Peacebuilding, United Nations and Civil Society: The Case of Cyprus

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Abstract
Peacebuilding is the political action which aims to promote the development of peaceful structures of social interaction after wars and conflicts. As such it deals with long-term processes and involves complex dynamics and a wide range of agencies, each of them with its own specific strengths and shortcomings. The paper begins by examining briefly the way peacebuilding ideas have emerged in the international system and especially in the United Nations, intended both as an international organisation and as the international institutional framework where the problems of war and conflict are tackled. An historical account of the changing nature of warfare, the emergence of the UN Peacebuilding Commission and the related involvement of civil society agencies in international peace efforts is provided, along with a relevant theoretical framework developed by the World Bank. Cyprus is then cited as a case in point for the traditional form of UN peace operations and the role played by civil society peacebuilding. UNFICYP is examined and Cypriot civil society peacebuilding introduced. Finally, the ‘Home for Cooperation’ project is presented as a noteworthy development which deserves local and international monitoring, support and involvement.

Keywords: Conflict analysis, Peacebuilding, International affairs, Civil society, Cyprus conflict, UNFICYP, Peacebuilding in Cyprus, Cypriot civil society, ‘Home for Cooperation’

Introduction
The complex phenomena of war and violent conflict have impacted on human societies since the beginning of time. Far from stopping with mere ceasefire agreements, violent conflicts are typically used to foster social norms and structures that are able to protract the conflict after armed clashes

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have passed, thus hindering conflict resolution possibilities and peaceful social changes to take effect. History, nevertheless, shapes human societies but it is also shaped by them: past actions and interactions influence the context where we live but our living actions and interactions are what mould the future form it will come to embrace. Ultimately, the past and the future are what we make of them and there is always the possibility of focusing on a conflicting past of enmity, painful thought it may be, in order to build a peaceful and shared future.

Peacebuilding is commonly intended as a political action which aims to promote self-sustainable peaceful structures of social interaction in conflict-affected contexts. Hence, its goals and ideals involve long-term social and institutional changes that cannot be viewed in isolation from other types of conflict resolution efforts. Peace actions and initiatives are undertaken by different actors, groups and organisations, each with its own peculiarities, resources and shortcomings too. International organisations, individual states, non-governmental organisations, business groups and ordinary citizens alike act individually or in cooperation, and sometimes in conflict, with others, while the effectiveness of their networks and interventions is far from predictable in the changing circumstances that generally shape conflicts. Building peace, in sum, involves complex phenomena and dynamics in much the same way as making war does.

Although peace efforts are not confined to the UN system and agencies, with their distinctive potentials and constraints, the UN is perhaps the most relevant player on the field. As Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005, pp. 326-327) argue, “the UN remains a hybrid organization, reflecting the coexisting aspects of the international collectivity: At the same time an instrument manipulated by the great powers, a forum for the mutual accommodation of state interests, and a repository of cosmopolitan values”. As such, the UN still retains its specific reservoir of legitimacy and integrative power in the international and global community. “That is why most of those engaged in conflict resolution see the United Nations as the essential institutional global framework for the realization of conflict resolution goals” (p. 327). It provides the reason for this analysis in relation to the way peacebuilding ideas have developed throughout the history of the UN as an international organisation and as an international forum, more generally, where the problems of war and peace are tackled in one way or other.

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1 See Brown (2000) for some socio-psychological perspectives of the processes taking place within and between groups. It provides good insight into the ways that social norms emerge, structure and evolve. It also deals with conflict dynamics. Berger and Luckman (1966) focus on the social phenomena of transmission and construction of knowledge. See Schutz (1960) for a more philosophical account of the ways individuals are shaped by their social context in addition to how they shape it as well. See also Hayek (1973) for an analysis of the social norms’ often unintended evolution through individual actions and group interactions. Using the game theory framework, Axelrod (1984) and Taylor (1987) show how cooperative norms of interaction can evolve out of intercourse between rational egoist players. Axelrod, for instance, applies his model in explaining cooperative norms that emerged on World War I battlefields between groups of enemy soldiers.
In light of the changing nature of war, a brief account is given here as background to the rules and practice of UN interventions in armed conflicts. It is pinpointed, however, that social changes on a longer-term level are simply not in the mandate or in the culture of traditional UN peacekeeping, neither are they a proper matter for international concern. Although this article will not examine the evolution of UN peacekeeping through its so-called ‘first’, ‘second’ and ‘third generations’ (ibid., pp. 132-158; Arielli and Scotto, 2003, pp. 140-148; Durch, 1993), it will follow the emergence of peacebuilding ideas within the UN system until the recent establishment of the UN Peacebuilding Commission. The difference between keeping and building peace has prompted the UN to involve civil society actors in its peace operations – a noteworthy development for the UN as an international organisation as well as in its role as the international body coping with the problems of war and peace.

The need to understand the role that civil society agencies can play in building a sustainable peace out of conflict and war has prompted many institutions and organisations to systematically analyse the issue. One interesting attempt, published by the World Bank (2006), will be evaluated later.

Following a short account of the links between the international system and peacebuilding, with the related involvement of civil society and NGOs in peacebuilding efforts, the case of Cyprus will be examined. Assuming that readers possess sufficient knowledge of the island’s recent past, and given the space constraints of this paper, the history of the Cyprus conflict or its mutual influence in current world affairs will not be covered in depth. The mission and activities of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) will be explored initially in order to underline its strengths and limits. It will be argued that a stronger involvement of civil society actors is needed in Cyprus to provide a peace process which is less dominated by political leadership. It will also be observed how strengthened bi-communal cooperation to enhance civil society’s impact, visibility and influence on the high-level, ‘track one’ peace process, calls for institutionalisations and structures for bi-communal initiatives. Finally the recent bi-communal project ‘Home for Cooperation’ (H4C) will be introduced, suggesting that, once realised, the H4C could provide the island with a visible structure of cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and NGOs. As such the H4C might constitute both a peacebuilding means and an end in itself.

