Rusfeti and Political Patronage in the Republic of Cyprus

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Abstract
This article analyses the roots, transformations and current workings of political patronage in the Republic of Cyprus during the fifty years since the country's independence. It attempts to assess how politicians and political parties during the various presidencies have managed to establish their far reaching control over many aspects of Cypriot society through a highly sophisticated system of favours (rusfeti). The establishment of clientelistic relationships between the citizen on the one side and politicians and political parties on the other is at the centre of the analysis. The primary but by far not only areas where clientelistic relationships are formed through rusfeti are the public sector and the semi-governmental organisations where parties and politicians are most capable of exercising influence. It will be argued that a Cyprus Consensus has been established between the political parties but also between individual politicians and a large number of the citizens that sustains and perpetuates the firmly entrenched structures and widespread clientelistic practices as a mutually beneficial arrangement for all sides involved. Political patronage undermines the principle of meritocracy and has led to the establishment of oversized and privileged public and semi-governmental sectors at the expense of the wider Cypriot public, which is footing an increasing bill that the Republic of Cyprus might soon be unable to afford.

Keywords: Rusfeti, Clientelism, Political Patronage, Party Patronage, Political Parties, Public Service, Semi-Governmental Sector, Cyprus Consensus

Introduction
A key element of the political culture in Cyprus is the way in which political parties and politicians firmly control almost all aspects of Cypriot society and have far reaching influence over the individual citizen. The stranglehold that parties and their leaders have is based on various factors...
pillars. The small size of Cypriot society is one of them: the Greek Cypriot electorate comprised only 526,000 in 2009. Consequently, small town political patterns shape the relation amongst the elites and between the politicians and the ordinary citizen. In small societies, personal connections inevitably become vital for the interaction of the individual with the state and the promotion of personal goals. The members of the elites know each other but also most ordinary citizens have personal contacts to leading politicians or at least know somebody who has the contacts needed. As a result, public and private interaction is shaped by a highly developed system of mutual favours, through which one can achieve almost anything, if one only has the right connections. Greek and Greek Cypriots use the Turkish term rusfeti to describe this practice. Between ordinary citizens, those favours are often done without any immediate service in return (exceeding the feeling of a moral obligation to return the favour one day) and in many (but by far not all) cases they have more to do with just helping a friend or a friend of a friend.

However, if one looks at the role favours play in the relationship between political parties, politicians and the citizen the picture becomes less favourable and by far more detrimental for the development of Cypriot society as a whole. Today, Cypriot politics are conducted within the framework of widespread and deeply rooted clientelistic patterns and structures. Clientelism means that an influential patron dispenses favours, i.e. politically motivated rusfeti (appointments, promotions, transfers, exemptions from the implementation of laws, access to services, administrative favours) to his less influential client in exchange for political support. If the client is already a party member or a supporter of an individual politician then he/she expects to be rewarded through the favour. Failure to deliver favours might result in the loss of the client’s support. From a patron’s perspective, the client has to vote for the party or the politician in exchange for the favour. Often, clients are expected, sometimes even pressured, to join the party responsible for the favour if they are not already members. Essential for clientelism in contrast to nepotism, corruption or favouritism is the establishment of a patron-client relationship which includes the commitment of the client to vote for the individual politician and/or the party in return for the favour. Clientelistic networks can spread via powerful politicians who integrate or build their networks within political parties over the entire country. In clientelistically structured societies, the execution of state power is extensively used to distribute favours to the supporters of the ruling parties or individual politicians within the public service, semi-governmental organisations and any other area where parties or politicians have influence. Since these networks cover almost all aspects of public life, they exceed what Western European societies know.


3 The term rusfeti in a wider sense describes any act of granting a favour or service. In a political context it is used to describe a favour by a minister or Member of Parliament to party followers, friends or acquaintances. G. Bambiou, Λεξικό της Νέας Ελληνικής Γλώσσας [Lexicon of Modern Greek Language], 2nd edition, (Athens: Lexicological Center, 2005).
themselves as clientelism in the form of party patronage, favouritism and nepotism. Sotiropoulos even argues that patronage and clientelism are the most common characteristics of southern European states which share a different administrative tradition than core Western or Central European countries like Britain or Germany. While patronage and clientelism are widespread in both communities of Cyprus and the two separate political entities they live in today, this article will focus on the Republic of Cyprus whose political institutions are since 1963 exclusively in the hands of the Greek Cypriot community and not on the ‘Turkish Republic of Northern Cyprus’. Nevertheless, many of the following observations apply to the Turkish Cypriot entity as well though there are also significant differences - the most important being the role and influence of Turkey within its domestic affairs.

Methodologically, it is impossible to precisely quantify the extent of politically motivated favours due to their covert nature. But one – imprecise – indicator of the extent of clientelism next to anecdotal evidence, political patronage related scandals, public confessions/accusations and legal prosecutions is an examination of the growth of the public and semi-public sectors. Appointments, transfers and promotions in these state controlled sectors are important tools available to politicians and parties to gain, keep and reward supporters. For this reason, clientelistically structured societies are usually marked by large public and semi-public sectors. Employment by far exceeds administrative needs. Recruitments, promotions and transfers are very often influenced by political interference. Obviously, it would be too simplistic to explain the growth of the public and semi-governmental sectors exclusively as the outcome of clientelistic practices. Administrative needs and changes (created, for example, by the institution building after independence or the EU accession process and membership), pressure created by trade unions and the inherent tendency of organisations to grow play an important and often decisive role as well. Nonetheless, it is argued here that the large number of new appointments in an already oversized public service by all governments since independence cannot be convincingly explained by administrative and organisational needs. Moreover, a quantitative evaluation does allow – with a degree of caution and imprecision – an assessment of the scope of rusfeti practices by the various administrations since 1960. Additionally, even necessary organisational expansion and transformation in Cyprus takes

