. Even if it seems to be very advantageous from the point of view of the Greek Cypriots that a solution “from Cypriots for Cypriots” is now to be found, agreement to the result of the negotiations on the Greek Cypriot side will depend on the political leaders of the south, above all President Christofias, applying all political impetus to gain support for the result of the negotiations not only among the people, but also among the media. This is a key lesson from the failed Annan initiative, in which President Papadopoulos did not carry out this task, but instead mobilised feeling against the reconciliation plan. If a referendum would be held in early 2010 time is running short.

Secondly, EU perspectives remain attractive for the Turkish Cypriots, whatever unification plan they are tied to, regardless of all disappointments regarding the conduct of the EU after 2004. Problems, however, may loom with Turkey. In 2004 Ankara supported the Annan plan primarily because goodwill was required in order to avoid creating obstacles for the opening of the EU accession negotiations; nevertheless, this is no longer the current situation. The EU is no longer holding out any “carrots” for Turkey. On the contrary, eight issues have become blocked in the accession negotiations, and no agreement is in sight between Ankara and Brussels with respect to

45 See op. cit., p. 30-31.
the requirement to open Turkish harbours and airports for ships and aeroplanes from the Republic of Cyprus, and signals from EU states are increasing which are critical of or even oppose EU membership for Turkey. In a traditional manner Turkey is, however, following a “give and take” policy. It demands concessions from the EU if it is to show itself ready to compromise with regard to Cyprus. For this reason, it is difficult to calculate the likely attitude of Ankara if the two ethnic groups of Cyprus were to agree on a unification plan. It cannot be ruled out that Ankara might withhold its support. What will be decisive will be whether the Turkish military figures who see the Cyprus problem exclusively from the point of view of national security, can prevail. The “window of opportunity” held open in 2004 may be closed in the near future by Turkey.

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