The case of Cyprus is instructive for many reasons. Together with the Arab-Israeli conflict in Palestine and the discord between India and Pakistan centred in the Kashmir area, Cyprus, in fact, hosts one of the world’s most protracted conflicts. Analysing the Cyprus case may, therefore, provide a peace process which is less dominated by political leadership. It will also be observed how strengthened bi-communal cooperation to enhance civil society’s impact, visibility and influence on the high-level, ‘track one’ peace process, calls for institutionalisations and structures for bi-communal initiatives. Finally the recent bi-communal project ‘Home for Cooperation’ (H4C) will be introduced, suggesting that, once realised, the H4C could provide the island with a visible structure of cooperation between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and NGOs. As such the H4C might constitute both a peacebuilding means and an end in itself.

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provide useful and relevant information when studying other war-affected contexts. Indeed, the Cyprus case concurrently portrays local variables and external influences, various networked interests and escalation processes, and the connections between a local context and the broader geopolitical circumstances as they relate in conflict dynamics. The strengths and shortcomings of traditional UN peacekeeping are also highlighted and may indicate the absolute relevance of local civil society agencies in any reliable peacebuilding effort. Additionally, as much as international actors and dynamics have been crucial for Cyprus, the island may be of special importance in trying to solve some of the problems affecting international society.

United Nations and Peacebuilding

UN involvement in peacebuilding efforts is considered in this section. In order to provide an account of changing responses to the ever evolving climate in which contemporary wars take place, a synopsis of the historical context that led to the formation of UN peacebuilding is presented.

The Historical Context

The United Nations was created following the demise of the League of Nations and its failure to prevent the eruption of violent conflicts, i.e. the outbreak of World War II. The general aims of the new international organisation, as envisaged in its Charter (1945) ‘Preamble’, were “to save succeeding generations from the scourge of war, which twice in our lifetime has brought untold sorrow to mankind, and to reaffirm faith in fundamental human rights, in the dignity and worth of the human person, in the equal rights of men and women and of nations large and small, and to establish conditions under which justice and respect for the obligations arising from treaties and other sources of international law can be maintained, and to promote social progress and better standards of life in larger freedom”.

Notwithstanding these wide ideals and the juridical provisions set in the Charter’s articles, the adversarial decades shaping Cold War geopolitics made it difficult for the UN to fulfil its promises and to act independently from the two blocks rivalry and the related possibility of a nuclear holocaust. Moreover, the UN system began life as an intergovernmental body according to international law, which at that time was clearly rooted — particularly before developments in the human rights jurisprudence — in the primacy of the state as the sovereign source of international juridical obligations. The constraints established by the Cold War and the primacy of state sovereignty in international law posed serious limits to the UN’s flexibility and effectiveness. Limitations also led the UN involvement in peace operations to follow a narrow vision of action under strict conditions of intervention.3 The practice of UN peacekeeping was not

clearly stated in the *Charter* and was introduced in 1948 like a pragmatic instrument for conflict management. During the Cold War, peacekeeping was mainly limited to maintaining ceasefires between regular forces so that efforts could be made at intergovernmental level to resolve the conflict by more peaceful means. The guiding principles for UN involvement in peace operations were the consent of the parties involved, impartiality and the non-use of force except in self-defence. There is a clear distinction between peacekeeping and peace-enforcing as envisaged under Article 42 of Chapter VII of the UN *Charter*, which does not require the consent of the main conflict parties. The role for more active peacebuilding was marginal, if present at all.

These guiding principles still hold today but their application has evolved in response to the shifting geopolitical context with the demise of the Cold War and the fluid nature of violent conflicts. On one hand the end of the Cold War opened new opportunities as well as challenges for peace and security in the global arena, but on the other hand the second half of the nineteenth century witnessed the emergence of a new type of warfare that was neither understandable nor manageable according to the traditional patterns of interstate wars, as structured in international law and affairs since the seventeenth century in Europe.4

The decolonisation process, the end of the Cold War and the globalising markets have indeed paved the way for armed conflicts which rather than being fought between states and national armies, are waged within a state’s territory between different armed groups. Moreover, in the new wars the civilian population is the main victim and target. Kaldor (1999) notes that, whereas during World War I the ratio between civilian and military victims was 1:8, in World War II the ratio was about 50:50 – now it is 8:1. Although these wars clearly involve ethnic variables, the “ethnic hatred” seems to be caused and shaped by existing conflict dynamics, rather than causing and shaping them. Although hatred and violence are often intentionally organised by local actors interested in presenting the conflict along ethnic identity lines in order to gain local and international acknowledgement as leaders of the ethnic group, external actors may well be interested in fostering a “divide and rule” policy, thereby fomenting mistrust and conflict to retain control over a territory’s population or resources.

Contemporary warfare peculiarities are also shaped by the global context of the world

4 See Vasquez (1993) for an analysis of interstate war from the modern age onwards, with some related suggestions on the ways to handle it by more peaceful means. Schmitt (1950) provides a deep insight into the relations between political dynamics, wars and procedures, rules and laws that emerged in modern age Europe and have since then spread internationally. One of these rules, perhaps the most basic one, is the formal and mutual recognition of sovereignty rights as the legal ground of the international community of states. Black (2004) tackles the history of warfare after World War II. Kaldor (1999) addresses the distinctions between the traditional form of warfare and the ‘new wars’, taking especially into consideration the war in Bosnia and Herzegovina. Istituto Geografico DeAgostini (2005) and (2008) are very useful, clear and updated textbooks about current violent conflicts. See Duffield (2001) for an interesting viewpoint on the relations between global governance and new wars.
economy, where the marketing of local resources and arms procurement takes place. The end of the Cold War and of the superpowers’ rivalry certainly diminished interests in the controlling of local conflicts. It severed the political and financial involvement of the USA, the Soviet Union and the former blocs that were previously able to freeze existing conflicts by arming and supporting one of the parties. Once this external patronage was no longer available, then striving for control of the local economy, population and resources became a fund raising strategy used by warring parties to forge flexible links with opportunities provided by current globalising markets and commercial networks. Warfare, then, becomes a worthy economic enterprise, with violence against the civilian population being its mode of accumulation in order to acquire the commodities that global markets demand. As an example, Charles Taylor, the Liberian warlord, was able to make $400 million per year during the 1992-1996 war (Berdal and Malone, 2000a, p. 5).