5 He argues that in Mediterranean countries the Weberian rational bureaucracy model was only superficially adopted since it remained inchoate and there is a deep dependence of the administration on the politicians in power. While the last point clearly also applies to Cyprus, the British colonial administration left Cyprus arguably with a more Western and Central European administrative system in a Weberian sense than that of Greece, Spain, Italy and Portugal which were investigated by Sotiropoulos. D.A. Sotiropoulos, Κρίτικος και Μεταρρύθμιση στην σύγχρονη Νότια Ευρώπη: Ελλάδα-Ιταλία-Ισπανία-Πορτογαλία [Government and Reform in Contemporary Southern Europe: Greece, Spain, Italy, Portugal] (Athens: Potamos, 2007), p. 27.
place in a context shaped by political patronage, i.e. many governmental and semi-governmental employees were employed or promoted with the help of politicians and political parties who expect their votes in return.

The costs of political patronage for the society are enormous. Sustaining an oversized public service requires huge resources. The financial burden is exacerbated by considerable privileges acquired by employees in the governmental and semi-governmental sectors with the help of politicians seeking re-election: according to the head of the Cypriot Employers and Industrialists Federation, Andreas Pittas, ‘in the space of 20 years, the number of civil servants has increased by 52 per cent, their earnings by 445 per cent and their pensions by 961 per cent’. At the presentation of the 2011 budget, the Finance Minister, Charilaos Stavrakis, lamented the ‘dramatic increase’ in public servants by around 20,000 to around 53,000 in the last twenty years. These figures indicate an even higher increase (about 61%) for the same period than the 52% claimed by Pittas. According to Stavrakis, the state payroll for the salaries, pensions and bonuses of public servants is expected to eat up €2.7 billion or 33.7% of the total state budget of €8.02 billion in 2011. He very bluntly called for an urgent change of policy in order to avert the collapse of the country’s economy:

‘We should reach measures to contain the state payroll and the whole pension framework of the public and wider public sector. [...] The current system is a time-bomb and if measures are not taken it will blow the country up.’

The figures given for the number of public servants by Pittas and Stavrakis should be taken with a grain of salt since they exceed the official numbers provided by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. But also according to official statistics, the state expenditure for the salaries and pensions of the public servants alone almost quadrupled from €519 million (which consumed even 38.4% of the total expenditure) in 1993 to the projected figure of €1.955 million in 2011 (31.9%). The picture becomes bleaker if one adds the state’s expenditure for salaries in the semi-governmental sector. Whatever the exact figures, it is safe to conclude that after 50 years of independence, the financial consequences of clientelistic practices constitute a serious threat to the country’s public finances.

The Development and Transformations of Political Patronage in Cyprus

The roots of modern political patronage within the Greek Cypriot community date back to the Ottoman but mostly the British colonial period. Within the very limited scope of political activity allowed during British colonial rule, elections for the Legislative Council (until its abolition in 1931) but also the elections of the Archbishop, the municipal councils as well as rural local

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6 ‘We are in One Big Financial Mess’, Cyprus Mail, 21 May 2010.
7 ‘State Payroll a “time bomb”’, Cyprus Mail, 16 September 2010.
8 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.
administration (during the periods when the British allowed their election) were the realm in which popular electoral support was required by the Greek Cypriot elites. When significant segments of those elites started to challenge British colonial rule more forcefully in the 1920s, the colonial administration introduced reforms which gradually broke many of the links between the local power holders and their electorate. Consequently, during the second half of British rule, the limited clientelistic networks which had been created during the Ottoman and the first half of the British colonial period and which were mostly based on economic dependency were largely destroyed.9

Moreover, Britain implemented Western European norms and values in the areas of administration and law. The efficiency and impartiality of the administration and judiciary based on the principle of meritocracy as well as the freedom of speech and the press during most of the period of British rule has left a lasting legacy, even if the British impact on the conduct of politics was substantially less. These changes took deep roots in the mentality of the Cypriots of both communities during the 82 years of British rule. After independence, many of these Western European norms, regulations and patterns of behaviour remained in the Republic, despite the emergence of a more personalised form of politics and the re-emergence and evolution of clientelistic practices ensuring much more efficient, well run and considerably smaller administration than that of their - at least in a cultural sense – kin in Greece.10

The era of mass politics in Cyprus began in 1941, when the foundation of political parties was tacitly allowed again at the end of a dictatorial period following the failed uprising of 1931. Elections in 1943 were for the first time based on universal male suffrage on a political level. Having said that, only elections on a municipal level were permitted and the sphere of influence and the area of favours where politicians or parties could exert authority remained limited to the areas of local politics, trade unions and cooperative societies strictly within the framework of a colonial administration.

After independence, a refined system of political patronage by powerful politicians became one of the most important features of Cypriot society. The violent struggle against British colonial

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9 For an account on the emergence and historical transformation of clientelism within the Greek Cypriot community as well as the British reforms, see H. Faustmann, ‘Clientelism’, op. cit., pp. 41-77.