In environments where political and economic agendas become intimately linked, war transforms not only the ‘continuation of politics with other means’ – as Clausewitz said – but also reshapes economics, providing pecuniary interests in fighting on instead of approaching the negotiation table sooner.5

Changing Context and Changing Response

Intrastate violent conflicts involving many different interests, actors, war economies, conditions and implications provide a far more complex situation than an external intervention does in a traditional interstate war. Under these conditions peace efforts require more tangled strategies than simple interpositions of military forces and observers.6

The shortcomings of traditional UN peace operations were brought to the fore, recognised, and tackled by the UN system in the 1990s. Intrastate wars constitute the overwhelming majority of post-Cold War and contemporary violent conflicts and as a result UN peacekeeping operations have become more intricate and broader in scope but without the tools to effectively address this new reality. This paved the way for many failures that have damaged the UN’s image and credibility, i.e. in Bosnia, Rwanda and Somalia, where the Blue Helmets did not prevent

5 The wars in former Yugoslavia, Afghanistan, Angola, Cambodia, Democratic Republic of Congo, Liberia, Peru, Colombia, Sierra Leone, Aceh (Indonesia), Sudan, Nigeria or Nepal present some common features that make them different from the traditional type of interstate war. See Berdal and Malone (2000a and 2000b) and Ballentine and Sherman (2003) for the contemporary civil wars’ political economy. See Gobbicchi (2004) for viewpoints and analysis on the relations between globalisation, conflicts and security.

6 As the war was changing, so did international law. As non-international armed conflicts has become the dominant form of conflict’, Cerone (2006, p. 232) observes, “so has the law applicable to non international conflicts been expanded through the practice of international criminal courts. Similarly, challenged by the increasing consolidation of power in the hands of non state actors, international criminal law has extended its reach to regulate their conduct”.
bloodshed and ethnic cleansing. These cases have urged the rethinking of UN doctrines, strategies and operations.

In 1992 the UN Security Council asked the Secretary-General, Boutros Boutros-Ghali, to prepare "analysis and recommendations on ways of strengthening and making more efficient within the framework and provisions of the Charter the capacity of the United Nations for preventive diplomacy, for peace-making and for peace-keeping" (Statement by the President of the Security Council, 31 January 1992). Following this invitation, Boutros-Ghali developed a report titled An Agenda for Peace: Preventive diplomacy, peacemaking and peace-keeping (1992) where, amongst other things, he dealt with 'post-conflict peace-building' (pt. VI), and suggested the close relationship between all dimensions for a successful UN operation: "peacemaking and peace-keeping operations, to be truly successful, must come to include comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people" (par. 55). In 1995, on the occasion of the UN’s fiftieth anniversary, the Secretary General presented another report to specify and better define some ideas already introduced in Agenda for Peace. In Supplement to an Agenda for Peace the idea of peacebuilding is tackled again (parr. 4756) and defined as

"comprehensive efforts to identify and support structures which will tend to consolidate peace and advance a sense of confidence and well-being among people. Through agreements ending civil strife, these may include disarming the previously warring parties and the restoration of order, the custody and possible destruction of weapons, repatriating refugees, advisory and training support for security personnel, monitoring elections, advancing efforts to protect human rights, reforming or strengthening governmental institutions and promoting formal or informal processes of political participation".

In the 2000 systematic report known as Brahimi Report – named after the Chairman of the Panel on UN Peace Operations – the role of peacebuilding is addressed as a crucial element in contemporary conflict resolution and a fundamental UN deficiency. This Report of the Panel on United Nations Peace Operations (2000) represents a systematic attempt to analyse the changing context in which the UN peace work gave rise to patent limits and many failures during the 1990s. Suggesting the close relationships between development and conflict prevention and arguing again about the complementarity of peacekeeping and peacebuilding in complex operations (parr. 25-47), the report advocates the involvement of local actors in self-sustainable peacebuilding efforts, taking into account human rights and national reconciliation issues. The

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7 It is very interesting to note that the Brahimi Report cites the case of Cyprus as an example of these UN shortcomings in peace operations. The report states that "traditional peace-keeping, which treats symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan)" (par. 17).
The final recommendation regarding peacebuilding is “to strengthen the permanent capacity of the United Nations to develop peace-building strategies and to implement programmes in support of those strategies” (par. 47d).

The need for a single intergovernmental agency with clear cut peacebuilding objectives and coordination functions was explicitly addressed in the 2004 UN Report of the High-level Panel on Threats, Challenges and Change (A more secure world, parr. 221-230), that requested a UN Peacebuilding Commission to be established to fill this institutional gap (parr. 261-269). These arguments and calls were raised again in the 2005 Report of the Secretary General Kofi Annan titled In larger freedom, where the Peacebuilding Commission proposal is strongly endorsed in order to “effectively address the challenge of helping countries with the transition from war to lasting peace” (par. 114). Kofi Annan began to effectively operationalise the idea of the Peacebuilding Commission with the related involvement of civil society actors in peacebuilding efforts. By encouraging reports, conferences and summits, this idea was spread and gained support. The report was published on 21 March 2005, and on 20 September, a Statement by the President of the Security Council was issued underlining the role and potentialities “a vibrant and diverse civil society could perform in conflict prevention, the peaceful settlement of disputes and national reconciliation attempts. A well functioning civil society”, it stated, “has the advantage of specialized knowledge, capabilities, experience, links with key constituencies, influence and resources, which can assist parties to conflict to achieve peaceful solution to disputes”. A proper civil society involvement, it further underscored, can provide leadership, positively influence public opinion and perform an important bridge building function for reconciliation efforts.

Finally, on 20 December 2005, the Security Council (Resolution 1645) and the General Assembly (Resolution 60/180) adopted similar, concurrent resolutions establishing a new UN Peacebuilding Commission to marshal resources at the disposal of the international community and to advise and propose integrated strategies for post-conflict recovery. Attention would be focused on countries emerging from conflict or reconstruction, institution-building and sustainable development; coordination would be promoted among all actors within and outside the UN system involved in assisting the recovery of a country.8 The Peacebuilding Commission was set up as an intergovernmental advisory body to work in cooperation with other UN agencies as well as international financial institutions. Furthermore, both resolutions stressed that local civil society organisations’ involvement would be crucial to any reliable and sustainable peacebuilding effort. This was worded in general terms without specifying the operational details of participants. Hawkins Wyeth (2006, pp. 3-4), in the report on the conference “Getting the Peacebuilding Commission off the ground – How to include civil society on the ground” (New York, 5

8 See Hufner (2007) for a more detailed analysis of the Peacebuilding Commission development, structure, functions and shortcomings.
September 2006), noted that “the principal stakeholders in post-conflict peacebuilding are the citizens of the state in question, and their perception of gaps are a valid barometer as to whether progress is taking root. (...) A crucial role of the Peacebuilding Commission will be to ensure that national actors have sufficient space for dialogue and priority-setting processes to take place. Civil society – and particularly organisations with deep ties to local communities – has a crucial role to play in ensuring that citizens are included in these processes”.

On 25 July 2007 the Commission published its Report of the Peacebuilding Commission on its first session that summed up the activities undertaken, the work with its first target countries (Burundi and Sierra Leone) and the challenges for future improvements. It is perhaps too soon to properly assess the strengths, weaknesses and initial results of the Peacebuilding Commission, not least because peacebuilding itself is a long-term activity. It also seems premature to propose scenarios on ways that civil society organisations might be involved in peacebuilding activities within the international system. Whereas peace efforts actually take place in the broad global context – of which the international system and the UN play a part – if the various actors, strategies and activities are able to coordinate to a greater extent, the more effective they could prove to be in the pursuit of shared goals.

This overview shows that the international system, and notably the UN, has gradually come to recognise the positive role of civil society organisations in any feasible and sustainable prospect of conflict transformation in war-torn societies. This fact may authorise a quiet reliable optimism, offering something concrete whereupon further improvements might be built. The next step is to clarify the strengths and weaknesses of civil society organisations and indicate how instrumental they might be in contributing to peace efforts. These issues are discussed in the next section.

**Peacebuilding and Civil Society: An Analytical Framework**

As can be perceived, peacebuilding efforts involve a wide range of activities which aim at promoting structures for cooperative social interactions out of wars and conflicts. Institution building, state reforms and good governance are typical peacebuilding objectives involving state structures.9 There are, however, other types of action belonging to the so-called ‘peacebuilding from below’, where solutions to the root causes of conflict are proposed and built by civil society’s resources and agencies (Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall, 2005, ch. 9). Although state actors and international organisations may well have a role to play, local communities, associations and civil society organisations are decisive players at the grassroot level of peacebuilding work by providing local knowledge, leadership and networks.

As mentioned earlier the last decade has witnessed the growing participation of NGOs and

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9 See UN-DESA (2008) for state-related peacebuilding measures.
civil society organisations in peacebuilding initiatives. In recognition of this role together with the need to understand its potential and limits, the World Bank (2006) has developed an analytical framework which the author believes worthy of note. The World Bank's framework is not the only attempt to analyse systematically the relations between peacebuilding and non-governmental agencies. It is particularly interesting, however, because it is field work-oriented and constitutes a kind of working model of an authoritative international organisation in its partnerships with civil society actors. The relevancy of the World Bank's framework is twofold in a sense: while it provides a theoretical model to clarify the links between civil society and peacebuilding, with the related limits and potentials, the model is also a noteworthy attempt by a prominent international organisation to address the role of civil society actors in conflict resolution efforts. On the one hand the latter appears to constitute an appropriate evolution of the international system before the changing nature of war and violent conflicts, but on the other hand it seems apropos of conflict management actors and processes.

The report initially begins by defining the analysis' subject: "civil society", then, defines "the arena of un-coerced collective action around shared interests, purposes and values" (p. 2). A methodological choice is further clarified by arguing that a functional, rather than an actor-centred approach, helps to better analyse the potentials and shortcomings of different types of civil society actors. A framework is then built from theoretical analyses and historical cases, from which there are seven functions that civil society actors can perform in peacebuilding efforts (listed in table 1 opposite).

As every conflict is unique in terms of its particular conditions, dynamics and actors, then any kind of peacebuilding intervention must be able to tackle precise problems using specific resources. In other words, peacebuilding needs are defined by the circumstances of each conflict and, therefore, the ways to transform them are similarly context-specific, along with the types of actors used and the function they can effectively perform in a conflict resolution framework. For these reasons abstract analyses are necessary but, at the same time, they should be complemented by exact conflict contextual accounts. As far as the World Bank's framework is concerned, it provides scholars and practitioners with one such abstract analysis that helps us to clarify the role of civil society in peacebuilding efforts. As such it is useful as a working model through which to explain our understanding as well as to assess policies and initiatives on the processes in the field of conflict resolution. Like any other abstract analysis, however, its practical use stems from its utilisation in a given conflict analysis, in an attempt to understand what has already been done in specific fields and what has still to be achieved in order to improve civil society involvement in building peace.
In this spirit Cyprus will be examined as a case in point for the previous discussion. It is intended to explore the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus together with a short account of Cypriot civil society peacebuilding activities to enable the assessment of the strengths and limits of both before proposing the project ‘Home for Cooperation’ as a recent noteworthy development in the field of civil society peacebuilding.