10 According to official statistics, in 2010, 768,000 or 17.3% of the working population in Greece were employed in the public service. It is estimated that a further 250,000 to 300,000 are employed in the semi-governmental sector. In Cyprus, the percentage of public servants was 11.5% (46,000) in 2009 and 45,000 in 2008. The number of employees in the semi-governmental sector in 2008 was around 22,000. For 2008, the total percentage of employees in the public and semi-public sectors in Cyprus was 17.1%. ‘Greece Concludes Civil Servant Census as Further Cuts Loom’, Deutsche Welle, 19 August 2010. Available at [http://www.dw-world.de/dw/article/0,5926884,00.html], accessed on 25 September 2010. For the figures on Cyprus, see Ministry of Finance, Labour Force Survey 2009, available at [http://www.mof.gov.cy/mof/cystat/statistics.nsf/All/1C367FF67CB41D48C2237770002CE4DA?Open Document&sub-I&c=], accessed on 30 August 2010 and the table in the Appendix, p. 287.
rule (1955-1959) had led to an elite change where large segments of the traditional Greek Cypriot elite were marginalised and replaced by a new one recruited from the leading EOKA members and close associates of the political leader of the Greek Cypriots, Archbishop Makarios. The most visible sign that the traditional Greek Cypriot elites were largely left out of the power centres of Greek Cypriot politics and that novi homines were now in charge was the average age of the Greek Cypriot ministers in the first two cabinets. The first ministers chosen by Makarios served as a Provisional Cabinet in 1959-1960 during the final phase of British rule while the second were appointed in the first cabinet after independence in 1960. Their average age was 32 and 37 respectively.\footnote{11}

During the first years after independence, the power centres within the Greek Cypriot community were the first president, Archbishop Makarios, and his closest associates as well as former EOKA members who became ministers or held other key positions in the administration. Through christenings, the creation of paramilitary groups and rusfeti, those few built powerful personalised networks. Former EOKA fighters and the networks created during the struggle were used to exercise power or even violently intimidate those who crossed vital interests of the new ruling elite outside the official and legal channels if deemed necessary.\footnote{12} Moreover, in the first years after independence, many EOKA fighters and their relatives demanded and obtained jobs in the civil service. This led to the creation of new posts which were not always necessary thereby laying the foundations for the politically motivated growth of the public sector within the Greek Cypriot community.\footnote{13} This practice is clearly illustrated by the massive increase in public servants from 15,000 to 25,000 during the 17 years of the Presidency of Archbishop Makarios, though one needs to take into consideration that considerable institutional change was necessary to provide the new state with fully functioning institutions. Accordingly, the proportion of the state budget needed for the salaries and pensions of the public servants grew between 1961 and 1977 from 21.1\% to 33.2\%.\footnote{14}

\footnote{11} Greek Cypriot members of the Transitional Cabinet serving from March/April 1959 to August 1960: Archbishop Makarios (46), Antonios Georgiades (26), Polycarp Tsorkias (27), Paschalis Psalidides (30), Glafkos Clerides (39), Tassos Papadopoulos (25) and Riginos Theocharis (32). The first Greek Cypriot cabinet after independence: Archbishop Makarios (born 1913), Andreas Apaousos (1906), Polycarpos Yiorkadjis (1930), Spyros Kyprianou (1932), Riginos Theocharis (1929), Andreas Papadopoulos (1922), Stella Souliotis (1920) and Tassos Papadopoulos (1934).

\footnote{12} Confidential interview with a high ranking Greek Cypriot public servant.

\footnote{13} L. Ierodiakonou, Αρχιεπίσκοπος Κύπρου 1959-2003, Πολιτικό Σύστημα, Πολιτικοί Θεσμοί. Διαδρομή Εκδημοκρατία μ, [A Zigzag Course: Cyprus 1959-2003, Political System, Political Institutions, Democratisation Process] (Nicosia: Alithia Publishing, 2002), pp. 208-209 The structural pressure to increase the public service in excess of its actual needs dates already back to 1960. From the inception of the Republic until the breakdown of the constitutional order in 1963 the 30% job ratio for Turkish Cypriots in the public service guaranteed in the constitution had already created pressure for hiring public servants in excess of administrative needs.

\footnote{14} Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. In 1960, the percentage for salaries
A typical example of how rules and regulations were bypassed in the public service to provide loyal followers with jobs in the early years of the Republic is the admission of the former minister of Justice and Public Order Nicos Koshis, who disclosed how policemen were recruited by him in the 1960s though he held no official office at that time:

‘I was sharing a house with (former interior minister Polycarpos) Yiorkadjis. [...] I personally had the main say, with Makarios approval. They [the applicants] had to come to me to be given a certificate, so that they would be able to join the police force’.15

The most skilful man to create personalised clientelistic networks next to Makarios is widely seen to be the house mate of Koshis, the Minister of Interior Yiorkadjis, whose network even survived his assassination in 1970 in the public service as well as within the party of DISY until the 1990s. Originally, the towering political figure and ultimate decision maker in confrontations between power holders remained Makarios. His power was unsuccessfully challenged by members of the traditional elites in confrontations between the mayors of the major towns and the Archbishop during the Transitional Period as well as in the first presidential elections in 1959. After independence, his main opponents were the followers of Georgios Grivas, the former military leader of EOKA, whenever the two fell out. On top of that, by the late 1960s, some of the autonomous sub networks and their leaders that were known and approved of by Makarios had also become so influential that they formed alternative power centres and a potential threat for the archbishop. The most significant case was the network created by Yiorkadjis. Some even openly turned against him, like that of the Ethniko Metopo (National Front) formed in 1968. Many of its members later became part of Grivas’ EOKA B.