### Table 1: Seven functions of civil society peacebuilding (World Bank, 2006, p. 12)

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Function</th>
<th>Activities</th>
<th>Typical actors</th>
</tr>
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<tbody>
<tr>
<td>Protection</td>
<td>Protecting citizens’ life, freedom and property against attacks from state and non-state actors.</td>
<td>Membership organisations, human rights, advocacy NGOs.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Monitoring/early warning</td>
<td>Observing and monitoring the activities of government, state authorities and conflict actors. Monitoring can refer to various issues (human rights, corruption), particularly those relevant for drivers of conflict and early warning.</td>
<td>Think tanks, human rights NGOs, operational NGOs (in conjunction with CBOs).</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Advocacy/public communication</td>
<td>Articulation of specific interests, especially of marginalised groups and bringing relevant issues to the public agenda. Creation of communication channels, awareness raising and public debate. Participation in official peace processes.</td>
<td>Advocacy organisations, independent media, think tanks, networks.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Socialisation</td>
<td>Formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens, including tolerance, mutual trust and non-violent conflict resolution.</td>
<td>Membership organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Social cohesion</td>
<td>Strengthening links among citizens, building bridge social capital across societal cleavages.</td>
<td>CBOs and other membership organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Intermediation/facilitation</td>
<td>Establishing relationships (communication, negotiation) to support collaboration between interest groups, institutions and the state. Facilitating dialogue and interaction. Promoting attitudinal change for a culture of peace and reconciliation.</td>
<td>Intermediary NGOs, CSO networks, advocacy organisations, faith-based organisations.</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>Service provision</td>
<td>Providing services to citizens or members can serve as entry points for peacebuilding, if explicitly intended.</td>
<td>NGOs, self-help groups.</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>
The Case of Cyprus: UN Peacekeeping, Peacebuilding and Civil Society

The Cyprus case clearly shows the traditional form of UN peacekeeping intervention, with its strengths together with its weaknesses. In light of this it is worth examining the mandate of the United Nations Peacekeeping Force in Cyprus (UNFICYP) in order to underline not only the benefits for the conflict resolution process but also the need for other actors, with different functions, to become involved in it. Some peacebuilding initiatives will be examined that have been carried out since the 1960s under the auspices and facilitation of the UN. More recently there has been a growing role for Cypriot civil society organisations, which have proved competent to organise joint initiatives across the north/south division of the island. The UN and international support for activities involving Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities and civil society organisations followed a case-by-case logic. It consisted of a general approach rather than framing clear-cut strategies of partnership with Cypriot civil society agencies in shared peacebuilding efforts. UNFICYP facilitated and hosted bicommunal meetings and workshops in a kind of natural yet low-profile extension of its mandate, involving civil society actors in something more than only keeping peace but also building it. After exploring UN peacekeeping in Cyprus, a short account of Cypriot civil society peacebuilding is provided and at this point the ‘Home for Cooperation’ will be broached as a worthy innovation.

UN Peacekeeping in Cyprus

In March 1964, after increasing violence in Cyprus between the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, the UN Security Council authorised the establishment of the UNFICYP. This decision was taken with the consent of the government of the Republic of Cyprus and in close consultation with the governments of Turkey, Greece and the United Kingdom. UNFICYP’s mandate was clearly stated in the Security Council Resolution 186, adopted 4 March 1964, by recommending “that the function of the Force should be in the interest of preserving international peace and security, to use its best efforts to prevent a recurrence of fighting and, as necessary, to contribute to the maintenance and restoration of law and order and a return to normal conditions”. Furthermore, the Security Council recommended the designation by the Secretary General, in agreement with the governments of Cyprus, Greece, Turkey and the United Kingdom, of a mediator in charge of promoting an agreed settlement of the conflict with the representatives of the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities (Security Council Resolution 186, points 4 and 7).

Besides this facilitating role in the hands of the UN-appointed mediator, however, the UN mission was not conceived in an active guise of promoting peace out of the previous interethnic clashes. Rather, as Mirbagheri (1998, p. 38) rightly points out, UNFICYP “was an impartial, objective body which had no responsibility for political solutions, and would not try to influence events one way or another” (see also Lindley, 1997).
Such a role constitutes the traditional form of UN interventions in war-affected areas, namely that of interposition between opposite armed forces with the aim of fostering peace talks between political leaderships.\textsuperscript{10} UNFICYP, in sum, seems to show both the strengths and limits of traditional UN peacekeeping, whose basic function is to maintain the military status quo on the ground by means of military yet unarmed interposition. Such a relatively passive role may be complemented, as in the Cyprus case, with the appointment of high-level mediators in charge of facilitating talks and negotiations between the conflicting parties’ political leaderships.

This type of traditional peacekeeping is easy to understand given the intergovernmental nature of the UN. Its limits, however, have been well acknowledged by the same organisation when, as in the Brahimi Report mentioned earlier, it is said that traditional peacekeeping “treats symptoms rather than sources of conflict, has no built-in exit strategy and associated peacemaking was often slow to make progress. As a result, traditional peacekeepers have remained in place for 10, 20, 30 or even 50 years (as in Cyprus, the Middle East and India/Pakistan” (par. 17).

\textit{Peacebuilding and Civil Society in Cyprus: An Overview}

Social changes are simply not in the mandate of traditional UN peacekeeping and, thus, they were not foreseen in UNFICYPs. In the words of Michael Moller, former UN Secretary General’s Special Representative and Head of UNFICYP, “the question is whether we are still part of the solution or we are part of the maintenance of a status quo … that would be a kind of stop progress. I can’t give you a clear answer, I think maybe a little bit of both. (…) We are in the middle. There is no aggressive posturing now on either side and I don’t think there is any intention by the military of either side to do anything aggressive but, in fact, our presence here prevents small incidents from escalating into big ones, and this is our role basically to maintain the lid on the pot” (in Berruti, 2008, p. 27).\textsuperscript{11} Eleni Mavrou, major of south Nicosia, notes that, although in Cyprus there is not a bloody conflict, “this perhaps leads somebody to the easy conclusion that there is no need for the peacekeeping forces in Cyprus, but I think that this is a conclusion reached superficially. There are areas or periods of time when the presence of UNFICYP is really vital for keeping peace and this calm we feel today. But apart from that, there are also issues that will be left unresolved if UNFICYP moved out from the island. For example UNFICYP is now in charge of patrolling along the buffer zone. How will contact between the two communities or crossing between the two areas be controlled if UNFICYP is not present? Who will play the role of the facilitator in solving small, sometimes local, problems that can easily lead to a violent conflict? So,

\textsuperscript{10} It is the so-called ‘first generation’ of UN peacekeeping that has witnessed the transformation, especially in the 1990s, that resulted in mixed outcomes on the field. See Arielli and Scotto (2003), pp. 140-148 and Ramsbotham, Woodhouse and Miall (2005), pp. 132-138.