The death of Makarios in 1977 together with the foundation of two new parties, DIKO and DISY in 1976, mark a watershed in Greek Cypriot domestic politics. Although the communist party AKEL and the Socialist EDEK (both loyal supporters of Makarios) had existed long before 1977 (as well as a number of usually short lived parties) it was only after the death of the towering figure of Greek Cypriot domestic politics that the country was transformed into a modern liberal democracy within a few years. Together with the contemporary party system and also the emergence of effective party competition for power, the contemporary system of political patronage evolved. It is characterised by a mixture of favours of political parties in order to gain or maintain votes overlapping with the previous individualised system of favours by politicians towards followers of this specific power holder. The democratisation of Cyprus also increased the needs and opportunities for clientelistic practices as well as the power of the parties by dramatically

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enlarged numbers of elected officials. During the first two decades after independence, only 36 Greek Cypriot officials (35 parliamentarians and the president) were elected. In the last three decades various reforms and changes (the numerically most significant being the introduction of municipal/mayoral elections) increased their number to more than 2,600. More than 10,000 candidates, who need to be a member or at least associated with a party in order to stand any chance of winning, are today competing for those offices, which in turn provide opportunities for the granting of favours.16

The first president after Makarios, Spyros Kyprianou, is widely considered to be the man, during whose terms in power, clientelistic practices peaked and were exercised more openly and excessively than ever before or after.17 Kyprianou, more than any other president, was extensively and openly personally involved in granting rusfeti. He systematically used clientelism to maintain his rule and as a basis for building his party, DIKO.18 In exchange for a favour or as a prerequisite for being recruited in the public sector party membership was often requested which had to be proven by a DIKO membership identity card. Favouritism also became more organised and even institutionalised. As was the case with all Cypriot governments after Makarios, the coalition partner also expected and got its share. The Deputy Secretary General of AKEL, Andreas Fantis, admitted in 1998:

'During Kyprianou's presidency I cannot testify responsibly about what happened in the first five year term (1978-1983). However, I can testify responsibly as personal testimony, about what was happening with regard to rusfeti during Kyprianou's second presidential term and particularly and more specifically during the period since his election in 1983, on the basis of the Minimum Program, until December 1984. I therefore testify that in the 20 month period between February 1983 – December 1984, rusfeti was institutionalized following an agreement between our parties. Specifically, Mr Dinos Michaelides was then appointed as Minister of the Presidency with an office at the presidential palace and following mutual agreement, for each appointment or promotion DIKO and AKEL would prepare lists-catalogues which were discussed in regular meetings between an AKEL delegation – Yiannis Katsourides and myself – and Mr Michaelides.'19

17 One example for this widespread perception is that of the DISY member and minister under Clerides, Leontios Ierodiakonou, who claims in his well researched book that compared to the Kyprianou presidencies favouritism continued but decreased under Vassiliou and Clerides. He concedes that both also failed to control the growth of the public service. Ierodiakonou, op. cit., p. 210.
As a consequence, large numbers of Greek Cypriots became party members and expected employment, promotion or another favour in return. The phenomenon of large scale membership growth in the parties of a ruling coalition became ever since a characteristic of Cypriot politics and one indicator of rusfeti practices. The DIKO vote increased from 19.5% in the parliamentary elections of 1981 to 27.7% in 1985 and its membership grew to 13,000 by 1987. The numbers for the growth of the public service during Kyrianos presidencies vary greatly however. Loucas G. Charalambous claims in an article in the Cyprus Mail that at the end of the Makarios era, the Republic of Cyprus had employed 18,000 public servants. At the end of the Kyrianos era, their number allegedly reached 32,000. An increase of almost 14,000 public servants in 11 years during a period without any significant institutional changes that would have warranted such an increase, would clearly confirm the widespread impression that the Kyrianos administration was the most notorious, in terms of rusfeti. Despite this, if the official data provided by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus is correct, then the opposite can be argued at least as far as employment in the public service is concerned. Never did the civil service grow more slowly than during Kyrianos terms in office. According to the official figures, between 1977 and 1988, 5192 public servants were engaged, an average of 472 per year in office. All other presidents of the Republic have a considerably higher annual average ranging from 581 (Makarios) to 803 (Papadopoulos). Furthermore, according to the official statistics, he inherited many more than the 18,000 civil servants from Makarios as Charalambous claims: officially 25017 were employed in 1977.

Kyrianos successor, AKEL backed but independent George Vassiliou, enhanced the possibilities of parties to extend their influence into the semi-public sector. Consultation and
cooperation between the government and the political parties became an important characteristic of Greek Cypriot politics during his presidency. This worked much to the benefit of all sides and the state but compounded the possibilities for favours for both the ruling party but also the opposition. He tried to ensure support for his handling of the Cyprus issue by offering ‘political parties functions and prerogatives that in some cases proved excessive, if not unlawful’. A law allowing party officials to attend the meetings of the boards of directors of the semi-governmental bodies was even declared unconstitutional by the Supreme Court. Ever since 1960, the members of the board of directors of the semi-governmental organisations were appointed formally by the government but effectively by the president. Vassiliou’s well intended attempt to cooperate with the political parties resulted in a new practice whereby the parties of a ruling coalition increase their influence in the semi-governmental bodies by providing non-paper nominations of their candidates for the various boards. The president then chooses from those lists effectively apportioning influence in the various organisations to the parties since these appointments are vital for the exercise of rusfeti within the respective organisation. Another negative side effect of this extensive party influence is the fact that the party faithful who are appointed to a board often lack the necessary qualification or expertise for their position. According to Charalambous, during Vassiliou’s five years in office, another 4,000 civil servants were appointed while the figures of the Statistical Service are only slightly lower: 3,542. AKEL membership remained steady at around 14,000 to 15,000 during the 1980s and early 1990s since it maintains a ceiling on membership in order to control who joins the party. Vassiliou’s unwillingness to employ a widespread clientelistic practice led to his downfall in the elections of 1993. He did not fly-in student supporters from abroad to vote for him believing that his re-election was certain. His rival, Glafkos Clerides, and his party DISY as well as the parties that supported him brought their supporters and Clerides won by 0.62% or 2,176 votes.

The use of rusfeti continued and in particular in his second term an ageing Clerides was widely perceived to be exclusively preoccupied with the negotiations for a solution to the Cyprus problem allowing his ministers largely to run their own rusfeti practices within and across their ministries and organisations. However, unlike Kyprianou who, according to anecdotal evidence, extensively directly contacted and pressured alleged and real receivers of favours to join and vote DIKO in return, Clerides (as well as his predecessor and his successors) was perceived to conduct (or at least tolerate) rusfeti in a more statesman like manner though Kyprianou and his party were his coalition partner. The presidents after Kyprianou were certainly aware of the clientelistic

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25 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus and Charalambous, op. cit.
practices, but their personal involvement is very difficult to assess since they seem to have been more hesitant to become openly personally implicated. What can safely be said is that all Cypriot presidents so far at least tolerated rusfeti and most, if not all, had it conducted through their close associates. According to Charalambous, within the ten years of Clerides’ presidency, the size of the public service grew by 8,000 to 44,000. Here, the figures of the Statistical Service are similar: the administration grew by 7,515 to a total of 41,266. As is the case with Vassiliou, only some of these appointments in an already oversized public service can be justified by Cyprus’ EU accession process or other administrative needs. Employment in the semi-governmental sector – for which there are no comprehensive figures available for the years before 1993-1994 – grew from 8,284 in 1994 to 12,058 in 2003, an increase of more than 31% in ten years. However, next to the EU accession process, the creation of new semi-governmental organisations and offices for independent officials, like the Ombudsman, during the 1990s also explains at least partly this massive increase. Not surprisingly, DISY party membership during Clerides’ ten years in office grew from 18,400 to 33,000.

To its credit, the Clerides’ administration introduced a law that made rusfeti a punishable offence in 2001. But a closer look at its provisions and in particular its non implementation sheds further light on the role of rusfeti within Cypriot politics and society. Until 2001, neither granting nor requesting rusfeti was punishable. Since 2001, ‘influencing the authorities’ within the context of employment, promoting, placing, transferring or exercising disciplinary power in public office, in favour of oneself or any other person became a criminal offence punishable by up to 12 months in prison and/or up to Cy£1,000/€1,708.60. Moreover, any member of any public authority or any committee approached for such purposes is legally obliged to report any person to the Head of Police or he/she is guilty of a legal offence (punishable by up to 12 months in prison or Cy£2,000/ €3,41720). Any criminal prosecution for rusfeti has to be initiated or at least approved by the Attorney General. Since punishment reflects the seriousness of a crime, the light punishment for requesting or exercising rusfeti is already telling. Even more striking is the prosecution record: in the 9 years since the law came into effect only one case has been filed and is still pending for trial despite a plethora of rusfeti related scandals, accusations and admissions to which the various Attorney Generals remained (with one exception) completely inactive.

In 2003, Clerides lost the elections to Tassos Papadopoulos, whose party, DIKO, is widely

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27 The growth of the two largest semi-governmental organisations, the telecommunications authority CYTA, and the electricity authority AHK, is listed in the table in the Appendix (p. 287) to provide some statistical information about the increase of employment in the semi-governmental sector prior to 1994.
28 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.
30 Law no 27(I)/2001 came into effect on 9 March 2001. It added a new section 105 to the existing Penal Code, Cap. 154. The information about the implementation of the law was provided confidentially to the author by a member of the legal service of the Republic of Cyprus.
perceived as being in absolute need to stay in power in order to distribute favours. DIKO came to power in 1977 and has remained there since with the exception of Vassiliou’s 5-year presidency and Clerides’ second term. It is therefore ironic that Papadopoulos was the initiator of the law making rusfeti a criminal offence in 2001. But, also during his presidency as in all previous governments, DIKO as well as the other coalition partners – in this case AKEL and EDEK – demanded and received their share of the spoils of power. Although Papadopoulos had a sound understanding of the need to bring technocrats from outside the traditional party system into powerful positions and seemed to have resisted the pressure of several groups for rusfeti even at election times, clientelistic practices remained widespread. The rusfeti law remained unimplemented despite numerous scandals.

According to Christophorou,

‘nepotism and favouritism gained new dimensions, [when] the President’s close relatives or supporters were appointed to key positions, as his close aides, ministers and administrators, promoted to party posts in DIKO or even placed in the public broadcasting corporation.’

In terms of administrative growth, Charalambous claims that the public service increased by another 6,000 in only five years. The numbers provided by the Statistical Service are considerably lower, 4,018, but still indicate the highest average growth per year of all presidents in office (803). The semi-governmental organisations grew from 12,058 to 13,524 employees. DIKO membership alone almost doubled since 2002. It grew from 9,750 in 2002 to 14,320 in 2006, reaching more than 19,300 by 2009.