\textsuperscript{11} See also Möller’s farewell article (2008).
even if I understand that the international community may be tired [of] keeping the UN presence in Cyprus when no solution is foreseen soon, I believe that it is important to have UNFICYP in Cyprus” (ibid., p. 32).

Now the problem, according to Moller again, “is to push the Cypriots, both Turkish Cypriots and Greek Cypriots, to take greater responsibility for their own problems. At the end of the day it is their problem, they have to solve it. Individuals need to get involved much more and by doing so, in a structured way, you also remove some of the reasons why the international community should continue to be here. It’s not just how you configure the UN presence, or the international presence, or the EU presence, but it’s also how you act as a catalyst for the people whose future you are dealing with to take responsibility for their own future” (ibid., p. 29).

The involvement of politicians and ordinary citizens alike in some kind of peacebuilding activity has a long history in Cyprus and provides a case in point for the previous discussion on the UN and peacebuilding. The involvement of Cypriot civil society in peacebuilding efforts has indeed received more attention and funding from the UN than other international organisations since the 1990s, in line with emerging peacebuilding ideas and their structuring within the international community.

The first problem-solving workshop dates back to 1966 in London, when John Burton and his colleagues hosted a group of representatives from both communities, in an academic environment, with the aim of discussing and proposing joint ideas on how to overcome the 1964 crisis in Cyprus (Hadjipavlou and Kanol, 2008, p. 14). In 1973 Leonard Doob facilitated an informal seminar in Rome with political leaders from both communities and, notwithstanding the events of summer 1974, similar workshops took place in 1979 and 1984 with the aim of providing training in controlled communication and conflict resolution skills (Doob, 1974). From the 1980s onwards many seminars of this kind have been held, mostly by academics with Cypriot citizens, both in Cyprus and abroad, often paving the way for political harassment and accusations on participants of being traitors of their own community. In 1981 the Committee of the Missing Persons (CMP) was established as an international organisation working under the UN with representatives of both communities, although it did not produce many results until the 1997 agreement between the Republic of Cyprus and the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’.

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12 UNFICYP (2007) provides an opinion poll of both communities in Cyprus on the role of the UN, UNFICYP as well as other issues and stakeholders of the Cyprus conflict and peace process.

13 See, for instance, Angelica (1999). See Hadjipavlou Trigeorgis (1993) on the unofficial inter-communal contacts in Cyprus. See also Jakobsson (1998) on civil society peacebuilding with special reference to the cases of Northern Ireland and Cyprus. Demetriou and Gürel (2008) give an interesting account on the relations between human rights, civil society and conflict in Cyprus. In Cyprus, as in other conflicts, human rights discourses can both enhance peacebuilding efforts and be used to fuel conflicts. Though not explicitly related to Cyprus, Mertus and Helsing (2006) provide many viewpoints, analyses and case studies on the complex relationships between human rights, conflicts and peacebuilding.
In 1996 the CMP issued a press release stating that “no committee, especially a humanitarian one, can operate successfully without the full cooperation of its Members. Until now; however, the indispensible spirit of collaboration between the Parties had not been sufficient” (cited in Sant Cassia, 2003, p. 66). Despite its beginning when the CMP was little more than a politicised forum, now it is generally regarded as a successful case of bi-communal cooperation and coordination with the UN. Rana Zincir Celal (2008) notably suggests that the CMP could well perform a similar function to that of the truth commissions in Africa or the Balkans, where past acts of violence were publicly brought to light, thereby promoting a shared understanding of the past and facilitating common visions for the future.

In 1990 The Citizens Joint Movement for a Federal and Democratic Cyprus was formed as the first bi-communal social movement but it was then closed in 1991 when Turkish and Turkish-Cypriot authorities stopped permission to attend the meetings at the buffer zone's Ledra Palace. In 1991 the Peace Centre Cyprus was the first formally registered NGO with the explicit mission of promoting peace. With workshops, seminars, discussion groups, youth camps, bi-communal sport, business and environmental groups mushrooming with USAID funds and UNFICYP facilities, the 1990s have also seen efforts to set up a bi-communal management centre for civil society organisations. These efforts, eventually, resulted in the 2001 establishment of two centres: the Management Centre in north Nicosia and the NGO Support Centre in south Nicosia. In 1998 the Peace Centre carried out a petition campaign for a speedy conflict solution which was signed by 41 organisations and then sent to the UN. In the meantime Youth Encounters for Peace was formed as a bi-communal youth organisation highly critical of the political leaderships on both sides. From 1998 to 2005 the UN managed the Bi-Communal Development Programme with the task of funding projects of common interest for Greek-Cypriots and Turkish-Cypriots. About 300 organisations and 220 projects benefited from the programme, which was later replaced in 2005 by the UNDP Action for Cooperation and Trust (the so-called UNDP-ACT). The latter has also sponsored the Cyprus Civil Society Strengthening Programme jointly run by the Management Centre and the NGO Support Centre. After the Republic of Cyprus acceded to the EU, the European Commission opened the Cypriot Civil Society in Action funding programme which has recently entered its third call for proposals. In 2000, Youth Encounters for Peace organised the first bi-communal meeting in Pyla without third party mediation, which brought hundreds of Cypriots together in the village. In 2003, the bi-communal women's NGO Hands across the Divide was formed to develop explicit peace actions such as the efforts to revive Famagusta area, Varosha included. In the same year the bi-communal Association for Historical Dialogue and Research (AHDR) was born with the aim of addressing education in general, and history education in particular, as a concrete means of promoting democratic citizenship, critical thinking and mutual understanding. AHDR has been working closely with the Centre for Democracy and Reconciliation in South-eastern Europe, EUROCLIO and the Council of Europe in order to promote 'multiperspectivity' and a humanistic, rather than nationalistic
Approach in history teaching and learning. AHDR, moreover, coordinated with POST Research Institute on the project ‘Education for Peace’, which examined the revision of history textbooks in the Turkish-Cypriot community, and has been active in lobbying for education reform in the Greek-Cypriot school system.\textsuperscript{14} AHDR was also project partner with the ‘Turkish-Cypriot Folk Art Foundation (HASDER) in 2007-2008 ‘Dialogues of Peace in Cyprus 2’, carried out by the Italian NGO Tangram with the support of the Italian municipality and province of Ferrara (Natali, 2007b). AHDR, is currently following the major project ‘Home for Cooperation’ that will be examined shortly. It is also worth adding that, in 2003, the International Peace Research Institute of Oslo (PRIO) officially opened its Cyprus Centre with the aim of fostering research, dialogue and an informed public debate.