In 2008, when Papadopoulos lost the elections to his former coalition partner, the communist leader Demetris Christofias, the latter’s party AKEL sensed that now was the time to make amends for the long periods when its supporters had been discriminated against and denied equal promotions and posts as other parties had. AKEL had supported all presidents since independence with the exception of Clerides. Up until 2003 they had not had AKEL members in any cabinet, for Cold War reasons. Instead they had nominated non-members that the party had confidence in, who seem to have been less willing or at least less successful in promoting AKEL members. The three party coalition of EDEK, DIKO and AKEL swiftly embarked on the distribution of the spoils of power amongst themselves. As ‘punishment’ for not supporting Christofias in the first round of elections and as a clear sign that it was now AKEL’s turn to benefit most from being in

31 See for example the description of Patroklos in his satirical column ‘Tales from the Coffee Shop’: ‘... the traditional values and ideals of DIKO – horse trading, rusfeti and total focus on the spoils of power’ ‘Struggle for the Soul of DIKO’, Sunday Mail, 21 February 2010.
34 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.
35 Phileleftheros 23 October 2006 and 13 March 2009.
power, the three most important ministries for administering rusfeti (Interior, Defence and Justice and Public Order) all went to AKEL or, in the case of the Ministry of Justice and Public Order, to a supporter of Christofias. Charalambous specifies that in the first two and a half years of Christofias’ government, the number of public servants increased by another 3,200 to a total of almost 53,000. The Statistical Service provided only data for 2009, indicating an increase of 970 public servants within one year to a total of 46,254. The number of employees in the semi-governmental sector grew during the same period from 13,524 to 14,150.36 The figures clearly indicate widespread rusfeti practices by the new administration. For reasons outlined above AKEL membership stayed at around 13,000.

If one includes the semi-governmental organisations the extent to which political parties and politicians can exercise influence on large segments in today’s Cypriot society becomes even more apparent. In 2008, out of a total workforce of 393,377,67,300 work in the public or semi-public sector.37 Many were appointed, promoted or transferred with the help of rusfeti. At least potentially, therefore, the Cypriot parties and politicians can currently exercise influence over about 17% of the workforce. Employees of other organisations need to be added to this number like trade or farmers unions attached to parties (AKEL-PEO/EKA, DISY-SEK/Panagrotikos, EDEK-DEOK), or companies owned or controlled by parties (for example, the beverage producer LOEL which is owned by AKEL).

Although there is no shortage of anecdotal evidence for the pervasiveness of rusfeti,39 which also features prominently in pre-election debates, and is frequently denied and denounced by all parties, there is very little quantitative research about the degree of favouritism in Cyprus. The EU’s Eurobarometer survey published in February 2010 claims that 54% of those Cypriots polled stated that many appointments in the Cypriot public administration were not attained through

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36 Charalambous, op. cit., and data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.
38 Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus. Journalists and Politicians provide repeatedly even a higher figure for the current number of public servants: 53,000 instead of the official figure of 46,254 in 2009 (in 2010 there was a decrease in the number of public servants due to the government policy to cut the service by 1,000 by the end of the year). One reason for the difference in numbers could be that the figures provided by the Statistical Service do not include public servants employed by the army. See for example Charalambous, op. cit., or the Finance Minister, Charilaos Stavvakis, quoted in: ‘State Payroll a “time bomb”’, Cyprus Mail, 16 September 2010.
39 The then House Speaker and leader of AKEL, Demetris Christofias, who became President of the Republic of Cyprus in 2008, openly admitted the widespread practice when confronted with a scandal within the Cypriot National Guard concerning transfers based on nepotism and favouritism. He stated in a press conference that, ‘it was normal for parties to interfere in such matters’. When asked what people who are not affiliated with parties should do, he answered that, ‘they should go see their local deputy’. ‘Probe Called Into Military Scandal. Top Names on List of People who Pulled Strings in the Army’, Cyprus Mail, 21 November 2006.
merit. The results of the only empirical study on favouritism, published in 2006, confirm its widespread nature. On a scale ranging from 0-4, where 0 amounted to no favouritism and 4 represented extreme favouritism, the category ‘prevalence of favouritism’ was given a staggering 3.65 by the 150 Greek Cypriots interviewed. The personal frustration with favouritism was again very high, at 3.13. Unsurprisingly, the belief in the fairness of Cypriot society, in other words its meritocracy, was low, scoring 2.41. The average number of known cases of favouritism was 43.34 while the belief of the respondents in the prevention of favouritism showed a realistic fatalistic low score of 0.29 on a scale where 0 signified that it could not be prevented and 1 amounted to a belief that it was preventable.

As far as anecdotal evidence is concerned, rusfeti related scandals regularly dominate the local news and shed some light on the true extent of favouritism in Cyprus. Regularly, the accused either denies any wrongdoing or declares that this a normal and widespread practice, while in a satirical show of hypocrisy the opposition denounces the ruling parties or the individual for their abuse of power. In reality, all parties in Cyprus practice it extensively once in power and during recent years there seems to be little if any difference in the degree to which they practice it. A textbook example occurred at the time of writing in July 2010 when the director of the office of President Christofias, Vassos Georgiou, resigned over rusfeti allegations. The opposition party DISY used the opportunity and accused Christofias of an ‘extremely professional large-scale and unrestrained way of granting political favours’ alleging that Georgiou’s ‘real job’ was to ‘deal full time with rusfeti’ using computerised lists ‘for easy filing and assessment of the benefit’ to AKEL. The government spokesman, Stefanos Stefanou, fired back in kind:

‘Is DISY talking about meritocracy? The party that during its ten years in power increased the number of public sector employees by 10,000, who, according to its then leader but also DISY MPs, were basically hired from among DISY voters ...’

The defence minister, Costas Papacostas, whose ministry was at the centre of the rusfeti allegations against Georgiou, then publicly stated that

‘he regularly received requests for favourable transfers and secondments from MPs, ministers, state officials and political party bigwigs “and don’t let anyone tell me that there is a single politician who has never made any kind of intervention” ’.