According to Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008, pp. 51-78) a great deal of peacebuilding work actually did take place in Cyprus. The question, however, “is what impact these peacebuilding activities had on the bigger peace process” (p. 51). Despite the high number of workshops that have endowed Cyprus civil society with skilled people in conflict management techniques, such seminars usually host a surprisingly small elite of activists.\textsuperscript{15} Research continues: indeed, until the 2004 referendum on the Annan Plan, peacebuilding initiatives were aimed “at the level of intellectual idealists who could benefit from these trainings and who were bold enough to face the accusation of being ‘traitors’ and ‘foreign agents’ and become marginalized in their own communities” (p. 53). The intensity of peacebuilding work was also intimately linked with the high-level negotiation process and the more general international climate. When this so-called ‘track one’ level gave rise to some optimism – as in the mid-1980s and mid-1990s – then the unofficial, ‘track two’ peace process flourished as well (ibid., pp. 51-54).

Although the 2004 referenda on the Annan Plan witnessed a lack of coordination between the ‘yes’ campaign in the Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot communities, very different attitudes were experienced towards each community’s authorities. The Plan was the most comprehensive peace plan in Cyprus’ history and it had the support of the EU, the UK and the US alike. Both Greek-Cypriot and Turkish-Cypriot leaders Papadopoulos and Denktash were against it even though the Turkish government of Erdogan, albeit with some tension within the army, officially upheld the plan including its provisions for the withdrawal of Turkish troops. These external circumstances set forth the mass mobilisation “yes” campaign in the north which was radically critical towards the Denktash’s regime and its dogma of the impossibility for the two


\textsuperscript{15} “We have always been the same old gang”: Interview with a Greek-Cypriot activist, south Nicosia, January 2008.
communities to live together. Civil society organisations, trade unions, activist groups, and the Chamber of Commerce played a leading role in organising pro-solution initiatives and demonstrations which found strong popular support.\(^{16}\)

The situation in the Greek-Cypriot community proved to be very different and the strong anti-solution stance of Papadopoulos found friendly media and weak opposition from a relatively low-profile "yes" campaign. Although "no" to the Annan Plan does not at all mean "no" to peace and it may well be true that widespread fears and concerns in the Greek-Cypriot community were not properly addressed, the referendum's opposite results, with around 63% of Turkish-Cypriots voting "yes" and around 75% of Greek-Cypriots voting "no", gave rise to deep disillusionment and loss of hope especially amongst the Turkish-Cypriots (see note 9). Feelings of mistrust, ethno-nationalistic attitudes and incidents were renewed, accentuating the fact that despite a great deal of peacebuilding work, much still needs to be done in the way of trust-building and reconciliation in Cyprus.\(^{17}\)

The main weakness of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus seems to be the absence of visible structures for bi-communal initiatives. Conflict management workshops did actually take place, NGOs have increased in number on both sides of the buffer zone, and international funding programmes have financed hundreds of projects. All these efforts, however, followed a case-by-case logic which, until now, has not produced any institutionalisation of peacebuilding aims in a social movement able to collect and coordinate single actors' initiatives and multiply the visibility and effectiveness of their peace claims. It is also worth citing that, according to some research, civil society is weak both in southern and northern Cyprus while the political debate is strongly dominated by political parties that mediate citizens' involvement in the peace process (CIVICUS, 2005).\(^{18}\) At the end research on the impacts of peacebuilding work on the Cyprus conflict, Hadjipavlou and Kanol (2008, pp. 55-56) conclude that cross community activities need to be

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16 "It was a cathartic moment for us. Everybody was discussing, pushing the others to do something. Everyone felt involved. Before the referendum we were sure we had the power to change things and, you know, the old politics. Denktash was thrown off but the Greek-Cypriot 'no' was a disaster for us and maybe Talat is now turning back to the old politics. We felt betrayed. We did a lot, sometimes we faced violence from the police and... nothing. Now I don't know; let's wait and see Christofias": Interview with a Turkish-Cypriot activist, north Nicosia, June 2008.

17 A number of researches and opinion polls seem to confirm it. See, for instance, Stias, Latif and Loizou (2007); Lordos, Faiz and Carras (2005); Lordos (2005 and 2006). See also Demetriou (2007) and Psaltis (2008).

18 In June and July 2008 the author spoke with some volunteers of a Greek Cypriot youth organisation and they said that the parties' youth groups have the tendency of monopolising any initiative carried out jointly with other organisations. "We try to be independent as much as possible. Somehow you need to work with them because they have money and they are well organised but the way they work it's always the same: they organise a big event, concerts with big names from Greece for the same target of people and that's all. You cannot be creative or organise something new. That's why we want to be independent."
more coordinated in order to enhance their impact and influence on the high-level, ‘track one’ peace process.

“There is a need to develop a third space in which all the peacebuilding groups and independent thinking individuals will have the opportunity to meet and work together. The efforts should be to make peace process more civil society driven and less political leadership dominated. It is at this very junction that the bi-communal peace activists can play a leading role with their experience and skills and the necessary networks they have built over the years across the divide” (p. 36).

Based on this premise, the project ‘Home for Cooperation’ is proposed. It is the author’s belief that this project attempts to address the above-mentioned weaknesses of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus and, at the same time, enhances the bi-communal experience of Cypriot NGOs.

**Cypriot Civil Society Peacebuilding: The Case of the ‘Home for Cooperation’**

‘Revitalising the ‘Dead Zone’: an Educational Centre and Home for Cooperation’ – briefly: Home for Cooperation (H4C) – is a project that the Association for Historical Dialogue and Research has been undertaking since 2007, and will be finalised in 2010. The project’s background, objectives, activities and timeframe can be located and downloaded at [http://www.hisdialresearch.org/news/HOME_FOR_COOPERATION.pdf].