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40 ‘Almost Everyone Thinks Police and Public Service are Corrupt’, Cyprus Mail, 3 February 2010.
44 ‘State Officials Seek Army Favours for their Own Sons’, Cyprus Mail, 30 July 2010.
Given the above, it is hardly an exaggeration to argue that in Cyprus not even in the lowest paid positions is someone appointed or promoted in the public and semi-public sector without the intervention of political parties. Only a few regulations like the waiting list for the appointment of teachers effectively limit or prevent rusfeti practices.\footnote{Public school teachers are so far exclusively appointed on the basis of a waiting list, which erases any possibility for clientelistic practices. But, once appointed teachers are under the same pressure as other public servants to attach themselves to parties and politicians since the latter become involved in transfers or promotions of teachers. Those who defend the waiting lists, a practice which has proven to have many negative consequences – including appointments of middle aged teachers after waiting periods of 20 years which they spend in other professions – use the fact that this hinders rusfeti as their most powerful argument. This line of defence indirectly provides further evidence for the widespread character of these practices in other areas which lack such regulations. Moreover, a switch to a mixed system of waiting lists and appointments by a board is currently debated. Such a change would increase the possibilities for party influence in the appointment of teachers dramatically.}

The upshot is that most Cypriots do not rely on meritocracy in their career pursuits knowing perfectly well that it is not ‘the best’ but ‘the best connected’ candidate who is likely to secure the job/promotion in the public and semi-governmental sectors. What preserves the remarkable efficiency of the Greek Cypriot public service – next to the British administrative tradition – is the fact that since Vassilious’s presidency any candidate for a post in the public service needs to possess the required qualifications before party patronage can come into play at all. Moreover, often the courts revoke – in many cases after years – unwarranted promotions thereby preserving some elements of meritocracy within the system.

The Cyprus Consensus

Party patronage in Cyprus occurs in two interrelated forms: the first can be called impersonal party patronage in which the party as an organisation dispenses favours to its supporters, hence their votes are expected in return. In addition, some corporate organisations are attached to parties, which firmly control them. For instance, the left wing trade union, PEO, is linked to communist AKEL. Whichever way you look at it, all major parties in Cyprus have institutionalised the distribution of rusfeti through specialised committees. Of particular importance in this context is to secure for a party at least one of the three ‘Rusfeti Ministries’ – Interior, Defence or Justice and Public Order – whenever a government is formed because they provide by far the largest opportunities for appointments and promotions. As already stated above, a particular form of party patronage during elections was the widespread practice of paying for return flights to the island for thousands of Cypriots studying or living abroad since only in-country voting was allowed. This is about to change though as out-country voting is currently being introduced. Up until 2010 political parties spent millions of euro and chartered dozens of planes for this purpose and neither the parties nor the students seemed to have had any ethical problem with this undisguised
practice. In most cases, the voters had to pick up the tickets from party offices or party officials following a selection process which involved recommendations by party members.

The second form of party patronage is exercised by individual politicians such as ministers, members of parliament, or other appointed or elected power holders. Being personally approached by citizens, they distribute rusfeti thereby creating clientelistic sub-networks attached to them. A peculiar — though not quantifiable — form is the practice of vote buying in parliamentary elections in which candidates are willing to pay money, or do other favours, in exchange for a vote. During the 2006 parliamentary elections, Cy£100 (€170) was frequently demanded and paid.

The overwhelming power of political parties in Cyprus also enhances reverse rusfeti, in other words, the punishment of critics or opponents of the government or power holders by preventing them from taking posts or obtaining promotions.

The personalised conduct of public-citizen relations through rusfeti has been refined over the years becoming a powerful, encompassing and self-perpetuating system based on what can be called 'The Cyprus Consensus'. This consensus functions on two levels. Political parties in Cyprus have established an informal and unofficial modus vivendi to share the spoils of power with each other. Peaceful co-existence on a live and let-live basis allows all parties access to the state machinery including the opposition. Often, politicians help each other across party lines to do favours. The degree and number of favours vary and are largely determined by the power the parties and politicians hold within the system. Moreover, the inter-party elite is linked to other power bodies — economic, trade unionist, church — thereby controlling almost all aspects of social life.

On a citizen level, the Cyprus Consensus results in a self-perpetuating paradox: Since personal contacts are the most efficient and often the only way to achieve one's objectives within the public and semi-public sector and since almost everyone else is attached to a party and to one or more politicians in order to safeguard against job or promotion competition, there is a strong systemic pressure to enter into a clientelistic relationship. Those who want to remain outside the system find it far more difficult though not impossible to succeed in their professional life. Alternatively, they simply opt to try their luck in the private sector. Although most Cypriots detest

46 During the 2008 presidential elections, the three main candidates booked at least 15,000 seats for their voters. AKEL admitted that they were bringing about 7,500. DISY was estimated to bring around 6,000. The figures for the incumbent ranged from 3,000-7,500. The total costs were estimated at €7.8 million. DISY and AKEL offered to pay two-thirds of the ticket price while supporters of President Papadopoulos were flown-in for free. 'Parties Fill CY Flights to Bring Voters', Cyprus Mail, 5 February 2008.
47 Confidential information provided to the author by an employee of a Cypriot member of parliament.
and protest this widespread practice, at the same time they benefit from it and are very willing to use it once they are personally affected. To a large degree this is based on necessity, given that the chances are slim of securing a lucrative post without having ‘mesa’ (which ‘means’, connections inside the power apparatus). As a result, western-European norms like meritocracy, efficiency and non-corruption stemming from the British colonial period coexist in an uneasy semi-harmonious relationship with clientelistic patterns of behaviour. \(^{50}\)

Greek Cypriot parties have developed quite efficient mechanisms to control the electoral behaviour of their clientele. Local party organisations can often ascertain who votes for whom by examining participation in their periodic activities, their regular contacts via labour unions, party and labour union membership lists, and so on. Their task is further facilitated by the small size of the electorate and the fact that since 1981 voting is compulsory in presidential, parliamentary and municipal elections. Most helpful for party control is a peculiarity of Cypriot political culture: Being a highly politicised society, Cypriots are very open about their political affiliations and preferences and usually friends, acquaintances but often also parties know where they stand. It is also not considered offensive to ask for whom somebody votes even for people who hardly know each other. Parties use this freely provided information bonanza to control the electorate, and punish ‘deviators’ once they find out.

**Conclusion**

As far as party patronage and rusfeti practices in Cyprus are concerned, things do not look good for the promoters of meritocracy and opponents of political favouritism. The systemic pressure of the Cyprus Consensus from the parties and politicians but also the citizens seems to be too overwhelming in this small society. The practices and structures established since independence are too entrenched to allow radical changes and improvements. Besides, any party or president credibly fighting political patronage and not granting any or only a few favours is likely to make more enemies than gain supporters. Such a party or president will in all probability not be able to retain his coalition partners and lose supporters of his own party and thereby almost certainly be defeated in the next election. Pressure from the outside is the most likely instrument for change in the absence of revolutions or other radical systemic changes from within which are extremely unlikely in this prosperous, liberal democratic EU member state. Even the European Union, as the most likely reformist catalyst, has traditionally only a very limited impact on clientelistic domestic structures. Budgetary discipline demanded by the EU is likely to lead to a reduction of the public service in the foreseeable future as one way to reduce the current budget deficit of 6.1% in 2009 to EU acceptable standards. The current government has committed itself to reducing the number of

\(^{50}\) This is not to say that the British civil service is without its own flaws or clientelistic structures. For example many British would claim that high civil service posts are class based and ‘Oxbridge’ influenced.
public servants by 1,000 per year for the next four years by not replacing all retiring public servants. But it remains to be seen if this policy survives economic recovery and the traditional domestic pressures to appoint supporters or make temporary employments permanent, particularly at election times.51 Either way, there is every likelihood that the Cyprus Consensus and therefore large scale political rusteti is in Cyprus to stay.

Appendix

Table: Growth of Public and Semi-Governmental Sector and its Cost

<table>
<thead>
<tr>
<th>Year</th>
<th>Number of Civil Servants according to the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus</th>
<th>Number of Civil Servants according to Loucas G. Charalambous</th>
<th>Number of Employees in the Semi-Governmental Sector</th>
<th>Number of Employees in CYTA (ex Cable &amp; Wireless/CYTA)</th>
<th>Number of Employees in AHK viii</th>
<th>Percentage of the National Budget for the Salaries and Pensions of the Public Servants</th>
<th>State Expenditure for the Salaries and Pensions of the Public Servants in Millions of Euros</th>
</tr>
</thead>
<tbody>
<tr>
<td>1960/61</td>
<td>15141/17835</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>733</td>
<td>935</td>
<td>33.7/21.1 vii</td>
<td>10.84/6.94</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1977</td>
<td>25017</td>
<td>18.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>1357</td>
<td>1449</td>
<td>32.4</td>
<td>64.60</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1988</td>
<td>30209</td>
<td>32.000</td>
<td>-</td>
<td>2246</td>
<td>1527</td>
<td>30.3</td>
<td>32117</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>1993</td>
<td>33751</td>
<td>36.000</td>
<td>8.284 vii</td>
<td>2352</td>
<td>1838</td>
<td>38.4</td>
<td>51887</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2003</td>
<td>41266</td>
<td>44.000</td>
<td>12.088</td>
<td>2410</td>
<td>2060</td>
<td>31.7</td>
<td>1233.24</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2008</td>
<td>45284</td>
<td>50.000</td>
<td>13.524</td>
<td>2403</td>
<td>2343</td>
<td>30.6</td>
<td>1733.67</td>
</tr>
<tr>
<td>2009/2010</td>
<td>46.254/-</td>
<td>53.000/-</td>
<td>14.150/-</td>
<td>2466/September 2010. 2333</td>
<td>2466/September 2010. 2465</td>
<td>30.9 viii</td>
<td>1878.68 vii</td>
</tr>
</tbody>
</table>

i The data refer to the number of the civil servants engaged in the wider public sector i.e. Ministries, Independent Authorities, Police & Fire Service, Educational Service & Local Authorities. The figures do not include the employees of the Cyprus' Army which could explain at least partly the higher figures provided by L.G. Charalambous.

ii L.G. Charalambous, 'Tame the Civil Service Beast or the IMF will', Sunday Mail 25 July 2010.

iii Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

iv Data provided to the author by the Cyprus Telecommunications Authority (CYTA). CYTA transformed since 1960 from a solely fixed telephone provider to a provider of a variety of telecommunications and electronic services requiring an increasing number of employees.

v Data provided to the author by Electricity Authority of Cyprus (AHK).

vi Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

vii Data provided to the author by the Statistical Service of the Republic of Cyprus.

viii For an explanation for this decrease see footnote 14 in the main text.

ix This figure refers to 1994.

x This figure refers to the projected percentage for 2010.

xi This figure refers to the projected percentage for 2010. The projected figure for 2011 is 1954.61 (31.9%).
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