AHDR’s idea is to restore a building in the UN buffer zone, in front of Ledra Palace (Nicosia), which is actually not used but nevertheless lies in a symbolic place. AHDR states that “the present project will offer notable opportunities for employment, education, archiving, research and production of cooperative ideas and publications, drawing on local resources”. It will also “contribute to promoting communication between people from different ethnic, religious or linguistic backgrounds at a local, regional, European and international level”. In this way, “the foundations will be placed for the establishment of sustainable cooperation within the civil society of Cyprus, across the divide. Cyprus can become an example of successful cooperation based on mutual respect, giving the ‘dead zone’ ‘a new meaning: from a symbol of separation to (...) a new symbol of cooperation’. The H4C will explicitly address the limited infrastructure for bi-communal activities and the lack of skills in finding institutional support that seems to affect Cyprus civil society and NGOs. The intended outcome is, therefore, to foster a process of skilled cooperation from below in Cyprus by endowing its civil society with a physical and visible bi-communal structure.

Although AHDR’s vision and identity are strongly rooted in education as a means to pursue critical thinking, democratic citizenship and mutual understanding, the H4C aims at fostering this and other objectives within a broader peacebuilding framework. As Rana Zincir Celal (2008,

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19 See also Hope (2008).
p. 27) argues, the H4C could for instance collect the work of researchers such as Sevgul Uludag and Andreas Paraschos in an archive open to consultation.

In terms of the civil society peacebuilding functions the H4C will be likely to perform,²⁰ the H4C’s activities would likely address the formation and practice of peaceful and democratic attitudes and values among citizens, including tolerance, mutual trust and non-violent conflict resolution (‘socialisation’ function). They would strengthen links among citizens, building bridge social capital across societal cleavages (‘social cohesion’ function). By facilitating dialogue and interaction, as well as promoting attitudinal change for a culture of peace and reconciliation, they would establish relationships to support collaboration between interest groups, institutions and the state (‘intermediation/facilitation’ function). The H4C would provide help and assistance in order to articulate specific interests and to bring relevant issues to the public agenda, thus influencing the public debate and raising awareness (‘advocacy/public communication’ function).

²⁰ See the World Bank’s working framework outlined above.
well be argued that the H4C represents a sign of the development of Cypriot civil society in relation to the conflict resolution process. The project, indeed, draws on the training, workshops and international funding for peace in Cyprus and it is also managed by an independent bi-communal NGO which has been able to enrich such resources in a common vision and mission. The H4C, thus, provides civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus with good news that the author believes deserving of local and international monitoring, support and involvement.

Conclusion

This paper has discussed issues of war and peace. It has pointed out that war and violent conflict are a somewhat integral part of human history. As such, they are used to influence social norms and institutions that structure the individuals’ social interaction and life. Wars, indeed, never stop with mere ceasefire agreements and violent conflicts continue to shape the social context in which armed confrontations have taken place. Such conflict-affected social structures are subsequently able to protract the conflict after armed clashes have ceased, thus obstructing any conflict resolution possibility or allowing peaceful social changes to occur.

History, nonetheless, shapes human societies but it is also shaped by them as well. In this regard, it has been noted that “peacebuilding” is commonly intended as a political action which aims to promote self-sustainable peaceful structures of social interaction in conflict-affected contexts. Peacebuilding goals and ideals, thus, involve social and institutional changes in the long-term perspective that cannot be viewed in isolation from other types of conflict resolution effort. Peace actions and initiatives are carried out by different actors, groups and organisations, each with its own peculiarities, resources and shortcomings. Building peace involves complex phenomena and dynamics in much the same way as making war.

The paper began by examining the way peacebuilding ideas have emerged in international affairs and, especially, within the UN system. An historical account on the changing nature of warfare has been provided along with the changing UN responses eventually leading to the 2005 UN Peacebuilding Commission. The latter explicitly calls for the involvement of civil society and NGOs in peacebuilding and conflict resolution efforts. The UN’s evolution both as an intergovernmental organisation and as the international framework where problems of war and peace are tackled, has been worthy of mention.

The growing relevance of civil society actors in peace processes has prompted other institutions to analyse the relations between civil society and peacebuilding. In this regard, the World Bank’s theoretical framework has been introduced and discussed as being interesting both conceptually and as an effort by a prominent international organisation to understand the role of its civil society’s partners.

Finally, Cyprus was examined as a case in point for the immediate discussion. UNFICYP’s mandate and role are totally in line with the traditional form of UN peacekeeping and show the latter’s strengths and limits. It has been noted that UNFICYP’s mission has been successful overall
in the sense that, without its presence, incidents would most likely have led to major confrontations that might have spiralled into credible threats of war. Changes at a societal level are simply not in the mandate of traditional UN peacekeeping and thus, they were not foreseen in UNFICYP. Social changes call for the involvement of civil society and, it has been argued, the involvement of Cypriot civil society in peacebuilding efforts has received more UN and international attention and funding since the 1990s, in line with the emerging and structuring of peacebuilding ideas within the international community.

A short account of civil society peacebuilding in Cyprus has been offered from the 1960s onwards concluding that, despite a great deal of peacebuilding work, its target has attracted a small elite. Its visibility, impact and influence on the official peace process have furthermore met with a lack of institutionalisations and structures of bi-communal cooperation. This research ended with an introduction of the recent project 'Home for Cooperation', suggesting that this project might be able to address widespread attitudes of mistrust while, at the same time, enhancing local resources for social change. The H4C represents a sign of the development of Cypriot civil society in relation to the conflict resolution process. The project, indeed, draws on the training, workshops and international funding for peace in Cyprus and it is also managed by an independent bi-communal NGO that is able to strengthen such resources in a common vision and mission. The H4C and, more generally speaking, the Cyprus conflict and its civil society peacebuilding deserve local and international attention. Cyprus hosts one of the world’s most protracted conflicts, therefore, its peace process and civil society initiatives may be helpful in shedding light on other conflict resolution processes and the people involved therein, to whom the case of Cyprus will hopefully constitute a successful example.

Bibliography


